Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- AZIZ A. SHEIKH Versus COMMR. OF INCOME-TAX1989 PLD 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an Income Tax reference where the Income-Tax Officer, the Appellate Tribunal, and the Lahore High Court had included dividend income from shares transferred by the appellant to his wife in the appellant's taxable income. The revenue authorities and the High Court had rejected the appellant's claim that the shares were transferred as part-payment of an increased dower (Haq Mehr) on the ground that the only evidence of the increase consisted of two subsequent affidavits from 1964, lacking contemporaneous documentary or oral evidence from 1958 when the increase allegedly occurred. The core legal question was whether the rules of evidence under Muslim Law allow the factum of an increase in dower to be established by subsequent declaration or acknowledgement of the husband without contemporaneous written or oral proof. The Supreme Court held that under Islamic jurisprudence, a husband's subsequent declaration or acknowledgement of an increase in dower is substantive law and constitutes sufficient proof. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ruling that the revenue authorities erred in applying a restrictive rule of evidence repugnant to Islamic law, and answered the reference in the negative.
Questions settled- Whether an increase in dower (Haq Mehr) subsequent to a Muslim marriage can be legally proved by a subsequent declaration or acknowledgement of the husband in the absence of contemporaneous documentary or oral evidence?
- Does the rule of evidence in Islamic Law regarding the acknowledgement of dower and its increase constitute a mere rule of procedure or does it partake of substantive Islamic Law?
- Are state functionaries and courts in Pakistan bound to apply the principles of Islamic law and jurisprudence in fields not fully occupied by statutory dispensation?
- Can a revenue authority or court lay down a rule of evidence that is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam under the constitutional mandate of Article 227 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- PAKISTAN Versus GENERAL PUBLIC1989 PLD 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal was filed by the State against a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which had declared several provisions of the Pakistan Army Act 1952, the Pakistan Air Force Act 1953, and the Pakistan Navy Ordinance 1961 repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The core legal question was whether the statutory bars on appeals against court-martial convictions for non-Hadd serious offences violated Islamic principles of justice. The Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court held that the Islamic injunctions of Adal, Qist, and Ehsan require that an aggrieved party be provided a right of appeal to test the correctness of decisions depriving them of liberty or livelihood. The Court rejected the State's argument that allowing appeals would undermine military discipline, noting that appellate systems exist in other jurisdictions and that the military had already conceded the right of appeal in Hudood cases. Consequently, the Court directed the legislature to amend the respective military laws to provide a right of appeal against court-martial convictions for serious offences.
Questions settled- Is a statutory provision barring the right of appeal against a court-martial conviction for serious offences repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
- Do the Islamic principles of Adal, Qist, and Ehsan require that an individual be given the right to appeal a decision that deprives them of liberty or livelihood?
- Can administrative convenience or military discipline justify the complete denial of a right of appeal under Islamic jurisprudence?
- FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN Versus GHULAM MUSTAFA KHAR1989 PLD 26 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns appeals challenging High Court judgments regarding the scope of judicial review over actions taken during the Martial Law period (1977-1985) following the enactment of Article 270-A of the Constitution and the Martial Law (Pending Proceedings) Order, 1985. The core legal question was whether these provisions granted absolute immunity to all acts and proceedings of Martial Law authorities, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of Superior Courts. The Supreme Court held that Article 270-A does not provide blanket protection. While it validates laws and actions taken during the Martial Law period, it does not preclude judicial scrutiny of acts that are coram non judice, without jurisdiction, or mala fide. The Court affirmed that provisions ousting the jurisdiction of Superior Courts must be construed strictly. It established that constitutional validation cannot be interpreted to protect illegal or indefensible acts, as Article 4 of the Constitution remains a fundamental guarantee that no action detrimental to a person shall be taken except in accordance with law. Consequently, the Court remanded cases for fresh consideration on these limited grounds.
Questions settled- Does Article 270-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 grant absolute immunity to all acts and proceedings taken during the Martial Law period?
- Can Superior Courts exercise judicial review over acts performed during the Martial Law period that are alleged to be coram non judice or without jurisdiction?
- Does the validation of acts under Article 270-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 extend to acts that are mala fide?
- Does the Martial Law (Pending Proceedings) Order, 1985, survive the revocation of the Proclamation of Martial Law?
- MUHAMMAD ARIF DAR Versus INCOME-TAX OFFICER1989 PLD 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-07Read full judgment →
- NAVEED ASIF Versus THE STATE1988 PLD 99 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-02Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD BASHIR Versus ANJUMAN -I-ISLAM1988 PLD 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-06Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD RAFIQ Versus MUHAMMAD ISMAIL1988 PLD 91 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from two constitutional petitions filed by a tenant challenging his eviction from non-residential property on the dual grounds of reconstruction and personal requirement of the landlords. The tenant contended that the landlords had previously rented out other reconstructed properties, which should legally bar the eviction, and that allowing eviction on both grounds simultaneously would render the tenant's statutory right to re-entry nugatory. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petitions, holding that there is no absolute legal bar to seeking eviction on grounds of reconstruction or personal requirement merely because other premises were rented out prior to the application, provided there is no bad faith. The Court clarified that the statutory bar under Section 13(3) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 requires a temporal and bona fide nexus between the previous vacating of property and the current demand. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed that the grounds of personal requirement and reconstruction are not mutually destructive, and eviction on both grounds in the same proceedings is legally permissible.
Questions settled- Whether a landlord is legally barred from seeking eviction on grounds of personal requirement if they rented out other properties prior to filing the application?
- How is the statutory bar under Section 13(3) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 regarding previously vacated property interpreted in terms of time and bona fides?
- Can a tenant be evicted on the dual grounds of personal requirement and reconstruction in the same proceedings?
- Does eviction on the dual grounds of personal requirement and reconstruction render the tenant's statutory right of re-entry nugatory?
- BASHIR AHMA Versus THE STATE1988 PLD 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-28Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AZIM Versus THE STATE1988 PLD 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-25Read full judgment →
- BASHIR Versus ILAM DIN1988 PLD 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from a dispute over the inheritance of land following the death of one Hakam in 1954, which was originally mutated in the name of the appellant, Bashir, as his son. The respondents, collaterals of the deceased, sued for possession, claiming the appellant was not Hakam's legitimate son. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, but the lower appellate court reversed this, holding the appellant was born of a lawful wedlock. The High Court, in second appeal, reversed the lower appellate court and restored the trial court's judgment. The core legal question concerns the weight and effect to be attached to an acknowledgement of parentage by the father in a mortgage deed when oral evidence regarding legitimacy is inconclusive. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that where legitimacy is uncertain rather than disproved, an acknowledgement of paternity by the father raises a valid presumption of a lawful marriage and the child's legitimacy under Islamic law. The judgment reaffirms that acknowledgement of parentage forms part of the substantive law of inheritance.
Questions settled- What weight should be attached to an acknowledgement of parentage contained in a mortgage deed when oral evidence produced by the parties is inconclusive?
- Does the doctrine of acknowledgement of parentage under Muslim Law apply when the illegitimacy of a child is positively disproved?
- Can a High Court in second appeal interfere with a finding of fact reached by the lower appellate court regarding legitimacy?
- What is the effect of an acknowledgement of paternity on the presumption of a valid marriage under Islamic law?
- FAYYAZ AKBAR Versus DELITE HOUSE LTD.1988 PLD 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an ejectment proceeding initiated by the appellant landlord against the respondent tenant for a commercial property on the ground of personal need. The appellant had previously filed an ejectment application which was dismissed because certain facts testified to—specifically, that the appellant was hard of hearing and wished to abandon his legal practice to start an electrical business—were not explicitly pleaded. A fresh ejectment application containing these specific pleas was subsequently filed, which the Rent Controller allowed, but the High Court reversed, holding that the fresh petition was barred under section 23 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The Supreme Court held that since the specific issues raised in the second application were not adjudicated on merits in the former proceedings due to lack of pleadings, the bar under section 23 did not apply. Furthermore, the respondent was estopped from pleading the bar after having previously successfully objected to the omission of those pleas. The appeal was allowed and the case remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits.
Questions settled- Does section 23 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 bar a fresh ejectment application when the specific issues raised were not finally decided on merits in the former proceedings?
- Can a party who successfully objected to the absence of specific pleadings in a prior proceeding subsequently rely on the doctrine of res judicata to bar a fresh application containing those pleadings?
- What is the scope and application of the rule against approbate and reprobate in rent restriction litigation?
- PARVAIZ AKHTAR Versus MUHAMMAD AHSAN1988 PLD 734 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from an eviction proceeding initiated by landlords against a tenant occupying commercial premises. The core legal questions were whether a tenant has the locus standi to challenge the validity of a property transfer (gift) between landlords and the Cantonment Board, and whether one of several co-landlords can seek eviction for personal use under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, when the premises are owned by multiple parties. The Supreme Court held that the validity of the property transfer was a matter solely between the Cantonment Board and the owners, and the tenant lacked standing to challenge it. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a single co-landlord may seek eviction for personal use, especially when other co-owners join the application. The Court upheld the High Court's finding regarding the bona fide nature of the landlord's requirement. The key principle laid down is that a tenant cannot challenge the internal title arrangements of landlords, and co-owners are not precluded from seeking eviction for personal use simply because they are not the sole owners of the premises.
Questions settled- Does a tenant have the locus standi to challenge the validity of a gift of property made by a landlord to co-owners in relation to the Cantonment Board?
- Can one of several co-landlords seek the eviction of a tenant for personal use under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963?
- Is a finding of fact regarding the bona fide requirement of premises by a landlord open to interference by the Supreme Court if the High Court has already appreciated the evidence?
- MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN Versus MUHHAMAD SIDDIQUE1988 PLD 731 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
- AIWZ KHAN Versus ALLAH BAKHSH1988 PLD 730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-14Read full judgment →
- AMANULLAH Versus SARKAR1988 PLD 710 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
- AHMAD BAKHSH Versus KHURSHID AKBAR KHAN1988 PLD 707 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the trial court decreed the suit in favor of respondent No. 1, directing him to deposit the sale price of Rs. 22,000. Respondent No. 1 appealed to the Additional District Judge seeking a reduction of the sale price to Rs. 10,000, but affixed court-fee stamps based on the original valuation rather than the relief claimed. The Additional District Judge held the appeal unentertainable due to deficient court-fee, dismissed it on merits, but extended the deadline for the pre-emption deposit. The appellants challenged the extension of time, arguing that a deficiently stamped appeal was not a proper appeal, rendering the court incompetent to vary the decree terms. The Supreme Court held that where an appellant pays court-fees insufficient for the full relief claimed, the appellate court can hear the appeal to the extent covered by the court-fees paid or allow the appellant to adjust the claim proportionately. Consequently, a proper appeal existed, enabling the lower court to extend the deposit deadline. The appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether an appellate court can entertain an appeal and grant partial relief proportionate to the court-fee actually paid when the court-fee is deficient for the full relief claimed?
- Whether an appellate court has the jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the pre-emption purchase price when the appeal memorandum suffers from a deficiency in court-fees?
- GHULAM QADIR Versus NAWAB DIN1988 PLD 701 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-31Read full judgment →
- W.A.P.D.A. Versus ZULFIQAR ALI1988 PLD 693 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-12Read full judgment →
- IHSANUL HAQ PIRACHA Versus CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER OF PAKSITAN1988 PLD 687 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a constitutional petition challenging the Chief Election Commissioner's decision to include the appellant, a Senator elected under Article 59(1)(d) of the Constitution, in the draw of lots for retirement. The appellant argued that his three-year term under Article 59(3)(d) should be calculated from the date he actually took the oath of office (January 23, 1986) pursuant to Article 255(3), rather than the first meeting of the Senate (March 21, 1985), and asserted that Section 82 of the Senate (Election) Act 1975 was ultra vires the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Article 255(3) regulates when a member may perform official duties but does not define or alter the statutory term of office. The Court observed that the Senate is a continuous body requiring periodic staggered retirements, which necessitates a uniform, common starting date for members' terms. Section 82 of the Senate (Election) Act 1975 validly fixes that date as the first meeting of the Senate under Article 222(f) of the Constitution and is not ultra vires.
Questions settled- Whether the three-year tenure of a Senator commences from the date of taking the oath of office under Article 255(3) or from the date of the first meeting of the Senate?
- Does taking an oath of office under Article 255(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 alter or control the statutory commencement of a legislator's term of office?
- Is Section 82 of the Senate (Election) Act 1975 ultra vires the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 for fixing the commencement of a Senator's term with reference to the first meeting of the Senate?
- SAKHI MUHAMMAD Versus ALLH BI1988 PLD 682 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellants filed a civil suit seeking a declaration as heirs of Sher Khan, whose mutation of inheritance was attested on the presumption that he was dead after not being heard of for over 26 years, claiming that Lal Khan, a nearer heir, had predeceased Sher Khan. The lower courts and the High Court dismissed the suit and subsequent appeals, holding that while the death of Sher Khan could be presumed under section 108 of the Evidence Act, the exact time or date of his death is not a matter of presumption but requires positive evidence, which the plaintiffs failed to provide. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the question. The core legal question was whether the statutory presumption of death under section 108 of the Evidence Act can extend to establishing the precise date or time of death, or whether a party claiming through such death must prove it by positive evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 108 creates a presumption of death at the time of the suit or proceeding but does not presume the date or time of death, which must be proved by affirmative evidence. The key principle laid down is that the presumption of death under section 108 of the Evidence Act does not determine the date or time of death.
Questions settled- Does the presumption of death under section 108 of the Evidence Act extend to presuming the precise date or time of death?
- Where a person has not been heard of for seven years, who bears the onus of proving that their death took place at any particular time?
- Can a party succeed in claiming through an inheritance without proving the actual date of death of a missing person when survivorship is in dispute?
- ABDUR RAHIM- ALLAH DITTA Versus FEDERATION OF PAKSITAN1988 PLD 670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-04Read full judgment →
- AHMAD BAKSH Versus KHURSHID AKBAR KHAN1988 PLD 67 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Civil appeal arose from the dismissal of the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan's revision petition by the High Court, confirming a declaratory decree in favor of respondent No. 1 that he was not liable for alleged agricultural loans granted to his deceased father. The primary questions before the Supreme Court were whether the execution of a hypothecation deed raised a legal presumption of consideration paid, whether the bank could enforce coercive recovery as arrears of land revenue against the deceased borrower's legal heir, and whether such recovery could occur without prior adjudication. The Supreme Court held that no statutory presumption of consideration applies to hypothecation deeds unlike negotiable instruments. Contractual debts of a deceased only bind legal heirs to the extent of inherited estate in their hands under Sections 50 and 52 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908. Furthermore, coercive recovery powers under Section 25 of the Agricultural Development Bank Ordinance 1961 cannot be invoked against an heir who did not personally obtain the credit facility, nor without prior formal determination and certification of the arrears.
Questions settled- Does the execution or proof of a hypothecation deed or mortgage deed raise a legal presumption that consideration was actually paid to the borrower?
- To what extent can the contractual and pecuniary obligations of a deceased borrower be enforced against their legal heirs?
- Can the Agricultural Development Bank exercise coercive recovery powers under Section 25 of the Agricultural Development Bank Ordinance 1961 against a legal heir who was not the original borrower?
- Can statutory machinery for recovering sums as arrears of land revenue be invoked without a prior determination and certified statement of account showing the ascertained amount due?
- LAL DIN Versus ABDUL WAHEED1988 PLD 664 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a procedural irregularity where a Supreme Court bench orally announced that a civil appeal was allowed, but the subsequently signed and issued written judgment dismissed the appeal. The judges involved later attempted to rectify the discrepancy by scoring off their signatures on the written judgment and issuing a new one reflecting the oral pronouncement. The core legal question was whether the initially signed judgment, which was officially issued, could be unilaterally altered or if the oral pronouncement governed the outcome. The Court held that there is no legal provision allowing judges to unilaterally score off signatures on a signed judgment to correct errors. Such corrections must follow the prescribed review procedure. Recognizing the confusion caused by the conflicting records and the need to ensure complete justice, the Court invoked its powers under Article 187 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. It determined that the most appropriate and fair course of action to resolve the imbroglio was to set aside the previous conflicting orders and direct that the appeal be heard afresh.
Questions settled- Can a court unilaterally alter a signed and issued judgment by scoring off the signatures of the judges?
- Does an oral pronouncement of a judgment prevail over a signed written judgment that contradicts it?
- What is the appropriate remedy when a court discovers a clerical error in a signed judgment after it has been issued to the parties?
- Can the Supreme Court order a fresh hearing of an appeal to ensure complete justice under Article 187 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- FEDERATION OF PAKISTA Versus GENERAL PUBLIC1988 PLD 645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal under Article 203-F of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed by the Federation of Pakistan against a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which had declared Sections 11-A, 11-B, and 11-C of the Security of Pakistan Act 1952 wholly repugnant to the injunctions of Islam and ordered their omission, while ordering amendments to Section 12. The core legal question was whether the statutory power of the Federal Government to seize, manage, and sell private undertakings based merely on its 'opinion' without prior notice, a right of hearing, or judicial recourse, is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, setting aside the wholesale omission of the provisions. The Court held that while the State has the authority under Islamic law to take preventive measures for national security, such limitations on human rights must be subordinated to the fundamental right to justice. Consequently, the provisions were declared repugnant only to the extent that they denied the right to a hearing and judicial appeal. The Court directed that the provisions would cease to have effect unless amended to substitute 'opinion' with 'satisfied', provide a prior opportunity of hearing (or post-decisional hearing in emergencies), and establish a right of appeal to a judicial forum.
Questions settled- Can statutory provisions allowing the state to seize and sell private property based on executive opinion without a hearing be sustained under Islamic injunctions?
- Does the Federal Shariat Court have the jurisdiction under Article 203-D of the Constitution to declare legislative exceptions to general Islamic rules repugnant to Islam?
- Is the right to a hearing (audi alteram partem) absolute under Islamic law, and can it be dispensed with or delayed in cases of national security or emergency?
- Can the Supreme Court, while declaring a law repugnant to Islam, permit the legislature to save the law from ceasing to have effect by indicating specific remedial amendments?
- SHAH NAWAZ Versus BADRUDDIN1988 PLD 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-26Read full judgment →
- SIKANDAR SADIQ Versus UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR1988 PLD 638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-02Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD SADIQ Versus PUNJAB LABOUR COURT NO. 1, LAHORE1988 PLD 633 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal addresses whether a hotel employee promoted to pastry chef, supervising four other workers, and drawing a salary including allowances, qualifies as a 'workman' under labour laws so as to challenge his dismissal. The core legal question is whether the High Court, in exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 199, was justified in reversing concurrent factual findings of the Labour Courts regarding the nature of the employee's duties. The Supreme Court held that the true criterion for determining a 'workman' is the nature of duties actually performed, and since the evidence established that the appellant's duties were primarily supervisory in nature, he did not fall within the definition of a 'workman' under the relevant statutes. Consequently, the High Court was justified in setting aside the reinstatement orders of the Labour Courts. The appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- What is the primary test for determining whether an employee falls within the definition of a workman under labour laws?
- Whether the High Court can reverse concurrent findings of fact by Labour Courts while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
- Does an employee performing supervisory duties and overseeing other staff qualify as a workman entitled to invoke section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969?
- Does the statutory definition of a workman include persons employed mainly in a managerial, administrative, or supervisory capacity?
- GHULAM MUHAMMAD Versus IMAM BAKHSH1988 PLD 631 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-01Read full judgment →
- ZULFIQAR ALI Versus ALI AHMED1988 PLD 630 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-04Read full judgment →
- KHALID LATIF Versus ALLAH JAWAYA1988 PLD 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-01Read full judgment →
- BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, LAHORE Versus GHULAM QADIR1988 PLD 625 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
- W.A.P.D.A. Versus SHUJAAT ALI BAGHDADI1988 PLD 622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by special leave arose from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal which had modified WAPDA's order removing the respondent from service to that of retirement. The respondent, an Accounts Clerk, was removed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) under Section 17(1-A) of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958. The Tribunal found no mala fides and sufficient material of misconduct, but altered the penalty solely on the ground of the respondent's long service since 1961. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the respondent's extensive record of misconduct and nuisance left no valid ground for the Tribunal to interfere with the employer's discretion. Furthermore, the Court rejected the respondent's interpretation of Section 17(1-A) that WAPDA could only retire, and not remove, its own employees. The Court ruled that the statutory requirement of thirty days' notice or pay in lieu thereof clearly indicates that the power of removal from service applies to WAPDA's own employees as well as deputationists. The appeal was accepted, and the original removal order was restored.
Questions settled- Does the long service of an employee prevent an employer from exercising its discretion to remove him for proven misconduct under Section 17(1-A) of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958?
- Whether the power of removal from service under Section 17(1-A) of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958 applies to WAPDA's own employees or is restricted to deputationists?
- Can the Federal Service Tribunal modify an order of removal to retirement solely on the ground of length of service when there is sufficient evidence of severe misconduct?
- ASMAT ULLAH KHAN Versus BAZI KHAN1988 PLD 621 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
- IFTIKHAR AHMAD Versus PRESIDENT N.B.P1988 PLD 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These seventy-five appeals by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan raised a common question of law: whether employees of nationalised banks could approach a Labour Court under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 to seek redress for grievances relating to their termination or removal from service, given that their terms and conditions of service were governed by the Wage Commission Award. The employers argued that the Wage Commission Award was not an "award" under Section 25-A of the Ordinance, and that exclusive jurisdiction vested in the National Industrial Relations Commission. The Supreme Court held that the word "any" preceding "award" in Section 25-A(1) expands its scope beyond the narrow definition in Section 2(ii), thereby including the Wage Commission Award. Furthermore, the Court determined that Section 22-B(3)(a) does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the National Industrial Relations Commission for general grievances, as its jurisdiction is restricted to cases involving elements of unfair labour practices. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Courts' judgments, and remanded the cases for determination of the remaining issues.
Questions settled- Does a Wage Commission Award qualify as an award for the purposes of filing a grievance petition under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969?
- Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have exclusive jurisdiction over all individual grievances of bank employees to the exclusion of Labour Courts?
- Does Section 22-B(3)(a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 confer general jurisdiction on the Benches of the National Industrial Relations Commission in the absence of allegations of unfair labour practices?
- BENAZIR BHUTTO (MISS) Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN1988 PLD 416 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the validity of various post-July 1977 amendments to the Political Parties Act, 1962, as being violative of Fundamental Rights, particularly Articles 17 and 25. The core legal questions involved the scope of the freedom to form and operate political parties under Article 17(2), the extent of the ouster of judicial review and validation under Article 270-A, and whether compulsory registration and audit requirements imposed on political parties constitute reasonable restrictions. The Supreme Court held that while Article 270-A validates the enactment of laws made during the specified martial law period as to legislative competence, it does not immunize sub-constitutional laws from future inconsistency with Fundamental Rights upon their revival. The Court ruled that compulsory registration provisions (section 3-B) and certain unconstitutional constraints in the Political Parties Act are void ab initio as they impose unreasonable restrictions on the right to form and operate political parties, which can only be dissolved upon a final reference to the Supreme Court. The key principle laid down is that political parties form the bedrock of parliamentary democracy, and any statutory restriction curtailing their functioning beyond the explicit confines of Article 17(2)—namely, the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan—is unconstitutional and void.
Questions settled- Whether Article 270-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 renders laws enacted during the martial law period immune from being challenged on the ground of inconsistency with Fundamental Rights?
- Does the right to form a political party under Article 17(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 include the right of the party to function, propagate its views, and participate in elections?
- Can the legislature require compulsory registration of political parties as a precondition for participating in elections under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Whether the dissolution of a political party or the imposition of restrictions on its functioning can be validly entrusted to an executive authority or the Election Commission rather than the Supreme Court?
- KHUDA BAKHSH Versus THE STATE1988 PLD 413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-16Read full judgment →
- SHER MUHAMMAD Versus ALLAH DITTA1988 PLD 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-23Read full judgment →
- JAMILA BEGUM Versus ABDULLAH JAN1988 PLD 409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from execution proceedings where shops belonging to the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants were sold in a public auction. The judgment debtor filed a civil suit challenging the sale due to fraud and irregularities, which he later withdrew before filing an application under Order XXI, Rule 90, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside the sale. As the application was time-barred, he sought the exclusion of time spent prosecuting the civil suit under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act 1908. The executing Court dismissed the application as time-barred, but the District Judge reversed this. The High Court restored the dismissal, holding that the suit was barred by law and not prosecuted in good faith. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the applicability of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court held that initiating a separate suit expressly barred by Order XXI, Rule 92(3), Code of Civil Procedure 1908 does not constitute due diligence or good faith, as required for the exclusion of time under Section 14(2). The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Is a party entitled under section 14(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 to the exclusion of time spent in prosecuting a separate suit when such a suit is expressly barred by law?
- Does the filing of an independent suit that is barred by Rule 92(3) of Order XXI, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 satisfy the requirement of good faith and due diligence under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act 1908?
- RAFHAN MAIZE PRODUCTS CO. LTD. Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX1988 PLD 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves appeals against judgments of the Sind High Court concerning the entitlement of the appellant company to a 10% rebate on super-tax under the Finance Acts of 1965, 1967, and 1968, in respect of income derived from processing maize into corn oil, starch, and cattle-feed. The core legal question is whether such conversion constitutes 'processing' of grain within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Finance Acts. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was not entitled to the rebate because the end-products (oil, starch) were distinct commodities and did not retain their identity as 'grain', failing the statutory requirement that income must be derived directly from processing the grain itself. The key principle laid down is that statutory terms like 'processing' must be interpreted in their legislative context alongside associated terms (freezing, preserving, canning), requiring that the raw material retains its core identity rather than being completely transformed into a new marketable product.
Questions settled- Whether a company extracting corn oil, starch, and cattle-feed from maize is entitled to a rebate of 10% on super-tax under the relevant Finance Acts?
- Whether the term 'processing' in the context of food and grain rebate provisions requires the raw material to retain its identity without being transformed into a completely new marketable product?
- Whether the High Court has the power to resettle and reframe a question referred under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act 1922 to extract the real issue in controversy?
- Whether dictionary meanings of statutory words can be applied in isolation from the context in which they are used in a legal provision?
- YASMEEN NIGHAT Versus N.B.P.1988 PLD 391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-17Read full judgment →
- COMBINED ENTERPRISES Versus W.A.P.D.A. LAHORE1988 PLD 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave arose from a High Court order annulling a Civil Court's appointment of an arbitrator under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940. The High Court had held that the application was incompetent because it was signed by only one partner of the firm and the arbitration agreement lacked proper stamp duty. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that under Order XXX Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, any one partner may sign and verify pleadings filed in the firm's name, which operates as an exception to general procedural joinder rules and Section 45 of the Contract Act 1872. The Court clarified that while a single partner lacks implied authority under Section 19(2) of the Partnership Act 1932 to submit an existing dispute to arbitration without consent, initiating court proceedings to enforce a contractual arbitration clause against a third party falls within a partner's implied agency to collect firm debts. Furthermore, once an arbitrator makes an award, any challenge to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement must be adjudicated by the designated court under Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Arbitration Act 1940, barring premature interference via revisional jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Can an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940 filed in the name of a firm be validly signed and verified by a single partner?
- Does a single partner have authority to initiate court proceedings in the firm's name to enforce an arbitration clause against a third party?
- Can the High Court exercise revisional jurisdiction to invalidate an arbitration agreement after the arbitrator has entered on the reference and delivered an award?
- SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, HEADQUARTER, LAHORE Versus MUHAMMAD LATIF1988 PLD 387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns the jurisdictional limits of the High Court in service matters. The respondent, a police official dismissed for embezzlement, challenged the Service Tribunal's adverse decision via a Constitutional Petition in the High Court, which set aside the dismissal order. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in exercising writ jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether a High Court can entertain a Constitutional Petition against a Service Tribunal's order, effectively bypassing the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that Article 212(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 creates an absolute bar on the jurisdiction of any court other than the Service Tribunal or the Supreme Court in service matters. The High Court cannot pre-judge whether a case involves a 'substantial question of law of public importance' to justify its own intervention. The ratio established is that once a Service Tribunal has adjudicated a matter, the exclusive remedy for an aggrieved party is to petition the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and the High Court possesses no authority to review such orders.
Questions settled- Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a Constitutional Petition against an order passed by a Service Tribunal?
- Is the bar on jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 applicable after a Service Tribunal has already disposed of an appeal?
- Can a High Court pre-judge whether a case involves a substantial question of law of public importance to justify assuming jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- AZIZUR REHMAN Versus MUHAMMAD NAWAZ1988 PLD 384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal addresses whether the right of pre-emption is heritable under Muslim law and the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, or whether it is a purely personal right that must be possessed by the pre-emptor on the date of sale. The respondent's father, a co-sharer and contiguous owner, died after a sale occurred, and the respondent sought to pre-empt the sale based on inheritance of that status. The Supreme Court held that the right of pre-emption must exist on the date of the sale and cannot be improved or acquired subsequently by inheritance upon the death of the original qualified owner during the pendency of the matter. The Court ruled that the right is governed strictly by the provisions of the statute, which requires the pre-emptor to possess a superior right at the time of the sale, and the right does not survive to heirs by inheritance if the original claimant dies before obtaining a decree.
Questions settled- Whether the right of pre-emption is heritable under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950?
- Must a pre-emptor possess a superior right of pre-emption on the date of the sale?
- Can a pre-emptor improve their position or acquire a right of pre-emption through inheritance after the date of sale?
- GOVT. OF PUNJAB Versus BOARD OF FOREIGN MISSIONS OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA1988 PLD 382 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a review petition filed under Article 188 of the Constitution of Pakistan, seeking review of the Court's earlier judgment dated 13-5-1987 in Civil Appeal No.253 of 1981. The core legal question involved whether the vesting of a privately-managed school under paragraph 5 of Martial Law Regulation No.118 conferred absolute proprietary ownership on the Government or merely transferred management. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the mere incorrectness of a conclusion reached after full consideration of a matter is not a ground for review. The Court reaffirmed the key principle that review jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely to reargue a settled point or to seek reversal of a considered interpretation, unless the decision was given per incuriam through oversight of an important statute or aspect.
Questions settled- Can a judgment of the Supreme Court be reviewed merely on the ground that the conclusion reached on a legal question is incorrect?
- Does the word 'vest' under paragraph 5 of Martial Law Regulation No.118 imply vesting in title with full proprietary rights as an absolute owner?
- What constitutes a valid ground for the exercise of review jurisdiction by the Supreme Court?
- Does the vesting of privately-managed schools along with their assets in the Government under Martial Law Regulation No.118 amount to confiscation of property or merely a takeover of management?
- GOVT. OF PUNJA Versus MUHAMMAD MAHMOOD, ADVOCATE1988 PLD 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a writ petition filed in the Lahore High Court by candidates for the posts of Additional District and Sessions Judges. The candidates challenged the appointment of several other individuals, alleging that the appointments were not made on the recommendation of the High Court as required by law, since some appointees had failed the written test and were not interviewed. The High Court directed the Provincial Government to produce the original letter of recommendation. The Government resisted, arguing that the document was confidential, that official acts carry a presumption of correctness, and that the writ petitioners lacked standing. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that under Article 4 of the Constitution, every citizen has an inalienable right to be treated in accordance with law. The Court ruled that where a factual controversy exists as to whether statutory recommendations were followed, the High Court is fully justified in summoning the relevant document to satisfy itself of the legality of the state action, and no privilege could be claimed to shield such a document from judicial scrutiny.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court has the jurisdiction to summon a recommendatory letter sent by the Chief Justice to the Provincial Government to verify if appointments were made in accordance with law?
- Can the Provincial Government claim privilege over a recommendatory letter for judicial appointments to prevent its inspection by the Court?
- Does the presumption of correctness of official acts preclude a court from summoning the primary document upon which the state action is purportedly based?
- BISVIL SPINNERS LTD. Versus SUPERINTEDENT, CENTRAL EXISE & LAND CUSTOMS CIRCLE, SHEIKHUPURA1988 PLD 370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute regarding the leviability of sales tax on machine-made carpets manufactured from man-made fibre. The appellant contended that because its products fell under the generic category of 'Fabrics of man-made fibre' which was exempted from sales tax under an earlier notification (S.R.O. 666(1)/81), a subsequent notification (S.R.O. 580(1)/83) imposing a reduced tax rate of 5% on 'machine-made carpets' could not apply without first formally rescinding or amending the earlier exemption notification. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while tax-imposing statutes must be strictly construed, exemptions are also to be rigidly interpreted against the taxpayer. Applying the principle of statutory construction that a subsequent special provision overrides an earlier general provision, the Court ruled that the specific inclusion of machine-made carpets in the later notification carved out an exception to the general exemption of man-made fabrics, thereby making the reduced tax rate legally applicable without requiring the express rescission of the general exemption.
Questions settled- Can a subsequent specific notification imposing a reduced tax rate on a product override a prior general notification exempting a broader class of goods containing that product?
- How should tax exemptions in fiscal statutes be construed in the event of an ambiguity or conflict between general and specific notifications?
- Is the formal rescission of a general tax exemption notification a prerequisite for the Federal Government to levy a reduced rate of tax on a specific sub-category of those goods via a subsequent notification?
- HABIB BANK LTD. Versus NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION1988 PLD 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by Habib Bank Limited examines the applicability of paragraph 237 of the First Wage Commission Award to promotions from the clerical cadre to the officers' grade, the Federal Government's authority to prescribe promotion examinations, and the extent to which an employer's plenary power to set promotion conditions is limited by statutory instruments. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Wage Commission under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is confined strictly to matters concerning workmen, and that promotion criteria to a higher cadre form part of the service conditions of the higher post rather than the lower post. Consequently, paragraph 237 of the First Wage Commission Award does not govern promotions from clerical staff to the officers' grade, which falls outside the Wage Commission's purview. The Court further ruled that the Federal Government possesses the authority under section 10(6) of the Banks (Nationalization) Ordinance, 1974 to issue directives regarding uniform promotion policies and written examinations for recruitment to the officers' grade based on recommendations of the Pay Commission, and that the employer's power to prescribe qualifications for ensuring efficiency remains unaffected where no statutory prohibition exists. The appeal was accordingly allowed.
Questions settled- Whether provisions of paragraph 237 of the First Wage Commission Award govern promotions from the clerical cadre to the officers' grade?
- Whether the Federal Government is possessed of authority to prescribe a promotion examination for officers in nationalized commercial banks?
- Whether the plenary power of an employer to prescribe conditions and qualifications for promotion stands controlled or limited by a Wage Commission award meant for workmen?
- Whether terms and conditions relating to promotion to a higher post form part of the service conditions of the lower post or the higher post?
- PUNJAB PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION Versus MARUF AHMAD ALI1988 PLD 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court allowing the respondent's intra-court appeal regarding eligibility for viva voce and psychological tests in the competitive examination for Civil Judges held in February 1985. The respondent failed to obtain qualifying marks in one written paper and fell short of the aggregate qualifying marks by 0.13 percent. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of the relevant rule governing the grant of grace marks: whether grace marks granted in an individual subject are automatically counted toward the aggregate marks. The Supreme Court held that the language of the rule implies that grace marks granted in respect of an individual subject must be added to the aggregate, provided that such marks shall not entitle the grantee to a better position in the merit list over successful candidates who received no grace marks. The appeal was dismissed, and the Court clarified that while grace marks are granted to really deserving candidates based on performance, any resultant anomaly in the rule should be addressed by appropriate administrative amendment rather than restrictive interpretation.
Questions settled- Whether grace marks granted in an individual subject under the relevant examination rules should also be counted toward the aggregate marks?
- Does the departmental construction of a rule override the true and reasonable interpretation of that rule by a court?
- Can grace marks given for an individual subject be used to gain an advantage against other competing candidates in the merit list?
- MUHAMMAD SHOIB Versus MEMBER (REVENUE)1988 PLD 355 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-24Read full judgment →
- ABDUL HAMEED Versus W.A.P.D.A.1988 PLD 35 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-24Read full judgment →
- AMAN Versus LAND ACQUISTIOON COLLECTOR1988 PLD 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves civil petitions for special leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning the assessment of compensation for land acquired for the Tarbela Dam. A notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued in May 1967, but the award was announced nearly seven years later in January 1974. The core legal question was whether the sharp rise in land prices during the long delay between the section 4 notification and the announcement of the award is a relevant factor to be considered when determining market value under section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Supreme Court held that while the factors enumerated in section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act are not exhaustive and the sharp increase in land prices during an inordinate delay by the Collector in announcing the award can be a valid factor for assessing compensation, the claimants must lay the foundational basis for it by producing relevant evidence on record. The petitions were dismissed because the petitioners failed to bring any evidence regarding the rise in land prices during the interim period.
Questions settled- Are the factors enumerated in section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act exhaustive for determining market value?
- Can the sharp rise in land prices during the period between a section 4 notification and the announcement of the award be considered when assessing compensation?
- Is it necessary for landowners to produce evidence of increased land prices during the delay period to claim higher compensation?
- SULTAN ERAJ ZAMA Versus W.A.P.D.A.1988 PLD 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-24Read full judgment →
- GOVT. OF PUNJA Versus MUHAMMAD SARFRAZ1988 PLD 280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to examine whether a notification issued under Section 9(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and Section 6 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance 1962 conferred the status of a regular civil servant on an ad hoc appointee whose initial six-month period had expired.
The respondent was appointed on an ad hoc basis as an Additional District and Sessions Judge for six months via a notification issued by the Services, General Administration and Information Department. After the six-month period expired, a subsequent notification was issued by the Home Department under Section 9(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and Section 6 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance 1962, posting him to a civil district from the date he took charge. The Service Tribunal treated this second notification as a regular appointment. The Supreme Court reversed the Service Tribunal's judgment, holding that under the Punjab Government Rules of Business 1974 framed pursuant to Article 139(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, only the Services and General Administration Department possessed the authority to recruit and appoint civil servants, whereas the Home Department merely possessed power to constitute courts and confer jurisdictional powers. Consequently, statutory notifications under procedural or jurisdictional laws do not constitute a regular civil service appointment, nor do de facto service or administrative lapses extend an ad hoc appointment beyond its efflux of time.
Questions settled- Does a notification issued under Section 9(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and Section 6 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance 1962 constitute a regular appointment to the civil service?
- Can a department other than the one designated under the Rules of Business framed pursuant to Article 139(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 validly appoint a civil servant?
- Whether the de facto continuation of work and grant of leave after the expiry of an ad hoc appointment operates to extend the service or reinstate a civil servant?
- MUHAMMAD AKBAR Versus MUHAMMAD KHAN1988 PLD 274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal, by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court which had acquitted six respondents previously convicted by the trial court for murder and murderous assault. The core legal question concerned the reliability and necessity of corroboration for the testimony of injured eye-witnesses who were alleged to be interested and inimical. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in rejecting the testimony of the injured eye-witnesses and disbelieving the recoveries on flawed grounds, noting that the witnesses were natural and present at the scene, and that the police officer's testimony regarding recoveries was untainted. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restored the convictions recorded by the trial court under sections 302/149, 307/149, 323/149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but modified the death sentences of three respondents to imprisonment for life in view of mitigating circumstances arising from prior cross-enmity and pending litigation. The key principle laid down is that injured eye-witnesses who are victims of the same occurrence are natural witnesses whose testimony cannot be discarded merely due to a previous background of enmity, provided their presence is established beyond doubt.
Questions settled- Whether the testimony of injured eye-witnesses can be rejected outright solely on the ground of being interested and inimical witnesses?
- Can the evidence of recoveries be relied upon through the testimony of an investigating officer even if a private recovery witness is held to be suspect?
- Whether prior enmity and cross-cases between parties can serve as a mitigating circumstance to reduce the sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
- MUHAMMAD YAQOOB Versus THE STATE1988 PLD 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from petitions and appeals following a trial for multiple murders and related offenses involving high-ranking police and civil officials, including a Superintendent of Police, Deputy Commissioner, and Station House Officer, alongside private individuals. The core legal question involves assessing the credibility of eyewitness testimony, approver evidence, and the veracity of manipulated official records regarding a fabricated police encounter used to cover up custodial violence and extrajudicial killings. The court held that the evidence against the convicted petitioners, concerning their involvement in the murders, custody manipulation, and concoction of the encounter story, requires a thorough reappraisal consistent with the principles of safe dispensation of justice. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to the petitioners in all relevant petitions, dismissed one petition for non-prosecution, and issued non-bailable warrants for the arrest of absconding convicts.
Questions settled- Whether the testimony of an approver requires independent corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder?
- Can leave to appeal be granted when the evidence on record requires reappraisal consistent with principles of safe dispensation of justice?
- Whether manipulation of official police files to fabricate a false encounter warrants the conviction of police officials under sections relating to framing of incorrect records and causing disappearance of evidence?
- MUHAMMAD ARSHAD SAEED Versus PAKISTAN1988 PLD 269 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a review petition filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was reported to be barred by 348 days. The core legal question concerned whether the requirement of furnishing a cash security of Rs.2,000 for filing a review petition under Order XXVI Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules applies to service matters, or whether it is overridden by the special provisions of Order XXIV relating to service appeals. The Supreme Court held that the review petition was indeed subject to the cash security requirement under Order XXVI Rule 7, as review petitions fall under Article 188 of the Constitution rather than Article 212(3) which governs service appeals, rendering the maxim generalia specialibus non-derogant inapplicable. Consequently, finding no sufficient ground for condoning the substantial delay in depositing the required security, the court dismissed the review petition as time-barred. The key principle laid down is that review petitions in service matters are governed by the general security requirements for reviews under the Supreme Court Rules and are not exempt by virtue of special provisions applicable to petitions for leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Whether a cash security of Rs.2,000 is required for filing a review petition in service matters under the Supreme Court Rules?
- Does Order XXIV of the Supreme Court Rules override the requirement of cash security for review petitions under Order XXVI Rule 7?
- Are review petitions under Article 188 of the Constitution subject to different procedural requirements than petitions for leave to appeal under Article 212(3)?
- KHUSHI MUHAMMAD Versus AZIZ BIBI1988 PLD 259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This order disposes of three applications seeking the recall of judgments delivered by the Supreme Court in two separate civil appeals, raising the common question of whether a judgment rendered without taking note of the death of a party becomes a nullity requiring mandatory recall. The core legal question revolves around whether the death of a party results in automatic abatement of proceedings under the Supreme Court Rules, 1956, absent explicit provisions akin to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The Court held that the Supreme Court Rules govern substitution of legal representatives to the exclusion of the Civil Procedure Code, and because these rules do not provide for automatic abatement, the Court must exercise judicial discretion rather than treating such judgments as inherent nullities. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court's judgments do not automatically abate upon a party's death without a specific court order, but the Court may review and reopen decisions where a party was prejudiced by a defect in the record without contributory fault.
Questions settled- Whether after the death of a party, judgments of the Supreme Court delivered without taking note of such death become nullities requiring recall as a matter of right?
- Do the provisions of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings in the Supreme Court regarding the abatement of appeals?
- Does the death of a party in an appeal before the Supreme Court result in automatic abatement without an express order of the Court?
- Can a party seek the recall of a judgment as a matter of right on the ground of a procedural defect in the record arising from the death of an opposing party?
- AHMAD NAWAZ Versus MUHAMMAD AYUB1988 PLD 258 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' civil revision, which challenged the dismissal of their first appeal as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the period between the date a certified copy is ready for delivery and the date it is actually delivered can be excluded as of right as time requisite for obtaining the copy under Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's ruling, holding that under the existing law, such time cannot be automatically excluded as of right; rather, it can only be condoned upon showing sufficient cause. Finding no error of law or reason to disturb the factual findings of the lower courts, the Court dismissed the petition. The Court noted the long-standing controversy and inconvenience caused to litigants and recommended legislative intervention to clarify Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908 regarding time requisite for obtaining copies.
Questions settled- Whether the period between the date a certified copy is ready for delivery and the date it is actually delivered can be excluded as of right as time requisite under Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908?
- Can delay occurring between the readiness and actual delivery of a certified copy be condoned without sufficient explanation?
- Is the High Court justified in refusing to interfere under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 where the lower appellate court exercised its discretion in refusing to condone delay?
- MASHAL KHAN Versus THE STATE1988 PLD 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arose from a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder, where the High Court judges had differed on the reliability of a retracted confession and the applicability of the right of self-defence. The trial court had convicted the appellant based solely on a retracted judicial confession, rejecting ocular and recovery evidence. The Supreme Court examined whether a retracted confession could be the sole basis for conviction and whether the appellant had acted in self-defence. The Court held that if a retracted confession is relied upon, it must be accepted in its entirety. Finding that the appellant acted under a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt due to prior enmity and threats, the Court determined that the appellant's actions fell within the scope of the right of private defence. The Court emphasized that actions taken in a state of panic during the exercise of self-defence cannot be measured in golden scales. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.
Questions settled- Can a retracted judicial confession serve as the sole basis for a criminal conviction?
- Must a retracted confession be accepted in its entirety if relied upon by the court?
- Does the exercise of the right of private defence in a state of panic require exact proportionality?
- Is a conviction for murder sustainable when the only evidence is an uncorroborated retracted confession?
- FAROOQ HASSAN Versus MUMTAZ KHAN1988 PLD 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment arises from cross-appeals concerning an election to fill a casual vacancy in the Senate for a seat reserved for ulema, technocrats, and professionals. The successful candidate, Mumtaz Ahmad Khan, was declared elected after receiving the majority of votes, while Dr. Farooq Hassan challenged his election through an election petition, alleging the respondent lacked the requisite qualifications of a technocrat or professional under the relevant legal framework. The Election Tribunal dismissed the petition, holding that although the successful candidate was not a professional, he qualified as a technocrat. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court considered whether the appeals had become infructuous due to the impending expiration of the appellant's term, and whether the candidate possessed the requisite qualifications. By majority, the Court held that the candidate did not qualify as either a technocrat or a professional, thereby setting aside his election, but ruled that the seat could not be automatically awarded to the runner-up without establishing that the disqualification was notorious and that voters threw away their votes willfully.
Questions settled- Whether an election challenge regarding the eligibility of a sitting parliamentarian becomes infructuous simply because the term of office is nearing expiration?
- When can the votes cast in favour of a disqualified candidate be deemed to have been thrown away so as to declare the runner-up elected?
- Does a journalist with extensive reporting and editorial experience qualify as a professional or technocrat under the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977?
- MUHAMMAD BASHI Versus MUHAMMAD FIRDAUS1988 PLD 232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court challenges a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition arising from an eviction order under the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The core legal question was whether an amendment changing the forum of appeal from the District Court to the High Court operates retrospectively to affect pending appeals, rendering a decision by the District Court a nullity. The Supreme Court held that the right of appeal to a particular tribunal is an existing substantive right, and an amendment transferring the appeal to a new forum does not apply retrospectively to pending actions unless express language or necessary intendment manifests such an intention. Consequently, the District Court maintained its jurisdiction to decide the appeal, and the appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does a statutory amendment changing the forum of appeal operate retrospectively to affect pending appeals?
- Is the right of appeal to a particular tribunal considered an existing substantive right or a matter of mere procedure?
- Can an amendment altering appellate jurisdiction divest a District Court of jurisdiction over an appeal pending at the time of the amendment without express legislative intendment?
- ASGHAR ALI IMAM Versus MUHAMMAD ALI1988 PLD 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-09-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court which allowed the respondent-tenant's rent appeal against eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent. The core legal questions involved were whether the tenancy agreement expired after the initial six-month period ceasing to govern the tenancy, and whether a security deposit could be adjusted towards future or current rents. The Supreme Court held that the security deposit cannot be adjusted against current liability to pay rent and remains to be adjusted by the landlord when the tenant vacates the premises towards unpaid rent, loss, or damages, and that the agreement continues to operate regarding security notwithstanding its expiry. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ruling that the tenant committed wilful default and was not entitled to discretionary relief, and ordered the tenant to hand over vacant possession.
Questions settled- Whether the tenancy agreement after the efflux of the first period of six months had expired and did no longer govern the tenancy?
- Whether the security amount could be adjusted towards future or current rents?
- Does the nature of a security deposit undergo a change upon the expiry of the tenancy agreement?
- Mir SALAH-UD-DIN Versus Qazi ZAHEER-UD-DIN1988 PLD 221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed a civil revision petition and held that a regular civil suit filed by the appellant to claim possession of a property subject to an ejectment order was not maintainable. The core legal question was whether a matter involving a dispute of title or possession, having reached finality in the Rent Controller's forum and its appellate hierarchy, can subsequently be re-agitated through a civil suit before a court of general jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that once an ejectment order attains finality under the rent restriction laws, a separate civil suit is barred by the principle of res judicata, section 12(2) and section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and section 15(7) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, unless specific recognized exceptions apply. The key principle laid down is that the finality of orders passed by rent forums cannot be bypassed by third parties or family members collusively initiating separate civil suits to frustrate execution, and appropriate remedies must instead be pursued within the executing court under the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.
Questions settled- Can a matter involving a dispute of title or possession that has attained finality in the Rent Controller's hierarchy be re-agitated through a civil suit before a court of general jurisdiction?
- Whether a separate civil suit is barred after the conclusion of proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
- What are the exceptions where the finality attached to orders passed under rent restriction laws can be challenged in a court of general jurisdiction?
- Does the executing court have exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions arising from the obstruction of an ejectment decree under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN Versus PUBLIC AT LARGE1988 PLD 202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of multiple shariat appeals filed by the Federation of Pakistan and the Provinces of Punjab and Baluchistan against an order of the Federal Shariat Court directing various amendments to the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance, 1963, after finding certain provisions repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The core legal question was whether the Federal Shariat Court validly exercised its jurisdiction under Article 203-D of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, in ordering amendments to the Statute, and whether the specific provisions declared repugnant actually contravened Islamic injunctions. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, holding that while freedom of the press and the right to an honest livelihood are protected under Islamic principles of fairness (Adal, Qist, and Ihsan) requiring reasonable timeframes for administrative decisions and rights of appeal, certain procedural matters dealt with by the Federal Shariat Court went beyond its substantive jurisdiction of testing laws against the Qur'an and Sunnah. The Court laid down key principles regarding the protection of fundamental economic and professional freedoms under Islamic law, the necessity of a right to be heard even in emergency administrative actions, and the limits of the Federal Shariat Court's review power over procedural statutory provisions.
Questions settled- Whether the Federal Shariat Court can direct amendments to statutory provisions without establishing their specific repugnancy to the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah?
- Does an uncontrolled executive power to indefinitely delay the authentication of a press or newspaper declaration violate Islamic injunctions of fairness and the right to earn a livelihood?
- Is it mandatory under Islamic law to afford an opportunity of being heard before taking adverse administrative action against a printing press or publisher?
- Whether procedural provisions of a statute fall within the scope of review of the Federal Shariat Court under Article 203-D of the Constitution?
- GHULAM HAIDER Versus NAWAB DIN1988 PLD 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This review petition arises out of a judgment dismissing an appeal in a pre-emption matter. The core legal question concerned the effect of an abatement of a second appeal and the subsequent deposit of pre-emption money pursuant to an interim order of the Supreme Court during the leave to appeal stage. The Supreme Court held that where the pre-emptor deposits the balance of the pre-emption money within the extended time granted by an interim order of the Supreme Court, the pre-emption decree is saved and fully effective, notwithstanding the ultimate dismissal of the appeal on the question of abatement. The Court laid down the principle that a party shall not be made to suffer on account of the act of the Court, and compliance with an interim deposit order preserves the rights accruing under the pre-emption decree.
Questions settled- Does the deposit of the balance pre-emption money pursuant to an interim order of the Supreme Court save the pre-emption decree despite the dismissal of the appeal?
- Whether the failure to bring legal representatives on record within the period of limitation results in the automatic abatement of an appeal?
- Can a pre-emptor be made to suffer the loss of benefits under a decree due to an act or omission of the Court?
- ZARINA KHAWAJA Versus MAHBOOB SHAH1988 PLD 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Sind, which allowed a rent appeal filed by a tenant against an eviction order. The eviction order was originally passed by the Rent Controller under section 16(2) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, for default in depositing monthly rent after the tenant's defence was struck off. The High Court had held that an existing security deposit with the landlady should have been adjusted against the outstanding rent, thereby obviating default. The core legal question examined was whether such a security deposit could be adjusted against rent required to be deposited under section 16, and whether terms of an expired tenancy agreement continue to apply. The Supreme Court held that the determination of rent under section 16 is tentative and approximate, that security deposits cannot be used to absolve a tenant from making mandatory rent deposits unless the agreement specifically permits, and that terms of an expired tenancy agreement continue to operate to the extent they are not repugnant to the rent law. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court judgment and restoring the Rent Controller's eviction order.
Questions settled- Whether under section 16(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, rent is to be determined finally or tentatively and approximately?
- Whether the question regarding propriety or validity of the order of deposit under section 16(1) can be examined in an appeal against the final order of eviction of the tenant?
- Whether on termination of an agreement of tenancy when the tenant remains in occupation, the terms of the expired agreement become irrelevant for regulating the tenancy?
- Whether the use of a security amount by the court for absolving a tenant from liability of eviction for non-compliance with an order of deposit is permissible in law?
- BASHIR Versus MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN1988 PLD 186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from an order of the Federal Shariat Court upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Section 494 of the Pakistan Penal Code and Section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question is whether the appellants committed "zina" under Section 4 of the Ordinance when the female appellant contracted a second marriage following an honestly believed, though allegedly forged, divorce deed (talaqnama) executed by her first husband. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions, holding that the term "wilfully" in Section 4 requires mens rea, a guilty mind, or guilty intent, and an act done with a bona fide belief and without criminal intent does not constitute zina. The Court established that where an accused person acts under a genuine, mistaken belief that a prior marriage has been lawfully dissolved, the requisite intent for the offence of zina is absent.
Questions settled- Whether the term 'wilfully' in Section 4 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 requires proof of mens rea or a guilty mind?
- Can an accused person be convicted of zina under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 when they contracted a second marriage under a bona fide belief that their first marriage had been dissolved?
- Does sexual intercourse following a marriage contracted under a genuine mistaken belief regarding the dissolution of a prior marriage constitute an offence under Section 4 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979?
- SECURITY PAPER LTD. Versus SINDH LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL1988 PLD 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-09-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns whether a Security Guard employed by the appellant company qualifies as a "workman" under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The core legal question is whether the nature of duties performed by a Security Guard, specifically searching employees and guarding premises, constitutes "manual or clerical work" as required by the statutory definition. The Supreme Court held that the determination of whether an employee is a "workman" is a question of fact to be decided based on the evidence of the actual duties performed, rather than the job designation. The Court affirmed that because the evidence established the respondent's duties included manual tasks like searching personnel, he fell within the definition of a "workman." The key principle laid down is that the designation of an employee is not conclusive; the essential test is the nature of the work performed, specifically whether manual or clerical labour constitutes the pith and substance of the employment, which must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Questions settled- Does the designation of an employee as a 'Security Guard' automatically exclude them from the definition of 'workman' under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
- Is the determination of whether an employee is a 'workman' a question of fact or law?
- What is the essential test for determining whether an employee qualifies as a 'workman' under labour legislation?
- Does the performance of manual tasks as an incidental part of a supervisory role qualify an employee as a 'workman'?
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF Versus THE STATE1988 PLD 176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These appeals challenged an order of the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) that restricted legal representation to Muslim counsel under Rule 2(e) of the Federal Shariat Court (Procedure) Rules, 1981. The central legal question concerned whether the FSC could validly exclude non-Muslim advocates from representing parties in criminal matters, and whether such a restriction conflicted with constitutional guarantees of equality and the right to legal representation. During the proceedings, it was established that the underlying criminal revision petition, which gave rise to the dispute, had already been dismissed on merits by the FSC, and the appellant did not pursue further challenge. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the appeals had become infructuous, rendering a decision on the substantive legal questions unnecessary. The Court noted that the FSC had already amended the relevant rule to allow non-Muslim advocates to represent non-Muslim parties in cases other than Shariat petitions under Article 203-D of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeals as infructuous without adjudicating the constitutional validity of the original rule.
Questions settled- Does an appeal become infructuous when the underlying criminal revision petition has already been dismissed on merits?
- Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to adjudicate constitutional questions regarding legal representation when the main proceedings have achieved finality?
- Should a court decide the validity of a rule when the underlying case has concluded and the issue is no longer live?
- ABDUL WAJID Versus FEDERAL GOVT. OF PAKISTA1988 PLD 167 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment arises from appeals filed under Article 203-F of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against a decision of the Federal Shariat Court rendered under Article 203-D, wherein the validity of the Anti-Islamic Activities of the Quadiani Group, Lahori Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance 1984 was challenged on the touchstone of Islamic Injunctions. The Federal Shariat Court had declined to declare the law repugnant to Islam. During the hearing before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, the appellants raised various preliminary objections and interlocutory requests, including seeking the expungement of portions of the impugned judgment and alleging bias against the Ulema judges on the bench. The Court overruled the objections regarding the bench's constitution, holding that no party can dictate the composition of a court and that prior tentative opinions or scholarly writings do not constitute legal bias, particularly under Islamic principles of justice and 'Rujoo'. Ultimately, rather than arguing the merits, the appellants abruptly withdrew both appeals. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals as withdrawn, leaving the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court to hold the field. The core legal principle affirmed is that preliminary objections regarding bench composition based on prior opinions are untenable when judges confirm their impartiality, and litigants cannot weaponize interlocutory delay tactics to avoid addressing the merits of religious-constitutional appeals.
Questions settled- Whether a party to an appeal can claim the right to be tried by a particular judge or judges of their choice?
- Does the prior expression of an opinion by a judge in a tentative manner or academic writing constitute legal bias disqualifying them from hearing a case?
- Can appellants in an appeal under Article 203-F of the Constitution insist on the expungement of substantial portions of the impugned judgment prior to the hearing of the main appeal?
- What is the effect of an unconditional withdrawal of appeals by the appellants before the Shariat Appellate Bench?
- MUHAMMAD YASIN Versus GHULAM MURTAZQ1988 PLD 163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an execution dispute following an ejectment order passed under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. After an eviction order was issued against a tenant on grounds of default, his brother instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration of his own tenancy and an injunction, and also filed an objection petition under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 before the executing Rent Controller. The High Court held that a third party could file a separate civil suit because the Rent Controller was not a Civil Court and could not entertain Order XXI objections. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's judgment, holding that under Section 17 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, an eviction order is executed by the Controller 'as if it were a decree of a Civil Court'. Applying the deeming provision fully, the executing Controller possesses all necessary powers to entertain and decide objections to the decree's execution, thereby barring an independent civil suit.
Questions settled- Does a Rent Controller executing an eviction order under Section 17 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance have the power to decide objections to execution under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can a third party institute a separate civil suit to declare a tenancy in an urban area where rent restriction laws apply?
- Does the statutory phrase 'as if it were a decree of a Civil Court' confer on the executing authority all necessary powers to effectively execute the order and decide objections?
- MUHMMAD INSHA ULLAH Versus CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS(P*E),PUNJAB1988 PLD 155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examined whether the Punjab Service Tribunal correctly held that promotion rules confer a vested right upon civil servants and cannot be altered to their disadvantage. The contesting respondents, initially recruited as Foresters or Deputy Rangers, challenged a 1976 notification by the Governor of the Punjab altering the academic qualifications required for promotion to Sub-Divisional Forest Officer under section 23 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The Tribunal had accepted their appeal, ruling that service rules create a binding contract protecting career prospects. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that a civil servant's rights are limited to the post currently held and do not extend to a vested right in the continuation of existing promotion rules or future prospects. The Court laid down that the Government possesses the competence to amend promotion rules and prescribe academic qualifications over on-the-job experience in the interest of public service efficiency, and such alterations do not violate the terms and conditions of service unless an existing vested right to a post is impaired.
Questions settled- Whether the rules governing promotion to a higher post confer a vested right that cannot be altered to the disadvantage of a civil servant awaiting promotion?
- Does the expression 'terms and conditions of service' include future prospects of promotion to higher posts?
- Can the competent authority amend service rules to give greater weightage to academic qualifications over on-the-job experience for promotions?
- Are departmental notings and opinions of officers decisive in determining the validity of statutory rules framed by the Governor?
- FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN Versus PUBLIC AT LARGE1988 PLD 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a review petition filed by the Federation of Pakistan, which was barred by 285 days. The petitioner sought condonation of delay, citing two reasons: that the previous judgment allowed their appeal and remanded the case, leading functionaries not to consider it necessary to examine its contents for compliance directions; and that a copy sent by the Supreme Court Office for compliance was received late. The Court held that neither reason was sufficient for condonation, emphasizing the duty of functionaries to examine judgments, even remand orders, and to apply for copies in due time. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed as time-barred. However, the Court, acting suo motu, clarified a previous direction regarding the process of Islamisation, stating that while the word "may" ordinarily conveys a directory sense, it was explicitly meant to be directory, not mandatory, in the context of the specified date.
Questions settled- Can an inordinate delay in filing a review petition be condoned if government functionaries failed to examine a remand judgment or apply for a copy in time?
- Is a direction in a judgment using the word "may" ordinarily considered mandatory or directory?
- What is the duty of a concerned functionary regarding examining a judgment, even if it is a remand order?
- Can a time-barred review petition be dismissed while still granting clarification on a previous judgment's directions?
- REHMAN GUL Versus THE STATE1988 PLD 147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Punjab Special Court, convicting the appellant under Section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentencing him to imprisonment for life for kidnapping a minor child. The core legal question revolves around whether minor discrepancies in eyewitness testimonies vitiate the conviction, and whether the intention to sell a two-year-old child satisfies the statutory requirement of kidnapping in order to subject the victim to slavery or similar harm under Section 364-A. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that natural discrepancies in testimonies of independent eyewitnesses do not undermine the prosecution case, and that the intended sale of an infant constitutes subjecting the victim to slavery under the extended meaning of the provision. The key principle laid down is that minor inconsistencies in the statements of straightforward witnesses are normal and do not discredit their core testimony, and the commercial trafficking or sale of a minor child brings the act within the ambit of Section 364-A.
Questions settled- Whether minor discrepancies in the testimony of independent eyewitnesses are sufficient to discredit the prosecution case?
- Does the intended sale of a two-year-old child constitute subjecting the victim to slavery under Section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Whether the absence of certain neighbours from the witness box affects the reliability of other eyewitnesses examined by the prosecution?
- N.-W.F.P. Versus HUSSAN PARI1988 PLD 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two review petitions filed against the Supreme Court's judgment in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Malik Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360). The petitions were filed with significant delays of 263 and 334 days, respectively. The core legal question was whether the delay could be condoned and whether the judgment required review regarding the pre-emption rights of tenants and the scope of exemptions under pre-emption laws. The Court held that the petitions were time-barred as the applicants failed to explain the inordinate delay, adhering to the principle that each day of delay must be justified. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed. Regarding the substantive issues, the Court clarified that its original judgment already provided sufficient scope for exemptions based on the principle of 'Zaroorat' (necessity). The Court established that such exemptions must be legislated rather than left to executive discretion, must be construed in accordance with Islamic injunctions, and remain subject to judicial review to ensure the necessity is genuine. The Court further dismissed associated applications for impleadment as the main petitions were dismissed.
Questions settled- Is a party required to explain each day of delay in filing a review petition to obtain condonation?
- Can the Supreme Court clarify its previous judgment while dismissing a review petition as time-barred?
- Must exemptions to pre-emption laws based on necessity be legislated rather than left to executive discretion?
- Are exemptions to pre-emption laws based on necessity subject to judicial review?
- PROVINCE OF SINDH Versus PUBLIC AT LARGE1988 PLD 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment concerns appeals filed under Article 203-F of the Constitution against two judgments of the Federal Shariat Court. The Federal Shariat Court, exercising its suo motu jurisdiction under Article 203-D, had declared certain provisions of the Sind Provincial Assembly Members Privileges Act XI of 1975 and the Baluchistan Chief Minister and Provincial Ministers (Salaries, Allowances and Privileges) Act III of 1975 repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The core legal questions involved the validity of a provision staying court proceedings when an Assembly Member is a party, and the validity of provisions allowing compensation upon death to nominees instead of legal heirs. The Supreme Court noted that cases involving the same subject-matter had previously been decided and remanded to the Federal Shariat Court. To avoid conflict of judgment, achieve consistency, and ensure observance of rules laid down in the earlier reported judgment, the Supreme Court accepted these appeals and remanded the cases to the Federal Shariat Court.
Questions settled- Can a provision staying court proceedings involving an Assembly Member be held repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
- Can provisions allowing compensation upon death to nominees instead of legal heirs be held repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court remand cases to the Federal Shariat Court to ensure consistency with prior judgments?
- What is the scope of the Federal Shariat Court's suo motu jurisdiction under Article 203-D of the Constitution?
- What is the effect of a Supreme Court decision to remand a case to the Federal Shariat Court?
- Can a law granting privileges to assembly members that interfere with the administration of justice be considered repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
- PROVINCE OF SINDH Versus PUBLIC AT LARGE1988 PLD 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a Federal Shariat Court judgment declaring Section 6(2) of the Sind Co-operative Housing Authority Ordinance, 1982, repugnant to Islamic injunctions due to the absence of a requirement to provide a hearing before the government takes over a society's management. The core legal question was whether a statutory provision allowing the government to supersede a co-operative society without a prior hearing violates the Quranic commands and Sunnah. The Supreme Court upheld the principle that any law permitting action against a person or entity without an opportunity for defense is contrary to Islamic injunctions. However, acknowledging the necessity of preventing the dissipation of assets by unscrupulous management, the Court modified the Federal Shariat Court's directive. It held that while a hearing is mandatory, it may be dispensed with in emergent cases provided it is granted as soon as possible thereafter, and interim orders may be passed to prevent mischief. The Court thus partially allowed the appeal, mandating specific amendments to the Ordinance to balance the requirement of natural justice with the state's interest in protecting public funds.
Questions settled- Is a statutory provision that allows the government to supersede a co-operative society without a prior hearing repugnant to the injunctions of Islam?
- Can the requirement of a prior hearing be dispensed with in cases of emergency when the government exercises its power to take over the management of a co-operative society?
- Does the principle of natural justice require that a person or entity be given an opportunity of defense before a public authority exercises power involving their rights and liabilities?
- FAZLE-I-QADIR Versus SECRETARY ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION1988 PLD 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns appeals under Article 212(3) of the Constitution regarding seniority disputes among civil servants, specifically challenging the validity of an Office Memorandum (OM) dated 27-1-1975 and the seniority principles applied to direct recruits versus promotees. The core legal questions addressed whether the OM was ultra vires the Civil Servants Act 1973, whether administrative instructions could function as service rules, and whether the seniority principle favoring promotees over direct recruits of the same year was legally permissible. The Supreme Court held that the OM was competently framed and valid, noting that administrative instructions in the ESTACODE possess the force of rules. The Court further held that Section 8(2) of the Civil Servants Act 1973 permits the rule-making authority to establish seniority principles, and the practice of granting seniority to promotees over direct recruits of the same year is not inconsistent with Section 8(4). Consequently, the Court upheld the seniority determinations, dismissed the appeals of the civil servants, and allowed the Federation’s appeal, affirming that the challenged seniority principles were saved under Section 25 of the Civil Servants Act 1973.
Questions settled- Can an Office Memorandum be considered a valid service rule if it lacks the formal appellation of a rule?
- Is the principle of granting seniority to promotees over direct recruits of the same year inconsistent with Section 8(4) of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
- Does Section 8(2) of the Civil Servants Act 1973 authorize the rule-making authority to determine inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees?
- Are administrative instructions contained in the ESTACODE saved by Section 25 of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
- ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN Versus ATA HUSSAIN1988 PLD 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by the Federation of Pakistan examines whether the Service Tribunal correctly held that oral orders of the Chief Martial Law Administrator were insufficient for retiring a civil servant under section 13, clause (ii) of the Civil Servants Act 1973, and whether the grounds of retirement were open to scrutiny. The Supreme Court considered whether the retirement order of the respondent civil servant, which was processed through an oral directive communicated by an Adviser and recorded by the Establishment Secretary, fulfilled the legal requirements of an order by the competent authority. The Court held that the power to retire a civil servant after twenty-five years of service in the public interest must be exercised strictly by the competent authority or its designated alter ego in accordance with established rules and instruments. Since the procedural requirements and valid channels of communication were not satisfied to establish that the Chief Martial Law Administrator or the President had actually passed or approved the order, the retirement order lacked legal efficacy. The principle laid down is that executive retirement orders of civil servants must strictly emanate from the competent authority through authorized legal channels, and mere departmental processing of unauthenticated oral directives does not satisfy the statutory mandate.
Questions settled- Whether oral orders of the Chief Martial Law Administrator are sufficient for retiring a civil servant under section 13 of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
- Can an order of retirement passed under clause (ii) of section 13 of the Civil Servants Act 1973 be scrutinized on merits before the Service Tribunal?
- Whether the presumption of truth attached to a duly authenticated official order can be rebutted by a finding of fact that no written order was passed by the competent authority?
- ABDUL MAJID Versus AKHTAR HUSSAIN ZAIDI1988 PLD 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by the plaintiff arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a summary suit instituted under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 based on a demand promissory note. The core legal question was whether the local amendments introduced by the Lahore High Court to rule 1 of Order XXXVII, C.P.C. extending summary procedure to subordinate courts in Lahore stood deleted or revoked by subsequent legislative enactments, notably the Central Laws (Statute Reforms) Ordinance 1960 and the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972, thereby depriving the trial court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's local amendments and rules framed under section 127 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 were duly preserved by the savings clauses of the amending ordinances and did not vanish. The Court ruled that Order XXXVII relates to procedure rather than jurisdiction and that local amendments identifying the courts competent to apply summary procedure remain intact. Furthermore, if summary procedure is found unavailable, the proper course is to proceed with the suit as an ordinary suit rather than return the plaint. The appeal was accordingly allowed.
Questions settled- Whether rule 1, clause (e) of Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as introduced by the Lahore High Court stood deleted on account of subsequent statutory amendments and adaptations?
- Whether Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 relates to procedure or jurisdiction?
- What is the proper course of action when a suit is not triable under the summary procedure of Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Whether the Central Laws (Statute Reforms) Ordinance 1960 revoked the local amendments made by the Lahore High Court to Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- SHUJAAT HASNAIN QURESHI Versus RAEES QURESHI1988 PLD 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of two cross-appeals arising from an Election Tribunal's decision regarding a Senate bye-election. The primary appellant, Pir Shujaat Hasnain Qureshi, had contested and lost a National Assembly election under the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977, before subsequently winning a Senate bye-election. The core legal question was whether a candidate unsuccessful in a general election held under P.O. V of 1977 was permanently or temporarily disqualified from contesting the Senate, and whether the Election Tribunal rightly ordered re-election rather than declaring the runner-up as the returned candidate. The Supreme Court held that the disqualification under Article 10(4) of P.O. V of 1977, read with Article 63(1)(p) of the Constitution of Pakistan, validly barred unsuccessful candidates of those specific elections from the Senate until future general elections are held under the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court held that votes cast for a disqualified candidate are not treated as 'thrown away' unless the disqualification was notorious at the time of the poll. The appeals were dismissed, upholding both the disqualification and the order for re-election.
Questions settled- Whether a candidate who unsuccessfully contested an election under the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order 1977 is disqualified from being elected to the Senate?
- Does Article 63(1)(p) of the Constitution of Pakistan make applicable the disqualifications contained in existing laws such as President's Order No. V of 1977?
- Under what circumstances can votes cast for a disqualified candidate be treated as thrown away in an election contest?
- Whether an Election Tribunal is justified in ordering a re-election rather than declaring the runner-up as the winner when the disqualification of the returned candidate was not notorious?
- ABDUR REHMAN Versus BARKAT ALI1988 PLD 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-10Read full judgment →
- ZAFAR IQBAL Versus BAHIR AHMAD1988 PLD 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by leave arose from a suit for specific performance of an agricultural land sale agreement filed by the appellants. During trial, the appellants sought to produce an audio-cassette recording, but their application under Order XIII Rule 2 and Order XVIII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was rejected due to non-inclusion in the reliance list and late stage, which rejection was affirmed up to the Supreme Court. Subsequently, after an additional issue was framed, the appellants filed a fresh application under Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 to produce the same audio-cassette. The trial court rejected this application as mala fide and frivolous, which order was upheld by the High Court in revision. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Article 164 makes modern evidence admissible but does not override procedural rules governing late production. The Court further ruled that framing an unnecessary additional issue cannot be used as a device to re-agitate settled evidentiary rulings, imposing exemplary costs of Rs. 10,000 on the appellants.
Questions settled- Does Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 permit the late production of evidence previously disallowed under procedural rules?
- Can a party re-agitate the admissibility of evidence previously rejected by court orders upon the framing of an additional issue?
- Whether the framing of an unnecessary additional issue enables a party to produce evidence that was rejected under earlier procedural orders?
- MOHABAT KHAN Versus HAZRAT KHAN1988 PLD 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-07-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These civil appeals arise from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning the redemption of two mortgages originally created in 1949. The core legal question is whether the dismissal of a summary redemption application by the Collector under the N.-W.F.P. Redemption of Mortgages Act, 1935, on grounds of non-joinder of parties rather than on merits, constitutes a final bar requiring a suit to be filed within one year under Article 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, or whether the mortgagor retains the full statutory period to file a regular redemption suit. The Supreme Court held that where a Collector's order does not decide the matter on merits but merely refuses to proceed due to a technical defect, it does not require a suit to set it aside under Article 14 of the Limitation Act, and the mortgagor may institute a redemption suit within the ordinary sixty-year limitation period. The Court laid down the principle that summary orders not passed on merits do not extinguish the substantive right of redemption or trigger the one-year limitation bar.
Questions settled- Does the dismissal of a redemption application by a Collector on technical grounds rather than on merits attract the one-year limitation period under Article 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
- Whether a regular suit for redemption is barred if a prior summary application under the N.-W.F.P. Redemption of Mortgages Act, 1935 was dismissed without deciding the rights of the parties on merits?
- What is the applicable limitation period for instituting a suit for the redemption of mortgaged property when a summary redemption order is not passed on merits?
- SINDH EMPLOYEES' SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTION Versus DAWOOD COTTON MILLS LTD.1988 PLD 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These consolidated appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Sindh High Court concerning the assessment of social security contributions under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965. The primary legal questions were whether employees earning more than twenty rupees per day should be entirely excluded from contribution calculations, and whether payments for leave encashment and festival holidays constitute 'wages' under Section 2(30) of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that Section 20(4)(a) of the Ordinance does not exclude an employee from contribution calculations merely because their daily wages exceed twenty rupees; rather, contributions remain payable on the wage amount up to twenty rupees, with only the excess amount being exempt. Furthermore, the Court ruled that payments for leave encashment and festival holidays are remuneration for services rendered and thus fall within the definition of 'wages', distinguishing them from 'overtime' which carries a distinct industrial connotation of hours worked beyond standard limits. The Court also affirmed that employers failing to make timely contributions are liable to statutory increases under Section 23.
Questions settled- Whether an employee is completely excluded from social security contribution calculations under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965 if their daily wages exceed twenty rupees?
- Do payments made to employees for leave encashment and festival holidays constitute 'wages' for the purpose of assessing social security contributions?
- Can payments for leave encashment or festival holidays be legally equated with 'overtime' to exempt them from the definition of wages?
- Is an employer liable to pay a penalty increase under Section 23 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965 for delay in making contributions during the pendency of a dispute?
- GOVT. OF PAKISTAN Versus DADA AMIR HAIDAR KHAN1987 PLD 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a Lahore High Court judgment granting a writ petition filed by a political worker whose application for a passport was refused by passport authorities without assigning any reason. The core legal questions involved whether the Federal Government possesses absolute discretion to refuse a passport to a citizen, whether foreign travel is regulated under public interest, and whether executive discretion to deny travel documents must satisfy principles of natural justice and reasonableness under the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court's declaration that the refusal was without lawful authority. The Court held that while the Passport Act 1974 regulates departure and entry, executive discretion to grant or refuse travel documents must be exercised reasonably, fairly, and in good faith. An applicant cannot be denied a passport on vague political grounds, such as holding communist thoughts, nor can refusal occur without giving the affected person an opportunity of hearing and communicating valid grounds, unless public interest sensitivity precludes full disclosure.
Questions settled- Does the Federal Government have unbridled and arbitrary discretion to refuse the issuance of a passport to a citizen without giving reasons?
- Is a citizen entitled to an opportunity of hearing and disclosure of grounds before a passport application is refused?
- Can a citizen's right to travel abroad be restricted solely on the basis of their political ideology or political thought?
- MUHAMMAD KHAN Versus THE STATE1987 PLD 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal and cross-appeal for enhancement of sentence arise from the conviction of a patwari under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code for demanding and accepting illegal gratification. The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced him to three years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine. On appeal, the High Court maintained the conviction and fine but reduced the substantive sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone (twenty days), citing the passage of time, trial agony, loss of service, and brief incarceration. The Supreme Court dismissed the accused's appeal against conviction, finding the charge conclusively proven, and allowed the State's appeal for enhancement. The Court held that once a corruption offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt, showing undue leniency or reducing sentences on such mitigating grounds is untenable and undermines societal welfare. The Supreme Court accordingly restored the original sentence of three years' rigorous imprisonment while maintaining the fine.
Questions settled- Whether grounds such as trial agony, loss of service, and passage of time constitute valid mitigating circumstances for reducing a sentence of imprisonment in corruption cases once guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt?
- Can a sentence of imprisonment for accepting illegal gratification under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code be reduced to the period already undergone merely because the accused has served a short duration in jail?
- Whether courts are justified in showing leniency to public functionaries convicted of corruption on the premise that bribery has become a way of life in society?
- FARRUKH IKRAM Versus THE STATE1987 PLD 5 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
- LALA Versus THE STATE1987 PLD 414 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns criminal appeals against convictions for Zina under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the existence of a valid prior marriage between the complainant and the female appellant beyond reasonable doubt, thereby rendering her subsequent union with the male appellant an act of Zina. The trial court had convicted both appellants based on the complainant's testimony and the testimony of the female appellant's mother. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged marriage, noting that the complainant admitted to falsely implicating another co-accused, rendering his testimony unreliable. Furthermore, the Nikah registrar failed to register the alleged marriage, and the mother's testimony was biased. The Court emphasized that in criminal cases, the burden of proof lies heavily on the prosecution, and where the foundational fact of a prior marriage is not established beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction for Zina cannot be sustained. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted both appellants.
Questions settled- Can a conviction for Zina be sustained when the prosecution fails to prove the existence of a valid prior marriage beyond reasonable doubt?
- What is the evidentiary value of a Nikah registrar's testimony when the alleged marriage was not entered into the register?
- Does an admission by a complainant that they falsely implicated a co-accused undermine the credibility of their entire testimony?
- PAKISTAN Versus PUBLIC AT LARGE1987 PLD 304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This consolidated batch of appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan relates to the constitutional validity of provisions empowering the premature retirement of civil servants after twenty-five years of qualifying service or upon holding the rank of Additional Secretary or above, under federal, provincial, and cantonment service laws, on the touchstone of Islamic Injunctions. The Federal Shariat Court had declared these provisions repugnant to Islam for lacking procedural safeguards and notice. The core legal question was whether statutory provisions permitting summary premature retirement without a prior show-cause notice violate the Injunctions of the Holy Quran and Sunnah. The Supreme Court, by majority, held that while the executive possesses the power to retire civil servants in the public interest, the absence of a provision requiring a proper show-cause notice and an opportunity of hearing renders the impugned retirement provisions repugnant to Islamic principles of justice. The Court laid down the key principle that any law affecting the tenure, rights, and reputation of individuals must incorporate procedural fairness and due process, specifically a right to be informed of the grounds and heard before adverse administrative action is taken.
Questions settled- Whether provisions empowering the premature retirement of civil servants without a prior show-cause notice are repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
- Does the absence of procedural safeguards such as an opportunity of hearing in retirement laws violate Islamic principles of justice?
- Can statutory provisions regarding the terms and conditions of civil service be declared un-Islamic solely on the basis of being capable of misuse?
- Whether employees of cantonment boards and statutory corporations stand on the same footing as civil servants regarding protections against arbitrary retirement?
- IJAZ AHMED CHAUDHRY Versus ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE LAHORE1987 PLD 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-11Read full judgment →
- SAID SHAH Versus THE STATE1987 PLD 288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court upholding the convictions and sentences of the appellants for offences under Article 3 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, relating to the transportation of a large quantity of liquor in a Suzuki van. The core legal questions involved whether there was sufficient evidence of possession and transportation, whether drivers or conductors of public vehicles possess a general defence of lack of knowledge regarding passengers' luggage, and whether ownership of the intoxicant is a necessary prerequisite for establishing guilt. The Supreme Court held that ownership of the intoxicant is not strictly necessary to prove an offence under the Prohibition Order, and that the criminal liability of a driver or conductor depends on the facts and circumstances of each case regarding their consciousness of the contents being transported. Finding concurrent findings of fact by the courts below regarding the appellants' knowledge and participation, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals.
Questions settled- Whether ownership of the intoxicant is necessary for proving an offence under Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
- Does a driver or conductor of a public vehicle incur criminal liability if they are unaware of the illicit contents of a passenger's luggage?
- Is it necessary for the Court to lay down a hard and fast rule regarding the presumptions of knowledge for drivers or conductors of public vehicles carrying contraband?
- MEHMODD ALAM SHAH Versus THE STATE1987 PLD 250 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, a public servant, was convicted by a Special Judge for forgery under sections 468 and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, regarding the alleged alteration of a cheque. The High Court upheld the conviction. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the evidence and found the prosecution's case regarding the forgery to be unsubstantiated, noting the absence of physical evidence of tampering and the unreliability of the handwriting expert's opinion. Furthermore, the Court addressed the jurisdictional issue, holding that the Special Judge lacked authority to try the case. The Court established that for an offence to be triable by a Special Judge under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, the act must be committed by a public servant "as such," meaning it must have a nexus with their official duties. Since the appellant was acting in a private capacity as an agent for his wife, the trial was vitiated for lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.
Questions settled- Does a Special Judge have jurisdiction to try a public servant for an offence committed in a private capacity?
- What is the test to determine if an act is committed by a public servant 'as such' for the purposes of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958?
- Is a court bound to accept the opinion of a handwriting expert in criminal proceedings?
- Can a conviction be sustained when the trial court ignores defense evidence and fails to properly evaluate the prosecution's proof?
- GHULAM ALI Versus THE STATE1986 PLD 741 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for theft liable to Hadd under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, involving the theft of a wall-clock from a mosque. The core legal questions concerned whether the strict evidentiary requirements for Hadd were satisfied, specifically regarding the process of Tazkiya-al-Shuhood (purgation of witnesses), the definition of Hirz (custody), the valuation of Nisab, and the procedural requirement to examine the victim before eye-witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to meet the rigorous standards required for Hadd. The Court found significant contradictions in witness testimonies, an improper Tazkiya-al-Shuhood process, and a failure to prove the property was removed from the Hirz or met the required Nisab value. Consequently, the Court set aside the Hadd sentence. However, the Court upheld a conviction for theft liable to Tazir under Section 379, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing the appellant to the time already served. The judgment establishes that Hadd punishments require strict evidentiary proof, and any reasonable doubt necessitates acquittal from Hadd, though a Tazir conviction may remain permissible.
Questions settled- Does the failure to conduct a proper Tazkiya-al-Shuhood vitiate a conviction for theft liable to Hadd?
- Is the removal of stolen property from the Hirz a mandatory requirement for the commission of theft liable to Hadd?
- Must the victim of a theft be examined before the eye-witnesses in a case of theft liable to Hadd?
- Can an appellate court convert a conviction for theft liable to Hadd into one for theft liable to Tazir?
- ALLAH BAKHSH Versus THE STATE1986 PLD 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court convicting the petitioner under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for perjury and forgery, sentencing him to three years' rigorous imprisonment after he falsely claimed to be the husband of Mst. Janet Bibi and exhibited a forged nikahnama in a Zina trial under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The core legal questions involved whether procedural irregularities vitiated the summary trial, the extent of the sentencing powers of the Federal Shariat Court under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the Federal Shariat Court could be equated with the High Court for sentencing limits under the said section. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Federal Shariat Court possesses sentencing powers comparable to the High Court under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by virtue of the mutatis mutandis application of provisions under Section 20 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The key principle laid down is that the Federal Shariat Court functions analogously to the High Court in the hierarchy of the Hudood laws regarding summary punishment for perjury, and severe deterrence is warranted for fabricated accusations against women in marital disputes.
Questions settled- Whether procedural irregularities in summary proceedings under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiate a conviction in the absence of a failure of justice?
- What is the extent of the sentencing jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court when punishing for perjury under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- How does Section 20 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 apply the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mutatis mutandis to the Federal Shariat Court?
- Whether an accused person who chooses to be represented by counsel is bound by the conduct of their counsel during summary proceedings?
- ABU DAWOOD MUHAMMAD SADIQ Versus REGISTRATION OFFICER1986 PLD 564 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged the validity of the National Registration Act (Act LVI of 1973) and its rules, which mandate that male applicants submit photographs for National Identity Cards, arguing such requirements are repugnant to the Qur'an and Sunnah. The core legal question was whether the mandatory use of photographs for identification constitutes an un-Islamic practice. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the requirement is not repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. The Court reasoned that the Qur'an contains no direct prohibition against photography. While certain Ahadith express disapproval of image-making, the Court determined these prohibitions are context-specific, primarily targeting practices involving shirk (idolatry), worship, or challenges to the Creator. The judgment established that photography used for legitimate social needs, such as the orderly functioning of state affairs and personal identification, is permissible. The Court emphasized that Islamic law is dynamic and resilient, allowing for modern necessities provided they do not conflict with fundamental religious tenets like Tauheed.
Questions settled- Is the requirement of a photograph for a National Identity Card under the National Registration Act 1973 repugnant to the injunctions of Islam?
- Does the Holy Qur'an contain a direct prohibition against the making of photographs or pictures of living beings?
- Are prohibitions regarding picture-making in the Sunnah absolute or dependent on the purpose and context of the usage?
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF Versus THE STATE1986 PLD 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-15Read full judgment →
- GOVERNMENT OF N.W.F.P. Versus SAID KAMAL SHAH1986 PLD 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Supreme Court of Pakistan judgment addresses several appeals filed under Article 203-F of the Constitution, examining the constitutional validity and alleged repugnancy of various provisions of pre-emption laws (including the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913, N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1950, and Land Reforms Regulation 1972) to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. The core legal question revolves around whether the Islamic law of pre-emption is strictly confined to the three categories recognized by Hanafi jurists (co-sharers, participators in amenities, and neighbours) or if the State can extend, curtail, or exempt certain properties and classes. The majority of the Court held that the Federal Shariat Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain the petitions, and that the pre-emption laws are largely based on mundane social dealings (Mu'amelat) rather than immutable rituals, allowing for legislative adjustments and extensions to prevent public damage, provided they have a nexus with the objects of pre-emption. However, provisions recognizing the right of pre-emption based merely on a successor's spes successionis were held repugnant. The key principle laid down is that the traditional Hanafi categories of pre-emptors are not exhaustive or immutable, and statutory modifications that advance the purpose of pre-emption are valid under Islamic law.
Questions settled- Whether the provisions of pre-emption laws are repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah?
- Are the categories of pre-emptors recognized by Hanafi jurisprudence exhaustive, or can the State extend or curtail pre-emption rights?
- Does the Federal Shariat Court have the jurisdiction to examine the constitutional and statutory validity of pre-emption laws?
- Whether the right of pre-emption conferred on a successor of the vendor based on spes successionis is repugnant to Islamic Injunctions?
- PAKISTAN Versus PUBLIC AT LARGE1986 PLD 240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard five consolidated appeals preferred by the Federation of Pakistan under Article 203-F of the Constitution against judgments of the Federal Shariat Court. In those judgments, the Federal Shariat Court had, in suo motu exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 203-D of the Constitution, declared certain provisions of specified laws repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam and ordered their amendment. The core legal questions involved the scope, proper exercise, and procedural requirements of the Federal Shariat Court's special jurisdiction under Chapter 3-A of the Constitution, particularly the necessity of grounding decisions explicitly in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Shariat Court erred by annulling legal provisions without making references to or deriving reasons from the Injunctions of Islam as defined in the Constitution. The Court laid down key principles regarding the methodology of Ijtihad, the paramount status of the Holy Quran and Sunnah as sources of organic law, and the mandatory procedural steps required when examining laws for Islamic repugnancy. Consequently, the appeals were allowed and the cases remanded to the Federal Shariat Court for fresh decisions.
Questions settled- Whether the Federal Shariat Court is legally required to make explicit references to the Holy Quran and Sunnah when declaring a legal provision repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
- Can the Federal Shariat Court exercise its jurisdiction under Article 203-D of the Constitution of Pakistan suo motu?
- What are the mandatory procedural steps and requirements for the Federal Shariat Court when examining and deciding the question of repugnancy of laws to the Injunctions of Islam?
- Does the Federal Shariat Court possess the power to review any decision given or order made by it under Chapter 3-A of the Constitution of Pakistan?
- MUKHTAR HUSSAIN SHAH Versus WASIM SAJJAD1986 PLD 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal as of right challenged the decision of the Election Tribunal invalidating seventeen ballot papers for the special seats of the Senate from Punjab and ordering a recount, which resulted in respondent No. 1 being declared elected instead of the appellant. The core legal questions concerned the maintainability of the election petition in light of an earlier appeal before the Chief Election Commissioner, the interpretation of mandatory versus directory rules regarding voting procedures, and whether unauthorized markings on ballot papers rendered them invalid due to the possibility of voter identification. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that election petitions cannot be pre-empted by decisions of the Chief Election Commissioner under section 32 of the Senate Act, 1975, and that any deliberate, unauthorized markings or deviations on ballot papers—such as encircling preferences or mixing scripts—violate the secrecy and purity of the ballot and render the votes invalid. The key principle laid down is that ballot papers bearing marks capable of identifying the voter, unless attributable to mere accidental oversight, are invalid under the relevant election laws to preserve the absolute secrecy of the ballot.
Questions settled- Does an order of the Chief Election Commissioner in an appeal under section 32 of the Senate Act, 1975 bar a subsequent election petition before an Election Tribunal?
- Are the requirements regarding voting procedures and markings under the Senate (Election) Rules, 1975 mandatory or directory for voters?
- Does any unauthorized mark or writing on a ballot-paper automatically render it invalid on the ground that the voter can be identified?
- Can an Election Tribunal invalidate ballot-papers containing intentional unauthorized markings without positive extrinsic evidence of a pre-arrangement between the voter and the candidate?