Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Lajbar Khan & others vs Kamin Khan & others2022 PHC 276 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-06-16Read full judgment →
• Lahore Development Authority, etc vs Muhammad Arif Khan deceased2022 LHC 1690 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Lahore Development Authority through Director General vs Habib2022 CLC 294 · Lahore High Court · 2021-09-01Read full judgment →
• Lahore Development Authority through Director General vs Dr. Javaid Iqbal2022 PLJ Lahore 297 · Lahore High Court
  civil revisionexemption cancellationpleadings and proofunauthorized witnessbona fide purchaseraudi alteram partemmandatory injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises out of concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the lower courts decreeing a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction filed by Respondent No. 1 concerning a disputed plot in M.A. Johar Town, Lahore. The core legal question revolved around whether the petitioner-authority validly cancelled the plot's exemption and whether the evidence adduced by the petitioner substantiated its pleadings. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner failed to prove the cancellation of the exemption by producing any supporting document, that evidence set up by its witness was beyond the scope of pleadings, and that the witness lacked authorization to represent the statutory authority. Furthermore, the court held that any adverse order passed without notice violates the principle of audi alteram partem and Article 10-A of the Constitution. The petition was accordingly dismissed as no jurisdictional defect or procedural impropriety was found in the impugned concurrent findings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a witness appearing on behalf of a statutory authority must produce an authorization letter or resolution to represent it?
  • Can evidence set up by a witness that goes beyond the scope of pleadings in the written statement be relied upon?
  • Whether a bona fide purchaser can be deprived of title without prior notice and in violation of the principle of audi alteram partem?
  • Does a civil revision lie against concurrent findings of lower courts in the absence of any jurisdictional defect or procedural impropriety?
  Read full judgment →
• Lahore Development Authority (LDA) through D.G. and 2 others vs Abdul2022 PLJ Lahore 183 · Lahore High Court · 2021-09-27Read full judgment →
• Lahore Development Authority (LDA) through D.G. & others vs Ikram-Ul-2022 PLJ Lahore 433 · Lahore High Court · 2021-09-22Read full judgment →
• Lady Lamp College of Nursing & Health Sciences & others vs Registrar KMU2022 PHC 608 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Lady Dr. Nafeesa Saleem and another vs Justice Of Peace/Additional2022 PLD Lahore 18 · Lahore High Court · 2021-07-26
  medical negligencePunjab Healthcare Commission Act 2010exclusive jurisdictioncriminal negligencepostmortem reporthealthcare service providerwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged an order passed by a Justice of Peace directing the registration of an FIR against medical practitioners for alleged medical negligence resulting in a patient's death. The core legal question was whether the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010 grants the Punjab Healthcare Commission exclusive jurisdiction over complaints of medical negligence, thereby barring criminal proceedings initiated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court held that the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010 provides a comprehensive mechanism for regulating healthcare services and adjudicating complaints of medical negligence. Consequently, the Commission possesses exclusive jurisdiction in such matters, and legal proceedings, including the registration of an FIR, are barred except as provided under the Act. The Court further observed that the absence of a postmortem report, which is statutorily required under the Act to establish medical negligence, rendered the criminal complaint unsustainable. The key principle laid down is that the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010 is a special law that prevails over general criminal procedure regarding the regulation and prosecution of healthcare service providers for medical negligence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010 grant the Punjab Healthcare Commission exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate complaints of medical negligence?
  • Can a Justice of Peace order the registration of an FIR against a healthcare service provider for medical negligence in light of the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010?
  • Is a postmortem report a mandatory requirement to establish medical negligence under the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010?
  • Does the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010 bar all criminal proceedings against healthcare service providers for medical negligence?
  Read full judgment →
• KuraKuram Hotel Pvt Ltd vs Government of KP2022 PHC 616 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-06-23Read full judgment →
• Kse Stockbrokers Association and others vs Securities & Exchange2022 SHC 104 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Kse Stockbrokers Association and others vs Securities & Exchange2022 PCTLR 1099 · Sindh High Court · 2022-04-13Read full judgment →
• Kishwar Khan & others vs Jan Afroza & others2022 PHC 278 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-05-26Read full judgment →
• Kifayatullah son of Khawaja Muhammad vs The State2022 SHC 406, 2024 PCRLJ 605 · Sindh High Court · 2022-09-16
  murderdeath sentencered-handed arresteyewitness testimonymotivecrime weapon recoveryCCTV footageanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal appeals filed against the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellant for the murder of an under-trial prisoner inside court premises and sentencing him to death, alongside convictions under the Sindh Arms Act. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through direct ocular testimony, red-handed arrest, and recovery of the crime weapon, notwithstanding minor discrepancies and CCTV footage arguments. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeals and answered the death reference in the affirmative, holding that reliable, confidence-inspiring eyewitness testimony of independent witnesses who apprehended the accused at the spot, coupled with corroborative medical and circumstantial evidence and a well-established motive of revenge, is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction. The key principle laid down is that direct, unimpeachable ocular evidence of a single or multiple independent eyewitnesses supported by prompt on-the-spot arrest and recovery of the weapon holds the field, and minor discrepancies or supportive video evidence do not weaken the prosecution's case where the guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a murder conviction be sustained on the basis of eyewitness accounts when supported by an on-the-spot arrest and recovery of the crime weapon?
  • Whether medical evidence is considered substantive evidence for establishing the identity of the offender or merely corroborative of the physical injuries?
  • Does previous enmity act as a double-edged weapon that requires independent corroboration before a conviction can be recorded?
  • Is the testimony of independent police officials acting as eyewitnesses reliable when they have no personal ill will or enmity against the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Revenue Authority Kpra through its Director Gernal, Peshawar vs M_s Legacy Pharmaceutical (Pvt.) Limited, 111-a, Industrial Estate, Jamrud Road, Peshawa2022 PHC 520 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Forest Development Corporation, through its2022 PHC 146 · Peshawar High Court
  EOBI ActEighteenth Constitutional Amendmentdevolution of powersprovincial domainresidual subjectsconstitutional petitionstatutory complaintcoercive measures
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two connected writ petitions challenging the operational validity of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Institution Act, 1976 in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa following the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, as well as challenging certain financial demands and coercive recovery measures. The core legal questions involved whether the federal EOBI Act lost its legal validity post-devolution and whether the High Court should interfere with disputed contribution calculations. The court held that despite the omission of the concurrent legislative list, pre-existing federal laws continue to remain in force under Article 270-AA of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 until explicitly repealed, amended, or altered by the provincial legislature, and that failure to complete devolution by the specified cut-off date does not invalidate these laws by virtue of Article 254 of the Constitution. The court concluded that the EOBI Act remains fully operational in the province, but directed that the petitioners' objections be treated as statutory complaints under the Act for proper adjudication, while setting aside coercive attachment measures pending that determination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Employees Old Age Benefits Institution Act, 1976 became invalid in the provinces after the passage of the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment?
  • Does the failure to complete the legislative devolution process by the cut-off date specified in Article 270-AA render pre-existing federal laws ineffective?
  • Can the constitutional court adjudicate upon disputed calculations of employer contributions and arrears under the EOBI Act bypassing statutory forums?
  • What is the effect of Article 254 of the Constitution when an act required to be done within a specific period is not completed within that time?
  Read full judgment →
• Khurshid Iqbal vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2022 PHC 240, 2022 PLD Peshawar 206 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-05-10Read full judgment →
• Khurshid Anwar Bhinder vs Judge, Accountability Court No.III, Islamabad &2022 IHC 258 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-09-21Read full judgment →
• Khurshid Ahmed vs The Chairman NHA, Islamabad, etc2022 IHC 78 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-03
  writ petitionupgradationpromotionservice tribunalNational Highway Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking implementation of judgments passed by the Federal Service Tribunal and upheld by the Supreme Court, which directed the National Highway Authority (NHA) to consider his case for upgradation to BS-20. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could claim upgradation as a matter of right and whether the writ court could enforce such upgradation contrary to departmental rules and policy. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that upgradation cannot be claimed as a matter of right and is distinct from promotion, as it depends entirely on a policy decision by the competent authority to address stagnation. The court noted that the NHA had already considered the petitioner's case and declined upgradation in accordance with the NHA (Appointment & Promotion) Rules, 1995 and government policy. The key principle laid down is that upgradation is a policy measure meant for isolated posts to relieve stagnation, does not constitute a vested right, and cannot be regulated or substituted by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can upgradation of a post be claimed as a matter of right by an employee?
  • What is the distinction between promotion and upgradation in civil service matters?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to regulate or substitute policy decisions regarding the upgradation of posts?
  Read full judgment →
• Khursheed Hussain Shah vs The State & others2022 SC AJ&K 3, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 694 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2022-02-01
  narcotics possessionspecial law vs general lawforensic sample delaymitigating circumstancessentencing reductionminor contradictionspolice witness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a High Court judgment upholding the conviction of the appellant for narcotics possession under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2001. The core legal questions concerned whether the trial court had jurisdiction to try offences under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Act, 1985, alongside the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2001, and whether procedural lapses—specifically the delayed dispatch of narcotic samples to the laboratory and discrepancies in sample weight—vitiated the conviction. The Supreme Court held that the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2001, being a special law, takes precedence over the general Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Act, 1985, thereby validating the trial court's jurisdiction. While the Court rejected the argument that minor contradictions in witness testimony or the absence of private witnesses invalidated the prosecution's case, it acknowledged that the unexplained delay in sending samples for forensic analysis and discrepancies in sample weight constituted mitigating circumstances. Consequently, the Court maintained the conviction but reduced the sentence of fourteen years' rigorous imprisonment to eight years, affirming that while minor discrepancies do not destroy the prosecution's case, they may warrant sentencing leniency.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2001, take precedence over the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Act, 1985, when both are applicable to the same offence?
  • Does an unexplained delay in dispatching narcotic samples to a forensic laboratory invalidate a conviction or merely serve as a mitigating circumstance?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when there are minor discrepancies in the weight of narcotic samples between the time of seizure and laboratory analysis?
  • Are police officials considered competent witnesses in narcotics cases in the absence of private witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Khursheed Ahmad, Etc. vs Province of Punjab Through Collector District2022 LHC 5004 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khurram Shehzad vs The State2022 KLR Criminal Cases 444 · Lahore High Court · 2021-03-29
  narcotic substanceschain of custodysafe transmissionbenefit of doubtforensic analysiscriminal appealadverse inference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 for the possession of 1045 grams of charas. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the safe custody and transmission of the recovered contraband to the forensic laboratory. Upon review, the Court found that the prosecution failed to prove an unbroken chain of custody. Specifically, there was an unexplained delay in the transmission of the sample to the Punjab Forensic Science Agency, and the prosecution failed to examine the official responsible for the delivery, leading to an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt. The judgment reaffirms the principle that the prosecution is strictly obligated to prove that the chain of custody of case property remains unbroken and secure; any lapse therein vitiates the reliability of the forensic report and necessitates acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to examine the official responsible for the transmission of a narcotic sample to a forensic laboratory warrant an adverse inference against the prosecution?
  • Is the prosecution required to prove an unbroken chain of custody for recovered contraband to sustain a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • Does a delay in the transmission of a narcotic sample to a forensic agency create reasonable doubt regarding the integrity of the evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Khurram Shahzad vs Senior Superintendent Police, District Mirpur Azad2022 YLR 1891 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2021-09-02Read full judgment →
• Khurram Shahzad vs Province of Punjab and others2022 LHC 6033, 2022 [M] CLR 1399, 2023 PLC (C.S.) 1375, KLR 2022 Civil Cases · Lahore High Court · 2022-07-06
  government accommodationallotment policytenancy-at-willvoid ab-initiocivil revisionvested rightspecific relief
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a police official, challenged the concurrent findings of the lower courts which dismissed his suit for declaration and injunction regarding the withdrawal of his government residence allotment. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, not belonging to the Service and General Administration Department (S&GAD) cadre, was entitled to retain the government house under the applicable Allotment Policies. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner failed to meet the eligibility criteria stipulated in the relevant policies, rendering the initial allotment void ab-initio. The Court affirmed that government servants possess no vested legal right to government-owned accommodation, which constitutes a tenancy-at-will terminable by the state. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the petitioner’s suit was not maintainable, citing the bar under Section 56(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and noted the petitioner's contradictory stance regarding legal remedies. The principle laid down is that an allotment of government residence made in violation of eligibility criteria is void, and such occupation confers no vested right, allowing the state to rescind the allotment at will.

  Questions settled

  • Does a government servant have a vested legal right to the allotment of government-owned residential accommodation?
  • Is an allotment of government residence made in violation of eligibility criteria void ab-initio?
  • Can an authority that possesses the jurisdiction to pass an order also rescind or recall the same?
  • Is a suit for declaration and injunction maintainable against the withdrawal of government accommodation where the occupant lacks a vested right?
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• Khurram Manzoor Ch. and others vs Suriya Begum2022 PLD Islamabad 131 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-01-25Read full judgment →
• Khurram Manzoor and another vs Suriya Begum (Late) through her legal2022 PLD Islamabad 68 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-04Read full judgment →
• Khurram Imtiaz vs The State and another2022 MLD 329 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-15
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausefurther inquirybail concessioncriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arises from an FIR registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning the dishonor of cheques issued by the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the case. The court held that the offence under Section 489-F does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Relying on established Supreme Court precedents, the court reiterated that for non-bailable offences falling outside the prohibitory clause, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, applicable only in extraordinary circumstances such as risk of abscondance, tampering with evidence, or repetition of the offence. Finding that the investigation was complete, the evidence was documentary and in prosecution custody, and the petitioner was a non-convict, the court granted bail, emphasizing that mere involvement in other cases without conviction is insufficient to deny bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of bail the rule and refusal the exception for non-bailable offences that do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can mere involvement in other criminal cases, without conviction, be a valid ground to withhold the concession of bail?
  • Does a case involving documentary evidence in the possession of the prosecution generally entitle an accused to bail when the investigation is complete?
  Read full judgment →
• Khurram Imtiaz vs Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Islamabad and others2022 IHC 276 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khurram Iftikhar and Others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Interior Division, Islamabad and Others2022 PCRLJ 1665 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-16
  constitutional jurisdictionquashment of FIRterritorial jurisdictionalternate remedyfugitive from lawFIA investigationlaches
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns writ petitions filed by directors of companies challenging inquiries and an FIR initiated by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) regarding alleged financial losses to the Employees Old Age Benefit Institution (EOBI). The petitioners sought the quashment of these proceedings, alleging harassment, lack of jurisdiction, and mala fide intent. The core legal questions addressed whether the High Court could exercise constitutional jurisdiction to quash an FIR when the cause of action arose outside its territorial jurisdiction and whether such relief is appropriate when alternate statutory remedies exist. The Court held that the petitions were not maintainable, dismissing them on grounds of laches, lack of territorial jurisdiction, and the petitioners' status as fugitives from law. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass the trial court's authority. The key principle laid down is that once a trial court takes cognizance of a case, the High Court should not interfere via constitutional jurisdiction; instead, the accused must exhaust alternate remedies like seeking acquittal under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise constitutional jurisdiction to quash an FIR when the cause of action arose outside its territorial jurisdiction?
  • Is the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court an appropriate substitute for the trial court's power to grant acquittal under the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to quash an FIR after a trial court has already taken cognizance of the matter?
  • Can a petitioner who is a fugitive from law invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court for relief?
  Read full judgment →
• Khudadad vs Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah @ S. Inaam Hussain and others2022 SCP 48, 2022 SCMR 933 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-07
  specific performanceagreement to selllimitationattesting witnessproof of documentsignature comparisonjoint propertyco-sharerrevisional jurisdictioncivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment concerns Civil Appeals against a High Court decision upholding the dismissal of suits for specific performance of an agreement to sell and the decreeing of a suit for possession and mesne profits. The core legal questions revolved around the proof of execution of the agreement to sell, the limitation period for filing a specific performance suit, and the authority of a co-sharer to sell joint property. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts. It was held that the suit for specific performance was time-barred under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, having been filed beyond three years from the fixed date of performance. The appellant failed to prove the execution of the agreement to sell as per Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, due to the non-production of necessary attesting witnesses. The Court reiterated that courts are empowered under Article 84 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, to compare disputed signatures. It was also noted that a co-sharer cannot unilaterally sell entire joint property without the consent of other co-owners, rendering such an agreement illegal to that extent. The High Court's revisional jurisdiction is limited to specific errors, not re-appraisal of evidence.

  Read full judgment →
• Khuda Yar vs Muhammad Gulzar2022 LHC 3735 · Lahore High Court · 2022-05-24Read full judgment →
• Khuda Bakhsh vs The State2022 LHC 8195 · Lahore High Court · 2022-11-14
  abatement of appealdeath of accusedcriminal appealdeath sentencecivil service benefitsabatement ab initiolex fori
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, convicted of murder and sentenced to death with compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, died during the pendency of his appeal. The core legal question was whether the criminal appeal could proceed after the appellant's death, specifically whether legal heirs could continue the appeal to preserve service benefits, and whether the doctrine of abatement applied. The Court held that under Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, criminal appeals against conviction and sentence of imprisonment abate upon the death of the accused, except where the appeal is against a sentence of fine. The Court rejected the argument that the appeal should continue to protect the deceased's civil service benefits, noting that abatement effectively nullifies the conviction ab initio, and that departmental proceedings against a deceased civil servant cannot be initiated or concluded. The Court affirmed that the principle of 'lex fori' dictates that the court's jurisdiction is governed by domestic law, not foreign precedents, and consequently, the appeal abated and the murder reference was answered in the negative.

  Questions settled

  • Does a criminal appeal against a conviction and sentence of imprisonment abate upon the death of the appellant?
  • Can a criminal appeal continue after the death of the accused if the legal heirs seek to protect the deceased's service benefits?
  • Does an appeal against a composite sentence of imprisonment and compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 qualify as an appeal against a sentence of fine for the purposes of avoiding abatement?
  • Can departmental proceedings be initiated or continued against a civil servant after their death?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawar Kayani vs The State, etc2022 SCP 178, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 233, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 551 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-06-20
  post-arrest bailjuvenile justiceheinous offencedelay in trialJuvenile Justice System Act 2018restorative justiceQatl-i-amd
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a High Court order denying post-arrest bail to a juvenile petitioner charged with Qatl-i-amd under Section 302/34 PPC. The petitioner sought bail on the ground of statutory delay in the trial exceeding six months under Section 6(5) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 ('Act'). The core legal questions were whether Section 6(5) applies to 'heinous offences' and from which date the six-month period of detention should be calculated. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and granted bail, holding that Section 6(5) solely applies to heinous offences and acts as a proviso to Section 6(4). The Court further laid down that the six-month period of trial delay under Section 6(5) must be computed from the date of actual arrest of the juvenile, rather than the date of age determination by the court. The Court emphasized that the juvenile justice framework is rehabilitative and restorative under Articles 25(3) and 35 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 6(5) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 is applicable to a case where a juvenile is accused of a heinous offence?
  • From which date is the six-month detention period mentioned in Section 6(5) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 to be calculated?
  • Whether a juvenile is entitled to bail as of right under Section 6(5) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 when trial delay is not attributable to any act or omission by the juvenile?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Tariq Siddiq vs The Chairman, M/s. Karachi Electric Supply2022 SHC 426 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khawaja Tahir Mehmood vs Punjab Housing and Town Planning Agency2022 YLR 2330 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-04Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Nazir Ahmed vs Azad Government of The State of Jammu And Kashmir through Secretary Forest and 5 others2022 PLC (C.S.) 1417 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2022-04-18
  time-scale incentivecivil servantvested rightretirementdepartmental delaypromotionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed under Article 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, seeking a direction to the respondents to grant a time-scale incentive to the petitioner from the date of entitlement, alternatively from 01.06.2019 in light of departmental notifications. The core legal question was whether a retired civil servant, whose time-scale incentive case was approved during service but delayed by administrative inaction, could be denied the incentive due to a subsequent promotion issued post-retirement. The High Court held that the petitioner had a vested right to the time-scale incentive upon completing the requisite ten years of service in the same scale, and that administrative delay or subsequent post-retirement promotion could not deprive him of accrued monetary benefits. The court laid down the principle that a civil servant cannot be penalized for departmental delays, mal-functioning, or non-action, and that time-scale incentives do not depend upon the availability of vacancies since they are designed to provide financial progression for stagnant posts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can be denied a time-scale incentive due to administrative delay in processing his case before retirement?
  • Does a time-scale incentive policy require the availability of a vacant post for its grant to eligible employees?
  • Can a subsequent post-retirement promotion be used to deprive an employee of an accrued time-scale incentive?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Muhammad Maqbool War, Advocate Supreme Court Advocate Genera_11ba26a32022 SC AJ&K 28 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Khawaja Muhammad Maqbool War, Advocate and others vs Sardar Muhammad Javed Ayub, Member Legislative Assembly Azad Jammu & Kashmir Muzaffarabad and others2022 PSC 1536 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Khanzada Muhammad Rafique Khan vs Hussain-ur-Rehman and others2022 PHC 156 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-05-09Read full judgment →
• Khanvaiz Khan & another vs The State & another2022 PHC 490 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-11-11Read full judgment →
• Khanimullah & others vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Home Secretary & others2022 PHC 174, 2022 CLC 1879 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-04-04Read full judgment →
• Khan vs The State2022 KLR Criminal Cases 132 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-08-19
  murdercriminal appealbenefit of the doubtinterested witnessesunproved motivepolice disclosuresection 342 examinationacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Trial Court convicting and sentencing the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The core legal questions involve the reliability of interested ocular evidence, the legal effect of an unproved motive, the admissibility of disclosure statements under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and the consequences of omitting incriminating evidence such as abscondence during the examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Balochistan High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of the doubt. The court held that where prosecution witnesses are related and inimical, their testimony requires independent corroboration, unproved motives carry no sanctity, police disclosures without discovery of new facts are inadmissible, and failure to put incriminating circumstances to the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 causes prejudice and vitiates reliance thereon.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction on a capital charge be sustained solely on the testimony of interested and inimical witnesses without independent corroboration?
  • What is the legal effect when the prosecution fails to prove an alleged motive in a murder case?
  • Are disclosure statements made to police admissible under Articles 38 and 39 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 when no new facts are discovered?
  • Does the failure of the trial court to put an incriminating circumstance like abscondence to the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 cause prejudice warranting exclusion of that evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Muhammad and others vs Muhammad Sadiq and others2022 CLC 1891 · Lahore High Court · 2021-05-24Read full judgment →
• Khan Bahadur Khan vs Khan Malook Khan2022 SCP 92, 2022 PLJ SC 274, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-10
  civil revisionlimitationcondonation of delaysuo motu jurisdictionconcurrent findingsscope of revisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision application as barred by time due to an unexcused delay and failure to explain each day's delay. The core legal question addressed is whether a time-barred revision petition must automatically be treated as information for the exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and the extent of interference with concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and suo motu powers is entirely discretionary and depends on the satisfaction of conditions establishing a grave illegality or jurisdictional defect, and a time-barred petition cannot be used to bypass limitation rules and indefinitely prolong litigation. The key principles laid down are that limitation cannot be rendered redundant under the guise of treating a time-barred revision as information, that courts must uphold the doctrine of finality of litigation, and that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts are not interfered with in revisional jurisdiction unless tainted by perversity, misreading, or non-reading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a time-barred revision petition must be treated as information by the High Court to invoke suo motu revisional jurisdiction?
  • Does the failure to explain the delay of each and every day justify the dismissal of a revision petition on the ground of limitation?
  • What is the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding concurrent findings of fact?
  • Can the statutory period of limitation for filing a revision application be circumvented by invoking the inherent or supervisory powers of the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Khamiso & Misri vs T he State2022 SHC 470 · Sindh High Court · 2022-09-21
  murdergrave and sudden provocationeyewitness testimonydelay in FIRmedical evidencewater disputecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased following a sudden altercation regarding the diversion of water to agricultural fields. The core legal questions involved the credibility of eyewitness testimony, the explanation of delay in lodging the F.I.R., the reliability of material recoveries, and whether the appellants' actions fell within the exception of grave and sudden provocation to warrant a lesser punishment under Section 302(c). The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through consistent and trustworthy ocular evidence corroborated by medical evidence, and that the defence failed to establish the elements of grave and sudden provocation or discharge the burden of proof regarding the same. The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction and sentence. The key principles laid down include the criteria for invoking the defence of grave and sudden provocation, requiring proof of provoking circumstances, loss of self-control, an ordinary person standard, proportionality of retaliation, and temporal proximity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a delay of fifteen hours in lodging the First Information Report is fatal to the prosecution case when a plausible and natural explanation is provided?
  • What are the essential elements that an accused must establish to successfully claim the defence of grave and sudden provocation under criminal law?
  • Can a plea of grave and sudden provocation be validly raised for the first time during the hearing of an appeal when the accused maintained a plea of complete denial and alibi at the trial stage?
  • Whether the repetition of fatal blows to vital parts of the body with sharp-edged weapons negates the proportionality requirement necessary for the exception of sudden provocation?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalique Zaman Chaudhry and 2 others vs Shabbir Anjum Mehdi and 52022 MLD 1459 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-04-05Read full judgment →
• Khalil-Ur-Rehman, etc vs State etcPLJ 2022 Cr.C. 505 · Lahore High Court · 2021-10-11
  criminal appealnarcotics controlcharas recoverybenefit of doubtsafe custody of case propertyforensic report contradictionacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting and sentencing the appellants under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for the alleged possession of charas. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the safe custody of the case property and material contradictions between ocular evidence, sample weights, and the forensic report. The Lahore High Court held that discrepancies in the weight of samples sent versus analyzed by the forensic agency, combined with contradictions regarding the physical shape of the recovered contraband vis-a-vis the trial court's observation, created serious doubts in the prosecution's case. The court laid down the principle that even a single circumstance creating a reasonable doubt in a prudent mind is sufficient to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused, and that the initial onus of proof under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 rests on the prosecution to bring home guilt beyond a shadow of doubt before shifting to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy between the weight of narcotic samples dispatched and the weight reported by the forensic laboratory create a fatal doubt in the prosecution case?
  • Whether contradictions between ocular testimony regarding the physical shape of recovered contraband and the trial court's observation of the case property warrant acquittal?
  • Can the benefit of doubt be extended to an accused based on a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind?
  • When does the burden of proof shift to the accused under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalil Khan and another vs Fazaldad Khan and 4 others2022 YLR 2059 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2022-02-18Read full judgment →
• Khalil Ahmad etc vs Muhammad Iqbal etc2022 PLJ Lahore 312 · Lahore High Court · 2021-12-31Read full judgment →
• Khalid Safdar Makhdoom vs Government of the Punjab etc2022 LHC 2535 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-31Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood vs Dilawar Khan2022 LHC 6528 · Lahore High Court · 2022-09-21Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood @ Khaloo vs The State2022 SCP 42, 2022 SCMR 1148, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 151, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-10
  MurderAppealConvictionAcquittalEvidenceMedical evidenceAbsconsionReasonable doubtSolitary witnessCriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned an appeal against the appellant's conviction for murder under Section 302(b) PPC, where the Trial Court and High Court had maintained a life sentence. The core legal questions revolved around the admissibility and reliance on medical evidence (post-mortem report and doctor's statement) from a previous trial of co-accused, which was not exhibited in the appellant's current trial, and whether a conviction could be sustained solely on a solitary eye-witness statement and the appellant's absconsion. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and acquitting the appellant. The Court held that evidence recorded in one case cannot be relied upon in another without proper exhibition in the current trial, emphasizing that every criminal proceeding must be decided on its own record. It further reiterated that absconsion alone is not proof of crime and cannot be the sole basis for conviction, and any reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused, requiring the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt with unimpeachable evidence.

  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mattoo vs The State & another2022 LHC 6207 · Lahore High Court · 2022-08-18
  post-arrest bailretrospective effect of penal statutesprohibitory clauseillegal gratificationprevention of corruptionfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks post-arrest bail in a case registered under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 regarding allegations of accepting illegal gratification for government jobs. The core legal question is whether an amendment enhancing punishment under a penal statute applies retrospectively at the bail stage, and whether the case falls within the prohibitory clause of section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Lahore High Court held that penal amendments cannot apply retrospectively in view of Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which protection extends to the bail stage. Since the offence occurred prior to the 2021 amendment and did not fall within the prohibitory clause at the relevant time, and further inquiry was warranted regarding delayed evidence and dubious video clips, bail was granted as a rule. The court laid down that amendments enhancing penalties cannot be applied retroactively to determine whether an offence falls within the prohibitory clause of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does an amendment enhancing punishment in a penal statute apply retrospectively at the bail stage?
  • Whether bail should be granted when an offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is protection under Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 available to an accused at the bail stage regarding enhanced punishments?
  • Does a case call for further inquiry when prosecution evidence like video clips are delayed and unverified?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Maqbool Siddiqui & Others vs Province of Sindh & Others2022 SHC 318 · Sindh High Court · 2022-06-24Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mansoor vs National Industrial Relations Commission Islamabad2022 PLC 214 · Sindh High Court · 2021-02-23
  constitutional petitionservice terminationmisconductforged certificateback benefitsreinstatementNational Industrial Relations Commissionmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to challenge an order passed by the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission, which had reversed a Single Bench decision and dismissed the petitioner's grievance application against his termination from service. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of the constitutional petition against the NIRC's factual findings, whether the alleged act of submitting a forged certificate constituted misconduct under the relevant labor laws, and whether the employer had established the charges through proper evidence. The court held that the Full Bench's order was based on a misreading and non-reading of evidence, and that the alleged act did not fall within the definition of misconduct under Standing Order 15 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968. Consequently, the court set aside the Full Bench's decision, restored the Single Bench's judgment, and ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner with back benefits. The key principle laid down is that disciplinary termination for misconduct requires strict adherence to statutory definitions and proof established through concrete, unassailable evidence, and appellate tribunals cannot reverse findings of fact without properly evaluating the record.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against findings of the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission based on misreading and non-reading of evidence?
  • Does the submission of a forged educational certificate constitute misconduct under Standing Order 15 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Whether an employee can be found guilty of producing a fake promotion document without the document being confronted to him or formally exhibited in evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mahmood vs Secretary, Information and Broadcasting and others2022 PLC (C.S.) 1423 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-04-22
  supersessionpromotioncivil servantwrit petitionmala fidesquantification of PERsselection board
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment from the Islamabad High Court addresses a writ petition filed by a petitioner impugning orders of supersession and the promotion of private respondents to the post of Controller (News) in the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner's supersession was unlawful, mala fide, or contrary to the revised promotion policy, and whether the High Court could interfere in departmental promotion matters. The court held that the petitioner was lawfully superseded on multiple occasions due to a failure to attain the required qualifying score based on quantified PERs and Selection Board marks, that allegations of mala fides were unsubstantiated, and that the court under Article 199 of the Constitution cannot substitute its own evaluation for that of the Selection Board or compel promotion. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee can challenge promotion supersessions after failing to contest earlier successive supersessions on the same grounds?
  • Can the High Court interfere with departmental promotion decisions and compel the competent authority to promote an individual?
  • What constitutes mala fides of law versus mala fides of fact in service matters?
  • Is a promotion policy requiring a specific threshold of aggregate marks in PERs and Selection Board evaluation legally binding?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Iqbal, etc vs Mst. Yasmeen, etc2022 LHC 7028 · Lahore High Court · 2022-09-19Read full judgment →
• Khalid Hussain vs National Accountability Bureau (NAB) through Director2022 PLJ Lahore 517 · Lahore High Court · 2022-02-21Read full judgment →
• Khalid Hussain vs Drug Inspector/Drug Controller Lodhran and 2 others2022 P Cr. L J 364 · Lahore High Court · 2021-02-01
  criminal revisionde-sealing of medical storespeaking orderremanddrug court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition was filed under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging an order dated 5.1.2021 passed by the Duty Judge of the Chairman, Drug Court, Multan, which dismissed the petitioner's application for the de-sealing of his medical store. The core legal question was whether the impugned order was sustainable given that it failed to refer to the specific allegations levelled against the petitioner or demonstrate a perusal of the relevant record. The Lahore High Court held that the impugned order was not a speaking order and was therefore unsustainable. Consequently, the High Court set aside the order and remanded the matter back to the Chairman, Drug Court, Multan, with directions to decide the de-sealing application afresh after providing an opportunity of hearing to all stakeholders. The key principle laid down is that judicial and quasi-judicial orders must be speaking orders, reflecting a perusal of the record and detailing the allegations or grounds upon which the decision is based.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by a Drug Court dismissing an application for de-sealing a medical store is sustainable if it is not a speaking order?
  • Can a non-speaking order that fails to detail the allegations or show perusal of the record be set aside in revisionary jurisdiction?
  • What is the appropriate remedy when a Drug Court fails to provide a reasoned decision on an application for de-sealing premises?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Ali Dars and 27 others vs Province Of Sindh through Chief Secretary2022 PLD Sindh 20 · Sindh High Court · 2020-08-26Read full judgment →
• Khalid Alam vs Province of Sindh through Home Secretary Sindh and 52022 PCRLJ 1094 · Sindh High Court · 2020-10-05
  quashment of FIRmultiple FIRsdishonour of chequecriminal breach of trustSughra Bibi principletrial court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought the quashment of two FIRs, contending that multiple FIRs regarding the same transaction violated the principles established in Mst. Sughra Bibi v. The State (PLD 2018 SC 595), which prohibits the registration of multiple FIRs for the same incident. The petitioner argued that the transactions were part of a single series of events involving the purchase of CNG rickshaws. The Court, however, distinguished the facts, finding that the FIRs involved distinct transactions, different quantities of vehicles, and separate financial instruments issued at different times. The Court held that the ratio of Mst. Sughra Bibi does not apply where incidents are factually distinct, even if the parties and the general nature of the business are the same. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Section 71 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning limits of punishment, is relevant only at the sentencing stage post-conviction, not for quashing FIRs. Given that challans had already been submitted under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Court dismissed the petition, directing the petitioner to seek relief before the trial courts under Sections 249-A or 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle in Mst. Sughra Bibi v. The State regarding multiple FIRs apply to distinct transactions involving the same parties?
  • At what stage of criminal proceedings does Section 71 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 become applicable?
  • Can a petition for quashment of FIR be entertained when a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 has already been submitted to the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Khairullah Qureshi vs Province of Sindh through Home Secretary Sindh and 8 others2022 PCRLJ 1345 · Sindh High Court · 2020-09-02
  quashment of FIRconstitutional jurisdictionpending investigationcriminal misappropriationalternative remedyHigh Court interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking the quashment of an FIR registered under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning allegations of misappropriation of a government vehicle by the petitioner following his suspension from his position as Project Director at a university. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction to quash an FIR while the criminal investigation is still ongoing. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that it would not interfere in the investigation process at this stage. The Court reasoned that the petitioner has adequate alternative remedies, including presenting his defense to the Investigating Officer or seeking discharge before the trial court. The key principle laid down is that the High Court will refrain from exercising its constitutional jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings while an investigation is pending, as the law enforcement agencies must be allowed to perform their statutory duties unless clear mala fides are established.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to quash an FIR while a criminal investigation is still pending?
  • Is it permissible for the High Court to restrain law enforcement agencies from investigating a cognizable offense?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to grant a blanket cover against the registration of a criminal case?
  Read full judgment →
• Khair Muhammad and 12 others vs Ali Sher and 4 others2022 PCRLJ 1603 · Sindh High Court · 2021-12-14
  illegal dispossessioninterim reliefcommencement of trialframing of chargetaking cognizancecriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application assails an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge whereby an application for interim relief under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 was allowed. The core legal question before the court was whether interim relief under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 can be granted after taking cognizance but before the framing of a charge and commencement of the trial. The Sindh High Court held that the expression 'during trial' in section 7 of the Act requires that a trial must have formally commenced, which occurs only after the supply of relevant documents under section 265(c) and the framing of a charge under section 265(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Taking cognizance is not synonymous with the commencement of a trial. Consequently, granting interim relief before framing a charge is illegal and without lawful authority. The impugned order was set aside, and the trial court was directed to decide the application afresh after framing a charge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether taking cognizance of an offence is synonymous with the commencement of a trial under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  • Can interim relief under section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 be granted before the framing of a charge against the accused?
  • Does the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 apply to proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 where the Act lacks specific provisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Khadim Hussain Shah vs The State through National Accountability Bureau2022 YLR 1174 · Sindh High Court · 2020-10-21
  white-collar crimemisappropriationburden of proofaccountability appealsecondary evidenceadmissibility of documentsNational Accountability Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal accountability appeal challenges a conviction under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, for the misappropriation of wheat and empty bags by a Food Supervisor. The core legal questions concerned the admissibility of documentary evidence, the necessity of direct eyewitness testimony in white-collar crimes, and the burden of proof under the Ordinance. The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction. It held that in white-collar offenses, the prosecution is not required to produce direct eyewitnesses if circumstantial evidence and official records sufficiently establish the misappropriation. The Court emphasized that Section 14 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, shifts the burden of proof to the accused once the prosecution establishes a prima facie case, which the appellant failed to rebut. Furthermore, the Court ruled that objections regarding the admissibility of secondary evidence cannot be raised for the first time at the appellate stage if the documents were exhibited without objection during the trial. Finally, it clarified that fact-finding committees do not require the same procedural formalities as full-fledged inquiries.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 14 of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 shift the burden of proof to the accused in cases of corruption?
  • Can an objection regarding the admissibility of secondary evidence be raised for the first time during an appeal?
  • Is a fact-finding committee report in a white-collar crime case required to follow the same procedural formalities as a formal criminal inquiry?
  • Does the prosecution need to produce direct eyewitness testimony to establish a charge of misappropriation in a white-collar crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Khadim Hussain Rajpar & another vs Muhammad Ibrahim Rajpar & others2022 SHC 154, 2024 CLC 215 · Sindh High Court · 2022-04-22Read full judgment →
• Khadam Hussain and 2 others vs Khursheed Bibi and 2 others2022 MLD 1565 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2022-06-03Read full judgment →
• Kazim Ali vs Ishaq Ali2022 PLD Balochistan 66 · Balochistan High Court · 2021-03-22Read full judgment →
• Kashmir Orphan Relief Trust Jarri Kass Mirpur through Chairman vs Family2022 CLC 1465 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2022-03-21Read full judgment →
• Kashif Mahmood vs Additional District Judge and others2022 LHC 1553, 2022 MLD 1762 · Lahore High Court · 2022-02-15
  maintenance allowanceannual increaseretrospective effectremedial legislationconstitutional petitionfamily courts
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged orders passed by the lower forums allowing a ten percent annual increase in maintenance allowance under Section 17A(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, starting from the date of the amending Act's promulgation, in respect of a maintenance decree passed prior to the amendment. The core legal question was whether the provision for automatic annual increase in maintenance introduced through the Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 has retrospective application to maintenance decrees passed before its enactment. The Lahore High Court held that Section 17A(3) is a beneficial and remedial piece of legislation that operates prospectively from the date of its enactment, but its application to prior decrees does not render it retrospective merely because a part of the requisites is drawn from an antecedent time. The Court established that applying the ten percent annual increase from the date of promulgation of the 2015 Act to earlier decrees does not impair vested rights and is legally sound, dismissing the petition accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 17A(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 apply to maintenance decrees passed prior to the enactment of the Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015?
  • Whether the automatic ten percent annual increase in maintenance under Section 17A(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 constitutes a retrospective operation of law when applied to prior decrees?
  • Is Section 17A(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 considered a beneficial and remedial piece of legislation subject to liberal construction?
  Read full judgment →
• Kashif Ali alias Moj vs The State2022 YLR 1960 · Sindh High Court · 2021-10-04
  criminal appealmurderrobberyocular testimonyrule of consistencyinvestigative lapsesminor contradictionsballistic report
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal jail appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant for murder and robbery committed during a street incident. The core legal questions involve evaluating the reliability of ocular testimony, the impact of minor discrepancies and investigative lapses, the applicability of the rule of consistency given the co-accused's acquittal, and whether the appellant was apprehended red-handed with the crime weapon. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence, holding that unimpeachable ocular testimony supported by medical and forensic evidence outweighs minor investigative flaws and minor contradictions, and that the rule of consistency does not apply where the appellant was apprehended at the scene with a firearm while the co-accused was acquitted due to the lack of an identification parade. The key legal principles laid down are that minor contradictions and procedural irregularities in investigation do not vitiate a conviction where strong, confidence-inspiring ocular testimony and forensic recovery connect the accused to the crime, and that the rule of consistency is inapplicable when the roles and evidentiary foundations regarding the convicted and acquitted co-accused are materially distinct.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of minor contradictions and procedural irregularities in the police investigation vitiate a conviction when supported by unimpeachable ocular testimony?
  • Whether the rule of consistency applies to a co-accused who was apprehended red-handed at the crime scene with a firearm when another co-accused was acquitted due to the absence of an identification parade?
  • Does the mere relationship of eye-witnesses to the deceased render their testimony unreliable in the absence of established enmity?
  • Is a conviction sustainable under section 302(b) read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the ocular and medical evidence consistently connect the accused to the fatal gunshot?
  Read full judgment →
• Kashif Ali @ Kalu vs The State and another2022 SCP 166, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 195, 2022 SCMR 1515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-06-06
  MurderRobberyHouse-trespassDying declarationRecovery of evidenceDelay in FIRReasonable doubtAcquittalCriminal appealBenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a criminal appeal against the conviction of the petitioner for murder, robbery, and house-trespass. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had established its case beyond reasonable doubt, particularly scrutinizing the reliability of the dying declaration, the evidentiary value of alleged recoveries, and the impact of material contradictions and procedural irregularities. The Supreme Court observed significant flaws including an unexplained 18-hour delay in lodging the FIR, initial nomination of a different accused, the complainant's hearsay evidence, and the Investigating Officer's failure to record the dying declaration properly or produce it in court. Furthermore, the weapon of offence was not sent for chemical examination, and recoveries of ornaments lacked independent witnesses. The Court held that these grave and sensational dents created reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the impugned judgment, and acquitted the petitioner. The key principle reiterated was that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt about the accused's guilt entitles them to the benefit of doubt, as conviction must rest on unimpeachable and reliable evidence.

  Read full judgment →
• Kashif Aftab Ahmed Abbasi vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2022 SCP 186, 2022 PSC 1584, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 1319, 2022 SCMR 1618 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-06-06
  antedated seniorityPolice Service of PakistanCommon Training Programdeferment of trainingservice tribunalvested rightinter-se seniority
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal regarding the assignment of antedated seniority. The petitioner, initially a Pakistan Navy officer, was inducted into the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) in BS-17 based on Federal Public Service Commission recommendations. Due to continuous requests by the Governor of Sindh for his deferment while serving as an ADC, the petitioner repeatedly deferred joining the Common Training Program (CTP) until he finally joined the 43rd CTP, whereupon his inter-se seniority was fixed with that batch. The core legal question was whether a probationer who underwent continuous deferments from the CTP is entitled to claim antedated seniority from the year of his initial appointment without completing the mandatory training along with his original batch. The Supreme Court held that antedated seniority cannot be claimed as a vested right and that seniority must be regulated in accordance with the applicable rules, specifically requiring completion of training with the batch the probationer actually undergoes the CTP. The key principle laid down is that no officer has a vested right to a particular seniority or antedated promotion without fulfilling mandatory prerequisites such as training, and seniority is governed strictly by applicable service rules and executive policies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an officer can claim antedated seniority from the date of initial appointment without qualifying the mandatory Common Training Program along with their original batch?
  • Does a civil servant acquire a vested right to a particular seniority or promotion under service laws?
  • How is the inter-se seniority of probationers determined when multiple deferments from training are granted?
  • Can seniority be assigned from a date prior to when a probationer actually joined and completed the requisite training?
  Read full judgment →
• Karim Bakhsh and others vs Government of Balochistan through Secretary2022 YLR 2195 · Balochistan High Court · 2020-12-07Read full judgment →
• Kareem Nawaz & 4 others vs District Collector/ Deputy Commissioner2022 LHC 3711 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Karachi Tax Bar Association and another vs Pakistan and 2 others2022 SHC 36, 2022 [M] CLR 791, 2022 PCTLR 660 · Sindh High Court · 2022-03-07
  probationary periodtermination of servicecivil servantAppellate Tribunal Inland RevenueFederal Service Tribunalaudi alteram partemconstitutional jurisdictionservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions challenged the termination of a Judicial Member of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) during his probationary period. The petitioners contended that the termination was illegal, violated principles of natural justice, and that the appointee was not a civil servant. The respondents argued the petitions were not maintainable due to the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution, as the appointee was a civil servant governed by the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Court held that a probationer has no vested right to continue in service, and services may be terminated during probation without a show-cause notice, provided the termination is not punitive for misconduct. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the Court affirmed that challenges to the terms and conditions of civil servants fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere, noting that collateral attacks on the vires of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 were not maintainable. The petition was disposed of, leaving the respondent department to address pensionary matters under the Fundamental Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Can the services of a probationer be terminated without a show-cause notice?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a petition regarding the terms and conditions of a civil servant in view of Article 212 of the Constitution?
  • Is a collateral attack on the vires of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 maintainable in a constitutional petition?
  • Does a probationer have a vested right to continue in service until superannuation?
  Read full judgment →
• Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works Ltd vs Sindh Labour Appellate2022 SHC 532 · Sindh High Court · 2022-11-22
  writ jurisdictionlimitationlabor disputepay scalesurmises and conjecturesgrievance petitionmisappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a judgment of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal which had reversed a Labour Court decision and granted a worker's claim for a higher pay scale sixteen years after his initial appointment. The core legal questions involved the misappreciation of evidence based on surmises and whether the law of limitation could be disregarded as a mere technicality. The Sindh High Court held that the Labour Appellate Tribunal's findings were predicated on erroneous assumptions of fact and that limitation prescriptions are substantive legal mandates rather than mere technicalities that can be casually disregarded. The Court established that courts are bound to determine limitation issues regardless of whether an objection is raised, and each day of delay must be explained.

  Questions settled

  • Can the law of limitation be disregarded by a tribunal as a mere technicality?
  • Is it incumbent upon courts and tribunals to determine whether proceedings are within time regardless of whether an objection is raised?
  • Does a writ court possess the jurisdiction to interfere with a tribunal's judgment based on manifest illegality and misappreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Kanwar Naveed Jameel and 5 others vs Province of Sindh through Chief2022 PLD Sindh 499 · Sindh High Court · 2022-06-01
  recusaljudicial biasforum shoppinglarger benchjudicial independencelegal ethicscontempt of court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed an application seeking the recusal of a presiding judge and the constitution of a larger bench of ten judges to hear their petition. The core legal questions concerned whether a judge is obligated to recuse based on a litigant's subjective perception of bias and whether a larger bench is warranted for the subject matter. The court dismissed both requests. It held that the decision to recuse is a matter of a judge's own conscience and that courts must not succumb to 'forum shopping' or intimidation tactics employed by counsel to manipulate bench composition. The court observed that such behavior, including misbehavior in court, is unethical and undermines judicial independence. Furthermore, the court found no legal complexity justifying a larger bench, noting that the request appeared to be a dilatory tactic. The principle laid down is that judges must firmly reject unfounded allegations of bias and attempts to manipulate the roster, as succumbing to such tactics would erode public confidence in the judiciary and encourage unethical practices among legal practitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Is a judge obligated to recuse from a case based solely on a litigant's subjective perception of bias?
  • Can a litigant successfully demand the constitution of a larger bench as a matter of right in the absence of complex legal issues?
  • Does a judge's decision to remain on a bench despite allegations of bias constitute a valid exercise of judicial discretion?
  Read full judgment →
• Kanwar Arif Ali Khan, M/s Sukkur Motel Company (Pvt) Limited vs Danish Ali2022 SCP 392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-01
  leave to appealnon-partyimpleadmentlocus standicivil petitionSupreme Court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves civil petitions arising from proceedings before the Sindh High Court, where one of the petitioners was denied impleadment and subsequently challenged the main judgment of the High Court. The core legal question concerns the procedure and maintainability of a petition or appeal filed by a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the High Court. The Supreme Court held that a non-party affected by a judgment, decree, or order may prefer an appeal or petition provided they obtain leave from the appellate court through a separate application. The Court laid down the principle that any person challenging a High Court judgment without being a party to those proceedings must first file a separate leave application to establish locus standi and ensure transparency, endorsing the longstanding practice tacitly part of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the High Court file an appeal or petition against the judgment?
  • What is the procedure for a non-party to challenge a judgment of the High Court before the Supreme Court?
  • Is a separate application seeking leave of the Court mandatory for a non-party challenging a High Court judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Kaneshiro (Private) Limited through Authorized Representative vs Sajjad Ali2022 PLC 137 · Sindh High Court · 2019-11-26
  writ of certiorariunlawful dismissalgrievance noticereinstatementback benefitsIndustrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinanceconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner employer challenged a judgment of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and allowed the respondent workman's appeal, ordering his reinstatement with back benefits. The core legal question was whether the termination of the respondent's service without a written order or notice violated labour laws, and whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the service of a grievance notice could be disturbed in constitutional jurisdiction. The Sindh High Court held that the concurrent finding regarding the service of the grievance notice was unexceptionable, and that even assuming the employee had committed misconduct by absenting himself, the employer was legally bound under Standing Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 to issue a written order stating reasons for any adverse employment action. The key principle laid down is that dispensing with the services of a workman without complying with the mandatory requirement of a written order stating reasons under the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is unlawful, irrespective of alleged voluntary abandonment or absenteeism.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the service of a grievance notice under constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the failure of a workman to attend work absolve the employer from the mandatory requirement of issuing a written order stating reasons under Standing Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Is an employer required to issue a show-cause notice and a written order of dismissal even if the employee allegedly left employment voluntarily?
  Read full judgment →
• Kamran Mirza son of Mirza Riaz Baig vs The State2022 SHC 572, 2024 MLD 1436 · Sindh High Court · 2022-11-30
  bank fraudmisappropriationbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidencecriminal appealhandwriting expertinvestigating officer opinion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant, a bank cashier, for offenses under Sections 409, 468, 471, and 477-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, regarding the alleged misappropriation of customer funds. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt through admissible evidence. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case, noting that the oral testimony was contradictory and unreliable. Crucially, the court observed that the trial court had acquitted a co-accused based on the same evidence, and the principle of consistency precluded convicting the appellant without independent, strong corroboration. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to prove the authenticity of the deposit slips via expert handwriting analysis or establish the appellant's specific duty roster at the time of the alleged offenses. The court reaffirmed that an Investigating Officer’s opinion on guilt is inadmissible, and convictions cannot be based on mere presumption. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, extending him the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be maintained if the prosecution witnesses were disbelieved regarding a co-accused facing the same charges?
  • Is the opinion of an investigating officer regarding the guilt or innocence of an accused admissible as evidence?
  • What is the legal requirement for proving the authenticity of a document under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 when the signature is disputed?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on presumption in the absence of unimpeachable evidence?
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• Kamran etc vs State etcPLJ 2022 Cr.C. 1241 · Lahore High Court · 2021-12-23
  child witness testimonyraperes gestaeidentification paradeforensic evidencecriminal appealrationality test
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the conviction of the appellant for the rape of a six-year-old student, alongside a criminal revision for sentence enhancement. The core legal questions involved the credibility of a child witness, the admissibility of statements made to parents as res gestae evidence, the necessity of a formal identification parade, and the impact of inconclusive forensic reports on the charge of rape. The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence. It held that the testimony of a child witness, once subjected to a rationality test and found credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. The Court established that statements made by a victim to parents immediately following a traumatic event are admissible as res gestae under the law of evidence. Furthermore, it affirmed that the absence of spermatozoa in forensic reports does not negate the occurrence of rape where medical evidence confirms penetration, and that a formal identification parade is unnecessary when the victim recognizes the perpetrator from their workplace or prior acquaintance.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of a child witness sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape without corroboration?
  • Are statements made by a victim to parents shortly after a sexual assault admissible as res gestae evidence?
  • Does the absence of spermatozoa in forensic reports negate the occurrence of rape if other medical evidence confirms penetration?
  • Is a formal identification parade mandatory when the victim is already acquainted with the accused?
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• Kamran and another vs The State and others2022 PLD Lahore 645 · Lahore High Court · 2021-12-23
  child rapechild witnessres gestaespontaneous declarationmedical evidencepenetrationidentification paradecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses criminal appeals and a revision petition arising from a trial court verdict concerning the rape of a six-year-old school student. The primary appellant, a security guard at the school, was convicted of rape under section 376(3) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while a co-employee was acquitted. The core legal questions involved the credibility of a child witness of tender years, the applicability of the res gestae and spontaneous declaration doctrines to statements made by the victim to her mother, the evidentiary value of medical examinations and partial penetration in child rape cases, and whether the absence of a formal identification parade vitiates the trial when the accused is a known workplace acquaintance. The Lahore High Court upheld the conviction and sentence, ruling that the victim's testimony was trustworthy, corroborated by medical evidence, and that partial penetration within the labia majora satisfies the legal requirement of rape. The principle laid down is that a child victim's testimony, when found competent through a rationality test and supported by spontaneous disclosures and medical findings, is sufficient to sustain a conviction without requiring a formal identification parade.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a six-year-old child witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape without independent corroboration?
  • Does a statement made by a child victim to her mother shortly after an incident qualify as a spontaneous declaration under the doctrine of res gestae?
  • Is full penile penetration necessary to constitute the offense of rape, or does partial penetration within the labia majora suffice?
  • When is a formal identification parade legally unnecessary for identifying an accused person known to the victim through a workplace setting?
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• Kamran Ali, Superintendent Of Police, Deputy Director FIA, Lahore and 32022 PLC (C.S.) 375 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2021-10-20
  review jurisdictionseniority disputecivil service lawerror apparent on the face of the recordservice tribunalinterpretation of statutes
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenged a judgment of the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir concerning a seniority dispute among police officers. The petitioners argued that the court erred in its interpretation of Rule 8(1)(b) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977, specifically regarding the distinction between "grade" and "cadre" in determining seniority. The core legal question was whether the previous judgment suffered from an error apparent on the face of the record justifying review. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners were merely attempting to re-argue the merits of the case, which is impermissible in review jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that review is not a regular remedy for re-evaluating legal interpretations or seeking a different outcome based on dissatisfaction. The key principle laid down is that review jurisdiction is strictly limited to correcting patent errors apparent on the face of the record or considering new evidence; it cannot be invoked simply because a party disagrees with the court's interpretation of law or desires a different conclusion.

  Questions settled

  • Is a review petition maintainable solely on the ground that a party disagrees with the court's interpretation of law?
  • What is the scope of the Supreme Court's power to review its own judgments under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974?
  • Can a party re-argue the merits of a case in the guise of a review petition?
  • Does the use of the term 'grade' in civil service rules necessarily imply a different seniority determination than 'cadre' in all circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Kamran @ Kami s/o Ikram @ Jaga by caste Qureshi vs The State2022 SHC 244, 2024 MLD 1047 · Sindh High Court · 2022-05-31
  criminal appealrapebenefit of doubthostile witnessmedical evidenceDNA reportacquittalattempt to commit rape
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offence of rape under Section 376 read with Section 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, given that the complainant and victim turned hostile, there were significant delays in reporting the incident, and substantial contradictions existed between the ocular evidence and the medical/forensic reports. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The court noted that the victim and complainant did not support the prosecution's version, the medical examination occurred well beyond the viable window for semen detection, and the forensic evidence was riddled with inconsistencies regarding sample collection and chain of custody. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reaffirms the principle that if any circumstance creates a reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding the guilt of an accused, the benefit of that doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in reporting an incident of rape, without a plausible explanation, cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right when the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Can a conviction for rape be sustained when the victim and complainant turn hostile and do not support the prosecution's version of events?
  • Does the absence of physical injuries on the victim's body undermine a charge of forcible rape?
  Read full judgment →
• Kalsoom Mai vs DPO, etc2022 LHC 5949 · Lahore High Court · 2022-07-29
  habeas corpuswomen traffickingillegal custodycontinuous mandamusfundamental rightsdignity of womenrecovery of detenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This habeas corpus petition filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sought the recovery of the petitioner's daughter and granddaughter from the illegal custody of private respondents, following allegations that the former husband had sold the detenue. The core legal question concerned the State's duty and the efficacy of law enforcement agencies in curbing human trafficking and the treatment of women as commodities. The Lahore High Court held that the practice of treating women as objects of trade is a grave violation of fundamental constitutional rights and issued a continuous mandamus to the District Police Officer, Rajanpur, for the immediate recovery and production of the detenues. The key principles laid down emphasize that executive law enforcement agencies must adopt a proactive role to eradicate women trafficking and ensure strict application of penal provisions to uphold the dignity and inviolability of women guaranteed under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ of habeas corpus be used to issue a continuous mandamus to law enforcement agencies for the recovery of a person allegedly sold into trafficking?
  • Does the trafficking and trading of women by family members violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What is the scope of judicial intervention when law enforcement agencies display apathy toward the illegal confinement and trafficking of women?
  Read full judgment →
• Kalimullah vs Amir Fiaz and 02 others2022 PHC 224, 2022 PLJ Peshawar 159 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-03-07Read full judgment →
• Kalim Arshad Khan vs Peshawar High Court, Peshawar through Registrar2022 PLC (C.S.) 398 · Peshawar High Court · 2021-12-18
  seniority fixationservice appealjudicial servicemerit listselection processcivil servantback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal concerns the fixation of seniority for an Additional District and Sessions Judge who was appointed in 2005, following a court order, despite having participated in the same selection process as colleagues appointed in 2001. The appellant challenged the Administration Committee's refusal to grant him seniority alongside his batch-mates. The core legal question was whether the appellant’s seniority should be determined by his merit position in the original selection process or by his actual date of appointment. The Court held that the appellant is entitled to seniority with his batch-mates, noting that he had topped the merit list and his delayed appointment resulted from administrative circumstances rather than his own fault. The Court emphasized that for civil servants selected through the same process, seniority must be determined based on the merit assigned by the Selection Committee, regardless of the date of appointment. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, directing that the appellant be assigned seniority effective from the date his batch-mates were appointed, affirming that merit, not the fortuitous date of appointment, governs seniority in such instances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant appointed later due to administrative delay is entitled to seniority with their original batch-mates from the same selection process?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to a seniority dispute where the previous judgment did not attain finality or was reopened by higher court directions?
  • Is a service appeal maintainable against a final order of the Administration Committee regarding seniority fixation?
  Read full judgment →
• Kafayat Ullah vs State and 6 othersPLJ 2022 Cr.C. 349 · Lahore High Court · 2021-10-06
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationprohibitory clausemala fidecross-versioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition seeking the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent by the Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question concerns whether pre-arrest bail was properly granted in a case involving a serious head injury falling within the prohibitory clause, without considering the specific role attributed to the accused, the requirement of custody for recovery, or the absence of mala fide. The Lahore High Court held that the lower court failed to consider essential parameters for granting pre-arrest bail, such as the specific role of the accused, the need for custodial investigation, and the strict requirement to demonstrate mala fide or ulterior motives for an extraordinary pre-arrest bail remedy. The court laid down the principle that pre-arrest bail cannot be granted as a routine substitute for post-arrest bail without establishing mala fide, and that the mere existence of a cross-version does not automatically entitle an accused to pre-arrest relief. Consequently, the petition was allowed and the pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent was cancelled.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the mere registration of a cross-version case entitles an accused to the extraordinary relief of pre-arrest bail?
  • Does the grant of pre-arrest bail require the demonstration of mala fide or ulterior motive on the part of the complainant or police?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be sustained if the lower court fails to discuss the specific role attributed to the accused and the need for custodial investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Kabir Hussain vs Arshad Saeed & others2022 PHC 646 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-12-05Read full judgment →
• Kabeer Akbar vs The State etc2022 LHC 8156 · Lahore High Court · 2022-12-08
  pre-arrest baildishonoured chequecorporate criminal liabilityseparate legal identityalter egomens reacompany prosecution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a pre-arrest bail application filed by Kabeer Akbar, the Chief Executive Officer of a private limited company, who was implicated in a criminal case registered under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for issuing a dishonoured cheque to Dost Steel Mills Limited. The core legal questions addressed by the court are whether criminal liability under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 is attributable to a company, and whether the individual signing the cheque on behalf of the company bears criminal liability. The Lahore High Court held that the term 'whoever' in section 489-F encompasses both natural and juristic persons, meaning a company can be prosecuted for issuing a bad cheque, and that an individual signing on behalf of the company may also face criminal liability depending on their role, position, and control as the directing mind of the company. Finding that the transaction arose from a commercial dispute and that civil litigation was pending, the court confirmed the pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioner, laying down principles regarding corporate criminal liability and the interpretation of corporate personhood under Pakistani penal law.

  Questions settled

  • Is criminal liability under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 attributable to a company?
  • Does the person who signs a cheque on behalf of a company bear criminal liability under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
  • Does the term 'whoever' in penal statutes include artificial and juristic persons such as corporations?
  • How is the 'identification doctrine' applied to determine the criminal intent of a corporate body?
  Read full judgment →
• Justice Qazi Faez Isa vs The President of Pakistan and others2022 SCP 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-13
  live-streamingjudicial transparencyright to informationArticle 184(3)open justicefundamental rightsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a miscellaneous application filed by Justice Qazi Faez Isa in pending review petitions, seeking live-streaming of court proceedings. The core legal question was whether the public possesses a fundamental right to access information regarding judicial proceedings conducted under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction pursuant to Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court held that Article 19A of the Constitution imposes a positive obligation on State institutions, including the Judiciary, to facilitate public access to information in matters of public importance. The Court determined that cases heard under Article 184(3) constitute matters of public importance, thereby granting the public a fundamental right to observe how these proceedings are conducted. Consequently, the Court directed that audio recordings of the review proceedings be made available on its official website and ordered the Registrar to develop the necessary technological infrastructure for future live-streaming and to propose amendments to the Supreme Court Rules 1980. The judgment establishes that judicial transparency is a constitutional imperative, reinforcing the principle that open justice is essential for maintaining public trust in the judiciary.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 19A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 impose a positive obligation on the Judiciary to provide public access to information regarding court proceedings?
  • Are proceedings conducted by the Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction pursuant to Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 considered matters of public importance?
  • Can a Bench of the Supreme Court order the live-streaming of its own proceedings in the absence of specific rules, provided the technological infrastructure exists?
  • Is the right of the public to access information regarding court proceedings fulfilled solely by the physical openness of the courtroom?
  Read full judgment →
• Junaid Maseeh vs The State through PS CTW, FIA, Islamabad and 2 others2022 PCRLJ 1331 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-01-10
  quashing of FIROfficial Secrets Actcognizance of offenceinvestigationFIR registrationauthorized complaintdistinction between FIR and cognizance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought to quash an FIR registered against him under Sections 3 and 4 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923, arguing that under Section 13 of the Act, a court could only take cognizance upon a complaint from an authorized government officer, thereby precluding the registration of an FIR and investigation. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that there is a clear distinction between the registration of a case and its investigation by law enforcement agencies, and the subsequent act of a court taking cognizance. The court clarified that Section 13 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923, only places an embargo on a court taking cognizance without a proper complaint, but it does not prohibit the lodging of an FIR, the investigation of the matter, or the arrest of an accused. Therefore, the FIR and ongoing investigation were deemed permissible, and the petition for quashing was without merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can an FIR be registered and an investigation conducted under the Official Secrets Act, 1923, before a formal complaint is made by an authorized government officer?
  • Does Section 13 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923, prohibit the lodging of an FIR and investigation, or only the court's taking of cognizance?
  • What is the distinction between the registration of a case/FIR and a court taking cognizance of an offence?
  • Can an FIR be quashed solely on the ground that a court cannot take cognizance without a specific authorized complaint?
  Read full judgment →
• Junaid Akhtar Farooqui vs Province of Sindh & others2022 SHC 390 · Sindh High Court · 2022-09-07Read full judgment →
• Junaid Ahmed vs Azad Government Of The State Of Jammu And through Secretary Elementary and Secondary Education. Muzaffarabad and 5 others2022 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 23 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Juma Khan vs The State2022 PCRLJ 1083 · Balochistan High Court · 2021-09-27
  rash and negligent drivingcriminal appealburden of proofreasonable doubtacquittalcontributory negligenceqatl-i-khata
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant under sections 320, 337/G, 427, and 279 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for rash and negligent driving resulting in death and injury. The core legal question was whether the prosecution sufficiently established the essential element of "rash or negligent" driving to sustain a conviction. The Balochistan High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the accused acted rashly or negligently, noting that the mere occurrence of an accident or high speed does not automatically imply criminal liability. The court emphasized that judicial verdicts cannot be based on surmises, conjectures, or presumptions. The holding established that the prosecution bears the burden of proving rashness and negligence through independent, cogent evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the court highlighted that contributory negligence by the other party must be considered, and where evidence is open to two interpretations, the one favorable to the accused must be adopted. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere occurrence of a road accident or high speed establish the offense of rash and negligent driving under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when based on presumptions and conjectures rather than cogent evidence?
  • Must the prosecution prove rash and negligent driving through independent evidence to secure a conviction under Section 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • When evidence in a criminal case is open to two interpretations, which interpretation must the court adopt?
  Read full judgment →
• Juma Khan vs The State & another2022 PHC 342 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-09-19Read full judgment →
• Juma Khan and another vs The State and others2022 PCRLJ 1427 · Balochistan High Court · 2021-04-26
  murderjudicial confessioncircumstantial evidenceextra-judicial confessioncriminal appealrecovery of weaponburden of proofillicit relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal jail appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant under section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of his wife. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of evidence, specifically the reliability of eye-witnesses, the admissibility of a judicial confession, and the weight of circumstantial evidence, including motive and weapon recovery. The Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt. It affirmed that a judicial confession, if found voluntary and true, is admissible and can form the basis of conviction. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that when a death occurs within the private residence of the accused, the burden to explain the circumstances shifts to the accused; failure to provide a reasonable explanation strengthens the prosecution's case. Additionally, the Court held that extra-judicial confessions corroborated by the recovery of crime weapons are sufficient for conviction. Consequently, the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment were maintained, and the revision petition seeking enhancement was dismissed due to mitigating circumstances surrounding the motive of illicit relations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be based on a judicial confession if the accused later retracts it?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused when a death occurs within their private residence?
  • Is an extra-judicial confession sufficient for conviction if corroborated by the recovery of a crime weapon?
  • Can a court maintain a conviction for murder based on circumstantial evidence when the motive is established?
  Read full judgment →
• JS Global Capital Limited vs Mrs. Raheela Yahya2022 KLR Civil Cases 418 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-26Read full judgment →
• JS Bank Limited vs Ghulam Shabbir2022 SHC 218 · Sindh High Court · 2022-05-13Read full judgment →
• Johnson Controls Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd. vs Securities & Exchange Commission2022 SHC 394 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Johar Ali vs The State and another2022 PCRLJ 1177 · Peshawar High Court · 2021-12-09
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtchance witnesseye-witness testimonymotiveabscondenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the reliance on a sole eye-witness. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The Court found the complainant to be a "chance witness" whose presence at the crime scene was not satisfactorily established, noting significant contradictions in his testimony and the absence of corroborative evidence. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to substantiate the alleged motive, which, once pleaded, must be proven. The Court reiterated that conviction cannot rest on abscondence alone and that medical evidence did not support the complainant's version of events. Emphasizing the golden principle of criminal jurisprudence that the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, ruling that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to sustain a capital charge.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of the accused's abscondence?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a chance witness in a criminal trial when their testimony remains uncorroborated?
  • What are the legal consequences for the prosecution when it sets up a motive but fails to prove it?
  • Is the testimony of a witness sufficient for conviction if their presence at the crime scene is doubtful?
  Read full judgment →