Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• MUHAMMAD MOHSIN KHAN Versus MARYAMBIBI1976 SCMR 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-08Read full judgment →
• MUNAWAR HUSSAIN Versus NISAR & CO.1976 SCMR 239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  lis pendensevacuee propertyallotment cancellationspecial leave to appealtransfer of propertyrehabilitation and settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the allotment of land originally acquired for industrial purposes. Respondent No. 1 was permitted by the Central Government to purchase the land in 1958 and took possession in 1962, subsequently constructing a factory. However, the land was later erroneously allotted to Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner. Respondent No. 1 successfully challenged these allotments in revision before the Settlement Commissioner, who set aside the allotments on the grounds that the land was not available for such transfer. The petitioners, who had purchased the land from Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 during the pendency of the dispute, challenged the Settlement Commissioner's order via a writ petition, which the High Court dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, holding that the petitioners, having purchased the land during ongoing litigation, were bound by the outcome of the proceedings. The Court affirmed that the principle of lis pendens, as reflected in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, prevents parties from alienating property to the detriment of the opponent during pending litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of lis pendens apply to the alienation of property during pending litigation regarding its ownership?
  • Can a purchaser of land during pending litigation challenge an order passed in that litigation if they failed to pursue their application to be impleaded as a party?
  • Is land that has been validly acquired and possessed for industrial purposes available for subsequent allotment under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme?
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• MUKHTAR AHMAD Versus SHAH MUHAMMAD1976 SCMR 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-08Read full judgment →
• SAHIB GUL Versus ZIARAT GUL1976 SCMR 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-07
  criminal appealleave to appealacquittalmurderappreciation of evidenceSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Sahib Gul against the acquittal of the respondents, Ziarat Gul and Jahan Gul, who were initially convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Peshawar, for the murder of Hayat Gul. The Peshawar High Court acquitted the respondents, holding the prosecution evidence unreliable. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence so as to warrant interference with the acquittal order. The Supreme Court examined the testimony, noting significant discrepancies in the statements of the eye-witnesses, an unexplained delay in recording the statement of a key witness, and the absence of a proven motive for the crime. Holding that the High Court's assessment was supportable and that no adequate grounds existed to interfere with an order of acquittal, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court will not interfere with an order of acquittal unless the assessment of evidence by the trial or high court is perverse or wholly unwarranted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court based on its appreciation of evidence?
  • Does an unexplained delay in recording the statement of an eye-witness cast doubt on the prosecution case?
  • Is the absence of a proven motive a relevant factor in assessing the reliability of prosecution evidence in a murder case?
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• NUR ALI Versus MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN1976 SCMR 234 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• SHAH NAWAZ Versus NIAMAT ALI BEG1976 SCMR 227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-02-19
  review applicationspecial leave to appealland allotmentpreferential rightcertified copies
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a review application seeking review of an earlier order dated 12th July 1973, which had dismissed the petitioners' petition for special leave to appeal concerning land allotment disputes. The core legal questions involve whether heirs of a deceased person are entitled to retain excess land allotments based on a preferential claim, and whether the inability to obtain sealed certified copies of khatas constitutes a valid ground for review. The Supreme Court held that the review application lacks merit, noting that the contention regarding preferential rights was not raised during the initial hearing of the leave petition and that the respondents held a valid preferential right to the disputed lands as their claim was received earlier in time. Furthermore, the inability to substantiate claims due to sealed records is not a valid ground for review. The key principle laid down is that fresh contentions not raised at the original hearing and unsubstantiated factual grievances regarding sealed records cannot form the basis for reviewing an order dismissing a special leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contention not advanced during the original hearing of a petition for special leave to appeal can be raised in a review application?
  • Does the inability to obtain certified copies of sealed village khatas constitute a sufficient ground for review?
  • Whether heirs of a deceased person can claim preference in land allotment over earlier received claims of respondents?
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• MUBARIK HUSSAIN Versus MUHAMMAD KHAN1976 SCMR 226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-03-04Read full judgment →
• ALLAH RAKBI Versus ALAM BIBI1976 SCMR 222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-22
  settlement propertytransfer of propertydisplaced personsequitable distributionwrit jurisdictionlachesprocedural incompetence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the transfer of property under settlement laws in Quetta. The appellant challenged the transfer of a portion of a house to the respondent, arguing that the entire property had previously been transferred to her, rendering the subsequent transfer to the respondent legally invalid. The core legal question concerned whether the settlement authorities possessed the jurisdiction to partition the property and transfer a portion to the respondent after the initial transfer to the appellant, and whether the appellant's procedural lapses in challenging the orders precluded her claim. The Supreme Court held that the property was divisible into two independent units, and the settlement authorities acted within their discretion to transfer the respective portions to the parties in possession. The Court found no merit in the appellant's claim, noting that she had previously declined the entire property, her subsequent appeals were procedurally incompetent, and substantial justice had been achieved by accommodating both parties. The Court affirmed that where property is divisible and in separate possession, settlement authorities may exercise discretion to transfer portions to respective occupants to ensure equitable distribution.

  Questions settled

  • Can settlement authorities partition a property and transfer portions to different occupants if the property is found to be divisible?
  • Does a party who initially declines the transfer of an entire property have the right to later claim the whole property after a portion has been transferred to another?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with the discretionary orders of settlement authorities when substantial justice has been done between the parties?
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• ABDUL GHANI Versus NAWAB DIN1976 SCMR 221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD KHAN Versus STATE1976 SCMR 220 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• PUNJAB PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, LAHORE Versus ALI GUL KHAN1976 SCMR 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-23
  Public Service Commissionviva vocecharacter rollsuitability for appointmentjudicial servicecompetitive examinationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had declared that the Punjab Public Service Commission acted without lawful authority in reducing a candidate's viva voce marks on the basis of adverse entries in his character roll. The High Court had held that the Commission's role under Article 186 of the 1962 Constitution was strictly limited to conducting examinations and forwarding results, leaving the determination of suitability to the Government. The Supreme Court reversed this finding, holding that the constitutional mandate to conduct examinations 'for the selection of suitable persons' empowers the Commission to assess a candidate's character and integrity. The Court ruled that examining the character rolls of candidates already in government service is a valid and long-standing practice essential for determining suitability for judicial appointments. Consequently, the Commission's powers are not restricted to the mere holding of examinations, and it is authorized to rely on character rolls to assess suitability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the functions of a Public Service Commission under Article 186 of the 1962 Constitution are limited to conducting examinations or extend to assessing the suitability of candidates?
  • Can the Punjab Public Service Commission lawfully examine and rely upon the character rolls of government servant candidates to determine their suitability for judicial appointments?
  • Does the term 'recommendations' in recruitment rules bind the government to the Commission's findings on a candidate's suitability?
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• HUSSAIN BIBI Versus MUHAMMAD DIN1976 SCMR 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertySettlement Scheme No. VIpublic auctionwrit jurisdictionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave arises from a dispute over an evacuee property house site in Kamoke, District Gujranwala. The core legal questions concern whether rights acquired by the highest bidder at a public auction under Settlement Scheme No. VI could be affected by a belated claim form, and whether the High Court had jurisdiction to set aside settlement orders where the occupant allegedly failed to meet construction requirements for eligibility. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order remanding the case for fresh determination was proper, noting that auction proceedings remained unconfirmed, no vested rights accrued to the bidder, and the occupant's claim form had never been properly considered by the authorities. The Court laid down that requirements in a scheme going beyond statutory provisions cannot bar eligibility, and that failure to exhaust revisional remedies does not bar writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can rights acquired by the highest bidder at an auction under Settlement Scheme No. VI be affected by a belated claim form filed by an occupant?
  • Does failure to have recourse to an available revisional remedy necessarily operate as a bar to the invocation of writ jurisdiction?
  • Whether a requirement contained only in a settlement scheme that is in excess of the relevant statutory provision can operate as a bar to the transfer of property?
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• RAHMAT ALI Versus STATE1976 SCMR 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-06-11
  double jeopardyautrefois acquitsection 403 CrPCdelay in criminal prosecutionlimitation in criminal casesforgeryprevention of corruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court which set aside the discharge of the appellants by the Special Judge and remitted the case for trial on merits. The core legal questions involve whether the previous acquittal of the appellants operates as a bar to their subsequent prosecution under the principle of double jeopardy, and whether delay in criminal proceedings warrants the quashing of a trial. The Supreme Court held that section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not bar the second prosecution because the transactions and accusations in the two cases are entirely distinct. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that limitation does not apply to criminal prosecutions and delay alone does not furnish a ground for discharging accused persons of serious offences or constitute an abuse of the process of the court. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a previous acquittal bar a subsequent prosecution when the transactions and accusations in the two cases are entirely different?
  • Does limitation apply to criminal prosecutions in Pakistani law?
  • Can delay in the commencement or conclusion of a criminal trial alone serve as a ground to quash proceedings or discharge an accused?
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• SHER MUHAMMAD Versus SAMUNDAR KHAN1976 SCMR 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-07Read full judgment →
• NOORUL Versus STATE1976 SCMR 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-06-03Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD DIN Versus STATE1976 SCMR 185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-12-08
  double murderocular testimonysifting grain from chaffabsconsionmitigating circumstancesfamily honourcommutation of sentencefirst information report
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the conviction and death sentences of the appellant for the double murder of two brothers, Khushi Muhammad and Niamet. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular testimony that contained exaggerations and improvements at the trial stage, the consistency of the medical evidence with the eyewitness account, the evidentiary value of the appellant's long absconsion, and the existence of mitigating circumstances regarding family honour. The Supreme Court held that the principle of sifting grain from chaff applies, allowing the court to rely on an eyewitness's testimony against the principal accused despite exaggerations implicating others. The Court affirmed the conviction and the death sentence for the murder of Niamet, but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life for the murder of Khushi Muhammad due to mitigating circumstances involving family honour arising from the elopement of the appellant's sister with the deceased. The key principle laid down is that minor exaggerations or false implication of co-accused do not warrant the wholesale rejection of an eyewitness's testimony if it is natural, corroborated by prompt reporting, and supported by medical evidence and absconsion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the entire testimony of an eyewitness must be rejected if he exaggerates or falsely implicates some co-accused at the trial stage?
  • Can absconsion for a prolonged period serve as a corroborative circumstance to sustain a criminal conviction?
  • Whether involvement in a matter concerning family honour constitutes a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence to imprisonment for life in a murder case?
  • Is there an essential contradiction between ocular testimony and medical evidence when the eyewitness does not specify the precise distance from which shots were fired?
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• MUHAMMAD FAYYAZ AHMAD Versus STATE1976 SCMR 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-10
  pre-arrest bailmurder conspiracybail cancellationabsent accusedcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, wherein the appellant sought pre-arrest bail, having been implicated in a multiple murder case allegedly committed at his instance while he was out of the country. The core legal question was whether reasonable grounds existed at the pre-trial stage to believe the appellant was guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life, given his admitted absence from Pakistan on the date of the incident. The Supreme Court held that it was premature at this stage to conclude the appellant's guilt based on the disputed material and motive evidence, making it a fit case for the grant of bail. The key principle laid down is that where an accused's absence from the country on the date of the crime is admitted and the incriminating evidence requires evaluation at trial, pre-trial bail may be granted, subject to cancellation by the trial court if satisfactory prima facie evidence emerges during commitment proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted when the accused was out of the country on the date of the alleged crime?
  • Can bail granted by the Supreme Court be cancelled by the trial court or Magistrate if satisfactory evidence appears during commitment proceedings?
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• WARIS MUHAMMAD Versus AHMAD YAR1976 SCMR 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-11-21
  post-arrest bailmurderdelayed FIRcriminal appealSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the denial of post-arrest bail to the petitioner, who along with three co-accused was committed to the Court of Session under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Bashir Ahmad. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail notwithstanding his commitment for trial and the allegation of firing the fatal shot, given the delayed naming of the accused in the first information report and the peculiar circumstances of the investigation. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and accepted it, granting bail to the petitioner. The holding establishes that where the reliability of the initial report and the identification of the accused during investigation are subject to serious questions, post-arrest bail may be granted even after commitment to the trial court, without delving into the final guilt or innocence of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can post-arrest bail be granted after the accused has been committed to the Court of Session for trial under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does a significant delay in naming the accused in the first information report constitute a ground for granting bail?
  • Will an appellate court interfere with the refusal of bail by lower courts when the circumstances of the investigation warrant relief?
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• NAZIR AHMAD Versus STATE1976 SCMR 179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  private defenseself-defenseculpable homicideperverse judgmentexceeding right of private defensemurdercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the trial court's acquittal of the appellant for murder and convicted him under Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for exceeding the right of private defense. The core legal question was whether the appellant's plea of private defense was reasonably established given the circumstances of the altercation. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's finding of self-defense was perverse. The Court reasoned that the deceased, who was cutting fodder, possessed a sickle as a tool of his trade, not as a weapon of offense, and the appellant had sustained no injuries during the incident. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the mere presence of an agricultural tool in the hands of a victim does not create a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt sufficient to justify the use of lethal force in private defense.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of an agricultural tool by a deceased person, in the context of his daily work, automatically create a reasonable apprehension of danger justifying the use of lethal force?
  • Can a plea of private defense be sustained when the accused has suffered no injuries during the alleged altercation?
  • Under what circumstances can a trial court's finding of self-defense be characterized as perverse by an appellate court?
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• MUHAMMAD SARFRAZ Versus STATE1976 SCMR 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-12-09Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF Versus SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER,MIANWALI1976 SCMR 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-07
  limitationcondonation of delaybarred by timesufficient causepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal which is barred by 82 days. The core legal question concerns whether sufficient cause has been shown for the condonation of delay under the law, specifically addressing confusion regarding the date of the High Court judgment and the petitioner's alleged illness. The court held that the explanation provided was unsatisfactory as each day of delay beyond the prescribed period must be explained, and the petitioner's medical condition did not prevent him from giving timely instructions for filing the petition. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as time-barred. The key principle laid down is that an applicant seeking condonation of delay must satisfactorily explain each day of delay beyond the period of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether confusion regarding the date of the High Court judgment constitutes sufficient cause for condoning delay?
  • Does illness of a petitioner automatically justify the condonation of delay without explaining each day of default?
  • Is it mandatory for an applicant to explain each day of delay beyond the prescribed period of limitation?
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• SARDAR KHAN Versus STATE1976 SCMR 171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-12-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASHRAF KHAN Versus CONSOLIDATION OFFICER, DASKA, DISTRICT SIALKOT1976 SCMR 17 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-05-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ANWAR SAMMA Versus STATE1976 SCMR 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-07-10
  pre-arrest bailattempted murderabductionprohibitory clausecriminal procedureFirst Information Reportmedical report
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the accused against the Lahore High Court's order refusing pre-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under sections 148, 365, and 506/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with subsequently added offences. The core legal question was whether the allegations in the First Information Report and the medical report prima facie established offences under section 307 (attempted murder) or section 367 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, bringing the case within the prohibitory clause of subsection (1) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the material on record did not prima facie disclose a clear case under section 307 or section 367, and that the High Court erred in importing a new offence not laid down in the First Information Report. The Court laid down the principle that for the purposes of bail, courts must evaluate whether the specific ingredients of an offence—such as injuries being imminently dangerous to life or abduction for specific statutory purposes—are prima facie made out from the record, rather than conjecturing uncharged offences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the addition of an offence under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is justified where the medical report does not show injuries imminently dangerous to life?
  • Can a court deny bail by importing a new offence not alleged in the First Information Report?
  • Whether mere abduction without specific statutory intent satisfies the ingredients of section 367 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Under what circumstances should accused persons be granted bail when co-accused facing similar allegations have already been enlarged on bail?
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• MUHAMMAD AFZAL Versus STATE1976 SCMR 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-11-26Read full judgment →
• WAKEEL HASSAN Versus STAKE1976 SCMR 159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-12-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI Versus STATE1976 SCMR 155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-12-05
  culpable homicidejudicial admissionprivate defencecriminal appealevidentiary value of confessionmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, where the trial court and the High Court had rejected the testimony of eye-witnesses but relied upon the appellant's judicial admissions. The core legal question was whether a conviction could be sustained solely on the basis of such admissions when the prosecution's primary evidence was discarded. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was justified. The Court reasoned that the appellant's consistent admissions before the committing Magistrate and the Sessions Judge, coupled with the medical evidence showing the deceased suffered multiple injuries and strangulation, excluded the possibility of third-party involvement. Although the appellant attempted to invoke the right of private defence, the Court found that the nature and extent of the injuries indicated an excess of that right. Consequently, the Court affirmed that judicial admissions, when corroborated by surrounding circumstances and medical evidence, are sufficient to establish guilt, thereby upholding the conviction under Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of an accused's judicial admissions when eye-witness testimony is rejected?
  • Does the admission of causing injuries while pleading private defence constitute sufficient evidence for a conviction under Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the possibility of third-party involvement excluded when an accused admits to causing injuries and transporting the victim to the police station?
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• MULAKH BAN Versus GHAR BAN1976 SCMR 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-11-17Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAFIQ Versus ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER1976 SCMR 15 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  leave to appealhistorical grantadverse possessionco-sharerssettlement authoritiesinheritance rightsproprietary rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners and respondents sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their Letters Patent Appeal by the Lahore High Court regarding the devolution of land allotted in lieu of a special historical grant. The core legal question involved the interpretation of Condition No. 4 of the grant concerning the expiry of rent-free tenure for three lives and the subsequent vesting of proprietary rights in the heirs of the original grantee. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's claim of exclusive ownership based on adverse possession against the Government was untenable, as possession of one co-sharer is deemed possession for all co-sharers. However, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the lower authorities and the High Court correctly interpreted Condition No. 4 of the Conditions of Grant in determining the rights of the parties. The key principle laid down is that possession by a co-sharer operates on behalf of all co-sharers, and rights under historical conditional grants must be strictly determined according to their specific stipulated terms.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-sharer claim exclusive ownership of land on the basis of adverse possession against other co-sharers?
  • Whether proprietary rights under a historical conditional grant vest in all heirs of the original grantee upon the lapse of the grant?
  • Does possession of one co-sharer operate on behalf of all co-sharers?
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• MUHAMMAD IQBAL Versus DURAB KHAN1976 SCMR 149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-12-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD UMAR SAEED Versus GOVERNMENT F WEST PAKISTAN1976 SCMR 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-12-12
  non-prosecutiondismissal of appealdefault of appearanceadjournment requestappellate procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as an appeal filed by the appellant, Muhammad Umar Saeed, against the Government of West Pakistan. The proceedings were scheduled for hearing, but the appellant's counsel, Mr. Nemat Khan, submitted a telegraphic request for an adjournment citing sickness. The Court observed that while it might have considered the request for adjournment due to the counsel's illness, there was no justification provided for the absence of the Advocate-on-Record, Sh. Abdul Karim. Furthermore, the Court noted that with only three appeals fixed for the day and none capable of being heard due to the default of appearance by the respective counsel, there was no business to occupy the Court's time. Consequently, expressing dissatisfaction with the state of affairs regarding the lack of professional diligence, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution, with no order as to costs. The judgment serves as a reminder of the necessity for proper representation and the consequences of failing to appear before the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal be dismissed for non-prosecution when the counsel fails to appear?
  • Does the absence of an Advocate-on-Record justify the dismissal of an appeal despite a telegraphic adjournment request from the lead counsel?
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• MUNIR MUHAMMAD Versus STATE1976 SCMR 145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-11-04Read full judgment →
• SAADAT ULLAH HUSSAIN Versus SARDAR ALAM1976 SCMR 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-05-29Read full judgment →
• WAHID BAKSH Versus STATE1976 SCMR 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-11-12
  interim bailbail pending appealconvictionpre-emption of appealcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of interim bail by the High Court to the petitioners, who had appealed their convictions and sentences under sections 148, 459, 366, and 323 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting interim bail pending an appeal against conviction where granting such relief would pre-empt the main subject matter of the appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that granting interim bail under such circumstances is not feasible as it would pre-empt the appeal. The key principle laid down is that interim bail pending an appeal against conviction will generally be refused if it has the effect of pre-empting the central subject matter of the pending appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether interim bail can be granted by an appellate court when it would pre-empt the subject matter of the pending appeal against conviction?
  • Does the refusal of interim bail by the High Court warrant interference by the Supreme Court when the appeal itself is awaiting hearing?
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• NABI AHMED SHAH Versus MIRWAIZ MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH1976 SCMR 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-12-23Read full judgment →
• HAYAT BIBI Versus MUHAMMAD KHAN1976 SCMR 128 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-11-11Read full judgment →
• ZAFAR IQBAL Versus STATE1976 SCMR 126 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• RESIDENT EDITOR Versus DAILY "JANG", RAWALPINDI NOTICE TO1976 SCMR 123 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-08-25Read full judgment →
• INAYAT ALI Versus GHULAM MUHAMMAD1976 SCMR 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-06-14
  pre-emptionabatement of appeallegal representativesjoint pre-emptorslimitationretrospective operation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two civil petitions for leave to appeal concerning pre-emption suits. The core legal questions involved whether the death of one of the joint pre-emptors resulted in the total abatement of the second appeals and whether the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1971 applied retrospectively to save the appeals, alongside the nature of the right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that since the right of pre-emption was claimed jointly by the two brothers, the failure to implead the legal representatives of the deceased pre-emptor within the period of limitation caused the appeals to abate in toto, and that the Law Reforms Ordinance did not operate retrospectively to undo an abatement that occurred prior to its enforcement. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a pre-emption right is heritable under the cited jurisprudence. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of one of the joint pre-emptors without bringing his legal representatives on record within the limitation period result in the total abatement of the appeal?
  • Does the amendment of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1971 operate retrospectively to undo an abatement that occurred prior to its coming into force?
  • Is a right of pre-emption claimed jointly by co-plaintiffs severable upon the death of one of them?
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• SHEIKH INAYAT ALI Versus GHULAM KUHAMMAD1976 SCMR 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-06-14
  pre-emptionabatement of appeallegal representativeslimitation periodretrospective operationjoint pre-emptionheritability of right
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil petitions arising from pre-emption suits where the petitioner challenged the abatement of two second appeals following the death of one of the joint pre-emptors, Fazal Muhammad. The petitioner failed to implead the legal representatives of the deceased pre-emptor within the prescribed limitation period, leading the High Court to order the abatement of the appeals. The petitioner subsequently sought to set aside the abatement, arguing that the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1971, saved the appeals and that the right of pre-emption was personal and not heritable. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1971, does not operate retrospectively to revive proceedings that had already abated prior to its enactment. Furthermore, the Court rejected the contention that the right of pre-emption was merely personal, relying on established precedent that such rights are heritable. The Court also held that because the right of pre-emption was claimed jointly by the brothers, the failure to implead the legal representatives of the deceased co-plaintiff resulted in the total abatement of the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1971, have retrospective effect to undo the abatement of appeals that occurred prior to its enforcement?
  • Does the right of pre-emption survive the death of a pre-emptor during the pendency of a suit?
  • Does the failure to implead the legal representatives of one joint pre-emptor result in the total abatement of an appeal?
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• HUSSAN JAN Versus ABDUL RAHMAN1976 SCMR 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-10-09
  evacuee propertysettlement schemetransfer of propertyauction cancellationspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the transfer and auction of an evacuee house. The petitioner, an old tenant and allottee, had her initial transfer set aside in ex parte proceedings, and her subsequent challenges up to the revision before the Settlement Commissioner were dismissed in October 1964 and left unchalleged. Meanwhile, auction proceedings regarding the property continued, involving defaults by the auction-purchaser and subsequent cancellation and re-transfers under differing administrative orders. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioner could claim rights to the property under Settlement Scheme No. VIII when her previous challenges had attained finality and the auction cancellation proceedings were still pending. The Supreme Court held that the unchalleged order of October 1964 attained finality, restricting the petitioner to claims under the new Scheme No. VIII, under which she was not eligible as the auction cancellation had not yet finally terminated. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unchalleged revisional order by a Settlement Commissioner attain finality?
  • Can a party claim property under Settlement Scheme No. VIII while auction cancellation proceedings remain pending?
  • Does the issuance of a P.T.D. vest rights when underlying litigation is still pending?
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• WALL MUHAMMAD GUT MUHAMMAD Versus NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN1976 SCMR 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-10-23Read full judgment →
• BASHIR AHMAD Versus SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER LAHORE1976 SCMR 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-10-29
  review petitionsettlement authorityregistered sale deedmutationproperty transferresidential allotmentfinding of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had previously dismissed a civil petition regarding the transfer of a property known as a 'Chaubara'. The petitioner challenged the finding that the property was situated in a predominantly commercial area, arguing that no Settlement Authority had made such a determination and that the Chaubara was part of his residential allotment. The Supreme Court re-examined the findings of the Settlement Commissioner, noting that the Commissioner had concluded as a matter of fact that the Chaubara was not part of the residential portion transferred to the petitioner. Furthermore, the Court addressed the petitioner's argument regarding the validity of a registered sale deed used to support this finding, specifically rejecting the claim that the deed was invalid due to a lack of attested mutation. The Court held that a registered sale deed does not become void merely because the mutation in respect of the sale has not been attested. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed, affirming the original order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a registered sale deed become void if the mutation in respect of the sale is not attested?
  • Can a petitioner challenge a finding of fact made by a Settlement Authority in a review petition?
  • Is a Chaubara considered part of a residential portion if it is not explicitly transferred as such?
  Read full judgment →
• KUBRA BEGUM Versus MUHAMMAD YAHYA KHAN1976 SCMR 111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-10-24
  appointment of receiverdisputed giftspecial jurisdictionpetition for leave to appealprotection of interests
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order passed by the High Court refusing to appoint a receiver for certain disputed property and discharging a receiver of property in possession of the petitioners, while imposing conditions to protect the respective interests of both parties. The core legal question concerns the propriety of declining to appoint a receiver where a gift of property is disputed by legal heirs but prima facie supported by a declaration of gift by the late donor. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court's order was in aid of justice and did not warrant interference under special jurisdiction, clarifying that observations made by the High Court pertained only to the refusal to appoint a receiver and had no bearing on the merits of the main suit. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court order refusing to appoint a receiver in exercise of its special jurisdiction?
  • Does an order refusing to appoint a receiver have a bearing on the merits of the main suit?
  • Can conditions be imposed on contesting parties to protect their respective interests pending litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• PRESIDENT SARHAD CHAMBER OF COMMERCE Versus CHAIRMAN EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY BORD GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1976 SCMR 110 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• ZARIFUL HASNAN Versus MUHAMMAD ILYAS1976 SCMR 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-10-10Read full judgment →
• TAUFAIL AHMED SHAH Versus WATER & POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY1976 SCMR 106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-10-09
  electricity ratesunilateral increasetubewellcontractual agreementregular second appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing in limine a Regular Second Appeal concerning a dispute over electricity rates charged by WAPDA to the petitioner for a agricultural tubewell. The core legal question was whether WAPDA could unilaterally increase electricity consumption rates in accordance with the terms of the agreement between the parties. The Supreme Court held that since the agreement explicitly reserved the right for the respondent to vary rates unilaterally, the increase was valid and the lower courts rightly dismissed the petitioner's suit. The key principle laid down is that contractual terms permitting unilateral rate variation by a utility provider, when agreed upon, are enforceable and binding on the consumer.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a utility provider can unilaterally increase electricity rates if the agreement reserves such power?
  • Is a unilateral increase in electricity charges enforceable when sanctioned by the terms of the contract between the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• KHURSHID BEGUM Versus SETTLEMENT DEPARTMENT1976 SCMR 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil reviewleave to appealdelay and lacheslocus standinon-evacuee propertyvested rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil review petition filed against the dismissal of a civil petition for special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question involved whether inordinate and unexplained delay of fifteen years in challenging an administrative decision, coupled with a failure to establish locus standi and the creation of third-party rights, could defeat a claim regarding non-evacuee property. The Supreme Court held that the review petition was devoid of merit because the petitioner failed to satisfactorily explain the massive delay, did not substantiate her claim of being the daughter of the original property owner when her identity was challenged, and third-party rights had accrued in the meantime. The court laid down the principle that in civil matters, each day's delay must be satisfactorily explained, and a claimant cannot defeat the defense of laches and delay without establishing a clear locus standi and diligence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether inordinate delay of fifteen years without satisfactory explanation can defeat a claim for non-evacuee property?
  • Does a person whose identity and relationship to the original owner are disputed have locus standi to claim property without establishing such relationship?
  • Can a review petition be entertained when third-party rights have already accrued and been settled in the intervening period?
  Read full judgment →
• Z. A. AMMIN Versus MUSLIM INSURANCE CO. LTD.1976 SCMR 101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-10-10
  debt adjustmentsuspense accountcreditor-debtor relationshipexecution proceedingspayment receiptunfair practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over a payment of Rs. 30,000 made by the petitioner to the respondent, Muslim Insurance Company Ltd., for which a stamped receipt was issued. The core legal question was whether the respondent company was entitled to withhold credit for this payment by placing it in a suspense account, citing that the payment was made by the petitioner's husband, who was also a debtor to the company. The Supreme Court held that the respondent acted unfairly. The Court determined that if the money was received on behalf of the petitioner, it must be credited to her account, regardless of the husband's separate indebtedness. The Court allowed the petition, treating it as an appeal, and directed the respondent to adjust the Rs. 30,000 against the petitioner's dues in the pending execution proceedings. The key principle laid down is that a creditor cannot unilaterally divert funds received from a specific debtor into a suspense account to satisfy the debts of a third party, even if that third party is a relative, when a valid receipt has been issued to the original payer.

  Questions settled

  • Can a creditor unilaterally place a payment received from a specific debtor into a suspense account to satisfy the debt of a third party?
  • Is a debtor entitled to credit for a payment made to a company when a valid receipt has been issued in their name?
  Read full judgment →
• FAHIM & COMPANY Versus NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN1976 SCMR 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-10-23Read full judgment →
• SALEEM Versus STATE1975 SCMR 306 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• NAJAB KHAN Versus COL. SAID SHAH1975 SCMR 291 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• AQIL HUSSAIN JAFRI Versus MASOOD JILANI1975 SCMR 258 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  functus officioclarification of orderSupreme Court Rulesremand proceedingsappellate remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed for the clarification of a previous order issued by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Civil Petition No. 313 of 1970, which had dismissed a petition for special leave to appeal with specific observations regarding the scope of remand proceedings before the Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land). The petitioner sought a clarification of the Court's directive restricting the consideration of rights arising after 13th July 1960. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that such a petition for clarification is unknown to the Rules of the Court. Furthermore, the Court determined that it became functus officio once the original order was passed and signed. The Court clarified that if a lower court or authority misinterprets its order, the aggrieved party must pursue appropriate legal remedies, such as appeal or revision, rather than seeking clarification from the Supreme Court itself. The principle established is that the Supreme Court cannot entertain petitions for clarification of its orders once it has become functus officio.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court entertain a petition for clarification of an order after it has become functus officio?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a party if a lower court misinterprets an order of the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• KANEEZ FATIMA Versus GHULAM MUHAMMAD1975 SCMR 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD LATIF Versus CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER1975 SCMR 217 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-16Read full judgment →
• HAFIZULLAH KHAN Versus GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1975 SCMR 211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-08Read full judgment →
• MURAD GUL Versus GOVERNMENT OF N.-W. F. P.1975 SCMR 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-02-04Read full judgment →
• GHULAM SARWAR Versus DAYA RAM1975 SCMR 199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-17Read full judgment →
• GHULAM NABI Versus STATE1975 SCMR 164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-16Read full judgment →
• JAMSHED AHMAD Versus MUHAMMAD AKRAM KHAN1975 SCMR 149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-07
  registration of criminal casesecond FIRLetters Patentdiscretionary reliefprivate complaintcriminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing in limine the petitioner's application under Clause 22 of the Letters Patent read with section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which sought a direction to the Station House Officer to register a criminal case against respondents regarding forgery, cheating, and other offenses, and to conduct a preliminary investigation. The core legal question was whether the police are mandatorily required under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to register a second FIR reflecting the accused's version of the same transaction when a case has already been registered in respect thereof. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's refusal to exercise its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction was proper, noting that a prior case regarding the same transaction was already under investigation, the proposed registration involved officials requiring anti-corruption committee approval, and alternative remedies via private complaints remained available. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that interference is unwarranted absent grave injustice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the police are bound to register a second case under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the same transaction where a case has already been registered?
  • Does the High Court possess discretion to refuse the issuance of a direction for the registration of a criminal case under its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can a criminal case be registered against a Tehsildar or Sub-Registrar without the previous approval of the Provincial Anti-Corruption Council or Divisional Anti-Corruption Committee?
  Read full judgment →
• ALI BUX KHAN Versus CHIEF LAND COMMISSIONER, WEST PAKISTAN1974 SCMR 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-30
  land commissionmartial law regulationjurisdiction of high courtzamindari rightscivil court decreewrit petitionconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellants. The appellants claimed absolute ownership and Zamindari rights over agricultural land that was surrendered to the Land Commission by the heirs of a former Jagirdar. The appellants had earlier secured a civil court decree declaring their Zamindari rights. The Land Commission, however, refused to recognize the decree and dismissed subsequent review applications, leading to the writ petition. The core legal question was whether the constitutional bar of jurisdiction under paragraph 27 of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 shielded orders of the Land Commission passed after the promulgation of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962, and whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Article 98 to examine if such orders were passed without lawful authority. The Supreme Court held that after the promulgation of the Constitution, the immunity under paragraph 27 is limited to orders made in substance and form in compliance with the Regulation, and the High Court possesses jurisdiction under Article 98 to review them. The Court concluded that the appellants' title was validly established by a genuine civil decree and revenue records, and directed the Land Commission to release the disputed land.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the bar of jurisdiction under paragraph 27 of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 is limited after the promulgation of the Constitution to orders made in substance and form in compliance with the Regulation?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution to declare an order of the Land Commission made without lawful authority to be of no effect?
  • Whether the Land Commission is legally bound to recognize a civil court decree establishing ownership rights of a claimant over surrendered land?
  Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN Versus A.M.KHAN LEGHARI C.S.P., MEMBER BORD OF REVENUE WEST PAKISTAN LAHORE1974 SCMR 535 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1968-01-17Read full judgment →
• AMTUL RASOOL Versus GHULAM RASOOL1974 SCMR 532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-25
  civil revisioncase decidedinterlocutory ordercross-examinationexecution of decreerestoration of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which summarily dismissed a civil revision petition challenging the dismissal of an application for cross-examination under Order XIX, rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether the rejection of an interlocutory application for permission to cross-examine a deponent constitutes a 'case decided' so as to be amenable to civil revision under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the revision application filed before the High Court was incompetent because the interlocutory order did not amount to a 'case decided' under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and therefore the High Court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that an interlocutory order refusing cross-examination on affidavits in execution proceedings does not fall within the purview of section 115, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, though clarifying that observations made by the High Court on merits should not prejudice the pending proceedings under Order XXI, rule 100, Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the rejection of an application for permission to cross-examine a deponent under Order XIX, rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 constitutes a 'case decided' under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a civil revision petition competent against an interlocutory order passed by an executing court in proceedings under Order XXI, rule 100, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• AI-MAHMOOD INDUSTRIES (PAKISTAN) LTD. Versus TRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN LTD1974 SCMR 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-04Read full judgment →
• GHULAM HASSAN KHAN Versus MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN, CHAIRMAN, ENROLMENTCOMMITTEE, PROVINCIAL BAR COUNCIL1974 SCMR 495 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  contempt of courtenrolment of advocateEnrolment CommitteeProvincial Bar Counciltoutprofessional misconductLegal Practitioners Act 1879
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court seeking contempt proceedings against the Chairman and Member of the Enrolment Committee of the Provincial Bar Council, Lahore, and a direction to enroll him as an Advocate. Earlier, the Supreme Court had set aside a High Court order declaring the petitioner a tout under the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, observing that the Bar Council may consider afresh the petitioner's application for enrolment if renewed and that an erring person showing reformed conduct should be afforded an opportunity to join the profession. Upon renewed application, the Enrolment Committee kept his application pending due to pending complaints, findings of abetment of professional misconduct, and misrepresentation. The Supreme Court held that the respondents had not disobeyed its directions. The Court explained that it had merely directed fresh consideration, and the Enrolment Committee acted within its lawful jurisdiction and for valid reasons in assessing the petitioner's conduct and deferring enrolment. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the refusal or deferral of an enrolment application by a Bar Council Enrolment Committee constitutes contempt of court where the Supreme Court merely directed fresh consideration?
  • Does an Enrolment Committee act within its jurisdiction when keeping an advocate's enrolment application pending on account of unresolved complaints and allegations of professional misconduct?
  • Can a court remove the name of a person from the list of touts under Section 36(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879 if subsequent conduct shows genuine reformation?
  Read full judgment →
• QADIR BAKHSH JAVED Versus GOVERNMENT OF N: W. F. P1974 SCMR 391 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• AKHTAR HASSAN KHAN Versus STATE1974 SCMR 199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  illegal gratificationanti-corruption trapjurisdictionpublic servantcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court dismissing the appellant's appeal against his conviction under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, while enhancing his sentence. The core legal questions involved whether accepting a bribe for an official act outside one's territorial jurisdiction constitutes an offence under section 161, and whether charges under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act are distinct and cannot be lumped together. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that it is sufficient for the purposes of section 161 that the accused represented himself to be capable of rendering the official service, regardless of actual authority or territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the offence under section 161 is included in section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and lumping them in the charge causes no prejudice unless specifically shown. The key principle laid down is that a public servant who represents they can perform an official favour falls within the ambit of corruption laws even if the matter technically lies outside their specific jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does accepting a bribe for an official act outside one's territorial jurisdiction constitute an offence under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can charges under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 be combined in a single trial without causing prejudice?
  • Is it necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused public servant actually possessed the power to render the promised service under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF Versus STATE1974 SCMR 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-23
  culpable homicideprivate defencesentence reductioncriminal appealintention vs knowledgemurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the appellant's act of striking the deceased with a sota, following the theft of sugarcane from his property, constituted murder or a lesser offence, specifically considering the appellant's plea of private defence and the circumstances of the incident. The Supreme Court observed that the appellant struck only one blow, and given the darkness of the night, it was doubtful whether the head was deliberately targeted. While the injury was sufficient to cause death, the Court held that the conviction under Section 302 could not be sustained. Instead, the Court found the appellant had the knowledge contemplated under Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Consequently, the conviction was altered, and the sentence was reduced to the period already undergone, emphasizing the principle that where intent to kill is not clearly established, a conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder is appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Does a single blow struck in the dark, resulting in death, necessarily constitute murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction be altered from Section 302 to Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the requisite intent for murder is not clearly established?
  • Is a sentence of imprisonment already served sufficient to meet the ends of justice when a conviction is altered on appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUHAMMAD ALLAH WARAYO PANHWAR Versus STATE1974 SCMR 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  misappropriationcriminal breach of trustvalidity of investigationprocedural irregularityprejudiceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Junior Store Keeper, was convicted by the Special Judge for misappropriating petrol, an offence under Section 409, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The prosecution established a significant shortage of petrol through register entries and physical verification. The petitioner's defense, citing evaporation, unauthorized withdrawals by officers, and meter errors, was rejected by the trial court and the High Court, which found a substantial unexplained shortage even after accounting for these claims. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner raised a new argument challenging the validity of the investigation on the grounds that it was conducted by an Inspector rather than a Deputy Superintendent of Police. The Supreme Court held that an objection regarding the validity of an investigation must be raised at the earliest opportunity. As the point was not raised in lower courts and the petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the investigation, the Court refused to entertain the plea and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can an objection regarding the validity of an investigation be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Does an investigation conducted by an officer of a lower rank than required by statute automatically vitiate a trial in the absence of prejudice?
  Read full judgment →
• ALLAH BACHAI Versus WAHID BAKHSH1974 SCMR 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-19Read full judgment →
• IBRAHIM Versus KULSOOM BEGUM1973 SCMR 589 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-31
  civil revisionex parte decreemaintainabilityalternative remedysetting aside ex parte decree
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which had dismissed his revision petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground that it was not maintainable. The core legal question was whether a revision petition under section 115 is maintainable against an interlocutory order when an ex parte decree has already been passed in the suit and alternative remedies by way of appeal under section 96(2) or an application under Order IX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 were available. The Supreme Court held that once an ex parte decree has been passed, a defendant must pursue either an application under Order IX, rule 13 (with an appeal under Order XLIII, rule 1(d) in case of rejection) or an appeal under section 96(2) against the ex parte decree, and a revision petition under section 115 is not maintainable in such circumstances. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a revision petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable after an ex parte decree has already been passed in the suit?
  • What are the available remedies for a defendant against whom an ex parte decree has been passed?
  • Does an appeal lie from an order rejecting an application to set aside an ex parte decree under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL RASHID Versus CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER1973 SCMR 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-02-10Read full judgment →
• GHULAM FATIMA Versus ABDUL GHANI1973 SCMR 56 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1966-10-07Read full judgment →
• MARYAM BIBI Versus MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM1973 SCMR 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1968-05-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAMZAN Versus KALIMULLAH1973 SCMR 409 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• RAMZAN Versus STATE1973 SCMR 245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IJAZ AHMAD Versus JOINT DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF MINERAL DEVELOPMENT1973 SCMR 227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  special leave to appealunregistered sale deedadmission in written statementfraud and impersonationcause of action
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a second appeal before the Peshawar High Court. The petitioner had filed a suit for a declaration of ownership and injunction regarding property left by his cousin, based on an unregistered sale deed and an alleged admission in a written statement by one of the defendants, Mst. Taj Bibi. The trial Court dismissed the suit, finding the petitioner's claim false and the written statement procured through coercion and impersonation. The Additional District Judge partially decreed the suit based on the admission, but the High Court remanded the matter for inquiry and subsequently accepted the trial Court's report regarding fraud and impersonation, dismissing the second appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that if the entire foundation of the cause of action is found to be false, the suit cannot succeed in part even as regards a defendant who ostensibly admitted the plaintiff's claim. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit succeed in part based on an admission in a written statement when the entire foundation of the cause of action is found to be false?
  • Whether an appellate court is justified in decreeing a suit against a defendant who allegedly admitted the claim when the trial court found the written statement was procured through coercion and impersonation?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMID Versus STATE1973 SCMR 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-12Read full judgment →
• ABDUL RAHIM Versus SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER1973 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-23
  settlement of propertydisplaced personwrit jurisdictionproperty transferadministrative lawearmarking listsurvey records
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the transfer of property, specifically house No. F/67-1199/1, under the settlement laws. The appellant, a claimant displaced person, challenged the transfer of the property to respondent No. 5, arguing that the property was a distinct and separate unit from house No. F/67-1199, which had been transferred to the respondent. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner acted lawfully in treating two distinct properties as one for the purpose of transfer and whether the High Court erred in failing to exercise its writ jurisdiction despite evidence of separate survey and assessment records. The Supreme Court held that the evidence from the Excise and Taxation Department clearly established that the two properties were separate and distinct. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the Settlement Commissioner and the High Court, ruling that the appellant was entitled to retain the disputed house upon payment of its evaluation price. The judgment affirms that administrative authorities must base decisions on accurate factual records and cannot ignore findings of fact without proper justification.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner treat two distinct and separately surveyed properties as a single unit for transfer purposes?
  • Is a finding of fact by an Additional Settlement Commissioner binding if it is not set aside by the revisional authority?
  • Can a revisional authority pass an adverse order against a party without impleading them in the proceedings?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to interfere under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution when administrative findings are based on a misconception of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• YAQOOB Versus ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER1973 SCMR 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-01-23
  evacuee propertysatisfaction of chargespartnership deedleasehold interesttransfer of propertydisplaced personcharge-holder
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition regarding the satisfaction of a charge against evacuee property. The appellant, a displaced person, had paid a significant sum to an evacuee for a partnership interest in a cinema business, which included the transfer of leasehold rights. The central legal question was whether this payment constituted "money paid in cash to an evacuee for the purchase of his property" under Exception (b)(ii) of Rule 4 of the Satisfaction of Charges (Evacuee Property) Rules, 1961, thereby entitling the appellant to full satisfaction of the charge. The Supreme Court held that the transaction, despite being structured as a partnership, effectively transferred the evacuee's leasehold interest to the firm. Affirming that a leasehold interest constitutes property and that partners hold an interest in partnership assets, the Court ruled the transaction fell within the scope of the exception. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower authorities' decisions, establishing that such transfers of leasehold rights to a partnership qualify as the purchase of property for the purpose of satisfying charges.

  Questions settled

  • Does a partnership agreement that transfers leasehold interests constitute a purchase of property under the Satisfaction of Charges (Evacuee Property) Rules, 1961?
  • Is a leasehold interest considered 'property' for the purposes of the Satisfaction of Charges (Evacuee Property) Rules, 1961?
  • Can a charge-holder claim full satisfaction of a charge if the underlying transaction involves the transfer of property to a partnership firm?
  Read full judgment →
• HASHIM KHAN Versus GHULAM NABI1973 SCMR 112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-07Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD AHMAD Versus STATE1972 SCMR 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-31
  stay of criminal proceedingscivil suit and criminal prosecutionfalse evidencejudicial discretionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a leave petition arising from an order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan at Karachi, which refused to stay criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner under section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code for giving false evidence. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings should invariably be stayed pending the outcome of a subsequently filed civil suit involving a similar question of fact. The Supreme Court held that the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to stay the criminal proceedings, finding that the civil suit was filed long after the prosecution was ordered and solely to delay the criminal trial. The Court laid down the principle that there is no invariable rule requiring criminal proceedings to be postponed pending civil litigation concerning the same subject matter, and normally criminal proceedings should proceed unless strong judicial grounds dictate otherwise.

  Questions settled

  • Should criminal proceedings be automatically stayed pending the disposal of civil litigation involving the same subject-matter?
  • Does the institution of a civil suit long after the initiation of a criminal prosecution justify staying the criminal proceedings?
  • Did the High Court exercise its discretion improperly by refusing to stay the criminal proceedings under section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• QADIR KHAN Versus BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN1972 SCMR 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-10
  auctionpublicityrevocation of auctionwrit petitiondiscretionary jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a dispute over a plot of land auctioned by the Revenue authorities and purchased by the appellant. The auction was confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner, but subsequently set aside by the Additional Commissioner upon an appeal by a respondent who alleged lack of due publicity. A revision before the Member of the Board of Revenue was dismissed, and a subsequent writ petition in the High Court was summarily dismissed. Leave was granted to examine whether the lower authorities failed to consider evidence of due publicity. The Supreme Court held that the Revenue authorities had set aside the auction upon finding it was not properly conducted, and the High Court was justified in declining to interfere with that discretionary order. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere under Article 98 with an order of Revenue authorities setting aside an auction conducted without proper publicity?
  • Did the Revenue authorities commit an error of record in holding that no publicity was given to the auction?
  • Whether an auction of State land can be set aside in the interest of justice and equity upon complaints of inadequate publicity?
  Read full judgment →
• FAIZULLAH KHAN Versus STATE1972 SCMR 672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-04
  acquittal appealocular evidencerelated witnessesabscondencecorroborationappellate powersmurdersentence enhancement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a murder conviction where the appellant, initially acquitted by the Sessions Judge, was convicted by the High Court upon a State appeal under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question concerned the scope of appellate interference with an acquittal and the reliability of ocular evidence from related witnesses. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court should not interfere with an acquittal if the trial court’s view is plausible, it must intervene when the trial court’s reasoning is speculative, artificial, or based on a misinterpretation of evidence resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The Court affirmed that the testimony of related witnesses cannot be rejected solely on the ground of relationship, and that long, unexplained abscondence of an accused serves as valuable corroborative evidence. Consequently, the Court upheld the conviction and dismissed the cross-petition for sentence enhancement, finding the High Court’s reasoning for the original sentence appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with an order of acquittal in an appeal filed by the State?
  • Can the testimony of prosecution witnesses be rejected solely on the basis of their relationship to the deceased?
  • Does the long abscondence of an accused person serve as corroborative evidence in a criminal trial?
  • Is the High Court empowered to re-examine the entire case on facts and law when hearing an appeal against an acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• BASHIR Versus THE STATE1972 SCMR 515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  police investigationmagisterial inquirycognizable casecriminal procedurejurisdictionpolice powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the Lahore High Court's order holding that a District Magistrate is not competent under section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to direct a subordinate Magistrate to hold a preliminary inquiry into a cognizable case while the police are actively investigating it. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate can order a preliminary inquiry under section 159 while police investigation is underway. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that where the police are actively investigating a cognizable case and have not acted under section 157(2), a Magistrate cannot stop the investigation or order a preliminary inquiry to supplant police functions. The judiciary and police have complementary, non-overlapping functions, and the police have a statutory duty to investigate cognizable offences to their conclusion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate can direct a preliminary inquiry under section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure while the police are actively investigating a cognizable case?
  • Does the judiciary have the power to interfere with the statutory duty of the police to investigate cognizable crimes?
  • What is the scope of a Magistrate's control over police investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
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• GHULAM MOHAMMAD Versus STATE1972 SCMR 393 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AKBAR Versus STATE1972 SCMR 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-22
  criminal case quashingcognizance of offencepolice reportpowers of superior police officerssubsequent police reportrole of magistrate
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the High Court of Lahore refusing to quash a criminal case pending against the appellant under section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions involved were whether the cognizance of the case by the Magistrate was illegal due to the Senior Superintendent of Police directing the submission of a charge-sheet, and whether an investigating officer can submit a subsequent report superseding an earlier one. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the charge-sheet constituted an act of the Station House Officer under section 170(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, furnishing a valid ground for taking cognizance under section 190(1)(b). Furthermore, the Court held that the police is not the final arbiter of a complaint, that the Magistrate may take cognizance upon materials before him regardless of a negative police opinion, that superior police officers possess requisite powers under section 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that an investigating officer may submit a subsequent report either on their own initiative or under superior direction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence upon a police report despite a negative final report or opinion by the investigating officer?
  • Does a Senior Superintendent of Police have the power to direct the submission of a charge-sheet under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an investigating officer submit a subsequent report in supersession of an earlier report on the direction of a superior police officer?
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• SHAUKAT HUSSAIN SHAH Versus COMMISSIONER, LAHORE DIVISION1972 SCMR 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-02
  criminal lawspecial tribunalright to be heardnatural justicereference to tribunalordinary criminal jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition challenging an order of reference made by the Commissioner, Lahore Division, transferring a criminal case against the appellants to a tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner was required to provide the appellants an opportunity to be heard before referring their case to the special tribunal. Relying on the precedent established in Home Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Lahore v. Jan Muhammad and another (PLD 1969 SC 333), the Supreme Court held that a reference of a case to a tribunal under Section 3 of the Act without affording the accused an opportunity to show cause is illegal. Consequently, the Court set aside the reference order and directed that the case be tried by a regular Magistrate under ordinary criminal jurisdiction. The Court declined to rule on the conflict between the Central Sea Customs Act and the Provincial Act, noting that the repeal of the latter rendered the issue moot.

  Questions settled

  • Is a reference of a case to a tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963, valid if the accused was not given an opportunity to show cause against the reference?
  • Does the failure to provide a hearing before an administrative order of reference to a special tribunal render the order illegal?
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• NABAHOO Versus STATE1972 SCMR 31 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ILYAS Versus STATE1972 SCMR 255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-29
  abetmentalteration of convictionframing of chargeminor offenceattempted cheatingcriminal procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Assistant Superintendent in the Accountant General's office, was convicted by the Special Judge (Central) for attempted cheating and sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment. On appeal, the Lahore High Court altered the conviction from section 420/511 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to section 420/116 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing the sentence to the period already undergone. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the conviction could not be altered to abetment (section 116) without a specific charge being framed, as it constituted a distinct offence. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that the provisions of section 238 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 allowed for conviction of a minor offence without a separate charge. The Court affirmed that the petitioner's actions in instigating an official to defraud the government constituted abetment. Consequently, the Court upheld the conviction and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, establishing that abetment can be treated as a minor offence under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court convict an accused for abetment without framing a specific charge for that offence?
  • Does the act of instigating an official to defraud the government constitute abetment?
  • Is abetment considered a minor offence under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the purpose of section 238?
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• KHAIR MOHAMMAD Versus AIJAZ HUSSAIN1971 SCMR 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-19Read full judgment →
• BHOMAR ALI Versus MOINUDDIN1971 SCMR 55 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-16
  pre-emptionBengal Tenancy Actco-sharerdistribution of rentspecial leave to appealrent rolls
  Summary & questions settled

  These two petitions arise out of proceedings for pre-emption under the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885. The respondents filed suits to pre-empt two sales of land, arguing they remained co-sharers because there was no valid distribution of rent concerning the khatian with the consent of all landlords and co-sharer tenants, specifically pointing out that one co-sharer landlord had never consented. The lower courts accepted this contention and allowed the pre-emption suits, a decision upheld on appeal and in revision by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the purchaser-petitioners sought leave to appeal, contending that a presumption arose under the proviso to section 88(1) of the Bengal Tenancy Act based on rent rolls. The Supreme Court held that this new ground, involving the investigation of documents, could not be raised for the first time at the leave stage, and noted that the documents relied upon were from a period subsequent to the sales. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the petitions, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a new ground involving the investigation of documents can be raised for the first time in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Does a presumption regarding the distribution of rent under the proviso to section 88(1) of the Bengal Tenancy Act apply to provisional rent receipts and documents of a period subsequent to the sales in question?
  • Can a pre-emption suit succeed where the rent of a tenancy has not been validly sub-divided with the consent of the entire body of landlords and co-sharer tenants?
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• MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH Versus MUHAMMAD AKBAR1971 SCMR 480 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-10Read full judgment →
• SHAHADAT HOSSAIN Versus STATE1971 SCMR 23 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-30
  special leave to appealenhancement of sentencewitness credibilityappreciation of evidencecriminal revisiongunshot injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which had maintained the petitioners' convictions under sections 324 and 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 while enhancing their sentences. The petitioners challenged the convictions, arguing that the lower courts failed to properly evaluate defence evidence and that certain prosecution witnesses' testimony cast doubt on the prosecution's case. The core legal questions were whether the lower courts erred in their assessment of witness credibility and whether the High Court acted legally in enhancing the sentences. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts had duly considered the defence evidence and that isolated statements in cross-examination did not discredit the consistent testimony of prosecution witnesses. The Court affirmed that the assessment of witness credibility is not a function of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Court held that the High Court committed no illegality in enhancing the sentences, noting that the sentences remained lenient given the nature of the injuries caused by gunshots. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a finding based on the credibility of witnesses?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to enhance sentences in a criminal revision?
  • Does an isolated statement in cross-examination necessarily discredit the entirety of a witness's testimony?
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• HIRJINA & CO. (PAKISTAN) LTD. Versus COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX1971 SCMR 128 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• SHEFALI RANI DAS Versus GOVERNMENT OF EAST PAKISTAN1970 SCMR 880 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-22Read full judgment →
• DAUD AHMED Versus FEROZE SIDDIQUE1970 SCMR 832 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-26Read full judgment →
• FAIZU Versus DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, KACHHI1970 SCMR 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-09
  Jagirdari abolitionbataitenancy rightsMartial Law Regulationleave to appealwrit petitionland reform
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions for special leave to appeal arising from a dispute between Jagirdars and tenants regarding the payment of batai (share of crops) for lands in Sub-Tehsil Chattar, District Karachi. Following the abolition of jagirdari via Martial Law Regulation No. 64, the Deputy Land Commissioner initially issued instructions terminating the rent-receiving interests of Jagirdars. However, the Commissioner subsequently directed the withdrawal of these instructions, prompting the Deputy Land Commissioner to issue fresh directives. Tenants challenged the legality of the Deputy Land Commissioner's withdrawal order through writ petitions, which the High Court dismissed in limine. The core legal questions involve the nature of the petitioners' title and interests in the land, the specific effect of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 on these tenancies, and the legality of the Deputy Land Commissioner's order cancelling his previous memorandum. Finding that the issues raised were complex and not free from difficulty, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to allow for a full hearing, while refusing the prayer for a stay of proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • What is the nature of title and interests of tenants in lands previously held under Jagirdari?
  • What is the effect of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 on existing tenancies?
  • Is an order by a Deputy Land Commissioner cancelling a previous administrative memorandum legally valid?
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• RUSTAM Versus STATE1970 SCMR 799 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-22Read full judgment →
• NAZIR AHMAD Versus NOOR MUHAMMAD1970 SCMR 716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-20
  evacuee propertysettlement authoritieswrit jurisdictionfindings of factrevision powersestoppeltransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee residential property. The petitioner sought the transfer of the property, claiming status as an allottee in possession. Following a series of remand orders by settlement authorities, the Settlement and Claims Commissioner, with the consent of both parties, decided the case on its merits, ultimately dismissing the petitioner's claim due to lack of proof regarding possession and the filing of the requisite transfer form. The petitioner challenged this decision via a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court on the grounds that the findings were factual and not perverse, and that the petitioner was estopped from challenging the Commissioner's jurisdiction to decide the merits after having consented to that procedure. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the Settlement Commissioner possesses wide powers in revision under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, to decide a case on its merits. Furthermore, the Court held that findings of fact based on evidence are not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to decide a case on its merits while exercising revisional powers under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Can a party challenge the jurisdiction of a tribunal to decide a case on its merits after having consented to that procedure?
  • Is a finding of fact based on evidence subject to interference by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction?
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