Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• INDIA FLOUR MILLS WORKERS' UNION vs MESSERS INDIA FLOUR MILLS LTD., KARACHI1970 PLC 203 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-05-19Read full judgment →
• INAYATULLAH vs PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF1970 SCMR 668 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-06
  reserved seatsadmission policyadministrative discretionjudicial reviewJunagadh Statenomination process
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a Junagadh State subject, sought admission to Dow Medical College, Karachi, against a seat reserved for Junagadh State. He challenged the Ruler of Junagadh's failure to nominate him, alleging that the selection process was arbitrary and ignored academic merit, as other candidates with lower marks were nominated. The High Court dismissed his writ petition, holding that the nomination process was within the absolute discretion of the Ruler and that no specific rules mandated nomination based solely on merit. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the relevant administrative directives governing the reserved seats. The Court held that the directives required nominations to be made by the relevant authority (the Ruler) without imposing a mandatory requirement to select candidates based on academic merit. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the Ruler possessed absolute discretion in the nomination process, and the judiciary could not interfere with the exercise of that discretion in the absence of a legal duty to act otherwise. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Ruler of Junagadh State have absolute discretion in nominating candidates for reserved seats in Dow Medical College?
  • Is there a legal requirement for the Ruler of Junagadh State to nominate candidates for reserved medical seats based solely on academic merit?
  • Can the High Court interfere with the nomination process for reserved seats if no specific rules governing the selection criteria are shown?
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• In Re : KARAMATULLAH KHAN vs NOT1970 PLD Supreme Court 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-07-08
  contempt of courtscandalizing the courtjudicial integritydeterrent punishmentunqualified apology
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns contempt of court proceedings initiated against the respondent, Karamatullah Khan, following his issuance of two letters to judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the respondent’s conduct, which involved making scandalous imputations against the integrity of the Court and its judges, constituted contempt of court, and whether his subsequent apology was sufficient to mitigate the offense. The Court held that the respondent’s actions amounted to gross contempt, noting that the allegations were false and scandalous, and that the respondent had failed to show genuine repentance, as evidenced by his history of prior contempt proceedings. The Court rejected the respondent's purported mitigating circumstances as invalid. Consequently, the Court found the respondent guilty of contempt and imposed a deterrent sentence of a fine of Rs. 2,000, or in default, three months of simple imprisonment. The principle laid down is that repeated contemptuous conduct, despite prior warnings and fines, warrants a deterrent punishment to uphold the authority and dignity of the Court, and that an insincere apology does not mitigate such conduct.

  Questions settled

  • Does the submission of an insincere and qualified apology mitigate the offense of contempt of court?
  • Can a respondent's history of prior contempt proceedings be considered when determining the severity of punishment for a subsequent contempt?
  • Does the making of false imputations against the integrity of judges constitute gross contempt of court?
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• IMAM BUX vs PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH THEDEPUTY1970 SCMR 491 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-13
  special leave to appealinterim injunctiondismissal from servicedisciplinary proceedingscivil suitrevisional jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, which set aside an injunction previously granted in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner, an Assistant in the office of the Director, Basic Democracy, was dismissed from service following disciplinary proceedings regarding the unauthorized purchase of a taxi-car. The petitioner subsequently filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that his dismissal was illegal and obtained an interim injunction from the trial court, later upheld by the District Judge, restraining the government from removing him from service. The High Court, exercising its revisional jurisdiction, set aside the injunction order. The Supreme Court considered whether the petitioner was entitled to the interim relief of an injunction against his dismissal from government service. The Court ultimately denied the petition for special leave to appeal, effectively maintaining the High Court's decision to vacate the injunction. The judgment affirms the principle that interim injunctions restraining the government from removing a public servant from service are not granted as a matter of course, particularly where the underlying suit challenges the legality of a dismissal order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil court grant an interim injunction restraining the government from removing a public servant from service during the pendency of a suit challenging the dismissal?
  • Does a High Court have the authority to set aside an injunction order granted by lower courts in a revision application?
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• ILAM DIN AND 3 Othbrss vs The STATE1970 SCMR 576 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-18
  murderself-defence of propertygrave and sudden provocationcommon intentionvicarious liabilityappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellants for murder and causing injuries. The core legal questions involved the applicability of the pleas of self-defence of property and grave and sudden provocation arising from a dispute over the diversion of rain water between neighbouring fields. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the occurrence comprised two distinct incidents separated by time, thus negating the defence pleas, and that the presence of injuries on independent witnesses corroborated the prosecution version. The key principle laid down is that where evidence establishes a time gap between an initial altercation and a subsequent armed attack, the pleas of self-defence and grave and sudden provocation are unavailable, and participants sharing a common intention remain vicariously liable for the resulting fatal injuries.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the plea of self-defence of property is available when an attack occurs hours after an initial dispute over water diversion?
  • Does a time gap between an initial altercation and a subsequent assault negate a plea of grave and sudden provocation?
  • Are co-accused vicariously liable for fatal injuries inflicted during an assault carried out in furtherance of a common intention?
  • Can the testimony of injured eyewitnesses corroborated by a disinterested witness form the basis of a conviction in a murder trial?
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• IKRAMUL HAQ vs The STATE1970 SCMR 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-05
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonyleave to appealcriminal petitionappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentence of death for the murder of the deceased by stabbing him with a knife following a quarrel between the children of the two families. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the petitioner's guilt based on eye-witness testimony and corroborating circumstances were sustainable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the eye-witnesses, including the brother of the deceased and independent neighbours whose presence was established at the hospital, gave consistent and reliable accounts supported by the circumstances of the crime, and that no mitigating circumstances existed to alter the death sentence. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that consistent ocular testimony corroborated by attending circumstances is sufficient to sustain a capital conviction for murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of guilt under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be maintained on the basis of consistent eye-witness testimony?
  • Does a sudden quarrel between children resulting in an altercation constitute a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence?
  • Whether independent eye-witnesses whose presence is verified at the hospital provide sufficient corroboration in a murder trial?
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• IJAZ AHMAD vs P. W. RAILWAY, LAHORE1970 PLC 77 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1968-11-29Read full judgment →
• IFTIKHAR A. CHAUDHARY vs BEECHAM (PAKISTAN) LTD., KARACHI1970 PLC 882 · Labour Court · 1969-06-24Read full judgment →
• IBRAHIM KHALIL vs SAMIUDDIN AND 3 Other1970 SCMR 885 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-18
  ex parte proceedingscriminal proceduredispute concerning landspecial leave to appealrevision petitionnegligence of party
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision petition by the High Court, which had declined to interfere with a Magistrate's final order passed in ex parte proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who admitted having notice of the dates of hearing and the ex parte order but deliberately chose not to appear or cross-examine witnesses, was entitled to challenge the final order passed after the conclusion of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was grossly negligent and could not make any grievance against the Magistrate's order, as the final order had already been lawfully passed before his belated appearance. The ratio decidendi is that a party who fails to participate despite due notice and allows ex parte proceedings to conclude cannot subsequently claim a right to reopen the case or cross-examine witnesses, and their proper alternative remedy lies in instituting a civil suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party having notice of ex parte proceedings and failing to appear can challenge the final order of a Magistrate?
  • Can a party demand permission to cross-examine witnesses after the final order in proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 has already been passed?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a party aggrieved by an ex parte order passed under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when revision and reference are refused?
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• HYDRO (ENGINEERS) (PRIVATE) LTD vs THEIR WORKMEN1970 PLC 522 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-04-30Read full judgment →
• HYDER AND Another vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1078 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-30Read full judgment →
• HUSSAIN vs MESSRS MERCHANT NAVY CLUB SOCIETY1970 SCMR 513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-09
  tenant evictiondefault in renturban rent restrictionconcurrent findingsspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for special leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the concurrent findings of the lower forums, including the Rent Controller, the District Judge, and the High Court, which ordered his eviction from the disputed premises. The respondent landlord had sought eviction under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1959, on the grounds of default in rent payment for a period of twenty-five months and personal requirement. The core legal question concerned the legality of the tenant's ejectment for non-payment of rent. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent orders directing the ejectment of the petitioner on the ground of non-payment of rent were lawful and properly made by the courts below. The key principle laid down is that concurrent factual findings regarding default in rent payment under the relevant rent restriction laws warrant no interference by the apex court in appellate review.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant can be evicted on the ground of default in rent under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1959?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts regarding non-payment of rent?
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• HUSSAIN BAKHSH vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, RAWALPINDI AND Other1970 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-10-13
  Supreme Court RulesProcedural Law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The provided judgment text is extremely brief, containing only a reference to Order XLV, rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1956, and details regarding the appearance of counsel and hearing dates. It does not contain any factual background, legal questions addressed, the court's decision, or any legal principles laid down. Therefore, a comprehensive summary of the case's substance cannot be generated from the given text.

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• HOTEL SHAHBAGH WORKERS' UNION vs PAKISTAN HOTELS LTD., DACCA1970 PLC 867 · Labour Court · 1970-06-03Read full judgment →
• HOTEL KARACHI INTER-CONTINENTAL, KARACHI vs MUHAMMAD YOUNUS1970 PLC 70 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-01-07Read full judgment →
• HIKMAT KHAN AND Another vs FAZALDAD (REPRESENTED BY 6 HEIRS)1970 SCMR 495 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-03
  pre-emptionbenami transactioncollusive suitsuperior right of pre-emptionrevision jurisdictionfindings of fact
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated as a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, which had reversed concurrent findings of lower courts regarding a pre-emption suit. The dispute concerned agricultural land purchased by the petitioners, against which the respondent, Fazaldad, filed a pre-emption suit claiming a superior right based on his status as a collateral of the vendor. The trial court and the first appellate court had initially concluded that the suit was collusive and filed benami for the vendor's benefit. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in interfering with these factual findings in revision. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in its decision, finding that the lower courts' conclusion regarding the benami nature of the suit lacked satisfactory evidentiary support. The Court affirmed the principle that while findings of fact are generally not disturbed in revision, a court may interfere when such findings are based on no evidence or a misappreciation of the record, particularly where no presumption of collusion exists.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with a finding of fact in revision if the finding is based on no evidence?
  • Does a relationship as a collateral of the vendor create a presumption that a pre-emption suit is filed for the vendor's benefit?
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• HAYAT vs SADA AND ANOTHERs1970 P Cr. L J 1034 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-08
  bail cancellationspecial leave to appealjudicial discretionabetmentlalkaramurder case
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, which declined to cancel the bail previously granted to the respondent by the Sessions Judge, Gujranwala, in a pending murder case. The primary legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts exercised their discretion arbitrarily in granting bail to the respondent, an elderly individual aged 60 to 65, whose alleged involvement was limited to raising a lalkara before the attack on the deceased. The Supreme Court held that it would not interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below, as the determination of whether the respondent's alleged actions constituted the offence of abetment was a matter to be resolved during the trial. The Court affirmed that the lower courts had not acted arbitrarily in granting bail. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court will not interfere with the discretion exercised by lower courts in bail matters unless such discretion is shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.

  Questions settled

  • Does the act of raising a lalkara necessarily constitute the offence of abetment in a murder case?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion exercised by lower courts in granting bail?
  • Is age a relevant factor for the court to consider when exercising discretion in bail matters?
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• HAYAT vs SADA AND Another1970 SCMR 472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-08
  bail cancellationmurder caselalkaradiscretion of courtsspecial leave to appealabetment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, which declined to cancel the pre-trial bail granted to the respondent by the Sessions Judge in a pending murder case. The core legal question was whether the lower courts exercised their discretion arbitrarily in granting bail to an accused whose only attributed role was raising a lalkara and who was aged between 60 and 65 years. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the discretion exercised by the lower courts was not arbitrary, noting that the exact legal effect and nature of the act attributed to the respondent—specifically whether it constitutes abetment—must be determined during the trial. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that bail granted on such grounds does not warrant interference by the apex court at the pre-trial stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted to an accused on the ground of old age and the attribution of a lalkara can be cancelled by the Supreme Court?
  • Does raising a lalkara conclusively constitute abetment at the bail stage or is it a matter to be determined at trial?
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• HASSAN vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 598 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1969-10-08Read full judgment →
• HASSAD AND Another vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 947 · Sindh High Court · 1969-08-20Read full judgment →
• HASAN DIN CHISHTI vs CHIEF ENGINEER, WAPDA1970 SCMR 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-09
  special leave to appealconstitutional petitionalternative remedieswrit jurisdictionmaster and servanttermination of service
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed a constitutional petition filed under Article 98 of the Constitution. The petitioner, formerly a Mechanical Foreman in WAPDA, was removed from service and initially challenged his removal through a civil suit, which was dismissed on 12th November 1962. Instead of appealing that decision, he subsequently filed a writ petition in the High Court seeking the same relief. The core legal question was whether a party who elects to pursue one alternative remedy and fails can subsequently invoke writ jurisdiction for the same grievance. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly refused to interfere, as a person who elects to avail of one alternative remedy cannot agitate the same questions a second time after failing to obtain relief. The key principle laid down is that the pursuit and exhaustion of an elected legal remedy bars a subsequent constitutional petition for the identical relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person who has elected to avail of one alternative remedy can agitate the same questions through a constitutional petition after failing to obtain relief?
  • Can the High Court refuse to interfere under Article 98 of the Constitution when the petitioner previously filed a civil suit for the same relief?
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• HAROON LACE & GENERAL MILLS WORKERS' UNION vs MESSRS HAROONLACE &1970 PLC 761 · Labour Court · 1970-08-12Read full judgment →
• HAROLD ROBERTHENRY LIND vs BRITISH INSULATED CALLENDER's CONSTRUC1970 PLD Karachi 315 · Sindh High Court · 1969-10-28
  defamationqualified privilegeexpress malicemitigation of damagesgeneral reputationlibelaggravated damages
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The plaintiff, a consultant, filed a defamation suit against the defendant company for publishing a public notice in newspapers announcing the termination of a sub-contract and implying the plaintiff was an imposter regarding his association with the 'Canbrit Group'. The core legal questions were whether the notice was defamatory, whether the defendant was protected by qualified privilege, and the appropriate assessment of damages. The Court held that the notice was defamatory as it contained false, malicious statements intended to injure the plaintiff's reputation. The Court rejected the defense of qualified privilege, finding that the defendant acted with express malice by including unnecessary, false information and fabricating evidence during the trial. The Court established that in defamation suits, evidence for mitigation of damages must be limited to the plaintiff's general bad reputation, not specific acts of misconduct. Consequently, the Court decreed the suit, awarding Rs. 13,000 in damages, noting that the defendant's conduct throughout the proceedings aggravated the injury.

  Questions settled

  • Is a defendant in a defamation suit entitled to introduce evidence of specific acts of misconduct by the plaintiff to mitigate damages?
  • Does the publication of a notice in a newspaper regarding the termination of a contract enjoy qualified privilege if the notice contains false and malicious statements?
  • Can a foreign company's failure to register under the Companies Act 1913 invalidate its contracts?
  • Does the conduct of a defendant during the trial proceedings constitute a factor for the aggravation of damages in a defamation suit?
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• HARISH CHANDRASARKER vs MESSRS EAST PAKISTAN STANDARD SCIENTIFIC1970 PLC 842 · Labour Court · 1970-06-18Read full judgment →
• HARA LAL SARA vs THE STATE AND Another1970 SCMR 834 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-30
  criminal trialcharge defectconstitutional petitionsentence modificationfood grains offencecurable irregularity
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which had discharged a Rule nisi issued under Article 98 of the Constitution and confirmed the petitioner's conviction under section 6 of the East Pakistan Food (Special Courts) Act, 1956, while modifying the substantive sentences of rigorous imprisonment from consecutive to concurrent running. The core legal questions involved whether the non-mention of contravened notified orders in the charge vitiated the trial, whether section 6 of the Act was void for failing to specify a fine limit, and whether the High Court possessed the power to modify sentences under Article 98 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the non-mention of notified orders was a curable irregularity under section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code as no prejudice was caused, the omission of a fine limit in the Act did not render it invalid, and although the High Court improperly confirmed convictions and sentences under constitutional writ jurisdiction, it amounted to a mere technical defect. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-mention of the notified orders contravened in the charge vitiate the trial?
  • Is an Act bad for failing to specify the amount of fine that can be imposed under its penal provision?
  • Can the High Court alter or modify sentences of imprisonment under constitutional writ jurisdiction?
  • Does confirmation of convictions and sentences under Article 98 of the Constitution amount to a vitiating illegality?
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• HAQDAD KHAN vs The STATE1970 SCMR 417 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-30
  murderpetition for leave to appealappreciation of evidencedying declarationeye-witness testimonyabsconding
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal matter where the petitioner was convicted under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and sentenced to death for shooting dead his co-villager in broad daylight. The conviction and death penalty awarded by the Additional Sessions Judge were subsequently confirmed by the High Court on appeal and reference under Section 374, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the grounds raised regarding the evaluation of eye-witness testimony and the petitioner's absconding warranted interference with the concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that all grounds raised in support of the petition related purely to the appreciation of evidence. The Court laid down the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent factual findings where the grounds raised pertain merely to the appreciation of evidence. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal where the grounds raised pertain solely to the appreciation of evidence?
  • Whether the absconding of an accused after an incident can be relied upon to corroborate eye-witness testimony?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the basis of credible eye-witness testimony notwithstanding the exclusion of a dying declaration?
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• HAQ NAWAZ vs Mst. NUR BHARI AND 3 Other1970 SCMR 554 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-09
  legal representativesregular second appealimpleadmentinheritancefraudcivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a regular second appeal by the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore. The core legal question concerned whether a fresh application to bring legal representatives of a deceased party on record was necessary when the petitioner had already done so in another related proceeding arising from the same litigation. The Supreme Court held that where a party has already brought the legal representatives of a deceased on the record in a connected proceeding, no fresh application is required for subsequent stages of the same case, and such representatives are considered properly impleaded. The Court laid down the principle that prior inclusion of legal representatives in related appellate proceedings suffices for subsequent appeals, avoiding procedural redundancies, and that unraised factual contentions regarding legal representation cannot be entertained for the first time.

  Questions settled

  • Is a fresh application to bring legal representatives on record necessary if they were already brought on record in a connected proceeding of the same case?
  • Can a contention regarding improper legal representation by counsel be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court without being urged in the High Court?
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• HAMIDA vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1970 P Cr. L J 267 · Lahore High Court · 1969-08-13Read full judgment →
• HAMID. HUSSAIN vs THE CROWN1970 P Cr. L J 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1951-05-15
  criminal breach of trusthead cashieradmissibility of evidencesubsequent conductconfessionreversal of acquittalappeal against acquittal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arose from a decision of the Chief Court of Sind, which reversed the acquittal of the appellant, a Head Cashier, and convicted him under Section 408 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for criminal breach of trust involving Rs. 10,600. The trial Magistrate had acquitted both the appellant and a co-accused on the ground of benefit of doubt. The primary legal question was whether the appellant's conduct on a subsequent day—offering to repay the sum to hush up the matter—was inadmissible as being part and parcel of an excluded confessional statement, and whether the appellate court improperly relied upon it. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent act of bringing money to the Manager constituted an independent, subsequent conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act 1872 and was not part of the excluded confession. The Court affirmed that where the lower court relies on admissible circumstantial evidence without error of law, the Supreme Court will not re-evaluate the credibility of evidence or disturb findings of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Is the subsequent conduct of an accused offering to repay embezzled funds admissible in evidence independently of an inadmissible confession?
  • Will the Supreme Court reassess the credibility of factual evidence on appeal where no inadmissible evidence was relied upon by the High Court?
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• Hakeem ABDUR REHMAN vs NOOR MUHAMMAD AND Another1970 SCMR 582 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-04
  limitation periodcondonation of delayspecial leave to appealforma pauperistime-barred petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan, which was filed 182 days beyond the prescribed limitation period. The petitioner sought condonation of the delay, citing his advanced age (80 years) and illness (asthma), which allegedly hindered his ability to raise the necessary funds for court fees in a timely manner. The core legal question was whether poverty or financial difficulty constitutes a valid ground for condoning a significant delay in filing a petition. The Supreme Court held that financial hardship or poverty is not a valid legal ground for condonation of delay. The Court emphasized that if a litigant is indigent, the proper legal recourse is to file an application in forma pauperis rather than allowing the limitation period to expire while attempting to raise funds. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as time-barred due to the lack of a valid basis for condonation.

  Questions settled

  • Does poverty or financial difficulty constitute a valid ground for the condonation of delay in filing a legal petition?
  • What is the appropriate legal procedure for a litigant who cannot afford court fees to pursue an appeal?
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• Haji TAYAB AND 2 Other vs EASTERN TEXTILE MILLS LTD.,1970 PLD Karachi 357 · Sindh High Court · 1969-11-11
  arbitration awardmisconduct of arbitratornatural justiceright of hearingspecific performanceremand of case
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge who dismissed the appellants' objections under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act and refused to set aside an arbitration award. The dispute arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement for the sale and transfer of all shares of a textile mill. During the trial, the parties referred the dispute to a sole arbitrator. The appellants challenged the award on the ground that the arbitrator misconducted himself by failing to give them notice or a hearing, and by conducting secret inquiries in violation of the principles of natural justice. The High Court held that unless the terms of reference explicitly dispense with an inquiry, the right of hearing is presumed, and an arbitrator cannot hold secret inquiries behind the parties' backs. The Court observed that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that no notice or hearing was necessary. Emphasizing that the arbitrator or relevant witnesses should have been examined regarding the allegations of a lack of hearing, the appellate court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case to the Single Judge for recording evidence and fresh adjudication on the objections.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an arbitrator is required to give notice and a hearing to the parties unless expressly excluded by the terms of reference?
  • Does an arbitrator commit misconduct by holding secret inquiries behind the back of the parties in violation of the principles of natural justice?
  • Whether the court should summon the arbitrator as a court witness when serious allegations of misconduct or lack of hearing are made against him?
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• Haji SULEMAN vs Haji MOHAMMAD SIDDIQUE AND 2 OTHERS1970 P Cr. L J 1060 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-14
  criminal breach of trustquashment of proceedingsinfructuous petitioncivil disputespecial leave to appealmootness
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, which had quashed criminal proceedings initiated against the respondents. The petitioner, a tea dealer, had filed a complaint against the respondents for criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alleging that they refused to release his stored tea chests. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in quashing the criminal proceedings. During the pendency of the petition, it was disclosed that the petitioner had filed a parallel civil suit, and the High Court had subsequently ordered the delivery of the disputed goods to the petitioner, a directive that was complied with and upheld by the Letters Patent Bench. The Supreme Court held that since the subject matter of the dispute—the tea chests—had been recovered by the petitioner, the criminal petitions had become infructuous and abortive. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the High Court's order and dismissed the petitions, establishing that where the underlying grievance is resolved through civil litigation, criminal proceedings may be rendered moot.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of disputed goods through civil proceedings render pending criminal proceedings for breach of trust infructuous?
  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to interfere with an order quashing criminal proceedings when the underlying civil dispute has been resolved?
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• Haji SULEMAN vs Haji MOHAMMAD SIDDIQUE AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 464 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-14
  criminal breach of trustquashment of proceedingsinherent powers of High Courtcivil dispute vs criminal offencespecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, which quashed criminal proceedings initiated against the respondents. The petitioner, a tea dealer, had stored tea chests in the respondents' godown under an alleged agreement that no rent would be charged until a loan was repaid. A dispute arose when the respondents demanded warehouse rent and refused to allow the removal of the goods. The petitioner filed a police complaint, leading to a charge-sheet under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court subsequently quashed these proceedings. The Supreme Court addressed the petitioner's request for leave to appeal against this quashment. The core legal issue involves the propriety of quashing criminal proceedings in a dispute that appears to be civil in nature, specifically regarding the alleged criminal breach of trust. The judgment addresses the threshold for invoking the High Court's inherent powers to terminate criminal litigation. The court's decision involves evaluating whether the underlying dispute constitutes a criminal offence or merely a civil disagreement over warehouse charges.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be quashed when the dispute is essentially civil in nature?
  • Under what circumstances is the quashment of criminal proceedings by the High Court justified?
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• Haji SHER MUHAMMADAND 13 OTHERS vs THE STATE-1970 P Cr. L J 175 · Sindh High Court · 1969-05-27Read full judgment →
• Haji REHMAT ULLAH vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND Another1970 SCMR 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  limitationtime-barredpetition for leave to appealprocedural bardismissal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question addressed by the Court concerned the maintainability of the petition in light of the limitation period prescribed for filing. Upon reviewing the record, the Court observed that the petition was filed with a significant delay of 167 days beyond the statutory period allowed for such filings. Consequently, the Court held that the petition was time-barred and could not be entertained. The principle laid down by the Court is that a petition filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, without sufficient cause or condonation, is liable to be dismissed on the ground of being time-barred. The Court did not delve into the merits of the underlying dispute regarding the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner's decision, as the procedural bar of limitation was dispositive of the matter. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petition for leave to appeal filed 167 days late maintainable?
  • What is the consequence of filing a petition beyond the statutory period of limitation?
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• Haji RAHMATULLAH AND Another vs STANDARD BANK LTD., KARACHI1970 PLD Karachi 577 · Sindh High Court · 1969-01-29Read full judgment →
• Haji RAHIMULLAH vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1970 P Cr. L J 1230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-02
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationsick or infirmold age bailleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner against the cancellation of his bail by the High Court, which had overturned the Additional Sessions Judge's order granting bail under the grounds of infirmity and old age. The core legal question is whether old age and illnesses such as gastritis and lumbago constitute sufficient grounds for the grant of bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that old age by itself does not warrant bail, and minor ailments treatable within a jail hospital do not render an accused a sick or infirm person within the contemplation of the statutory proviso. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that advanced age and easily curable conditions managed within prison medical facilities do not justify the statutory exception for bail on grounds of sickness or infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Does old age by itself constitute a sufficient ground for the grant of bail?
  • Whether gastritis and lumbago treated in a jail hospital make an accused a sick or infirm person under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • When can the High Court interfere with an order granting bail passed by a lower court?
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• Haji RAHIMULLAH vs THE STATE AND Another1970 SCMR 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-02
  bail cancellationstatutory bailsickness or infirmityold age as ground for bailcriminal petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the cancellation of bail by the High Court, where the petitioner was charged under sections 302, 307 read with section 149 and section 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns whether old age and ailments such as gastritis and lumbago constitute sufficient grounds for granting bail under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that old age by itself is not a ground for bail, and that minor illnesses easily amenable to cure in a jail hospital do not render an accused a sick or infirm person within the meaning of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 497. The key principle laid down is that ordinary treatable ailments and advanced age do not automatically entitle an accused charged with heinous offences to statutory bail unless true sickness or infirmity is established.

  Questions settled

  • Is old age by itself a sufficient ground for granting bail under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Do conditions like gastritis and lumbago qualify an accused as a sick or infirm person entitled to bail?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in cancelling bail granted on improper grounds of infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji NOOR ALI vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND Another1970 SCMR 501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-16
  stage carriage permitsexcess of jurisdictionappellate jurisdictionwrit petitionremandadministrative lawtransport authority
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition despite finding that the Member, Board of Revenue (MBR) had acted in excess of jurisdiction. The dispute arose from the Regional Transport Authority’s grant of stage carriage permits to the appellant for a portion of an advertised route. The MBR had set aside this grant, ordering re-advertisement of the modified route. Although the High Court acknowledged the MBR exceeded its appellate jurisdiction under the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, it dismissed the petition, hoping for a fresh assessment of the claims. The Supreme Court held that an order passed by a tribunal in excess of jurisdiction, which adversely affects a party's rights, cannot be sustained in law. The High Court erred by maintaining an order it identified as legally invalid. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and the MBR’s order, remanding the case for disposal on merits. The principle established is that an order made without or in excess of jurisdiction affecting rights must be quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court maintain an order of a tribunal that it has found to be passed in excess of jurisdiction?
  • Does an order passed in excess of jurisdiction by a tribunal that affects the rights of a party require judicial intervention?
  • What is the scope of the appellate jurisdiction of the Member, Board of Revenue under the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1970 PLD Peshawar 58 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-10-06Read full judgment →
• Haji MD. KINU MUNSHI Alias KINU SHEIKH vs THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, KHULNA AND 2 Other1970 PLD Dacca 680 · Dacca · 1969-07-11Read full judgment →
• Haji HABIB ULLAH vs Haji ABDUL HALIM (REPRESENTED BY HEIRS)1970 PLD Dacca 667 · Dacca · 1968-08-16Read full judgment →
• Haji GHULAM RASUL vs Mian ABDUL AZIZ AND Another1970 SCMR 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-16
  election petitionwrit jurisdictionmaterial effecttendered votesremandElectoral Collegeelection irregularities
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from an election dispute concerning the Electoral College in Lahore. The Election Tribunal had declared the election void based on three specific irregularities, including tendered votes and discrepancies in ballot counts. The High Court, exercising writ jurisdiction, quashed the Tribunal's order, reasoning that even if the irregularities were accepted, the resulting vote discrepancy did not materially affect the election outcome, given the respondent's 37-vote majority. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the irregularities, as analyzed, were insufficient to invalidate the election. However, the Supreme Court identified a procedural error: the Tribunal had failed to record specific, definitive findings on all eleven grounds raised in the election petition, focusing disproportionately on only three. The Supreme Court held that the High Court, upon quashing the Tribunal's order, should have remanded the matter for a comprehensive decision on all grounds rather than finalizing the result itself. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the case was remanded to the Election Tribunal for a fresh, thorough adjudication of all issues raised in the original petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere recording of answers to questions under Rule 33 of the West Pakistan Basic Democracies Election Rules 1959 establish the identity of a voter?
  • Is an election tribunal required to record specific findings on all grounds raised in an election petition?
  • When a High Court quashes an election tribunal's order due to incomplete findings, is the proper course to remand the case for a fresh decision?
  • Can an election be declared void if the proven irregularities do not materially affect the election result?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji FAIZUL HAQUE KHAN vs Syedabdul HAMID AND Another1970 SC MR 33 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-26
  leave to appealmisreading of evidencesettlement propertytransfer of propertypossession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had interfered with the decision of the Additional Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of a disputed property. The core legal question revolves around whether the High Court misread or failed to read the evidence on record, specifically concerning a receipt produced to establish entitlement via an NCS form without supporting registry entries or proceedings, and whether possession was lawfully taken in 1960. The Supreme Court held that the case warranted further examination, particularly in light of contentions regarding the sufficiency of the receipt as proof and the circumstances of possession. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal subject to furnishing security in the sum of Rs. 1,000. The key principle laid down is that where an appellate court or superior court allegedly ignores plain evidence or relies on uncorroborated single documents such as receipts without supporting official records, the matter merits a full review by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner based on a misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Does a bare receipt purporting to show the submission of an NCS form, without supporting entries in registers or proceedings, constitute sufficient proof of entitlement to the transfer of property?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when an impugned order ignores plain evidence regarding the manner and timing of taking possession of disputed property?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji BASHIR AHMAD vs HIGH COURT BAR ASSOCIATION1970 PLD Lahore 45 · Lahore High Court · 1969-05-09Read full judgment →
• Haji ALI AHMED vs THE STATE AND 8 OTHERS- Respondents1970 P C r. L J 493 · Sindh High Court · 1969-10-13Read full judgment →
• Haji ABDUL GHANI vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 511 · Sindh High Court · 1969-07-31Read full judgment →
• HAIDER ALI AND ANOTHER vs THE SALES ENGINEER, SHAHNEWAZ (E. P.)1970 PLC 862 · Labour Court · 1970-06-02Read full judgment →
• HAIDER ALI AND 10 OTHERS vs THE STATE-Opposite-Party1970 P Cr. L J 1238 · Dacca · 1970-03-03Read full judgment →
• HAFIZULLAH AND Another vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1242 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-02Read full judgment →
• Hafiz AZIM BAKHSH (REPRESENTED BY 11 HEIRS) vs DISTRICT JUDGE, LYALLPUR1970 PLD Lahore 720 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-03Read full judgment →
• Hafiz AHMAD SHAFI vs KALLU KHAN AND 4 Other1970 SCMR 652 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-04
  Displaced Persons Actvested rightspast and closed transactionsadministrative instructionslandlord-tenant relationshipearmarking listsettlement of claims
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a local government servant, sought the transfer of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, claiming its value was under Rs. 10,000. Settlement Authorities valued the property above Rs. 10,000, placed it on an earmarking list, and subsequently transferred it to the respondent, who paid the full price and received a Permanent Transfer Order (P.T.O.). The petitioner acknowledged the respondent as his landlord and paid rent. Years later, relying on administrative letters from the Chief Settlement Commissioner that purportedly allowed for the review of cases involving locals, the petitioner sought to revive his claim. The Chief Settlement Commissioner rejected the request, and the High Court dismissed subsequent writ and intra-court appeals. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's conduct—specifically his acceptance of the respondent as landlord—disentitled him to relief. Furthermore, the Court ruled that administrative instructions cannot be used to reopen past, closed transactions or disturb vested rights lawfully created in favor of third parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can administrative instructions from a Chief Settlement Commissioner be used to reopen past and closed transactions?
  • Does a petitioner's acceptance of a transferee as a landlord disentitle them from later challenging the transfer of the property?
  • Can administrative letters disturb vested rights lawfully created in favor of third parties under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz ABDUL KHALIQ RAHMANI vs ABDUL GHANI AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Karachi 446 · Sindh High Court · 1970-02-02
  quashment of proceedingsabuse of processcivil liabilitycriminal prosecutioninherent powerscheatingcoercion
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated against the applicant under section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 before an Additional City Magistrate. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings instituted primarily to enforce a civil liability and coerce the payment of a loan—after a civil suit and subsequent revision for the same transaction had already been dismissed on merits—constituted an abuse of the process of the court warranting interference under inherent powers. The Sindh High Court accepted the application and quashed the proceedings. The court held that utilizing criminal courts as a coercive mechanism to recover civil dues or settle business disputes amounts to a clear abuse of process, and the High Court is duty-bound under its inherent jurisdiction to intervene and prevent such uncalled-for harassment.

  Questions settled

  • Can the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked to quash criminal proceedings that are essentially of a civil nature?
  • Whether using the machinery of the criminal courts to enforce a civil liability or recover a loan constitutes an abuse of the process of the court?
  • Should criminal proceedings be quashed when a complainant initiates a criminal case after failing to recover dues through civil courts?
  • When will the High Court interfere at an interlocutory stage of criminal proceedings pending in a subordinate court?
  Read full judgment →
• HABIB ISMAIL BAJWA vs Khawaja GHULAM MOHY UD DIN1970 PLD Lahore 428 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-01
  ex parte proceedingsright of cross-examinationurban rent restrictioncourt-feedecreeremand of casenatural justice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal arises from an eviction application filed under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The Rent Controller proceeded ex parte against the tenant who arrived late due to engagement in the Supreme Court, and subsequently refused to allow the tenant to participate or cross-examine witnesses upon his physical appearance during ongoing proceedings. The Additional District Judge allowed the landlord's appeal and ordered eviction. The High Court examined whether a defendant rendered ex parte can join subsequent proceedings upon appearance, and whether orders under the Ordinance bear the force of a decree attracting ad valorem court fees. The Court held that a defendant does not become a dead person upon default and may participate in proceedings from the stage of appearance, and that orders of the Rent Controller possess the force of a decree under section 17 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, requiring ad valorem court-fee under the Court Fees Act 1870. The impugned orders were set aside and the case remanded for fresh trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant who has been proceeded against ex parte join and participate in judicial proceedings from the stage at which he subsequently appears in court?
  • Does an order passed by a Rent Controller under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 have the force of a decree passed by a civil court?
  • Whether an appeal arising from an order of the Rent Controller requires ad valorem court-fee under the Court Fees Act 1870?
  • Is a Rent Controller justified in refusing a defendant the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses or lead evidence when the defendant appears before the close of the plaintiff's case?
  Read full judgment →
• HABIB AHMAD. vs THE STATE1970 PCr. L J 983 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-02Read full judgment →
• HABIB AHMAD AND Another vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE (COLONIES), WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-16
  land allotmentTubewell Sinking Schemeresumption of landcompensationwrit jurisdictionconcurrent findingsnew pleascolonization of government lands
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners challenged the resumption of land allotted to them under the Tubewell Sinking Scheme, which was cancelled after the Governor's Inspection Team discovered the land had been irrigated and cultivated in 1951, rendering it ineligible for allotment under the scheme's criteria. The Collector's resumption order was upheld by the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue, and subsequently by the High Court under its writ jurisdiction. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners sought to raise new arguments: first, that Section 25 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, made the payment of compensation a condition precedent to resumption; and second, that they were denied an opportunity to rebut Khasra Girdawari entries. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Section 25 does not make compensation a condition precedent to re-entry, as it allows for assessment after resumption. Furthermore, the Court refused to entertain new factual contentions not raised before the lower forums or in the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the revenue authorities regarding the land's ineligibility.

  Questions settled

  • Is the payment of compensation a condition precedent to the resumption of land under Section 25 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912?
  • Can a party raise new factual contentions for the first time in a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to interfere with concurrent findings of fact by revenue authorities regarding land eligibility under a government scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• H. M. SILK MILLS LTD, vs FIVE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF WORKMEN OF H. M.1970 PLC 179 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-07-01Read full judgment →
• H. H. S. FELDMAN vs THE PROVINCE OF EAST BENGAL1970 PLD Karachi 295 · Sindh High Court · 1969-10-13
  Letters Patent Appealdeficit court-feeSection 149 CPClimitationOrder VII Rule 11 CPCcondonation of delaywant of prosecutionpoverty as ground
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Letters Patent Appeal arose from the dismissal of the appellant's suit for recovery of damages and interest regarding demurrage charges on a sea salt supply contract. At the appellate stage, the respondents raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was barred by limitation. The appellant initially lodged the appeal paying a nominal court-fee of Rs. 5 instead of the required Rs. 2,076. Upon the office returning the appeal with an objection allowing seven days for compliance, the appellant retained the papers for over eight months before re-submitting them with an application under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. A Division Bench admitted the appeal subject to respondents' objections. The High Court held that an ex parte admission order allowing payment of deficit court-fee remains open to reconsideration upon the objection of the affected party at final hearing. Furthermore, while Section 149 vests wide discretion, mere poverty, financial inability, or erroneous legal advice do not constitute sufficient cause. The appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ex parte conditional order accepting deficit court-fee subject to objections be reconsidered and set aside at the final hearing of the appeal?
  • Does the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree extend limitation under Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908 even if the court rules do not require such copy to accompany a Letters Patent Appeal?
  • Does mere poverty or inability to arrange funds constitute a sufficient ground for the exercise of judicial discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Do the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to a memorandum of appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• GULZAR HASSAN SHAH vs GHULAM MURTAZA AND 4 OTHER1970 PLD Supreme Court 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-18
  bailcancellation of bailinherent jurisdictionreview of orderex parte orderpreliminary trialmurder
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave was directed against an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which recalled an earlier ex parte order cancelling the respondents' bail and allowed them to remain on bail. The respondents were accused of murder under Sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the High Court, under its inherent jurisdiction, could recall or reverse an order made and signed by it, and whether bail was granted in disregard of established principles. The Court held that Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not control Section 498, as a bail order is not a 'judgment' within the meaning of Section 369. Consequently, in rare and exceptional cases, the High Court has inherent power under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to revoke, review, or alter its own earlier decisions to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice, especially where an order was passed ex parte. However, on the merits, the Court found that the lower courts erred by conducting a preliminary trial of the evidence at the bail stage. The appeal was allowed, and the bail was cancelled.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar the High Court from reviewing or recalling an order passed under Section 498 of the same Code?
  • Is an order granting or cancelling bail considered a 'judgment' within the meaning of Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the High Court invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to recall an ex parte order of bail cancellation?
  • Is it permissible for a court deciding a bail application to conduct a detailed inquiry into the merits of the prosecution case or the plea of defence?
  Read full judgment →
• GULZAR AND 2 Others vs The STATE1970 SCMR 603 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-26
  grievous hurtcutting of nosedelay in FIRminor witnessesnon-production of witnessesinjured witness testimonycommon intentionleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by three petitioners challenging the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, which had upheld their conviction and sentence under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for cutting the victim's nose. The petitioners challenged the prosecution case primarily on the grounds of inordinate delay in lodging the First Information Report (FIR) and the non-production of two minor companions who were present with the injured victim at the time of the incident. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the delay in lodging the FIR was plausibly explained by fear of the accused and possible compromise negotiations. The Court further held that the non-production of the minor witnesses did not adversely affect the prosecution case, as the broad daylight incident and the reliable testimony of the injured victim established the guilt of the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inordinate delay in lodging an FIR weakens the prosecution case when plausibly explained by fear of the accused?
  • Whether the non-production of minor eyewitnesses adversely affects the prosecution case where the testimony of the injured victim is available and reliable?
  • Whether a conviction under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be sustained on the solitary credible evidence of an injured eyewitness?
  Read full judgment →
• GULZAR AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE--1970 PCr.LJ 1145 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-08Read full judgment →
• GULAB KHAN vs GOVERNMENT OF AZAD J & K1970 PLD Azad J & K 35 · High Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• GUL NAWAZ Alias GUL MOWAZ AND 2 Others vs THS STATE1970 SCMR 667 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-02
  bail before arrestsuccessive bail applicationscriminal procedureattempt to murderinvestigation stage
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which dismissed in limine a petition for bail before arrest. The petitioners were accused of offences under sections 307 and 325 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for inflicting numerous injuries using lathis. The core legal question concerned the entitlement of the accused to pre-arrest bail and the maintainability of successive bail applications on the same facts before the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly determined that repeated applications for bail on the same facts do not lie, and that the nature of the offence—whether falling under section 307 or section 308 of the Pakistan Penal Code—cannot be restricted merely because injuries were caused by lathis at the investigation stage. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with the observation that fresh bail applications could be pursued before the Magistrate after recording of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether repeated applications for bail on the same facts lie in the High Court?
  • Does the use of lathis exclusively bring an offence under section 308 rather than section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can an accused file a fresh bail application before a Magistrate after evidence has been recorded following the dismissal of a prior petition?
  Read full judgment →
• GUL HASSAN vs The STATE1970 SCMR 441 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-03
  criminal misconductcheatingreversal of acquittalappreciation of evidencepublic servantillegal gratification
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arises from the reversal of an acquittal by the High Court, wherein the appellant, a public servant serving as an Assistant City Survey Officer, was convicted under section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 read with section 120-B of the Pakistan Penal Code for obtaining a pecuniary advantage of Rs. 6,000 by deceit and misrepresentation from a citizen under the pretext of a penalty imposed for unauthorized construction. The core legal question centered on whether the receipt of the sum by crossed cheque constituted an illegal gratification acquired through cheating and abuse of official position or a bona fide personal loan as claimed by the defence. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's acquittal was based on fantastic and far-fetched reasoning, and upheld the High Court's conviction, finding the defense plea of a loan to be absurd and falsified by contemporaneous documentary evidence, including an official receipt in the appellant's handwriting. The key principle laid down is that where circumstantial and documentary evidence overwhelmingly establishes guilt and dismantles the defense version, an appellate court is fully justified in reversing an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is justified in reversing an acquittal when the trial court's evaluation of evidence is based on far-fetched and irrational reasoning?
  • Does the acceptance of funds via a crossed cheque inherently preclude a finding of guilt for obtaining pecuniary advantage by corrupt means?
  • Whether the defense of a personal loan can be sustained when contradicted by contemporaneous official receipts and the absence of a plausible necessity for borrowing?
  Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT, OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER vs Haji FEROZUDDIN SABRI Applicant1970 SCMR 47 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-23
  clarification of judgmentdeletion of observationsremandrecital of factsindependent decisiontime of the essence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from an application filed by the respondent under Order XLIX, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, seeking the deletion or clarification of certain observations made in a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The respondent contended that the observations, which touched upon the forfeiture of premium, the respondent's failure to construct a cinema house within the stipulated period, and time being of the essence of the contract, could influence the High Court on remand and cause embarrassment. The appellants argued that the application was unnecessary as the observations, when read in context, were clearly not findings. The Supreme Court declined to delete the observations but clarified that they were merely part of the recital of facts and not findings of the Court. The Court held that the High Court, when hearing the appeal on remand, must arrive at its own independent decisions on these questions. Consequently, the petition was dismissed with the aforementioned clarification.

  Questions settled

  • Can factual recitals in a Supreme Court judgment be treated as binding findings of fact by a lower court on remand?
  • Whether observations made in a judgment that are not necessary for the decision can be clarified by the Supreme Court to prevent embarrassment to the lower court?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the power to clarify its own judgment to ensure a lower court arrives at an independent decision on remand?
  Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN vs SUBEDAR MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN AND 31970 PLD Lahore 463 · Lahore High Court · 1969-11-28Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND FOREST, LAHORE AND Another vs AHMAD SAFDAR KHAN AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 552 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-05
  temporary injunctioncivil revisionmining leasebalance of conveniencediscretion of appellate court
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court in civil revision, which had restored a temporary injunction granted by the trial court in favour of the respondent-plaintiff regarding a mining lease of ordinary sand, reversing the appellate court's order. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the First Appellate Court in vacating the temporary injunction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with the appellate court's discretion, as the lease deed was yet to be executed, possession had not been delivered, a bona fide dispute regarding forest land control existed between departments, and the balance of convenience favoured the appellants since damages were an adequate remedy. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the First Appellate Court in vacating a temporary injunction?
  • Does a plaintiff establish a prima facie case for a temporary injunction when the lease deed remains unexecuted and possession has not been delivered?
  • Where the balance of convenience favours the withholding of an injunction and damages remain an adequate remedy, is a temporary injunction sustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, RAWALPINDI vs HAQ NAWAZ1970 SCMR 673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-28
  civil servicepay scaleexecutive ordermistake in pay fixationwrit petitionsupreme court of pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government of Pakistan against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, passed in Writ Petition No. 1956 of 1966. The respondent, Haq Nawaz, a Lower Division Clerk in the Ministry of Defence, sought implementation of a formal order dated 7th July 1965, issued with the sanction of the President, regularizing his pay scale. The department failed to implement it, contending the order was issued by mistake and subsequently cancelled by the Ministries of Finance. The core legal question was whether an executive order issued with the sanction of the President could be ignored or treated as cancelled without a formal countermanding order issued with equal sanction. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of any order countermanding the 7th July 1965 order with the sanction of the President, the High Court was fully justified in directing the department to implement the validly issued order. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that formal executive orders issued under the President's sanction remain enforceable until properly countermanded through competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order issued with the sanction of the President can be ignored without a formal countermanding order issued with similar sanction?
  • Is the High Court justified in directing the implementation of a pay fixation order when no valid countermanding order is brought on record?
  Read full judgment →
• GOURANGA MOHAN SIKDAR vs THE CONTROLLER OF IMPORT AND EXPORT AND 2 Other1970 PLD Supreme Court 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The provided judgment text is empty. Consequently, it is impossible to generate a summary, identify statutory provisions, extract keywords, formulate legal questions, or identify the author of the opinion. The request requires the actual text of the judgment to perform the analysis.

  Read full judgment →
• GOLAM HOSSAIN vs MESSRS M. ALI & BROTHERS LTD., DACCA1970 PLC 780 · Labour Court · 1970-05-18Read full judgment →
• GOALUNDO FISHING INDUSTRIES vs PAKISTAN AND 3 Other1970 SCMR 888 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-18
  enemy propertylease terminationmanufacturing leasenotice periodTransfer of Property ActDefence of Pakistan Rules
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a suit filed by the petitioner seeking a declaration that two notices terminating its lease of two ice factories (which were vested in the Additional Custodian of Enemy Property as enemy properties) were illegal and ultra vires. The petitioner asserted that the lease could not be terminated by a one-month notice and that six months' notice was required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 because the properties were manufacturing concerns. The respondents contended that the petitioner was a licensee whose interest was validly terminated under the terms of the agreement. The High Court upheld the dismissal of the suit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 operates subject to any contract to the contrary, and since the parties' agreement explicitly provided for termination via one month's notice, the notices were valid. The Court also ruled that the petitioner could not challenge the Custodian's authority to sell the property under the Defence of Pakistan Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the statutory notice period of six months for terminating a manufacturing lease under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 can be overridden by a contract to the contrary?
  • Can a lessee challenge the validity of a lease termination notice on the ground that the lessor intends to sell the property under the Defence of Pakistan Rules?
  • Does the vesting of enemy property under Rule 182 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules authorize its disposal or sale by the Custodian?
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• GHULAM RASUL vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 941 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-27Read full judgment →
• GHULAM RASUL AND 3 OTRERS vs THE STATE1970 PLD Lahore 832 · Lahore High Court · 1970-02-12Read full judgment →
• GHULAM RASOOL KHAN vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT1970 PLC 356 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
• GHULAM QADIR vs THE STATE1970 PLD Peshawar 99 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-11-13Read full judgment →
• GHULAM QADIR vs THE STATE-1970 P Cr. L J 485 · Sindh High Court · 1969-07-30Read full judgment →
• GHULAM QADIR vs MEMBER BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 4 Other1970 SCMR 292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-23
  consolidation of holdingsrevenue jurisdictionwrit petitionjoint ownerallotment of land
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a writ petition challenging an order of the Member Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore, passed under the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960. The Revenue Authority had reallocated certain land parcels (killas) between the petitioner and the predecessor-in-interest of the private respondents during consolidation proceedings. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's writ petition after finding that the petitioner was a joint owner rather than an exclusive owner of the disputed land, and that no injustice had occurred. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in dismissing the petition, held that the determination of which specific land parcels (killas) should be allocated to parties during consolidation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities. The Court laid down the principle that the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, cannot sit in judgment as an appellate forum over the factual allocations made by competent Revenue Authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the allocation of specific land parcels during consolidation proceedings falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities?
  • Can the High Court interfere with factual land allocations made by Revenue Authorities under its writ jurisdiction?
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• GHULAM QADIR vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, RAWALPINDI1970 SCMR 685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-09
  settlement lawbusiness premisespublic auctionevacuee propertydisplaced personsdivision of property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave concerns a dispute over the transfer of a shop under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appellant challenged the Chief Settlement Commissioner's decision to divide a single business premises into two separate units, transferring one to the appellant and ordering the other to be sold via public auction. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authority's power to divide business premises is limited to satisfying the claims of displaced persons or if it extends to creating units for public auction. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Settlement Commissioner possesses the authority under the Act to divide business premises into separate units. Once divided, these units are treated independently. If a unit cannot be transferred to a claimant or non-claimant, it must be disposed of via public auction to generate funds for the rehabilitation of displaced persons, which is consistent with the Act's objectives. The Court affirmed the division and dismissed the appeal, clarifying that the power to divide is not restricted solely to satisfying specific claims.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the authority to divide a business premises into separate units for the purpose of public auction?
  • Is the power of the Settlement Authority to divide property restricted only to satisfying the claims of displaced persons?
  • Can a claimant under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 claim more than one business unit?
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• GHULAM QADIR AND Another vs THE STATE.1970 P Cr. L J 919 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-16Read full judgment →
• GHULAM NABI vs Mst. NAZIR FATIMA AND Other1970 PLD Azad J & K 62 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1970-02-09Read full judgment →
• GHULAM NABI AND Another vs Khan MUHAMMAD AFZAL KHAN, SETTLEMENT1970 SCMR 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-11
  special leave to appealwrit jurisdictionsettlement authoritiesprior possessiontransfer of propertyreappraisal of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court dismissing a writ petition that challenged the decision of the Settlement authorities regarding the transfer of a disputed house. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the factual finding of the Settlement authorities regarding prior possession of the property. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement authorities rendered their decision after properly considering the record and affording a full hearing, and that the High Court correctly declined to reappraise the evidence in writ jurisdiction merely because an alternative view was possible. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that superior courts exercising writ jurisdiction will not reappraise factual evidence or substitute their own view for that of the competent settlement authorities when the latter have acted within their jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court reappraise factual evidence in writ jurisdiction to reach a different conclusion than the Settlement authorities?
  • Does the mere possibility of taking another view of the evidence furnish ground for interference in writ jurisdiction?
  • Are findings of fact rendered by Settlement authorities after consideration of record and hearing open to challenge without showing lack of jurisdiction?
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• GHULAM NABI Alias ALLAHDINO AND Others vs Mst. JIANDI AND Other1970 SCMR 275 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08
  special leave to appealconcurrent findings of factpardanashin ladiesgift of landmutation in revenue recordsanction of the Collector
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition for special leave to appeal against concurrent findings of fact by the courts below regarding the lack of proof of a gift of land allegedly made by female respondents in favour of the first opponent. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in concurrently finding that the gift by pardanashin ladies without consideration and without proof of necessary statements or statutory sanction was invalid. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings were well-founded, noting that the donors were pardanashin ladies with their own children, the alleged statements before a magistrate could not be proved, and the transaction violated statutory requirements under Act III of 1899 necessitating prior sanction of the Collector. Consequently, the Court ruled that no substantial question of law arose and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the absence of proof of a gift can be interfered with in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Does a gift of valuable property by pardanashin ladies without consideration and without proper proof of statements require strict scrutiny?
  • Is a transfer of land hit by Act III of 1899 when prior sanction of the Collector was not obtained?
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• GHULAM MUSTAFA vs THE INDUSTRIAL COURT, WEST PAKISTAN1970 PLC 47 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-04-02Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUSTAFA vs DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT1970 PLC 6 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUSTAFA AND 27 Other vs THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR, AUQAF, WEST1970 PLD Lahore 619 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• GHULAM MUHAMMAD vs TAHIR JAHANGIR, MANAGING DIRECTOR, PUNJAB1970 PLC 220 · Industrial Court · 1969-11-18Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUHAMMAD KHAN vs DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT1970 PLC 115 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1968-11-12Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND Another vs The STATE1970 SCMR 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-29
  murdereye-witness testimonyappreciation of evidencemedical evidenceconcurrent findingscriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioners, Ghulam Muhammad and Bakhshal, for the murder of Allah Rakhio. The trial court convicted the petitioners under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing one to death and the other to transportation for life, with an additional conviction for Bakhshal under Section 13-D of the Arms Act. The High Court dismissed their appeal and confirmed the sentences. The core legal question was whether the eye-witness testimony, which alleged two gunshots were fired, should be discredited because the medical evidence showed only one gunshot injury on the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the discrepancy regarding the number of shots did not undermine the credibility of the eye-witnesses, as the lower courts had reasonably concluded the second shot may have missed or struck the deceased's bedding. The Court affirmed that natural witnesses, whose testimony was consistent and corroborated by the immediate post-incident arrival of neighbors, were reliable. The petition was dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy between the number of gunshots reported by eye-witnesses and the number of injuries found on the deceased necessarily discredit the testimony of the eye-witnesses?
  • Are the findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court regarding the credibility of natural witnesses subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can the testimony of eye-witnesses be accepted when they are the inmates of the house where the crime occurred?
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• GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND 3 Others vs Mst. AISHA1970 SCMR 70 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ex parte decreesetting aside ex parte decreerevisional jurisdictionspecial leave to appealmisrepresentationdiscretionary order
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which refused to interfere in revision with a trial court's decision to set aside an ex parte decree. The core legal question was whether the trial court acted correctly in exercising its discretion to set aside the ex parte decree passed against the defendant, an illiterate elderly woman. The trial court had found, based on evidence, that the defendant failed to appear on the date of hearing because the plaintiffs had misled her by claiming the suit had been dismissed for non-payment of court fees. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in declining to interfere with the trial court's order, as the trial court had sufficient grounds to be satisfied that the defendant's absence was due to the plaintiffs' misrepresentation. The principle laid down is that appellate or revisional courts should not interfere with a trial court's discretionary order to set aside an ex parte decree when such order is based on a sound finding of fact regarding the defendant's absence.

  Questions settled

  • Is a High Court justified in refusing to interfere with a trial court's order setting aside an ex parte decree when the defendant was misled by the plaintiff?
  • Can a trial court set aside an ex parte decree if it is satisfied that the defendant's absence was caused by the plaintiff's misrepresentation?
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• GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND 2 Others vs THE STATE-1970 P Cr. L J 765 · Lahore High Court · 1969-11-14Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND 2 Others vs THE SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1970 SCMR 546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-13
  partition of joint khataevacuee propertyrehabilitation schemehissadari qabzaspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning the partition of a joint khata held by locals and evacuees in village Channah, Tehsil Rahimayarkhan. The core legal question involves whether the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities lacked jurisdiction to order partition due to the petitioners' alleged Hissadari Qabza under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Scheme. The Supreme Court held that the argument regarding Hissadari Qabza was without merit, as findings of fact by the authorities and the High Court established that the land was held jointly and there was no exclusive Hissadari Qabza, and that locals could not take undue advantage of unauthorized occupation of better lands. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the validity of the partition and the concurrent findings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authority have jurisdiction to partition a joint khata where co-sharers do not have exclusive Hissadari Qabza?
  • Can local co-sharers claim protection from partition on the basis of unauthorized occupation of better quality evacuee land?
  • Will a plea regarding lack of jurisdiction that was not raised before the departmental authorities be entertained in writ jurisdiction?
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• GHULAM MOHAYYUDDIN AND Another vs SHER KHAN AND 4 Other1970 SCMR 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-20
  specific performanceadverse possessionlimitationagreement to sellrevenue recordspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners filed a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land and an ahata, or in the alternative, claimed ownership through adverse possession, alleging they had the original grant restored and paid government dues. The trial court dismissed the suit for specific performance as barred by time, but decreed the suit in part on the basis of adverse possession. On appeal, the District Judge set aside the decree and dismissed the suit entirely, holding the specific performance barred by limitation and finding no adverse possession. The High Court dismissed the subsequent regular second appeal, upholding the findings. Upon a petition for special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the limitation bar, lack of authority of the co-sharer to bind other heirs, and absence of continuous adverse possession were based on proper appreciation of evidence and revenue records. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land filed long after the refusal of the vendors is barred by limitation?
  • Whether a co-sharer can enter into a binding agreement to sell joint property on behalf of other heirs without established authority?
  • Whether possession originating as a tenant can ripen into ownership through adverse possession without clear and continuous hostile assertion for the statutory period?
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• GHULAM JILLANI AND 6 Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 619 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-23Read full judgment →
• GHULAM JILANI AND 6 Other vs THE STATE1970 PLD Lahore 73 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-23Read full judgment →
• GHULAM JAFFER vs Agha AZHAR HUSSAIN AND 4 Other1970 PLD Lahore 753 · Lahore High Court · 1970-02-04Read full judgment →
• GHULAM HYDER vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1052 · Sindh High Court · 1970-08-11
  murderdeath sentence confirmationretracted judicial confessioncorroborationrecovery of weaponextenuating circumstancesyouth as mitigationgrave and sudden provocation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from the conviction of the appellant, Ghulam Hyder, under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Budho, resulting in a sentence of death. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the retracted judicial confession, the sufficiency of corroborating ocular and circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of a blood-stained hatchet, and whether the appellant's youth or alleged provocation constituted extenuating circumstances warranting a reduction of the death sentence. The Sindh High Court held that the retracted judicial confession was voluntary and duly corroborated by eyewitness testimony and material recovery, and that neither youth alone nor jealousy arising from homosexual infatuation amounted to mitigating circumstances sufficient to commute the death penalty. The court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retracted judicial confession can form the basis of a murder conviction when duly corroborated by ocular testimony and material recoveries?
  • Does youth alone constitute a sufficient extenuating circumstance to justify the imposition of a lesser penalty than death in a premeditated murder?
  • Whether jealousy arising from the loss of affection of a companion amounts to grave and sudden provocation sufficient to mitigate a charge of murder?
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• GHULAM HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1093 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-16Read full judgment →
• GHULAM HUSSAIN vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1970 SCMR 665 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-11
  special leave to appealinterim custody of propertyseized truckcriminal revisionfraudulent inducementquashment of proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, which set aside a trial court's interim custody order regarding a seized truck and directed that the vehicle be handed over to respondent No. 2. The core legal question concerns the appropriate interim custody and disposal of property seized during criminal proceedings under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court reviewed the background where the petitioner had filed a complaint alleging offences under sections 420 and 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, leading to the initial seizure of the truck. The holding and key principles regarding interim custody involve balancing the possessory claims and ensuring proper surety pending the conclusion of the trial proceedings, though the specific appellate ratio is anchored in the procedural handling of property under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a revision petition against an interim custody order under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is maintainable before the final disposal of the case?
  • On what grounds can an appellate or revisional court interfere with an interim custody order of seized property passed by a trial magistrate?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in transferring the custody of the seized truck from the petitioner to respondent No. 2?
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• GHULAM HUSSAIN vs SARKAR1970 PLD Azad J & K 117 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1970-05-25Read full judgment →
• GHULAM HUSSAIN vs Malik MASOOD Alias MAHMOOD MASOOD AND Another1970 SCMR 658 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-07
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationsudden fightcriminal revisionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a criminal revision petition directed against the dismissal of a petition seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent in a murder case involving a stabbing incident outside a college. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in entering upon the merits of the case at the bail stage to consider the possibility of a sudden fight before evidence was recorded, and whether the discretion in granting bail was exercised arbitrarily. The Supreme Court held that the High Court did not exercise its discretion in an arbitrary or improper manner by considering the plea of a sudden fight on the facts of the case, and declined to interfere with the bail order, noting that the trial before the Committing Magistrate was nearly concluded and leaving it open to the Magistrate to decide whether to continue the bail upon commitment. The key principle laid down is that at the bail stage, examining the broad probabilities such as a sudden fight without deep evaluation of evidence is permissible, and trial courts retain the independent discretion to review bail upon the conclusion of committal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court consider the possibility of a sudden fight when evaluating a bail matter before evidence is recorded?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's discretion in refusing to cancel bail when the trial is at its closing stage?
  • Is it open to the Committing Magistrate to consider the question of bail upon committing the accused for trial under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
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