Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- KHUSHI MUHAMMAD ALIAS BOGI Versus THE STATE1986 PLD 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which had modified the petitioner's conviction from section 10(3) to section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, reducing the sentence accordingly. The core legal questions addressed were whether the testimony of a woman in a Zina case requires mandatory corroboration and whether the legal principles regarding consent applicable under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, extend to the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court held that no hard and fast rule exists requiring corroboration in all Zina cases, as it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Furthermore, the Court clarified that legal precedents concerning consent under section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, are not strictly applicable to the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, as consent does not provide a total absolution for the offender under the latter. The petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the testimony of a woman in a Zina case require mandatory corroboration?
- Are the legal principles regarding consent under section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 applicable to the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
- Does consent provide a complete defense to an offender under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
- NAVEED TEXTILE MILLS LTD. Versus ASSISTANT COLLECTOR (APPRAISING), CUSTOM HOUSE, KARACHI1985 PLD 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed by various textile mills against a consolidated judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing their constitutional petitions concerning the interpretation of a customs notification. The core legal question involved the construction of an explanation within a statutory notification (S.R.O. 702(1)/80) issued under the Customs Act, 1969, which excluded automatic cone-winders from customs duty exemption on the basis that they were substitutes for locally manufactured cone-winders. The Supreme Court held that the government's power to grant or revoke customs duty exemptions under section 19 of the Customs Act is discretionary, wide in amplitude, and uncontrolled, and that the disclosure of a factual reason or policy motivation in an explanation does not render the exercise of such delegated power justiciable or open to factual inquiry in constitutional jurisdiction. The petitions were accordingly dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.
Questions settled- Whether the government's power to grant exemptions under section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969 is discretionary and wide in amplitude?
- Can an explanation in a statutory instrument contain a statement of fact or policy motivation that is immune from factual inquiry in constitutional jurisdiction?
- Does an explanation in a statute invariably serve only to clarify, or can it contain a legal fiction or basis for differential treatment?
- SHAKIR MUHAMMA Versus THE STATE1985 PLD 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the plea of a valid Nikah raised by the appellants was mala fide and whether the principle laid down in Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal and others (PLD 1984 SC 95) applied. The appellants were convicted under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 for allegedly abducting and having unlawful relations with a married woman, a conviction that was upheld with a reduced sentence by the Federal Shariat Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan found that the trial court decided the crucial and conflicting claims regarding the validity of the marriage and legitimacy of a child without examining the Nikahkhwan, witnesses, or original Nikahnama, and ignored the pendency of a related family suit concerning jactitation or dissolution of marriage. Holding that the defence plea was not mala fide and that a full inquiry or awaiting the family court's decision was required in line with Azam's case, the Supreme Court set aside the convictions and ordered a re-trial, admitting the appellants to bail.
Questions settled- Whether a trial court can decide conflicting claims of a valid Nikah without examining the Nikahkhwan, witnesses, or the original Nikahnama?
- Is a criminal court required to await the decision of a pending family court suit regarding the validity of a marriage in a Zina case?
- Whether the principles laid down in Muhammad Azam's case apply when determining conflicting claims of marriage in criminal proceedings?
- Does the failure to conduct a full inquiry into conflicting marriage claims constitute a material defect in the trial warranting a re-trial?
- MUHAMMAD SHARIF Versus THE STATE1985 PLD 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court which had modified the appellant's conviction and sentence under sections 10 and 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, enhancing the sentence under section 11 to life imprisonment. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant could be convicted of graver offences than charged without amending the charge under the Criminal Procedure Code, whether section 11 of the Ordinance permits a sentence lesser than imprisonment for life, and whether the prosecutrix's long silence and absence of protest under alleged coercion raised a reasonable doubt regarding free will. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, holding that the prosecutrix's conduct—specifically her failure to raise an alarm or escape during a long train journey and extended stay in Sind—created a reasonable possibility that she left and remained with the accused of her own free will. Consequently, the conviction under section 11 and section 10(3) for Zina-bil-jabr was set aside on the benefit of doubt, and the appellant was instead convicted under section 10(2) for Zina liable to Tazir. The key principle laid down is that where the language of a penal statute is clear and mandatory, prescribing imprisonment for life without a lower minimum, the courts cannot interpret the word 'shall' as 'may' or read down the sentence, leaving any perceived legislative drafting anomaly regarding harsh mandatory minimums strictly for the legislature to amend.
Questions settled- Does section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 permit a court to award a sentence of imprisonment lesser than imprisonment for life?
- Can a conviction for Zina-bil-jabr be sustained where the prosecutrix fails to offer any plausible explanation for her long silence and absence of protest during a prolonged period of travel and stay?
- Whether the benefit of reasonable doubt should be extended to an accused where the evidence indicates a reasonable possibility that the prosecutrix accompanied the accused of her own free will?
- SULTAN MAQSOOD Versus THE STATE1985 PLD 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal through special leave is directed against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which dismissed the appellant's criminal appeal arising from his conviction and sentence under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, while modifying the sentence. The prosecution alleged that the appellant and an absconder committed Zina with the prosecutrix. The defence contended that the appellant was falsely implicated due to election rivalry and enmities involving village Zamindars known as Sardars. The core legal question examined was whether the background enmity rendered the false implication of the appellant probable. The Supreme Court held that the nexus between the background relations and the alleged false implication was too weak, and there was nothing to suggest that the prosecutrix or her family had any reason to falsely implicate the appellant. The conviction under section 10(2) of the Ordinance was upheld, but the sentence of imprisonment was reduced to the period already undergone while increasing the fine to be paid as compensation to the prosecutrix.
Questions settled- Whether previous election rivalry and litigation between an accused's family and third parties are sufficient to establish false implication in a Zina case?
- Can the conviction of an accused under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 be sustained upon credible testimony of the prosecutrix despite claims of enmity?
- Whether the sentence of imprisonment can be reduced while simultaneously increasing the fine to provide compensation to the prosecutrix in the absence of an appeal against acquittal for a graver charge?
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM Versus THE STATE1985 PLD 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by Muhammad Aslam arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming his conviction and death sentence for the murder of his uncle, Mehdi Hassan. The prosecution case was based on eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, and motive—specifically, that the appellant committed the murder at the age of 15 or 16 to avenge the suspected murder of his father by the deceased when the appellant was a young boy. While leave to appeal on merits was previously refused, leave was granted regarding the sentence. The core legal question was whether the minority of the appellant and the nature of the motive (avenging a father's death) constituted mitigating circumstances warranting a lesser sentence than death, and whether action should be taken for perjury. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the sentence of death should be commuted to transportation for life, relying on established precedents regarding private revenge and youth, while enhancing the fine. Furthermore, the Court directed the trial court to initiate proceedings for perjury against a prosecution witness and a defence witness.
Questions settled- Whether the age of the accused and a motive of avenging a father's murder constitute mitigating circumstances for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
- Can the Supreme Court enhance a sentence of fine while commuting a sentence of death?
- What action should courts take against witnesses who deliberately commit perjury during judicial proceedings?
- HAZOOR BAKSH Versus THE STATE1985 PLD 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-25Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD RAFIQ Versus THE STATE1985 PLD 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-26Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE Versus THE STATE1985 PLD 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-09Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AZAM Versus MUHAMMAD IQBAL1984 PLD 95 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
- SAEEDULLAH KAZMI Versus GOVT. OF PAKISTAN1984 PLD 463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-14Read full judgment →
- TALIB DIN Versus CHEIF LAND COMMISSIONER1984 PLD 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns appeals by cultivating tenants challenging the refusal of Land Commission authorities to sell them State land previously resumed from original grantees under the Land Reforms Regulation 1959 and Land Reforms Regulation 1972. The core legal question was whether such surrendered State land became available for disposal to cultivating tenants under the Land Reforms Scheme, or if it reverted to the Government as proprietary land outside the Commission's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Land Reforms Regulations did not apply to the proprietary interests of the Federal or Provincial Governments. Consequently, when State land was surrendered by grantees, it reverted to the Government rather than the Land Commission, rendering the Commission without jurisdiction to dispose of such land via sale to tenants. The Court affirmed that the Land Commission’s authority is limited to the scope of the Regulations, and it cannot exercise dispositive power over proprietary interests of the State. Accordingly, the appellants' claims to purchase the resumed land were untenable, and the appeals were dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the Land Commission have jurisdiction to dispose of State land resumed from grantees under the Land Reforms Regulation 1959?
- Is Government-owned land subject to the regulatory controls and limitations imposed by the Land Reforms Regulation 1959?
- Do cultivating tenants have a statutory right to purchase State land that has reverted to the Government after being surrendered by a grantee?
- Can the Land Commission exercise dispositive power over land that reverts to the Provincial Government?
- MUHAMMAD AMIN Versus THE STATE1984 PLD 440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal by leave of the court arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased following a previous altercation regarding the teasing of school girls. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular evidence, the presence of motive, and whether mitigating circumstances existed to warrant a lesser sentence than death due to preceding events. The Supreme Court, by a majority view, dismissed the appeal, upholding both the conviction and the death sentence, holding that the eyewitness testimony was credible, the motive was established, and minor injuries like an abrasion on the shoulder did not mitigate the deliberate nature of the fatal knife attack. The key principle laid down is that innocent social interventions against wrongful acts do not constitute mitigation for the assailant, and a premeditated fatal attack following a cooling-off period justifies capital punishment.
Questions settled- Does an intervention by bystanders to stop wrongful behavior operate as a mitigating circumstance for the assailant in a subsequent attack?
- Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained based on eyewitness testimony and medical evidence despite minor unexplained injuries on the deceased?
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and High Court regarding the appreciation of evidence.
- NAZIM KHAN Versus THE STATE1984 PLD 433 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of three brothers under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, who were sentenced to death by the trial court, which was subsequently confirmed by the High Court of Peshawar. The prosecution alleged that the appellants shot and killed two individuals following a dispute over an alleged rape. The trial court had disbelieved the three eye-witnesses as unreliable chance witnesses but convicted the appellants by relying on a portion of the dying declaration corroborated by their abscondence. The High Court, however, accepted the eye-witnesses and dismissed the appeal. On further appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the dying declaration lacked integrity, was recorded in the presence of relatives at the police station, and was inconsistent with the eye-witness accounts. Furthermore, the eye-witnesses had material discrepancies in their statements which the High Court erroneously explained away as police misunderstandings. The Supreme Court held that the benefit of reasonable doubt arising from such discrepancies must go to the accused, and abscondence alone cannot substitute for independent corroboration. Consequently, the Court accepted the appeal and acquitted the appellants.
Questions settled- Can a dying declaration recorded at a police station in the presence of close relatives be safely relied upon without strict scrutiny?
- Whether the discrepancies in the statements of eye-witnesses can be excused on the assumption of a recording police officer's misunderstanding to the detriment of the accused?
- Does the mere abscondence of an accused person provide sufficient independent corroboration to sustain a conviction when the primary evidence is unreliable?
- GHULAM RASUL Versus MUHAMMAD HAYAT1984 PLD 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, a registered voter, challenged the election of the respondent to the Zilla Council, Attock, via a constitutional petition in the nature of quo warranto. The appellant argued that the respondent, a full-time employee of Pakistan Oil Fields Limited, was disqualified under clause (aa) of Article 10(2) of the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Election) Order, 1977, as the company was allegedly controlled by the Government. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that regulatory control by the Government does not equate to proprietary control or management. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the term "control" within the disqualification clause. Applying the principle of noscitur a sociis, the Court held that "control" in this context must be interpreted in light of associated terms like "ownership" and "controlling share," implying a proprietary or management-based interest rather than mere regulatory or statutory oversight. Finding that the Government lacked proprietary control over the company, the Court affirmed the dismissal, ruling that extensive regulatory power does not constitute the "control" required to trigger the statutory disqualification for public office.
Questions settled- Does the term "control" in the context of election disqualification clauses include mere regulatory or statutory oversight by the Government?
- Can the principle of noscitur a sociis be applied to restrict the meaning of "control" when associated with terms like "ownership" and "controlling share"?
- Does an employee of a company subject to extensive government regulation fall under the disqualification criteria for holding public office?
- Is the regulatory power of the State over private enterprise equivalent to proprietary control or management?
- ISHTIAQ AHMED ALIAS KAKA Versus THE STATE1984 PLD 380 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-15Read full judgment →
- NISAR ALIAS NISARI Versus GOVT. OF PAKISTAN1984 PLD 373 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
- SHAKIR MUHAMMAD Versus THE STATE1984 PLD 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-02Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AMIN Versus THE STATE1984 PLD 343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-20Read full judgment →
- GHULAM SARWAR Versus THE STATE1984 PLD 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court upholding the petitioner's conviction for the offence of Zina liable to Tazir, with certain modifications regarding the specific provisions. The prosecution case alleged that the petitioner and his co-accused molested and dragged the prosecutrix and another girl to a hut, committing Zina-bil-Jabr. The core legal questions involved the credibility of the ocular testimony, the defense plea of false implication due to village party factionalism, the absence of physical injury marks on the prosecutrix, and the appropriateness of the sentence and refusal of discretionary benefits. The Supreme Court held that the overwhelming consistent ocular and medical evidence established the petitioner's guilt beyond doubt, rejected the plea of false implication, and held that the absence of physical scratches does not negate the occurrence of dragging or assault. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction.
Questions settled- Whether absence of visible marks of violence on the body of the prosecutrix disproves the allegation of dragging or assault in a charge of Zina-bil-Jabr?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the credibility of eyewitnesses where no misreading of evidence is shown?
- Whether the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is mandatory for the appellate or revisional court when considering a petition for leave to appeal?
- Does village party factionalism alone constitute sufficient ground to accept a plea of false implication in a heinous crime without corroborative motive linking the victim?
- MUHAMMAD RAMZAN Versus THE STATE1984 PLD 184 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter consists of two connected appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The first appeal arose from the Federal Shariat Court's dismissal of an appeal against the acquittal of accused persons charged under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance No. VII of 1979. The second appeal challenged the subsequent conviction of the complainant and witnesses under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for making false statements. The Supreme Court held that the appeal against acquittal filed by the complainant in a challan case was incompetent under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as only the State can appeal such acquittals. Regarding the perjury conviction, the Court ruled that where an acquittal in the main case is based on the extension of the benefit of doubt, it implies an equal possibility of the accusation being true or false. Consequently, the same benefit of doubt must be extended to the prosecution witnesses in the perjury proceedings, rendering their conviction unsustainable.
Questions settled- Does a private complainant have the locus standi to file an appeal against an acquittal in a criminal case initiated via a police challan?
- Can witnesses be convicted of perjury under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the accused in the main case were acquitted merely on the extension of the benefit of doubt?
- What is the appropriate legal remedy for a father disputing the validity of his daughter's marriage where a plea of valid marriage is used to defend against a charge of zina?
- GHULAM SARWAR Versus THE STATE1984 PLD 181 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two miscellaneous applications seeking the interim suspension of the sentence of whipping pending the hearing of petitions for leave to appeal against convictions under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question involves the power and procedure of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court to suspend a sentence of whipping and whether such suspension is warranted. The Shariat Appellate Bench held that due to the element of social disgrace, notoriety, and the irreversible and irreparable loss to a convict even upon a successful appeal, there is ample justification for suspending the sentence of whipping in appropriate cases pending appeal. The Court laid down the principle that sentences of whipping may be suspended pending the hearing of leave to appeal petitions, and if any individual feels aggrieved by the manner of execution of such punishment, they remain free to seek independent legal remedies.
Questions settled- Does the Supreme Court have the power to suspend a sentence of whipping pending the hearing of a petition for leave to appeal?
- Whether the sentence of whipping can be suspended in appropriate cases considering the social disgrace and irreparable nature of the punishment?
- What provisions govern the execution of a sentence of whipping in addition to imprisonment under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- KAMAL DIN Versus THE STATE1983 PLD 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-16Read full judgment →
- ABDUL REHMAN Versus THE STATE1983 PLD 73 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a criminal revision by the Lahore High Court, where the High Court dismissed the petition via a non-speaking, summary order without discussing the contentions raised or providing reasons. The Supreme Court examined whether a High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure is required to pass a speaking order addressing the contentions of the parties. The Court held that although revisional power is discretionary and does not create a right in any party, a High Court entertaining a revision must notice relevant contentions and record its reasons for rejecting them to ensure transparency and enable appellate review. Although the Supreme Court criticized the summary nature of the High Court's judgment, instead of remanding the case, it reviewed the record itself, found the ocular testimony reliable, and dismissed the petition on merits. The key principle laid down is that High Courts must render explicit, reasoned judgments or orders in criminal revisions rather than disposing of them in a summary manner.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court is required to write a speaking order when dismissing a criminal revision petition?
- Can the Supreme Court examine the record directly instead of remanding a case when the High Court passes a non-speaking summary order?
- Does the revisional power vested in the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure create an inherent right of revision for parties?
- ALLAH BAKHSH Versus THE STATE1983 PLD 70 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a criminal appeal and petition against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning charges of murder and assault under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involved the evidentiary value and reliability of multiple dying declarations made by a deceased victim, and whether a conviction could be sustained solely on such declarations after disbelieving the eye-witnesses and acquitting co-accused persons. The Supreme Court held that the dying declarations were trustworthy, consistent, and corroborated by the medical evidence, justifying the conviction of the main appellant. However, considering that the offense was committed to vindicate family honor following the abduction of a female family member, the Court partly accepted the appeal to the extent of reducing the death sentence to imprisonment for life, while dismissing the petition against the acquittal of the co-accused. The key legal principle laid down is that multiple dying declarations, when found voluntary, consistent, and free from enmity or fabrication, can form a sufficient basis for a conviction if properly sifted, even in the absence of supporting eyewitness testimony.
Questions settled- Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of dying declarations when eyewitnesses are disbelieved?
- Whether minor discrepancies between multiple dying declarations affect their overall credibility?
- Does the vindication of family honor constitute a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
- When can an appellate court interfere with the acquittal of co-accused persons?
- MUHAMMAD ILYAS Versus THE STATE1983 PLD 66 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
- RAZI Versus THE STATE1983 PLD 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves a review petition against the dismissal of an appeal upholding the conviction and death sentences of four petitioners for multiple murders and attempted murders arising from a land dispute. The core legal questions concern whether the failure of the prosecution to establish the alleged motive and the partial disbelief of the prosecution case warrant mitigating the death sentence to imprisonment for life, and whether vicarious liability or common intention applies under the circumstances. The court by majority dismissed the petition, maintaining the conviction, though differing on sentencing considerations. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's alleged motive is false or unestablished and a significant portion of its case is disbelieved, the court must carefully scrutinize the evidence and may consider such circumstances as mitigating factors while determining whether to commute a sentence of death to imprisonment for life.
Questions settled- Whether the failure of the prosecution to establish the alleged motive constitutes a mitigating ground for reducing a sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
- Does the rejection of a substantial part of the prosecution case against co-accused necessitate corroboration for maintaining the conviction of remaining accused?
- Whether discrepancies in the ocular testimony regarding the possession of disputed land affect the reliability of the prosecution story in a murder trial?
- IMAM BUX Versus THE STATE1983 PLD 35 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant and his co-accused brother under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder, resulting in a sentence of transportation for life. The core legal question was whether the appellant could be held vicariously liable under Section 34 for the murder committed by his co-accused, given that no injury was attributed to the appellant, no incriminating recovery was made from him, and the eyewitness accounts regarding his firing were contradictory. In a split decision, the majority of the Supreme Court held that the appellant's participation, including lying in wait with a firearm, issuing challenges to stop the victims, and fleeing together, sufficiently established a common intention and pre-concert to justify the application of Section 34. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence. The key principle laid down is that common intention for joint liability under Section 34 can be inferred from surrounding circumstances such as pre-planning, arming with deadly weapons, lying in wait, and acting in concert.
Questions settled- Can common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 develop at the spur of the moment?
- Is the absence of a weapon recovery or physical injury inflicted by an accused sufficient to absolve him from vicarious liability when shared common intention is established?
- How is common intention to be gathered when direct evidence is not forthcoming?
- FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN Versus MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE1983 PLD 273 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court concerning whether restrictions on the power of alienation of persons who inherited agricultural land under Punjab Customary Law prior to March 16, 1948, are opposed to the injunctions of Islam. The core legal question is whether such customary restrictions, kept in force by section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act 1872 and section 2 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962, violate Islamic law regarding absolute ownership and inheritance. The Supreme Court held that under Islamic law, property vests absolutely in heirs with unfettered rights of disposal, and distinctions between ancestral and non-ancestral property or restricted customary estates are repugnant to the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the declaration that custom allowing collaterals to challenge alienations is void, directing necessary legislative amendments.
Questions settled- Whether restrictions on the power of alienation under Punjab Customary Law for land inherited before 1948 are repugnant to the injunctions of Islam?
- Does Islamic law recognize any distinction between ancestral and self-acquired property regarding ownership and alienation?
- Is section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act 1872 void to the extent that it continues customary restraints on property alienations?
- MUHAMMAD RIAZ AHMAD Versus AJMAL HUSSAIN1983 PLD 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arises from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court dismissing an appeal against the acquittal of respondents accused under sections 11 and 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner's wife had left his house, and he subsequently lodged a police report alleging she was enticed away by respondent No. 1. The trial court acquitted the respondents under section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, upon finding no probability of conviction after prosecution witnesses were given up. The Federal Shariat Court dismissed the petitioner's ensuing appeal. The Supreme Court considered the competency of the appeal and the revisional jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court. The Court held that an appeal by a private complainant against an acquittal in a police challan case is incompetent under section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, read with section 20 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979, as private appeals are restricted to cases instituted upon complaints. However, the Federal Shariat Court's order was sustained under its newly conferred revisional jurisdiction, which was exercised lawfully and without perversity. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a private complainant file an appeal against an order of acquittal in a case instituted upon a police report rather than a complaint?
- Does the Federal Shariat Court possess revisional jurisdiction in criminal matters under the relevant constitutional provisions?
- Whether the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply mutatis mutandis to cases under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979?
- ABDUR RASHID Versus THE STATE1983 PLD 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-21Read full judgment →
- FATIM Versus ABDUL HAMID1983 PLD 158 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a constitutional petition in which the High Court set aside orders of the Settlement Authorities transferring a portion of a residential property to Mst. Fatima, the appellant. The core legal issues concerned whether the appellant could claim transfer of the property under a belated 'C.H.' Form after having subsequently submitted an 'E' Form to participate in the earmarking scheme, and whether the Settlement Commissioner could validly transfer property in lieu of an cancelled earmarking allotment. The Supreme Court held that the declaration attached to Form 'E' operates as an irrevocable condition precedent, and participating in the earmarking scheme amounts to an effective withdrawal or abandonment of any previously filed 'C.H.' Form. Furthermore, a delayed application cannot be entertained as of right after the property has already been validly transferred to another eligible party. The Court affirmed that transferring property on grounds extraneous to the statutory settlement scheme is illegal, upholding the High Court's judgment and dismissing the appeal.
Questions settled- Does the filing of an 'E' Form under an earmarking scheme amount to an irrevocable withdrawal of a previously submitted 'C.H.' Form?
- Can a belated 'C.H.' Form for transfer of evacuee property be entertained as of right after the property has already been transferred to another party?
- Can the Settlement Authorities transfer a residential property to an applicant in lieu of a cancelled earmarking lottery drawn in their favour outside statutory scheme instructions?
- ABDUL HAMEED Versus THE STATE1983 PLD 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose as a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court. The core legal questions concerned whether a petition for leave to appeal under Article 203-F(2-B) of the Constitution of Pakistan is subject to the limitation period prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, and whether the Shariat Appellate Bench constitutes a distinct forum separate from the Supreme Court. The Court held that the Shariat Appellate Bench remains a bench of the Supreme Court and consequently, the rules applicable to the Supreme Court apply mutatis mutandis to petitions filed under Article 203-F(2-B). The Court further held that the delay in filing the petition was not condonable. The petition was accordingly dismissed as time-barred.
Questions settled- Whether the Shariat Appellate Bench is a forum separate and distinct from the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
- Do the Supreme Court Rules apply to petitions for leave to appeal filed under Article 203-F(2-B) of the Constitution of Pakistan?
- Does the detention of a petitioner in custody and the advanced age of their father constitute sufficient grounds for the condonation of delay in filing an appeal?
- MAQBOOL BEGUM Versus GULLAM1982 PLD 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-02Read full judgment →
- Z. KAIKAUS Versus FEDERAL GOVT. OF PAKISTAN1982 PLD 409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from Shariat Appeals Nos. 11 and 12 of 1981, directed against judgments of the Federal Shariat Court concerning political parties, elections, and the compulsory acquisition of property under the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Act, 1973. During the hearings, the appellant submitted applications claiming that the judges of the Federal Shariat Court were not Muslims rendering their judgments null and void, and further conditioned his continued participation on the Supreme Court judges making a specific declaration of faith to his satisfaction, independent of the Constitution or law. The core legal question was whether the appellant's conditional refusal to proceed with the appeals amounted to an abandonment and withdrawal of the same. The Supreme Court held that the appellant's unilateral imposition of unwarranted conditions and refusal to pursue the appeals constituted an abandonment and withdrawal under the applicable procedural rules. The key principle laid down is that an appellant who refuses to prosecute appeals except upon extra-legal conditions of their own making is deemed to have abandoned and withdrawn the appeals.
Questions settled- Does an appellant's refusal to pursue an appeal except upon extra-legal conditions amount to abandonment and withdrawal?
- Can an appellant impose conditions regarding the religious faith or declaration of court judges as a prerequisite for prosecuting an appeal?
- BEGUM DARAB SULTANA Versus CUSTODIAN1982 PLD 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment quashing orders of the Custodian that had declared certain properties to be evacuee, as well as an order declining to review those earlier decisions. The core legal question concerned whether properties restored to their original owners under statutory provisions retained or lost their evacuee status, and whether past Custodian orders could be overridden by subsequent judicial pronouncements and government notifications. The Supreme Court held that the restoration of the properties in 1948 constituted a completed, past and closed transaction that erased all taint of evacuee status, rendering subsequent contrary orders by the Custodian without legal effect. The Court laid down that the statutory restoration of property to a returned evacuee owner removes its evacuee character, which cannot be revived by analogy or erroneous interpretation, though factual inquiries regarding subsequent re-acquisition of evacuee status remain within the domain of the competent authority.
Questions settled- Does an evacuee property retain its evacuee status after it has been legally restored to its original owner?
- Whether the restoration of property under section 17 of the West Punjab Protection of Evacuee Property Act 1948 erases the evacuee taint from the property?
- Can a property that is not evacuee legally form part of the Compensation Pool under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
- Does the Custodian retain suo motu review powers after the amendment of section 43(6) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957 by Ordinance LXIII of 1962?
- QABOOL Versus THE STATE1982 PLD 24 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellants for the murder of the deceased. The core legal questions were whether the testimony of the eye-witnesses was reliable despite allegations that the injuries were caused by blunt weapons rather than the alleged hatchets, and whether the First Information Report (FIR) was lodged promptly or fabricated after deliberation. The Supreme Court held that the eye-witnesses, including independent witnesses, were credible and their testimony was corroborated by the recovery of blood-stained hatchets. The Court clarified that the nature of the injuries (blunt) did not necessarily falsify the prosecution's case, as witnesses may not observe the specific side of a weapon used during a violent attack, and the complainant did not explicitly state the hatchets were used from the sharp side. Finding no material inconsistencies or evidence of deliberation in the FIR, the Court upheld the convictions and dismissed the appeal, affirming the principle that eye-witness testimony remains reliable when corroborated by forensic evidence, even if minor discrepancies in medical descriptions exist.
Questions settled- Does the fact that injuries were caused by a blunt weapon necessarily falsify eye-witness testimony that a hatchet was used?
- Can eye-witnesses be considered reliable if they are related to the deceased but have no proven enmity against the accused?
- Is the recovery of blood-stained weapons sufficient to corroborate eye-witness testimony in a murder case?
- MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN Versus CHAUDHRY UMAR BAKHSH1982 PLD 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a rent matter wherein the petitioner (tenant) challenged an ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller, which was subsequently upheld by the District Judge and the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question was whether a transferee-landlord is required to serve a notice under Section 13-B of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 upon the tenant before filing an ejectment application on the ground of personal use. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the ejectment application was maintainable despite the absence of such notice. The Court clarified that the requirement of notice under Section 13-B is strictly limited to protecting a tenant against allegations of default in rent payment. The key principle laid down is that the provisions of Section 13-B do not apply to ejectment applications based on grounds other than default in the payment of rent, such as personal use, and therefore, the failure to serve notice does not render an application on other grounds non-maintainable.
Questions settled- Does the failure to serve a notice under Section 13-B of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 render an ejectment application based on personal use non-maintainable?
- Is the notice requirement under Section 13-B of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 applicable to grounds for ejectment other than default in the payment of rent?
- KARACHI ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORPORATION LETD. Versus NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION1982 PLD 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These appeals by special leave arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which had dismissed constitutional petitions challenging the reinstatement of several employees of the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation by the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) acting as the 'specified authority' under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act 1952. The core legal question was whether the power to 'regulate' wages and other conditions of service under Section 6 of the Act and Rule 3 of the Rules of 1962 includes the power to adjudicate individual disputes and order reinstatement. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the word 'regulate' means to control, govern, or prescribe rules, and does not encompass the power to adjudicate individual disputes. The Court observed that the Act is emergency legislation with its own penal mechanism under Section 7 for violations. Consequently, the specified authority had no jurisdiction to entertain petitions for reinstatement or to adjudicate individual grievances. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and recalled the writs.
Questions settled- Does the power to 'regulate' wages and conditions of service under Section 6 of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act 1952 include the power to adjudicate individual employment disputes?
- Can the 'specified authority' under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act 1952 order the reinstatement of a dismissed or terminated employee?
- What is the proper legal remedy for an employee aggrieved by termination or dismissal under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act 1952?
- BOSTAN Versus SAHIB SHAH ALI1982 PLD 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-15Read full judgment →
- SAKHAWAT ALI Versus SHUI KHELAY1981 PLD 627 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of six Shariat Appeals (S.A. K-10 to K-12, K-14, K-15, and K-17 of 1980) filed by appellant Saeedullah Kazmi against orders of the Federal Shariat Court. In S.A. K-10 of 1980, the appellant challenged a Government circular permitting women of the 'Fiqa-e-Ja'afria' to perform Haj without a Mahram. The Supreme Court held that even if the circular were treated as having the force of law, it falls within the scope of 'Muslim Personal Law' under Article 203B of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which applies to Muslims as a special class and is expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court and the Shariat Appellate Bench. The court affirmed that matters of Muslim Personal Law fall within the purview of the Council of Islamic Ideology. The remaining appeals (K-11, K-12, K-14, K-15, and K-17), challenging various social practices, customs, and constitutional expressions, were dismissed as not pressed due to the appellant's refusal to prosecute them after his request to summon witnesses was rejected.
Questions settled- Whether a Government circular or policy granting specific exemptions to a particular Muslim sect falls within the definition of 'Muslim Personal Law' under Article 203B of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Whether the Federal Shariat Court has jurisdiction to examine laws, usages, or customs that fall within the scope of 'Muslim Personal Law'?
- Does the Federal Shariat Court have jurisdiction over general practices, usages, or customs that do not carry the force of law?
- SAEEDULLAH KAZMI Versus GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1981 PLD 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-29Read full judgment →
- FATEH MUHAMMAD Versus ABDUL GHANI1981 PLD 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-14Read full judgment →
- H.I. SHEIKH Versus MAHMOOD A. HAROON, FEDERAL MINISTER, RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS1981 PLD 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant filed a Shariat Application in the Shariat Bench of the Sind High Court under Article 203-B of the Constitution of 1973, challenging the Haj Policy (1980) of the Government of Pakistan, specifically objecting to the selection of pilgrims through a ballot system and the requirement of a non-refundable deposit for handling charges. The High Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court under Article 203-C of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the matters in issue pertain to Muslim Personal Law, and following its precedent in Federation of Pakistan v. Mst. Farishta, the scrutiny of Muslim Personal Law falls beyond the jurisdiction of Shariat Benches, Shariat Courts, and the Appellate Bench. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the original petition before the High Court was incompetent and properly dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the scrutiny of Muslim Personal Law fall within the jurisdiction of Shariat Benches and Courts?
- Whether the Haj Policy of the Government relating to the selection of pilgrims through ballot pertains to Muslim Personal Law?
- Is a Shariat application challenging the Haj Policy competent before the Shariat Bench of the High Court?
- MANSOOR ALI Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN1981 PLD 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-16Read full judgment →
- FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN Versus MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ1981 PLD 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment addresses a batch of service appeals arising under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan, concerning the interpretation of provisions of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 relating to the jurisdiction of Service Tribunals, the abatement of pending proceedings, and the right of appeal by government departments and statutory bodies like WAPDA. The core legal questions involved the determination of the exact date of abatement of suits and proceedings upon the establishment of tribunals under Article 212, and whether proviso (c) to section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act (excluding matters prior to 1st July 1969) retrospectively barred appeals where a right had already accrued upon abatement. The Supreme Court held that proceedings abated on the actual establishment of the Service Tribunal on 22nd February 1974 pursuant to the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1974, and that the right of appeal accruing to a party upon such abatement was a vested right not taken away retrospectively by subsequent amendments. The Court laid down that statutory abatements synchronise with the date of establishment of tribunals or the extension of laws to new bodies, and subsequent non-retrospective bars cannot defeat accrued rights of appeal.
Questions settled- When does the abatement of pending suits and proceedings take place under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan and the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
- Does the bar introduced by proviso (c) to Section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 regarding orders passed before 1st July 1969 operate retrospectively to take away the right of appeal accrued upon abatement?
- Is an appeal filed by a government department or employer competent under Section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
- What is the relevant date for the abatement of proceedings and application of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 to employees of statutory bodies when the statute is extended to them subsequently?
- DAWOOD COTTON MILLS LTD. Versus GUFTAR SHAH1981 PLD 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-04Read full judgment →
- ABDUL SHAHID Versus AZIM BAKHSH1981 PLD 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellants, tenants of a shop, sought to challenge an eviction order issued by the Rent Controller. After their appeal was dismissed by the District Court, they filed a second appeal in the Lahore High Court. During the proceedings, the appellants and their counsel failed to appear on the scheduled hearing date, leading the High Court to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution. A subsequent application for restoration was also dismissed by the High Court, as the appellants failed to provide a sufficient explanation for their absence or demonstrate diligence, particularly given the history of previous defaults and the existence of a stay order protecting their possession. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the High Court's discretionary dismissal of the restoration application was illegal or unreasonable. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exercised its discretion properly, noting that litigants cannot rely on the negligence of their counsel as a blanket excuse, especially when the party itself failed to show vigilance. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that discretionary orders based on a history of negligence are valid.
Questions settled- Can an appellate court dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution when both the appellant and their counsel fail to appear?
- Is a litigant entitled to the restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution based solely on the negligence of their counsel?
- Under what circumstances can a court refuse to restore an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution?
- HABIB-UR-REHMAN SIDDIQUI Versus GOVT. OF PAKISTAN1981 PLD 17 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges the judgment of the Shariat Bench of the Sind High Court, which dismissed a Shariat petition concerning the arrangements of hockey and cricket games played by women. The core legal question was whether the Shariat Bench had the jurisdiction under the Constitution to examine administrative actions, customs, or games in the absence of a specific law, rule, or regulation having the force of law, and whether the general practice of women playing sports constituted a custom having the force of law. The Supreme Court held that the Shariat Bench rightly dismissed the petition as incompetent, because the appellants failed to point out any specific law, rule, regulation, or custom having the force of law that could be examined for repugnancy to the Injunctions of Islam. The Court laid down the principle that the jurisdiction of the Shariat Bench is strictly confined to examining laws or provisions of law, including customs or usages having the force of law, and cannot be invoked against general actions, practices, or non-statutory arrangements of sports without identifying an enforceable law.
Questions settled- Whether the Shariat Bench of a High Court has jurisdiction to examine administrative actions or general practices of playing sports that do not constitute a law, rule, regulation, or custom having the force of law?
- What constitutes a custom or usage having the force of law capable of being examined for repugnancy to the Injunctions of Islam under the Constitution?
- Can an appeal before the Supreme Court be dismissed as infructuous when the grievance raised in the petition has been substantially addressed by governmental and presidential directives?
- AHMAD KHAN Versus SATTAR DIN1981 PLD 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-11Read full judgment →
- FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN Versus MST. FARISHTA1981 PLD 120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-20Read full judgment →
- S.M. JUNAID Versus PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN1981 PLD 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-28Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN PATEL Versus HABIB WALI MUHAMMAD1981 PLD 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns civil appeals against the dismissal of ejectment applications filed by a landlord against tenants for non-payment of conservancy charges. The core legal question was whether "conservancy charges," which the tenants had contractually agreed to pay to the landlord, fell within the ambit of "rent due" under Section 13(2)(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, thereby rendering the tenants liable for ejectment upon default. The Supreme Court held that the term "rent due" is not restricted to the specific sum labeled as "rent" in the agreement but encompasses all payments, including taxes and charges, that a tenant contractually agrees to render to the landlord in consideration for the enjoyment of the property. The Court established that the definition of "rent" in the Ordinance is not exhaustive and that the statutory "Explanation" serves as an illustrative guide rather than a limiting provision. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, ruling that the failure to pay agreed-upon conservancy charges constituted a default in "rent due," justifying the tenants' ejectment.
Questions settled- Does the term 'rent due' under Section 13(2)(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, include conservancy charges agreed to be paid by a tenant?
- Is the definition of 'rent' in the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, exhaustive?
- Does Section 9(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, prohibit a landlord from recovering taxes that were agreed upon by the tenant at the time of the lease?
- Can the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, be used to interpret the term 'rent' in the absence of a definition in the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
- GHULAM MUSTAFA Versus WAQAR AHMAD1980 PLD 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-17Read full judgment →
- HAMDARD DAWAKHANA Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KARACHI1980 PLD 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-10Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN Versus PAKISTAN TOBACCO CO. LTD.1980 PLD 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-08Read full judgment →
- ZAFARULLAH Versus MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ1980 PLD 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-27Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD MATIN MIRZA Versus JAHANGIR R. RUSTOMJI1980 PLD 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a long-standing dispute over the transfer of an evacuee property, specifically a bungalow in Karachi measuring 4227 square yards, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions involved the legality of transferring excess land attached to the house to a local non-transferee occupant pursuant to government press notes and notifications, the validity of earlier departmental orders, and the extent of land transferable to the primary transferee. The Supreme Court held that the initial transfer order in favor of the first respondent (a local) was void for lack of hearing and that subsequent policy changes by the Central Government via the Press Note of April 16, 1964, disqualified locals and non-claimant displaced persons from obtaining building sites out of excess area unless payments were finalized prior to the revised orders. The court ruled that the appellant transferee was entitled only to the main house and outhouses measuring 655 square yards plus three times that plinth area (1965 square yards), totaling 2620 square yards, while the remaining excess land of 1607 square yards was to be disposed of in accordance with the relevant law. The key principle laid down is that subsequent supersession of administrative policy and press notes regarding the disposal of excess evacuee land terminates pending incomplete claims of non-claimant locals unless saved by prior finalized transfers.
Questions settled- Whether a local non-transferee occupant remains eligible for the transfer of excess land attached to an evacuee property after the supersession of the Press Note of October 22, 1962 by the Press Note of April 16, 1964?
- Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the authority under the second proviso to Section 2(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, to issue instructions regarding the calculation and disposal of garden and ground areas attached to houses?
- Whether an administrative order of transfer passed in favor of a party without affording a hearing to the affected rival claimant is legally valid?
- Can subsequent structures illegally raised by occupants after partition be considered accretions to an evacuee property for calculating the original plinth area?
- MUHAMMAD KHAN Versus SHOBRA HOTEL LTD.1980 PLD 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-10Read full judgment →
- NAZIR AHMAD Versus MUHAMMAD SHAFI1980 PLD 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of three criminal petitions for special leave to appeal arising from connected proceedings involving a murder occurrence and a cross-complaint. The first petition sought the transfer of a complaint case pending before the Sessions Judge, Kasur, which the Supreme Court dismissed as lacking bona fides, noting that the petitioners faced no such grievance in a cross-challan case pending in the same court and that the petition was aimed at prolonging the confinement of the opposing party. The second petition, relating to a bail cancellation order, was treated merely as an item of reference and was likewise dismissed. The third petition challenged ongoing police investigation and the issuance of arrest warrants, contending that it violated the protection against double prosecution under Article 13 of the Constitution, and sought quashment under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the police power of investigation in cross-version cases remains unfettered, that Section 561-A cannot be invoked to halt police investigation, and that Article 13 is not attracted at the pre-trial investigation stage where no second prosecution exists. Consequently, all three petitions were dismissed.
Questions settled- Can Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked to halt or quash ongoing police investigation?
- Does police investigation into a cross-version case violate the protection against double prosecution under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Is the issuance of warrants of arrest by a magistrate in aid of further police investigation considered a second prosecution?
- MUHAMMAD SHARIF PURI Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE1980 PLD 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-16Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASLAM Versus MIMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE (SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION WING/CHIEF SATTLEMENT COMMISSIONER)1980 PLD 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-11Read full judgment →
- WAQAR ALI SHEIKH Versus ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN1980 PLD 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction regarding his dismissal from government service under Martial Law Regulation No. 58. The petitioner contended that he had already retired before the extension of his service and that the subsequent disciplinary action was mala fide. The core legal questions were whether the Service Tribunal possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter despite the validation provisions of Article 270(4) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and whether the Supreme Court should resolve disputed questions of fact regarding the petitioner's employment status. The Court held that the Service Tribunal erred in declining jurisdiction, affirming that such appeals are competent. However, the Court declined to resolve the underlying disputed questions of fact, such as the effective date of retirement and allegations of mala fides, holding that these matters fall within the purview of the Service Tribunal's appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's order and remanded the case for a decision on merits.
Questions settled- Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear appeals against dismissal orders passed under Martial Law Regulation No. 58?
- Can the Supreme Court determine disputed questions of fact regarding the effective date of a government servant's retirement under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Does the validation provision in Article 270(4) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 oust the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
- S.A. RIZVI Versus ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN1980 PLD 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the order of the Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's appeal against his dismissal under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 for want of jurisdiction. The core legal question concerns the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal to entertain an appeal against an order of dismissal passed under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 of 1969 in respect of a civil servant. Following the reasoning in M. Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction in the matter, set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal, and remanded the case for expeditious disposal on merits. The key principle laid down is that Service Tribunals possess jurisdiction to hear appeals relating to departmental actions and dismissals falling within the scope of relevant constitutional and statutory provisions as interpreted in precedent.
Questions settled- Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the dismissal of a civil servant under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 of 1969?
- Can a central employee be removed from service by a Provincial Government?
- AMANULLAH KHAN Versus SERVICE TRIBUNAL (FEDERAL)1980 PLD 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, a former Deputy Director in the Customs Department, challenged his dismissal under Martial Law Regulation No. 58. Initially, he approached the High Court and subsequently the Supreme Court, but withdrew his petition to pursue a remedy before the Service Tribunal, believing his case had abated under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Service Tribunal later dismissed his appeal, ruling it incompetent because the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976, had retroactively saved such proceedings from abatement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the Tribunal erred in applying the Fifth Amendment retrospectively to a case where the appellant had already withdrawn his petition before the amendment's promulgation. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred, as the amendment was not in force when the appellant approached the Tribunal. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal’s order and remanded the case for a decision on merits. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Service Tribunal’s appellate jurisdiction encompasses all questions of law and fact, rejecting arguments that review is limited to jurisdictional or mala fide grounds.
Questions settled- Does the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976, apply retrospectively to proceedings withdrawn before its promulgation?
- Is an appeal before the Service Tribunal competent if the appellant withdrew a pending Supreme Court petition prior to the enactment of the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976?
- Does the appellate jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal extend to all questions of law and fact, or is it limited to jurisdictional errors and mala fides?
- M.H. SHAMIM Versus PAKISTAN1980 PLD 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a former member of the Police Service of Pakistan dismissed from service under Martial Law Regulation No. 58, challenged the Service Tribunal's decision dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether actions taken under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 enjoy immunity from judicial review under Article 270 of the Constitution and whether the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to examine appeals against such dismissal orders. The Supreme Court held that while proceedings under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 fall within the validity and immunity granted by clause (4) of Article 270 of the Constitution, they remain open to appeal and revision before the Service Tribunal. The Court laid down the principle that the Service Tribunal has the legal duty to examine on merits all questions of law and fact raised by appellants challenging dismissal orders passed under Martial Law Regulation No. 58, setting aside the Tribunal's order and remanding the matter for a decision on merits.
Questions settled- Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain appeals against dismissal orders passed under Martial Law Regulation No. 58?
- Are proceedings and orders taken under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 protected under clause (4) of Article 270 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Is it the duty of the Service Tribunal to examine on merits all questions of law and fact raised to challenge an order of dismissal made under Martial Law Regulation No. 58?
- PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES Versus SINDH LABOUR COUTR NO.51980 PLD 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the classification of employees engaged by Pakistan International Airlines to supervise a construction project. The respondents, initially hired on a temporary basis, claimed they had become permanent workmen under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, having served for more than nine months. The Labour Court and the High Court ruled in favor of the respondents. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, however, allowed the appeal, holding that the respondents were not permanent workmen. The Court clarified that the definition of a "permanent workman" requires the work itself to be of a "permanent nature," in addition to the duration of employment. The Court emphasized that the mere duration of service exceeding nine months does not automatically convert temporary employment into permanent status if the underlying work is of a temporary nature. The judgment established that courts must adhere to the plain language of statutory definitions and cannot disregard the requirement of the "permanent nature" of work to achieve a perceived beneficial outcome for employees.
Questions settled- Does a workman become a 'permanent workman' solely by being employed for more than nine months?
- What is the essential distinction between a 'permanent workman' and a 'temporary workman' under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
- Can a court ignore the statutory requirement that work must be of a 'permanent nature' to qualify a worker as a 'permanent workman'?
- Does the right to file a grievance under Standing Order 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 extend to all workmen?
- ALI SHER Versus THE STATE1980 PLD 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines the legality of the acquittal of respondents Muhammad Hussain, Talib Hussain, and Abdul Hameed for the murder of Suleman, which had been set aside by the High Court from a conviction by the trial court. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in reversing the convictions in the presence of natural eye-witnesses, injured witnesses, corroborative medical evidence, injuries on the accused, and recoveries of blood-stained weapons. The Supreme Court held that the High Court fell into serious error by ignoring vital corroborative evidence, including injuries sustained by two of the accused, medical evidence consistent with weapons used (including sua punctures), and genuine recoveries of blood-stained hatchets. The ratio decidendi is that where eye-witness testimony—particularly of injured witnesses—is corroborated by the accused's own injuries and compatible medical evidence, an acquittal based on minor discrepancies or the rejection of site plan details is unsustainable. The Court restored the conviction and sentences originally passed by the trial court, granting credit for the period spent in custody during the appeal.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the conviction of the respondents for murder on the ground that eye-witnesses were related and inimical?
- Does the presence of injuries on the person of the accused provide sufficient corroboration of their participation in a crime?
- Can the omission of the exact position of prosecution witnesses in a site plan by itself lead to the inference that the witnesses were not present?
- Whether the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be extended when an appellate court restores a trial court's conviction upon setting aside an acquittal?
- ZARAR KHAN Versus GOVERNMENT OF SINDH1980 PLD 310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-12Read full judgment →
- ISLAMABAD CLUB Versus PUNJAB LABOUR COURT NO.21980 PLD 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-30Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YOUSUF Versus ABDULLAH1980 PLD 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an eviction application filed by the respondent-landlord against the appellant-tenant on the ground of default in rent payments under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal questions involved whether the terms of an expired lease agreement—including provisions for advance rent and security deposits—continued to govern the parties, and whether a security deposit lying with the landlord should have been adjusted against the arrears, thereby negating the default. The Supreme Court held that upon the expiry of the lease, the rights and liabilities of the parties were governed exclusively by the Ordinance rather than the expired lease agreement, and that a tenant's technical failure to tender rent when a larger security deposit remained with the landlord warranted the exercise of judicial discretion in the tenant's favor. The court laid down that statutory rent restriction laws override inconsistent contractual covenants of expired leases, and that holding over under such rent laws does not automatically import all terms of the old lease.
Questions settled- Do the terms of a written lease agreement continue to govern the parties after the expiry of the lease when a statutory rent restriction law is in force?
- Can a security deposit lying with the landlord be adjusted against arrears of rent to determine whether a tenant has committed a default under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
- Does the acceptance of rent by a landlord after the determination of a lease amount to an implied renewal of all terms of the original lease agreement?
- When can a court exercise its discretion in favor of a tenant who has committed a technical default in the payment of rent?
- AKBAR ALI Versus MUHAMMAD HANIF1980 PLD 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-14Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ISRAR NABI Versus PROVINCE OF PUNJAB1980 PLD 292 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had upheld the petitioner's premature retirement under Martial Law Regulation 114. The petitioner argued that the retirement was mala fide, stemming from a personal dispute with a Chief Engineer, and contended that the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction by focusing solely on the issue of mala fides without examining the merits of the retirement decision. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and addressed whether the Tribunal, as an appellate body, was obligated to review the merits of the retirement order beyond the allegation of mala fides. The Court held that while the petitioner failed to establish mala fides against the President of Pakistan, the Tribunal erred by failing to perform its duty to examine the petitioner's service record and the justification for the retirement. The Court established that a Service Tribunal, acting as an appellate authority, is obligated to review the merits of an administrative order, not merely the question of mala fides, to ensure the petitioner is not deprived of a valuable right.
Questions settled- Is a Service Tribunal, when hearing an appeal against a retirement order, obligated to examine the merits of the case beyond the issue of mala fides?
- Does a Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to review the service record of a civil servant to determine the justification for compulsory retirement?
- Can a Service Tribunal dismiss an appeal against a retirement order without specifically examining the merits of the service record?
- QURESHI BROTHERS Versus KHAIRPUR TEXTLE MILLS LTD.1980 PLD 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which had dismissed the appellant's first civil appeal and upheld the trial court's preliminary decree for accounts in a recovery suit. The core legal question was whether the business dealings between the parties constituted a 'mutual, open and current account' under Article 85 of the Limitation Act, thereby bringing the respondent's recovery suit within limitation. The Supreme Court held that the parties dealt in two distinct capacities—as principal and agent, and as seller and purchaser—giving rise to reciprocal demands and obligations capable of creating a shifting balance. Affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts, the Court held that the account was indeed a mutual, open and current account, and the suit filed within limitation from the last credit entry of December 1957 was maintainable. The key principle laid down is that mutuality of accounts requires transactions creating mutual obligations and independent demands on both sides, but absolute shifting of balances is not a mandatory conclusive test as long as the nature of the transactions is capable of giving rise to it.
Questions settled- Whether an account consisting of transactions arising from dual business relationships of principal-agent and seller-purchaser constitutes a mutual, open and current account?
- Does the absence of a balance actually shifting in favour of both parties disprove the mutuality of an account?
- Is a recovery suit governed by Article 85 of the Limitation Act when continuous mutual dealings exist between the parties?
- Whether the appropriation of sale proceeds towards a running account establishes valid credit entries for the purpose of computing limitation?
- N.J. SILK INDUSTRIES Versus PRESIDING OFFICER, IVTH SINDH LABOUR COURT1980 PLD 283 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind allowing a constitutional petition. The core legal question was whether Standing Order No. 15 of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, applies to an industrial establishment employing not more than 49 persons, in view of the second proviso to section 1(4) of the said Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the second proviso explicitly excludes the application of Standing Order No. 15 to establishments employing 49 or fewer workers unless extended by government notification, and Standing Order No. 12(5) cannot be invoked to override this explicit statutory exclusion. The Court laid down the principle that a proviso concerning the extent and application of an enactment carves out an exception that must be given full effect, and specific exclusionary provisions regarding establishment size override general protections against termination for misconduct where the statute provides otherwise.
Questions settled- Whether Standing Order No. 15 of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is applicable to an industrial establishment employing forty-nine or fewer persons?
- Does the second proviso to section 1(4) of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 override other inconsistent provisions regarding the applicability of Standing Orders?
- Can Standing Order No. 12(5) operate to enforce the procedure of Standing Order No. 15 when the application of Standing Order No. 15 has been explicitly excluded by statute?
- SOHRAB KHAN KALWAR Versus SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SINDH,DEPARTMENT OF FOOD1980 PLD 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal was filed against a judgment of the Sind Service Tribunal upholding the appellant's removal from service as Rationing Controller, Karachi, under the Sind Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. The core legal questions pertained to whether an Authorised Officer can recall an order initiating a formal inquiry under rule 5(2) to instead proceed under the summary show-cause procedure of rule 5(3), and whether denying a civil servant an explicit personal hearing requested pursuant to a show-cause notice invalidates the ultimate penalty. The Supreme Court held that under general administrative principles of locus poenitentiae and Section 20 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956, an authority retains the power to recall an unexecuted order and adopt an alternative statutory procedure when circumstances justify it. However, because the appellant was explicitly offered the option of a personal hearing in the show-cause notice and requested it, denying that hearing without sufficient cause deprived him of a fair opportunity to defend himself. The removal order was declared without lawful authority and the matter was remanded for fresh proceedings.
Questions settled- Does an Authorised Officer retain the power under administrative law to recall an order for formal departmental inquiry and instead proceed via summary show-cause notice?
- Can an authority deny a civil servant a personal hearing after explicitly offering the option in a disciplinary show-cause notice and receiving an affirmative request?
- Does the failure to afford a requested personal hearing render a subsequent order of removal from service illegal and without lawful authority?
- SHER AFZAL Versus SHAMIM FIRDAUS1980 PLD 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a suit for a declaration of marriage and the legitimacy of a child, filed by the respondents against the appellant. The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court and the High Court, decreed the suit, holding that the marriage was proved via direct evidence (Nikahnama) and corroborated by extensive circumstantial evidence, including correspondence and the appellant's conduct. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its second appeal jurisdiction by upholding concurrent findings of fact regarding the marriage and legitimacy. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court correctly applied the law by refusing to re-evaluate factual findings absent a material error or misreading of evidence. The Court affirmed that under Islamic Law, long-term cohabitation and the acknowledgement of paternity create a strong presumption of a valid marriage, which the appellant failed to rebut. The judgment reinforces the principle that courts must presume in favor of marriage and against concubinage, and that concurrent findings of fact are generally immune from interference in second appeal.
Questions settled- Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Does long-term cohabitation between a man and a woman create a legal presumption of marriage under Islamic Law?
- Does an acknowledgement of paternity by a man confer the status of a legitimate son upon a child under Islamic Law?
- Is secondary evidence admissible to prove a fact when the original document is available?
- ALLAH BAKHSH Versus SHAMMI1980 PLD 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-02Read full judgment →
- SADIQ ALI Versus IMTIAZ AHMAD KHAN1980 PLD 222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-14Read full judgment →
- M. YAMIN QURESHI Versus ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTSAN1980 PLD 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged an order of the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the appellant's appeal against his dismissal under Martial Law Regulation 58 of 1969 for lack of jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the immunity granted by Article 270 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to acts done under Martial Law precluded the Service Tribunal from exercising its appellate jurisdiction under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal possessed exclusive jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Court reasoned that the constitutional immunity from judicial scrutiny in "courts" did not extend to preventing an appeal before a specialized tribunal established under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Court affirmed that the Service Tribunal is obligated to examine the merits of such disciplinary orders, including allegations of procedural illegality, lack of jurisdiction, or mala fides. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's order and remanded the matter for a decision on merits, emphasizing that the Tribunal acts as an appellate forum with full powers to review the legality of the impugned dismissal.
Questions settled- Does the immunity granted by Article 270 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 bar the Service Tribunal from hearing appeals against dismissal orders passed under Martial Law Regulations?
- Does the Service Tribunal have the power to examine the merits of a dismissal order passed under Martial Law Regulation 58 of 1969?
- Can the Service Tribunal review disciplinary actions to determine if they were taken without jurisdiction, mala fide, or were coram non judice?
- ABDUL HAFIZ Versus SECRETARY, COMMUNICATION & WORKS DEPARTMENT1980 PLD 211 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
- GHULAM NABI Versus MUSHTAQ AHMAD1980 PLD 206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-29Read full judgment →
- FARMAN ALI Versus THE STATE1980 PLD 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from a conflict between the trial court's judgment convicting the appellants under section 304 Part I/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the High Court's judgment altering the conviction to section 302/34 of the same code and sentencing them to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, including the ocular testimony, the alleged dying declaration, medical evidence, and ballistic reports. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the genuineness and reliability of the dying declaration, particularly given the severe injuries sustained by the deceased and material contradictions among the medical and police witnesses. Furthermore, the medical and ballistic evidence indicated injuries consistent with the act of a single assailant using a single weapon, creating grave doubt regarding the participation of all appellants. The key principle laid down is that where the dying declaration is rendered doubtful by severe physical trauma and conflicting testimony, and where corroborative ocular and medical evidence suffers from serious infirmities and contradictions, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused, and mere abscondence alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction.
Questions settled- Whether a dying declaration recorded under contradictory circumstances by medical and police witnesses can be relied upon without corroboration?
- Does abscondence by itself suffice to sustain a conviction in the absence of reliable primary evidence?
- Whether medical and ballistic inconsistencies regarding the nature of injuries and weapons used warrant the acquittal of multiple accused?
- GHULAM HUSSAIN Versus KANWAR ASHIQ ALI KHAN1980 PLD 198 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
- FAZAL-I-RAZIQ Versus ZAMAN SHAH1980 PLD 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-28Read full judgment →
- BARKAT ALI Versus BASHIR AHMAD1980 PLD 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-09Read full judgment →
- GUL MIR Versus THE STATE1980 PLD 185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that exercised suo motu jurisdiction to enhance the appellant's sentence from life imprisonment to death for the murder of Janat Gul. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the High Court's enhancement of the sentence based on the assumption that the appellant was a hired assassin acting under the instigation of a third party, despite the trial court's finding that the motive remained shrouded in mystery. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding the ocular evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the dying declaration reliable. However, the Court held that the High Court's enhancement of the sentence was based on mere conjecture rather than evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed that judicial decisions regarding sentencing must be grounded in established evidence rather than speculation about motive or external instigation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal regarding the conviction but allowed it regarding the sentence, setting aside the death penalty and restoring the original sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial court.
Questions settled- Can a High Court enhance a sentence based on conjectures regarding motive that are not supported by evidence on the record?
- Is a site plan prepared by a police officer considered evidence in a criminal trial?
- Does the absence of a proven motive preclude a conviction for murder when ocular evidence is reliable?
- BARKAT KHAN Versus FAZAL-E-AKBAR1980 PLD 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a writ petition. The appellants had purchased land, which was subsequently made the subject of a pre-emption suit referred to the Council-of-Elders under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901. After prolonged proceedings, revisions, remands, and a final dismissal of the first respondent's revision by the Commissioner, the first respondent filed a second revision before the Officer on Special Duty, Government of N.-W. F. P., which was allowed. The appellants' writ petition against that order failed before the High Court. The core legal question was whether a second revision lay to the Officer on Special Duty under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901. The Supreme Court held that Section 49 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 provides for only one revision, and since the first respondent's revision had already been heard and rejected by the Commissioner, the second revision before the Officer on Special Duty was entirely incompetent. The appeal was accordingly allowed.
Questions settled- Does section 49 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 permit more than one revision against an order passed under the Regulation?
- Was the second revision filed before the Officer on Special Duty competent under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901?
- B.Z. KAIKAUS Versus PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN1980 PLD 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners, members of an organization, filed a constitutional petition in the Lahore High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, seeking extensive declarations and injunctions to the effect that Pakistan must be governed exclusively by the Divine Law (Sharia) derived from the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah, and that existing laws and provisions of the Constitution inconsistent therewith should be declared null and void. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the judiciary lacks jurisdiction to strike down the Constitution or issue mandates to the legislature to enact or alter laws. Upon a petition for special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Islamisation of laws and the formulation of legal codes are legislative and political functions entrusted to the State organs, not the courts. The judiciary's role is to interpret and apply existing laws rather than act as a legislature or supplant the legal system overnight. Consequently, the petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the superior courts have the jurisdiction to issue declarations and injunctions directing the legislature or state organs to enforce Islamic Sharia law or overhaul the existing legal system?
- Can the judiciary declare the Constitution of Pakistan or its provisions to be null and void as being contrary to the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah?
- Whether the process of Islamising laws and adapting legal systems to Islamic principles is a judicial function or a legislative and political responsibility?
- Whether a writ of mandamus or prohibition can lie against the legislature to compel or prevent the enactment of specific laws?
- IQAN AHMAD KHURRAM Versus GOVT. OF PAKISTAN1980 PLD 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns civil petitions for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed constitutional petitions as incompetent. The petitioners, employees of the Telegraph and Telephone Department, challenged the validity of notifications that revised recruitment and promotion rules, arguing these changes adversely affected their terms and conditions of service. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal possessed exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the vires of such rules, or if the High Court retained jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal is competent to examine the validity of rules governing service terms and conditions. The Court distinguished between challenges regarding an individual's fitness for promotion—where the Tribunal's jurisdiction might be restricted—and challenges to the rules themselves, which alter the method of recruitment and promotion. Consequently, because the impugned rules affected terms and conditions of service, the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution, rendering the constitutional petitions before the High Court barred. The petitions were dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to determine the vires of rules governing the terms and conditions of service?
- Does a challenge to the validity of recruitment and promotion rules fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution?
- Is there a distinction between challenging the fitness of an individual for promotion and challenging the rules that govern the method of recruitment and promotion?
- Does the Government possess the plenary power to frame and amend service rules, thereby superseding previous rules regarding promotion?
- GHULAM HUSSAIN Versus ZAHOOR DIN1980 PLD 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a Lahore High Court order dismissing a review petition as time-barred and directing the appellant to surrender possession of land. The core legal question was whether the High Court could lawfully order the appellant to deliver possession based on an undertaking provided by the appellant to secure an adjournment and maintain status quo, given the appellant's argument that the land was not the original subject matter of the suit. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant had voluntarily provided a solemn undertaking to vacate the land to obtain an adjournment. The Court determined that the property had become a central issue during the review proceedings, and the High Court acted within its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, to enforce this undertaking. The judgment establishes that a party cannot benefit from a court order obtained through an undertaking and subsequently seek to withdraw from that commitment. Furthermore, inherent powers may be invoked to enforce undertakings given to the court to maintain status quo, particularly when the party seeking relief has themselves introduced the subject matter into the proceedings.
Questions settled- Can a court enforce an undertaking given by a party to vacate property in exchange for an adjournment?
- Does the High Court have inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to enforce a status quo order?
- Can a party who has obtained a benefit from an undertaking given to the court later withdraw from that undertaking?
- Is a party permitted to challenge the jurisdiction of the court regarding the subject matter of a suit when they have themselves introduced that subject matter into the proceedings?
- ASGHARI KHANUM Versus THE STATE1980 PLD 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-05Read full judgment →
- M.A. HASEEB KHAN Versus SIKANDAR SHAHEEN1980 PLD 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These petitions for leave to appeal challenge a Lahore High Court judgment concerning the disposal of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions involved whether the cancellation of property transfers and subsequent auction were lawful, and whether the High Court properly exercised writ jurisdiction to re-open the matter despite the repeal of settlement laws and the dismissal of prior writ petitions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, upholding the High Court’s ruling. It held that the property units in question were never legally resumed or auctioned, meaning the auction purchaser acquired no valid title. The Court established that payment of the evaluated price for transferred evacuee property is inextricably linked to the issuance of a compensation book; consequently, no default could be attributed to a transferee until such book was issued. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the dismissal of a writ petition for non-prosecution does not constitute a decision on merits, does not bar a subsequent petition on the same cause of action, and does not create res judicata.
Questions settled- Does the dismissal of a writ petition for non-prosecution bar a subsequent petition on the same cause of action?
- Can a transferee of evacuee property be held in default for non-payment of the transfer price before the issuance of a compensation book?
- Does the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, divest the High Court of its constitutional writ jurisdiction to review settlement proceedings?
- BARKAT SHAH Versus AZIZULLAH KHAN1980 PLD 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-06Read full judgment →
- SAEEDA KHATOON Versus AMIR BEGUM1980 PLD 133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a property dispute concerning the western portion of property No. 3/18 Temple Road, Lahore, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions involved the legality of dividing a disputed property into separate units by settlement authorities, the restriction against a claimant obtaining multiple houses, and the interpretation of 'undisputed occupation' under a Central Government notification regarding possession. The Court held that the Settlement Commissioner acted within his lawful authority in dividing the property into two units, and that the appellants, having already been transferred one housing unit, were not entitled to a second unit. Furthermore, the Court held that the appellants' occupation of the ground floor was heavily contested in ongoing litigation and therefore did not qualify as 'undisputed occupation' under the relevant notification. The appeal was dismissed with costs, upholding the decision of the High Court's Letters Patent Bench which restored the Settlement Commissioner's fair and just allocation.
Questions settled- Whether a Settlement Commissioner has the jurisdiction in revision to divide a disputed property into separate units for transfer to different claimants?
- Can a claimant who has already been transferred one housing unit under settlement laws claim the transfer of a second unit or house?
- What constitutes 'undisputed occupation' under the Central Government Notification dated October 13, 1959, issued pursuant to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
- Does an occupation that is the subject of pending litigation and active challenge before a competent authority qualify as undisputed?
- MANSUKHDAS BODARAM Versus HUSSAIN BROTHERS LTD.1980 PLD 122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from a suit for damages filed by the appellant vendors against the respondent purchasers for the alleged breach of forward contracts for the supply of rapeseed. The contracts were entered into in July 1958, but before their implementation, Martial Law Regulation 42 of 1958 was promulgated, and a notification dated November 1958 fixed the maximum price of rapeseed at a significantly reduced rate. The trial court and the High Court in a Letters Patent Appeal both dismissed the suit, holding that the contracts had frustrated due to the price-fixing regulation which rendered performance at the original contractual rates unlawful and impossible. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Central Government was empowered under the regulation to control the prices of rapeseed as a "selected foodgrain" and that the subsequent price fixation directly frustrated the contracts under Section 56 of the Contract Act 1872. The Court laid down that the doctrine of frustration operates automatically to discharge parties from performance when supervening legislation renders a contract unlawful, and a party refusing to take the real risk of penal prosecution for violating a statutory price control cannot be deemed in breach.
Questions settled- Whether the Central Government was empowered to fix the price of rapeseed under Martial Law Regulation 42 of 1958?
- Does the fixation of a statutory price lower than the contractual rate render a forward contract void due to frustration under Section 56 of the Contract Act 1872?
- Whether a party refusing to perform a contract to avoid the risk of penal prosecution under a price-control regulation is guilty of a deliberate breach?
- What is the legal effect and operation of the doctrine of frustration on an executory contract?
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, LAHORE Versus FEROZEDIN ALLAH RAKHA M. RAMZAN1980 PLD 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-13Read full judgment →
- ALI KHAN Versus THE STATE1980 PLD 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment arises from three petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan: two filed by the convict Ali Khan challenging his conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance, and one by the complainant challenging the acquittal of co-accused. The deceased was shot dead while walking to court, allegedly due to long-standing family enmity. The trial court convicted three accused, but the High Court maintained only the petitioner's conviction while acquitting the others for lack of independent corroboration. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution is required to produce every witness named in the FIR or examined during investigation, whether interested eyewitness testimony requires independent corroboration, and whether private revenge constitutes a mitigating factor for sentence reduction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution is not bound to produce witnesses who lack awareness of relevant facts. It further held that corroboration of interested witnesses is a rule of prudence, and private revenge does not constitute a mitigating circumstance for capital punishment. All petitions were dismissed.
Questions settled- Is the prosecution legally required to produce every person named in the FIR or examined by the police as a witness at trial?
- Whether private revenge constitutes a mitigating circumstance for awarding a lesser sentence in murder cases under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Can the testimony of interested eyewitnesses be relied upon to convict an accused without independent corroboration?
- SIRAZ DIN Versus AMANULLAH QURESHI1980 PLD 1 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment involving a dispute over the allotment of urban agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly quashed an allotment order made by an Additional Settlement Commissioner and remanded the case for fresh adjudication, given that the petitioner had not explicitly used the word 'fraud' in the writ petition, despite alleging collusion and concealment. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the Settlement Authority's order was passed without application of mind because it failed to consider the respondent's prior pending claim and other relevant facts. The Court affirmed that pleadings should be interpreted based on their pith and substance rather than requiring artistic legal drafting. The key principle laid down is that administrative orders may be quashed for non-application of mind when authorities fail to consider relevant facts or adjudicate the comparative merits of competing claimants, and courts possess the discretion to remand such matters to ensure a fair determination of entitlement.
Questions settled- Can an administrative order be quashed for non-application of mind if the authority failed to consider relevant pending claims?
- Does the absence of the specific word 'fraud' in a writ petition preclude a court from examining allegations of collusion and surreptitious conduct?
- Is a court justified in remanding a case to an administrative authority when the authority failed to adjudicate the comparative merits of competing claimants?
- ATTA HUSSAIN KHAN Versus MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE KHAN1979 PLD 965 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-20Read full judgment →