Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Province of Sindh (through its Secretary, Transport Department) vs Rahim2023 SHC 132, 2024 MLD 968 · Sindh High Court · 2023-03-07Read full judgment →
• Province Of Sindh & Others vs Ali Muhammad & Others2023 SHC 311 · Sindh High Court · 2023-05-09Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh & another vs Sindh Valley Safari & others2023 SHC 94 · Sindh High Court · 2022-12-19Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through Secretary Housing and Physical Planning2023 PLJ SC 19 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land acquisitionhousing schemepreliminary notificationchange of public purposeaward legalitycivil revisionrevised layout plan
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the decree in favour of the Respondents, which declared the acquisition and subsequent transfer of land measuring 09 Kanals 16 Marlas in Jhelum (used as a 'Karbala') to the Education Department to be illegal. The core legal questions revolved around whether the disputed land was mentioned in the preliminary acquisition notification under Section 4(1) of the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Ordinance, 1973, and whether an award could legally transfer land for a purpose entirely different from that stated in the acquisition notification. The Supreme Court held that the disputed land was never included in the initial notification, that subsequent administrative correspondence and notifications established its withdrawal from the scheme, and that an acquiring agency cannot utilize acquired land for any purpose other than the specific public purpose declared in the statutory notification. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the judgments of the courts below.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land not specified in the preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Ordinance, 1973 can be lawfully included in a subsequent award?
  • Can an acquiring agency utilize compulsorily acquired land for a purpose different from the public purpose stated in the original acquisition notification?
  • Whether the Deputy Commissioner is empowered to withdraw from land acquisition proceedings under the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Ordinance, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through Secretary Agriculture Department, Lahore vs Saleem Ijaz, etc.,Muhammad Islam, Nisar Ahmad.,M_s Tiger Ag Pakistan, Jampur., Zulfiqar Ali2023 SCP 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pesticide laboratoryISO certificationreading downsubordinate legislationaccreditationstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from civil petitions challenging a High Court decision that invalidated pesticide laboratory reports because the laboratories were not certified by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) under Rule 22 of the Punjab Agricultural Pesticides Rules, 2018. The core legal question was whether a pesticide laboratory established under Section 13 of the Agricultural Pesticides Ordinance, 1971 must be certified by the ISO, which does not itself issue certifications. The Supreme Court held that subordinate legislation cannot conflict with parent or other federal statutes. Applying the doctrine of reading down, the Court interpreted Rule 22 to mean that laboratories must follow national and international standards as accredited by the Pakistan National Accreditation Council (PNAC) under the Pakistan National Accreditation Council Act, 2017. Since the laboratories were PNAC-accredited, their reports were valid. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the cases for determination of remaining factual and legal grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Can a subordinate rule impose a qualification or certification requirement that conflicts with the parent Act or another federal statute?
  • Does the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) directly certify or accredit laboratories?
  • How does the doctrine of reading down apply to save a subordinate rule from being declared ultra vires?
  • Which national body is legally authorized to accredit and certify conformity assessment bodies and laboratories in Pakistan?
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• Province of Punjab through Secretary Agriculture Department, Lahore vs Saleem Ijaz and others2023 SCMR 774 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-06
  pesticide laboratoryISO certificationPNAC accreditationreading down doctrinesubordinate legislationstatutory interpretationharmonious construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of pesticide laboratory reports used in criminal proceedings against pesticide dealers. The core legal question was whether a pesticide laboratory, established under the Agricultural Pesticides Ordinance, 1971, must be certified by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as mandated by Rule 22 of the Punjab Agricultural Pesticides Rules, 2018. The Supreme Court held that the ISO is a standards-setting body, not a certification body, and does not certify laboratories. Furthermore, the Court found that Rule 22, by requiring ISO certification, conflicted with the Pakistan National Accreditation Council Act, 2017, which designates the Pakistan National Accreditation Council (PNAC) as the sole body for accrediting and certifying laboratories in Pakistan. Applying the principle of 'reading down,' the Court harmonized Rule 22 by interpreting the requirement for ISO certification to mean that laboratories must follow national and international standards as accredited by the PNAC. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, upheld the validity of the PNAC-certified laboratory reports, and remanded the cases for the High Court to decide remaining issues.

  Questions settled

  • Does the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) perform certification or accreditation of laboratories?
  • Can a rule framed under a statute impose a requirement that conflicts with the parent statute or other prevailing legislation?
  • Is the Pakistan National Accreditation Council (PNAC) the authorized body for accrediting laboratories in Pakistan under the Pakistan National Accreditation Council Act, 2017?
  • Under what circumstances can the principle of 'reading down' be applied to harmonize subordinate legislation with parent statutes?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through EDO (R) vs Mehnga Khan (deceased) through Legal Heirs, etc2023 LHC 3209, 2023 PLJ Lahore 634 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through Collector, District Sialkot etc vs Mst. Sughran2023 LHC 5726, 2024 YLR 2722 · Lahore High Court · 2023-11-01Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab thr. the Deputy Commissioner, Collector District2023 SCP 349, 2024 SCMR 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-13
  land acquisitioncompulsory acquisitionproperty rightsfundamental rightsfrivolous litigationcompensationcosts
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Province of Punjab against the judgment of the High Court upholding the appellate court decision which favored the landowner whose nine marlas of land was utilized for constructing a road without acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or payment of compensation. The core legal question was whether the government could deprive a citizen of property without following due process of law and without paying compensation, while continuing frivolous litigation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the government's action violated fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The Court laid down the principle that the government and its functionaries must act responsibly, respect constitutional property rights, avoid frivolous litigation that wastes public resources and court time, and pay requisite compensation alongside costs for unauthorized land deprivation.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government construct a road on private land without acquiring it under the Land Acquisition Act or paying compensation?
  • Does the unauthorized deprivation of private land by the government violate the fundamental rights to acquire, hold, and dispose of property under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Whether the government can be burdened with costs for engaging in frivolous litigation against a landowner?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab and others vs Waseem Arshad and others2023 PLD Lahore 564 · Lahore High Court · 2021-10-04Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab and 05 others vs Jaffar Ahmed and 02 others, Mubashar Ali Shahzad and 02 others2023 LHC 2596 · Lahore High Court
  regularization of servicework charge employeesjurisdiction of labour courtPunjab Industrial Relations ActStanding Orders Ordinancepermanent workmangovernment department
  Summary & questions settled

  The present constitutional petitions were filed against the judgments of the Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal whereby grievance petitions of the respondents, who were employed on a work-charge basis as Baildar and Driver in the Irrigation Department, Government of the Punjab, were accepted and they were regularized in service. The core legal question was whether the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010 and the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 apply to work-charge employees of a government department governed by statutory rules, and whether mere length of service entitles such employees to regularization. The Lahore High Court held that government departments do not fall within the definition of establishments under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010 or commercial establishments under the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and thus neither law applies to government work-charge employees. The Court laid down the principle that regularization is an executive function dependent on a sanctioned post and policy, and cannot be claimed solely on the basis of length of service under labour laws.

  Questions settled

  • Are work-charge employees of a provincial government department governed by the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010?
  • Does the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 apply to industrial and commercial establishments carried on by the government where statutory rules of service are applicable?
  • Does an employee have a vested right to be regularized in service solely on the basis of length of service?
  • Do government departments fall within the definition of an establishment under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010?
  Read full judgment →
• Project Implementation Managers (Private) Limited and others, Tehreem2023 SHC 238 · Sindh High Court · 2023-03-30Read full judgment →
• Project Director University of Loralai and another vs Zarif Khan Hussainzai2023 YLR 527 · Balochistan High Court · 2022-08-15Read full judgment →
• Project Director University of Loralai and another vs M/s. Zarif Khan2023 PLJ Quetta 97 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• Project Director New Thakot Bridge and others vs Sher Zada and others2023 PLD Peshawar 71 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-10-10Read full judgment →
• Professor Muhammad Ibrahim Khan and others vs Province of Punjab2023 PLD Federal Shariat Court 1 · Federal Shariat Court · 2022-11-29Read full judgment →
• Professor Dr. Muhammad Arshad Aazmi vs Province of Sindh through Chief2023 PLC (C.S.) 341 · Sindh High Court · 2022-05-31
  constitutional petitionpublic appointmentintelligence reportsnatural justiceaudi alteram partemright to fair trialwithholding appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking directions for respondents to issue a notification appointing the petitioner as Chairman of the Sindh Board of Technical Education, Karachi, pursuant to an offer letter and recommendation by the Search Committee. The core legal question was whether an appointment order could be withheld based on unverified, undisclosed adverse intelligence reports without affording the candidate an opportunity of defense. The Sindh High Court held that relying on unsigned or undisclosed adverse intelligence reports without confronting the aggrieved person violates the principles of natural justice and Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution. The court laid down the principle that the right to a fair trial and the audi alteram partem rule are inherently embedded in statutory and constitutional governance, mandating that any adverse material must be disclosed to the affected individual to provide an opportunity for rebuttal before withholding a vested right or public appointment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appointment order to a public post be withheld on the basis of unsigned and undisclosed adverse intelligence reports?
  • Whether the principles of natural justice and audi alteram partem apply when considering character and antecedent verification reports for public employment?
  • Does a High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to direct public functionaries to issue appointment orders where a candidate has been duly recommended and offered the position?
  • Must a candidate be confronted with adverse material contained in intelligence reports before such material is used to deny them an appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• Prof. Dr. Shahid Mahmood Baig vs Ministry of Science and Technology and others2023 IHC 438, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1451 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-09-21
  contractual employeedisciplinary proceedingsstatutory bodyquasi-judicialdelegation of powersforced leaveconstitutional petitionManagement Position Scales Policy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, appointed as Chairman of the Pakistan Science Foundation (PSF) under the Pakistan Science Foundation Act, 1973, challenged a show cause notice and an order sending him on forced leave pending disciplinary proceedings, issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology. The core legal questions involved whether the Management Position Scales Policy, 2020 (MP Policy) governed the petitioner's appointment, whether an Additional Secretary on acting charge could initiate quasi-judicial disciplinary proceedings, and whether the President's statutory powers of appointment and removal could be delegated or exercised through the MP Policy without express statutory authority. The court held that while the MP Policy terms applied through the gazette notification, the show cause notice issued by an officer on look-after charge was void, and disciplinary powers being quasi-judicial cannot be delegated without express statutory authority. Furthermore, the forced leave order and assignment of acting charge to a junior, non-qualified officer were illegal. The writ petition was allowed, and the impugned show cause notice and order were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Management Position Scales Policy applies to the appointment of the Chairman of the Pakistan Science Foundation?
  • Can an Additional Secretary holding a look-after charge initiate quasi-judicial disciplinary proceedings?
  • Does the President have the authority to delegate statutory powers of appointment and removal in the absence of an express provision in the parent statute?
  • Whether a contractual employee appointed to a statutory position under a fixed tenure can be sent on forced leave pending disciplinary proceedings initiated by an unauthorized authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Prof. Dr. Manzoor Hussain, etc vs Zubaida Chaudhry, etc2023 SCP 165, 2023 PLC (C.S.) 1201, 2023 PLJ SC 579, 2023 SCMR 1311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-26
  Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Actdelegation of powersrepresentation to the Presidentprocessing of representationworkplace harassmentadministrative lawquasi-judicial functions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the interpretation of Section 14(4) of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013, which requires a representation made to the President against a decision of an Ombudsman to be 'processed' in the office of the President by a qualified legal expert. The core legal question was whether the word 'processed' implies that the decision-making power of the President has been delegated to the nominated officer, divesting the President of his authority. The Supreme Court held that the function of processing a representation by preparing the case and offering recommendations is merely ancillary and distinct from the adjudicatory power of decision-making, which remains solely with the President after independent application of mind. The Court laid down the principle that utilizing a qualified officer to process, analyze, and assist in legal representations does not amount to an unlawful delegation of executive or quasi-judicial authority, provided the final decision is consciously rendered by the competent authority itself.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the processing of a representation by a nominated officer under Section 14(4) of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 amounts to a delegation of the President's decision-making powers?
  • Are the functions of processing a representation and deciding a representation inherently distinct?
  • Does the President retain the sole authority to decide a representation filed against an Ombudsman's order notwithstanding the assistance and recommendations of a nominated legal officer?
  Read full judgment →
• Prof. Dr. Manzoor Hussain and others vs Zubaida Chaudhry and others2023 PLC (C.S.) 1201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-26
  delegation of powersadministrative lawFederal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act 2013Presidential representationworkplace harassmentadjudicatory processstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the interpretation of Section 14(4) of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013, specifically whether the "processing" of a representation by a nominated officer constitutes an unlawful delegation of the President’s decision-making authority. The High Court had set aside the President’s order, ruling that such processing amounted to an impermissible delegation. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the function of "processing" a representation—which involves consolidating the record and providing recommendations—is an ancillary administrative task distinct from the adjudicatory power of decision-making. The Court clarified that the President retains the sole, non-delegable authority to decide the representation after an independent application of mind. The nominated officer’s role is merely to assist the President by simplifying the record and providing views, which the President may accept, reject, or modify. Consequently, the Court ruled that the statutory scheme does not divest the President of decision-making power. The impugned judgment was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the High Court for a decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'processing' of a representation by a nominated officer under Section 14(4) of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 constitute an unlawful delegation of the President's decision-making power?
  • Are the functions of processing a representation and deciding a representation distinct legal functions?
  • Can a statutory authority delegate the preparation of a case to a subordinate while retaining the final decision-making power?
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• Prof. Dr. Gul Afshan vs Vice Chancellor, Salu, Khairpur & others2023 SHC 786 · Sindh High Court · 2023-09-28Read full judgment →
• President The Bank of Punjab and 2 others vs Authority under Payment of Wages Act, Vehari and another2023 PLC 163 · Lahore High Court · 2022-06-09
  trans-provincial organizationjurisdictionlabour disputeNational Industrial Relations CommissionPayment of Wages Actconstitutional petitionovertime dues
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition concerns the jurisdictional competence of provincial labour forums regarding claims filed against trans-provincial organizations. The petitioner, the Bank of Punjab, challenged the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, to adjudicate overtime claims, arguing that as a trans-provincial entity, it is subject only to the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC). The core legal question was whether provincial labour authorities possess the jurisdiction to hear labour disputes involving organizations operating across multiple provinces. The Court held that the Authority lacked jurisdiction, setting aside its order. The ratio established that the status of the employer, rather than the nature of the dispute, determines the appropriate forum. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the Court affirmed that for trans-provincial establishments, the NIRC holds exclusive jurisdiction, as provincial legislatures lack the extra-territorial authority to legislate on such matters. Consequently, the Court ruled that claims against trans-provincial organizations must be adjudicated by the NIRC, rendering the proceedings before the provincial Authority non-maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does a provincial labour authority have jurisdiction to adjudicate labour claims against a trans-provincial organization?
  • Is the jurisdiction of a labour forum determined by the nature of the dispute or the status of the employer?
  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have exclusive jurisdiction over labour disputes involving establishments operating in more than one province?
  Read full judgment →
• President National Bank of Pakistan and others vs Waqas Ahmed Khan2023 PLJ SC 276, 2023 PLC (C.S.) 1019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-16
  son-quota appointmentlegitimate expectationacquittal under Section 265-Kjudicial reviewbank employmentadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that directed the National Bank of Pakistan to allow the respondent to join his duty as a cashier under a son-quota appointment. The respondent had previously secured a court order for appointment, but the Bank withheld his joining upon discovering he was involved in a criminal case involving the murder of his wife. Although the respondent was subsequently acquitted under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Supreme Court examined whether the Bank was justified in refusing employment based on this criminal background. The Court held that an acquittal under Section 265-K Cr.P.C. does not carry the same sanctity as an acquittal following a full-fledged trial, as it lacks the recording of evidence. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that a bank cashier holds a sensitive position requiring impeccable conduct. Consequently, the Court ruled that the Bank acted within its domain in refusing the appointment, set aside the High Court's judgment, and allowed the appeal, affirming that administrative authorities may consider an applicant's criminal background in sensitive employment matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does an acquittal under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 carry the same evidentiary weight as an acquittal following a full-fledged trial?
  • Can a public authority refuse to honor an appointment offer if the candidate concealed a pending criminal case?
  • Is the doctrine of legitimate expectation absolute in the context of administrative appointments for sensitive positions?
  Read full judgment →
• Premier Insurance Limited vs M/s Ihsan Yousaf Textile Private Ltd. etc2023 PCTLR 4 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-27Read full judgment →
• Premier Insurance Limited through Authorized Officer vs Messrs Ihsan2023 CLD 135 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-27Read full judgment →
• Post Master General Central Punjab and others vs Muhammad Jameel2023 PLC 244 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 2023-06-13
  contempt of commissionviolation of stay ordertrade union activitiestermination of serviceNational Industrial Relations Commissioninjunctive order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed before the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission against an interim order passed by a Single Bench in a contempt petition. The respondent, an active trade union member, had challenged a show-cause notice issued by the appellant postal establishment under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The Single Bench had granted an injunctive order restraining the appellants from passing adverse final orders regarding the respondent's services. Despite this, the appellants terminated the respondent's services during the pendency of the petition, leading to contempt proceedings where the Single Bench set aside the termination and ordered restoration. The Full Bench held that disobedience of a stay or prohibitory order constitutes contempt, and mere knowledge of the order is sufficient to establish liability regardless of formal service. The Commission found that the appellants failed to demonstrate any illegality, jurisdictional error, or legal infirmity in the impugned order of the Single Bench. Consequently, the Full Bench dismissed the appeal as not maintainable, directing the appellants to implement the order and participate in the pending contempt proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the disobedience or violation of a prohibition or stay order issued by a judicial forum constitutes contempt?
  • Does the lack of formal service of a stay order excuse a party from contempt when they have actual knowledge of its existence?
  • Can an appeal be maintained against an interim order passed by a Single Bench in a pending contempt petition without showing any jurisdictional error?
  • Whether reinstatement of an employee can be ordered in contempt proceedings arising from the violation of a stay order?
  Read full judgment →
• Posco International Corporation through Authorised Officer vs Rikans2023 CLD 189 · Lahore High Court · 2022-05-26
  foreign arbitral awardrecognition and enforcementpublic policyarbitration agreementNew York Conventionanti-suit injunctioncommercial arbitration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act 2011. The core legal questions involved whether the respondent’s objections—based on alleged incapacity, inability to present a case due to concurrent local litigation, and public policy concerns—justified refusing enforcement. The court held that the application must be allowed, recognizing the award as a binding decree. It established that 'incapacity' under Article V(1)(a) refers strictly to the capacity to contract, not subsequent procedural difficulties. Furthermore, the court ruled that 'inability to present a case' requires objective constraints, not a party's tactical decision to boycott proceedings. Crucially, the court adopted a restrictive interpretation of 'public policy,' holding it cannot be used as a 'back door' to review the merits of an award or re-litigate issues. Emphasizing a pro-enforcement policy, the court affirmed that arbitration agreements impose negative obligations on parties to avoid parallel litigation, reinforcing the integrity of international commercial contracts.

  Questions settled

  • Does 'incapacity' under Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention refer to a party's capacity to contract or a subsequent inability to defend a claim?
  • Can a party claim it was 'unable to present its case' under Article V(1)(b) if it voluntarily chose to abstain from arbitration proceedings?
  • Is the 'public policy' exception in the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act 2011 a valid ground for courts to review the merits of a foreign arbitral award?
  • Does the pendency of civil litigation in a local court constitute a valid ground to refuse enforcement of a foreign arbitral award?
  Read full judgment →
• Platinum Pharma Workers Union Pakistan vs National Industrial Relations2023 IHC 280 · Islamabad High Court
  trade union registrationcancellation of trade union registrationindustry-wise trade unionNational Industrial Relations Commissiondirectory vs mandatory provisionswrit of certiorari
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition assailed the order of the Chairman, National Industrial Relations Commission (N.I.R.C.), affirming the Registrar Trade Unions' (R.T.U.) decision to cancel the petitioner union's registration as an industry-wise trade union. Registration was cancelled after inquiries revealed that the union lacked multi-provincial membership and fell below the statutory threshold of one-fifth of the total workmen in the establishment under Section 8(2)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The petitioner argued that the cancellation was invalid because it was executed by the R.T.U. over four months after receiving N.I.R.C. permission, exceeding the seven-day timeframe specified in Section 11(3) of the Act. Dismissing the petition, the High Court held that where a statute prescribes a time limit for a public official to act without providing penalties or consequences for non-compliance, the requirement is directory rather than mandatory. Consequently, delay by the R.T.U. did not invalidate the cancellation. The Court also held that factual grounds not raised in the appeal before the Chairman, N.I.R.C. cannot be agitated for the first time in certiorari proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a statutory time limit binding on a public official directory or mandatory if no consequences for non-compliance are provided in the statute?
  • Does the failure of the Registrar Trade Unions to cancel a trade union's registration within seven days under Section 11(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2012 invalidate the cancellation order?
  • Can factual grounds that were not raised in an appeal before an appellate tribunal be raised for the first time in a constitutional writ petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Raza Muhammad vs The State2023 PCRLJ 164 · Balochistan High Court · 2022-08-01
  Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997confiscation of vehiclesection 32 CNSAsection 33 CNSAownership of vehicleheroin recoverydismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  This statutory criminal appeal was filed under Section 48 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 against an order of the Special Judge CNS, Khuzdar, challenging the confiscation of a motor vehicle to the State following the trial court's acquittal of the driver under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C. The core legal question was whether the vehicle used in transporting narcotics could validly be confiscated under Section 32 of the Act of 1997 without releasing it to the appellant claiming ownership. The High Court affirmed the trial court's order, holding that under Section 32, a conveyance used to transport contraband is liable to confiscation unless the owner proves lack of knowledge of the offence. The Court held that the appellant failed to seek custody during investigation or trial under Section 74, offered no plausible explanation for a four-month delay, and relied solely on a purchase slip while registration documents stood in another person's name. The appeal was dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a vehicle used in carrying narcotic drugs is liable to confiscation under Section 32 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 when the accused driver is acquitted under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C.?
  • What proof of knowledge or ownership is required for an owner to avoid confiscation of a vehicle under the proviso to Section 32(2) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • Whether an unverified purchase slip is sufficient evidence to establish ownership of a vehicle for releasing it under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 when registration documents stand in another person's name?
  Read full judgment →
• Pirzada Noor-Ul-Basar vs Mst. Pakistan Bibi and others2023 SCMR 1072, 2023 PLJ SC 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-29
  dower deednikah namacivil suit maintainabilitylimitation periodrevenue record correctionappellate jurisdictionparda nashin lady
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the Peshawar High Court's judgment decreeing the respondent's civil suit for a declaration of ownership of property transferred through a dower deed in 1967. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of a civil suit for dower-based property transfer, the applicability of limitation periods under the Limitation Act 1908, and the raising of new factual pleas in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the suit was maintainable as a civil suit rather than before a Family Court since it pertained to ownership and revenue record corrections rather than recovery of dower money, that the suit was within time, and that new factual pleas not raised before lower forums cannot be entertained for the first time in the apex court. The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment that the thirty-year-old Nikah Nama carried a presumption of correctness under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit seeking a declaration of property ownership based on a dower deed is maintainable before a civil court or must be filed before a Family Court?
  • Can a party raise a new factual plea for the first time before the Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction?
  • What limitation articles apply to a suit concerning property transferred in lieu of dower where the plaintiff remains in possession through tenants?
  • Does a thirty-year-old Nikah Nama carry a presumption of correctness under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Muhammad Construction Company Private Limited vs Water and Development Authority through its Chairman, Lahore & others2023 LHC 4292, 2023 PLD Lahore 703, 2023 PLJ Lahore 785 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• PIA Officers Cooperative Housing Society Limited vs Province of Punjab etc.2023 LHC 5208, 2024 CLC 947 · Lahore High Court · 2023-10-10
  cooperative societiesinquiry by registrarconstitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionrevisional powershousing societyadministrative control
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed by the PIA Officers Cooperative Housing Society Limited to challenge orders passed by the Registrar Cooperative Societies Punjab and the Secretary Cooperative Department, Government of the Punjab, regarding an inquiry into the affairs of the society. The core legal question revolved around whether the Registrar and the Secretary acted within their lawful authority under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, in ordering and upholding an inquiry into the society's constitution, working, and financial condition. The Lahore High Court held that the Registrar is fully empowered under Section 43 of the Act to initiate an inquiry on his own motion, and the Secretary possesses valid revisional and administrative powers under Section 64-A of the Act read with the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011. The court established the principle that regulatory authorities can lawfully investigate irregularities within cooperative societies to protect members' interests, and constitutional courts will not interfere with such legally sound administrative orders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Registrar of Cooperative Societies has the power under Section 43 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, to hold an inquiry into the affairs of a society on his own motion?
  • Can the Secretary of the Cooperatives Department exercise revisional powers under Section 64-A of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, to examine the legality or propriety of an order passed by a subordinate officer?
  • Does the Secretary of a department have the administrative competence under the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011, to oversee the functioning and administration of cooperative societies?
  • Under what circumstances can a constitutional court interfere with an inquiry ordered into the working and financial condition of a cooperative housing society?
  Read full judgment →
• Petrosin Services Haro (Pvt.) Ltd., Islamabad vs National Highway Authority2023 PLD Islamabad 255 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-03-31Read full judgment →
• Peshawar High Court Bar vs State etc.2023 PLJ Peshawar 24 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-09-15Read full judgment →
• Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. (PESCO) and another vs SS Ploypropylene (Pvt.) Ltd., Peshawar and others2023 PLD Supreme Court 316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-14
  Fuel Price AdjustmentNEPRAconsumer-end tariffNet Hydel ProfitArticle 157Article 161(2)Council of Common Interestsjudicial restraintalternate remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals were filed in the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a consolidated judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had declared the imposition of Fuel Price Adjustment and consumer-end charges by the Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO) unconstitutional. The core legal questions pertained to whether NEPRA possesses exclusive authority to determine electricity tariffs and fuel adjustments across Pakistan, whether non-payment of Net Hydel Profit to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa under Article 161(2) of the Constitution invalidates consumer-end tariffs, and whether the High Court improperly exercised constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 without exhausting statutory remedies. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that tariff determination falls within the exclusive domain of NEPRA under the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997. The Court established that Net Hydel Profit disputes between a province and the Federation under Article 161(2) are distinct from consumer-end tariff obligations. Additionally, High Courts must exercise judicial restraint in technical economic policy matters and refrain from invoking Article 199 where effective alternate statutory remedies remain unexhausted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether NEPRA possesses exclusive statutory authority to determine electricity tariffs and fuel price adjustment charges across Pakistan?
  • Can non-payment of Net Hydel Profits to a province under Article 161(2) of the Constitution justify setting aside consumer-end electricity tariffs determined by NEPRA?
  • Is a Provincial Government entitled to determine electricity tariffs under Article 157(2)(d) of the Constitution if it does not purchase electricity in bulk or construct its own grid network?
  • Does a High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to interfere in technical economic policies and tariff determinations without exhausting statutory remedies?
  Read full judgment →
• PESCO through Chief Executive PESCO and others vs Mohib Ullah Khan and another2023 YLR 302 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-05-24Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Hussain Shah, Secratery to Government of the Punjab Food Department, Lahore, etc vs Secratery to Government of the Punjab Food Department, Lahore, etc., Pervaiz Hussain Shah2023 SCP 363, 2024 SCMR 309, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-14
  pension withholdingservice tribunalgross negligenceproportionalitycurative statuteretrospective operationdisciplinary proceedingsPEEDA
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil petition seeking leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had partially allowed the petitioner's appeal by converting the punishment of withholding 100% of his pension to withholding 50%, following departmental proceedings under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline, and Accountability Act, 2006. The core legal questions relate to whether ordinary negligence by a supervisory officer justifies the major penalty of withholding pension and whether the 2017 amendment to the Act, introducing a specific timeframe for withholding pension, applies retrospectively as a curative measure. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's conduct amounted to ordinary negligence rather than gross negligence, and that the penalty imposed was disproportionate and unreasonable under the doctrine of proportionality. The Court concluded that the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline, and Accountability (Amendment) Act, 2017 is curative and retrospective in nature. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, partially allowed it, and restricted the withholding of 50% of the petitioner's pension to a specific two-year period, while dismissing the department's competing petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does ordinary negligence by a supervisory officer warrant the major penalty of withholding pension under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline, and Accountability Act, 2006?
  • Whether the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline, and Accountability (Amendment) Act, 2017 is curative and retrospective in nature?
  • Is pension considered a bounty or an acquired right earned through satisfactory service?
  • Does an administrative service penalty meet the test of proportionality when it is more drastic than necessary?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Akhtar vs Mst. Farida Bibi and others2023 SCP 220, 2024 PLJ SC 273, 2023 PLD Supreme Court 628 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-08-08
  pardanashin womangeneral power of attorneyfraud and misrepresentationburden of proofcivil appealdeclaration suitmutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby a civil revision filed by the respondents was allowed, setting aside concurrent judgments of the lower courts and decreeing their suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The dispute concerns property sold by the respondents' general power of attorney holder to the appellant via mutation. The core legal question is whether the sale executed through a general power of attorney by illiterate or pardanashin women is binding when fraud is alleged and independent advice or consent is lacking, and whether a bona fide purchaser is protected under such circumstances. By a majority of two to one, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's judgment which protected the rights of the vulnerable property owners against unauthorized alienation. The key principle laid down is that the execution of a general power of attorney does not absolve the attorney or the beneficiary from establishing that pardanashin or illiterate women had full knowledge, independent advice, and gave free consent to the specific transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the execution of a general power of attorney absolves the attorney and the beneficiary from proving that a pardanashin or illiterate woman had independent advice and gave informed consent to a property transaction?
  • Can a sale effected through a general power of attorney be set aside on the grounds of fraud and lack of consent when the beneficiary fails to produce independent evidence of the oral sale?
  • Whether a suit for declaration challenging a mutation is maintainable against a purchaser where the transaction suffers from a lack of free will and knowledge on the part of vulnerable female grantors?
  Read full judgment →
• Pepsi Cola International (Pvt.) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2023 PTCL CL. 71 · Lahore High Court · 2022-04-01Read full judgment →
• Pepsi Cola International (Pvt.) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan and others2023 PTD 541 · Lahore High Court · 2022-04-01Read full judgment →
• Peerzada Waqar Alam vs National Accountability Bureau (NAB) through Chairman, Islamabad and others2023 SCMR 742 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-05
  disability rightsemployment discriminationdisability quotamedical fitnessfundamental rightsright to livelihoodright to dignity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the withdrawal of an appointment offer for an Assistant Director position at the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) on the grounds that the petitioner, a wheelchair user, failed to provide an 'unequivocal' medical fitness certificate. The core legal questions were whether the employer could unilaterally reject a medical certificate declaring a candidate 'fit for office job' and whether disability quotas are restricted to specific lower-grade posts. The Court held that the medical certificate was sufficient for an office-based role, and the employer's rejection was arbitrary and discriminatory. The Court ruled that the 3% disability quota mandated by law applies across all tiers of an organization, including the highest posts, and cannot be restricted by administrative policy. The judgment establishes that employment of persons with disabilities is a constitutional right, not charity, and that public institutions must ensure compliance with disability quotas across all grades, prohibiting discrimination in employment based on disability.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer unilaterally reject a medical fitness certificate that declares a candidate 'fit for office job'?
  • Does the 3% disability quota for employment apply across all tiers of an organization or is it restricted to lower-grade posts?
  • Is the employment of persons with disabilities a matter of charity or a constitutional right?
  • Can an appointment be withdrawn on the basis of a candidate's disability if the candidate is medically fit for the job description?
  Read full judgment →
• Peer Syed Fayaz Shah vs The State2023 SHC 992 · Sindh High Court · 2023-11-22
  post-arrest baildomestic helpsexual abuseheinous crimeevidence tamperingcustodial deathcriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, who was implicated in the death of a nine-year-old domestic help. The core legal question was whether the applicant, who had custody of the minor before she was transferred to his daughter's house where she died, was entitled to bail despite allegations of torture, sexual abuse, and evidence tampering. The Court held that the applicant was not entitled to bail at this stage. The holding was based on the prima facie evidence of the minor's sexual abuse while in the applicant's custody, the applicant's attempts to conceal the death, and the severity of the offense, which carries capital punishment. The Court emphasized that in cases involving heinous crimes and influential accused, bail should not be granted when there is sufficient material suggesting active participation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the bail application, directing the trial court to expedite the examination of material witnesses within three months, after which the applicant may file a fresh application.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to bail when there is prima facie evidence of sexual abuse and torture leading to a minor's death?
  • Can a bail application be dismissed based on the influence of the accused and the severity of the offense?
  • Should a trial court expedite the examination of material witnesses in cases involving heinous crimes?
  Read full judgment →
• Peer Bux alias Peeral through Legal Heirs and others vs Mushtaque Ahmad2023 CLC 1933 · Sindh High Court · 2022-04-18Read full judgment →
• Pearl Continental Hotels National Labour Union through President vs National Industrial Relations Commission through Chairman and 4 others2023 PLC 206 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-09-12
  National Industrial Relations CommissionCollective Bargaining AgentCBA ReferendumAlternate Statutory RemedyFull Bench AppealConstitutional JurisdictionMaintainability of Writ PetitionIndustrial Relations Act 2012
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed by the petitioner labour union challenging an order dated 22.02.2022 passed by an Authorized Officer of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) which halted referendum proceedings for determination of a Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA). The respondent employer raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition due to the presence of an alternate statutory remedy of appeal before the Full Bench of the Commission. The core legal questions were whether an order passed by an Authorized Officer delegated by a Member of the NIRC is deemed to be an order of a Bench appealable under Section 58 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, and whether the constitutional petition was maintainable. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that an Authorized Officer acts on delegated powers of the Commission's Member, rendering their order appealable before the Full Bench of the NIRC under Section 58(2) read with Sections 56(2) and 58(1) of the 2012 Act. Consequently, bypassing the adequate, functional statutory forum rendered the writ petition non-maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by an Authorized Officer acting under the delegated powers of a Member of the National Industrial Relations Commission is deemed to be an order of a Bench under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Whether an order of an Authorized Officer stopping referendum proceedings is appealable before the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission under Section 58 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Can a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan be maintained when an efficacious and functional alternate statutory remedy of appeal is available before the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission?
  Read full judgment →
• Peace Enterprises through Sole Owner vs Azad Government of the Jammu2023 MLD 1403 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2022-09-20Read full judgment →
• Pauper appellant Ayyaz vs State2023 SHC 262 · Sindh High Court · 2023-03-29
  criminal appealqatl-e-amdsolitary eye-witnessinjured witnessmitigating circumstancesreduction of sentencecircumstantial evidenceunproven motive
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant for the qatl-e-amd of his wife under Section 302(b), along with offenses under Sections 324 and 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution case rested primarily on the testimony of an injured eye-witness, medical evidence, and circumstantial evidence, as the motive could not be established and certain investigative discrepancies existed. The core legal question concerned whether a conviction could be sustained upon solitary ocular testimony corroborated by medical and circumstantial evidence despite unproven motive and investigative flaws, and whether such flaws constituted mitigating circumstances for sentence reduction. The Sindh High Court held that the solitary ocular testimony of the injured witness was trustworthy, unimpeachable, and sufficiently corroborated by medical evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, considering unproven motive, defense contradictions, and investigative lapses as mitigating circumstances, the court dismissed the appeal as to conviction but modified the sentence for qatl-e-amd from life imprisonment to fourteen years rigorous imprisonment under Section 302(c), while maintaining the remaining sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be sustained solely on the testimony of a solitary injured eye-witness if found trustworthy and consistent?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove motive vitiate an otherwise well-supported conviction based on ocular and medical evidence?
  • Whether investigative lapses and unproven motive can be considered as mitigating circumstances for the reduction of a sentence from life imprisonment to fourteen years?
  • Does a contradiction in the recovery of a crime weapon affect the core prosecution case when supported by strong independent evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Parvez Elahi vs Care Taker Government of Punjab etc.2023 LHC 4107, 2024 PLJ Lahore 43, 2023 PLJ Lahore 688 · Lahore High Court · 2023-07-13Read full judgment →
• Parina Haresh and 19 others vs The Govt. of Balochistan and 16 others2023 SCP 291, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 99, 2023 SCMR 2126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-26
  civil servantsinitial recruitmentdepartmental selection committeebalochistan civil servants rulesmerit-based appointmentpublic service commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a constitutional petition challenging the recruitment process initiated by the Agriculture and Cooperatives Department, Government of Balochistan, for filling posts in Basic Pay Scales 1 to 14. The core legal questions involve the legality and transparency of the recruitment mechanism, the constitution and selection criteria of Departmental Selection Committees, and the methods for conducting tests and interviews for initial appointments under the relevant civil service rules. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision allowing the recruitment process to proceed subject to certain conditions, refusing leave to appeal. The Court held that in the absence of a detailed objective testing mechanism within the Departmental Selection Committee rules for BPS 1 to 15, the Government may engage reputable institutions like the Balochistan Public Service Commission or statutory bodies such as the Institute of Business Administration (IBA) to conduct transparent tests and interviews, while the Selection Committee remains responsible for scrutiny, shortlisting, and final recommendations based strictly on merit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether initial recruitment to posts in basic pay scales 1 to 15 can be conducted through external reputable testing institutions when departmental selection rules lack a structured testing mechanism?
  • Does the absence of objective selection criteria in service rules vitiate the transparency of public appointments?
  • What are the statutory functions and limitations of Departmental Selection Committees under the Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 2009?
  • Can the Government of Balochistan requisition posts to the Public Service Commission for initial recruitment in place of a Departmental Selection Committee?
  Read full judgment →
• Paradise E-Commerce Solutions vs The Deputy Collector of Customs, MCC2023 PTD (Trib.) 1290 · Customs Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Television Corporation vs Noor Sanat Shah2023 PLC 135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-27
  tortious liabilityvicarious liabilitystate-owned corporationcivil court jurisdictiondamages for mental agonyservice matterCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment upholding a decree for damages against the Pakistan Television Corporation in favor of its employee, who suffered financial loss and mental agony due to the corporation's failure to implement orders of the National Industrial Relations Commission. The core legal questions concerned the maintainability of a suit for tortious liability against a state-owned corporation and the applicability of vicarious liability for the acts of its employees. The Supreme Court held that the suit was maintainable, affirming that the corporation, as a distinct legal entity, is not immune from tortious liability. The Court established that an employer is vicariously liable for torts committed by employees during the course of employment, especially when the entity condones or fails to prevent such acts. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that in the absence of specific legislation regulating such damages, civil courts possess plenary jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to adjudicate these claims, applying the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for damages based on tortious liability maintainable against a state-owned corporation?
  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to adjudicate suits for damages in the absence of specific legislation?
  • Can a corporation be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employees committed during the course of their employment?
  • Does the doctrine of sovereign immunity protect a state-owned corporation from being sued for tortious acts?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Television Corporation through Company Secretary vs Commissioner Inland Revenue (Audit-v), Large Taxpayers Office and 4 others2023 PTD 102 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-05-25Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. vs Mst. Fatima and others2023 IHC 188, 2024 PLC 324 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-08-18
  National Industrial Relations Commissioncontempt of courtenforcement of ordersindustrial relationssuperannuation benefitsjurisdiction of NIRCworkman rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. (PTCL) to challenge concurrent orders of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) concerning a complaint filed by a daily-wage worker for the implementation of superannuation benefits and non-compliance with earlier orders. The core legal question centered on whether the NIRC possesses the jurisdiction to prosecute and punish a party for failing to implement its orders or whether such jurisdiction exclusively vests in a Labour Court or a Magistrate's Court under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the NIRC is fully empowered under Sections 33(6), 33(7), and 57(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 to penalize non-compliance and punish for contempt, and that the absence of an explicitly stated timeframe in the original order does not insulate a defaulter from prosecution if the order is not complied with within seven days. The key principle laid down is that statutory provisions empowering administrative tribunals to enforce their own orders and punish for contempt must be interpreted purposefully to prevent protracted litigation and safeguard the rights of workmen.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the National Industrial Relations Commission has the jurisdiction to punish a party for non-compliance with its orders under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Does the omission of a specific timeframe in an order passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission insulate a defaulter from prosecution under Section 33(6) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Can proceedings for non-compliance with a decision of the National Industrial Relations Commission be initiated independently of a Labour Court or a Magistrate of the First Class?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited vs Province Of Sindh And Others2023 SHC 874 · Sindh High Court · 2023-10-05Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited vs Pakistan2023 IHC 14 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-08-26Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited through Authoirzed Officer2023 PLJ Islamabad 324, 2024 PLC 79 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-03-27
  maintainability of writ petitionlocus standiaggrieved persontrade unioncollective bargaining agentservice benefitsindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal challenged a judgment of the Judge-in-Chambers which partly allowed a writ petition filed by registered trade unions of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (P.T.C.L.) seeking various service and financial benefits for workmen. The core legal question was whether a trade union or an association can maintain a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution to espouse the individual grievances and enforce the rights of its members. The Islamabad High Court held that a trade union lacks locus standi to file a constitutional petition in its own name for the enforcement of individual rights of workmen, as it is not an "aggrieved person" under Article 199. The Court ruled that provisions of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 allowing a Collective Bargaining Agent to represent workmen do not authorize the institution of writ proceedings. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment was set aside, dismissing the writ petition as not maintainable while preserving the right of individual workers to seek remedies before appropriate forums.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trade union file a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution to espouse the individual grievances of its members?
  • Does Section 20(1)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 authorize a Collective Bargaining Agent to institute legal proceedings on behalf of workmen before any forum?
  • Whether a trade union can maintain a writ petition for the enforcement of rights guaranteed to workers collectively in the presence of an alternative remedy under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecom Mobile Limited (Ufone) and another vs The Learned2023 IHC 296 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-08-18
  NIRC jurisdictioncontempt of courtindustrial relationsenforcement of orderslabour lawnon-compliancewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple writ petitions filed by employers challenging the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) to initiate contempt proceedings and issue arrest warrants against management for failing to implement NIRC orders. The core legal question is whether the NIRC, under the Industrial Relations Act 2012, possesses the authority to punish for non-compliance or contempt without referring the matter to a Labour Court or Magistrate. The Court held that the NIRC maintains the jurisdiction to prosecute and punish defaulters for non-compliance with its orders under Sections 33(6) and 57(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2012. The Court reasoned that the NIRC’s power to enforce its own orders is essential to its statutory functions and that the absence of a specified time frame in an order does not prevent prosecution if compliance is not achieved within seven days. The key principle laid down is that the NIRC is not denuded of its authority to punish for disobedience of its directions, and such powers are not exclusively reserved for Labour Courts or Magistrates under the current statutory framework.

  Questions settled

  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have the jurisdiction to punish for contempt of court under the Industrial Relations Act 2012?
  • Can the National Industrial Relations Commission initiate prosecution for non-compliance with its orders if no specific time frame for implementation was mentioned in the original order?
  • Is the National Industrial Relations Commission required to refer matters of non-compliance with its orders to a Labour Court or a Magistrate of the First Class?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pti) through its Additional Secretary General Mr.2023 IHC 1, 2023 PLJ Islamabad 153, 2024 PLD Islamabad 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-01-11Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Tehreek-E-Insaf (Pti) through Additional Secretary General vs Election Commission of Pakistan and another2023 PLJ Islamabad 153 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf through its General Secretary Asad Umar, Munir2023 LHC 395 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf through its General Secretary Asad Umar vs Governor of Punjab and another2023 LHC 143 · Lahore High Court · 2023-01-30Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Tehreek-E-Insaaf through General Secretary Asad Umar and others vs Governor of Punjab and another2023 PLJ Lahore 461 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Tehreek-E-Insaaf through General Secretary and others vs Government of Punjab and others2023 PLD Lahore 179 · Lahore High Court · 2023-02-10
  provincial assembly electionsdissolution of assemblyelection commission of pakistanconstitutional penumbratime-bound mandatewrit of mandamuscaretaker governmentelectoral process
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses consolidated petitions seeking the interpretation of time-bound constitutional provisions regarding the holding of general elections to the Provincial Assembly of Punjab within ninety days of its dissolution under Articles 105, 112, 218, 219, and 224 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, read with the Elections Act, 2017. The core legal question was which authority is constitutionally mandated to announce the date of the general election when the provincial assembly stands dissolved by operation of law rather than by an express order of the Governor. The Lahore High Court held that while Article 224(2) of the Constitution does not explicitly name the declaring authority in such an eventuality, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), acting under the doctrine of constitutional penumbra and its broad mandates under Articles 218(3), 219(d), and 220, is the ultimate independent constitutional authority responsible for organizing and conducting elections. Consequently, the Court allowed the petitions and directed the ECP to immediately announce the election date for the Provincial Assembly of Punjab, after consulting the Governor, to ensure elections are held within the mandatory ninety-day period.

  Questions settled

  • Which authority is constitutionally mandated to announce the date of general elections when a Provincial Assembly stands dissolved by operation of law?
  • Does the Election Commission of Pakistan possess the implied power to fix and announce election dates under the doctrine of constitutional penumbra?
  • Can a writ of mandamus be issued under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan directing the authorities to hold elections within the mandatory ninety-day period following the dissolution of an assembly?
  • What is the scope of the duties entrusted to the Election Commission of Pakistan under Article 218(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan regarding pre-poll election stages?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf and others vs Province of Sindh through Chief2023 PLD Sindh 110 · Sindh High Court · 2022-11-18Read full judgment →
• Sahib Gul and 3 others vs Soucha Gul and others2023 CLC 2019 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-05-05Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Sugar Mills Association through Authorized Representative and 52023 CLD 265 · Sindh High Court · 2022-06-13Read full judgment →
• Pakistan State Oil Company Limited vs Abdul Ali and 3 others2023 PLD Sindh 174 · Sindh High Court · 2022-08-11Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Railways Through its Senior General Manager and 2 others vs Misri Khan & Company Through Misri Khan (deceased) Through His Legal Heirs2023 LHC 6823 · Lahore High Court
  civil revisionlimitationexclusion of timeFederal Ombudsmancivil proceedingsrecovery of moneygovernment contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 arose from a suit for recovery of Rs. 31,65,640/- filed by a government contractor against Pakistan Railways for unpaid building materials. The trial court decreed the suit, and the appellate court affirmed the decision, applying Article 115 of the Limitation Act 1908 and holding the suit to be within time. The petitioners challenged these findings on the ground of limitation, arguing that Article 56 of the Limitation Act 1908 governed the claim and that the suit was time-barred. The High Court examined whether the time spent by the respondent prosecuting a complaint before the Federal Ombudsman could be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Court held that the Federal Ombudsman is not a 'court' and proceedings before it do not constitute 'civil proceedings' for the purposes of Section 14. Consequently, the time consumed before the Ombudsman could not be excluded. The Court set aside the concurrent findings, holding that they suffered from material irregularities, and dismissed the suit as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time spent prosecuting a complaint before the Federal Ombudsman can be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does the Federal Ombudsman qualify as a court for the purposes of Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Which provision of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to a suit for the recovery of the price of work done or materials supplied?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact be disturbed by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if they are based on misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Railways through its Chief Executive Officer/Senior General Manager, Lahore & another vs Muhammad Aslam2023 SCP 296, 2024 SCMR 97, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-12
  service lawlocus poenitentiaeright to sueabatement of proceedingsabsorptionvested rightscivil petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenged a judgment by the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside an order withdrawing the respondent's absorption as Guard Grade-I. The respondent, a Pakistan Railways employee, had been absorbed into the position in 2012, but the department rescinded this order six years later in 2018. Following the respondent's death, the petitioner sought to continue the challenge. The Supreme Court addressed whether the right to sue survived the respondent's death and whether the department could unilaterally withdraw the absorption. The Court held that the right to sue survived because the dispute concerned a service status and the withdrawal of a vested right, rather than a purely personal action. Applying the doctrine of locus poenitentiae, the Court ruled that once a decisive step has been taken and rights have accrued, the authority cannot rescind the order without justification or due process. Finding no illegality in the Tribunal's decision or any substantial question of law of public importance, the Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to sue survive the death of a respondent in a service matter concerning the withdrawal of a previously granted absorption?
  • Can a department rescind an order of absorption after a significant lapse of time once valuable rights have accrued to the employee?
  • Does the doctrine of locus poenitentiae prevent the withdrawal of a service benefit granted to an employee in the absence of any error or illegality?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Petroleum Ltd vs State Bank of Pakistan and others2023 PLJ Karachi 109 · Sindh High Court · 2023-05-24Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. Through its2023 LHC 4751 · Lahore High Court · 2023-09-05Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Medical Commission through Secretary vs Construction2023 PLJ Islamabad 136 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Medical Commission ('PMC') through Secretary (Successor of Registrar PMDC), Islamabad Capital Territory vs Construction Experts (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive_Director, Islamabad and another2023 PLD Islamabad 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-09-08Read full judgment →
• Pakistan International Container Terminal Limited vs Federation of Pakistan2023 SHC 100 · Sindh High Court · 2023-03-02Read full judgment →
• Pakistan International Container Terminal Limited through authorized2023 CLC 2119 · Sindh High Court · 2023-03-02Read full judgment →
• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs Sumera Ghaffar and others2023 IHC 314 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-11-17
  permanent workmancontract workerindustrial establishmentNIRC jurisdictionlabor lawretrenchmentemployment statusthird-party contractor
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC), challenged concurrent orders by the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) which reinstated a contract employee and declared her a permanent workman. The core legal question was whether a worker, engaged through third-party contractors but performing duties at PIAC for over two years, acquires the status of a permanent workman under the West-Pakistan Industrial and Commercial (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The Court held that the nature of the work, rather than the contractual designation, determines employment status. Applying the "integration" and "control" tests, the Court found that the respondent performed work of a permanent nature, thereby attaining permanent status. The Court affirmed that employers cannot use third-party contracts to circumvent labor laws or deprive workers of statutory rights. Consequently, the NIRC’s findings were upheld, and the petition was dismissed. The judgment reinforces that when an establishment exercises control and the work is permanent, the worker is entitled to the protections of the 1968 Ordinance, irrespective of the existence of a third-party service provider.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contract worker who performs duties of a permanent nature for more than nine months acquire the status of a permanent workman under the West-Pakistan Industrial and Commercial (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can an employer use third-party contracts to circumvent the statutory rights of a worker performing permanent duties within the establishment?
  • What criteria determine whether a contract worker is an employee of the principal establishment rather than the contractor?
  • Is the National Industrial Relations Commission empowered to grant relief to a worker seeking the status of a permanent workman?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation through Managing Director vs Amna Fraz and others2023 PLC (C.S.) 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-24
  writ jurisdictionmaintainability of writ petitionvested rightcompensation packagePIACservice benefitslegal heirs
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a petition challenging a High Court order directing the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) to grant compensation to the respondent, the widow of a deceased employee. The core legal questions were whether a writ petition is maintainable against PIAC and whether a non-statutory compensation package creates a vested right enforceable in writ jurisdiction, particularly when the policy was later placed in abeyance. The Court held that the writ petition was maintainable because PIAC remains under the ultimate control of the Federal Government. Regarding the merits, the Court ruled that the compensation package created a vested right for the respondent upon the death of her husband, which occurred while the policy was validly in existence. The subsequent notification placing the package in abeyance did not extinguish this right, as the revised policy distinguished between employees who died before and after the cut-off date. The Court affirmed that a vested right to compensation accrues upon the occurrence of the qualifying event under a valid policy and is not extinguished by temporary suspension of the policy.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable against the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation?
  • Does a non-statutory compensation package create a vested right for the legal heirs of a deceased employee?
  • Does the placement of a compensation policy in abeyance extinguish the vested rights of employees who qualified for benefits prior to the suspension?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation & another vs Nadeem Lodhi2023 SHC 642 · Sindh High Court · 2023-08-18Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Engineering Council through Chairman and 3 others vs Federal2023 MLD 1945 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-12-28Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority vs Pakistan Broadcasters2023 PLD Supreme Court 378 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-24
  surchargeannual feeultra viresdelegated legislationfiscal statuteregulatory authoritybroadcasting license
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had allowed a constitutional petition filed by private broadcasters. The appellant, Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), had issued show-cause notices to the respondents demanding a late-payment surcharge on annual license fees under Regulation 9(5) of the PEMRA (TV/Radio Broadcast Operations) Regulations, 2002. The core legal question was whether PEMRA possessed the statutory authority to levy and recover such a surcharge, and whether the 2002 Regulations were validly promulgated. The Supreme Court held that the parent Ordinance, prior to its 2007 amendment, did not empower PEMRA to make regulations, and the power purportedly extended via Rule 30 of the 2002 Rules was ultra vires. Furthermore, the 2007 amendment was not retrospective and did not validate the 2002 Regulations. The Court reiterated that fiscal statutes must be strictly construed, and because the Ordinance did not explicitly provide for a late-payment surcharge on annual fees, the demand was void ab initio and without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a regulatory body issue regulations under its rules if the parent statute does not explicitly confer the power to make regulations?
  • Does a subsequent statutory amendment granting regulation-making power retrospectively validate prior regulations made without authority, in the absence of an express validation clause?
  • Can the term 'other charges' in a fiscal or regulatory statute be interpreted to include a late-payment surcharge in the absence of an express charging provision?
  • Can rules made under a parent statute enlarge the scope of the statutory provisions or run parallel to the parent statute?
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• Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority vs Pakistan Broadcasters2023 SCP 91 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ultra viresdelegated legislationsurchargefiscal statuteregulatory authorityvoid ab initiostrict interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had declared the demand for late payment surcharge on annual licence fees under Regulation 9(5) of the PEMRA (TV/Radio Broadcast Operations) Regulations, 2002 to be ultra vires the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002. The Supreme Court examined whether the 2002 Regulations were legally promulgated and whether the Ordinance authorized the levy of a surcharge on late payments. The Court observed that the parent Ordinance did not originally empower PEMRA to issue regulations, and the subsequent 2007 amendment granting such power was not retroactive and did not validate the 2002 Regulations. Furthermore, the 2002 Regulations were never notified in the official Gazette. The Court held that rules and regulations cannot exceed the scope of their parent statute, rendering the 2002 Regulations void ab initio. Additionally, the Court ruled that fiscal provisions must be strictly construed, and since the Ordinance did not explicitly authorize a surcharge on annual fees, PEMRA lacked the authority to impose it.

  Questions settled

  • Can a regulatory authority issue regulations under rules when the parent statute does not explicitly grant regulation-making power?
  • Does a subsequent statutory amendment granting regulation-making power retrospectively validate regulations that were void ab initio?
  • Can a late payment surcharge be levied under a fiscal statute in the absence of an express charging provision?
  • Can rules or regulations made under a parent statute run parallel to or enlarge the scope of that parent statute?
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• Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Pemra), Islamabad vs Pakistan Broadcasters Association and another2023 SCP 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  delegation of powersPEMRAbroadcast licenseadministrative lawstatutory interpretationsuspension of licenseregulatory authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment declaring the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority’s (PEMRA) delegation of its power to suspend broadcast licenses to its Chairman as null and void. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of Section 13 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002, specifically whether the Authority could delegate the power of license suspension—granted under Section 30—without framing rules to govern such delegation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the power of delegation under Section 13 is not an unfettered, disjunctive discretion. Instead, it must be exercised in a structured manner, where the scale of importance of the function determines the necessity of conditions. The Court held that for significant powers like license suspension, the Authority cannot ignore the requirement to impose conditions via rules. Because the Authority failed to structure the delegation or impose meaningful conditions, the purported delegation was legally unsustainable. The judgment establishes that statutory delegation of high-stakes regulatory powers requires rigorous, structured application of mind and the imposition of conditions through formal rules.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority delegate its power to suspend broadcast licenses under Section 30 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002?
  • Is the power of delegation under Section 13 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002 an unfettered discretion?
  • Does the delegation of high-stakes statutory powers require the framing of rules to impose conditions?
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• Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) through its2023 SCP 112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-12
  freedom of expressionright to informationPEMRA ordinanceCouncil of Complaintsprohibition orderobscenity and decencymedia regulationproportionality
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns whether Section 27(a) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002 is an independent and self-governing provision or whether its application requires prior opinion from the Council of Complaints under Section 26(2) of the said Ordinance. The Supreme Court examined the two-tiered regulatory mechanism established under the PEMRA Ordinance in light of the fundamental rights to freedom of speech and expression and the right to information guaranteed under Articles 19 and 19A of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Court held that Section 27(a) is not an independent provision and that PEMRA cannot bypass the Councils of Complaints; any prohibition order regarding programme content or advertisements must be preceded by obtaining and considering the opinion of the relevant Council of Complaints. The key principle laid down is that media regulation must respect constitutional values, viewing community standards of decency through the lens of tolerance and proportionality, and ensuring public regulatory oversight through independent bodies of eminent citizens to safeguard fundamental rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 27(a) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002 is an independent and self-governing provision or requires the opinion of the Council of Complaints under Section 26(2)?
  • Can the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority issue a prohibition order under Section 27 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002 without first obtaining the opinion of the Council of Complaints?
  • How do the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and right to information under Articles 19 and 19A of the Constitution of Pakistan apply to the regulation of media content and artistic works?
  • What is the legal benchmark for determining whether a television program or advertisement is obscene, vulgar, or offensive to commonly accepted standards of decency under electronic media laws?
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• Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) through Chairman, Islamabad and others vs Southern Networks Limited, Karachi2023 SCMR 1348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-11
  PEMRAlicense revocationchange of managementregulatory complianceproportionalitystatutory interpretationMMDS license
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) against a High Court judgment that set aside PEMRA's order revoking the respondent's Multi-Channel Multi-Point Distribution Service (MMDS) license. The core legal question was whether PEMRA's revocation of the license, based on the respondent's failure to obtain prior written permission for management changes, was proportional and legally sound, given that PEMRA had previously renewed the license despite being aware of the management change. The Supreme Court held that while the statutory provisions regarding prior permission for management changes are mandatory, PEMRA's own inconsistent conduct—having renewed the license while the management change was known—precluded a strict application of revocation as the sole remedy. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and the PEMRA order, remanding the matter for a fresh decision on the merits of the respondent's application for change of management. The key principle laid down is that a regulatory authority cannot strictly enforce punitive measures like license revocation for statutory violations when its own prior conduct has misled the licensee or created ambiguity regarding compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a regulatory authority revoke a license for a management change violation if the authority previously renewed the license despite knowing of such change?
  • Are the statutory requirements for prior permission for management changes under the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 mandatory?
  • Does a regulatory authority have the discretion to insist on the presence of outgoing directors when processing an application for a change of management?
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• Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) through Chairman2023 PLD Supreme Court 431 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-12
  freedom of speechright to informationPEMRAmedia regulationCouncil of Complaintsprohibition orderconstitutional interpretationproportionality
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the scope of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) Ordinance, 2002, specifically whether Section 27(a) empowers PEMRA to independently prohibit media broadcasts or if it requires prior input from the Council of Complaints under Section 26(2). The Supreme Court examined the two-tiered regulatory framework designed to protect the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and information under Articles 19 and 19A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court held that Section 27(a) is not a self-governing provision; rather, PEMRA must obtain and consider the opinion of the Council of Complaints before issuing a prohibition order. The Court emphasized that media regulation must align with constitutional values, particularly tolerance. It established that 'obscene' or 'vulgar' content must be assessed against 'commonly accepted standards of decency,' which represent a standard of tolerance rather than taste. Furthermore, the Court ruled that content must be evaluated as a whole, and any restrictions on fundamental rights must be necessary, proportionate, and narrowly tailored to achieve legitimate objectives.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 27(a) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002 an independent provision that allows PEMRA to prohibit broadcasts without the opinion of the Council of Complaints?
  • What is the legal standard for determining whether media content is 'obscene' or 'vulgar' under the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002?
  • Must PEMRA obtain the opinion of the Council of Complaints before exercising its power to prohibit a broadcast under Section 27(a) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002?
  • Does the right to freedom of expression under Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 extend to the broadcast of plays and dramas on electronic media?
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• Pakistan Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs Karachi Development Authority through Director General and another2023 PLD Sindh 202 · Sindh High Court · 2022-09-27Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority vs Mst. Gul Rukh Samina Butt2023 CLC 1495, 2023 CLD 1136 · Sindh High Court · 2022-11-28Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Artificial Leather Manufacturers Association and others vs Directorate General of Trade Organizations and others2023 IHC 332 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-12-21Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Agricultural Research Council vs Khurram Bashir, Ex-Research2023 IHC 236 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Accumulators (Pvt) Limited vs Additional Commissioner lnland2023 PHC 338 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pak Telecom Mobile Limited vs M/s Saftey & Security Services (Private)2023 IHC 408 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pak Maniar Investment Ltd vs Salehbhoy (late) s_o Tayyab Ali Since dead through his legal heirs Mrs. Batool Salehbhoy & others2023 SHC 164 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pak Arab Refinery Limited vs Commissioner Of Income Tax/Wealth Tax2023 PTD 1158 · Lahore High Court · 2020-10-20Read full judgment →
• Owais Qureshi vs Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir2023 PLC (C.S.) 1010 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2022-05-09
  writ jurisdictionrecruitment quotaForest DepartmentDistrict Jhelum Valleyadministrative lawservice matterevasive denial
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, challenging the recruitment process for twelve posts of Range Officers (BPS-16) by the Forest Department. The core legal question was whether the respondents failed to correctly calculate and allocate the 4.55% recruitment quota reserved for District Jhelum Valley in the impugned advertisement. The respondents contended that the quota had been exhausted by a prior appointment; however, the petitioner demonstrated that the cited appointment occurred before the establishment of District Jhelum Valley. The High Court held that the respondents' evasive denial of the petitioner's claims regarding the quota calculation amounted to an admission. Consequently, the court set aside the impugned advertisement and directed the respondents to recalculate the quota for all units of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and re-advertise the posts accordingly. The judgment establishes that administrative authorities must accurately determine recruitment quotas based on factual data and that evasive pleadings by state respondents in writ proceedings may be treated as admissions of the petitioner's case.

  Questions settled

  • Does an evasive denial in a written statement by state respondents amount to an admission of the petitioner's claim?
  • Can a court in writ jurisdiction direct the recalculation of recruitment quotas when administrative authorities fail to account for specific district allocations?
  • Is an appointment made prior to the creation of a district valid for exhausting the recruitment quota of that subsequently created district?
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• Ovais Akhtar & 5 Others, Ovais Akhtar & 4 Others vs Abdullah and another, Zohra Khanum and others2023 SHC 78 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Omer Bin Mehmood S/o Mehmood Bin Kafil vs Imran Qureshi, Mst. Alaya2023 SHC 1018, 2024 CLC 1033 · Sindh High Court · 2023-08-30Read full judgment →
• Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority through its Chairperson and another and others vs Sui Southern Gas Company Limited through its Chairperson and another and others2023 SCP 110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-31
  Gas Utility Courtexclusive jurisdictionconsumer complaintsbilling and metering disputesregulatory authoritystatutory interpretationoverriding effect
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involved civil petitions filed by the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) challenging High Court judgments that declared the Gas Utility Court, established under the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016, to have exclusive jurisdiction over consumer billing and metering disputes. The core legal question was whether OGRA possesses concurrent jurisdiction with the Gas Utility Court to adjudicate consumer complaints regarding billing and metering, or if the 2016 Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Gas Utility Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the Gas Utility Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction over matters defined under the 2016 Act, which has an overriding effect over other laws. The Court established the principle that while OGRA functions as a forum for informal dispute resolution between consumers and licensees under its regulations, it is not a court and lacks the authority to prosecute offences or adjudicate matters exclusively reserved for the Gas Utility Court. Section 5(6) of the 2016 Act allows parties to seek remedies elsewhere but does not confer concurrent jurisdiction on OGRA for matters within the Gas Utility Court's exclusive purview.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority have concurrent jurisdiction with the Gas Utility Court regarding consumer billing and metering disputes?
  • Does the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 have an overriding effect over the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002?
  • Is the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority a court capable of prosecuting offences under the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016?
  • What is the legal effect of Section 5(6) of the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 on the jurisdiction of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority?
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• Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority through Chairperson and others vs Sui2023 SCMR 908 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-31
  OGRA jurisdictionGas Utility Courtconsumer complaintsbilling and metering disputesspecial law overriding effectdispute resolution forumgas theft and recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses civil petitions concerning the jurisdictional overlap between the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) and the Gas Utility Courts regarding consumer complaints in the natural gas sector. The core legal question was whether OGRA possesses concurrent jurisdiction with the Gas Utility Court to adjudicate consumer disputes, particularly regarding billing and metering, under the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 and the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016. The Court held that while OGRA serves as an administrative dispute resolution forum to amicably resolve complaints under its regulatory framework, it does not enjoy concurrent judicial jurisdiction with the Gas Utility Court. The Gas Utility Court holds exclusive jurisdiction over matters covered by the 2016 Act, such as gas theft, offences, and related disputes, owing to the Act's special nature and overriding effect. However, a consumer or utility company retains the option to seek alternative remedies before forums like OGRA. The Supreme Court consequently dismissed the petitions and upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the Gas Utility Courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority share concurrent jurisdiction with the Gas Utility Court under the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016?
  • What is the scope of jurisdiction of the Gas Utility Court established under the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016?
  • Can a consumer approach the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority for billing and metering disputes notwithstanding the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016?
  • Does the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 possess an overriding effect over other laws regarding matters within its purview?
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• Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. vs Dr. Riaz Arshad, Deputy Chief2023 IHC 238 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. through Authorized Officer vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Overseas Pakistani and Human Resource Development Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others2023 PLC 217 · Balochistan High Court · 2023-03-24
  Industrial RelationsNIRCLachesLimitation ActConstitutional PetitionWorker DefinitionDisciplinary ProceedingsJurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the orders of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) which had allowed a grievance petition filed by an employee against the Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. The petitioner alleged that the employee, while serving on a hiring committee, misled the committee to award a contract to his father's company, leading to disciplinary action and financial recovery. The core legal questions were whether the employee qualified as a 'worker' under the Industrial Relations Act 2012, thereby establishing the NIRC's jurisdiction, and whether the petition was barred by laches due to the delay in filing. The Court held that the employee was indeed a 'worker' based on his active participation in trade union activities. Furthermore, the Court dismissed the petition on merits, noting the petitioner failed to prove the employee was a member of the hiring committee. The Court emphasized that prosecuting a remedy in a wrong forum does not constitute due diligence under the Limitation Act 1908, and that laches is a valid ground for dismissing a constitutional petition where the petitioner is negligent.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee who participates in trade union activities qualify as a 'worker' under the Industrial Relations Act 2012?
  • Does pursuing a legal remedy in a wrong forum constitute due diligence for the purpose of condoning delay under the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can a constitutional petition be dismissed on the grounds of laches if the petitioner fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay?
  • Is the National Industrial Relations Commission competent to entertain a grievance petition filed by a worker?
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• Oil and Gas Development Company Limited vs Commissioner Inland2023 IHC 214 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-01-19Read full judgment →