Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Obs Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and 2 othersPTCL 2022 CL. 466 · Sindh High Court · 2021-11-17Read full judgment →
• Numan alias Nomi and others vs The State2023 PCRLJ 1394 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-19
  forensic evidencedigital evidencedue processlimited de novo trialcriminal appealadmissibility of evidenceSection 265-C Cr.P.C.electronic document
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the convictions of the appellants for gang rape, primarily focusing on the trial court's reliance on forensic video evidence that was not properly exhibited or provided to the accused. The core legal question was whether the improper admission of this forensic evidence necessitated a de novo trial. The Lahore High Court held that while the forensic evidence (video/snaps) was not properly admitted, a full de novo trial was not required. The Court established that digital evidence possesses a dual character: as a "document" containing information and as "real evidence" for inspection. Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for a limited purpose. The trial court was directed to provide the accused with copies of the forensic evidence, allow time for defense preparation, and properly exhibit the evidence in camera, followed by cross-examination and a fresh statement of the accused under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court affirmed that Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, permits convictions based on such forensic evidence, provided procedural fairness is maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Does the improper admission of forensic evidence in a criminal trial necessitate a full de novo trial?
  • What is the dual legal character of audio/video clips and digital snaps in the law of evidence?
  • Is the prosecution required to provide copies of forensic evidence to the accused before it can be used at trial?
  • Can a conviction be lawfully based on forensic evidence under Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
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• Numan alias Nomi and others vs State etc.2PLJ 2023 Cr.C. 320 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-19
  electronic evidenceforensic evidencevideo recording admissibilitydue processremand for trialQanun-e-Shahadat Ordergang rape trialreal evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants under Sections 376(ii) and 509 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the trial court. During the hearing, it emerged that forensic video evidence and snaps generated from a cell phone by the Punjab Forensic Science Agency were relied upon by the trial court without being played in court, without copies being provided to the accused, and without being properly exhibited through a witness. The core legal question revolved around the admissibility and proper procedure for bringing digital and electronic forensic evidence on record during a criminal trial. The Lahore High Court held that electronic documents and video clips possess a dual character as documentary and real evidence, and while they are admissible under Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, they must be properly proved, exhibited through witness testimony, and supplied to the accused in advance to satisfy due process. The court set aside the convictions and remanded the matter to the trial court for a limited de novo procedure to properly exhibit the forensic evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether electronic and video evidence can be relied upon without being properly exhibited through witness testimony and played in court?
  • Can digital forensic evidence be treated as both an electronic document and real physical evidence under the law of evidence?
  • What is the proper procedure for supplying copies of electronic and forensic evidence to the accused under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether improper admission of evidence necessitates a limited remand of the case to the trial court for correct exhibition?
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• NP Waterproof Industries (Private) Ltd. and 4 others vs NP Spinning Mills2023 CLD 33 · Sindh High Court · 2022-10-06Read full judgment →
• Novatex Limited and Another: In the matter of vs Not2023 CLD 1161 · Balochistan High Court · 2023-05-09Read full judgment →
• Nousheen Akram vs Federation of Pakistan etc2023 LHC 5901 · Lahore High Court · 2023-11-15Read full judgment →
• Nouman Arshad vs The Director General, etc2023 LHC 6820 · Lahore High Court · 2023-12-21Read full judgment →
• Noshiba Latif & twenty-one others vs The Islamia University of Bahawalpur2023 IHC 134 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-06-30Read full judgment →
• Nosherwan Khan vs United Bank Limited and others2023 PLC 1 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-25
  misconductbanking employeedismissal from serviceconcurrent findingsbreach of trustwrit jurisdictionfake currency
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the concurrent findings of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) which upheld the dismissal of the Petitioner, a bank cashier, from service. The Petitioner was terminated for gross misconduct involving the placement of fake currency notes within a bundle of genuine notes. The core legal question was whether the NIRC's findings, which affirmed the dismissal based on the Petitioner's misconduct, warranted interference by the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction. The Court held that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate any procedural illegality or error in the concurrent findings of the lower forums. It observed that the Petitioner participated in the inquiry proceedings without objection and that the misconduct—a breach of trust in a sensitive banking role—justified the dismissal. The Court affirmed that banking institutions rely on public trust and cannot retain employees involved in such breaches. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing the principle that procedural irregularities in financial institutions are serious matters, and courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding employee misconduct where the inquiry process was substantially fair.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the National Industrial Relations Commission in a service matter?
  • Does the placement of fake currency notes by a bank cashier constitute gross misconduct justifying dismissal?
  • Is a bank justified in dismissing an employee for breach of trust despite a long tenure of service?
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• Noshad Ali vs Government of Gilgit-Baltistan through Chief Secretary2023 PLC (C.S.) 1515 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2023-04-03
  PM Assistance Packagedeceased employeeemployment on compassionate groundswrit petitionconcealment of facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional writ petition was filed under Article 86(2) of the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018, seeking directions for the petitioner's appointment as EST (BPS-14) or UDC (BPS-14) under the Prime Minister Assistance Package following the death of his father, a deceased government employee. The petitioner claimed eligibility upon attaining majority, supported by a nomination from his mother. The respondents opposed the petition, asserting that the benefit under the Prime Minister Assistance Package had already been extended to the deceased employee's daughter in 2011, and further argued that the petition was barred by time due to a 13-year delay. The Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court examined the record and confirmed that the daughter of the deceased employee had indeed been appointed under the package in 2011, a fact suppressed by the petitioner. Holding that the statutory package benefit could only be availed once per deceased employee's family, the court dismissed the writ petition for lack of merit, granting liberty to file a civil suit if disputed.

  Questions settled

  • Can more than one family member of a deceased government employee claim employment under the Prime Minister Assistance Package?
  • Does the concealment of a prior appointment under the Prime Minister Assistance Package disentitle a petitioner from seeking extraordinary relief in a writ petition?
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• Noorullah and others vs Ghulam Murtaza and others2023 SCP 381, 2024 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-10
  land ownership disputeminor's capacity to contractvoid sale transactionburden of proofmutation validitycivil revisionagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from consolidated civil suits concerning ownership disputes over agricultural land, where the appellants challenged a High Court judgment that had partially allowed the respondents' revision petitions. The core legal questions involved the validity of land sale transactions allegedly executed in 1986, specifically whether minors could legally enter into such contracts and whether the appellants had sufficiently proven the execution of the mutation and sale documents. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the alleged sale in 1986 was void because the respondents were minors at the time, rendering them incompetent to contract under the law. Furthermore, the Court held that the appellants failed to provide necessary evidence to prove the execution of the mutation, specifically failing to summon required attesting witnesses as mandated by the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the High Court’s judgment was based on sound reasoning and correctly applied the law regarding the capacity to contract and the burden of proof in property disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Is a sale contract executed by a minor valid under the Contract Act 1872?
  • What is the legal effect of a sale transaction involving property owned by minors?
  • Does the failure to produce attesting witnesses for a mutation render the transaction unproven under the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
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• Noor-ur-Rehman vs The State and another2023 PCRLJ 826 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-05-18
  self-defenceprivate defenceqatl-i-amdcriminal appealsentence reductiontrespassmitigating circumstances
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction and fourteen-year sentence under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellant acted in self-defence and the determination of an appropriate sentence given the factual background. The court observed that the deceased had committed illegal trespass into the appellant’s house, which served as a mitigating factor. Although the appellant exceeded the right of private defence by firing at the deceased, the court noted that the shot was directed at a non-vital part (the thigh) and the appellant refrained from further firing despite having the opportunity. Consequently, the court held that the appellant had exercised a right of self-defence, albeit excessively. The court affirmed the principle that a plea of self-defence may be inferred from the evidence even if not explicitly raised during trial. Furthermore, it reiterated that cases falling under the exceptions of the former Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 are to be adjudicated under Section 302(c). The court partially allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence to ten years.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of self-defence be considered by the court if it was not explicitly raised by the accused during the trial?
  • Are cases falling under the exceptions of the former Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to be adjudicated under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the illegal trespass of a deceased into an accused's home constitute a mitigating circumstance for sentencing in a murder case?
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• Noor Zaman vs Mst. Gullan through Legal Heirs2023 MLD 551 · Lahore High Court · 2022-01-12Read full judgment →
• Noor Ullah vs The State and another2023 YLR 1039 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-08-17
  criminal appealqatl-i-amdbenefit of doubtmotiveevidentiary valueacquittalmurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his brother. The core legal question was whether the prosecution provided sufficient, confidence-inspiring evidence to sustain the conviction, particularly given the absence of eyewitnesses and the failure to establish the alleged motive. The Peshawar High Court found that the prosecution's case suffered from significant evidentiary gaps: no eyewitnesses were produced, the investigating officer failed to secure independent witnesses, and the alleged motive—a domestic dispute—remained unproven. The Court held that when the prosecution sets up a specific motive and fails to establish it, the prosecution must suffer the consequences. Emphasizing that the quality of evidence is paramount and that even a single reasonable doubt entitles an accused to acquittal as a matter of right, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to meet the required standard of proof. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, with the Court reiterating that the benefit of doubt is a legal right, not a concession.

  Questions settled

  • What are the consequences when the prosecution fails to establish a motive it has specifically set up?
  • Is the benefit of doubt a matter of grace or a legal right for an accused?
  • Does the absence of eyewitnesses in a murder case necessitate the acquittal of the accused if other evidence is insufficient?
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• Noor Shah Ali Khan alias Nawarish Ali Khan vs Khan Momin and 6 others2023 CLC 2002 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-02-02Read full judgment →
• Noor Rehman and another vs The State through Additional Advocate2023 PCRLJ 310 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-09-24
  honor killingcompromiseretrospective effectvested rightscompoundable offensecriminal appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellants under sections 302, 322, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and section 13 of the Arms Ordinance 1965, arising from a murder case registered in 2011. The core legal question was whether the bar on compounding honor-killing offenses introduced by the Criminal Law (Amendment) (Offences in the Name or on Pretext of Honor) Act, 2016 applies retrospectively to offenses committed prior to its enactment, thereby precluding a compromise between the parties. The Peshawar High Court held that the 2016 amendment Act does not apply retrospectively to impair vested or substantive rights accrued under the law in force at the time of the offense in 2011, when the offense was compoundable with the permission of the court. The court established that the relevant date for determining the compoundability of an offense is the date of the occurrence. Consequently, the court accepted the genuine compromise reached between the appellants and the legal heirs of the deceased, setting aside the murder convictions and acquitting the appellants while safeguarding the interests of minor legal heirs.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar on compounding honor-killing offenses introduced by the Criminal Law (Amendment) (Offences in the Name or on Pretext of Honor) Act, 2016 apply retrospectively to offenses committed prior to its enactment?
  • What is the relevant date for determining whether an offense is compoundable under the law?
  • Can a statute that takes away or impairs vested rights enjoyed under an existing law be presumed to have retrospective effect?
  • How are the interests of minor legal heirs protected when a compromise is effected in a murder case involving Diyat?
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• Noor Muhammad vs Mst. Umar Wadi and others2023 YLR 532 · Lahore High Court · 2021-12-14Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Ist A.D.J Badin & Others2023 SHC 349 · Sindh High Court · 2023-05-24Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad (deceased) through L.Rs. and others vs Muhammad2023 PLJ SC 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  revisional jurisdictionremand orderCode of Civil Procedureland disputeownershippossessionimpleadmentcondonation of delayHigh Court powerscase decided
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that set aside an appellate court's remand order and restored a trial court's decree concerning land ownership and possession. The respondents had initially obtained a decree for declaration, perpetual injunction, and recovery of possession, which was later set aside by the appellate court on the ground that a co-owner, Muhammad Siddique, was a necessary party and required impleadment. The High Court, in revision, restored the trial court's decree, finding no need for remand. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was the scope of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, specifically whether it could decide the case on merits or was restricted to affirming or setting aside the remand order. The Supreme Court condoned a one-day delay in filing the appeal. It held that the High Court's revisional jurisdiction is not restricted to merely affirming or setting aside a remand order; it can decide the case on its merits if sufficient evidence is available and no new evidence is required. The Court found that the rights of Muhammad Siddique had already been adjudicated through his brothers, who had identical claims, making a remand unnecessary. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when reviewing a remand order?
  • Can the High Court decide a case on its merits in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, even if the subordinate court had issued a remand order?
  • Is a remand order necessary when the rights of an impleaded party have already been adjudicated through other parties with identical claims?
  • Can a one-day delay in filing an appeal be condoned due to a calculation mistake regarding the number of days in a month?
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• Noor Kamal and Asad Kamal @ Syed Kamal vs The State and another2023 SCP 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-30
  post-arrest bailstatutory grounddelay in trialfurther inquiryrule of consistencymurderous assault
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their post-arrest bail petition by the Peshawar High Court in a case registered under Sections 324/34 PPC. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail on statutory grounds and on the basis of further inquiry under Section 497 Cr.P.C. due to the prolonged incarceration exceeding 22 months without the trial being concluded, where the delay was not attributable to them, and in light of the rule of consistency given that a co-accused had already been granted bail. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and set aside the impugned judgment, granting post-arrest bail to the petitioners. The Court held that where an accused has been detained for a continuous period exceeding one year in non-bailable offences not punishable with death and the delay is not occasioned by the accused, they are entitled to bail under the statutory provisions, and that liberty is a precious right not to be taken away lightly.

  Questions settled

  • Are accused persons entitled to post-arrest bail on statutory grounds when their detention exceeds one year and the delay in the conclusion of the trial is not attributable to them?
  • Does the assignment of a general role without specifying who fired the fatal or injurious shot warrant further inquiry into the guilt of the accused under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be granted to petitioners on the ground of consistency when a co-accused facing a similar role has already been released on bail by the court?
  • Does the absence of repeated firing by the accused prima facie negate an intention to kill in a murderous assault case?
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• Noor Kamal and another vs The State and another2023 SCMR 999 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-30
  post-arrest bailstatutory bailprolonged incarcerationfurther inquirycriminal trial delaypersonal libertymurderous assault
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that denied post-arrest bail to the petitioners in a case registered under sections 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners, accused of a murderous assault, sought bail on statutory grounds, arguing that they had been incarcerated for over 22 months without the trial concluding, and that the delay was not attributable to them. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to statutory bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 given the prolonged detention and lack of trial progress. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were entitled to bail, noting that the delay in trial was not caused by the accused, and that the case warranted further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court affirmed the principle that personal liberty is a precious right and that statutory provisions mandating bail for prolonged detention without fault of the accused must be strictly applied to prevent indefinite incarceration.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory provision for bail apply when an accused has been detained for over one year without the trial concluding due to reasons not attributable to them?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the prosecution fails to attribute the delay in trial proceedings to the accused?
  • Can bail be granted on the ground of consistency when a co-accused with a similar role has already been granted bail?
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• Noor Kamal and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-30
  post-arrest bailstatutory baildelay in trialprinciple of consistencyattempted murdercriminal justice administration
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that denied post-arrest bail to the petitioners in a case involving attempted murder. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail on statutory grounds due to the prolonged detention and delay in the trial, and whether the principle of consistency applied given that a co-accused had already been granted bail. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were entitled to bail. The Court observed that the petitioners had been incarcerated for over 22 months without the trial concluding, and the delay was not attributable to them. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioners were ascribed a general role without specific allegations of repeated firing, and a co-accused with a similar role had already been granted bail. The Court affirmed the principle that liberty is a precious right that cannot be curtailed without exceptional grounds and that statutory provisions regarding bail due to trial delay must be strictly applied when the delay is not caused by the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the trial has been delayed for over one year without fault on the part of the accused?
  • Does the principle of consistency apply when a co-accused with a similar role has already been granted bail by the Court?
  • Can bail be granted under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the allegations involve a general role without specific attribution of the fatal act?
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• Noor Habib Shah vs The State and another2023 PCRLJ 1413 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-10-12
  murder convictioneye-witness credibilityabsconsionsite plansentence enhancementappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellant for the murder of Noor Alam Shah under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. A concurrent criminal revision sought the enhancement of the sentence to death. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of eye-witness testimony amidst alleged inconsistencies, the evidentiary value of site plans, and whether the witnesses' conduct was unnatural. The Court held that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through consistent eye-witness accounts and medical evidence. The Court affirmed the conviction and dismissed the revision for sentence enhancement, noting that the occurrence happened suddenly. Key principles laid down include: site plans are not substantive evidence and cannot be used to discredit unchallenged eye-witness testimony; minor inconsistencies arising from relentless cross-examination do not warrant discarding otherwise credible testimony; and absconsion, while not sufficient alone to prove guilt, serves as valid corroboratory evidence. The Court emphasized that courts should focus on the general demeanor and truthfulness of witnesses rather than manufactured contradictions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a site plan a substantive piece of evidence that can be used to discredit eye-witness testimony?
  • Does the presence of minor inconsistencies in a witness's testimony during cross-examination necessarily invalidate their entire statement?
  • Can the conduct of witnesses who fail to apprehend an assailant immediately after a shooting be deemed unnatural?
  • Is absconsion sufficient by itself to prove guilt in a criminal case?
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• Noor Din vs Kanay2023 PHC 121 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-02-16Read full judgment →
• Noor Din deceased through LRs vs Pervaiz Akhtar & others2023 SCP 288, 2024 PLJ SC 338, 2023 SCMR 1928 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-08-01
  inheritancemutationlimitationconstructive possessionIslamic law of inheritancerevenue recordShariadeclaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an inheritance dispute arising from the 1958 exclusion of a daughter, Mst. Mir Jan, from her father Qaim Din’s estate mutation. The appellants, successors of the deceased's sons, contended that the respondents' 2005 suit for declaration and cancellation of the mutation was time-barred. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court held that the suit was not time-barred, as the cause of action accrued only upon the respondents' discovery of the erroneous entry in 2004. The Court reaffirmed that under Islamic Law, inheritance opens immediately upon death, and a mutation record, being for fiscal purposes, cannot divest a legal heir of their Sharia-mandated share. Furthermore, an heir in possession holds the property constructively for all co-heirs unless there is clear evidence of express repudiation or relinquishment of rights. Absent such evidence, the law of limitation does not preclude a claim for inheritance, as the revenue record does not confer title contrary to the principles of Sharia.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mutation entry in the revenue record confer title to property contrary to Islamic Law of inheritance?
  • Is an heir in possession of inherited property considered to be in constructive possession on behalf of all other heirs?
  • When does the limitation period commence for a suit challenging an inheritance mutation that excluded a legal heir?
  • Can a claim for inheritance be defeated by the plea of limitation in the absence of evidence of relinquishment of rights by the excluded heir?
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• Noor Ajab and 3 others vs Ahmed Nawaz Khan and 2 others2023 MLD 576 · Peshawar High Court · 2021-02-01Read full judgment →
• Noman Khaliq vs The State and another2023 SCP 249, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 42, 2023 SCMR 2122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-08-11
  post-arrest baildishonouring of chequeprohibitory clausefurther inquiryabsconsionbusiness relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail where the offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and whether Section 489-F PPC applies to disputes arising from joint business relations rather than repayment of a loan or fulfillment of an obligation. The Supreme Court held that the case fell within the ambit of Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. for further inquiry, noting that Section 489-F PPC is not intended for the recovery of money, that offences not falling within the prohibitory clause warrant bail as a rule, and that absconsion alone is not sufficient to deny bail. The petition was converted into an appeal, allowed, and the petitioner was admitted to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is intended to be used for the recovery of alleged amounts arising from business relations?
  • Does an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can absconsion alone be made a sole ground to discard the grant of bail when the case otherwise falls for further inquiry?
  • Is the grant of bail the general rule for offences not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Nishtar Hospital Multan through Medical Superintendent vs Messrs Linde2023 YLR 2364 · Lahore High Court · 2022-12-21Read full judgment →
• Nisar vs Said Qamar (Late) through LRs and others2023 MLD 1870 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-01-13Read full judgment →
• Nisar Sarwar vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Energy Power Division), Islamabad and others2023 PLC (C.S.) 81 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-27
  current chargemaster and servantadministrative discretiontransfer and postingLESCOservice matterwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Superintending Engineer (BS-19) at LESCO, challenged an office order replacing him with a junior officer on a 'current charge' basis, alleging violation of seniority and transfer policies. The core legal question was whether the court could interfere in the internal transfer and posting matters of a corporate entity governed by non-statutory rules under the master-servant doctrine, and whether administrative discretion in such postings was exercised lawfully. The Court held that while LESCO is governed by non-statutory rules, limiting direct judicial interference, administrative authorities are still obligated to exercise discretion fairly, transparently, and in accordance with established policies. Consequently, the Court disposed of the petition by directing the Secretary, Ministry of Energy (Power Division) to treat the petition as a formal representation, hear the parties, and issue a speaking order within fifteen days. The principle laid down is that administrative authorities must act fairly and reasonably, and discretionary powers cannot be exercised arbitrarily, even in organizations governed by the master-servant principle.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere in the internal transfer and posting matters of an entity governed by non-statutory rules?
  • Is an administrative authority required to exercise discretionary powers in a transparent and unbiased manner despite the master-servant doctrine?
  • Does the appointment of a junior officer on a current charge basis to a non-vacant post require adherence to established seniority and transfer policies?
  Read full judgment →
• Nisar deceased through Legal Heirs Muhammad Akram and others vs Muhammad Iqbal deceased through Legal Heirs Mst. Riasat Begum and others2023 PLJ Peshawar 159 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Nisar Ali vs Chairman Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission and another2023 PHC 544 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmed, Khuda Bux son of Mohammad Bux Panhwar vs Umed Ali, Abdul Lateef, Abdul Fatah, Mehboob Ali and Nabidad and others, The State2023 SHC 335 · Sindh High Court · 2023-05-19
  custodial deathpolice torturecircumstantial evidencereferee judgecriminal appealacquittal appealasphyxiacommon object
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and acquittal appeal arose from a reference to a Referee Judge following a difference of opinion between a Division Bench regarding the conviction of a police official and the acquittal of others for a custodial death. The core legal question concerned the assessment of circumstantial evidence in a case of death by torture in police custody and the scope of a Referee Judge under section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court held that the chain of circumstantial evidence unbrokenly connected the accused policemen who held the deceased in custody behind closed doors to his death by asphyxia. The acquittal of four policemen was set aside, and their convictions were recorded under section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while maintaining the 10-year sentence originally handed down to the primary convict. The key principle laid down is that where custodial death by torture is established through consistent ocular and medical circumstantial evidence, the responsible law enforcement personnel cannot escape liability merely due to the absence of direct eyewitnesses to the physical blows.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope and legal effect of a reference to a Referee Judge in criminal appeals under section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when a Division Bench is equally divided?
  • Can a conviction for qatl-i-amd based on custodial torture be sustained on circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct eyewitness accounts of the infliction of blows?
  • When does an act of homicide committed during police interrogation attract the lesser discretionary punishment under section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than section 302(b)?
  • Does the vicarious liability rule under section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply automatically to a group of police officials interrogating a detainee behind closed doors when death ensues?
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• Nisar Ahmed vs Haji Fazal Dad2023 CLC 201 · Lahore High Court · 2021-09-13Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmed Khan vs N.H.A. and others2023 SHC 1006 · Sindh High Court · 2023-08-03Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmed Afzal & another vs National Accountability Bureau (NAB)2023 IHC 72 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-04-10
  asset freezingmoney launderingAccountability CourtjurisdictionAnti-Money Laundering ActNational Accountability Bureauproceeds of crimecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns consolidated criminal appeals and a writ petition challenging asset freezing orders imposed by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) against the appellants. The core legal question was whether NAB could maintain freezing orders under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, following legislative amendments that ousted the Accountability Court's jurisdiction over matters related to the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010. Additionally, the Court examined whether NAB could proceed under the 2010 Act before the Court of Sessions. The Court held that the freezing orders under the 1999 Ordinance were no longer sustainable due to the retrospective change in law. However, it affirmed that NAB remains a competent investigating agency under the 2010 Act. The Court directed NAB to conclude its investigations and file a formal complaint before the Court of Sessions, which is empowered to independently adjudicate the attachment of assets. The key principle established is that while the Accountability Court's jurisdiction regarding the 2010 Act has been ousted, the Court of Sessions retains jurisdiction to adjudicate money laundering offences and related asset attachments upon a competent complaint.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Accountability Court retain jurisdiction to adjudicate matters under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, following the National Accountability (Amendment) Act, 2022?
  • Can the National Accountability Bureau initiate proceedings under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, before the Court of Sessions?
  • Is a complaint in writing by an investigating officer appointed under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, a mandatory requirement for the Court of Sessions to take cognizance of an offence?
  • Can freezing orders passed under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, survive after the retrospective amendment of the law?
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• Nirma Shahzadi vs The State and others2023 PCRLJ 316 · Lahore High Court · 2021-10-29
  section 164 statementjudicial discretionrecording of statementcriminal procedureconstitutional petitioncoercioninvestigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a Judicial Magistrate's order refusing to record the petitioner's statement a second time under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether a witness or complainant has an absolute right to have their statement recorded under section 164, Cr.P.C. multiple times, or if the Magistrate possesses discretion to decline such requests. The Court held that the power to record statements under section 164, Cr.P.C. is discretionary, not mandatory, and must be exercised judicially to advance the cause of justice. The Court established that while section 164, Cr.P.C. does not explicitly prohibit a second statement, it cannot be granted mechanically. A petitioner seeking a second statement must demonstrate exceptional circumstances, such as proving that the initial statement was involuntary, coerced, or procured through duress. Absent such proof, or where the request appears mala fide or intended to aggravate charges without justification, the Magistrate is justified in refusing the application.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Magistrate legally obligated to record a statement under section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, whenever requested?
  • Can a statement recorded under section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, be recorded a second time?
  • What criteria must a Magistrate apply when deciding whether to allow a second statement under section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the burden of proof lie on the person seeking to record a second statement under section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, to show that their first statement was involuntary?
  Read full judgment →
• Nib Bank Limited vs Messrs Pasban Agro Chemicals Company and others2023 CLD 1131 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-27Read full judgment →
• Niaz vs The State and another2023 YLR 234 · Peshawar High Court · 2021-11-11
  post-arrest bailfirearm injurycharring marksmedical evidence contradictionfurther inquirycriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was moved by the petitioner seeking post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 159 registered under Sections 324/337-F(iii)/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code and Section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013. The core legal question revolved around whether discrepancies between the ocular account, medical evidence regarding charring marks from specified distances, and the injury sheet created a case of further inquiry entitling the accused to bail. The Peshawar High Court held that the presence of charring marks on both the entry and exit wounds despite distances ranging from eight to twenty paces, alongside contradictions between the medical report and the site plan, rendered the prosecution's version subject to further inquiry. Consequently, the petition was allowed and the petitioner was granted post-arrest bail. The key principle laid down is that material contradictions between the ocular account and medical evidence regarding the physical possibility of firearm injuries and charring marks at given distances make out a case of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contradictions between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding charring marks at a distance create a case for further inquiry?
  • Does a discrepancy between the injury sheet and the medico-legal report regarding the number of firearm injuries justify granting post-arrest bail?
  • Can bail be granted when the distance between the assailant and the victim raises questions about the presence of charring marks?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Muhammad etc, Momin Khan and another vs The State etc, The State2023 PHC 366 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-07-10Read full judgment →
• Niaz Muhammad and others vs The State and others2023 PCRLJ 1741 · Balochistan High Court · 2022-10-10
  kidnapping for ransomcircumstantial evidencedisclosure statementAnti-Terrorism ActDNA evidenceconcealment of evidencedeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a conviction for kidnapping for ransom and murder, a murder reference for death sentence confirmation, and an acquittal appeal against a co-accused. The core legal questions involved the admissibility of disclosure statements leading to the discovery of incriminating facts, the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, and the applicability of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 to kidnapping for ransom cases. The Court held that the appellant’s disclosure leading to the recovery of the victim's body and ransom money was admissible under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. It further held that kidnapping for ransom under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 does not automatically constitute terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 unless specific design or purpose is proven. Consequently, the Court set aside the appellant's conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act, maintained the death sentence under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and convicted the co-accused under Section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for concealing evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is kidnapping for ransom under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 automatically an act of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Are disclosure statements made by an accused in police custody admissible if they lead to the discovery of new facts?
  • Can a co-accused be convicted under Section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for concealing evidence of a murder?
  • Does the absence of direct evidence preclude a conviction when circumstantial evidence is sufficient?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Muhammad (Nazak Khan) vs Bibi Khatima and another2023 PLD Balochistan 51, 2024 PLJ 32 · Balochistan High Court · 2022-10-03Read full judgment →
• Niaz Khan vs The State2023 PCRLJ 567 · Lahore High Court · 2022-06-01
  mental illnessschizophreniacapability to stand trialunsound mindfair trialmedical boardremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a judgment of the Sessions Judge, Attock, whereby the appellant was convicted under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to imprisonment for life for the murder of his wife. The core legal question revolved around the appellant's mental illness (schizophrenia) and whether the trial court failed to properly determine his capability to face trial and defend himself under sections 464 and 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Lahore High Court held that once a court observes or receives material suggesting an accused's mental incapacity, it is mandatory to conduct a thorough inquiry supported by a comprehensive medical board report, and the summary rejection of the defence application in this regard caused a miscarriage of justice and violated the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Consequently, the High Court set aside the conviction and sentence, remanding the matter back to the trial court to determine the appellant's capability to stand trial in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court is bound to conduct a formal inquiry into the mental health and capability of an accused to face trial when prima facie signs of abnormality are observed?
  • Does the summary dismissal of an application by the defence to examine the head of a medical board regarding an accused's psychiatric condition vitiate the trial?
  • What is the legal procedure and onus of proof when a plea of mental incapacity or insanity is raised in a criminal trial under Pakistani law?
  • Whether a judgment of conviction can be sustained when the trial court completely fails to address or determine a properly raised plea concerning the accused's mental illness?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Hussain vs The State and 4 others2023 MLD 128 · Sindh High Court · 2021-03-22
  criminal acquittal appealbenefit of doubtocular evidencemedical evidence contradictiondelay in FIRpresumption of innocenceappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal challenged the judgment of the trial court which acquitted the respondents of charges under sections 324, 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the trial court's acquittal was based on a possible view of the evidence or if it warranted interference by the appellate court. The High Court upheld the acquittal, finding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The court identified fatal inconsistencies in the prosecution's evidence, including an 11-day delay in lodging the FIR, contradictory statements by prosecution witnesses regarding the timing of events, and a direct conflict between the ocular account and the medical evidence. The court held that an acquittal order should not be lightly interfered with, as the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an acquittal. Appellate courts should only intervene if the trial court's view is impossible or results in a miscarriage of justice, which was not the case here.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal order merely because a contra view is possible?
  • Does an inordinate delay in lodging an FIR create a presumption of false implication?
  • What is the effect of a direct conflict between ocular testimony and medical evidence on the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Hussain Soomro vs The State2023 YLR 2292 · Sindh High Court · 2022-04-11
  murdercriminal appealocular testimonymedical corroborationdelay in FIRinterested witnessabscondencecompromise
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Kamber-Shandadkot at Kamber, convicting the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to imprisonment for life for the murder of the deceased through firearm injuries. The core legal questions involved whether the delay in lodging the FIR was fatal, whether ocular testimony sufficiently corroborated medical evidence, and whether the acquittal of a co-accused on different facts vitiated the appellant's conviction. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through consistent ocular accounts and medical corroboration, and that any delay in the FIR was fully explained by the circumstances of rushing the injured to hospital. The court laid down that a related or natural witness's testimony is credible unless proven to have a motive for false implication, and that the prosecution must stand on its own legs regardless of whether an accused testifies on oath under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR always prove fatal to the prosecution case?
  • Can the testimony of a related eye-witness be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship to the deceased?
  • Whether an accused's failure to examine himself on oath under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be used to draw an adverse inference of guilt?
  • Is the acquittal of one co-accused on distinct roles and facts grounds for setting aside the conviction of another co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Hussain Shah vs The State & others2023 IHC 104 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-08-22Read full judgment →
• Niaz Abbas alias Muhammad Nawaz, etc, The State vs The State, etc, Muhammad Asif, etc2023 LHC 5215 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Newage Cables (Pvt.) Ltd vs Lahore Electric Supply Company, etc2023 LHC 566 · Lahore High Court · 2023-02-16Read full judgment →
• New Dadu Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd vs Sindh Sugar Corporation Ltd. and Another2023 SHC 1048, 2024 CLD 525 · Sindh High Court · 2023-11-15Read full judgment →
• Nestle Pakistan Ltd. through Plant Manager vs Full Bench of National2023 PLC 95 · Sindh High Court · 2022-10-11
  writ petitionNational Industrial Relations Commissiongrievance petitionreinstatementdomestic inquirymisconductuncontroverted evidencelimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by an employer challenging the judgment of the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC), which had reversed the Single Bench's decision dismissing an employee's grievance petition against his termination. The employee was dismissed following a domestic inquiry into charges of submitting falsified medical claims and fake receipts. The primary legal questions were whether the Full Bench erred in disregarding uncontroverted inquiry evidence on the ground that hospital administrators/doctors were not examined, and whether the disciplinary proceedings were time-barred under labor laws. The High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the Full Bench's order and restoring the Single Bench's judgment. The Court held that an appellate forum cannot disregard unimpeached and uncontroverted evidence in favor of a mere presumption. It laid down that where an employee participates in an inquiry without objection, signs the proceedings, and fails to rebut evidence, the inquiry findings stand valid. Furthermore, the one-month period to issue a show-cause notice under Section 15(4) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 runs from the date the misconduct comes to the employer's knowledge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate forum can disregard uncontroverted inquiry evidence merely because external witnesses were not examined?
  • From what date does the one-month period for informing a workman of alleged misconduct begin under Section 15(4) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Whether an employee who participates in a domestic inquiry and signs the report without demur can subsequently challenge its procedural validity?
  Read full judgment →
• Nestle Pakistan Ltd. Karachi through Plant Manager vs Full Bench of National Industrial Relations Commission and 2 others2023 PLJ Karachi 1 · Sindh High Court
  industrial relationsdismissal from servicefalsification of documentswrit jurisdictiondisciplinary inquiryback benefitsuncontroverted evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a judgment by the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) which had reinstated an employee dismissed for falsifying medical claims. The core legal question was whether the Full Bench of the NIRC erred in setting aside the dismissal order when the employee had failed to challenge the evidence or the inquiry proceedings before the Single Bench. The High Court held that the Full Bench of the NIRC acted on an erroneous assumption of facts and misapplied the law by disregarding uncontroverted evidence. The Court found that the disciplinary proceedings were procedurally sound, the employee had admitted the factual narration, and the initiation of proceedings was within the statutory time limit. Consequently, the High Court set aside the Full Bench's judgment and restored the dismissal. The key principle laid down is that an appellate forum cannot disregard uncontroverted evidence in favor of presumptions, and that where due process is manifest from an employee's participation and signatures in inquiry proceedings, they cannot subsequently resile from those proceedings without demonstrating procedural impropriety.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate forum disregard uncontroverted evidence in favor of a presumption?
  • Does an employee's signature on inquiry proceedings preclude them from later claiming procedural impropriety?
  • Is a disciplinary proceeding time-barred if the employer initiates it within one month of the date the misconduct came to their notice?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to interfere with an NIRC judgment that is predicated upon an erroneous assumption of facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Nestle Pakistan Limited through Authorized Officer and others vs The Federal Board of Revenue through Chairman and others2023 PTD 527 · Sindh High Court · 2022-11-29
  Customs Act 1969Income Tax Ordinance 2001Sales Tax Act 1990Post-clearance auditJurisdiction of CustomsShort levyFiscal statutes
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged notices issued by the Collectorate of Customs (Adjudication) seeking to assess and recover alleged short levies of income tax and sales tax on imported goods after their clearance. The core legal question was whether the Customs department retains jurisdiction to adjudicate or recover such taxes post-clearance. The Court held that the Customs department lacks such jurisdiction. It determined that while Customs acts as a collecting agent for advance tax at the import stage, this role is limited to the time of import. Once consignments are assessed and released under the Customs Act, 1969, the authority to assess or recover income tax and sales tax vests exclusively with the Inland Revenue department. The Court emphasized that charge, assessment, and recovery are distinct facets of a levy, and specific parent statutes govern these taxes. The insertion of the word "taxes" in the Customs Act did not confer blanket concurrent jurisdiction. Consequently, the impugned notices were declared illegal and set aside, affirming that Customs' authority is circumscribed to the import stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Customs department have jurisdiction to assess or recover income tax and sales tax after the clearance of imported goods?
  • Does the insertion of the word 'taxes' in sections 32 and 179 of the Customs Act, 1969 confer concurrent jurisdiction upon the Customs department to recover income tax and sales tax post-clearance?
  • Is the Customs department's authority to collect advance tax under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 limited to the time of import?
  • Does the Inland Revenue department have the exclusive authority to recover short-levied income tax and sales tax after the release of consignments?
  Read full judgment →
• Nestle Pak Limited, Lahore etc. vs Shehryar Kureshi etc.2023 LHC 5317, 2024 CLD 502 · Lahore High Court · 2023-10-18Read full judgment →
• Nemat Ullah Khan vs Province of The Punjab, etc.2023 PLJ Lahore 334 · Lahore High Court · 2022-11-30Read full judgment →
• Nemat Ullah Khan vs Province of The Punjab and others2023 CLD 261 · Lahore High Court · 2022-11-30Read full judgment →
• Nek Din etc vs The State etc2023 PHC 492 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-10-18Read full judgment →
• Neelum View Hotel vs Vice Chancellor Azad Jammu and Kashmir2023 SC AJK 60 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2023-08-30Read full judgment →
• Neelum Tours & Travels (Pvt.) Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan and others2023 IHC 336 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-12-29Read full judgment →
• Neelum Jhelum Hydro Electric Project (Wapda), Muzaffarabad through Chief Engineer_Project Director vs Abdul Hameed deceased through L.Rs. and others2023 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 81 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  company litigationboard resolutioncompetency of appealauthorizationmaintainabilitypower of attorneycivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals filed by the Neelum Jhelum Hydro Electric Project against a High Court judgment regarding compensation for acquired watermills. The respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeals, arguing that the petitions for leave to appeal were filed without the mandatory authorization from the Company's Board of Directors. The core legal question was whether legal proceedings initiated on behalf of a private company are competent without a specific resolution from its Board of Directors authorizing the signatory. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the appeals were incompetent. Relying on established precedents and the requirements of Order XXIX, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the Court concluded that the appellant failed to produce any evidence, such as a board resolution, authorizing the Chief Engineer or Project Director to institute the proceedings. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals on this preliminary ground, affirming the principle that legal proceedings on behalf of a company are not maintainable unless the person instituting them is duly authorized by a valid board resolution.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal filed on behalf of a private company maintainable without a resolution from its Board of Directors?
  • Does the absence of a board resolution authorizing the institution of legal proceedings render an appeal incompetent?
  • Can a Project Director initiate legal proceedings for a company without explicit authorization from the Board of Directors?
  Read full judgment →
• NBP Officers Welfare Association And others vs Federation of Pakistan and Others2023 SHC 40 · Sindh High Court · 2023-02-07
  writ jurisdictionstatutory corporationmaster and servantannual incrementservice rulespolicy decisionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by officer-grade employees and an association against the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP), seeking directions for the payment of annual increments effective from 1st January of each year pursuant to bank policy, rather than from later months as implemented in 2020 and 2021. The core legal questions involved whether the NBP is a statutory entity amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, whether its service rules are statutory, and whether the bank's policy decision regarding the timing of annual increments is open to judicial review. The Sindh High Court held that the NBP is a statutory corporation established under the National Bank of Pakistan Ordinance 1949 and is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199(5) of the Constitution. However, dismissing the petition on merits, the court held that internal policy matters regarding the timing and award of performance-based annual increments do not violate fundamental rights and cannot be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction unless a clear violation of fundamental rights is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the National Bank of Pakistan is a statutory corporation amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can the High Court interfere with internal policy matters and performance-based increment timelines of a banking institution under its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether annual increments in banking employment constitute an unconditional vested right claimable irrespective of performance evaluation?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmed vs The State2023 SCP 175, 2023 SCMR 1140, PLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 241, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-06-01
  explosive materialofficial witnessestestimony of police officersSection 340(2) CrPCdefence pleawithholding best evidenceminor discrepanciesburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a criminal petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which upheld the conviction and sentences of fourteen years' rigorous imprisonment awarded to the petitioner under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Section 7(ff) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The prosecution alleged that explosive material, detonators, and safety fuses were recovered from the petitioner during a police search. The primary legal questions concerned the credibility of official police witnesses without public association, the effect of minor discrepancies in prosecution evidence, and the legal consequence of an accused failing to testify on oath under Section 340(2) Cr.P.C. when raising a specific defence plea of false implication. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave. The Court held that testimonies of official witnesses are as reliable as private witnesses absent animus, and minor discrepancies do not shatter a consistent prosecution case. Furthermore, under Article 119 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, where the prosecution proves its case, the burden shifts to the accused to prove a specific defence; an accused who fails to examine himself on oath under Section 340(2) Cr.P.C. withholds the best evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Are the uncorroborated testimonies of police or official witnesses legally sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction absent proof of animus or malice?
  • What is the evidentiary effect of an accused failing to testify on oath under Section 340(2) Cr.P.C. when raising a specific defence plea?
  • Do minor discrepancies in the statements of prosecution witnesses justify the rejection of evidence in its entirety?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmed vs StatePLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  explosive substancesofficial witnessesappreciation of evidencedefence pleastatement on oathminor discrepanciesburden of proofcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition filed against the judgment of the High Court, which maintained the petitioner's conviction and sentence under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Section 7(ff) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, handed down by the Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, Sargodha. The core legal question concerns the reliability of official police witnesses in recovery cases, the treatment of minor discrepancies in prosecution evidence, and the legal effect of an accused failing to depose on oath under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 when raising a specific defence plea. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the testimonies of official witnesses are entirely reliable in the absence of proved animus, minor discrepancies should be ignored if the evidence inspires confidence, and the failure of an accused to appear as a witness on oath under Section 340(2) weakens their specific defence plea as withholding the best evidence. The key principle laid down is that official witnesses stand on an equal footing with private witnesses, and an accused person raising a specific defence must substantiate it by stepping into the witness box where facts are exclusively within their knowledge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of official police witnesses can be relied upon for conviction without corroboration by private witnesses?
  • What is the legal consequence when an accused person raising a specific defence plea fails to appear as a witness on oath under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • How should courts treat minor discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses?
  • Upon whom lies the burden of proof when an accused takes a specific defence plea after the prosecution discharges its initial burden?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmed vs Capital City Police Officer, Lahore and 5 others2023 YLR 382 · Lahore High Court · 2021-11-09
  habeas corpusphysical remandcase diarypost-arrest bailillegal detentionjudicial mindinvestigating officersupplementary statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, sought the recovery of a 17-year-old detenu from alleged illegal police custody. The Court examined the legality of the detention, the validity of the physical remand order, and the procedural irregularities in the investigation, specifically the delegation of case diary recording to subordinates. The Court held that the remand order was passed mechanically without the Magistrate applying an independent judicial mind to the evidentiary material. Furthermore, the Court determined that the investigating officer lacked the authority to delegate the recording of case diaries to subordinates. Finding no cogent evidence connecting the detenu to the alleged offence, the Court set aside the remand order and converted the habeas petition into a post-arrest bail application under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, admitting the detenu to bail. The judgment establishes that Magistrates must record reasoned, speaking orders for physical remand and that supplementary statements cannot substitute for FIRs or justify arrest without sufficient incriminating material.

  Questions settled

  • Can an investigating officer delegate the duty of recording case diaries to a subordinate?
  • Is a Magistrate required to record reasons when granting physical remand of an accused?
  • Can a habeas corpus petition under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be converted into a post-arrest bail application?
  • Does a supplementary statement have the same legal status as an FIR for justifying an arrest?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad and 10 others vs Hasanullah and 17 others2023 PHC 135 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-03-20Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad & another vs Muhammad Siddique2023 LHC 6984, 2025 CLC 32 · Lahore High Court · 2023-12-15Read full judgment →
• Nazim Uddin S/o Allah Dino vs Election Commission of Pakistan and Others2023 SHC 377 · Sindh High Court · 2023-06-02Read full judgment →
• Nazim Shaheen and 10 others vs Adalat Khan and 8 others2023 PCRLJ 132 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2021-12-22
  suspension of sentencestatutory bailpost-conviction bailappellate courtcriminal appealabetmenthardened criminal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the order of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court, which granted bail to a convict sentenced to life imprisonment under sections 302 and 109 of the Azad Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the convict was entitled to suspension of sentence and bail under section 426(1-A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given that his appeal had remained pending for over two years. The Supreme Court upheld the bail, holding that the convict had earned a statutory right to bail because the delay in the appeal's disposal was not attributable to him or his counsel. The Court affirmed that while this right is not absolute and may be denied if the convict is deemed a hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal, the evidence did not support such a classification in this instance, particularly as the convict was abroad during the occurrence. The Court emphasized that appellate courts should not engage in the meticulous appreciation of evidence or decide the merits of the case during the bail stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does a convict have a statutory right to bail under Section 426(1-A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the appeal remains undecided for more than two years?
  • Can the appellate court deny bail under Section 426(1-A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the grounds that the convict is a hardened or dangerous criminal?
  • Should an appellate court engage in the meticulous appreciation of evidence when deciding an application for suspension of sentence pending appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazeer Ahmed vs The State2023 PCRLJ 1681 · Balochistan High Court · 2022-10-24
  anti-terrorismproscribed organizationcriminal appealinadmissible confessionpolice disclosureflag recoveryacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Trial Court convicting and sentencing the appellant under Section 11-F(6) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal question revolves around whether the mere possession of a flag resembling that of a proscribed organization, along with an inadmissible police disclosure, is sufficient to establish an offence under Section 11-F of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Balochistan High Court held that a disclosure made to a police officer which does not lead to any distinct discovery is inadmissible under Articles 38 and 39 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and that mere possession of a flag without independent, tangible, and strong corroborative evidence does not constitute an offence under Section 11-F of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The court laid down the principle that conviction for association with a proscribed organization requires solid independent evidence beyond the mere resemblance of recovered items, and that police confessions not falling under statutory exceptions are legally inadmissible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether mere possession of a flag resembling that of a proscribed organization constitutes an offence under Section 11-F of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Is a disclosure statement made before a police officer admissible in evidence when it does not lead to a distinct discovery under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • What quantum and nature of evidence is required to establish an indictment under Section 11-F of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazeer Ahmed Muhammadani vs The State2023 YLR 1392 · Sindh High Court · 2020-11-25
  trial in absentiaAnti-Terrorism Actcriminal appealfundamental rightsconviction in absentianatural justiceabsconder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants under Section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, rendered by the Anti-Terrorism Court in their absentia. The core legal question was whether such a conviction, imposed without framing a charge or providing an opportunity for a hearing, was legally sustainable. The Sindh High Court held that the trial court’s procedure was illegal and violative of the appellants' fundamental rights. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellants were acquitted. The Court established that trial in absentia, without adhering to mandatory legal procedures, contravenes Articles 9 and 10 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, and violates the principles of natural justice. Additionally, the Court clarified that a person convicted in absentia under Section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, is not barred from filing an appeal under Section 25 of the Act without first seeking relief through an application under Section 19(12) of the same Act before the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Is a conviction in absentia under Section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, valid if the trial court failed to frame a charge or record evidence?
  • Does a trial in absentia violate Articles 9 and 10 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Is it a mandatory condition for a person convicted in absentia to file an application under Section 19(12) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, before filing an appeal under Section 25 of the same Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazeer Ahmad vs Muhammad Sadiq (deceased) through L.Rs. and 22023 LHC 4648, 2024 MLD 18 · Lahore High Court · 2023-09-15Read full judgment →
• Nazar Muhammad vs DPO, etc2023 LHC 6318 · Lahore High Court · 2023-10-19Read full judgment →
• Nayab Khan vs Chief Executive Office PESCO, Peshawar and others2023 PLC (C.S) 944 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-07-20
  writ petitionmaintainabilitymaster and servantterms and conditions of servicecorporate entityPESCOstatutory rulestransfer and posting
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an employee of Peshawar Electric Supply Company Limited (PESCO), invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court challenging his transfer order. The core legal question was whether a writ petition is maintainable against PESCO by its employee regarding terms and conditions of service in the absence of statutory rules. The court held that PESCO is incorporated under the Companies Ordinance and lacks statutory rules governing its service terms; consequently, the relationship between PESCO and its employees is governed by the principle of Master and Servant, making the writ petition non-maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution. The key principle laid down is that where an organization is a corporate entity without statutory service rules, its employees cannot invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, and their remedy lies before a civil court.

  Questions settled

  • Are the service rules of Peshawar Electric Supply Company Limited (PESCO) statutory in nature?
  • Can a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution be maintained by an employee of PESCO against a transfer order?
  • Does the principle of Master and Servant apply to the employment relationship of PESCO employees?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for a PESCO employee aggrieved by an adverse personnel action in the absence of statutory rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawaz Khan alias Margha vs The State etc2023 PHC 251, 2024 YLR 1986 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-05-31Read full judgment →
• Nawal & another, Ms. Hiba Rehan vs Federation of Pakistan & others2023 SHC 82, 2024 MLD 225 · Sindh High Court · 2022-11-14Read full judgment →
• Nawabzada Saeed Ahmed Khan vs Mst. Aisha and others2023 SHC 455 · Sindh High Court · 2023-07-19Read full judgment →
• Nawabzada Abdul Qadir Khan and others vs Land Acquisition Collector2023 SCMR 950 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-05
  land acquisitioneminent domainmarket valuecompensationstatutory interestSection 34 LAAconstitutional property rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a Peshawar High Court judgment regarding the quantum of compensation for land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for university purposes. The core legal questions involved the appropriate valuation of acquired land and the legality of awarding six-percent interest under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in light of arguments regarding riba. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, affirming the compensation rate of Rs. 125,000 per marla. The Court held that the one-year average method is not an absolute yardstick for determining market value; rather, Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 requires a broader assessment considering location, potentiality, and the impact of eminent domain. Furthermore, the Court ruled that interest awarded under Section 34 is compensatory, not riba, as it serves to indemnify landowners for the loss of use of their property during the acquisition process. The judgment reinforces the principle that statutory compensation must aim to restore landowners to their pre-acquisition position, acknowledging the state's unilateral exercise of eminent domain.

  Questions settled

  • Is the one-year average of land sales an absolute yardstick for determining market value under the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Does the interest awarded under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 constitute prohibited riba?
  • What factors must a Referee Court consider when determining compensation under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
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• Nawabzada Abdul Qadir Khan and others vs Land Acquisition Collector2023 SCP 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  eminent domainland acquisitionmarket valuecompensatory interestSection 23 LAASection 34 LAAriba
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a Peshawar High Court judgment regarding the quantum of compensation for land acquired by the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the establishment of universities. The core legal questions were whether the one-year average (Aust Yaksala) constitutes the exclusive method for determining market value under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, and whether the six-percent interest awarded under Section 34 of the same Act is prohibited as riba. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's valuation. The Court held that the one-year average is merely one mode of assessment and not an absolute yardstick, as Section 23 requires consideration of broader factors like location and potentiality. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the interest provided under Section 34 is compensatory in nature, intended to mitigate financial loss due to the state's unilateral exercise of eminent domain, and is not riba. The key principle established is that compensation must be determined by considering the totality of circumstances to ensure landowners are restored to their pre-acquisition position, and statutory compensatory interest remains enforceable.

  Questions settled

  • Is the one-year average (Aust Yaksala) the absolute yardstick for determining market value under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Does the interest awarded under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 constitute riba prohibited by Islamic injunctions?
  • What factors must a Referee Court consider when determining compensation for land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
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• Nawab Siraj Ali and others vs The State through A.G. Sindh2023 SCMR 16 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-18
  terrorismpersonal vendettaAnti-Terrorism Actcompromiseforensic evidencecriminal appealmurderArms Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerns the conviction of appellants for murder and terrorism. The core legal question was whether an incident arising from a personal dispute between youths could be classified as terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, and whether the conviction under the Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965 was sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the incident, rooted in a personal vendetta, lacked the requisite design to destabilize the government or society, thus failing to meet the statutory definition of terrorism. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions under the Anti-Terrorism Act. Regarding the murder charge, the Court accepted the compromise reached between the parties. Furthermore, the conviction under the Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965 was overturned, as the delay in sending crime empties to the forensic laboratory alongside the weapon rendered the evidence unreliable. The Court affirmed the principle that terrorism is a distinct species of crime, and private heinous acts do not automatically fall under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The appellants were acquitted of all charges.

  Questions settled

  • Does a murder committed due to a personal dispute automatically constitute an act of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Is a conviction under the Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965 sustainable if crime empties are sent to the forensic laboratory after the recovery of the weapon?
  • Can a compromise between the parties in a murder case lead to the acquittal of the accused regarding the substantive offence?
  • Does the definition of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 include all heinous offences?
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• Nawab Brothers Steel Mills vs Federation of Pakistan and Others2023 SHC 24, 2024 PTD 256 · Sindh High Court · 2023-02-11Read full judgment →
• Naveed vs The State2023 YLR 1377 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-12-05Read full judgment →
• Naveed Sattar vs The State etc2023 SCP 307, 2024 SCMR 205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-09-20
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycircumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtsupplementary statementidentification paradeforensic examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged a Lahore High Court order denying post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the delayed nomination in supplementary statements, the lack of forensic verification for incriminating photographs, and the reliance on circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case, which relied on a belated nomination after four months and unverified evidence, created sufficient doubt to warrant bail. The Court emphasized that the benefit of doubt can be extended at the bail stage and that police findings regarding guilt are not conclusive. Furthermore, it affirmed that liberty is a precious constitutional right that cannot be curtailed based on vague allegations. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned order, and admitted the petitioner to bail, ruling that the case fell within the ambit of Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, necessitating further inquiry into the petitioner's guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Can the benefit of doubt be extended to an accused at the bail stage?
  • Is the police opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of an accused binding on the court during bail proceedings?
  • Does a delayed nomination of an accused in supplementary statements entitle the accused to further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can unverified photographs be relied upon as conclusive evidence to deny bail?
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• Naveed Sadiq vs The State2023 YLR 2562 · Lahore High Court · 2022-05-10
  murderbenefit of doubtacquittal of co-accusedmedical contradictionre-appraisals of evidencejudge's power to question witnessesprivate complaintcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Naveed Sadiq, handed down by the trial court under sections 302(b) and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, arising from a private complaint after co-accused were declared innocent during police investigation. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution successfully established its case beyond reasonable doubt through ocular and medical evidence, and the proper scope of the trial court's powers under Article 161 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 to ascertain the truth. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution case suffered from material discrepancies, unproven motive, lack of independent corroboration despite the acquittal of co-accused on the same evidence, and medical contradictions. Consequently, the court extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellant. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and major co-accused are acquitted on identical evidence, remaining convictions cannot stand without reliable independent corroboration, and any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused can be convicted on the same set of evidence when co-accused facing identical charges have already been acquitted, in the absence of independent corroboration?
  • Does the presence of injuries on a prosecution witness conclusively prove their truthfulness and presence at the crime scene?
  • What is the scope and extent of a trial judge's power under Article 161 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 to question witnesses and summon material evidence?
  • What is the legal effect of an unproven motive on a criminal case resting on ocular testimony?
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• Naveed Nazeer vs National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)2023 PLC (C.S.) 1330, 2024 PLJ Islamabad 9 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-06-14
  writ jurisdictionmaster and servantNADRAservice regulationsmisconductdismissal from servicenon-statutory rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the dismissal of a Data Entry Operator by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) for misconduct involving the illegal processing of identity documents. The petitioner contended that the dismissal order was procedurally flawed and that the competent authority lacked the power to enhance the penalty recommended by the inquiry committee. The core legal question was whether a writ petition is maintainable against NADRA regarding service matters and whether the competent authority is bound by inquiry recommendations. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. Relying on established precedents, the Court determined that NADRA Employees (Service) Regulations, 2002 are non-statutory, meaning the employment relationship is governed by the "master and servant" doctrine rather than statutory rules. Consequently, the High Court lacks jurisdiction under Article 199 to enforce these non-statutory terms. Additionally, the Court affirmed that a competent authority is not strictly bound by an inquiry committee's recommendations and may impose appropriate penalties upon proving misconduct, provided due process and a fair opportunity for defense are afforded.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable against the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) regarding service matters?
  • Are the NADRA Employees (Service) Regulations, 2002 statutory or non-statutory in nature?
  • Is the competent authority legally bound to adhere to the penalty recommended by an inquiry committee in service disciplinary proceedings?
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• Naveed Khursheed vs Dpi E&S Education (M) Azad Government of the State2023 PLC (C.S.) 1023 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2022-07-25
  writ petitionconstitutional jurisdictionpublic employmentmerit listjunior clerkfundamental rightsdiscriminatory treatment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, seeking a direction to the official respondents to appoint him on a permanent basis as a Junior Clerk based on his position in the merit list. The core legal question was whether the authorities could deny permanent appointment to a meritorious candidate who was initially appointed on a temporary basis due to administrative delays and evasive denials. The High Court held that the petitioner acquired a valuable legal right upon succeeding in open competition, which could not be defeated by official procrastination or arbitrary actions, and that authorities cannot take advantage of their own loopholes. The court accepted the petition, ruling that the denial of a permanent appointment violated fundamental rights and the doctrine of reasonable expectations, and directed the respondents to appoint the petitioner permanently.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a meritorious candidate acquires a legal right to appointment upon succeeding in open competition?
  • Can official respondents deny permanent appointment to a candidate by taking advantage of their own administrative delays?
  • Does the failure of authorities to redress a genuine grievance violate fundamental rights and the doctrine of reasonable expectations?
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• Naveed Daud vs The State2023 PCRLJ 154 · Peshawar High Court · 2021-07-09
  narcotics traffickingreasonable doubtforensic science laboratory reportfair trialbenefit of doubtpolice daily diarycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the alleged transportation of narcotics. The core legal questions concern whether the prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt given material contradictions in witness testimony and the validity of a Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report prepared by an unqualified analyst. The Peshawar High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and acquitting the appellant. The Court held that significant discrepancies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses regarding the handling of the Murasilla and the absence of mandatory police daily diaries created reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an FSL report issued by an analyst not qualified under Section 35 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, is inadmissible. Crucially, the Court affirmed that allowing the prosecution to re-test samples to cure evidentiary defects would violate the principles of a fair trial and the adversarial system, as the court cannot assist the prosecution in filling lacunas. Consequently, the benefit of doubt was extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-production of police daily diaries regarding the movement of the raiding party create reasonable doubt in a narcotics case?
  • Is an FSL report admissible if the analyst was not qualified under Section 35 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Can an appellate court order the re-testing of narcotic samples to allow the prosecution to fill lacunas in its evidence?
  • Does the failure to send samples to the FSL within the prescribed 72-hour period invalidate the chemical examiner's report?
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• Naveed Ali alias Nadeem vs Syed Gulam Murtaza Shah and another2023 YLR 1036 · Sindh High Court · 2021-01-22
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaydesperate criminalterrorismbail cancellationheinous offence
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant sought post-arrest bail in a criminal case involving charges under Sections 302, 324, 148, 149, 109, 404, and 427 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, arising from an election-day attack that resulted in multiple fatalities and injuries. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail based on the statutory delay in the trial, despite being accused of a heinous act of terrorism. The Court held that the applicant was not entitled to bail. It reasoned that the applicant’s conduct, including his status as a fugitive from justice and the nature of the offense—which involved indiscriminate firing on political rivals and police—categorized him as a 'desperate or dangerous criminal.' The Court established the principle that the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 acts as a controlling provision, allowing courts to deny bail for statutory delay if the accused is deemed a desperate or dangerous criminal, regardless of the absence of prior criminal convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of prior criminal convictions preclude an accused from being classified as a 'desperate or dangerous criminal' under the fourth proviso of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail on the ground of statutory delay be denied if the accused is found to be a desperate or dangerous criminal?
  • Is it necessary for a court to calculate the exact number of days of delay caused by an accused to deny bail under the fourth proviso of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Naveed Ahmed vs The State2023 YLR 1449 · Sindh High Court · 2021-08-16
  pre-arrest bailhabitual offenderinvestigationmisuse of bailcognizable offencetentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for pre-arrest bail filed by an accused booked for offences under sections 420, 406, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicant, who had been granted interim pre-arrest bail, was entitled to confirmation of that bail despite allegations of non-cooperation with the investigation and habitual criminality. The Court held that the applicant was not entitled to the concession of pre-arrest bail and consequently recalled the interim order. The Court reasoned that the applicant failed to join the investigation, misused the bail concession by allegedly harassing the complainant, and was a habitual offender. The key principles laid down are that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary judicial intervention intended to protect the innocent from abuse of process, not a substitute for post-arrest bail. It cannot be invoked in routine criminal cases where there is prima facie evidence of a non-bailable offence. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that bail decisions at this stage rely on a tentative assessment of the record, avoiding deeper appreciation of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is pre-arrest bail a substitute for post-arrest bail?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted where the accused has failed to join the investigation?
  • Does the court require a deeper appreciation of evidence when deciding a bail application?
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• Naveed Ahmed vs Family Judge, Panjgur and another2023 CLC 1489 · Balochistan High Court · 2023-03-02Read full judgment →
• Naveed Ahmed etc vs Sheikh Amjad Saeed deceased through his legal2023 LHC 2201, 2024 PLJ Lahore 151 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Nauman Safdar vs Citi Lab (Computerized Innovative Tests and Investigation Lab)2023 CLD 1324 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-01-19Read full judgment →
• Nauman Anjum vs Area Magistrate, etc2023 LHC 2625 · Lahore High Court · 2023-05-04Read full judgment →
• National Transmission & Despatch Company Ltd vs The Commissioner2023 LHC 6773, 2024 PLD Lahore 360, 2024 PTD 599 · Lahore High Court · 2023-12-28Read full judgment →
• National Tiles and Ceramics Ltd. and Another, Mr Agha Tajammul Hussain2023 SHC 1156, 2024 CLD 264 · Sindh High Court · 2023-12-14Read full judgment →
• National Telecommunication Corporation (NTC) vs Pakistan2023 CLC 1481 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-04-20Read full judgment →
• National Logistics Cell, Government of Pakistan, HQ NLC, Karachi vs The Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Port Muhammad Bin Qasim, Karachi, etc2024 SCP 28, 2023 PTD 1177, 2023 SCMR 1325, PTCL 2025 CL. 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Afghan Transit Traderegistered carrierpilferage of cargoadditional evidencereference jurisdictionremandsuo motu
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from suo motu proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 regarding the alleged pilferage of Afghan transit trade cargo. The Federal Board of Revenue issued show cause notices to the National Logistics Cell (NLC), as a registered carrier, for failing to produce Cross Border Certificates, leading to tax and duty liabilities. The High Court of Sindh dismissed NLC's reference applications, affirming its liability. On appeal, NLC sought to introduce official correspondence from customs authorities confirming that the cargo had been safely transported and reconciled. The Supreme Court addressed whether it could consider additional factual material for the first time in a tax reference appeal. The Court held that while appellate courts generally do not disturb concurrent findings of fact, an exception exists where the findings are perverse or based on incorrect facts, and the new material was neither in the possession nor knowledge of the party. The Court set aside the impugned judgments and remanded the case to the Customs Appellate Tribunal to verify the new evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court consider additional factual material for the first time while hearing an appeal arising from a Special Customs Reference?
  • Under what exceptional circumstances may an appellate court interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by a tax tribunal?
  • Is a registered carrier of transit cargo liable for duties and taxes if official internal customs correspondence confirms the safe delivery and reconciliation of the cargo?
  • How should the Supreme Court exercise its suo motu jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution so as not to undermine the lawful authority of independent investigating or adjudicatory forums?
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• National Highway Authority vs Senior Civil Judge, (Referee Court), Lodhran2023 CLC 1798 · Lahore High Court · 2022-06-21Read full judgment →
• National Highway Authority vs Rai Ahmad Nawaz Khan etc.2023 PLJ SC 361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-14
  land acquisitioneminent domainmarket valueexcess compensationstatutory interestribacompulsory acquisition
  Summary & questions settled

  The National Highway Authority challenged three judgments of the Lahore High Court which upheld the enhancement of land acquisition compensation by the Referee Court and modified the interest rate on excess compensation from 6% to 8% per annum. The appellant argued that the compensation was correctly assessed using a one-year market average and that the imposition of interest under Sections 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 violated Islamic injunctions against riba (usury). The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeals, holding that a one-year market average is merely one mode of assessment and not an absolute yardstick under Section 23. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the interest prescribed under Sections 28 and 34 is statutory, mandatory, and compensatory rather than exploitative. It serves to compensate landowners for the time lag between the deprivation of their property and actual payment, distinguishing it from riba in voluntary financial transactions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a one-year market average of sales transactions an absolute yardstick for determining market value under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Does the interest payable on delayed compensation under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 constitute riba or usury under Islamic law?
  • Does a Referee Court have the discretion to vary the statutory rate of compound interest on excess compensation prescribed under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
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• National Highway Authority vs Rai Ahmad Nawaz Khan and others2023 SCMR 700 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-14
  land acquisitioneminent domainmarket valuestatutory interestexcess compensationcompulsory acquisitionriba
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals filed by the National Highway Authority challenging High Court judgments that upheld the enhancement of land acquisition compensation and modified the applicable interest rate. The core legal questions involved the criteria for determining market value under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LAA), the legality of increasing interest on excess compensation from 6% to 8%, and whether interest under Section 34 of the LAA constitutes prohibited usury (riba). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the one-year market average is not an absolute yardstick for determining compensation, as factors like location and potentiality must be considered. The Court affirmed that the 8% interest rate under Sections 28 and 34 is a mandatory statutory requirement following the 1969 amendment. Furthermore, the Court ruled that interest under Section 34 is compensatory in nature, arising from the state's unilateral exercise of eminent domain, and is distinct from predatory financial riba. Consequently, the Court established that such statutory interest is beneficial to landowners and cannot be withheld by the state.

  Questions settled

  • Is the one-year market average the absolute yardstick for determining the market value of acquired land under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
  • Does the interest payable under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, constitute prohibited riba?
  • Is the rate of interest on excess compensation under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, discretionary or fixed at eight percent?
  • Can the benefit of statutory interest under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, be withheld by the state on the grounds of religious repugnancy?
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• National Highway Authority through its Chairman, Islamabad vs M/s2023 SCP 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-13
  arbitration awardarbitrator misconductjudicial reviewalternative dispute resolutioncontract interpretationpre-bid meetingvexatious litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to an arbitration award regarding a contract for the rehabilitation of a national highway. The core legal question was whether the arbitrators committed misconduct under Section 30(a) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, by interpreting the contract to include pre-bid meeting minutes as an integral part of the agreement, thereby awarding additional costs for work outside the original scope. The Supreme Court upheld the award, holding that the arbitrators acted within their jurisdiction and that the pre-bid minutes were indeed part of the contract. The Court emphasized that its jurisdiction in reviewing arbitration awards is supervisory rather than appellate, and courts should not interfere with an arbitrator's findings unless there is a patent illegality or clear misconduct. The principle laid down is that arbitration is a final determination of disputes, and courts must avoid an over-intrusive approach or re-appraisal of evidence. Furthermore, the Court strongly discouraged vexatious litigation that undermines the purpose of alternative dispute resolution, imposing costs on the petitioner for frivolous proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Are minutes of a pre-bid meeting considered an integral part of a contract?
  • What is the scope of judicial review for an arbitration award under the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • What constitutes misconduct by an arbitrator resulting in a miscarriage of justice?
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• National Highway Authority through Ghulam Mujtaba, G.M, Lahore vs Mazhar Siddique and others2023 SCMR 493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-21
  land acquisitioncompound interestcontempt jurisdictionexecution proceedingsextraordinary jurisdictioncompensation award
  Summary & questions settled

  The National Highway Authority (NHA) challenged the orders of the Lahore High Court which had dismissed its Intra Court Appeals against the modification of a land acquisition award. The NHA had acquired land for a motorway interchange, but a portion of the land was inadvertently omitted from the initial notification and award. Subsequently, a fresh award was announced at a significantly higher rate, and the High Court, through various contempt and constitutional petitions, directed the calculation of compound interest from the date of possession in 1993. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeals, holding that once a land acquisition award is made by the Collector, any subsequent dispute regarding the quantum of compensation or interest must be resolved through the statutory mechanism provided under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, rather than through the High Court's extraordinary constitutional or contempt jurisdictions. The Court further ruled that contempt jurisdiction cannot be used as a substitute for execution proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can exercise its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to determine land compensation disputes when an adequate statutory remedy exists under the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • What is the relevant starting date for the computation of compound interest on compensation amounts under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Can the High Court's contempt of court jurisdiction be utilized as a substitute for execution proceedings to enforce land acquisition awards?
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