Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Muhammad Shayan alias Shani vs The State2024 MLD 1721 · Sindh High Court · 2024-05-23Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Rana Muhammad Sharif (deceased through LRs)2024 MLD 1176 · Lahore High Court · 2024-04-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and others vs Province of Sindh through Chief2024 CLC 371 · Sindh High Court · 2022-05-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and another vs The State and others2024 YLR 841 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-24
  murder referencebenefit of the doubtocular accountmedical evidencerecovery of weaponappeal against acquittaldelay in post-mortemsource of lightcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside an appeal against the co-accused's acquittal and a murder reference. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular testimony, the corroborative value of motive, medical evidence, recovery of weapons, and the application of the principle of benefit of the doubt. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to major flaws in the ocular account, unexplained delays in the post-mortem examination, lack of proof regarding the source of light during a night-time occurrence, and non-compliance with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding weapon recovery. The Court established that where eyewitness testimony is untrustworthy and natural human conduct rules contradict the prosecution's narrative, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, the appellant was acquitted, the murder reference was answered in the negative, and the appeal against the acquittal of the co-accused was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of related eyewitnesses can sustain a murder conviction when their presence at the crime scene is rendered doubtful by natural human conduct?
  • Does a delay in conducting the post-mortem examination of a deceased person create an adverse inference against the prosecution's case regarding the time of the FIR?
  • Can the recovery of a weapon be used as incriminating evidence when mandatory provisions regarding independent witnesses under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are violated?
  • What is the standard of proof required for an appellate court to interfere with an order of acquittal which carries a double presumption of innocence?
  • Is medical evidence alone sufficient to identify the culprit in a criminal case where the direct ocular testimony has been disbelieved?
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• Muhammad Shamoon etc vs SHO , etc2024 LHC 2802, 2024 MLD 1970 · Lahore High Court · 2024-05-16
  case propertyreturn of propertyacquittalcriminal revisiontrial court jurisdictiondisposal of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision arises from an order passed by the Special Judge (Central), Lahore, declining the petitioners' request for the return of money allegedly recovered from them by the Railway Police in relation to a corruption case. The petitioners were initially convicted but subsequently acquitted by the High Court, and leave to appeal was declined by the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerned the competence of the trial court to entertain applications for the return of case property under Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 following an acquittal, and whether the trial court retained jurisdiction notwithstanding the acquittal. The court held that the trial court erroneously considered that it lacked jurisdiction due to the acquittal and that the trial court is competent to decide ancillary questions relating to case property as an executing court. The revision petitions were allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the trial court for a fresh decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the trial court retains jurisdiction under Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to decide applications for the return of case property after an accused has been acquitted by the High Court?
  • Does an order of acquittal entail all consequential effects regarding the release of case property without requiring a separate express exemption by the appellate court?
  • Can the High Court in revisional jurisdiction determine the entitlement of petitioners to disputed case property without a factual inquiry and recording of evidence by the trial court?
  • Does the principle of merger apply when a trial court judgment of conviction is not upheld or modified, but rather quashed by an appellate court?
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• Muhammad Shamim Ali vs Mst. Asma Begum & others2024 SCP 239, 2024 SCMR 1642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-15
  family courtexclusive jurisdictionconstitutional petitionconcurrent findingsdowry articlessecond appealscope of writ jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a family suit filed by the respondent for dissolution of marriage by way of khula, recovery of dowry articles, and monthly maintenance, which was decreed by the Family Court and subsequently upheld in a family appeal by the Additional District Judge. The petitioner then challenged these concurrent findings through a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution before the High Court, which was dismissed. Upon seeking leave to appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scope of concurrent factual findings, the special and exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, and the limited scope of constitutional interference where no second appeal is provided by the legislature. The Supreme Court held that High Courts should not routinely exercise constitutional jurisdiction as a substitute for a second appeal or re-evaluate factual controversies already settled by the trial and appellate courts, thereby upholding the legislative intent of expeditious dispute resolution in family matters. Leave to appeal was consequently refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can re-appreciate evidence in a constitutional petition against concurrent factual findings of family courts?
  • Does the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 provide for a right of second appeal?
  • What is the extent of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 185(3) of the Constitution regarding concurrent findings of fact in family disputes?
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• Muhammad Shakeel vs Deputy Commissioner, etc2024 LHC 3071 · Lahore High Court · 2024-05-30
  electricity arrearsrecovery of land revenuedetentionwrit petitiondue processstatutory authorityhabeas corpus
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges the detention of the petitioner's father by revenue authorities for the recovery of alleged electricity arrears owed to MEPCO. The core legal question is whether a statutory authority can initiate detention proceedings under the Land Revenue Act, 1967, to recover disputed electricity dues without first obtaining a judicial determination of the liability from a court of competent jurisdiction. The Court held that the detention was illegal and without lawful authority. The ratio of the decision is that electricity charges, even when recoverable as arrears of land revenue, do not constitute land revenue itself, and such recovery proceedings cannot be initiated unless the liability has been fixed, ascertained, and determined by a court or competent forum. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the mandatory procedural requirements, specifically the issuance of prior notice under Sections 81 and 82 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967, must be strictly satisfied before any coercive measures, such as detention, are taken. Consequently, the detention order was set aside and the detenue was ordered to be released.

  Questions settled

  • Can electricity arrears be recovered as arrears of land revenue without prior determination of the liability by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  • Is a prior notice under Section 81 of the Land Revenue Act 1967 mandatory before initiating detention proceedings for the recovery of dues?
  • Does the recovery of electricity charges as arrears of land revenue transform such charges into actual land revenue or government dues?
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• Muhammad Shakeel alias Chotoo vs The State2024 MLD 286 · Sindh High Court · 2022-10-20
  criminal appealidentification paradebenefit of the doubtsole eyewitnessanti-terrorismmurderpolice confessionwithholding evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellant under sections of the Pakistan Penal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, resulting in sentences of life imprisonment and rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question before the Sindh High Court was whether the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was one of the unknown assailants who committed the murders and caused injuries during the firing incident, particularly in light of sole eyewitness identification after a delay of over three years. The court held that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the appellant reliably, as the identification parade was held excessively late, no prior physical description or hulia was provided, the eyewitness had only a fleeting glance under traumatic conditions, and the best available eyewitness was withheld. Consequently, the High Court set aside the conviction, extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellant, and acquitted him. The key principles laid down include the necessity of rigorous compliance with identification parade rules, the requirement of prompt physical descriptions in police statements, and that heinousness of an offense cannot substitute for legally admissible, trustworthy evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be safely sustained on the sole identification of an unknown accused after an unexplained delay of over three years without a prior description or hulia?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession made by an accused while in police custody in another case?
  • What adverse inference is drawn under the law when the prosecution withholds a star injured eyewitness without a reasonable explanation?
  • Does the heinous nature of an offense permit a court to relax the strict standard of proof required in criminal cases?
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• Muhammad Shahid vs StatePLJ 2024 Cr.C. 1148, 2025 PLD Islamabad 35 · Islamabad High Court · 2024-06-03
  transfer of offendersforeign convictionsentence adaptationnarcotics controllife imprisonmentjurisdiction of Pakistani courts
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges an order passed by the Judge Special Court (CNS), Islamabad, regarding the appellant who was convicted of drug trafficking in Sri Lanka and subsequently transferred to Pakistan under the Transfer of Offenders Ordinance, 2002 to serve his sentence. The core legal question concerns the scope of powers of Pakistani courts under Section 9(4) of the Ordinance to adapt or modify sentences imposed by foreign courts to make them compatible with municipal laws. The Islamabad High Court held that Pakistani courts do not act as courts of appeal or revision over foreign judgments and cannot alter, reduce, or review the duration of a foreign sentence, nor can they aggravate its nature or duration. The Court laid down the principle that the power of adaptation under Section 9(4) is strictly limited to removing incompatibility between the foreign sentence and Pakistani law without worsening the convict's position, and that determining whether an un-categorized foreign sentence of life imprisonment is rigorous or simple falls within the domain of the Competent Authority under the Ordinance rather than the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Pakistani court act as a court of appeal or revision against a foreign judgment of conviction under the Transfer of Offenders Ordinance, 2002?
  • What is the scope of a court's power under Section 9(4) of the Transfer of Offenders Ordinance, 2002 to adapt a foreign sentence?
  • Whether a trial court in Pakistan can aggravate the nature or duration of a sentence imposed by a foreign court while adapting it under the Transfer of Offenders Ordinance, 2002?
  • Who is empowered to determine whether an un-categorized sentence of life imprisonment transferred from a foreign state is rigorous or simple?
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• Muhammad Shahid vs National Highway Authority and others2024 IHC 188 · Islamabad High Court · 2024-10-03
  departmental promotiondeferment of promotionpending disciplinary proceedingsminor penaltywrit of mandamusNational Highway Authorityservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an employee of the National Highway Authority (NHA), challenged an office order deferring his promotion to BS-20 due to pending departmental inquiries. The petitioner argued that mere pendency of proceedings is insufficient to defer promotion. The NHA contended that under its Administrative Manual and relevant promotion rules, pending inquiries justify deferment. The Court noted that while a previously initiated disciplinary proceeding had concluded with a minor penalty—which the Court held does not bar promotion—a separate disciplinary proceeding initiated by a charge sheet dated 30.11.2022 remained pending. The Court held that under Clause 2.7(1)(ii) of the NHA Administrative Manual, 2002, the Departmental Promotion Committee is authorized to defer promotion consideration if disciplinary proceedings are pending. Since the proceedings related to the 30.11.2022 charge sheet were ongoing, the Court declined to issue a writ of mandamus to compel promotion consideration. The petition was dismissed, with the Court directing that the pending disciplinary proceedings be concluded expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Does the imposition of a minor penalty constitute a valid legal obstacle for the consideration of an officer for promotion?
  • Can the Departmental Promotion Committee defer an employee's promotion consideration if disciplinary proceedings are pending against them?
  • Is a writ of mandamus appropriate to compel promotion consideration when valid disciplinary proceedings remain pending under the NHA Administrative Manual?
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• Muhammad Shahid Mehmood vs The State2024 LHC 6189, 2025 PCRLJ 922 · Lahore High Court · 2024-10-29
  narcoticscharasexamination of accuseddefective questioningremandfair trialprejudice to accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and life imprisonment sentence of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the alleged recovery of twelve packets of charas. The appellant contended that the trial court's examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, was highly defective and misleading. Specifically, the trial court questioned the appellant regarding narcotics recovered from his 'personal search,' whereas the prosecution's actual evidence and witness testimonies alleged that the contraband was recovered from the 'secret cavities of the car' driven by him. The Lahore High Court held that the examination of an accused under Section 342 is not an inane formality but a fundamental safeguard of fair trial, requiring all incriminating circumstances to be accurately put to the accused. Finding that the trial court's erroneous questioning materially prejudiced the appellant's defense, the High Court set aside the conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for re-examination of the appellant and a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal effect of a trial court putting an incorrect or misleading factual circumstance to an accused during their examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does every error or omission in the examination of an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically vitiate the trial?
  • Upon whom does the burden lie to prove that a defective examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 has caused a miscarriage of justice?
  • Can an appellate court remand a case back to the trial court specifically for re-examination of the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without it amounting to filling up a lacuna in the prosecution's case?
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• Muhammad Shahid Faqir vs Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice2024 PLD Lahore 561 · Lahore High Court · 2024-03-25Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahban s/o Shah Muhammad r/o Rakh Baloch Nilah Singh2024 SC AJK 80 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafique vs Muhammad Imran and another2024 SCP 115, 2024 SCMR 814, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-18
  murderdeath sentencelife imprisonmentmitigating circumstancessingle fire shotacquittal of co-accusedre-appraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, brought by leave of the court, challenged a Lahore High Court judgment confirming the appellant's death sentence and convictions under Sections 302(b), 324, and 337-F-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions pertained to whether an accused could be convicted for additional murders and injuries specifically attributed to co-accused who were ultimately acquitted, and whether causing a single firearm injury despite opportunity to fire again constitutes a mitigating factor in sentencing. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant fired a solitary shot causing the death of one deceased; however, because he did not repeat the fire despite having ample opportunity and did not cause injuries to other victims, he could not be held liable for the acts attributed to the acquitted co-accused. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, maintaining the conviction under Section 302(b) PPC for one murder, altering the death sentence to life imprisonment, and acquitting the appellant of all other charges.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused can be convicted for murder and injuries specifically attributed to co-accused who have been acquitted?
  • Whether inflicting a single firearm injury despite having ample opportunity to repeat constitutes a mitigating circumstance to reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can conviction for a specific fatal shot be sustained against one accused when the same eye-witness evidence is disbelieved regarding the co-accused?
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• Muhammad Shafique vs Director General, Punjab Emergency Service, Lahore etc2024 LHC 874, 2024 PLJ Lahore 229, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 214 · Lahore High Court · 2024-02-22
  unauthorized absencewillful misconductconstitutional petitionservice lawPunjab Emergency ServicePEEDAproportionalityreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the removal of a Fire Rescuer from the Punjab Emergency Service due to unauthorized absence. The petitioner argued his absence was involuntary, resulting from his incarceration in a criminal case for which he was later acquitted. The core legal questions were whether unauthorized absence caused by compelling circumstances beyond an employee's control constitutes "willful" misconduct, and whether the department possessed the authority to impose the penalty of removal under the Punjab Emergency Service Leave, Efficiency and Discipline Rules 2007. The Court held that the impugned removal orders were unsustainable. It established that unauthorized absence is not necessarily "willful" if it arises from circumstances beyond the employee's control, such as incarceration. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the department erred by applying the wrong rules; regular employees must be proceeded against under the Punjab Employees Efficiency and Discipline Act 2006 for major penalties, as the specific Emergency Service Rules only provided for minor penalties for absence. Consequently, the Court set aside the removal orders, reinstated the petitioner, and directed the department to determine back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unauthorized absence from duty caused by involuntary incarceration constitutes willful misconduct?
  • Can a regular employee of the Punjab Emergency Service be removed from service under Rule 6 of the Punjab Emergency Service Leave, Efficiency and Discipline Rules 2007?
  • Does the result of criminal proceedings have a bearing on the determination of willful absence in departmental proceedings?
  • Is the principle of proportionality applicable when determining the quantum of penalty for an employee's absence from duty?
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• Muhammad Shafique Solangi vs Federation of Pakistan & others2024 SHC 474 · Sindh High Court · 2024-05-14Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafi vs The State through Muhammad Qasim and another2024 YLR 2059 · Peshawar High Court · 2024-02-16
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaydelay in conclusion of trialthird proviso to section 497 Cr.P.C.fundamental rightsright to libertymurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail application filed by the petitioner, Muhammad Shafi, facing trial under sections 302/324/336/337-D/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, seeking release on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of his trial. The core legal question before the Peshawar High Court was whether the accused was entitled to post-arrest bail under the third proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 due to the prolonged incarceration exceeding three years without conclusion of the trial. Holding in the affirmative, the court reasoned that the delay in the trial was not attributable to the petitioner through any concerted effort, nor was he a previous convict or a hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal. The court laid down the key principle that once a statutory right to bail accrues under the third proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, it cannot be defeated by discretion, and routine adjournments sought by the defence do not constitute an act or omission to delay the trial unless part of a concerted design.

  Questions settled

  • Does an accused become entitled to post-arrest bail as a matter of right if the trial is not concluded within the statutory period under the third proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can routine adjournments sought by an accused's counsel be counted as an act or omission to delay the trial for the purpose of denying statutory bail?
  • Does a statutory right to bail once earned under the third proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 get taken away by judicial discretion?
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• Muhammad Shafi Nagori through Legal Heirs vs Muhammad Ayoub and others2024 SHC 1414 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Shabir son of Diwan Ali and 02 others. vs Shakila Bibi daughter2024 SC AJK 5 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2024-01-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shabbir Ahmed & Ors, Bilawal, Malir Court Bar Association, Ghazi Khan & another vs Province of Sindh & others2024 SHC 1252 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Sarfraz etc vs The State, etc2024 LHC 6200 · Lahore High Court · 2024-11-20
  acquittalcriminal revisionappeal against acquittalSection 249-A Cr.P.C.Section 417 Cr.P.C.bar of revision
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge whereby a criminal revision petition against their acquittal under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was allowed and a retrial was ordered. The core legal question was whether a criminal revision petition is maintainable against an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate, or if the aggrieved party's exclusive remedy lies in filing an appeal under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court held that an order of acquittal—whether passed after recording evidence or without recording evidence—is amenable to challenge solely via an appeal under Section 417, and in the presence of an appellate remedy, Section 439(5) expressly bars the entertainment of a revision petition. The petition was consequently allowed, setting aside the Additional Sessions Judge's order. The key principle laid down is that the statutory remedy against any order of acquittal is an appeal, and revision proceedings are barred where an appeal lies, regardless of the stage at which the acquittal was recorded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal revision petition is maintainable against an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate?
  • Does an acquittal under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without recording evidence necessitate an appeal rather than a revision?
  • Does Section 439(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar revision proceedings where an appeal is provided by law?
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• Muhammad Sarfaraz vs Qamar Mushtari Begum and others2024 SHC 208 · Sindh High Court · 2024-03-11Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Salik Athar vs Muhammad Obaid and others2024 PLJ Karachi 29 · Sindh High Court · 2023-04-11Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleh vs The State2024 YLR 1415 · Sindh High Court · 2022-06-16
  narcoticscharas recoveryburden of proofshift of onussafe custodychemical examiner reportpolice witnessescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution proved the recovery of a large quantity of charas from the appellant and his motorcycle beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether the statutory presumption of possession applied. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully established its case through consistent and reliable police testimony, corroborative chemical reports, and the production of the recovered narcotics and motorcycle. The Court ruled that under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, once recovery is proven from a vehicle under the accused's control, the burden shifts to the accused to disprove knowledge, which the appellant failed to do. Furthermore, Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 is excluded by Section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, rendering independent mashirs unnecessary.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the evidence of police witnesses alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 in the absence of independent corroboration?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 once the recovery of narcotics from a vehicle driven by the accused is established?
  • Is the association of independent private mashirs under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 mandatory for searches and seizures conducted under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Whether minor contradictions in the deposition of prosecution witnesses are sufficient to warrant the acquittal of an accused in a narcotics case?
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• Muhammad Saleh vs Rajab Ali & others2024 SHC 972 · Sindh High Court · 2024-09-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem vs The State2024 SHC 1336 · Sindh High Court · 2024-12-10
  post-arrest baildacoityconfession to policerule of consistencyfurther inquiryprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant sought post-arrest bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case registered under Section 395 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for dacoity. The prosecution alleged that the applicant facilitated the crime by brokering stolen goods, relying on the statements of a co-accused and a private witness. The applicant contended that he was not named in the FIR, no recovery was made from him, and the co-accused's statement to the police was inadmissible. The Sindh High Court observed that under Articles 38 and 39 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, confessions made to police or while in police custody are inadmissible. Applying the rule of consistency, as a co-accused had already been granted bail, and noting that the lesser alternative sentence for the offense should be considered when determining if it falls under the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) Cr.P.C., the Court held that the case required further inquiry. The bail application was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a confession made by a co-accused to a police officer admissible against another accused under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • How does the rule of consistency apply to bail applications when a similarly placed co-accused has already been granted bail?
  • Should the lesser alternative sentence of an offense be considered to determine whether it falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Saleem vs The State and others2024 SHC 522, 2025 PCRLJ 126 · Sindh High Court · 2024-05-22
  SHO joined as accusedillegal omissionabetmentpolice negligencecognizance of offenceAnti-Terrorism Courtcriminal application
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a criminal application filed by an SHO challenging an order passed by the Anti-Terrorism Court, Khairpur, whereby the trial judge, upon submission of the final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, not only took cognizance against the nominated accused but also joined the applicant-SHO as an accused in the main crime under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 due to his alleged failure to prevent the commission of the offence within his jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether a police officer can be arraigned as an accused in the main substantive offence merely on the ground of alleged negligence or failure to prevent a crime committed within their jurisdiction. The Sindh High Court held that the trial court's order was based on a misconceived interpretation of Section 107 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and related provisions, holding that a police officer's negligence in maintaining law and order cannot be equated with active participation or abetment in the main offence. The court set aside the impugned order, establishing that mere failure of an SHO to prevent a crime within their jurisdiction does not make them a co-accused in the substantive offence without evidence of advance knowledge, conspiracy, or direct abetment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an SHO be joined as an accused in a substantive criminal case merely because an offence was committed within their police station's jurisdiction?
  • Does a police officer's failure to prevent the commission of a crime amount to illegal omission and abetment under Section 107 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can police negligence in maintaining law and order be equated with actual participation in the main offence?
  • What is the proper legal consequence and procedure for dealing with a police official found negligent in the performance of preventive duties?
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• Muhammad Saleem vs The State & 2 others2024 PHC 70 · Peshawar High Court · 2024-02-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem vs The Assistant Commissioner Turbat and another2024 CLC 1797 · Balochistan High Court · 2023-11-15Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem vs Regional Police Officer and five others.2024 LHC 1500 · Lahore High Court · 2024-04-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem vs Govt. of Balochistan through Chief Secretary and another2024 SCP 30, 2024 SCMR 614, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 611 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-21
  service tribunalliencivil servantautonomous bodyNADRAparent departmentreversion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an application seeking the restoration of a civil petition which challenged a judgment of the Balochistan Service Tribunal, wherein the petitioner's request to accept his lien against the post of Junior Scale Stenographer in the S&GAD, Government of Balochistan, was rejected. The core legal question centered on whether a civil servant who leaves government service to join an autonomous body like NADRA retains a right of lien to their former government post. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that under Rule 6(2) of the Civil Servants (Confirmation) Rules, 1993, and Rule 7(2) of the Balochistan Civil Servants (Confirmation) Rules, 2012, a civil servant ceases to hold a lien against their government post upon taking up an appointment on selection in an autonomous body. The key principle established is that transitioning from civil service to an autonomous body on selection, rather than on deputation, fundamentally changes the employment status and extinguishes any prior lien in the parent government department.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant retains a lien on their government post after taking up an appointment on selection in an autonomous body?
  • Does an administrative assurance allowing a civil servant to retain a lien override statutory confirmation rules?
  • What is the legal effect under service law when a civil servant transitions from government employment to an autonomous organization?
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• Muhammad Saleem vs Adj2024 SCP 250, 2024 SCMR 1770 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-23
  maintenance allowancefrivolous litigationconcealment of factswrit petitionimposition of cost
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the petitioner against the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had also imposed a cost of Rs.50,000/- upon him for filing a frivolous second writ petition. The core legal questions involved the propriety of imposing costs for filing successive concealment-riddled petitions, the waiver of such costs, and the permissibility of paying a decretal amount in installments before the Supreme Court without approaching the executing court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner, having concealed material facts, made false accusations against counsel, and indulged in frivolous litigation, did not deserve leniency, and that requests for installment payments of a decree must be raised before the executing court. The petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a litigant can seek waiver of costs imposed by the High Court for filing a frivolous second writ petition without convincing reasons?
  • Can the Supreme Court entertain a request for the payment of a family court decree in installments when no such application was made before the Executing Court?
  • Does a litigant who conceals material facts and makes false accusations against counsel deserve leniency from the court?
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• Muhammad Saleem s/o Muhammad Azam vs The State2024 SHC 694, 2025 MLD 238 · Sindh High Court · 2024-06-27
  Illegal Dispossession ActCriminal AppealCompounding of offencesBeneficial interpretationRestoration of possessionCode of Criminal ProcedureAmicable settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 3(2) of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, following a trial court judgment. The core legal question was whether an offence under this Act, which is not explicitly listed as compoundable in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, could be compounded upon an amicable settlement between the parties. The High Court held that although the Act is silent on compoundability, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to such proceedings. Emphasizing that non-compoundability should not be read in isolation, the Court adopted a beneficial interpretation, noting that the dispute was essentially of a civil nature. It held that when parties have genuinely settled their differences and restored possession, the court should accept the compromise to foster peace and harmony. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, while the order regarding the restoration of possession was maintained. This judgment reinforces the principle that courts should prioritize societal reconciliation and the welfare of parties over strict adherence to technical non-compoundability in appropriate cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can an offence under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 be compounded despite the statute's silence on the matter?
  • Does the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  • Should a court accept a compromise in a non-compoundable offence if the parties have amicably settled their dispute?
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• Muhammad Saleem Minhas vs Ashfaq Hussain Minhas, etc2024 LHC 5348 · Lahore High Court · 2024-11-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem Khan and others vs Umair Ali and others2024 SHC 758 · Sindh High Court · 2024-07-15Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem (deceased) Through his Legal Heirs vs Habib-ur-2024 LHC 5406 · Lahore High Court · 2024-11-21Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sajid vs Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi and another2024 IHC 144 · Islamabad High Court · 2024-05-21Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Safeer and others vs Muhammad Azam and others2024 SCP 211, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 838, 2024 PLJ SC 612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-06-12
  constitutional jurisdictionadequate remedymaintainabilityreview jurisdictionejusdem generisboard of revenuedemarcation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed their constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 solely on the ground of maintainability, holding that an adequate and efficacious alternative remedy of review under Section 8 of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act 1957 was available. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court correctly evaluated the adequacy of the statutory review remedy. The Court held that the High Court erred by failing to examine the specific grounds raised by the petitioners before concluding that the review remedy was adequate. The Supreme Court laid down that the scope of review under Section 8 of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act 1957 is strictly confined to its expressly prescribed grounds, and the phrase 'for any other sufficient reason' must be read ejusdem generis with the preceding grounds. If the grievances raised in a constitutional petition fall outside the narrow scope of such statutory review, the remedy becomes illusory and cannot bar the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the matter remanded to the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court can dismiss a constitutional petition under Article 199 solely on the ground of an alternative statutory remedy without examining the specific grounds raised by the petitioner?
  • What is the true legal scope and extent of the review jurisdiction conferred under Section 8 of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act 1957?
  • How should the expression 'for any other sufficient reason' in Section 8 of the Punjab Board of Revenue Act 1957 be construed?
  • When does an alternative statutory remedy of review become illusory or inadequate for the purpose of barring constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
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• Muhammad Safdar Mir, Machine Operator (B-5) vs Syed Adil Hussain2024 SC AJK 38 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  Death Assistance Packagecivil service appointmentequality before lawmerit-based recruitmentwrit jurisdictionfundamental rightsadministrative policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against High Court judgments that directed the appointment of children of deceased government employees under a "Death Assistance Package" notification dated 31.03.2020. The core legal question was whether the government could bypass statutory recruitment procedures—specifically the requirement for merit-based selection and public advertisement of vacancies—through an executive policy, and whether the High Court could enforce such appointments via writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the notification, to the extent it permitted appointments without following the prescribed mode of selection, was issued incompetently and violated the constitutional guarantee of equality before the law. The Court ruled that any policy inconsistent with the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants Act, 1976, and the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977, cannot be enforced. Consequently, the Court struck down the notification regarding contract or permanent employment and set aside the High Court's judgments, establishing that government appointments must strictly adhere to transparent, merit-based processes to satisfy constitutional requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government create a policy for appointment to public service that bypasses the statutory requirement of merit-based selection and public advertisement?
  • Does a government policy providing for the appointment of children of deceased employees violate the constitutional right to equality before the law?
  • Can the High Court issue a writ to enforce an executive policy that is inconsistent with the Civil Servants Act and Rules?
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• Muhammad Saeed, Waqar Ali vs The State and another2024 SCP 190, 2024 SCMR 1421, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-30
  murderdying declarationmitigating circumstancesimprisonment for lifecriminal petitioncorroborationmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal matter arises from a petition challenging the judgment of the Islamabad High Court, which maintained the conviction of the petitioner under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Nagina Bibi, but converted his death sentence into imprisonment for life while enhancing the compensation amount. The core legal question revolved around the reliability and corroboration of the dying declaration made by the deceased. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed both the convict's petition for leave to appeal and the complainant's petition for sentence enhancement, holding that the dying declaration made to witnesses implicating the accused was voluntary, trustworthy, and sufficiently corroborated by medical and circumstantial evidence, including the medical-legal certificate and post-mortem report. The key principle laid down is that a dying declaration made to private persons, when free from outside influence, made in a fit state of mind, and corroborated by consistent testimony and medical evidence, forms a safe basis for conviction, while mitigating circumstances such as a single stab wound, unproven motive, and rejected recovery can justify reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a dying declaration made before private persons can form the basis of a conviction without being recorded by a magistrate?
  • Can a dying declaration be accepted when it is supported by medical evidence and consistent testimonies of witnesses?
  • Whether the absence of motive and a single stab wound constitute mitigating circumstances to convert a death sentence into imprisonment for life?
  • Is a dying declaration required to be evaluated with great care and caution under Article 46 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
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• Muhammad Sadique and others vs The State2024 PCRLJ 560 · Sindh High Court · 2021-11-19
  police encounterbenefit of doubtbiased investigationcomplainant as investigating officerballistic report delayoffshoot casecriminal appealidentification in darkness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under sections 399, 402, 324, 353, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Section 24 of the Sindh Arms Act 2013, following an alleged police encounter. The core legal questions involve the credibility of identification during night-time hours in a jungle, the legality of a police officer investigating a case where they themselves are the complainant, the effect of unexplained delays in sending crime weapons to the Forensic Science Laboratory, and whether acquittal in a main criminal case entails acquittal in an offshoot arms case. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to glaring contradictions in evidence, unnatural circumstances regarding the lack of injuries to the police party despite prolonged firing, biased investigation conducted by the complainant himself, and delayed forensic submissions. The court laid down that a police officer cannot act as the investigating officer in a case where they are the complainant, and that acquittal in a main case warrants acquittal in its offshoot.

  Questions settled

  • Can a police officer who is the complainant in a criminal case legally conduct the investigation of the same case?
  • Whether an accused acquitted in the main criminal case is entitled to acquittal in an offshoot arms case arising from the same incident?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a ballistic expert's report when crime weapons and empties are sent to the forensic laboratory after an unexplained delay?
  • Does the absence of any injury or vehicle damage to a police party during an alleged prolonged cross-firing encounter cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
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• Muhammad Sadiq vs The State2024 PHC 234, 2025 PLD Peshawar 31 · Peshawar High Court · 2024-06-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rizwan Ahmed alias Bablo vs The State2024 LHC 6145, PLJ 2025 Cr.C. 216 · Lahore High Court · 2024-12-11
  narcotics controlcriminal appealbenefit of doubtplanting of contrabandcontradictory evidencechain of custodylife imprisonmentacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and sentencing him to life imprisonment with a fine. The core legal question involves whether the prosecution successfully established the recovery of narcotics and proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, given material contradictions in witness testimonies, missing details in the formal charge regarding weight and quantity, and evidence placing the seized vehicle in police custody prior to the alleged recovery. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a shadow of doubt due to glaring discrepancies, suspicious circumstances surrounding the handling of the case property, and lack of credible corroboration. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and sentence, extending the benefit of the doubt to the appellant and ordering his immediate acquittal. The key principle laid down is that under special penal statutes carrying harsh sentences, strict scrutiny of evidence is mandatory, and any reasonable doubt in the prosecution's narrative must be resolved in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to specify the exact kind and quantity of narcotics in the charge vitiate a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • Whether material contradictions among recovery witnesses regarding the place and time of seizure are sufficient to create reasonable doubt in the prosecution case?
  • Is an accused entitled to an acquittal as of right when serious flaws in the chain of custody and handling of case property emerge during trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Riaz vs Muhammad Akram etc.2024 SCP 84, 2024 SCMR 692, 2024 PLJ SC 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-25
  pre-emptionTalb-i-MuwathibatTalb-i-Ishhadimmediate demandchain of informationhearsay evidenceadverse inferencepersonal right
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the respondents under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. The primary legal questions concerned the validity of Talb-i-Muwathibat (immediate demand) and the necessity of proving a complete chain of information regarding the sale. The Supreme Court observed that respondent No. 2 made his demand with a slight delay after respondent No. 1, and more critically, the informer's source (DW-3) denied providing information, thereby breaking the chain of knowledge required to establish the 'immediate' nature of the demand. The Court held that the right of pre-emption is a piratical right requiring strict compliance with Section 13 of the Act. It further ruled that pre-emption is a personal right; the failure of respondent No. 2 to testify in person or through an attorney attracted an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the trial court's dismissal of the suit.

  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Riaz and others vs The State and others2024 SCP 287, 2024 SCMR 1839 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-22
  joint recoverybenefit of doubtterrorism definitionocular evidence contradictionspersonal enmitymotive double edged weaponsuspension of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of a criminal appeal and a civil petition arising from a trial under Sections 302/324/148/149 PPC and Sections 7/21-L ATA, where the trial court convicted the appellants for murder, attempt to murder, and terrorism, and the appellate court subsequently modified the sentence from death to life imprisonment while acquitting them under Section 7 ATA. The Supreme Court considered whether the ocular account, joint recovery of weapons, motive, and applicability of the Anti-Terrorism Act were sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Court held that the eyewitness testimonies contained material contradictions, no specific injury was attributed to the appellants, and the joint recovery of weapons from the same place without independent proceedings carried no evidentiary value and failed to match crime cartridges. Furthermore, an act arising from personal enmity without the design or purpose under Section 6 ATA does not constitute terrorism. Applying the established principle that a single reasonable doubt entitles the accused to benefit, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, acquitted the appellants, and dismissed the petition for suspension of sentence as infructuous.

  Questions settled

  • Does a joint recovery of weapons conducted simultaneously from the same place carry evidentiary value against co-accused persons?
  • Can an act committed in furtherance of personal enmity or private vendetta be categorized as terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Is the existence of motive alone sufficient to establish the guilt of an accused in the presence of material contradictions in eye-witness accounts?
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• Muhammad Rehman and others vs Asim Rasheed and others2024 LHC 2583, 2024 YLR 2215 · Lahore High Court · 2024-03-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Raziq Shah and others vs Dawood Shah2024 CLC 624 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-03-14Read full judgment →
• Rasoolan Bibi vs The State, etc2024 LHC 2265, 2025 PLJ Lahore 403 · Lahore High Court · 2024-05-14Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Raziq & another vs The State2024 PHC 222, 2025 YLR 26 · Peshawar High Court · 2024-06-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Raza Shaikh vs Province of Sindh & others2024 SHC 632 · Sindh High Court · 2024-05-29Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rauf vs The State, etc2024 LHC 3281, PLJ 2024 Cr.C. 1219, 2025 MLD 610 · Lahore High Court · 2024-06-28
  post-arrest bailstatutory grounddelay in conclusion of trialdishonoured chequeabscondencebail as a matter of right
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Muhammad Rauf, sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of his trial exceeding one year. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail as a matter of right under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 due to the prolonged detention and delayed trial not occasioned by his own acts or omissions. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner had been in continuous detention for more than one year and ten months without the trial concluding, that the delay was not attributable to him, and that he did not fall within the exceptions disqualifying him under the fourth proviso. The court established the principle that once the statutory period of detention expires without the trial concluding and without fault on the part of the accused, bail is granted as a matter of right rather than a concession, and such right cannot be defeated solely by allegations of abscondence or the pendency of other non-terrorist criminal cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail as a matter of right under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the trial is not concluded within one year?
  • Does any delay attributable to the accused after the expiration of the statutory period of detention affect his right to statutory bail?
  • Can statutory bail be denied to an accused solely on the ground of prior abscondence or the registration of other non-terrorist criminal cases?
  • What constitutes an act or omission on the part of the accused sufficient to delay the timely conclusion of a trial and disentitle him to statutory bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rasool and others vs Syed Akbar Shah and others2024 PHC 204 · Peshawar High Court · 2024-05-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rasheed vs Shah Muhammad and others2024 SHC 30, 2024 YLR 1309 · Sindh High Court · 2024-01-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs The State and another2023 LHC 6420, 2024 PCRLJ 1401 · Lahore High Court · 2023-12-04
  criminal revisionSection 540 Cr.P.C.filling of lacunafair trialforensic evidencesupplementary reportwitness re-examinationneutral arbiter
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Multan, which permitted the prosecution to submit a supplementary Punjab Forensic Science Agency report and re-examine a witness under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The petitioner, accused of rape under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, argued that these applications were filed after cross-examination specifically to fill lacunae in the prosecution's case. The High Court examined whether the trial court’s discretion under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was exercised correctly. The Court held that while Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 empowers a court to summon witnesses for a just decision, it cannot be used to allow a party to fill evidentiary gaps or improve its case after cross-examination has highlighted deficiencies. Finding that the prosecution sought the supplementary report specifically to address points raised during cross-examination, the Court set aside the impugned order, emphasizing that a judge must act as a neutral arbiter and not assist either party in overcoming evidentiary failures.

  Questions settled

  • Can the prosecution be permitted to introduce a supplementary forensic report after the cross-examination of the relevant witness has concluded?
  • Does the power of the court under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 extend to allowing a party to fill lacunae in its evidence?
  • Is a trial court permitted to allow the re-examination of a witness solely to address deficiencies highlighted during cross-examination?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Khizar Hayat & another2024 SCP 134, 2024 SCMR 1085, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-17
  murder trialinterested witnessforensic evidencecriminal acquittalburden of proofocular accountinvestigative failurereasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged the Lahore High Court’s judgment acquitting the respondent of murder charges. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in rejecting the prosecution's ocular account and the conviction based on alleged misreading of evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the acquittal. The Court held that the prosecution’s case, relying on interested witnesses, suffered from material contradictions and lacked independent corroboration, rendering the testimony unreliable. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the failure to conduct forensic analysis on the alleged murder weapon (a sota) significantly weakened the prosecution's case. The judgment established that while interested witnesses are not inherently incredible, their testimony requires careful scrutiny and independent corroboration to sustain a conviction. The Court reiterated that the burden of proof remains strictly on the prosecution to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that modern forensic science is an essential component of a fair trial and effective criminal justice system, which the investigating agency must prioritize to avoid erroneous acquittals.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the testimony of interested witnesses without independent corroboration?
  • What is the legal consequence of the prosecution's failure to subject a recovered weapon to forensic analysis?
  • Does the failure of an investigating agency to utilize modern forensic techniques entitle an accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right when the prosecution fails to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Addl. District Judge, Shujabad etc2024 LHC 6013 · Lahore High Court · 2024-11-14Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan etc. vs Haleema Bibi etc.2024 LHC 1139, 2025 MLD 847 · Lahore High Court · 2024-02-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan and others, Muhammad Ashraf and others, Haji2024 SCP 314, 2025 SCMR 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-16
  Shamlat DehAla MalkiyatAdna MalkiyatLand ReformsProprietary RightsConstitutional JurisdictionWajib-ul-ArzHasab Rasad KhewatPossessionLand Distribution
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court dismissed appeals concerning the distribution of Shamlat Deh land, affirming the Lahore High Court's judgment. The core dispute revolved around the interpretation and implementation of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 of 1959 and a 1960 Notification, specifically regarding the proprietary rights of Ala Maliks, Adna Maliks, and Ala-khud-Adna Maliks in common village land. The Court held that superior courts, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction, cannot create new rights for parties. It was reiterated that Ala Malkiyat and similar intermediary interests stood abolished by Paragraph 22 of MLR-64, and Shamlat Deh land is to be distributed among the proprietary body of the village based on their entitlement in the Malkiyat Khata, not merely on possession. The Court clarified that terms like "Hasab Rasad Khewat" and "Hissa Hasab Rasad Khewat Jama Bandobast Qanuni" are interchangeable for determining shares.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court or Supreme Court create a new right in favour of any party while dealing with a matter under Article 199 or 185 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • How is Shamlat Deh land to be distributed among the proprietary body of a village after the abolition of Ala Malkiyat?
  • Does mere possession of Shamlat Deh land, without any right in the Malkiyat Khata, create a right for its grant?
  • Do the provisions of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959 No.64, override customary practices or agreements like Wajib-ul-Arz for the distribution of Shamlat land?
  • What is the legal status of Ala Malkiyat and similar intermediary interests after the promulgation of West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959 No.64?
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• Muhammad Ramzan (deceased) and Others vs Muhammad Sharif2024 LHC 5194 · Lahore High Court · 2024-10-29Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan & Company vs Muhammad Ameer Khan and others2024 YLR 684 · Lahore High Court · 2023-10-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rajar vs The State through Prosecutor General Sindh and others2024 SCP 360, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-14
  direct complaintpreliminary inquiryfrivolous complaintissuance of processretaliatory FIRmalafide intentcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenges an order of the High Court of Sindh, which allowed a revision application and set aside a trial court's order issuing bailable warrants on a direct complaint filed by the petitioner. The core legal question concerns the scope and duty of the trial court under Sections 202, 203, and 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, in scrutinizing direct complaints and preliminary inquiry reports to prevent frivolous or malafide litigation. The Supreme Court held that the direct complaint was a retaliatory and malafide measure filed subsequent to an FIR registered against the petitioner's party, and that the preliminary inquiry report failed to disclose sufficient grounds or incriminating material to proceed. The Court laid down that trial courts must thoroughly scrutinize complaints and inquiry reports to protect individuals from vexatious prosecutions and must dismiss unsubstantiated claims at their inception.

  Questions settled

  • What is the primary purpose of holding an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Whether a trial court is justified in dismissing a direct complaint at its inception when no prima facie case is made out through the preliminary inquiry report?
  • Can a direct complaint filed as a retaliatory measure against an earlier registered FIR be entertained without satisfactory explanation for contradictions and expanded accusations?
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• Muhammad Rahman vs Muhammad Ayub and others2024 PHC 328 · Peshawar High Court · 2024-10-11Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rahim vs The State2024 PCRLJ 42 · Balochistan High Court · 2023-06-27
  murder appealdeath sentencerelated witnesseschance witnessesmedical and ocular contradictionballistic expert reportsafe custody of case propertyproof of motivebenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of death awarded to the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 arising from a murder case. The core legal questions involved the reliability of related eye-witnesses, the consistency between ocular and medical evidence, the evidentiary value of delayed ballistic reports where crime empties and alleged weapons are sent together, and the proof of motive. The Balochistan High Court held that the eye-witnesses were chance witnesses whose presence at the crime scene was doubtful due to unnatural conduct and contradictions with medical evidence, that retaining crime empties before sending them to the forensic laboratory alongside the recovered weapon renders the ballistic report suspicious, and that unproven motive must benefit the accused. Consequently, the High Court set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitted the appellant, and answered the murder reference in the negative. The key principles laid down include the necessity of evaluating related witnesses' conduct with caution, the strict requirement for safe custody and transmission of case property for ballistic analysis, and the rule that a failed prosecution motive rebounds against the prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related eye-witnesses can be relied upon when their conduct at the scene of occurrence runs counter to natural human behavior?
  • Does the simultaneous transmission of crime empties and the alleged crime weapon to the Forensic Science Laboratory after a considerable delay render the ballistic report inconsequential?
  • What is the legal effect on the prosecution's case when a set-up motive is not substantiated by independent evidence?
  • Whether contradictions between ocular testimony regarding indiscriminate firing and medical evidence showing a single firearm injury are fatal to the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rahim Sawati and others vs The State2024 YLR 1636 · Sindh High Court · 2022-11-08
  additional evidenceappellate stageSection 428 CrPCfair triallocus standiprosecution lacunacriminal appealAnti-Terrorism Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed by the complainant during the pendency of criminal appeals against the conviction of the appellants for murder. The core legal question was whether the appellate court should exercise its discretion under Section 428, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, to admit a video recording as additional evidence at the appellate stage. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that the evidence was not "new" as it was publicly available and referenced in Joint Investigation Team reports during the trial. The court emphasized that Section 428, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is not intended to allow parties to fill lacunae in the prosecution's case due to negligence or lack of due diligence. Furthermore, the court ruled that the complainant lacked the locus standi to independently move such an application, as the role of a private pleader is subordinate to the Public Prosecutor under Section 493, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The holding establishes that appellate courts must exercise restraint to preserve the accused's right to a fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, ensuring that evidence is only admitted if truly necessary and previously unavailable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a complainant independently file an application for additional evidence at the appellate stage without the involvement of the Public Prosecutor?
  • Does the power of an appellate court under Section 428, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, extend to allowing the prosecution to fill lacunae in its case?
  • Is evidence that was publicly available and referenced in investigation reports during the trial considered 'new' or 'additional' evidence for the purposes of Section 428, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the right to a fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 restrict the admission of additional evidence that causes undue delay in appellate proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique vs Station House Officer and others2024 LHC 3860 · Lahore High Court · 2024-01-31
  habeas corpusmissing personuntraceable personillegal detentionconstitutional petitioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a habeas corpus petition filed under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the recovery of the petitioner's missing 17-year-old brother, who went missing after leaving to offer prayers, with an FIR subsequently registered under section 365 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 against unknown persons. The core legal question is whether a habeas corpus petition is maintainable for tracing a missing person where an active police investigation under criminal procedure is already underway and there is no direct allegation or credible suspicion of unlawful detention by an identified party. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition as not maintainable, holding that habeas corpus jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely to locate a missing or untraceable person where an investigation is proceeding under the ordinary criminal law, as unlawful detention or wrongful confinement is a condition precedent for such a writ. The key principle laid down is that missing person cases must be addressed through regular criminal investigation rather than constitutional or statutory habeas corpus petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a habeas corpus petition is maintainable for locating a missing person where an FIR has been registered and an investigation is underway?
  • Is unlawful or illegal detention a condition precedent for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 or Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What is the distinction between cases involving untraceable missing persons and cases of enforced disappearances in the context of habeas corpus proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique and 9 others vs Inspector General of Police, Azad2024 PLC (C.S.) 626 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2024-03-06
  police promotionlist Blower school courseage relaxationdepartmental examinationconstitutional petitionservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by permanent police constables in District Neelum seeking to set aside orders regarding the assignment of seniority and the nomination of other constables for the lower school course, or alternatively, to direct the official respondents to conduct examinations for their entry into list "B" and subsequent participation in the lower school course. The core legal question revolved around whether the petitioners could be denied examination opportunities and promotion list entries due to administrative delays and prolonged litigation. The High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the petitioners should not be penalized for delays caused by the department during the pendency of the matter. Consequently, the court partly accepted the petition, directing the official respondents to conduct the requisite examinations for the petitioners to enter list "B" within a specified timeframe while relaxing the age barrier, and thereafter nominate successful candidates for the lower school course. The key principle laid down is that an employee cannot be made to suffer or be deprived of valuable rights due to the fault, delay, or inaction of the administrative authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether police constables can be denied entry into promotion list B due to administrative delays caused by departmental authorities?
  • Can the court direct the official respondents to conduct departmental examinations for promotion by relaxing the upper age limit when the delay is attributable to the authorities?
  • Whether employees transferred from one police unit to another are to be placed at the bottom of the seniority list?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq son of Gul Rauf vs The State2024 SHC 356 · Sindh High Court · 2024-04-24
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaystatutory ground of delaydacoity with murderreckoning of statutory periodexceptions to statutory delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition where the applicant sought post-arrest bail on the statutory ground of delay under Section 497(1) Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case involving dacoity with murder under Section 396 Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions were whether the two-year statutory period for delay is to be reckoned from the date of arrest or the date of framing of the charge, and whether the exceptions regarding delay caused by the accused or the accused being a dangerous criminal applied. The Sindh High Court held that the statutory period is to be reckoned from the date of arrest rather than the framing of the charge, and since neither the delay could be attributed to a concerted effort by the accused nor was he a hardened criminal within the meaning of the exceptions, the applicant was entitled to bail as a matter of right. The key principle laid down is that pre-conviction detention exceeding two years without conclusion of trial entitles an accused to statutory bail unless specific statutory exceptions are strictly established.

  Questions settled

  • From which date is the two-year statutory period for bail on the ground of delay to be reckoned?
  • Can bail on the statutory ground of delay be denied on the basis of the seriousness of the offence or identification by eye-witnesses?
  • What constitutes an act or omission on the part of the accused sufficient to trigger the first exception to statutory delay under Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • When does an accused qualify as a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal under the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafie vs Ghaneem Aabir, etc.2024 LHC 938, PLJ 2024 Cr.C. 627 · Lahore High Court · 2024-03-13
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationfake advocatefraudimpersonationcriminal breach of trustabuse of process
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenges an order of the Additional Sessions Judge granting pre-arrest bail to respondent No. 1, who was accused of posing as an advocate without being enrolled with the Punjab Bar Council and defrauding the public and courts in F.I.R. No. 847/2023 registered under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with Section 58 of the Legal Practitioners and Bars Councils Act 1973. The core legal question was whether pre-arrest bail was rightly granted to an accused facing allegations of impersonation as an advocate supported by sufficient incriminating material during investigation, in the absence of any established mala fide or ulterior motive on the part of the complainant. The Lahore High Court held that the impugned bail-granting order was perverse, arbitrary, and contrary to settled principles governing extraordinary relief, as the accused failed to satisfy the conditions for pre-arrest bail and sufficient material connected him to a heinous offence against the legal system. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the pre-arrest bail granted to respondent No. 1 was recalled.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted to an accused when sufficient material connects him to the offence of posing as an advocate without legal justification?
  • Does the submission of a challan create an absolute embargo against the cancellation of an improperly granted pre-arrest bail?
  • What are the essential parameters and extraordinary circumstances required for the grant of pre-arrest bail under criminal jurisprudence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Qutub-Ul-Arefeen & Seven (7) Others vs Muhammad Younus2024 SHC 1310 · Sindh High Court · 2024-12-03Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Qaswa r Hussain vs Judicial Magistrate Section, 30, Multan2024 LHC 6109 · Lahore High Court · 2024-12-23Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Qasim vs Registrar of Trade Marks etc2024 LHC 4823, 2025 CLD 313 · Lahore High Court · 2024-10-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Qasim and 2 others vs Muhammad Ismail and others2024 CLC 449 · Balochistan High Court · 2023-05-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Qaseem and others vs Abdul Hameed and another2024 PCRLJ 1575 · Balochistan High Court · 2021-09-22
  illegal dispossessiondouble jeopardymaintainability of complaintconstitutional petitionsame offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge Pishin, which rejected the petitioners' application questioning the maintainability of a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The respondent filed a complaint alleging that the petitioners forcibly dispossessed him of his property by breaking the locks during his absence. The petitioners sought rejection of the complaint, arguing that an earlier complaint filed by their predecessor-in-title over two decades ago was dismissed, and thus the current proceedings violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy under Article 13(a) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Balochistan High Court held that the two matters involved entirely different occurrences separated by an interval of almost two decades, different allegations, and different enactments, meaning the rule of double jeopardy did not apply. The petition was accordingly dismissed in limine, affirming that double jeopardy requires the same occurrence between the same parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prior dismissed complaint regarding a property dispute bar a subsequent complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 involving a different occurrence decades later?
  • Whether the protection against double jeopardy under Article 13(a) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 applies to occurrences separated by a long interval of time with different allegations and enactments?
  • Can a trial court reject an application questioning the maintainability of a complaint when the factual foundations of the current and past proceedings are distinct?
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• Muhammad Pannah Mahar vs Province of Sindh & others2024 SHC 526 · Sindh High Court · 2024-05-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nusrat Ali & others vs Province of Sindh through Secretary, Finance Department, Government of Sindh & others2024 SHC 668 · Sindh High Court · 2024-06-21Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Noman vs Muhammad Arif2024 PLD Sindh 476 · Sindh High Court · 2024-04-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz, Sharafat Ali, vs The State etc, Muhammad Talal etc, The State etc2024 LHC 5030, PLJ 2025 Cr.C. 44 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz, Muhammad Iqbal in Crl.P.522 vs The State & others2024 SCP 272, 2024 SCMR 1731 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-09-25
  murderbenefit of doubtBadal-i-Sulhprivate complaintacquittalcompromisespecial leave to appealmedical evidenceFIR delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses several petitions arising from a murder case involving multiple accused. The Trial Court had convicted several individuals, sentencing some to death and others to life imprisonment. The High Court subsequently acquitted most of the accused, maintaining only the conviction of Muhammad Nawaz while reducing his death sentence to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court, upon review, converted Muhammad Nawaz's petition into an appeal and acquitted him, noting that the prosecution failed to explain a delay in the FIR and that the medical evidence contradicted the ocular account regarding the time of death. Furthermore, the Court observed that the complainant (the deceased's brother) could not override the will of the legal heirs (Walis), who had entered into a compromise (Badal-i-Sulh) with one co-accused and declined to challenge the other acquittals. The Court reaffirmed that a single doubt is sufficient for the benefit of the doubt and that special leave to appeal is a condition precedent under Section 417(2) Cr.P.C. for challenging acquittals in complaint-based cases.

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• Muhammad Nawaz vs The State and another2024 YLR 670 · Sindh High Court · 2022-09-08
  attempted robberymurderanti-terrorism actcommutation of death sentencesole eye-witnesscctv footagedelay in FIRon-the-spot arrest
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant preferred a jail appeal against his conviction and sentence passed by the Anti-Terrorism Court for offences relating to an attempted bank robbery, murder, and possession of an unlicensed weapon. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the delay in lodging the FIR was fatal, and whether the acts constituted terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The court held that the prosecution successfully established the appellant's identity and active participation in the incident through reliable eyewitness and medical evidence, but that the offence did not fall within the scope of terrorism as the primary intent was robbery rather than creating terror. Consequently, the court acquitted the appellant of anti-terrorism charges, altered his conviction from section 302(a) to section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment while maintaining other convictions and sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Does an armed bank robbery that results in murder automatically constitute an act of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Can a criminal conviction be sustained primarily on the testimony of a sole eyewitness when corroborated by medical and forensic evidence?
  • Does an eleven-hour delay in lodging the First Information Report vitiate the prosecution case when the delay is adequately explained by life-saving priorities?
  • What is the appropriate quantum of sentence when it cannot be conclusively established which of multiple co-accused fired the fatal shot?
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• Muhammad Nawaz vs Muhammad Ilyas & others2024 LHC 2198 · Lahore High Court · 2024-04-29Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Additional District Judge Dadyal District Mirpur Azad2024 PLJ AJ&K 153 · High Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Naveed Zameer S/O Zameeruddin vs The State2024 SHC 812 · Sindh High Court · 2024-07-19
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeSection 489-F PPCprohibitory clausecivil disputefurther inquirycriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, who was charged under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for allegedly issuing dishonored cheques. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail given the nature of the offense and the contention that the underlying dispute was civil in nature, involving security cheques rather than a criminal loan transaction. The Court held that the offense under Section 489-F does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and thus, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal the exception. The Court emphasized that criminal courts cannot be utilized as a mechanism for the recovery of money in civil disputes. Finding that the applicant's case constituted a matter of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Court granted post-arrest bail, establishing that bail should not be refused in such non-prohibitory offenses without cogent, non-arbitrary reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Does the offense of dishonestly issuing a cheque under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a criminal court be utilized to effect the recovery of money in a dispute involving dishonored cheques?
  • Is the grant of bail the rule and refusal the exception for offenses not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Naveed & others vs Habib Bank Limited2024 SHC 26, 2024 CLD 648 · Sindh High Court · 2024-01-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nasser Janjua & Others vs Federation of Pakistan & Another2024 SHC 866 · Sindh High Court · 2024-08-08
  civil servanttransfer and postingservice tribunalrejection of plaintexclusive jurisdictionterms and conditions of serviceArticle 212
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil suit filed by twelve officers of the Inland Revenue Service challenging transfer notifications issued by the Federal Board of Revenue. The plaintiffs argued that these transfers were effectively equivalent to being placed as Officers on Special Duty (OSD), a contention the defendants disputed. The core legal question was whether a civil suit is maintainable for challenging the transfer orders of civil servants, given the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon Service Tribunals by Article 212 of the Constitution. The Court held that matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants, including transfers and postings, fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of Service Tribunals. Consequently, civil courts are barred from entertaining such suits. The Court determined that the impugned notifications were transfer orders and did not involve determinations of fitness for promotion or appointment that might otherwise trigger specific provisos. Accordingly, the Court rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, affirming that the grievance must be agitated before the appropriate Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 preclude civil courts from entertaining suits regarding the transfer of civil servants?
  • Are transfer orders of civil servants considered matters relating to terms and conditions of service within the exclusive jurisdiction of Service Tribunals?
  • Does the proviso to Section 4(1)(b) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 apply to simple transfer orders?
  • What is the scope of judicial power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when determining if a suit is barred by law?
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• Muhammad Nasir Khan & others vs Province of Sindh & others2024 SHC 1340 · Sindh High Court · 2024-12-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nasir Cheema vs Election Commission of Pakistan and others2024 MLD 1376 · Lahore High Court · 2024-05-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Naseer Raees vs P.O Sindh & others2024 SHC 1290 · Sindh High Court · 2024-11-21
  judicial restraintcivil servant suspensiondue processanti-corruptionjudicial conductcollateral proceedingsadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an order passed by a Special Judge Anti-Corruption, which directed the immediate suspension and criminal prosecution of the petitioner, a Circle Officer of the Anti-Corruption Establishment, based on allegations of bribery and intimidation made by a witness. The core legal questions concern whether a trial court has the jurisdiction to unilaterally order the suspension of a civil servant and initiate criminal proceedings in collateral proceedings without providing the affected party an opportunity to be heard. The Sindh High Court held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction. It ruled that the judiciary must exercise restraint, avoid pejorative remarks against public officials without due process, and refrain from usurping the administrative powers of competent authorities regarding disciplinary actions. The court emphasized that suspension is a discretionary administrative decision, not a judicial one. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned directions, ordering that the allegations be investigated independently by the competent authority without prejudice from the trial court’s observations, while affirming that any criticism of public servants requires a prior opportunity for explanation to ensure fairness and adherence to due process.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court order the suspension of a civil servant in collateral proceedings without a hearing?
  • Is it permissible for a court to issue directions for criminal proceedings against a public servant based on unverified allegations without providing the official an opportunity to explain?
  • Does a trial court possess the authority to usurp the discretionary powers of a competent administrative authority regarding the suspension of a civil servant?
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• Muhammad Naseer Khan s/o Muhammad Khan r/o Dherray Tehsil and2024 SC AJK 48 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Naeem, Advocate etc vs The Member (Judicial-II), Bor2024 LHC 4125, 2025 MLD 31 · Lahore High Court · 2024-09-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Naeem vs Federation of Pakistan & Others2024 SHC 100, 2024 MLD 890 · Sindh High Court · 2024-01-31Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Naeem Khan and others vs Mst. Alia and another2024 PHC 92 · Peshawar High Court · 2024-01-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Naeem Iqbal and others vs Abdul Baseer Tajwer and others2024 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 145 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2023-10-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Naeem & others vs Federation of Pakistan & others2024 SHC 1082, 2025 CLC 133 · Sindh High Court · 2024-08-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nadeem vs The State and others2024 MLD 197 · Sindh High Court · 2022-11-18
  appeal against acquittalmurdersupplementary statementbenefit of doubtdouble presumption of innocencedeliberation and consultationperverse judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses criminal acquittal appeals filed by the complainant under section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging the judgment and order of the 1st Additional Sessions Judge/Model Criminal Trial Court, Naushehro Feroze, which acquitted the respondents of offences under sections 302, 337-H(2), 337-L(2), and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by extending the benefit of doubt. The core legal questions pertained to the evidentiary weight of belated supplementary statements introducing unidentified accused without disclosing the source of information, and the permissible scope of appellate interference against an acquittal. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the complainant's dishonest improvements through supplementary statements made after deliberation rendered the prosecution's case doubtful. The Court reiterated that interference in an acquittal appeal is exceptionally narrow, warranting intervention only if the trial court's judgment is manifestly perverse, arbitrary, or legally vitiated, as an acquittal reinforces the initial presumption of innocence into a double presumption.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary effect of a supplementary statement that introduces previously unidentified accused persons without disclosing the source of information?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court interfere with a trial court's judgment of acquittal in a criminal appeal?
  • Does an acquittal by a trial court enhance the accused's constitutional and legal presumption of innocence?
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• Muhammad Nadeem Sajid vs National Accountability Bureau and others2024 IHC 196, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 36 · Islamabad High Court · 2024-10-01
  writ jurisdictionsuppression of material factsdiscretionary reliefabuse of processshow cause noticeunclean handsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Deputy Director at the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), filed a writ petition challenging multiple show cause notices issued to him regarding potential dismissal from service. During proceedings, it was revealed that the petitioner had previously challenged one of the impugned show cause notices before the High Court of Sindh in a pending constitutional petition, a fact he failed to disclose in the present proceedings. The core legal question was whether the court should exercise its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction in favor of a petitioner who has suppressed material facts regarding prior litigation on the same subject matter. The Court held that the petition must be dismissed. It affirmed that writ jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and is not exercised in favor of a litigant who approaches the court with unclean hands or conceals material facts. The court emphasized that the suppression of prior litigation constitutes an abuse of the process of the court, thereby disentitling the petitioner to any relief, regardless of the underlying merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the concealment of prior litigation on the same subject matter disentitle a petitioner from seeking discretionary relief under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Is a writ petition liable to be dismissed if the petitioner fails to disclose the filing of an earlier petition regarding the same impugned show cause notice?
  • Can a court exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in favor of a litigant who has suppressed material facts from the pleadings?
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• Muhammad Nadeem and another vs Sumeira Nadeem Sulemani and others2024 SHC 268 · Sindh High Court · 2024-03-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Muzzammil through Attorney vs Khurram Saeed2024 CLD 474 · Sindh High Court · 2023-11-14Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Muzammil through Attorney vs Khurram Saeed2024 CLC 610 · Sindh High Court · 2023-11-14Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Musharaf Hassan vs The State, etc2024 LHC 1058, PLJ 2025 Cr.C. 109 · Lahore High Court · 2024-03-13
  criminal revisiondefamationadvocate immunityprofessional dutyprivate complaintpleadinggood faith
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lalian, which declined to summon respondent No. 2, a practicing advocate, as an accused in a private complaint filed by the petitioner under sections 500, 501, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner alleged defamation arising from a civil suit plaint drafted by respondent No. 2 on behalf of his client, respondent No. 3. The core legal question was whether an advocate can be held criminally liable for defamation for drafting a pleading based on client instructions. The Lahore High Court held that an advocate acting in a professional capacity, merely drafting a pleading based on client instructions, cannot be held liable for defamatory statements contained therein, as the client verifies the truth of the contents. The Court affirmed that such actions are protected by good faith and Exception 9 to Section 500 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Consequently, the Court upheld the trial court's order, finding no illegality or perversity warranting interference under its revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a lawyer be held criminally liable for defamation for drafting a pleading based on the instructions of a client?
  • Does an advocate enjoy protection under Exception 9 to Section 500 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when drafting a plaint?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with a trial court's order declining to summon an accused in a private complaint?
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• Muhammad Musa vs Provincial Government and others2024 PLC (C.S.) 1536 · Gilgit Baltistan Service Tribunal · 2024-09-02
  service appeallocus poenitentiaedue processwrongful terminationservice rulesnatural justicefunctus officioback pay
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal challenges the verbal stoppage of the appellant's salary and subsequent effective termination from his position as a Naib Qasid. The core legal questions concern whether the appellant was removed from service following due process, whether inquiry committee reports constituted a valid termination order, and the applicability of the principle of locus poenitentiae. The Gilgit Baltistan Service Tribunal held that the department failed to follow mandatory service laws, as no formal termination order was issued, nor were proceedings initiated under the Efficiency and Discipline rules. The Tribunal emphasized that once an appointment order is implemented and salary is drawn, a valuable right accrues, rendering the appointing authority functus officio. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned office order, restored the appellant to service, and ordered the payment of salary arrears. The key principle laid down is that an employee cannot be removed from service without a formal, speaking order issued in compliance with due process, and the department cannot unilaterally cancel an appointment that has already been acted upon and implemented.

  Questions settled

  • Does an inquiry committee report recommending the cancellation of an appointment constitute a valid termination order in the absence of a formal speaking order?
  • Is the principle of locus poenitentiae applicable to an appointment order that has been implemented and acted upon by the department?
  • Can a civil servant be removed from service without following the procedure prescribed under the Efficiency and Discipline rules?
  • Does the appointing authority become functus officio once an appointment order has taken legal effect and salary has been disbursed?
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