Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• M. M. A. RAUF vs SHAMS UD DIN AHMAD AND 6 Other1970 SCMR 349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-16
  special leave to appealwrit petitionnon-evacuee propertysettlement authoritiesproperty acquisition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against an order of the West Pakistan High Court, Lahore, which upheld the setting aside of a Settlement Commissioner's order regarding the transfer of a disputed bungalow located on plot No. 8-F, Gulberg, Lahore. The core legal question concerns whether the disputed property was validly acquired by the Lahore Improvement Trust and thus excluded from the compensation pool, and whether the High Court erred in setting aside the Settlement Commissioner's findings on a writ petition. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioner regarding the acquisition status of the property and the propriety of the High Court entering into disputed questions of facts instead of remanding the matter deserved consideration. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to the petitioner and ordered that status quo be maintained during the pendency of the appeal. The key principle laid down is that where a tribunal's finding is based on an assumption of facts not supported by record, the High Court's interference in constitutional jurisdiction may warrant further examination by the apex court, particularly regarding the limits of factual inquiry and the necessity of remand.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is competent to decide disputed questions of facts on merits in a writ petition instead of remanding the case to settlement authorities?
  • Whether property acquired by the Lahore Improvement Trust forms part of the compensation pool under settlement laws?
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• M. G. HASAN, SUPERINTENDENT OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY, PAKISTAN1970 PLD Lahore 518 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• M. A. SHAHID TARAFDAR vs SIREFA CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES, SYLHET1970 PLC 833 · Labour Court · 1970-06-18Read full judgment →
• M. A. HANNA N. vs THE CHIEF TRAFFIC MANAGER, EAST PAKISTAN1970 PLC 797 · Labour Court · 1970-05-06Read full judgment →
• LT.-COL. SAFDAR ALI MALIK AND Another vs KHADIM HUSSAIN AND 6 Other1970 PLD Lahore 629 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-05Read full judgment →
• LT. COL. A. H. MINHAS vs GHULAM AHMAD AND Another1970 SCMR 128 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-03
  leave to appealconstitutional jurisdictionsettlement authoritiesappurtenanceremand of case
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court. The core legal question is whether the High Court acted within its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution by itself inquiring into the nature of the property in dispute—specifically, whether it was an appurtenance to the main transferred house or an independent residential unit—rather than remanding the case to the Settlement authorities for determination. The Supreme Court held that the contention raised regarding the excess of jurisdiction by the High Court requires consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal subject to the deposit of security for costs in the sum of Rs. 1,000, establishing that factual inquiries into the nature of properties in settlement matters generally fall outside the scope of constitutional review when an appropriate remand to administrative authorities is the proper course.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court exceed its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 98 by inquiring into the nature of a property instead of remanding the case to the Settlement authorities?
  • When is a case properly remanded to the Settlement authorities for determining whether a property is an appurtenance or an independent residential unit?
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• LINGAM SEETHARAMIAH vs BIJJAM BRAHMARAMBA1970 PLC 600 · Andhra Paradesh High Court · 1968-06-19Read full judgment →
• LATFUR RAHMAN AND Another vs SULTAN AHMED AND Other Opposite Parties1970 PLD Dacca 377 · Dacca · 1969-03-14Read full judgment →
• LANDALE AND MORGAN (PAKISTAN) LTD., NARAYANGANI vs THE CHAIRMAN, JUTE BOARD, DACCA AND ANOTHER1970 SCMR 853 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-22
  writ jurisdictionlachesdisputed questions of factsubsidyagency agreementdelay
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner-Company, Landale and Morgan (Pakistan) Ltd., filed a writ petition in the High Court of East Pakistan challenging the Jute Board's decision to withhold a subsidy on raw jute sales. The Jute Board had denied the subsidy on the ground that the petitioner failed to satisfy the condition that sales must not be from agents to principals, a conclusion reached after examining the petitioner's agency agreements. The High Court dismissed the writ petition due to laches and delay of approximately one and a half years, noting that the lack of urgency suggested the matter could have been pursued in a civil court. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the dismissal, holding that the dispute involved a controversial question of fact regarding the petitioner's status in relation to the consignees. The Court ruled that such factual controversies requiring detailed investigation and proof do not fall appropriately within the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition can be dismissed solely on the grounds of laches and delay where an alternative remedy in a civil court is available?
  • Can the High Court entertain a writ petition under its extraordinary jurisdiction when the dispute involves controversial questions of fact requiring investigation and proof?
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• LALAN AND 4 Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 236 · Sindh High Court · 1969-10-07Read full judgment →
• LALA AND Another vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE1970S C M R 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-27
  writ petitiondismissal in defaultrestoration of petitioncounsel absencelocus standievacuee trust propertyleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against an order of the West Pakistan High Court, which had dismissed their writ petition in default due to the absence of the petitioners and their counsel, and subsequently refused to restore it, a decision affirmed in limine by a Letters Patent Bench. The core legal question concerned whether the lower courts properly exercised their discretion in refusing to condone the absence of counsel and restore the writ petition. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts properly exercised their discretion based on the facts of the case and found no grounds for interference. Furthermore, on the merits, the Supreme Court held that if the disputed property was evacuee trust property, action lay with the Evacuee Trust Board, leaving the petitioners without locus standi. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to restore a writ petition dismissed in default due to the absence of the petitioners and their counsel?
  • Does a party have locus standi to file a writ petition concerning evacuee trust property when the statute vests the power to take action in the Evacuee Trust Board?
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• LAL SHAH vs The STATE1970 SCMR 743 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-03
  circumstantial evidencemurderbenefit of doubtlast seen evidencecriminal appealforensic evidenceappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence imposed upon the appellant for the murder of his sister, Mst. Bahishtan, based entirely on circumstantial evidence. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution's evidence—comprising "last seen" testimony, recovery of ornaments, and forensic reports regarding bloodstains—was sufficient to sustain a conviction. The Supreme Court held that the circumstantial evidence was weak and contradictory. Specifically, the "last seen" evidence was uncorroborated, the recovery of ornaments was marred by suspicious witness testimony, and the forensic findings were unreliable, particularly given that human blood was allegedly detected on an amulet that had been subjected to fire. The Court emphasized that for a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the facts must be incompatible with innocence and incapable of any explanation other than guilt. Finding that the prosecution failed to meet this standard and that the evidence raised reasonable doubts, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, granting him the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • What is the standard of proof required for a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence?
  • Does the discovery of human blood on an object previously subjected to fire cast doubt on the reliability of forensic evidence?
  • Can uncorroborated 'last seen' evidence be sufficient to sustain a conviction in a murder case?
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• LAL MUHAMMAD AND Another vs Mst. NIAZ PARWARA1970 PLD Peshawar 52 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-11-28
  family courtexecution of decreecode of civil procedurerestitution of conjugal rightscivil revision
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil revision petition addresses the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the execution of decrees passed by Family Courts under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. The core legal question was whether a Family Court can apply provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to execute a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights. The Peshawar High Court held that while special procedure is provided for money decrees, decrees for restitution of conjugal rights and other non-money decrees are to be executed in the manner provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as otherwise such decrees would remain unenforceable. The petition was accepted and the order of the appellate court setting aside the attachment was reversed.

  Questions settled

  • Do the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 apply to the execution of non-money decrees passed by a Family Court?
  • How are decrees for the restitution of conjugal rights passed by a Family Court to be executed?
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• LAL MUHAMMAD AND 64 Other vs MESSRS BROOKE BOND (PAKISTAN) LTD, KARACHI1970 PLC 1 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-01-27Read full judgment →
• LAL BADSHAH AND 5 Others vs SOHAIL KHAN1970 SCMR 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-28
  co-sharerexclusive possessionconcurrent findingssecond appealsuit for partitionspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal in limine of a Regular Second Appeal by the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench. The original suit brought by the respondent sought a declaration of possession as a co-sharer over specific land, an injunction against interference, and demolition of structures erected by the defendants. Both lower courts rendered concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiff was in exclusive physical possession while the defendants were completely out of possession. The core legal question is whether a concurrent finding of fact regarding possession, based on revenue records, can be disturbed in a second appeal, and whether co-sharers out of possession can forcibly occupy joint land. The Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact based on evidence cannot be disturbed in a second appeal, and co-sharers out of possession have no right to forcibly occupy land and must seek partition. The key principle laid down is that co-sharers out of possession cannot take the law into their own hands and their sole remedy against exclusive possession by another co-sharer is a suit for partition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a concurrent finding of fact regarding possession based on revenue records be disturbed in a second appeal?
  • What is the legal remedy for a co-sharer who is out of possession of joint land?
  • Is a co-sharer out of possession entitled to forcibly occupy a portion of joint land?
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• LAHORE IMPROVEMENT TRUST vs THE CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, WEST1970 PLD Lahore 257 · Lahore High Court · 1969-05-26
  evacuee propertyacquisition of landdevelopment schemeultra viresprior approvaltown improvementcustodian of evacuee propertywrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The Lahore Improvement Trust filed a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenging the sale of evacuee land by the Custodian of Evacuee Property to a co-operative society. The Trust asserted that it had previously acquired the land for a Development Scheme under the Punjab Town Improvement Act 1922. The core questions before the High Court were whether a valid Development Scheme had been framed and sanctioned, whether the Trust could compulsorily acquire land on behalf of an external statutory body without complying with statutory procedures, and whether acquisition proceedings regarding evacuee land initiated without prior Central Government approval were legally valid. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Trust failed to prepare a proper layout and scheme as required by law, rendering the Government's approval and subsequent proceedings null and void. Furthermore, initiating acquisition of evacuee property without prior Central Government permission violated statutory protections under evacuee property laws, rendering the acquisition void ab initio and leaving the Custodian's transfer intact.

  Questions settled

  • Does a notification under town improvement laws operate as conclusive evidence of a scheme's validity if no layout plan or statutory scheme was actually prepared?
  • Can an improvement trust exercise its compulsory acquisition powers to acquire land solely for the use of another statutory body without framing a genuine statutory development scheme?
  • Are land acquisition proceedings in respect of evacuee property void ab initio if initiated prior to obtaining the statutory mandatory approval of the Central Government?
  • Does a notice issued under Section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act 1922 mark the commencement of acquisition proceedings that affect rights in evacuee property?
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• LACHMANDAS vs CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Supreme Court 379 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertycustodian of evacuee propertyevacuee property inquiries tribunalconstitutional petitionspecial jurisdictionnon-evacuee statusstatutory interpretation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition against an order of the Evacuee Property Inquiries Tribunal. The core legal questions concerned whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review Custodian orders passed before January 1, 1953, under Section 43-A of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957, and whether an order passed by the Tribunal on its final day without public announcement was valid. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal possessed broad jurisdiction under Sections 43-A and 43-B to review Custodian orders regardless of the 1953 date, as Section 43-B contained no such limitation. Furthermore, the Court held that the Tribunal's order was valid despite not being publicly announced, as it was not a court of general jurisdiction requiring such formalities. The key principle established is that the Tribunal’s special jurisdiction under the 1957 Act allows for the review of prior Custodian declarations, and that a mere declaration of personal non-evacuee status does not automatically restore property status without specific adjudication under Section 18 of the relevant Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Evacuee Property Inquiries Tribunal have the jurisdiction to review orders passed by a Custodian of Evacuee Property prior to January 1, 1953?
  • Is an order passed by the Evacuee Property Inquiries Tribunal invalid if it was not publicly announced in open court?
  • Does a declaration of personal non-evacuee status automatically restore property to a claimant without a specific declaration under Section 18 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance 1949?
  • Can a subordinate authority in the Custodian organization modify an order passed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property?
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• LABHU vs Mst. MUMTAZBEGUM1970 SCMR 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-13
  limitationcondonation of delayevacuee propertyvested rightsleave to appealsettlement authority
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition sought leave to appeal against a High Court order refusing to quash a Settlement Authority's decision to transfer an evacuee house to Mst. Mumtazi Begum, which the petitioner had claimed for himself. The petition was filed 178 days beyond the prescribed limitation period. The petitioner sought condonation of delay, citing that his counsel informed him of the High Court's decision very late and that time was consumed in obtaining legal advice and collecting funds. The Supreme Court held that the reasons provided for the delay were vague, as no specific dates were mentioned, and the circumstances were not beyond the petitioner's control. Consequently, the Court found that property rights had already vested in the respondent due to the petitioner's failure to act in time. The petition was dismissed as time-barred, affirming the principle that unexplained and avoidable delays in filing appeals cannot be condoned, particularly when vested property rights are at stake.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be entertained when it is filed 178 days beyond the limitation period without sufficient cause?
  • Does a failure to provide specific dates for the reasons behind a delay in filing an appeal justify the refusal of condonation?
  • Are delays caused by a party's own inaction or failure to coordinate with counsel considered circumstances beyond the party's control?
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• KRISHNA PADA DAS vs MOKTAB HOSSAIN1970 SCMR 838 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-24
  special leave to appealacquittaltrade markpassing offcriminal complaintconcurrent findings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against the acquittal of the respondent from a charge under section 482 of the Pakistan Penal Code, arising from a complaint alleging the fraudulent use of a trade mark and identical labelling for a medicine named 'Saribadi Sab Salsa' to imitate the petitioner's product 'Saribadi Salsa'. The trial magistrate, Sessions Judge, and High Court concurrently acquitted the respondent after physically examining the exhibits and concluding that the labels were sufficiently different and not apt to deceive an ordinary unwary purchaser, and noting a lack of bona fides in the delayed complaint. The core legal question concerns whether concurrent findings of acquittal by three courts regarding trade mark imitation warrant interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not act fancifully or arbitrarily in weighing the evidence, and since a substantial ground existed showing a margin of difference between the products, no interference was justified. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that concurrent factual findings on the absence of deception will not be disturbed lightly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of acquittal by three lower courts regarding trade mark imitation?
  • Is it sufficient for a prosecution under section 480 of the Pakistan Penal Code to show that a product's labelling is likely to produce a reasonable belief in the public mind that it is the complainant's product?
  • Whether delay in filing a complaint against an alleged imitation of goods affects the bona fides of the complainant?
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• KOHINOOR SILK MILLS WORKERS' UNION vs MESSRS KOHINOOR SILK MILLS LTD., KARACHI1970 PLC 336 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-02-04Read full judgment →
• KOHINOOR INDUSTRIES LTD. (UNITED CHEMICALS), LAHORE vs ABDUL MAJID1970 SCMR 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-08
  pauper applicationsue in forma pauperislimitationcivil revisionspecial leave to appealemployment injuries
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan in civil revision, which upheld the trial court's decision that an indigent worker's suit for damages for employment injuries was not barred by limitation. The respondent sought permission to sue in forma pauperis, which the petitioner opposed on the ground of limitation. The High Court concluded that the claim was governed by Article 36 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act and held that an application to sue as a pauper should not be rejected when the question of limitation is complicated or not free from doubt. The Supreme Court heard the petitioner's counsel and affirmed the High Court's view as unexceptionable, holding that no serious question of law arose at this stage. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application to sue in forma pauperis should be rejected when the question of limitation is complicated or not free from doubt?
  • Does a revision lie under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against an order holding that a cause of action is not barred by limitation in a pauper application?
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• KHUSHI MUHAMMAD vs The STATE1970 SCMR 515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-08
  suspension of sentencebail pending revisionsection 307 PPChatchet injuryjudicial discretionspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed against the order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioner's application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail pending the decision of his criminal revision petition. The petitioner had been convicted under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for causing an injury to the victim's head with a hatchet (kulhari) and was sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court exercised its discretion properly in refusing to suspend the sentence and grant bail pending criminal revision. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had exercised its discretion on sound judicial principles and that the impugned order called for no interference. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, reaffirming the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with a High Court's discretionary refusal of bail pending revision unless sound judicial principles have been violated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with a High Court's order refusing to suspend sentence and grant bail pending criminal revision when discretion was exercised on sound judicial principles?
  • Whether a conviction under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for inflicting a head injury with a hatchet warrants the suspension of sentence during the pendency of a revision petition?
  • What standard of review does the Supreme Court apply when evaluating a High Court's discretionary rejection of a bail application pending revision?
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• KHUSHI MUHAMMAD AKHTAR vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 797 · Lahore High Court · 1969-02-24Read full judgment →
• KHUSHI MOHAMMAD vs The STATE1970 SCMR 679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-17
  bailjudicial discretionreasoned ordercriminal procedurenon-bailable offence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the refusal of bail to the appellant, who was arrested for allegedly importing rice in violation of the West Pakistan Foodstuffs (Control) Act, 1958 and the West Pakistan Paddy and Rice (Control) Order, 1958. The lower courts had denied bail without providing adequate reasons, with one court citing the appellant's caste as a ground for refusal. The core legal question was whether the courts below were required to provide reasons for refusing bail in a non-capital case under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred by failing to record reasons for denying bail in a case where the maximum punishment was three years imprisonment. Emphasizing the mandatory nature of judicial discretion under the relevant statutory provisions, the Court confirmed the interim bail previously granted to the appellant. The judgment reinforces the principle that judicial orders refusing bail in non-bailable offences must be supported by cogent, reasoned grounds rather than arbitrary considerations.

  Questions settled

  • Are courts required to provide reasons when refusing bail in cases not punishable by death or transportation for life?
  • Is a person's caste a valid legal ground for refusing bail in criminal proceedings?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to bring an accused to trial after the grant of leave to appeal influence the confirmation of bail?
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• KHURSHED vs KHUSHI MUHAMMAD1970 P Cr. L J 401 · Lahore High Court · 1969-09-26Read full judgment →
• KHUDA YAR vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 18 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murder convictioneye-witness testimonyblood-stained recoverycriminal appealFirst Information Reportmedical evidencebenefit of doubt
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenges a High Court judgment confirming the appellant's conviction for murder and the associated death sentence. The core legal questions concerned the credibility of an injured eye-witness, the impact of alleged delays in lodging the First Information Report, and the sufficiency of evidence regarding the recovery of incriminating items. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the conviction was sound. The Court found the testimony of the injured eye-witness credible, noting that his injuries were consistent with the prosecution's narrative and remained unchallenged during cross-examination. Furthermore, the recovery of a blood-stained weapon and shirt provided the necessary independent corroboration required as a rule of caution in cases involving long-standing enmity. The Court established that minor discrepancies in witness statements regarding weapon descriptions do not invalidate testimony when the overall account is supported by medical evidence and forensic recoveries. Additionally, the Court rejected the defense's claims of fabricated injuries and delayed reporting, finding the prosecution's timeline consistent with the circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does a minor discrepancy in the description of a weapon in an FIR invalidate the testimony of an eye-witness?
  • Is the recovery of blood-stained articles sufficient corroboration to sustain a murder conviction in the presence of long-standing enmity?
  • Can a conviction be upheld based on the testimony of an injured eye-witness whose injuries were not challenged during cross-examination?
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• KHUDA DAD AND Another vs GHULAM ABBAS AND 3 Other1970 SCMR 462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-10
  Customary Lawalienation of propertyreversionary rightscollateralslimited estatemutationsuccession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The matter concerns a dispute over land ownership in village Tarkwal, District Rawalpindi, originally owned by a deceased male governed by Customary Law. Upon his death in 1908 without issue, his estate was mutated between his mother and widow, with the widow eventually succeeding to the entire property. In 1958, the widow gifted a portion of this land to the petitioners. The respondents, identified as collaterals of the original owner, challenged this alienation, claiming it violated law and custom, lacked necessity, and was ineffectual against their reversionary rights. The trial court decreed in favor of the respondents, declaring the alienation void, a decision upheld by the District Judge. The petitioners filed a Regular Second Appeal before the High Court. During the pendency of this appeal, the widow passed away, and her legal representatives were brought on record. The core legal question addressed the validity of the widow's alienation of property held under Customary Law and the standing of collaterals to challenge such transfers based on reversionary interests, ultimately affirming the restrictions imposed by Customary Law on limited estate holders.

  Questions settled

  • Does a widow holding property under Customary Law have the right to alienate the estate without legal necessity?
  • Do collaterals of the last full owner have the standing to challenge an alienation made by a widow holding a limited estate?
  • Is an alienation of property by a widow governed by Customary Law binding upon the reversioners after her death?
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• KHUDA BAKHSH vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. LJ 1118 · Lahore High Court · 1970-02-13Read full judgment →
• KHUDA BAKHSH AND 4 Others vs THE STATE And 2 Other1970 SCMR 626 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-19
  Frontier Crimes Regulationconstructive liabilityjoint liabilityJirgacriminal referenceSection 149 PPCSection 34 PPC
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court of West Pakistan, which had upheld the appellants' convictions under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901. The appellants were tried by a Jirga for murder and attempted murder, with convictions recorded under Section 302 and Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901. The core legal question was whether a conviction is legally valid when it relies on Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, a provision governing constructive liability, despite it not being explicitly listed in the Second Schedule to the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the inclusion of constructive liability provisions like Section 149 or Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in the schedule is immaterial. The Court affirmed the principle that because these sections do not create distinct offences but merely establish principles of joint liability, their absence from the schedule does not invalidate a reference or conviction for the primary offence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 from the Second Schedule of the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901 invalidate a conviction based on constructive liability?
  • Is it necessary for provisions governing constructive liability, such as Section 34 or Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, to be explicitly listed in a schedule of referable offences to be applied by a Tribunal or Jirga?
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• KHOKHAR GLASS WORKS, KARACHI vs KHOKHAR GLASS WORKS MAZDQOR1970 PLC 659 · Industrial Court · 1970-02-14Read full judgment →
• KHEMUMAL AND 2 Others vs THE CUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY, SOUTH1970 SCMR 419 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-28
  statutory interpretationadjournmentcognate mattersDisplaced Persons Actprocedural law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns an appeal pending before the Supreme Court of Pakistan involving the interpretation of provisions within the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. During the preliminary hearing, the Court identified that the appeal raises significant questions of law that are of general application and require authoritative determination. Noting that other cognate matters involving identical legal questions are currently pending before the Court, the Bench determined that it would be procedurally appropriate and advisable to defer the hearing of the present appeal. Consequently, the Court ordered the adjournment of the proceedings to be heard concurrently with the related pending matters by the Full Court at Lahore on a specified future date. The judgment does not resolve the substantive issues but establishes the procedural necessity of consolidating similar cases for a definitive ruling on the statutory interpretation of the aforementioned Acts.

  Questions settled

  • Is it appropriate to adjourn an appeal to be heard alongside other pending cognate matters involving identical questions of law?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the discretion to consolidate cases involving similar statutory interpretation issues for a Full Court hearing?
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• KHANUN vs MATHELA AND ANOTHER1970 P Cr. L J 480 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-30Read full judgment →
• Khan, Member EMPLOYEES' UNION vs MANAGER, PAKISTAN PHARMACEUTICAL1970 PLC 821 · Labour Court · 1970-04-04Read full judgment →
• Khan Bahadur Mian FEROZ SHAH (REPRESENTED BY 10 HEIRS) vs THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NORTH ZONE, (WEST PAKISTAN), LAHORE1970 PLD Peshawar 83 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-10-30Read full judgment →
• KHALIL KHAN vs THE STATE1970 PLD Peshawar 24 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-07-15Read full judgment →
• KHALIL AHMAD vs JAMIL AHMAD AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 787 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-20
  alteration of sentencesudden fightsudden quarrelculpable homicidemurderleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court which altered the respondents' conviction from Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to Section 304 Part II/34 of the same Code, reducing their sentences from transportation for life to three years' rigorous imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that the respondents launched a pre-planned attack on the deceased and his companions, causing fatal head injuries. However, the High Court appraised the evidence and concluded that the incident was a sudden affair arising from an altercation in the bazaar, during which both parties sustained injuries. Applying Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, the High Court determined that the respondents did not take undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner during the sudden fight. The Supreme Court, reviewing these findings, declined to interfere with the High Court's assessment of the facts and application of the law, thereby upholding the alteration of the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sudden altercation in a public street resulting in mutual injuries attracts Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to Section 304 Part II if the accused did not take undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner during a sudden fight?
  • Does the presence of injuries on the person of the accused support the plea of a sudden melee or mutual fight for the purpose of mitigating a murder charge?
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• KHALIL AHMAD SIDDIQUI vs B. F. CABRAL1970 SCMR 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-27
  evictionpersonal bona fide requirementlandlord and tenantmedical groundssecond appealresidential property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an eviction dispute concerning a residential bungalow in Karachi. The respondent-landlord sought the eviction of the petitioner-tenant on the ground of personal bona fide requirement under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. Although the Rent Controller and the appellate authority rejected the eviction application, the High Court reversed their decisions in second appeal and decreed eviction. The core legal question was whether the landlord's requirement was bona fide given that he had sold his previous house and purchased a third-floor flat. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, upholding the High Court's decision, held that the landlord's advanced age of 81 years and medical conditions, which prevented him from climbing stairs to his third-floor flat, established a genuine and bona fide need to occupy the ground-floor bungalow. Additionally, the Court ruled that the relevant rent restriction law does not contemplate or warrant the physical division of a residential house to be shared between a landlord and a tenant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord's medical condition and advanced age preventing him from climbing stairs to a third-floor flat constitute a bona fide requirement for a ground-floor residential bungalow under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Can a residential house be ordered to be divided or partitioned to accommodate both the landlord and the tenant under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• KHALID MAHMOOD AND Another vs THE STATE1970 PLD Lahore 470 · Lahore High Court · 1969-04-14
  bail before arrestmartial law regulationsjurisdiction of high courtcriminal procedure codeprovisional constitution order
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves petitions for bail before arrest arising from a criminal case registered at Police Station Gojra, involving offences under the Pakistan Penal Code and contraventions of Martial Law Regulations and Orders. The core legal question is whether the High Court possesses jurisdiction under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to grant pre-arrest bail in respect of offences created by Martial Law Regulations. The Court held that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to grant bail under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for offences created by Martial Law Regulations, as the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are excluded by virtue of special regimes, Martial Law provisions, and the Provisional Constitution Order. The key principle laid down is that where special procedures and bars are established under Martial Law Regulations and Orders, ordinary criminal court jurisdictions and the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are ousted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to grant bail before arrest in respect of offences created by Martial Law Regulations?
  • Does the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 stand excluded when special procedures are prescribed under Martial Law Regulations and Orders?
  Read full judgment →
• KHALI D PERVEZ vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 264 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• KHAISTA GUL vs MIAN GUL1970 SCMR 571 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-25
  pre-emptionGadoon Areastatutory extensionGovernor-General's OrderEstablishment of West Pakistan Actterritorial application of lawsprovincial laws
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the right to pre-empt the sale of land in the Gadoon Area of Mardan District. The petitioner sought to enforce a claim under the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act 1950. The core legal question was whether this Act, or other provincial laws, had been extended to the Gadoon Area, which was added to the Mardan District via the Governor-General's Order No. VII of 1953. The Supreme Court held that the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act 1950 had not been extended to the area, as no notification was issued by the Governor under the relevant Order. The Court rejected arguments that the Establishment of West Pakistan Act 1955 automatically extended the Pre-emption Act to the added area. The key principle laid down is that laws in force in a province do not automatically apply to newly added areas without specific notification as required by the governing instrument, and the mere inclusion of an area into a province does not extend all pre-existing provincial statutes to that territory.

  Questions settled

  • Was the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act 1950 extended to the Gadoon Area of Mardan District?
  • Did the Establishment of West Pakistan Act 1955 automatically extend all provincial laws to newly added areas?
  • Does the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to the Gadoon Area?
  • Can a party enforce a right of pre-emption in the Gadoon Area independently of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act 1950?
  Read full judgment →
• KHAIR MUHAMMAD KHAN AND Other vs WAHID BUX1970 PLD Karachi 60 · Sindh High Court · 1969-08-27Read full judgment →
• KHAIR MOHAMMAD vs AIJAZ HUSSAIN1970 SCMR 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-19
  ejectmentpersonal userent appealmixed question of fact and lawleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a second rent appeal by the High Court, which upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts ordering the ejectment of the petitioner from the disputed house on the ground of reasonable and good faith requirement by the respondent for his personal use due to illness. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could raise a new plea regarding the non-service of notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act at the appellate stage. The Supreme Court held that the point raised was a mixed question of fact and law that could not be allowed to be raised for the first time in these proceedings. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing the principle that mixed questions of fact and law cannot be agitated for the first time in leave to appeal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea regarding the non-service of notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act be raised for the first time in leave to appeal proceedings?
  • Whether a mixed question of fact and law can be allowed to be raised in the Supreme Court when not urged before the lower forums?
  Read full judgment →
• KHAIR MOHAMMAD KHAN AND 5 Others vs WAHID BUX1970 SCMR 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08
  agricultural landmortgage redemptionstatutory interpretationcivil appealland transferleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a civil dispute over the possession of agricultural land, originally initiated by the petitioners who claimed the land was mortgaged to the respondent and subsequently redeemed. The respondent contended the transaction was an outright sale. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the petitioners. During the pendency of the appeal, the Sind Rural Credit Land Transfer Act was amended in 1963. The District Judge applied the amended Section 3, which restricted the prohibition on land sales to specific debtor-creditor relationships, and dismissed the suit. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' second appeal, holding that because the transaction was a mortgage, the statutory bar in Section 3 of the Sind Rural Credit Land Transfer Act did not apply. Upon further appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioners challenged the application of the amended law and the interpretation of the transaction. The Supreme Court found merit in the petitioners' contentions and granted leave to appeal, indicating that the lower courts' application of the law and interpretation of the transaction requires further judicial scrutiny.

  Questions settled

  • Does the amendment to Section 3 of the Sind Rural Credit Land Transfer Act 1963 apply retrospectively to pending suits?
  • Whether a transaction characterized as a mortgage falls under the prohibition of sale provisions of the Sind Rural Credit Land Transfer Act?
  • Can an appellate court apply an amended statute to a suit that was decided by the trial court prior to the amendment?
  Read full judgment →
• KHAIR MOHAMMAD (REPRESENTED BY HEIRS) AND Another vs GHULAM1970 PLD Karachi 212 · Sindh High Court · 1969-05-16
  execution of decreelimitation periodFederal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Actrepeal of statuteletters patent appealJudicial Committee of Khairpur Stateconstitutional interpretation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns Letters Patent Appeals arising from execution proceedings of decrees originally passed by the Judicial Committee of the former Khairpur State. The core legal question was whether the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, 1949, was a constitutional amendment to the Government of India Act, 1935, that stood repealed upon the repeal of the 1935 Act in 1956, or whether it remained an independent statute governing the limitation period for executing the subject decrees. The Court held that the 1949 Act was an independent statute and not a constitutional amendment to the 1935 Act; thus, it survived the repeal of the 1935 Act. Consequently, the orders of the Judicial Committee of Khairpur State were deemed orders of the Supreme Court of Pakistan under Section 9(3) of the 1949 Act. The Court established that Article 183 of the Limitation Act, 1908, providing a 12-year limitation period, applied to these decrees rather than Article 182, rendering the execution applications filed in 1960 within time.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, 1949, constitute an independent statute or an amendment to the Government of India Act, 1935?
  • Was the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, 1949, repealed by the repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935, under the Constitution of 1956?
  • Does Article 183 of the Limitation Act, 1908, apply to the execution of decrees passed by the Judicial Committee of the former Khairpur State?
  Read full judgment →
• KHAIR DIN vs CHIFF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE1970 SCMR 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-03
  evacuee propertymortgage redemptionagricultural landspecial leave to appealwrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the summary dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, concerning the ejectment of a mortgagee in possession of evacuee agricultural land. The core legal question revolves around whether the expiry of the stipulated period under section 14-A of Amending Ordinance LXIV of 1962 renders the mortgage irredeemable if the mortgage money is not paid within such period. The Supreme Court held that the time prescribed in the said section is for the benefit of the settlement authorities and does not confer any new or additional right on the mortgagee, and that the settlement authority is entitled to redeem the mortgaged property upon payment of the debt. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the settlement authority can redeem the property and the mortgagee may request the amount due.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 14-A of Amending Ordinance LXIV of 1962 render a mortgage irredeemable if the mortgage money is not paid within the stipulated period?
  • Is the time prescribed under section 14-A of Amending Ordinance LXIV of 1962 intended for the benefit of the settlement authorities?
  • Can settlement authorities redeem mortgaged evacuee property upon payment of the mortgage debt after the expiry of the prescribed time?
  Read full judgment →
• KHAGENDRA NATH DAS Alias KHOKA DAS AND Another vs BIRENDRA NATH1970 SCMR 823 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-22
  petition for leave to appeallimitationcondonation of delayLetters Patent appealsecond appealcertified copy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court summarily dismissing a Second Appeal. The plaintiff had successfully obtained a decree for declaration of title and recovery of possession, which was affirmed by the lower appellate court based on concurrent findings that the plaintiff had taken delivery of possession in execution of a previous decree. The petitioners applied for leave to appeal under the Letters Patent, which was refused. The Supreme Court held that the petition for leave to appeal was barred by limitation by twenty-five days, as time ran from the date of the initial High Court judgment rather than the subsequent order refusing leave under the Letters Patent, and the petitioner failed to show sufficient cause for the delay. The petition was accordingly dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does limitation for filing a petition for leave to appeal run from the date of the primary judgment or from the date of the order refusing leave under the Letters Patent?
  • Whether illness of a petitioner during a period after the limitation has already expired constitutes sufficient ground for condonation of delay?
  • Can time spent in pursuing an incompetent or subsequent remedy be excluded when computing the period of limitation for a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• KHADIM HUSSAIN vs THE STATE AND 8 OTHERS1970 P Cr. L J 56 · Sindh High Court · 1969-05-24Read full judgment →
• KHADIM AND 16 Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 166 · Lahore High Court · 1969-01-20Read full judgment →
• KHADAM HUSSAIN AND 3 Others vs ATA MUHAMMAD AND 7 Other1970 SCMR 127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-02
  civil jurisdictionwaqf propertyproprietary rightsgraveyard managementcharitable endowmentspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of West Pakistan. The petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of civil courts, raising two primary legal questions: first, whether Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was attracted, thereby barring the suit regarding the management of a graveyard; and second, whether Section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 ousted the jurisdiction of civil courts where proprietary rights had been acquired. The Supreme Court rejected both contentions. It held that because the petitioners claimed the land as private property rather than acting as Mutawallis, Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was inapplicable. Furthermore, the Court determined that Section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 did not bar the suit because the grant of proprietary rights was predicated on the land being private property. The Court affirmed that if land is dedicated to charitable or religious purposes, the grant of proprietary rights is legally invalid and subject to civil court jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to a suit where the defendants do not claim to act as Mutawallis of a graveyard?
  • Does Section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 bar civil court jurisdiction when proprietary rights were granted based on the premise of private ownership?
  • Is a grant of proprietary rights over land dedicated to charitable or religious purposes amenable to the jurisdiction of civil courts?
  Read full judgment →
• KHADAM HUSAIN Arts 4 Others vs The STATE1970 P Cr. L J 735 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-22Read full judgment →
• KETAB ALI vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 415 · Dacca · 1969-07-23Read full judgment →
• Kazi DOULATUR RAHMA14 vs THE MANAGER, KOHINOVR JUTE MILLS LTD., DACCA1970 PLC 810 · Labour Court · 1970-05-07Read full judgment →
• Kazi DAUD AHMED vs Kazi FEROZE SIDDIQUE1970 SC M R832 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  quashment of criminal proceedingscriminal proceduremalicious prosecutionspecial leave to appealdischarge of accused
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed against the decision of the High Court of East Pakistan dismissing an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner by his nephew. The core legal question concerned whether criminal proceedings that fail to disclose any specific offence or complicity against the accused should be allowed to continue, amounting to harassment. The Supreme Court of Pakistan declined to grant leave for appeal, noting that doing so would unduly prolong the proceedings and cause further delay. Instead, the Court dismissed the petition while directing the trial magistrate to expeditiously dispose of the case within thirty days, emphasizing that if the complaint and initial examination disclose no specific offence or if the complainant fails to bring forth material establishing guilt, the petitioner should be promptly discharged to prevent malicious prosecution. The key principle laid down is that criminal proceedings lacking specific allegations or disclosing no offence on their face should be resolved expeditiously to prevent harassment of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether criminal proceedings that fail to disclose any specific offence against the accused should be quashed?
  • Can a person be cited as both an accused and a witness in the same criminal complaint?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure when speedy disposal by the trial court adequately safeguards the petitioner's interest?
  Read full judgment →
• KAVASJI AND 2 Others vs THE KARACHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,KARACHI1970 SCMR 523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-13
  conservancy taxmunicipal corporationsecond appealquestion of factnotice requirementrefuse removal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the competency of the Karachi Municipal Corporation to recover conservancy tax from the petitioners in respect of their property situated in the Karachi Port Trust (K.P.T.) Area. The petitioners contended that the respondent-Corporation failed to issue the requisite notice under Section 99(1) of the Karachi Municipal Act prior to charging the tax. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the objection regarding the lack of notice was a question of fact which could not be raised for the first time during a second appeal. On the merits, the Court reiterated the established principle that the validity of a conservancy tax does not depend on the municipal authority making individual arrangements for the collection and removal of refuse from every specific premises, provided that general arrangements for the collection and removal of refuse from the broader area are in place.

  Questions settled

  • Can an objection regarding the failure to issue a statutory municipal tax notice under Section 99(1) of the Karachi Municipal Act be raised for the first time in a second appeal?
  • Is a municipal corporation required to make individual arrangements for the collection and removal of refuse from every specific premises to validly levy a conservancy tax?
  Read full judgment →
• KATRA SINGH vs MESSRS B. K. RAKSHIT & Co., CHITTAGONG1970 PLC 831 · Labour Court · 1970-01-29Read full judgment →
• KAROO vs THE CROWN1970 SCMR 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1952-10-30
  attempt to murdercommon intentionvicarious liabilitycriminal appealdeath sentencemedical evidencecausation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged a conviction for murder and a sentence of death. The appellant had struck the deceased on the head with a hatchet, while two other individuals subsequently threw the victim into a canal. The core legal question was whether the appellant could be held liable for murder under the doctrine of common intention, given that the lower courts had found no pre-concerted plan and that the fatal act was likely the drowning, not the head injury. The Supreme Court held that since the findings of fact excluded a pre-concerted plan and intentional co-operation between the appellant and the others, the appellant could not be held liable for the act of drowning. Consequently, the Court set aside the murder conviction and death sentence, substituting it with a conviction for attempted murder under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing the appellant to transportation for life. The judgment establishes that in the absence of common intention, an accused is only liable for the specific criminal act they personally committed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted of murder when the findings of fact negate a pre-concerted plan or common intention with others who performed the fatal act?
  • Does the infliction of a non-fatal injury, followed by a separate fatal act by others, constitute murder by the initial assailant in the absence of common intention?
  • Is an appellate court bound by the findings of fact of lower courts regarding the absence of a pre-concerted plan?
  Read full judgment →
• KAROO vs THE CROWN-1970 P Cr. L J 871 · Federal Shariat Court · 1952-10-30Read full judgment →
• KARIM vs Hajyani HANIFA AND 4 Other1970 PLD Karachi 613 · Sindh High Court · 1961-01-19
  nominationinheritanceMahomedan Lawco-operative societyabsolute ownershippartition suitpersonal law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from a suit for partition of property filed by the appellant, claiming a share in the estate of his deceased father, Haji Habib. The central legal question was whether a nomination made under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, regarding a house in a housing society, overrides the personal law of inheritance (Mahomedan Law), thereby conferring absolute ownership upon the nominee to the exclusion of other legal heirs. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the nomination made by the deceased in favour of his wife, Mst. Hajiani Hanifa, was valid and conferred absolute title upon her. The Court established that Section 27 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, operates in supersession of personal law. Consequently, a nominee under the Act becomes the absolute owner of the property, and the property does not form part of the deceased's estate subject to distribution among heirs under Mahomedan Law. The Court rejected the argument that the nominee acts merely as an administrator or trustee for other heirs.

  Questions settled

  • Does a nomination under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, override the personal law of inheritance?
  • Is a nominee under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, an absolute owner of the property or merely an administrator for the heirs?
  • Does the nomination of property under the Provident Funds Act, 1925, confer absolute rights to the nominee?
  Read full judgment →
• KARIM HAYAT KHAN vs MUHAMMAD RAFIQ AND 11 Other1970 SCMR 382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-02
  special leave to appealrevenue entriesrecord of rightspossessionshamlat landconcurrent findingsdeclaratory suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges the decision of the High Court upholding decrees of the lower courts in a suit brought under section 45 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act. The suit sought a declaration that revenue entries in the Record-of-Rights for 1956-57 and subsequent girdawari showing the petitioner in possession of disputed Shamlat land were incorrect. The core legal question concerned the validity of the revenue entries and whether the petitioner or his predecessors-in-title were in lawful possession of the property prior to the impugned entries. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts and the High Court were unexceptionable, as the petitioner failed to establish valid possession, and documents not part of the record could not be relied upon. The Court laid down the principle that revenue entries unsupported by antecedent lawful possession or valid primary record cannot form the basis of a declaration in favour of a claimant, and appellate courts will not entertain documents produced for the first time without proper admission into evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding revenue entries can be disturbed in second appeal without a valid legal ground?
  • Can an unproduced document or khatauni not made part of the trial record be relied upon for the first time before the appellate court?
  • Do revenue entries showing possession without a valid basis in antecedent records confer rights to the claimant?
  Read full judgment →
• KARIM GUL AND Another vs SHAHZAD GUL AND Another1970 SCMR 141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-11-13
  withdrawal of suitfresh suitcause of actioncivil procedurespecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court upholding the decree in favor of the respondent in a suit for possession of land. The core legal question concerns whether a court, upon an application under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, can permit the withdrawal of a suit while refusing permission to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The Supreme Court held that the application for withdrawal and permission to bring a fresh suit under sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is indivisible, and the right to bring a fresh suit follows from the withdrawal so permitted. The petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for withdrawal of a suit and permission to bring a fresh suit under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is indivisible?
  • Can a court allow the withdrawal of a suit while refusing permission to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter?
  Read full judgment →
• KARIM BAKHSH vs Mst. MUBARIK JAN1970 PLD Peshawar 169 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-03-18
  superintendence and controlFamily Courtdissolution of marriagejudicial reviewadministrative powerfinality of decreerestitution of conjugal rights
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought to challenge a decree of dissolution of marriage granted by a Family Court, which had upheld a prior dissolution by a Conciliation Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court, under its power of superintendence and control over subordinate courts pursuant to Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962, could interfere with the findings and decrees of a Family Court, particularly when the statute governing Family Courts restricts appeals. The Court held that while Article 102 empowers the High Court to supervise and control subordinate courts to ensure the proper administration of justice, this power is administrative and judicial in nature, intended to maintain the purity of the judicial process rather than to function as a substitute for appellate or revisional jurisdiction for the benefit of private litigants. The Court established that Article 102 does not grant parties a right to seek relief against adverse judgments; rather, it is a tool for the High Court to correct systemic errors. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the Family Court's decree, noting that the petitioner's attempt to re-litigate a concluded matter subverted the legislative intent of finality in family disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Family Court constituted under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962?
  • Does the power of superintendence under Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962 allow the High Court to act as a court of appeal or revision for the benefit of private litigants?
  • Can the High Court exercise its power of superintendence under Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962 to interfere with a decree of a Family Court where the statute provides for finality of such decrees?
  Read full judgment →
• KARIM BAKHSH vs GHULAM RASOOL AND 13 OTHERS1970 P Cr. L J 1246 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-23Read full judgment →
• KARAMAT ALI TALUKDAR vs MD. NOWAZ ALI TALUKDAR AND Other1970 PLD Dacca 388 · Dacca · 1967-07-05Read full judgment →
• KARAM KHAN vs WEST PAKISTAN AGRICULTURALDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION1970 SCMR 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-12
  leave to appealState landtenancyproject areaejectmentvested rights
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging his ejectment from fifty acres of State land held as a tenant under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. The dispute originated when the Governor of West Pakistan declared the area a project area under Section 23 of the West Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation Ordinance, 1961, and transferred its management to the Agricultural Development Corporation under Section 25. The Corporation sought to eject the petitioner under Section 17(3) of the Ordinance after he refused to execute a Patanama requiring him to vacate the land at the end of the agricultural year. The petitioner contended that Section 17(3) was inapplicable, no regulations had been framed under Section 17(i), and the Patanama confiscated his vested rights. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the important questions of law raised regarding the scope and applicability of the statutory provisions governing ejectment and continued possession in project areas.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Agricultural Development Corporation can order the ejectment of a tenant under Section 17(3) of the West Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation Ordinance, 1961, without framing regulations under Section 17(i)?
  • Is a condition requiring a tenant in possession to vacate the land at the end of the agricultural year repugnant to Section 17(i) of the West Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation Ordinance, 1961?
  • Does a Patanama issued by the Agricultural Development Corporation confiscate vested rights acquired under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912?
  Read full judgment →
• KARAM DIN vs THE SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE1970 PLD Lahore 766 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• KARAM BAKHSH vs MUHAMMAD ASHRAF AND Another1970 SCMR 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-09
  Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Actlocus standitransfer of propertysettlement authoritiesspecial leave to appealinformant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding the transfer of a shop situated in Burewala, initially divided into two portions occupied by different individuals, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question is whether a person not in occupation of any portion of the property and not a party to the initial transfer proceedings has the locus standi to challenge the transfer as an informant before settlement authorities. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner had no locus standi to interfere or act as an informant under the Act, and that the transfer of the unified property to the occupant claimant was regular and lawful. The Court laid down the principle that third parties cannot intervene in transfer proceedings through unauthorized methods and that complaints regarding such matters must be directed to the proper Enforcement Authorities under the relevant Press Note rather than attempting to backdoor litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person not in occupation of a property have locus standi under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 to act as an informant in transfer proceedings?
  • Can property occupied by a local be transferred to a claimant when treated as a single unit by the Settlement Authorities?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner who assumed jurisdiction upon an unauthorized complaint?
  Read full judgment →
• KARACHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, KARACHI vs THB KARACHI PARSI CO1970 PLD Karachi 216 · Sindh High Court · 1969-07-24Read full judgment →
• KARACHI HOTEL WORKERS' UNION vs MESSRS HOTEL METROPOLE, KARACHI1970 PLC 767 · Labour Court · 1970-02-28Read full judgment →
• KARACHI CO OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETIES UNION LTD vs SAFIA BAI AND 121970 PLD Karachi 379 · Sindh High Court · 1969-09-10
  arbitration awardreceiver authorityretrospective ratificationestoppelacquiescenceLetters Patent Appealjurisdiction of arbitrator
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment arises from two Letters Patent Appeals challenging a decision of a learned Single Judge who made an arbitration award a rule of the Court and granted interest. The core legal questions involved whether a court-appointed receiver had the authority to refer a dispute to arbitration without prior express permission, whether such a reference could be ratified retrospectively, and whether a participating party was estopped from subsequently challenging the arbitrator's jurisdiction based on technical irregularities. The Sindh High Court held that the receiver acted with implied authority, which was subsequently made explicit by retrospective court sanction, and that the appellant Union, having fully participated in the arbitration proceedings and consented to extensions of time without timely objection to jurisdiction, was estopped from challenging the validity of the award. The key principles laid down include that the element of agreement in conferring jurisdiction upon an arbitrator allows for the doctrine of acquiescence and estoppel, and that a party taking the chance of an award cannot later invalidate it on technical grounds of initial informalities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court-appointed receiver can make a reference to arbitration without prior express permission of the court?
  • Can an unauthorized reference to arbitration be validated through retrospective sanction or ratification by the court?
  • Is a party that actively participates in arbitration proceedings and consents to extensions of time estopped from later challenging the arbitrator's jurisdiction on technical grounds?
  • Does the doctrine of acquiescence prevent a party from avoiding an unfavorable arbitration award due to initial informalities in the submission to arbitration?
  Read full judgment →
• KAMIL NOOK KHAN vs CONTROLLING AUTHORITY, UNION COMMITTEE1970 PLD Karachi 730 · Sindh High Court · 1970-04-17
  constitutional petitionvote of no-confidencecontrolling authoritybasic democraciesmandatory and directory provisionsnotice periodunion committee
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition under Article 98 of the Constitution challenged the convening of a no-confidence meeting against the Chairman of a Union Committee and his subsequent removal. The core legal questions revolved around whether the Chairman of the Karachi Municipal Corporation was legally competent to act as the Controlling Authority to convene the meeting, and whether the requirement of providing seven clear days' notice under the West Pakistan Basic Democracies (Vote of No-Confidence against Chairman) Rules, 1963 was mandatory or directory. The Sindh High Court held that the Chairman of the Karachi Municipal Corporation was lawfully empowered as the Controlling Authority by virtue of government notifications issued under the definition clause of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, and that the provision regarding seven clear days' notice is directory rather than mandatory, serving as a procedural irregularity that does not invalidate proceedings unless prejudice is shown, particularly where all members attended and participated. The petition was consequently dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chairman of a Municipal Corporation is authorized to act as a Controlling Authority under the Basic Democracies Order, 1959?
  • Is the requirement of giving seven clear days' notice under rule 3(2) of the West Pakistan Basic Democracies (Vote of No-Confidence against Chairman) Rules, 1963 mandatory or directory?
  • Does the failure to provide the prescribed clear days' notice invalidate a no-confidence meeting when all members attend and participate without showing prejudice?
  Read full judgment →
• KAMAL AHMAD SIDDIQUI vs MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ AND Other1970 SCMR 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-13
  election disputenomination paperReturning Officerspecial interest representationmunicipal electionlawful authoritywrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns an election dispute regarding the rejection of a nomination paper for the Karachi Municipal Corporation. The core legal question was whether the Returning Officer acted lawfully in rejecting the respondent's nomination paper on the ground that the certificate of membership for a social organization, required for special interest representation, was not properly authenticated. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the rejection of the nomination paper was without lawful authority. The Court held that neither the Municipal Administration Ordinance nor the West Pakistan Municipal Committee (Election of Members to represent Special Interests) Rules, 1966, contained any provision requiring the authentication of the certificate of membership for a social organization. Consequently, the rejection of the nomination paper was legally invalid, and the High Court correctly set aside the Returning Officer's order. The key principle laid down is that election authorities cannot impose requirements for nomination papers, such as the authentication of documents, that are not explicitly prescribed by the governing statute or rules, as doing so constitutes an act without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Returning Officer reject a nomination paper based on a requirement not prescribed by the governing election rules?
  • Does the Municipal Administration Ordinance or the West Pakistan Municipal Committee (Election of Members to represent Special Interests) Rules, 1966 require the authentication of a membership certificate for a social organization?
  • Is the rejection of a nomination paper without a statutory basis considered an act without lawful authority?
  Read full judgment →
• KALIMULLAH & SONS vs THE PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH THE COLLECTOR, SHEIKH UPURA1970 SCMR 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-06
  interest on money decreeevacuee propertyrestraint orderwithheld paymentpetition for leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court concerning a money decree and the claim for interest on a sum found due to the petitioner, Kalimullah & Sons. The core legal question is whether the Provincial Government is liable to pay interest on money whose payment was withheld due to a restraint order issued by the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's view, finding the Provincial Government not liable for interest during the period it was prevented by the Custodian's restraint order from releasing the funds, is correct. The key principle laid down is that a party withholding payment strictly in compliance with a valid legal restraint order from a competent authority cannot be held liable for interest on the detained sum for the duration of the restraint.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Provincial Government is liable for interest on a sum whose payment was withheld pursuant to a restraint order issued by the Custodian of Evacuee Property?
  • Does a communication regarding the non-evacuee nature of property constitute a formal release order lifting a prior restraint order?
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• KALIMUDDIN ANSART AND Another vs DIRECTOR, EXCISE AND TAXATION, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Karachi 1 · Sindh High Court · 1969-08-04Read full judgment →
• KALIA Alias AFIRUDDIN vs THE STATE-Opposite-Party1970 P Cr. L J 1322 · Dacca · 1970-04-21Read full judgment →
• KALA MIA vs THE MANAGER, MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ORGANISATION, E. P.1970 PLC 826 · Labour Court · 1970-05-15Read full judgment →
• KAKA AND 24 Others vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, SIALKOT AND Other1970 S CM R 618 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  property transferlachesunregistered factorylocus standidisplaced personswrit petitionsettlement authorities
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Letters Patent Appeal by the High Court, which had upheld the transfer of property known as Desraj Dinanath Rice Mills to a respondent. The petitioners, refugees from Jammu and Kashmir, claimed occupancy rights based on kacha hutments erected on the premises. The core legal questions were whether the petitioners had standing to challenge the property transfer despite failing to file necessary forms under the applicable settlement scheme, and whether the four-year delay in filing a writ petition constituted fatal laches. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners lacked entitlement to the property, as the settlement authorities correctly classified the premises as an unregistered factory, which the construction of kacha hutments did not alter. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the writ petition was barred by serious laches due to the four-year delay. The Court also clarified that the statutory protection against ejectment previously afforded to refugees under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act had been repealed by subsequent legislation, leaving the petitioners without legal recourse.

  Questions settled

  • Does the construction of kacha hutments on a factory compound change the legal character of the property for settlement purposes?
  • Does a four-year delay in filing a writ petition against settlement authorities constitute fatal laches?
  • Are refugees entitled to protection from ejectment under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act after the enactment of Ordinance No. XIII of 1964?
  Read full judgment →
• KAJIR AND 2 Other vs BARAN SHAH1970 PLD Quetta 19 · Balochistan High Court · 1969-10-08
  land revenuerecord of rightsdeclaratory suitfrontier crimes regulationstatutory interpretationpermissive provisionjurisdiction of civil court
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment disposes of four appeals involving an identical question of law regarding the maintainability of declaratory suits for rectification of record-of-rights under section 45 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1867, as applicable to Baluchistan, in the absence of prior permission from the Collector. The trial court had dismissed the suits for lack of prior permission, but the District Judge reversed the decision, holding that the relevant provisions had become inoperative upon the withdrawal of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901. The core legal question was whether section 45(1) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1867 is mandatory, requiring a litigant to obtain prior permission from the Collector before filing a declaratory suit in a civil court. The Balochistan High Court dismissed the appeals and held that section 45(1) was merely an enabling and permissive provision rather than a mandatory one, meaning that the absence of prior permission did not render the suits incompetent or not maintainable. The court laid down the principle that the word 'may' in section 45(1) confers a discretionary privilege for the benefit of the aggrieved party rather than imposing an imperative obligation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 45(1) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1867 is a mandatory provision requiring prior permission from the Collector before filing a declaratory suit?
  • Does the withdrawal of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 affect the interpretation of section 45 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1867?
  • Whether the word 'may' in section 45(1) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1867 should be construed as 'must'?
  • Are suits for declaration and rectification of record-of-rights filed without prior recourse to the Collector under section 45 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1867 maintainable in a civil court?
  Read full judgment →
• KAISAR MUSTAFA AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1128 · Lahore High Court · 1970-02-02Read full judgment →
• KAIM AND Another vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1061 · Sindh High Court · 1969-12-15Read full judgment →
• KABEZ MONDAL AND 7 Others vs The STATE1970 SCMR 884 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-15
  infructuous petitionspecial leave to appealcriminal revisionsentence serveddismissal of petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners were convicted under Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to two years of rigorous imprisonment, a conviction and sentence subsequently affirmed by the Sessions Judge. Upon revision, the High Court maintained the conviction but reduced the sentence to one year of rigorous imprisonment. The petitioners filed a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. During the pendency of these proceedings, the petitioners completed their full sentences. When the matter came up for hearing, counsel for the petitioners acknowledged that the petition had become infructuous due to the completion of the sentences and requested to withdraw the petition. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as having become infructuous. The judgment confirms the principle that where a sentence has been fully served, a petition for special leave to appeal against the conviction and sentence becomes infructuous and is liable to be dismissed on that ground.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petition for special leave to appeal become infructuous if the petitioner has served the full sentence imposed?
  • Can a petition be dismissed if the counsel for the petitioner does not wish to press it due to the completion of the sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• K. S. NOOR MUHAMMAD KHAN vs THE SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1970 SCMR 415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-30
  settlement authoritiesconstitutional jurisdictiontransfer of propertycompromiseLetters Patent Appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal regarding the transfer and division of garages, servant quarters, and an open compound of a residential bungalow in Karachi under settlement laws. The core legal question concerned the extent of jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution in interfering with factual divisions and determinations made by competent settlement authorities. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted in excess of its constitutional jurisdiction by disturbing the division made by the settlement authorities. During the proceedings, the parties filed a joint petition of compromise detailing an agreement of sale of the appellant's rights to the fifth respondent. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and disposed of the appeal in terms of the compromise, laying down the principle that the High Court cannot arbitrarily interfere with findings of fact and divisions made by statutory settlement authorities in constitutional jurisdiction unless jurisdictional defect is established, while acknowledging the parties' right to compromise.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with the division of property made by settlement authorities under constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can an appeal be disposed of in terms of a joint petition of compromise filed by the parties before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• K. M. ZAKER HUSSAIN, C. S. P. vs THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN THROUGH1970 SCMR 634 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-04
  compulsory retirementcivil servicedisciplinary inquiryreasonable opportunitynatural justicewrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a member of the Civil Service of Pakistan, challenged his compulsory retirement ordered by the President of Pakistan under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960, following an inquiry into corruption charges. The petitioner contended that the inquiry process was procedurally flawed, alleging he was denied a reasonable opportunity to defend himself because he was not provided with a list of witnesses or summaries of their statements, a defense witness was not called, and he was denied legal representation. The High Court dismissed his writ petition, finding that the inquiry complied with the relevant rules and that the petitioner had been afforded a full opportunity to meet the charges. Upon petition for special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the grievances and found no evidence that the inquiry officer acted contrary to the rules or that the petitioner suffered prejudice. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, affirming that no valid grounds existed for interference with the administrative action taken against the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to provide a list of witnesses and summaries of statements in a disciplinary inquiry constitutes a denial of a reasonable opportunity to show cause?
  • Does the denial of legal representation during a departmental inquiry violate the constitutional right to a reasonable opportunity of defense?
  • Can a court interfere with an order of compulsory retirement where the inquiry officer has acted in accordance with the applicable disciplinary rules?
  Read full judgment →
• K. E. S. C. LABOUR UNION vs MESSERS KARACHI ELECTRIC SUPPLY1970 PLC 43 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
• K. B. SALIK vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT1970 PLC 415 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-03-04Read full judgment →
• JOYNAL ABEDIN DHALI vs MABULLAH MATBAR AND 13 Others1970 P Cr. L J 830 · Dacca · 1969-11-14Read full judgment →
• JOHANN KELLER WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES UNION vs CHAIRMAN, THIRD1970 SCMR 821 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-25
  labour disputedismissal for defaultrestoration applicationsufficient causenon-appearancespecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a recognized trade union, filed a labour dispute case before the Third Labour Court, Dacca, which was subsequently dismissed for default due to the non-appearance of the parties. An application for restoration of the case was dismissed by the Labour Court on the ground that there was no sufficient cause for the petitioner's absence, as the parties were expected to ascertain the hearing dates themselves and no separate notice of the hearing date was required to be served. A writ petition challenging the Labour Court's order was dismissed by the High Court. Upon a petition for special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the petitioner had sufficient cause for non-appearance and whether notice of the hearing date was mandatory under the rules. The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court was justified in concluding that no sufficient cause was shown for restoration and that the rules did not enjoin giving separate notice of the hearing date to the parties. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's order and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party is entitled to a separate notice of the date of hearing in a labour dispute case under the applicable procedural rules?
  • Does the failure to ascertain the date of hearing constitute sufficient cause for the restoration of a labour dispute case dismissed for default?
  • Is interference warranted with the concurrent findings of the Labour Court and the High Court regarding the absence of sufficient cause for non-appearance?
  Read full judgment →
• JHANDA KHAN vs NAWAB DIN AND Other1970 SCMR 31 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-13
  land settlement schememortgagee rightsrehabilitation authoritiesallotment cancellationproduce index unitswrit jurisdictionleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated as a writ petition challenging the cancellation of agricultural land allotted to the petitioner under the Land Settlement Scheme No. 1, following a curtailment of his entitlement by the Central Record Office. The petitioner contended that the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner lacked the jurisdiction to review the initial allotment and confirmation order. The High Court dismissed the petition, finding that the authorities were merely implementing the Central Record Office's order regarding the petitioner's curtailed entitlement and that the petitioner had received land in excess of his actual entitlement. The Supreme Court examined the petitioner's claim regarding mortgagee rights, noting that under paragraphs 7 and 7-A of the Settlement Scheme, the petitioner was not entitled to land allotment against such rights. Furthermore, the Court observed that the land in question had already been allotted to the respondents and became their absolute property under the Land Settlement Act, 1961, prior to the promulgation of the scheme under which the petitioner sought to purchase the land. Leave to appeal was granted specifically to consider the application of paragraphs 7 and 7-A of the Land Settlement Scheme.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner have the jurisdiction to review an earlier order of allotment and confirmation of land?
  • Are mortgagee rights entitled to land allotment under paragraphs 7 and 7-A of the Land Settlement Scheme?
  • Does the allotment of land to a third party under the Land Settlement Act 1961 preclude a petitioner from claiming purchase rights over the same land?
  Read full judgment →
• JAVID UR REHMAN vs THF STATE-1970 P Cr. L J 248 · Lahore High Court · 1969-08-07Read full judgment →
• JAN MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1097 · Lahore High Court · 1969-05-06Read full judgment →
• JALAL KHAN AND Another vs IMAM DIN AND Other1970 PLD Azad J & K 88 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1970-06-13Read full judgment →
• JAFAR ALI AKHTAR YOUSAFZAI vs ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Quetta 115 · Balochistan High Court · 1970-06-29
  civil servicereversion in rankofficiating appointmentattached departmentwrit jurisdictionconstitutional protectionarbitrary termination
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition challenged an order reverting the petitioner from the post of Assistant Accounts Officer to a lower position in his parent department. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner’s initial appointment by transfer was irregular due to alleged non-compliance with service requirements regarding 'Attached Departments' and lack of Public Service Commission approval, and whether his 'officiating' status permitted the government to revert him arbitrarily. The Court held that the petitioner’s previous service in the Intelligence Directorate and Directorate of General Defence Purchase qualified as service in 'Attached Departments,' rendering his appointment regular. Furthermore, the Court held that the label 'officiating' or 'until further orders' does not confer upon the government an arbitrary power to revert a civil servant when the appointment was otherwise valid and the post was permanent. The Court emphasized that constitutional protections against arbitrary reduction in rank cannot be defeated by the mere use of 'officiating' terminology. Consequently, the reversion order was set aside as being without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Does the label 'officiating' in an appointment order grant the government arbitrary power to revert a civil servant?
  • Can a court look behind the designation of an appointment as 'officiating' to determine its true nature?
  • Does the definition of 'Attached Department' in the Rules of Business 1962 apply retrospectively to determine the status of service rendered prior to its promulgation?
  • Is an appointment to a permanent post valid even if the order uses the phrase 'until further orders'?
  Read full judgment →
• JABED ALI SARENG AND16 Others vs TAE STATE1970 SCMR 691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-19
  special leave to appealmurderassessment of evidenceextenuating circumstancesage as mitigating factorsentence enhancement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from the convictions of seventeen petitioners under various sections of the Penal Code relating to rioting, murder, and arson. The core legal question was whether the High Court failed to apply an independent mind and make an independent assessment of the evidence against the petitioners. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had properly examined and discussed the evidence, utilizing charts merely as an aid, and that both lower courts correctly established the identity and guilt of the petitioners upon careful evaluation. The Court laid down the principle that in heinous, cold-blooded crimes such as roasting a person alive, advanced age or youth alone does not constitute a valid extenuating circumstance for withholding the maximum sentence of death, though no enhancement was made in the absence of an application by the State or informant. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court failed to apply an independent mind and assessment to the evidence against the petitioners?
  • Does advanced age constitute a valid extenuating circumstance for withholding the death penalty in a gruesome murder case?
  • Can the Supreme Court enhance a sentence sua sponte without an application for enhancement by the State or private informant?
  Read full judgment →
• JAMAL AND 5 Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1225 · Sindh High Court · 1970-02-12Read full judgment →
• J GOKAK MILLS LTD. vs INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, MYSORE AND OTHERS1970 PLC 685 · Mysore High Court · 1968-11-22Read full judgment →
• ITTA NARASIMHA RAO vs AKULA MAHALAKSHMIAH1970 PLC 681 · Andhra Paradesh High Court · 1968-10-25Read full judgment →
• ISHAQUE vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 531 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-03Read full judgment →
• ISHAQ AHMED vs THE MANAGER, DELTA JUTE MILLS LTD., NOAKHALI1970 PLC 789 · Labour Court · 1970-05-16Read full judgment →
• IQBAL HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI AND 2 Others vs The STATE1970 SCMR 726 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-05
  sanction for prosecutionpublic servantland customs officersdischarge of official dutycriminal revisionanti-smuggling
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the orders of the High Court and the District Magistrate regarding the prosecution of customs officials for murder allegedly committed during anti-smuggling duties. The core legal question was whether the appellants, appointed as Land Customs Officers by notifications of the Central Government, enjoyed the protection of Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, requiring prior governmental sanction for prosecution, notwithstanding their separate appointment under another department. The Supreme Court held that since the appellants were appointed as Land Customs Officers directly by the Central Government via official notifications, they were removable only by or with the sanction of the Government, thus attracting the protective provisions of Section 197. The Court laid down the principle that public servants acting in the bona fide discharge of their official duties are entitled to statutory protection against vexatious prosecution, and the trial court must take evidence to determine if the acts were reasonably connected with official duties before requiring prior sanction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether customs officials appointed via Central Government notifications are public servants removable only by the Government for the purposes of Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code?
  • Does the requirement of prior sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code apply when public servants are accused of offences committed while purporting to act in the discharge of official duties?
  • What is the correct procedure for a trial court to determine whether an accused public servant is entitled to the protection of Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code?
  Read full judgment →
• INDIAN OXYGEN LTD. vs THEIR WORKMEN1970 PLC 513 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-08-05Read full judgment →
• INDIA FLOUR MILLS WORKERS' UNION vs MESSRS INDIA FLOUR MILLS LTD., KARACHI1970 PLC 309 · Industrial Court · 1969-02-10Read full judgment →