Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Mohammad Karim vs The State2022 IHC 110 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-29
  narcoticschain of custodychemical examiner reportbenefit of doubtcriminal appealsafe transmissionControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of heroin and ice. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution successfully established the chain of custody and the safe transmission of the recovered narcotics to the chemical laboratory. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to significant discrepancies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses regarding the handling of the case property, the unexplained ten-day delay in transmitting samples for analysis, and the use of an unverified seal on the parcels. The Court emphasized that the chain of custody is critical in narcotics cases, and any break or gap renders the Chemical Examiner's report unreliable. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, with the Court reiterating that the prosecution must strictly prove the integrity of the recovered substances from the point of seizure to the laboratory to sustain a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a break in the chain of custody of recovered narcotics render the Chemical Examiner's report unreliable?
  • Is the prosecution required to prove the safe custody and safe transmission of narcotics samples to secure a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • What is the legal effect of an unexplained delay in sending narcotics samples for chemical analysis?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the seal used on the recovered narcotics parcels is not linked to any of the prosecution witnesses?
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• Messrs Poly Foam (Private) Limited vs Government of Pakistan through Federal Secretary Finance and Revenue Division, Islamabad and 10 others2022 PCTLR 448 · Peshawar High Court · 2021-03-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Phandu Filling Station through CEO vs Government of Pakistan2022 CLD 1566 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-04-01Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pfizer Pakistan Limited and 2 others vs Pharma Plus International2022 CLC 1298 · Peshawar High Court · 2021-05-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs Performance Automotive Private Limited through Chief Executive2022 CLC 37, 2022 PCTLR 497 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-05-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and others2022 PTD 1730 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-11-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan LNG Limited through Authorized Representative vs Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary Revenue Division, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad2022 PTD 1763 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-09-07
  coercive recoverydue processtax assessmentnatural justicebank account attachmentstatutory interpretationright to appealaccess to justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a notice issued under Section 140 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which resulted in the immediate attachment and recovery of funds from the petitioner's bank accounts by the Commissioner, Inland Revenue, following the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal by the Commissioner (Appeals). The core legal question was whether tax authorities are mandated to issue a notice under Section 138(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, before invoking coercive recovery powers under Section 140 of the same Ordinance, particularly after an appellate authority has upheld an assessment order. The Court held that the issuance of a notice under Section 138(1) is a mandatory requirement of law before resorting to coercive recovery. The Court reasoned that such notice is essential to provide the taxpayer with a reasonable timeframe to discharge the liability or pursue further appellate remedies, thereby upholding the constitutional rights to due process and access to justice. Consequently, the Court declared the impugned recovery notice void ab initio and ordered the reimbursement of the recovered funds, emphasizing that state functionaries must act in a just, fair, and reasonable manner.

  Questions settled

  • Is the issuance of a notice under Section 138(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, a mandatory prerequisite before invoking coercive recovery powers under Section 140 of the same Ordinance?
  • Does the confirmation of an assessment order by an appellate authority automatically revive the original Section 137 notice to permit immediate coercive recovery?
  • Are tax authorities obligated to provide a taxpayer with a reasonable timeframe to discharge tax liabilities before resorting to coercive recovery measures?
  • Can tax authorities bypass the requirement of notice under Section 138(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, when an appeal against an assessment order has been dismissed?
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• Messrs Pakistan Housing Authority Foundation vs The Commissioner Inland2022 PTD 1263 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan General Insurance Limited vs Securities and Exchange2022 CLD 1528 · Lahore High Court · 2022-04-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nisar Ahmad Shahwani and Brothers through Owner and another2022 CLC 1999 · Balochistan High Court · 2020-07-13Read full judgment →
• Messrs New Dadu Sugar Mills Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi vs The Commissioner Inland2022 PTD (Trib.) 1927 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-09-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs Naveed Enterprises, Faisalabad vs The Commissioner Inland2022 PTD (Trib.) 1665 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2021-02-02Read full judgment →
• Messrs Naseem & Company and others vs Capital Development Authority2022 MLD 1426 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Murtaza Town Residence Society Association through General2022 PLD Sindh 282 · Sindh High Court · 2021-11-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mukhtar-Ul-Haq Power Looms, Toba Tek Singh vs The Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), Rto., Faisalabad2022 PTD (Trib.) 207 · Inland Revenue Appellate Tribunal · 2021-02-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Miq (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive/Directors and 2 others2022 CLD 1562 · Lahore High Court · 2022-09-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Masood Textile Mills Limited, Faisalabad vs The Commissioner2022 PTD (Trib.) 1508 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-11-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mardan Ways SNG Station vs General Manager SNGPL and others2022 SCMR 584, 2022 PSC 702 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-22
  Civil ProcedurePecuniary JurisdictionConsolidated SuitsSeparate Legal EntityImplied Bar of JurisdictionOil and Gas Regulatory AuthorityLeave to AppealNon-joinder of Parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court order dismissing a Regular First Appeal concerning a dispute over gas supply and alleged arrears. The petitioner had filed a civil suit against company officials without impleading the company itself, SNGPL. The Supreme Court held that the suit was fundamentally defective as a company is a separate legal entity that must be impleaded. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Authority to resolve such disputes, thereby barring the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. Regarding the procedural aspect, the Court ruled that when suits are consolidated, separate decrees are passed; therefore, appeals must be filed in the appropriate forum based on the pecuniary value of each specific decree. Because the petitioner’s suit was valued at Rs. 10,000, the appeal should have been filed before the District Judge, not the High Court. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts and emphasizing the necessity of proper forum selection and party impleadment.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil suit maintainable against company officials without impleading the company as a separate legal entity?
  • Does the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, create an implied bar on the jurisdiction of Civil Courts regarding gas supply disputes?
  • In the case of a consolidated judgment, can an appeal be filed in the High Court if the pecuniary value of one of the decrees falls below the High Court's jurisdiction?
  • When does the bar on the plenary jurisdiction of a Civil Court apply in relation to statutory authorities?
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• Messrs Manaco International through Proprietor vs Federation of Pakistan2022 PTD 1391 · Sindh High Court · 2022-01-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Lucky Cotton Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. vs The Collector of Customs2022 PTD (Trib.) 1051 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2021-12-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs Lucky Cement Limited through Authorized Representative vs Govt.2022 PCTLR 491 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Messrs Kohinoor Spinning Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner Inland Revenue2022 PTD 1727 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-23
  tax deductionunapproved gratuity fundincome from businessstatutory interpretationappellate jurisdictiontax reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which affirmed the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue's decision regarding tax deductions. The core legal question was whether contributions made by the petitioner to an unapproved gratuity fund are deductible when computing income under the head "income from business" pursuant to Section 21(e) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Additionally, the petitioner attempted to raise a new argument regarding tax exemption under the Second Schedule of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the petition must be dismissed. The Court affirmed that Section 21(e) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 explicitly prohibits deductions for contributions made to funds that are not approved, recognized, or superannuation funds. The Court emphasized that interpreting the law to allow deductions for unapproved funds would render the statutory requirement for "approved" status meaningless. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that parties cannot raise fresh questions of law before the Supreme Court that were not agitated before the forums below, specifically the Tribunal or the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Are contributions made to an unapproved gratuity fund deductible when computing income under the head 'income from business'?
  • Can a petitioner raise a fresh question of law before the Supreme Court that was not raised before the lower forums or the High Court?
  • Does the exemption under Clause 33, Part-II of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 apply to a person making a contribution to a gratuity fund?
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• Messrs Kohinoor Spinning Mills Ltd vs Commissioner Inland Revenue2022 SCMR 1943 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-23
  tax referenceunapproved gratuity fundincome from businessdeductions not allowedincome taxsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from a tax reference order wherein the High Court affirmed the view of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue regarding the non-deductibility of contributions made to an unapproved gratuity fund. The core legal question was whether contributions made to an unapproved gratuity fund are allowable as deductions under the head 'income from business' pursuant to section 21(e) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Supreme Court held that contributions to an unapproved gratuity fund cannot be deducted when computing income under the head 'income from business', as the statutory requirement explicitly mandates that the fund must be approved. Furthermore, the Court held that fresh questions of law not raised before the lower forums or the High Court cannot be agitated for the first time before the apex court. The key principles laid down are that statutory provisions requiring approval for gratuity funds must be strictly construed to prevent circumvention, and new factual or legal contentions not part of the record below are impermissible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contributions made to an unapproved gratuity fund are allowable as deductions under the head income from business pursuant to section 21(e) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a new question of law or exemption claim that was not raised before the forums below or the High Court be agitated for the first time before the Supreme Court in a tax reference?
  • Does an exemption applicable to beneficiaries of a gratuity fund extend to a person making contributions to an unapproved gratuity fund?
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• Messrs Kohi Construction Co./Government Contractors, Kohlu through2022 PLD Balochistan 103 · Balochistan High Court · 2020-11-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Khyber Export (Far-East) Co. through Proprietor vs The Director2022 PTD (Trib.) 1812 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2022-06-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Khalid Siraj Textile Mills Limited, Lahore and others vs Additional2022 CLD 1557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-26
  compulsory winding upcompany revivalSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistanbusiness planpost-petition eventslast resort measure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court whereby a compulsory winding up petition filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan was allowed and an official liquidator was appointed. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in ordering the compulsory winding up of the company without considering its subsequent business revival and generation of profits between the filing of the petition and the final order. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, setting aside the winding up order. The Court held that winding up is an extreme measure of last resort, and the regulator and courts must prioritize the preservation of businesses and protection of employment where a company has successfully revived its commercial operations and demonstrated profitability before the final order is passed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether winding up of a company should be ordered as a measure of last resort when the company has demonstrated business revival and profitability prior to the final order?
  • Does the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan have a duty to consider a company's business revival plan before seeking its compulsory winding up?
  • Whether the High Court is required to consider subsequent material developments and business revival applications before passing a winding up order under the Companies Act, 2017?
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• Messrs Kennol Petroleum (Pvt.) Limited And Others: In the matter of vs Not2022 CLD 859 · Competition Commission of Pakistan · 2021-08-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Karakorum Cooperative Bank and another vs Mst. Sofia Begum and 10 others2022 YLR 1207 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2021-11-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs Karachi Port Trust Karachi vs Commissioner Inland Re Venue Zone-2022 PTD (Trib.) 325 · Inland Revenue Appellate Tribunal · 2019-03-05Read full judgment →
• Messrs Kaim Khani and Brothers through Managing Partner vs Province of Sindh through Secretary Higher Technical Education and Research and School Education Department and 4 others2022 YLR 2188 · Sindh High Court · 2022-01-31Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Junaid Khan vs Azad Jammu And Kashmir University through Vice Chancellor and 6 others2022 PLC (C.S) 1146 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2021-12-23
  writ petitiondepartmental promotiontyping testfundamental rightsdiscrimination in servicealternate remedyequality of state subjects
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition filed under Article 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 sought a direction to the University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir to issue a promotion order for the petitioner to the post of Junior Clerk against the 25% quota reserved for Grade-1 to Grade-4 employees, based on a fitness and typing test held on 30.03.2021 in which the petitioner topped the merit list. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner was subjected to unlawful discrimination in promotion when similarly situated or less qualified candidates were promoted, and whether constitutional jurisdiction was barred by the availability of an alternate remedy before the Syndicate. The High Court held that the petitioner, having secured the top position with significantly higher typing speeds while other candidates with lower speeds were promoted, was subjected to blatant and unconstitutional discrimination in violation of fundamental rights, rendering the alternate remedy no bar to invoking writ jurisdiction. The ratio decidendi is that differential and arbitrary treatment of similarly qualified employees in promotional matters constitutes unlawful discrimination, obligating the constitutional court to intervene and grant relief. The key principle laid down is that public institutions must act transparently and without arbitrariness, and where state authorities violate fundamental rights against discrimination in public service, the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court can be directly invoked.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an aggrieved employee can invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court despite the availability of an alternate departmental remedy when a fundamental right against discrimination has been violated?
  • Does the promotion of candidates with inferior test results while ignoring a candidate who topped the merit list constitute unlawful discrimination under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974?
  • Whether the University authorities are legally justified in denying promotion to an eligible employee who successfully qualified the mandatory fitness and typing test for a reserved departmental quota?
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• Messrs Islam Soap Industries (Pvt.) Ltd vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Ltu, Lahore2022 PTD (Trib.) 662 · Inland Revenue Appellate Tribunal · 2020-02-24Read full judgment →
• Messrs Iqra Anwar-Ul-Quran Lil Itefal through Director vs Pakistan2022 CLC 173 · Balochistan High Court · 2021-03-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Iqbal Mining Co. through Partners and 6 others vs Punjab2022 CLD 1473 · Lahore High Court · 2022-01-18Read full judgment →
• Messrs Interloop Limited through General Manager vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and 3 others2022 PTD 769, PTCL 2022 CL. 745 · Lahore High Court · 2021-04-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs Hira Textile Mills Ltd. through Authorized Representative vs Bank Al-2022 CLD 285 · Lahore High Court · 2021-09-15
  corporate investigationshow cause noticeCompanies Act 2017regulatory authorityjurisdictional factsindependent opinioncreditor complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a show cause notice issued by the Commission under Section 257 of the Companies Act, 2017, proposing the appointment of inspectors to investigate the petitioner-company's affairs. The core legal question was whether the Commission could initiate such proceedings based solely on complaints from creditors regarding contractual defaults, and whether it had properly formed the independent opinion required by law. The Court held that the Commission acted mechanically on creditor complaints rather than forming an independent, bipartisan opinion as mandated by Section 257. The Court clarified that Section 256 and Section 257 of the Companies Act, 2017, serve distinct purposes and cannot be conflated; Section 256 is triggered by specific applications, while Section 257 requires the Commission to form an independent opinion based on material suggesting specific corporate malfeasance. The key principle laid down is that the Commission's power to investigate under Section 257 is not a carte blanche and must be preceded by a genuine, independent formation of opinion, uninfluenced by external sources, to avoid arbitrary exercise of regulatory authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Commission initiate an investigation under Section 257 of the Companies Act 2017 based solely on a complaint from a creditor?
  • Is the power of the Commission to investigate a company's affairs under Section 257 of the Companies Act 2017 distinct from its powers under Section 256?
  • Does the Commission's power to investigate under Section 257 of the Companies Act 2017 require the formation of an independent opinion prior to issuing a show cause notice?
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• Messrs Heal the World through Chief Executive vs Federation of Pakistan2022 CLC 1901 · Sindh High Court · 2022-03-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Harris Silicones and Glass (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan2022 PTD 1163 · Sindh High Court · 2021-04-14
  Customs Act 1969Goods DeclarationRe-assessmentShow-cause noticeCustoms Computerized SystemPost-clearance auditDue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a demand notice generated via the Customs Computerized System regarding the re-assessment of four Goods Declarations from 2013. The core legal question was whether customs authorities possess the jurisdiction to re-assess Goods Declarations under Section 80 of the Customs Act, 1969, after the goods have been cleared and released, and whether such action is valid absent a show-cause notice or opportunity for a hearing. The Court held that the impugned action was unlawful and set aside the demand. It ruled that the power of re-assessment under Section 80(3) is strictly limited to the 'checking' phase of the Goods Declaration and ceases once the goods are released. Consequently, any post-clearance recovery must be initiated through proper statutory channels, such as a show-cause notice under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969. The Court affirmed that demand notices issued without the prerequisite show-cause notice lack lawful foundation, emphasizing that statutory powers must be exercised strictly within the prescribed time and procedural mandates to ensure due process.

  Questions settled

  • Can customs authorities re-assess Goods Declarations under Section 80 of the Customs Act, 1969, after the goods have been released?
  • Is a show-cause notice a mandatory prerequisite for creating a demand for evaded duty and taxes?
  • Does the power of re-assessment under Section 80(3) of the Customs Act, 1969, extend beyond the initial checking of the Goods Declaration?
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• Messrs H.J. (Pvt.) Ltd. Through Chief Executive Officer, Rawalpindi and another vs Additional District and Session Judge, West-Islamabad and another2022 MLD 1651 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-02-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ghulam Muhammad & Sons vs Water And Sanitation Agency2022 MLD 1216 · Lahore High Court · 2021-02-09
  Punjab Procurement Rules 2014additional performance securityperformance guaranteeconstitutional petitiongovernment contractsbidding documentslowest evaluated bid
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition addressed whether the requirement for 'additional performance security' in government contracts, which often exceeds the 10% cap prescribed for 'performance guarantees' under Rule 56 of the Punjab Procurement Rules 2014, is legally sustainable. The petitioners argued that such demands violated Rule 56. The Court held that 'performance guarantee' and 'additional performance security' are distinct, mutually exclusive legal concepts; therefore, Rule 56 does not restrict the latter. The Court found that the legality of the demand depends on the specific bidding documents used. Where documents (Format-I) did not explicitly authorize security exceeding 10%, the Court directed that contractors be given the option to provide the security or withdraw without penalty. Conversely, where documents (Format-II) explicitly allowed for such demands, they were deemed valid. The Court emphasized that the terms of the bidding documents govern the procurement process and that these two security requirements serve different purposes, with the latter specifically addressing the financial risk of bids placed significantly below estimated project costs.

  Questions settled

  • Is 'additional performance security' legally distinct from the 'performance guarantee' capped at 10% under Rule 56 of the Punjab Procurement Rules 2014?
  • Can a procuring agency demand additional performance security exceeding 10% of the contract amount if the bidding documents explicitly provide for such a requirement?
  • Does the forfeiture of earnest money apply to a contractor who refuses to provide additional performance security in cases where the bidding documents did not clearly authorize a demand exceeding 10%?
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• Messrs Getz Pharma (Pvt.) Limited and others vs Novartis Ag and others2022 CLD 61 · Sindh High Court · 2021-09-02Read full judgment →
• Messrs Gazcon CNG through Managing Partner vs Oil and Gas Regulatory2022 CLC 1561 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-04-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Fact Finders (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs CNBC Pakistan and others2022 CLC 1397 · Lahore High Court · 2020-10-19
  defamationsuit for damagesjurisdiction of civil courtDefamation Ordinancereturn of plaintspecial law vs general lawconcurrent jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an order passed by the Civil Judge, Lahore, whereby a suit for recovery of damages for defamation was returned under Order VII, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for presentation before the District Court. The core legal question was whether the Defamation Ordinance 2002 explicitly or impliedly ousts the concurrent general jurisdiction of Civil Courts under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to entertain suits for damages on account of defamation. The Lahore High Court held that the Defamation Ordinance 2002 contains no express or implied ouster or repealing clause barring the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, and that an aggrieved person has a concurrent option to seek a remedy either under the general law before a Civil Court or under the special law before the District Court. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned order, allowed the appeal, and remanded the suit to be tried and decided on its merits by the Civil Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Defamation Ordinance 2002 ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain a suit for damages for defamation under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does an aggrieved person have the option to file a suit for defamation either before the Civil Court under general law or before the District Court under the Defamation Ordinance 2002?
  • Can a plaint be returned under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground that a special law provides for a different forum without an express ouster clause?
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• Messrs Envicrete Limited, Karachi vs The Commissioner Inland Revenue, (WHT) Zone, Rto-I, Karachi2022 PTD (Trib.) 447 · Inland Revenue Appellate Tribunal · 2019-11-27Read full judgment →
• Messrs Dancom Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. Through Chief Executive Officer vs Ministry of Information Technology And Telecom and 3 others2022 YLR 1189 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-12-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Coastex (Pvt.) Ltd., through Director and others vs The Collector of Customs (Adjudication-II) and others2022 PTD (Trib.) 1645 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2022-05-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs China National Electric Wire and Cable Import And Export2022 PTD (Trib.) 1839 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2022-08-05Read full judgment →
• Messrs Chawala Enterprises, Faisalabad vs The Commissioner Inland2022 PTD (Trib.) 1336 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2020-02-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bayer Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited through Legally Authorized Officer and others vs Province of Sindh through Member Board of Revenue and others2022 MLD 1680 · Sindh High Court · 2022-01-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bahria Link Shell Pump, Karachi and another vs Superintendent, Anti-Smuggling Organization, Mcc Of Preventive, Custom House, Karachi and 2 others2022 PTD (Trib.) 335 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2020-03-02Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ayan Trading Company, Faisalabad vs Commissioner Inland2022 PTD (Trib.) 783 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2021-03-24Read full judgment →
• Messrs Anwar Traders; Gujranwala vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Rto, Gujranwala2022 PTD (Trib.) 1542 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2020-04-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Alamdar Tahawar and Nasir (Private) Limited through Manager vs Rent Controller, Islamabad (West) and another2022 YLR 2424 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Messrs Al-Tariq Constructors (Private) Limited through authorized Officer2022 PTD 1444 · Sindh High Court · 2021-12-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Akhter Eye Hospital (Pvt.) Ltd.through Chief Accountant vs The Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone-v2022 PTD 1253 · Sindh High Court · 2022-01-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Akhter Eye Hospital (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Accountant vs The Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone-v2022 PCTLR 1532 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Messrs Ahmed Rubber, Karachi vs Assessment Officer, Group-II, Mcc Of PMBQ, Karachi and 3 others2022 PTD (Trib.) 381 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2020-03-02Read full judgment →
• Messrs Adamjee Impex through Hamza Anwar Lakhani vs Shaikh2022 YLR 2255 · Sindh High Court · 2021-04-19Read full judgment →
• Messrs Abid CNG Station through Special Power of Attorney vs Oil and Gas2022 PLC (C.S) 1169 · Islamabad High Court
  OGRAreview petitionsecond reviewCNG stationpetrol pumpregularization feestatutory powerquasi-judicial authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an application filed under Section 12(2) of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, impugning an order passed by the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) whereby its earlier decision accepting the applicant's review application and waiving a regularization fee was reviewed and amended to impose regularization charges of Rs. 500,000/- for establishing a petrol pump at the applicant's CNG filling station without prior permission. The core legal questions involved whether OGRA has the power to review a decision already taken on a review petition (second review), and whether the statutory preconditions for exercising review powers under Section 13 of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 were met. The Islamabad High Court held that the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 does not provide for a second review or the review of an order passed on a review petition, and that review powers must be strictly exercised upon a change in circumstances or discovery of new evidence. The court set aside OGRA's subsequent decision and restored the earlier review order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 permit a second review or the review of a decision already passed on a review petition?
  • What are the essential preconditions for the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority to exercise its power of review under Section 13 of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002?
  • Can a quasi-judicial authority assume an inherent power to review its own orders without express statutory conferment?
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• Messrs A.J. Traders through Proprietor vs Collector of Customs2023 PLJ SC 49, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 817 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-12
  customs appealstatutory time limitmandatory vs directorydue processappellate tribunalvoid ordertaxpayer rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against the dismissal of customs references by the High Court, where the appellants challenged the validity of orders passed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal after the expiration of the statutory time limit. The core legal question was whether the failure of the Tribunal to decide an appeal within the sixty-day period prescribed by Section 194-B of the Customs Act, 1969, renders the resulting appellate order void or a nullity. The Supreme Court held that the statutory time frame for deciding an appeal is not mandatory in a manner that invalidates the appellate decision if delayed. The Court reasoned that penalizing a taxpayer for the tardiness of a State functionary would be unfair and violate the constitutional rights to due process and fair trial under Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court established that while the legislature may impose time-bound obligations on authorities, such delays do not automatically render the appellate order void, as the consequences of non-compliance cannot be visited upon the appellant taxpayer.

  Questions settled

  • Is the statutory requirement for the Customs Appellate Tribunal to decide an appeal within sixty days under Section 194-B of the Customs Act, 1969, mandatory or directory?
  • Does the failure of an appellate authority to decide an appeal within the prescribed statutory time frame render the resulting order void or a nullity?
  • Can the consequences of a State functionary's failure to comply with statutory time limits be visited upon an appellant taxpayer?
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• Messr Choudhary Rice Mills through Partners and 3 others vs The Bank of Punjab through Principal Officer_Constituted Attorney2022 CLD 1002 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-22Read full judgment →
• MEPCO Chief Executive Officer and 4 others vs Fazal Cloth Mills Ltd. and 22022 CLC 1992 · Lahore High Court · 2022-02-08Read full judgment →
• Mehvish Kazmi vs Parvaiz Hussain and another2022 PLD Supreme Court (AJ&K) 1 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2021-09-09Read full judgment →
• Mehrab-Ud-Din vs Moula Bakhsh and 8 others2022 YLR 1353 · Balochistan High Court · 2021-02-10
  criminal acquittal appealreasonable doubtdelayed FIRpost-mortem delayinterested witnessesmurderappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal challenged the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Nasirabad, which acquitted the respondents of murder charges under Sections 302, 147, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had successfully proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, given the circumstances of the occurrence. The High Court upheld the acquittal, finding multiple fatal flaws in the prosecution's case. Specifically, the Court noted an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, a significant delay in the post-mortem examination suggesting the fabrication of witnesses, and the unnatural conduct of the alleged eye-witnesses who claimed to be present but sustained no injuries. Furthermore, the Court found the reliance on torchlight identification unreliable, particularly as the torch was never recovered, and noted the absence of a Forensic Science Laboratory report linking the recovered weapon to the crime. The Court reaffirmed the principle that a single reasonable doubt is sufficient to entitle an accused to acquittal, and that an acquittal judgment should not be reversed unless it is blatantly perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR and conducting a post-mortem examination create a reasonable doubt sufficient for acquittal?
  • Is the identification of accused persons by torchlight in a night occurrence reliable when the torch is not recovered by the police?
  • Can an acquittal judgment be set aside if the prosecution fails to provide forensic evidence linking the recovered weapon to the crime?
  • Does the failure of alleged eye-witnesses to sustain injuries during a violent attack render their presence at the scene unnatural?
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• Mehr Shaukat vs Ex-Officio Justice of Peace/ASJ, etc2022 LHC 6868 · Lahore High Court · 2022-09-28Read full judgment →
• Mehr Ashraf and another vs Station House Officer and others2022 PLD Lahore 328 · Lahore High Court · 2021-12-17Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Alam Sher vs HEC and others2022 CLC 1337 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-04-22Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Ahmad vs Asj, etc2022 LHC 7955, 2024 PCRLJ 786 · Lahore High Court · 2022-11-23
  registration of FIREx-Officio Justice of Peacecivil nature of disputeforgerywrit jurisdictionalternate remedyspecific performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an order passed by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, which dismissed the petitioner's application under Section 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the registration of an FIR against private respondents for alleged forgery of a power of attorney and agreement to sell. The core legal question was whether the court should direct the registration of an FIR when the underlying dispute is essentially civil in nature and a civil suit regarding the disputed document has already been decreed. The Court held that the petition was meritless, affirming the dismissal of the application. It reasoned that where a civil suit concerning the disputed document has been decreed and is currently subject to proceedings under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the criminal court should not interfere. The key principle laid down is that where the ultimate criminal liability depends on the outcome of a pending civil lis, criminal proceedings should be stayed, and the aggrieved party must pursue alternative remedies like a private complaint rather than invoking writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court direct the registration of an FIR when the underlying dispute is of a civil nature and a civil suit regarding the subject matter is already pending?
  • Does the existence of an alternative remedy, such as a private complaint, preclude the invocation of writ jurisdiction for the registration of an FIR?
  • Do the provisions of Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to documents forged before the institution of a civil suit?
  • Should criminal proceedings be stayed when the determination of criminal liability depends on the outcome of a pending civil litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Meherban Khan vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief2022 PLC (C.S.) 695 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-12-01
  constitutional petitionpensionary benefitscivil service pensionlegitimate expectancyupgradation of postretirement benefitssuperannuation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 seeking directions against the respondents to release and pay the petitioner's pensionary benefits and emoluments in BPS-16. The petitioner was promoted/upgraded to BPS-16 and served as Assistant Taxation Officer until superannuation, but the audit department refused to sanction his pension in BPS-16 on allegations of procedural irregularity in his upgradation. The core legal question was whether a civil servant who has performed duties in a higher scale till retirement can be denied pensionary benefits in that scale. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that pension is an earned right and not a bounty or ex-gratia payment. The Court ruled that having performed duties satisfactorily in BPS-16 until superannuation, the petitioner was entitled to pension in that scale under the doctrine of legitimate expectancy. The key principle established is that pension flows directly from applicable statutory rules upon satisfactory service, constitutes property under Articles 23 and 24(1) of the Constitution, and cannot be arbitrarily withheld or reduced post-retirement.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil servant who performed duties in a higher pay scale until retirement entitled to pensionary benefits in that higher scale?
  • Can pensionary benefits earned through satisfactory service be arbitrarily withheld or delayed post-retirement?
  • Does the right to receive pension by a retired civil servant constitute property protected under Articles 23 and 24(1) of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehdi Khan vs Shumaila Bibi, etc2022 LHC 1665, 2022 [M] CLR 623 · Lahore High Court · 2022-02-28Read full judgment →
• Mehboob ur Rehman vs National Highway Authority, etc2022 IHC 246 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-09-19Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Ali vs The State2022 PHC 62, 2022 PCRLJ 1788 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-03-01
  quashment of FIRwrit jurisdictionpolice investigationJustice of Peaceconstitutional petitiondisputed questions of factpremature petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition sought the quashment of an FIR registered under sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an order by a Justice of Peace under section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner contended that the FIR was registered without notice or an opportunity of hearing. The Court held that the petition was premature, as the investigation was in its initial stages and the Investigating Officer had yet to form an opinion on the allegations. The Court emphasized that it cannot act as an investigating agency, nor can it resolve disputed questions of fact regarding the truthfulness of FIR allegations or malafide intent within its writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The ratio established is that the High Court should not interfere with the ordinary course of police investigation or trial proceedings unless there is a clear jurisdictional defect or grave violation of law, as the statutory framework provides adequate remedies for an accused during investigation and trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court quash an FIR in its writ jurisdiction while the police investigation is still in its initial stages?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to resolve disputed questions of fact regarding the truthfulness of allegations in an FIR during writ proceedings?
  • Is the High Court empowered to interfere with or control the process of police investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an accused seek acquittal at the trial stage if the materials on file do not connect them with the commission of the offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Ali vs The State and others2022 PCRLJ 749 · Sindh High Court · 2020-04-22
  rule of consistencycriminal revisioncompromise in non-compoundable offencesacquittalhouse trespassamicable settlementappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant challenged his conviction under Section 456, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following his trial for offences including Sections 458, 506/2, and 337-H(2), Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court had acquitted his co-accused on the same evidence but convicted the applicant. The core legal questions were whether this conviction violated the "rule of consistency" and whether a compromise could be accepted for non-compoundable offences. The Court held that the conviction violated the rule of consistency, as the prosecution evidence disbelieved for the co-accused could not reliably support the applicant's conviction. Additionally, the Court accepted the compromise between the parties, holding that non-compoundability of certain offences should not be read in isolation. It established the principle that where parties have amicably settled disputes to restore peace and harmony, courts may exercise discretion to accept compromises in non-compoundable offences, treating them as merged with compoundable ones to promote societal welfare. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the applicant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rule of consistency prohibit the conviction of an accused when co-accused have been acquitted on the same set of evidence?
  • Can a court accept a compromise in non-compoundable offences if the parties have amicably settled their dispute?
  • Should non-compoundability of an offence under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be read in isolation or in the context of the overall settlement between parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Aamir & Others vs Abdur Rasheed Khan & Others2022 PHC 530 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-10-20Read full judgment →
• Mehar Ali Solangi vs The State2022 SHC 162 · Sindh High Court · 2022-04-07
  criminal appeal abatementdeath of appellantsentence of fineanti-corruptioncriminal breach of trustdelay in FIRbenefit of doubtposthumous acquittalconstitutional dignity
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, convicted under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, passed away during the pendency of his criminal appeal. The core legal question was whether a criminal appeal abates entirely upon the death of the appellant under Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, particularly when a sentence of fine was also imposed, and whether the appeal could be examined on merits to protect the estate, reputation, and service benefits of the deceased. The court held that while the sentence of imprisonment abates upon death, the appeal against a sentence of fine survives to protect the legal heirs' rights to the estate and back benefits, and that the conviction could be challenged on merits. Examining the case on merits, the court found multiple unexplained delays in lodging the First Information Report, glaring discrepancies in prosecution evidence, and a lack of tangible proof regarding misappropriation. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and fine, acquitting the appellant posthumously to benefit his legal heirs.

  Questions settled

  • Does a criminal appeal abate upon the death of the appellant under Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when a sentence of fine is imposed along with imprisonment?
  • Can the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be applied in criminal proceedings when specific provisions exist in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the right to challenge a criminal conviction and clear one's reputation survive after the death of the accused for the benefit of legal heirs?
  • What is the legal effect of an unexplained, inordinate delay in lodging a First Information Report in a criminal case?
  • Is an accused entitled to an acquittal when the prosecution fails to establish the essential ingredients of criminal breach of trust through concrete or tangible evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Meezan Bank vs WAPDA First Sukuk Company Limited and others2022 CLC 974, 2022 [M] CLR 1258 · Lahore High Court · 2021-12-01Read full judgment →
• Meeran Bakhsh alias Matru vs The State2022 P Cr. L J 360 · Balochistan High Court · 2020-11-23
  absconderanti-terrorismconviction in absentiafair trialdue processprocedural lapsebail and abscondence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant filed an appeal against the order of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting and sentencing him under Section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for abscondence, in absentia. The core legal question was whether an accused can be convicted under Section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 without following the trial procedure prescribed under Section 19 of the Act and without framing a charge or recording evidence. The Balochistan High Court held that the trial court's cursory conviction without framing a charge, recording evidence, or following the procedure under Section 19 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 violated the principles of a fair trial guaranteed by Articles 9 and 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The court laid down the principle that trials for offences under Section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 must strictly adhere to the mandatory procedural requirements of Section 19 and respect the constitutional guarantees of due process and a fair trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused can be convicted under Section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 without framing a formal charge and recording evidence?
  • Does a trial for an offence under Section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 require following the regular procedure provided under Section 19 of the said Act?
  • Is a conviction in absentia under Section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 sustainable if it violates the constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Meera Shafi vs Ali Zafar2022 SCP 348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-21
  video conferencingrecording evidenceupdating constructioninherent powerscivil procedureaccess to justicecross-examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses the core legal question of whether the evidence of a witness not physically present in court can be recorded in a civil case through video conferencing under the existing legal framework. The petitioner, a defendant residing abroad, sought to record her remaining cross-examination via video link from Canada due to travel inconvenience and childcare responsibilities, but lower courts dismissed her application. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the term 'attendance' in Order 18 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is not restricted to physical presence and can be extended via 'updating construction' to include virtual attendance through video conferencing. The Court further held that civil courts possess inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to permit virtual recording to serve the ends of justice, and that modern technological evidence falls within the scope of Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. The key principle laid down is that procedural laws must be interpreted dynamically and purposively through updating construction to embrace technological advancements, thereby enhancing access to justice and fair trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can the word 'attendance' under Order 18 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be extended to include virtual attendance through video conferencing?
  • Does Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 empower a civil court to allow the recording of a witness's evidence via video link?
  • Does oral evidence recorded through modern techniques like video conferencing fall within the scope of Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • What standards must courts apply when exercising discretion to permit the recording of evidence through video conferencing?
  Read full judgment →
• Meera Shafi etc vs Federation of Pakistan etc2022 LHC 1786, 2022 PLD Lahore 773 · Lahore High Court · 2021-12-24
  constitutional petitionfreedom of speechcybercrimedefamationhuman dignityquashing of FIRsimultaneous proceedingsreasonable restrictions
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the constitutionality of Section 20 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (PECA), and sought the quashing of an FIR registered thereunder. The petitioners argued that Section 20 violated Article 19 of the Constitution regarding freedom of speech and was discriminatory under Articles 4 and 25. The Court held that Section 20 is constitutional, as freedom of speech is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions, including the protection of human dignity and reputation under Article 14. The Court determined that PECA, as a special law (lex specialis), does not overlap with the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, but operates in tandem with it. Furthermore, the Court ruled that procedural irregularities in the investigation of non-cognizable offences are curable under Section 537 Cr.P.C. if no serious prejudice is caused to the accused. Finally, the Court affirmed that simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings are permissible, as their objectives differ, and criminal proceedings need not be stayed unless they cause prejudice or conflict of findings. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 20 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, unconstitutional for violating the right to freedom of speech?
  • Does the existence of Section 20 of the PECA create discriminatory legislation in violation of Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution when compared to the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can civil and criminal proceedings regarding the same subject matter be conducted simultaneously?
  • Does a procedural irregularity in the investigation of a non-cognizable offence under the PECA automatically vitiate the resulting criminal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Meera Shafi and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o2022 SCP 140, 2022 SCMR 1267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-06-08
  freedom of speechcriminal defamationconstitutional petitionfundamental rightsfair trialdue processPECAstay of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition challenging the constitutionality of Section 20 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (PECA), which criminalizes defamation. The petitioners, who are facing criminal proceedings under this section following allegations of sexual harassment, contend that the provision violates Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which guarantees freedom of speech and expression. They argue that criminalizing defamation suppresses fundamental rights and creates an anomalous situation where simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings for defamation undermine the right to a fair trial under Article 10A. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether Section 20 of PECA infringes upon fundamental rights, whether it undermines the defence of truth, and whether the simultaneous pursuit of civil damages and criminal prosecution for defamation is constitutionally permissible. Pending the final adjudication of these constitutional questions, the Court stayed the criminal proceedings arising from the FIR registered against the petitioners to prevent potential prejudice to their ongoing civil litigation and harassment complaints.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 20 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 violate Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan?
  • Does the simultaneous prosecution of civil defamation and criminal defamation proceedings undermine the right to a fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution?
  • Can a petitioner approach the Supreme Court directly without filing an intra-court appeal when the constitutionality of a law affecting fundamental rights is at issue?
  • Does the criminalization of defamation under PECA undermine the defence of truth?
  Read full judgment →
• Meer Nawaz alias Meero vs StatePLJ 2022 Cr.C. 955 · Lahore High Court · 2021-09-29
  DNA evidencechain of custodyforensic sciencecapital punishmentcriminal appealrapeQatl-i-amdbenefit of doubtocular evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the rape and murder of a woman and her fetus. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of the ocular account provided by chance witnesses and the evidentiary value of DNA forensic reports in the absence of a secure chain of custody. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court observed that the ocular witnesses were unreliable, and the forensic evidence was compromised by significant procedural lapses in the collection, packaging, and transmission of samples. While acknowledging that DNA evidence is admissible under Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, the Court ruled that it cannot sustain a conviction when the chain of custody is broken and the reports are contradictory. The Court emphasized that forensic evidence acts as corroboration and cannot replace primary evidence. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, the death sentence was not confirmed, and the appellant was acquitted, reaffirming that a single reasonable doubt warrants acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be based solely on DNA forensic evidence if the chain of custody is broken?
  • Does the admissibility of modern forensic evidence under Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, override the requirement for a secure chain of custody?
  • Is DNA evidence considered primary evidence or corroborative evidence in criminal trials?
  • What is the legal consequence of a failure to maintain the chain of custody for forensic samples in a criminal case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mda, Mirpur & others vs Rashid Mahmood2022 SC AJ&K 30, 2022 PSC 1521 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• MCB Bank Limited through Authorized Attorney vs Iqbal Ahmed and 62022 CLD 1499 · Sindh High Court · 2022-03-03Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Rasool Hashmi vs Government of the Punjab etc2022 LHC 8622 · Lahore High Court · 2022-12-23Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Khan vs The State2022 IHC 120 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-07
  post-arrest bailcontrol of narcotic substancesfurther inquiryco-accused statementheroin recoverycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, after his earlier bail application was dismissed by the trial court. The prosecution alleged that 1540 grams of heroin was recovered from a co-accused who claimed to be an employee of the petitioner and selling narcotics on his behalf, while the petitioner was not present at the spot. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail when the recovery was made from a co-accused and his nomination was based on a co-accused statement. The Islamabad High Court held that since the recovery was not from the petitioner's personal possession, he was not present at the spot, and his implication relied on a co-accused statement, the case fell within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The court laid down the principle that nomination in an FIR based on a co-accused statement without personal recovery constitutes a case for further inquiry warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the accused is nominated solely on the statement of a co-accused and no recovery is made from his personal possession?
  • Does nomination in multiple FIRs alone constitute sufficient ground for the refusal of bail?
  • Does a case fall within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the accused was not present at the spot of the alleged narcotics recovery?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Iqbal vs The State and another2022 MLD 752 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-09-16
  dishonest issuance of chequecriminal revisionbenefit of doubtstatement of accusedunexhibited documentpresentation of chequefair trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenges the judgments of the lower courts whereby the petitioner was convicted under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for dishonestly issuing a cheque and sentenced to three years simple imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner issued a cheque which was dishonored upon presentation due to insufficient balance. The core legal question before the Islamabad High Court was whether the prosecution successfully proved the foundational ingredients of Section 489-F, including dishonest intent and presentation of the cheque, beyond a reasonable doubt. The High Court accepted the revision, set aside the lower courts' judgments, and acquitted the petitioner. The court held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the presentation of the cheque and its formal dishonor slip through legal evidence, improperly relied on an unexhibited compromise document that was never put to the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that multiple glaring contradictions entitled the accused to the benefit of the doubt under the constitutional right to a fair trial.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients required to constitute an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can an unexhibited document or a compromise deed not put to the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used to maintain a conviction?
  • What is the procedure and legal requirement for the prosecution to examine a witness whose name is not included in the list of witnesses under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the mere issuance of a cheque and its dishonor by itself constitute an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 without proof of dishonest intent and formal presentation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Iqbal Satti vs StatePLJ 2022 Cr.C. 684 · Lahore High Court · 2021-10-06
  narcoticsheroin recoveryreduction of sentencechemical examiner reportconversion of convictioncontrol of narcotic substances
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the alleged possession of 1015 grams of heroin. The trial court had convicted him and sentenced him to six years rigorous imprisonment with a fine. During the appeal, the appellant's counsel did not dispute the conviction but sought a reduction in sentence, arguing that the forensic report and the weighing with the wrapper indicated the actual quantity of heroin was significantly less than alleged. The Lahore High Court held that due to the discrepancy in the chemical examiner's report and the weighing of the contraband with its wrapper, the actual quantity of heroin recovered fell below the threshold of Section 9(c) and into the purview of Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. Consequently, the court converted the conviction from Section 9(c) to Section 9(b), reduced the sentence to the period already undergone by the appellant, and dismissed the appeal with this modification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a discrepancy in the weight of a narcotics sample in a forensic report can lead to the conversion of a conviction from Section 9(c) to Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Can the weighing of contraband with its wrapper create a reasonable doubt regarding the exact quantity of narcotics recovered for sentencing purposes?
  • How is the quantum of sentence adjusted when the conviction of an accused is altered from a higher to a lower tier of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Iqbal and another vs The State through Police Station through and another2022 PCRLJ 1652 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2022-05-10
  quashment of FIRProhibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Actcognizable offencepublic placepolice jurisdictionintoxicationcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This application sought the quashment of an FIR registered under Sections 11 and 14 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Act, 1985, against the applicants who were apprehended by police while traveling in a private car. The core legal question was whether the police possess the jurisdiction to take cognizance of offences under the Act when the alleged intoxication occurred within a private vehicle rather than a "public place." The High Court held that, pursuant to Section 16 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Act, 1985, offences under Section 11 are only cognizable if committed in a public place. Defining "public place" under Section 2(l) of the Act, the Court determined that a private vehicle does not qualify as a public place. Consequently, the Court ruled that the police lacked the legal authority to register the FIR or take cognizance of the matter. The key principle established is that police cognizance of intoxication offences under the Act is strictly limited to occurrences in public places, rendering proceedings initiated for incidents in private vehicles without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a private vehicle constitute a 'public place' under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Act, 1985?
  • Are offences under Section 11 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Act, 1985, cognizable if committed in a private location?
  • Can an FIR be quashed if the police lacked the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the alleged offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar and others vs State etcPLJ 2022 Cr.C. 322 · Lahore High Court · 2021-10-14
  benefit of doubtchance witnessocular evidencemedical evidencedishonest improvementcriminal appealmurder referenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against the convictions and sentences of the appellants, Mazhar and Mst. Zahida Bibi, who were sentenced to death and life imprisonment, respectively, for the murder of Naseer Ahmad. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt, given significant delays in reporting the crime and conducting the post-mortem, the status of the eyewitnesses as 'chance witnesses', and material contradictions between the ocular account and medical evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The court found the eyewitnesses unreliable due to their status as chance witnesses, their failure to intervene during the alleged attack, and their dishonest improvements in testimony to align with medical evidence. Furthermore, the court noted a significant delay in the post-mortem examination, which contradicted the prosecution's timeline. The court reaffirmed the principle that any single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitles the accused to an acquittal as a matter of right. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution witnesses are found to be chance witnesses and their testimony is inconsistent with medical evidence?
  • Does a significant delay in conducting a post-mortem examination create a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution's timeline of events?
  • Is it permissible to rely on prosecution evidence against an accused when the same evidence has been rejected by the trial court regarding a co-accused?
  • Does a positive DNA report alone justify a conviction for murder in the absence of other reliable evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Ali vs Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary, Water and Power2022 PLC (C.S.) 150 · Sindh High Court · 2020-08-20
  constitutional petitioncompulsory retirementmisconductHESCOWAPDA rulesmaster and servantnatural justicefunctional test
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Executive Engineer at Hyderabad Electric Supply Company (HESCO), challenged an office order imposing a major penalty of compulsory retirement from service due to alleged poor performance and failure to meet targets, without holding a regular inquiry. The core legal questions involved whether HESCO is a person amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199, and whether the penalty of compulsory retirement for poor performance without an inquiry and without constituting 'misconduct' under the applicable rules was lawful. The court held that HESCO is amenable to constitutional jurisdiction as a state-controlled enterprise performing public functions, and that failure to achieve recovery targets does not constitute 'misconduct' under the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978, rendering the penalty illegal and in violation of natural justice. The court laid down the principle that corporate entities performing public statutory functions are amenable to judicial review, and that disciplinary penalties cannot be imposed for performance deficiencies under the guise of misconduct without proper inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Hyderabad Electric Supply Company (HESCO) is a person amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does failure to achieve recovery targets and poor performance constitute 'misconduct' under the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978?
  • Can a major penalty of compulsory retirement be imposed upon an employee without holding a regular and proper inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Ali and Mst. Uzma vs The State2022 SHC 468 · Sindh High Court
  murderabetmentcriminal conspiracyidentification paradecall data recordconfession before policebenefit of the doubtunlicensed pistol
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the Sessions Judge/MCTC, Tando Muhammad Khan, convicting the appellants Mazhar Ali for murder and Mst. Uzma for instigation under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside appellant Mazhar Ali's conviction under Section 25 of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013. The core legal questions involve the reliability of circumstantial evidence, delayed FIR, identification, and the admissibility of video-recorded confessions before police officers and unverified Call Data Records. The Sindh High Court held that while the prosecution successfully proved the case against appellant Mazhar Ali through consistent eyewitness testimony, prompt medical corroboration, recovery of the crime weapon, and positive forensic reports, the case against appellant Mst. Uzma suffered from fatal flaws, including delayed and doubtful implication, lack of independent proof of abetment or conspiracy, and inadmissible video-recorded statements made before the police in non-compliance with constitutional safeguards. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeals of Mazhar Ali while modifying the fine to compensation, and allowed the appeal of Mst. Uzma, granting her the benefit of the doubt and acquitting her.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in lodging an FIR is fatal to the prosecution case when the FIR is initially registered against an unknown accused?
  • Does a video-recorded conversation admitting guilt before a police officer constitute admissible evidence without fulfilling constitutional safeguards?
  • Is Call Data Record (CDR) alone sufficient to establish criminal conspiracy or abetment without a verified conversation transcript or independent evidence?
  • Whether failure to supply documents under Section 265-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiates the reliance on such documents during trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Abbas vs Additional District Judge Kamalia District Toba Tek Singh2022 PLJ Lahore 636 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Maulana Ibadur Rehman Abbasi vs Jehangir Adam and others2022 SHC 264, 2024 CLC 151 · Sindh High Court · 2022-06-07Read full judgment →
• Matloob Hussain Shah vs State etcPLJ 2022 Cr.C. 633 · Lahore High Court · 2021-09-20
  criminal appealnarcotics recoverycharasreduction of sentencefirst offendercontrol of narcotic substances
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 for the recovery of 1350 grams of charas and sentencing him to four years and six months rigorous imprisonment with a fine. The core legal question involves the challenge to the quantum of sentence while the conviction itself is not disputed by the appellant's counsel. The court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, maintaining the conviction. However, considering mitigating circumstances such as the appellant being a first offender, having undergone more than two and a half years of incarceration, and having faced a protracted trial, the court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone. The key principle laid down is that while convictions for narcotics offences supported by consistent evidence are maintained, appellate courts may exercise leniency in the quantum of sentence for first-time offenders who have suffered protracted trials and served substantial periods of imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the conviction under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 can be maintained when the prosecution proves the recovery of narcotics beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Can the sentence of a convict be reduced to the period already undergone in narcotics cases considering mitigating factors such as being a first offender and protracted trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Master Muhammad Naseem vs The State2022 YLR 469 · Balochistan High Court · 2020-10-12
  criminal appealmurder convictionbenefit of doubtocular evidencerecovery of weaponappreciation of evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life sentence imposed by the trial court against the appellant for the murder of his paternal uncle. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given the reliance on ocular testimony and alleged recovery of the crime weapon. The High Court found significant contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses regarding the sequence of events and the recovery of the weapon, which was allegedly found twenty days later on the roof of the complainant's house. Furthermore, the court noted that the prosecution failed to explain why the appellant, allegedly armed, did not target the eyewitnesses present at the scene. Holding that the prosecution's case was riddled with doubts and that the trial court misread the evidence, the High Court set aside the conviction. The court reaffirmed the principle that an accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right, not grace, even if only a single reasonable doubt exists in the prosecution's narrative.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of a single reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case entitle an accused to acquittal as a matter of right?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the ocular testimony of prosecution witnesses is contradicted by the physical evidence and the circumstances of the case?
  • Is medical evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of reliable direct evidence?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to produce independent witnesses when available undermine the credibility of the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Master Juman Buriro vs The State2022 YLR 299 · Sindh High Court · 2020-01-29
  kidnapping for ransomidentification paradebenefit of doubtrule of consistencyAnti-Terrorism Actcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals challenging the judgment of an Anti-Terrorism Court, which convicted the appellants for kidnapping for ransom under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal questions involved the sufficiency of evidence, the validity of the identification parade, and the application of the rule of consistency. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found significant lacunas, including an unexplained two-day delay in lodging the FIR, a flawed identification parade conducted jointly without following Supreme Court guidelines, and the failure to prove the recovery of alleged ransom money. Furthermore, the Court applied the rule of consistency, noting that a co-accused had been acquitted on the same evidence. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, emphasizing that the benefit of doubt is a right of the accused, not a concession, and must be extended whenever reasonable doubt exists in the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rule of consistency require the acquittal of co-accused when prosecution evidence against them is identical to that of an already acquitted co-accused?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the identification parade is conducted jointly for multiple accused without following established Supreme Court guidelines?
  • Is the recovery of alleged ransom money valid if the prosecution fails to record the denomination of currency notes or conduct an identification parade for the recovered items?
  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR, combined with other evidentiary discrepancies, entitle an accused to the benefit of doubt?
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• Masood Fabrics Limited through Chief Executive and 10 others vs Joint2022 CLD 1549 · Lahore High Court · 2022-06-28Read full judgment →
• Masheer Ahmed and another vs Sabir Hussain Shah and 2 othersPLJ 2022 Cr.C. 824 · Sindh High Court · 2021-05-21
  Ex-officio Justice of PeaceFIR registrationPolice Rules 1934Criminal investigationCognizable offenceStation House OfficerDiscretionary powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to an order passed by an Ex-officio Justice of Peace directing the Station House Officer (SHO) to record a statement and register an FIR if a cognizable offense is disclosed. The core legal question is whether such a judicial direction mandates the compulsory registration and investigation of an FIR, even when police reports suggest the allegations are false or doubtful. The Court held that while an SHO must record a statement upon receiving information of a cognizable offense, they are not duty-bound to investigate every case. Under Rule 24.4 of the Police Rules, 1934, an SHO possesses the discretion to decline investigation if they have reasonable grounds to believe the alleged offense is doubtful or false, provided they record their reasons in the station diary. The Court clarified that a direction to 'record a statement and act accordingly' does not equate to a mandatory order to register an FIR. Furthermore, the practice of noting 'lodged on court direction' in FIRs should be reserved for specific, clear-cut judicial orders to prevent misuse.

  Questions settled

  • Does a direction by an Ex-officio Justice of Peace to record a statement and act accordingly mandate the registration of an FIR?
  • Is a Station House Officer duty-bound to investigate every cognizable offense reported to them?
  • Under what circumstances may a Station House Officer refuse to investigate a reported cognizable offense?
  • What is the proper procedure for a Station House Officer when they suspect a reported cognizable offense is doubtful?
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• Maryam Nawaz Sharif (Maryam Safdar), Capt. (R) Muhammad Safdar vs The State, The State2022 IHC 248 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mariam Ahmad vs Raj Muhammad2022 PHC 18, 2022 YLR 1945 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-01-24Read full judgment →