Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Doud Khan vs Muhammad Rashid, etc2022 LHC 1837 · Lahore High Court · 2022-01-20Read full judgment →
• Dost Muhammad Khan (deceased) through L.Rs vs areed Muhammad2022 LHC 2660, 2024 YLR 793 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-30Read full judgment →
• Dost Muhammad etc vs State etcPLJ 2022 Cr.C. 864 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-02
  murderbenefit of doubtfalsus in uno falsus in omnibusprivate complaintriotingocular evidencemedical evidence contradictionalibi
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for the murder of the deceased in a private complaint, following a rioting incident. The core legal question is whether the prosecution established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given the acquittal of fourteen co-accused on the same evidence and the presence of significant contradictions. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the charge, noting that the ocular witnesses were unreliable, their testimony contradicted the medical evidence, and the appellant’s plea of alibi was supported by the Investigating Officer’s admission. Applying the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, the Court found the prosecution’s case to be based on presumptions rather than substantive evidence. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, holding that the benefit of the doubt is a right of the accused, not a matter of grace. The Court emphasized that where a reasonable doubt exists in a prudent mind, the accused must be acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution's ocular witnesses are found to be unreliable and contradict medical evidence?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused on the same set of evidence entitle the remaining accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Is the benefit of the doubt a matter of grace or a legal right of the accused?
  • Can a conviction be based on presumptions in the absence of substantive evidence?
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• Dollar Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and another vs Mr. Kamran Akhlaq2022 SHC 384 · Sindh High Court · 2022-09-15Read full judgment →
• Doctor Yasmin Rashid vs Election Commission of Pakistan, etc2022 LHC 5661, 2022 PLJ Lahore 878 · Lahore High Court · 2022-07-16Read full judgment →
• Doctor Khan vs The State2022 PHC 212, 2022 PCRLJ 1690 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-07-05
  suspension of sentencepost-conviction bailfunctus officionarcotics controlappellate jurisdictioncriminal appealinterim relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed under Section 426(2B) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking suspension of sentence and release on bail pending the final disposal of a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The petitioner, convicted under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997, had his appeal dismissed by the High Court, but subsequently obtained leave to appeal from the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 426(2B) to suspend a sentence when the matter is pending before the Supreme Court. The Court dismissed the application, holding that once the High Court has decided an appeal, it becomes functus officio. Consequently, it is improper for the High Court to grant interim relief when the petitioner has no legal impediment to seeking such relief directly from the Supreme Court, which possesses the authority to stay sentences under its own rules. The principle established is that the High Court’s seisin does not revive to grant bail pending appeal before the Supreme Court absent specific justification.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court retain jurisdiction to suspend a sentence under Section 426(2B) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after the Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal?
  • Is the High Court considered functus officio regarding a criminal case after it has dismissed the appeal and the matter is pending before the Supreme Court?
  • Can a convict seek suspension of sentence from the High Court when there is no legal impediment to approaching the Supreme Court for such relief?
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• Divisional Superintendent Postal Services Faisalabad, Accounts Officer2022 SCP 370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-06
  back benefitsregularization of serviceservice tribunaladmission of liabilityapprobate and reprobateconsensual ordercivil servants
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions directed against a common judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had allowed service appeals filed by employees seeking back benefits following the regularization of their services. The core legal question concerned whether the department could challenge a tribunal judgment that was rendered based on a clear, unequivocal admission and consensual statement made by the department itself in its written comments acknowledging the employees' right to regularization and arrears subject to fund availability. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that where parties are not at issue and an unambiguous admission of liability is made on record, a court or tribunal is fully justified in disposing of the matter accordingly, akin to the principles governing judgments on admissions. The Court laid down that a party cannot approbate and reprobate by challenging a consensual order or an admission it consciously made during proceedings, and that the doctrine of admission applies to expedite litigation when statements are clear, unconditional, and definite.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a judgment passed by a service tribunal based on its own clear and unequivocal admission made in written comments?
  • Whether the principles regarding judgment on admissions under the Code of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings before a service tribunal?
  • Does the doctrine of approbate and reprobate bar a department from resiling from a consensual statement made during judicial proceedings?
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• District Magistrate/Deputy Commissioner, ICT vs Maulana Abdul Majeed2022 IHC 132 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-26Read full judgment →
• Director, Directorate of Intelligence And Investigation FBR vs Malik Abdul2022 PTD 1760 · Sindh High Court · 2020-03-10
  customs fraudacquittal appealpre-shipment inspection certificatemis-declarationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant filed an appeal against the acquittal of the respondent in a criminal case initiated for offences punishable under Section 156 of the Customs Act, 1969, concerning the fraudulent clearance of old and used concrete transit mixture trucks through fake Pre-Shipment Inspection (PSI) certificates. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the falsity of the PSI certificates and the guilt of the respondent. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case because the alleged verification of the PSI certificates—purportedly issued by Bureau Veritas in Dubai—was only sought from the Karachi office of Bureau Veritas rather than the Dubai office, and the author of the verification letter was not produced as a witness at trial. The court laid down the principle that prosecution allegations regarding documents issued abroad must be verified directly from the foreign issuing authority and supported by competent witness testimony, and dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acquittal judgment can be set aside when the prosecution fails to produce the author of a crucial verification document as a witness?
  • Is verification of a foreign-issued Pre-Shipment Inspection Certificate legally sufficient when obtained only from a local office rather than the issuing foreign office?
  • Does failure to properly verify documents through competent evidence warrant the dismissal of an appeal against acquittal?
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• Director of Customs Valuation vs M/s. Hanna Dairies, I-3012022 SHC 304 · Sindh High Court · 2022-05-23Read full judgment →
• Director Intelligence and Investigation, (Customs), Peshawar vs Messrs2022 PTD 1496 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-04-25Read full judgment →
• Director (I&I) (Inland Revenue), Islamabad vs Chaudhary Riaz Ahmed And 04 Others2022 IHC 278 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Director (Aso) Customs Intelligence and Investigation vs Taimur Tariq Butt, etc2022 LHC 5735, 2022 PLJ Lahore 810 · Lahore High Court · 2022-07-19Read full judgment →
• Director (Aso) Customs Intelligence and Investigation vs Awais Khalid2022 LHC 5741 · Lahore High Court · 2022-04-21Read full judgment →
• Director (Aso) Customs Intelligence and Investigation through Deputy2022 PTD 1755 · Lahore High Court · 2022-07-21Read full judgment →
• Din Farm Products (Pvt) Ltd vs Security and Exchange commission of Pakistan2022 SHC 392 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Dilshad Akbar vs Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Lahore & others2022 LHC 6475, 2025 PLD Lahore 137 · Lahore High Court · 2022-09-07Read full judgment →
• Dilbar Chandio and Abdullah Brohi vs The State2022 SHC 336 · Sindh High Court · 2022-08-02Read full judgment →
• Dilawar Khan, Sardar Khan vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2022 PHC 664, 2024 MLD 1295 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-12-21Read full judgment →
• Dilawar Hussain vs Pakistan Railways through Chief Executive2022 PLJ Lahore 505 · Lahore High Court · 2021-06-14Read full judgment →
• Dilawar Ali vs The State and others2022 SCMR 1066, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 210, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 671 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-27
  post-arrest bailmurderstrangulationburden of proofjoint abodemedical evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Dilawar Ali, sought leave to appeal for post-arrest bail after his previous bail applications were dismissed by the lower forums, including the Lahore High Court, in a case involving the murder of his wife, Muqaddas Bibi, who was strangulated to death. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the medical evidence and statutory provisions regarding the burden of proof in a joint abode. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the medical evidence, including the autopsy report showing signs inconsistent with suicide and the petitioner's failure to discharge his burden under Article 122 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, constituted reasonable grounds under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, to connect the petitioner with the crime. Consequently, the court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower forums and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted to an accused when the medical evidence contradicts the plea of suicide in a murder case?
  • Does the failure of an accused spouse to explain the circumstances of a death occurring under a joint roof constitute reasonable grounds under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • How does the statutory burden under Article 122 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 apply to a husband when his wife is found dead in their joint abode?
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• Dila Baz and others vs Balqiaz and others2022 PHC 160, 2022 MLD 1673 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-05-31Read full judgment →
• Digri Sugar Mills Ltd vs The Additional Collector of Customs & Another2022 SHC 156 · Sindh High Court · 2022-04-22Read full judgment →
• Dewan Abdullah Ahmed Farooqui vs Court of Family Judge South, Saddar2022 YLR 2095 · Sindh High Court · 2022-01-06Read full judgment →
• Deputy Director Finance And Administration Fata through Additional Chief2022 SCMR 566, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 261, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 701, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-28
  regularization of servicecontract employeesproject employeesFATAPATAjurisdiction of High Courtconstitutional amendmentretrospective applicationstatutory basisArticle 247
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard civil appeals challenging Peshawar High Court judgments that had allowed the regularization of services for contract and project employees in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The core legal questions involved the applicability of the KP Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2009 to FATA/PATA, the High Court's jurisdiction in FATA/PATA matters prior to the 25th Constitutional Amendment, and the effect of Presidential Order No. 13 of 1972. The Supreme Court held that the 2009 Act was not applicable to FATA/PATA as its provisions were specific to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and its extension required a Presidential direction under Article 247(3) of the Constitution, which was absent. Furthermore, the High Court lacked jurisdiction in FATA/PATA matters under Article 247(7) of the Constitution, which was in force at the relevant time, and the 25th Amendment could not be applied retrospectively. Presidential Order No. 13 of 1972 was found inapplicable as it only covered employees in service on the appointed day. The Court emphasized that regularization requires a statutory basis, not merely long service or claims of discrimination based on others' potentially illegal regularization. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's judgments.

  Read full judgment →
• Deputy Commissioner Upper Dir, and others vs Mst. Nusrat Begum2022 PSC 1240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-26
  regularization of servicecontract employeeproject employeesPublic Service Commissionprescribed mannerlachesreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a Peshawar High Court judgment that allowed a constitutional petition filed by the respondent, ordering her regularization as a Charge Nurse. The respondent was originally appointed on a contract basis under an ADP project scheme, with contract extensions granted over time until her services were terminated in 2008. The Supreme Court considered whether a project contract employee whose post required recruitment through the Public Service Commission was entitled to statutory regularization under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act 2009 or the Civil Servants (Amendment) Act 2005. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that Section 2(b) of the 2009 Act explicitly excludes project employees from regularization. Furthermore, regularization under Section 19(2) of the 2005 Act required appointment in the 'prescribed manner', whereas the respondent was selected by a Departmental Selection Committee without Public Service Commission requisition. The Court reaffirmed that long service or contract extensions do not confer a vested right to regularization for project-based employees.

  Questions settled

  • Are project employees excluded from the scope of regularization under Section 2(b) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act 2009?
  • Does long continuous contract service automatically entitle a project employee to regular service status?
  • Can a contract employee claim regularization under Section 19(2) of the Civil Servants (Amendment) Act 2005 if their appointment was not made through the Public Service Commission as required by the rules?
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• Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue Services (Aec) & others vs M/s.2022 SHC 592 · Sindh High Court · 2022-12-30Read full judgment →
• Deputy Administrator Evacuee Trust Property, Rawalpindi vs Sakhi2022 SCP 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-22
  katchi abadievacuee trust propertyproprietary rightsself-projectionconstitutional oathpublic propertyregistration of documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court allowing a writ petition that challenged the refusal of the Sub-Registrar to register sale deeds and other documents for properties located in an area declared as a katchi abadi. The Evacuee Trust Property Board contended that the land belonged to a dharamshala and vested in the Board under the relevant law. The core legal question was whether the land in dispute constituted evacuee trust property and rightly vested in the Board, thereby precluding its status as a katchi abadi. The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence or record showing the land ever became evacuee trust property or formed part of the trust pool, nor had the Chairman of the Board determined it as such under the law. Consequently, the High Court's decision was upheld and leave to appeal was declined. Additionally, the Court laid down the principle that self-projection, self-glorification, and the affixing of photographs of political figures or living persons on public and government documents, records, or properties are unconstitutional, violate oaths of office, and are impermissible at public expense.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land declared as a katchi abadi automatically vests in the Evacuee Trust Property Board without a proper determination by the Chairman under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975?
  • Can a government authority refuse to register documents for properties in a katchi abadi based on an unsupported assertion of ownership?
  • Is it permissible under the Constitution and oath of office for public office holders to affix their photographs or names on public documents and government records for self-projection?
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• Defence Housing Authority Lahore through Secretary DHA and another vs Mst. Shaukat Ara and another2022 PLJ Lahore 322 · Lahore High Court · 2022-01-18Read full judgment →
• Deedar Ali Issran vs Abdul Wahid and others2022 SHC 248 · Sindh High Court · 2022-02-22Read full judgment →
• Dean / Chief Executive, Gomal Medical College, Medical Teaching2022 SCP 336, 2023 PLC (C.S.) 501, 2023 PLD Supreme Court 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-15
  administrative tribunalsappellate jurisdictionsupreme courtprovincial legislationconstitutional interpretationservice tribunalmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose as a leave petition under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, challenging an order of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Appellate Tribunal. The core legal question was whether a direct appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) against an order of a service tribunal created by a Provincial law to which the proviso to clause (2) of Article 212 has not been made applicable through a provincial resolution and federal extension legislation. The Supreme Court held that an appeal to the Court under clause (3) of Article 212 against a decision of an administrative tribunal created by a provincial law is maintainable if and only if clause (2) applies to that tribunal via the proviso. Because the tribunal in question was not covered by the proviso, the appeal was not maintainable. The key principle laid down is that clause (3) of Article 212 is not a standalone provision, and provincial assemblies lack the competence to independently alter or enlarge the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without prior activation of clause (2) through the constitutional mechanism prescribed in the proviso.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie to the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution against an order of a provincial service tribunal to which the proviso to Article 212(2) has not been extended?
  • Is clause (3) of Article 212 of the Constitution a standalone provision independent of clause (2)?
  • Can a Provincial Assembly enact legislation that directly affects or enlarges the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Dawood-Ur-Rehman vs The State2022 PCRLJ 1141 · Sindh High Court · 2020-09-17
  bailjurisdictionnarcotic substancescustoms actketamineconstitutional petitionspecial courtoverriding effect
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, arrested for smuggling Ketamine, filed a constitutional petition seeking bail, citing the prosecution's failure to file a challan within the statutory period. The core legal question was whether the offence, involving a substance reclassified as a psychotropic drug, fell under the jurisdiction of the Customs Court or the Special Court established under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The Court held that the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, possesses an overriding effect over the Customs Act, 1969, in matters concerning narcotic and psychotropic substances. Consequently, the Court affirmed the decision of the Special Judge (Customs, Taxation and Anti-Smuggling) to return the challan, ruling that such offences are exclusively triable by the Special Court established under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The key principle laid down is that where an offence involves narcotics or psychotropic substances, the provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, prevail over other laws, necessitating trial before the specialized forum created under that Act to avoid double jeopardy and ensure legal consistency.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 have an overriding effect over the Customs Act 1969 regarding the trial of narcotic-related offences?
  • Are offences involving psychotropic substances exclusively triable by a Special Court established under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • Can a Customs Court return a challan for lack of jurisdiction if the offence involves substances regulated under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Dawood Khan And Another vs Mst. Raffat Begum And others2022 PHC 640 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-11-10Read full judgment →
• Danish Khan Afridi vs The State2022 PHC 338 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-04-11Read full judgment →
• Danish Farooq vs Station House Officer, etc.2022 LHC 6452 · Lahore High Court · 2022-09-19Read full judgment →
• Danish Elahi and 2 others vs Mariam Kamran and 3 others2022 PLD Sindh 362 · Sindh High Court · 2021-12-14Read full judgment →
• Danish Azhar vs The Consumer Protection Court (South), Karachi and other2022 SHC 3, 2022 CLC 1203 · Sindh High Court · 2022-02-14Read full judgment →
• Danae International Corporation vs M.V. Camel (Ex-Camelot) and another2022 PLJ Quetta 78, 2022 CLC 1778 · Balochistan High Court · 2021-05-31Read full judgment →
• Daman Ali vs The State2022 PHC 80 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-03-18Read full judgment →
• Dalda Foods Limited vs The Competition Commission of Pakistan, etc.2022 PCTLR 540 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-09-14Read full judgment →
• Dalda Foods Limited through National Sales Manager (North) vs The Competition Commission Of Pakistan and others2022 CLD 10 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-09-14Read full judgment →
• Daily Khabrain vs Abdul Waheed Jamal, etc2022 IHC 118 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-07
  newspaper employeesITNE jurisdictiongratuitysalary in lieu of noticeWage Board Awardtermination of employmentmisconductintra court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges a Single Bench judgment that dismissed a writ petition against an Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees (ITNE) judgment. The core legal questions involve the jurisdiction of the ITNE under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 to award gratuity and salary in lieu of notice upon the termination of a newspaper employee, and whether the employee's termination constituted dismissal for misconduct. The court held that the ITNE possesses jurisdiction over gratuity claims as gratuity forms part of 'wages' governed by the Wage Board Award, but lacks jurisdiction over claims for salary in lieu of notice under Section 4 of the Act, which fall outside the implementation powers of the Tribunal under Section 12A. The key principle laid down is that while the ITNE can enforce Wage Board awards concerning wages and gratuity, claims strictly governed by Section 4 regarding notice or salary in lieu thereof must be pursued before the appropriate forum such as the NIRC, and termination without statutory notice and inquiry cannot be treated as dismissal for misconduct.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims regarding salary in lieu of notice under Section 4 of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
  • Is gratuity included within the definition of 'wages' under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973, thereby falling within the domain of the ITNE?
  • Can a newspaper employee's services be terminated on the ground of misconduct without complying with the procedure prescribed under Standing Order 15 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • What is the extent of the jurisdiction of the Implementation Tribunal constituted under Section 12A of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Dadu Khan (decd.) thr. LRs and 3 others vs Ghulam Abbas and 23 others2022 SCP 238, 2023 PLJ SC 129, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 376, 2022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-06-23
  evacuee propertyouster of jurisdictionredemption of mortgagecivil court jurisdictionDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actlimitation perioddeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit for declaration and redemption of mortgage concerning land treated as evacuee property. The appellants claimed the mortgage was redeemed in 1892, challenging subsequent allotments made by the Central Government. The core legal questions were whether the Central Government acquired valid mortgagee rights and whether the Civil Court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. The Supreme Court held that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that once land is treated as evacuee property under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, Section 25 of that Act bars the jurisdiction of civil courts, mandating that grievances be addressed through the specific statutory authorities created by the Act or its successors under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The Court further noted the suit was time-barred under the Limitation Act, 1908. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's judgment, affirming that the civil proceedings were coram non judice and that the appellants failed to pursue the correct legal forum for their grievances.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, bar the jurisdiction of civil courts to adjudicate matters concerning land treated as evacuee property?
  • Is a suit for declaration and redemption of mortgage maintainable in a civil court if the land in question has been allotted as evacuee property under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Does the right to redeem a mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, override the statutory ouster of jurisdiction regarding evacuee property?
  • Can the benefit of Section 13 of the Limitation Act, 1908, be claimed against a party that is not a defendant in the suit?
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• Dad Khan vs The State and another2022 PCRLJ 1371 · Lahore High Court · 2021-09-27
  post-arrest bailsmugglingassault on public servantprohibitory clausecustoms offencebail dismissal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises out of an application for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner Dad Khan in case FIR No.160 registered under the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail where the offenses do not fall within the prohibitory clause of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, but involve violent assault on customs officials engaged in intercepting smuggled goods. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that despite the offenses falling outside the prohibitory clause, the petitioner's violent and desperate conduct—including attacking the customs staff, firing weapons, and causing injuries while being caught red-handed—constitutes exceptional circumstances disentitling him to bail. The court laid down the principle that the normal rule of granting bail in cases outside the prohibitory clause is ousted where the accused is prima facie connected to a grave and violent assault on law enforcement officials discharging their public duties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail as a rule when the alleged offenses under the Customs Act, 1969 do not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.?
  • Does violent and aggressive conduct resulting in an assault on customs officials constitute exceptional circumstances to deny bail?
  • Can an accused caught red-handed at the spot of a scuffle involving firearms claim post-arrest bail merely because the offense falls outside the prohibitory clause?
  Read full judgment →
• D.G. Khan Cement Company Limited etc vs The Federal Board of Revenue2022 LHC 3288, 2025 PTD 199 · Lahore High Court · 2022-04-27Read full judgment →
• Cyrus Cowasjee and 2 others vs Karachi Metropolitan Corporation through Administrator, Karachi2022 PLD Sindh 106 · Sindh High Court · 2021-10-12
  mutation chargesinheritancetransmission of propertyfiscal statuteslocal government taxtransfer of propertyconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the authority of the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) to impose and collect 'mutation charges' on immovable property acquired by the petitioners through inheritance (via a will). The core legal question was whether the KMC possesses the statutory authority to levy such fees upon the transmission of property by operation of law, as opposed to a transfer between living persons. The Court held that the KMC lacks the authority to charge mutation fees in cases of inheritance. It reasoned that inheritance involves the automatic devolution of property by operation of law, which is distinct from a 'transfer' as defined under Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Court emphasized that fiscal statutes must be strictly construed, and no tax or fee can be imposed without explicit statutory authorization. Since the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013, only authorizes taxes on the transfer of immovable property and not on inheritance-based transmission, the impugned challan was declared illegal, and the KMC was directed to refund the collected amount.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation have the legal authority to charge mutation fees on property inherited through a will?
  • Is the transmission of property through inheritance considered a 'transfer of property' under Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
  • Can a local government authority impose a fee or tax that is not explicitly authorized by the governing statute?
  • Does the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013, empower the KMC to levy mutation fees on properties acquired by operation of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Crescent Textile Mills Ltd., Haripur vs Government Of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2022 PLD Supreme Court 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-14
  adjournmentdismissal for non-prosecutionSupreme Court of Pakistanunprepared counselabsence of medical certificate
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Crescent Textile Mills Ltd., Haripur against the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question concerns the handling of repeated requests for adjournment by the petitioner's counsel without sufficient justification or medical evidence on record. The Supreme Court held that where a matter has been repeatedly adjourned on previous dates of hearing due to the unavailability of the petitioner's counsel and no medical certificate is provided to substantiate the current illness, and the Advocate-on-Record lacks instructions and is unprepared, the court is not inclined to grant further adjournments. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for non-prosecution. The key principle laid down is that repeated unjustified adjournments sought by counsel without supporting evidence, leaving the associated advocate uninstructed, warrant the dismissal of the petition for non-prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition can be dismissed for non-prosecution when the petitioner's counsel repeatedly seeks adjournments without providing a medical certificate?
  • Is an Advocate-on-Record who lacks instructions and is unprepared to argue the case entitled to an adjournment when prior adjournments were already granted on the counsel's request?
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• Crescent Educational Trust vs Registrar of Trade Unions Lahore & another2022 LHC 2253, 2022 PTD 1384, 2022 PLC 180 · Lahore High Court · 2022-02-18
  trade union registrationcollective bargaining agenteducational institutioncommercial basisnon-profit organizationtax exemptioncharitable trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the Registrar of Trade Unions, Lahore, which determined that the petitioner, Crescent Educational Trust, was running its educational institution on a commercial basis and was therefore subject to the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010. The core legal question was whether an educational institution operated by a non-profit trust maintaining a financial surplus constitutes an establishment run on commercial basis under Section 1(3)(h) of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010. The Lahore High Court held that the mere generation of a financial surplus or profit does not render an educational institution commercial if the surplus is not distributed to trustees or individuals for private benefit but is exclusively plowed back into charitable and educational purposes. The court laid down the principle that the term 'commercial basis' requires an enterprise to have financial profit as its primary aim with benefits flowing to private individuals, and recognized that non-profit educational trusts holding valid non-profit organization status under tax laws are exempt from the provisions of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an educational institution operated by a non-profit trust can be considered as being run on commercial basis merely because it maintains a financial surplus?
  • Does the generation of surplus funds over expenditures in a charitable trust constitute trade or business carried on for profit under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010?
  • What factors determine whether an educational institution is exempt from the applicability of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010 under Section 1(3)(h)?
  • Is a trust holding a non-profit organization status and 100% tax credit eligibility under the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 subject to labor laws applicable to commercial establishments?
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• Controller General of Accounts, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and another vs Abdul Waheed, Sajid Iqbal, Syed Muhammad Usman, Ashar Jan Siddiqui, Muhammad Baqir2022 SCP 378 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service appealpromotionretrospective operationvested rightsrecruitment rulescivil servantsstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions for leave to appeal arose from a common judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which allowed service appeals filed by the respondent-employees and directed the department to consider them for promotion as Assistant Accounts Officer (BS-17). The core legal question concerned whether subsequent amendments to recruitment rules, requiring promotion sequentially in terms of qualified batches, operated retrospectively to affect employees who had already qualified the prerequisite examination prior to the Departmental Promotion Committee meeting. The Supreme Court held that the amendments operated prospectively and could not impair substantive rights or vested rights that had already accrued under the unamended rules. The Court laid down the principle that statutory amendments affecting substantive rights operate prospectively unless an express enactment or necessary intendment provides for retrospective operation, and rules cannot be applied retrospectively to alter the promotion eligibility of employees who qualified under existing criteria before the convening of a promotion committee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether amendments to service recruitment rules altering promotion criteria operate retrospectively to affect employees who qualified prior to the amendment?
  • Can a statutory rule or amendment impair substantive rights or vested rights accrued under previously existing rules without explicit retrospective language?
  • Are employees who qualified their professional examinations before the convening of a Departmental Promotion Committee entitled to be considered under the rules existing at that time?
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• Commissioner Relief and Rehabilitation Azad Jammu And Kashmir and 22022 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 61 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Zone-III, Regional Tax Office, Islamabad2022 PTD 1876 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-08-31Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Legal Division, Regional Tax Office, Lahore vs M_s. Rafaqat Marketing, Lahore & another2022 LHC 8615 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Legal Division, Lahore vs M/s Wire2022 LHC 3997, 2025 PTD 386 · Lahore High Court · 2022-06-02Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Inland Revenue vs M/s. Mughal Board IndustryPTCL 2022 CL. 19 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-02
  sales taxamnesty notificationdefault surchargeexemptionssubordinate legislationtax recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue against M/s. Mughal Board Industry, challenging the judgment of the High Court which granted the respondent the benefit of a tax amnesty notification. The core legal question was whether a registered taxpayer who voluntarily deposited the principal amount of illegally adjusted sales tax prior to the issuance of the amnesty notification (SRO 606(1)/2012) is entitled to the exemption from default surcharge and penalties, given that the notification requires payment by a specified cut-off date. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer is indeed entitled to the benefit, ruling that the spirit and object of the amnesty notification is to incentivize the quick recovery of stuck-up tax revenue by or before the cut-off date of 25th June 2012, and penalizing a taxpayer who made a voluntary prior deposit would create an absurd result. The court laid down the principle that beneficial subordinate tax legislation must be interpreted liberally in favor of the taxpayer to encourage voluntary compliance and achieve fiscal objectives.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a taxpayer who deposits the principal amount of sales tax prior to the issuance of an amnesty notification is entitled to the exemption of default surcharge and penalties?
  • How should beneficial subordinate legislation relating to tax amnesty be interpreted?
  • What is the primary objective of a tax amnesty scheme offering exemption on default surcharge and penalties upon payment of the principal tax amount by a cut-off date?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax vs M/s. Grays Leasing LtdPTCL 2022 CL. 811 · Lahore High Court · 2021-10-12Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax vs Messrs Grays Leasing Ltd.2022 PTD 951 · Lahore High Court · 2021-10-12Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax Legal Division, Rto, Lahore vs Messrs Meco2022 PTD 809 · Lahore High Court · 2021-06-09
  reference applicationincome tax assessmenttime limitationservice of ordercommunication of decisiontax referenceappellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application filed under section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 challenged an order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal regarding the interpretation of time limitation for making an assessment and whether it encompasses the service of the order. The core legal question revolved around whether the time limitation for assessment requires not just the passing of the order but also its communication or service to the taxpayer. The Lahore High Court, relying on the precedent established by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of M/s. Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Customs Appellate Tribunal, held that an adjudicatory decision must be duly declared and communicated to the parties to be effective within the prescribed limitation period. Consequently, the reference application was decided against the applicant-department and in favour of the respondent-taxpayer, affirming that time limitation includes proper communication of the assessment order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the time limitation for completing an income tax assessment include the service or communication of the order to the taxpayer?
  • Whether an adjudicatory decision takes effect from the date of conclusion of hearing or from the date it is communicated to the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax (Legal) vs M/s Askari Bank Limited,PTCL 2022 CL. 186, 2022 SCMR 1104, 2022 PLJ SC 228, 2022 PSC 1174, 2022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-01
  initial allowancedepreciable assetincome taxbuilding deductiontax year
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a controversy regarding the meaning and scope of section 23 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, specifically concerning whether a taxpayer can claim a deduction of initial allowance for an eligible depreciable asset, such as a building, put to use by the taxpayer for the first time in a tax year, even if the building had been used previously by other taxpayers. The core legal question revolves around the interpretation of the phrase 'first time in a tax year' under section 23. The Court held that the phrase relates to the first-time use of the building by the taxpayer, rendering any prior use by a previous owner or proprietor inconsequential. Furthermore, the Court noted that sub-section (5) of section 23 explicitly excludes previously used plant or machinery from the definition of an eligible depreciable asset, but does not exclude previously used buildings. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that a taxpayer is entitled to an initial allowance deduction for a building put into service by them for the first time in a tax year, irrespective of its prior usage history. The Supreme Court declined leave and dismissed the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a taxpayer can claim a deduction of initial allowance for a building put to use for the first time in a tax year if the said building was previously used by another person?
  • What is the scope and meaning of the phrase 'first time in a tax year' under section 23 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the definition of an eligible depreciable asset under section 23(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 exclude previously used buildings?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Ir, Zone-IV vs M/s. Hamdam Paper Corporation (Pvt) Ltd.,2022 SHC 342, 2022 PTD 1781 · Sindh High Court · 2022-08-22Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-VII, Regional Tax Office-II, Lahore vs Messrs Techlogix Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd2022 PTD 893, 2022 PCTLR 1139 · Lahore High Court · 2021-11-09Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV, Lahore vs Messrs Panther Sports2022 SCMR 1135, PTCL 2022 CL. 544, 2022 PCTLR 1543, 2022 PTD 888 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-21
  Income Tax Ordinancetax recordsstatutory periodtaxpayer obligationnoticestax administrationsix-year rulerecord maintenancetax recoveryconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered a petition seeking leave to appeal against a High Court order which set aside notices issued by the Commissioner Inland Revenue. The notices demanded statements under Section 165 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, reconciliation statements under Rule 44(4) of the Income Tax Rules, 2002, and sought recovery under Section 161(1A) of the Ordinance, for tax years 2007 and 2009, issued in 2017. The core legal question was whether a taxpayer could be compelled to furnish records beyond the six-year period stipulated in Section 174(3) of the Ordinance. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that taxpayers are not obligated to maintain tax records after six years from the end of the relevant tax year. Consequently, notices demanding such records are unlawful, ineffective, and unenforceable, attracting no penal consequences. The Court clarified that Section 214A of the Ordinance, dealing with condonation of time limits, does not apply to this scenario.

  Questions settled

  • Can a taxpayer be compelled to furnish tax records beyond the six-year period stipulated in Section 174(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Are notices issued under sections 161(1A) or 165(2B) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, or Rule 44(4) of the Income Tax Rules, 2002, effective and enforceable if they demand records beyond the statutory six-year period?
  • Does Section 214A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, apply to condone the time limit for demanding tax records beyond the six-year period under Section 174(3)?
  • Is the tax department restricted from seeking records beyond the statutory period under Section 174(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, from the taxpayer?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV vs Byco Petroleum Pakistan2022 SHC 158, 2022 [M] CLR 874, 2022 PCTLR 1266 · Sindh High Court
  default surchargepenaltymens reacircular debtsales taxreference jurisdictionquasi-criminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves reference applications filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue against concurrent findings of the Commissioner Appeals and the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which had set aside default surcharges and penalties imposed on petroleum sector entities for slightly late payment of sales tax. The core legal question was whether the levy of default surcharge and penalty was warranted under the Sales Tax Act 1990 without establishing willful default or mens rea, particularly when delayed payments resulted from a severe national liquidity crisis caused by circular debt. The Sindh High Court held that penalties and default surcharges under fiscal laws are quasi-criminal in nature and cannot be imposed in the manifest absence of demonstrable intent, willful default, or culpable mens rea. The Court laid down that financial defaults arising from external, uncontrollable macroeconomic factors like government-induced circular debt do not attract penal consequences, and administrative authorities must establish the presence of mens rea before imposing default surcharge and penalties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether default surcharge and penalty can be imposed under the Sales Tax Act 1990 without establishing willful default or mens rea?
  • Does a liquidity crisis caused by circular debt constitute a valid ground for deleting default surcharge and penalties on delayed tax payments?
  • Are penalties and default surcharges under fiscal statutes considered civil liabilities or quasi-criminal in nature?
  • Is the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue the final arbiter of facts regarding the presence or absence of a taxpayer's intent?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, Rto, Faisalabad vs Messrs Kamal2022 PTD (Trib.) 1435 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2021-04-20Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Officer (Rto), Mayo2022 SCP 152, 2022 SCMR 1333, 2023 PCTLR 76, 2022 PSC 1612, PTCL 2022 CL. · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-12
  sales taxlimitation periodmandatory provisionappellate tribunalcommissioner appealstax liabilitystatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a sales tax reference. The core legal question was whether the time frame prescribed under Section 45-B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for deciding an appeal by the Commissioner (Appeals) is mandatory or directory in nature, and whether a decision rendered beyond the maximum stipulated period of 180 days is void. The Supreme Court held that the provision is mandatory, as the use of restrictive and negative language limiting extensions to a maximum of 60 days beyond the initial 120 days reflects a clear legislative intent to ensure expeditious resolution of tax matters within the relevant tax year. Consequently, any appellate decision rendered beyond the prescribed 180-day limit is invalid and a nullity in law. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time period prescribed under Section 45-B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for deciding an appeal is mandatory or directory?
  • What is the legal consequence of a decision rendered by the Commissioner (Appeals) beyond the maximum prescribed period of 180 days?
  • Does the failure of the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide an appeal within the statutory time frame extinguish the underlying tax liability of the taxpayer?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Officer (Rto), Mayo Road, Rawalpindi and another vs Messrs Sarwaq Traders, 216_1-a, Adamjee Road, Rawalpindi and another2022 SCMR 1333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-12
  sales tax referencelimitation periodmandatory provisionCommissioner Appealstax liabilityappellate tribunalstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a sales tax reference and affirming the appellate tribunal's decision. The core legal question was whether the time limit prescribed under section 45-B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for deciding an appeal by the Commissioner (Appeals) within a maximum of 180 days is mandatory or directory in nature, and whether a decision rendered beyond this period is void. The Supreme Court held that the statutory time limit of 180 days is mandatory, as evinced by the restrictive and negative language used in the provisos limiting the extension of time. The Court concluded that any appellate decision rendered by the Commissioner (Appeals) beyond the prescribed 180 days is invalid and a nullity in law. The key principle laid down is that statutory timeframes imposing duties on public tax officials to decide appeals within a maximum stipulated period are mandatory, and failure to render a decision within such period renders the resulting order void.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time period prescribed under section 45-B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for deciding an appeal by the Commissioner (Appeals) is mandatory or directory?
  • Does an order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) beyond the maximum prescribed period of 180 days become void and a nullity in law?
  • What is the effect of negative and restrictive language in a statute imposing a duty on a public official?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-Ii, Regional Tax Office, Lahore vs Messrs Daewoo Pakistan Motorway Services (Pvt.) Ltd2022 PTD 1019 · Lahore High Court · 2021-10-07Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Lahore vs Shazia Zafar2022 LHC 4360, 2022 PTD 1942 · Lahore High Court · 2022-06-09Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II Regional Tax Office, Lahore vs M/s.PTCL 2022 CL. 852 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Rto, Faisalabad vs Al-Sehar2022 PTD (Trib.) 1010 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2021-08-31Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Regional Tax Office, Faisalabad vs M_s. Ahmad Straw Board Private Limited, Faisalabad2022 LHC 6656, 2023 PTD 1528, 2022 PCTLR 1587 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Ltu, Lahore vs M/s Marwat2022 LHC 7209 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Sialkot vs M_s Chaudhry Steel Mills S.I.E., Daska2022 LHC 3042, 2025 PTD 101 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Regional Tax Office, Peshawar vs Messrs2022 PTD 1776 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-02-24Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Regional Tax Office, Faisalabad vs Abdul2022 PTD 1673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-31
  Income Tax Ordinance 2001final tax regimelabour and carriage servicesstatutory interpretationFederal Board of Revenuelitigation managementtax services definition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue against a High Court order regarding the tax treatment of contracts for labour and carriage services. The core legal question was whether such contracts fall under Section 153(1)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, subjecting income to the final tax regime, or under Section 153(1)(b) as the rendering of services. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the definition of "services" in Section 153(9) of the Ordinance is not exhaustive and encompasses labour and carriage services. Consequently, the Court rejected the department's attempt to classify these services under Section 153(1)(c). The Court affirmed that excluding such services from the definition would be discriminatory. Furthermore, the Court expressed significant concern regarding the Federal Board of Revenue's failure to maintain an adequate data bank of decided cases, noting that this lack of institutional record-keeping hampers the efficient administration of justice and wastes judicial time. The Court directed the FBR to address these systemic shortcomings promptly.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'services' in Section 153(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 include labour and carriage services?
  • Are contracts for labour and carriage services subject to the final tax regime under Section 153(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Is the definition of 'services' provided in Section 153(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 exhaustive?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Peshawar vs M/s. Tribal Areas ElectricityPTCL 2022 CL. 599 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Peshawar vs M/s Pakistan Tobacco2022 SCP 148, PTCL 2022 CL. 698, 2022 PLJ SC 404, 2022 PCTLR 1175, 2022 PTD · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-31
  sales taxerstwhile tribal areasFATA and PATAtaxable suppliesadditional sales taxconstitutional application of lawsshow cause noticesale of goods
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated appeals arise from the dismissal of tax references by the High Court regarding the levy of additional sales tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for periods prior to the 25th Amendment. The core legal question is whether additional sales tax was payable on supplies made by a manufacturer/dealer located within settled areas of Pakistan to unregistered recipients situated in the erstwhile FATA/PATA, where the Sales Tax Act had not been extended under Article 247 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that for a valid levy under Section 3(1A), the taxable supply or sale must have taken place "in Pakistan" in the special constitutional sense prevailing at the relevant time, which required the supply to have been executed within the jurisdiction where the Act was applicable. The Court found that the department failed to properly allege and establish through evidence that the disputed supplies were made within Pakistan, as the mere fact that the supplier was located in Pakistan was insufficient. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether additional sales tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 could be levied on supplies made to recipients located in the erstwhile Tribal Areas where the Act had not been extended under Article 247 of the Constitution?
  • Is the mere fact that a supplier is located in Pakistan sufficient to establish that a taxable supply was made "in Pakistan" for the purposes of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • What is the effect of a failure by the tax department to properly allege and prove the factual basis regarding the place of supply in the show cause notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lyallpur Zone, Rto, Faisalabad. vs M/s. Ideal2022 LHC 7665 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lto, Karachi vs Packages LimitedPTCL 2022 CL. 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-13
  Income Tax Ordinancetime-barredshow cause noticestatutory limitationfrivolous litigationassessment ordertaxpayer rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the High Court of Sindh, which had ruled against the Commissioner Inland Revenue regarding the initiation of tax assessment proceedings. The core legal question was whether a show cause notice issued under Section 66-A of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, was time-barred, given that it was issued more than thirteen years after the original assessment order by the Deputy Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the proceedings were indeed time-barred. The Court observed that Section 66-A explicitly mandates that such notices must be issued within a period of four years from the date of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Since the notice in question was issued well beyond this statutory limitation, the action was invalid. The Court dismissed the petition with costs, emphasizing that the Federal Board of Revenue must act fairly, adhere to statutory time limits, and avoid frivolous litigation that wastes the time and resources of the taxpayers and the judiciary.

  Questions settled

  • Is a show cause notice issued under Section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, valid if issued more than four years after the original assessment order?
  • What is the statutory time limit for the issuance of a notice under Section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal Zone, Lto, Multan vs : M/s Usman2022 LHC 8015 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khush Murad and 6 others vs Malang Jan2022 YLR 1466 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2021-11-26Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Limited, Lahore2022 SCP 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-29
  limitation periodpronouncement of judgmentjudicial delaycivil procedureappellate jurisdictionjudicial accountabilitypetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from Civil Miscellaneous Applications concerning the limitation period for filing petitions for leave to appeal, where the impugned High Court judgments lacked the date of signing and pronouncement. The core legal questions addressed whether a judgment must be dated, the consequences of omitting such dates, and whether surrounding circumstances should be used to determine the limitation period when dates are absent. The Supreme Court held that every judgment must explicitly inscribe the date it is written, signed, and pronounced, as mandated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. The Court emphasized that "pronouncement" encompasses the statement of grounds, not merely the result. It further held that inordinate delays in writing judgments are objectionable and may constitute misconduct under the Judges Code of Conduct. Consequently, the Court directed the Registrars of all High Courts to ensure that all future judgments and orders clearly state the actual date of signing and pronouncement to prevent prejudice to litigants and avoid unnecessary wastage of judicial time.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judgment have to be dated?
  • What are the consequences if a judgment does not mention the date when it was written, signed and pronounced?
  • When a judgment, which does not mention when it was written, signed and pronounced, is challenged, should the surrounding circumstances and record be considered to determine whether the challenge has been made within the prescribed period?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs M/s. Sargodha Spinning MillsPTCL 2022 CL. 197, 2022 SCMR 1082, 2022 PSC 655, 2022 PLJ SC 231, 2022 PTD · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-03
  sales tax refundquestion of lawfinality of factsAppellate Tribunal Inland Revenueadvisory jurisdictiontax invoicesblack-listed units
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Sales Tax Reference where the petitioner department challenged a refund claim made by the respondent. The department alleged that the respondent claimed refunds on invoices from black-listed units where sales tax had not been deposited in the government treasury. The Appellate Tribunal, Inland Revenue, allowed the respondent's appeal, finding as a matter of fact that the department failed to produce evidence proving the invoices were fake or forged. The High Court subsequently dismissed the department's reference, holding that no question of law arose from the Tribunal's factual findings. The Supreme Court affirmed this, holding that the Appellate Tribunal is the final fact-finding body in tax matters. Its findings are conclusive and cannot be disturbed by the High Court unless specifically challenged as perverse or unsupported by evidence through a formulated question of law. Since the department failed to raise a specific question of law regarding the misreading of evidence, the Tribunal's factual determinations attained finality.

  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs M_s. Monnoowal Textile Mills Ltd., LahorePTCL 2022 CL. 430 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs M_s HNR Company (Pvt) Limited, Lahore2022 SCP 62, 2022 PSC 659, PTCL 2022 CL.463, 2022 PTD 1169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-24
  deemed assessmentbest judgment assessmentretrospective applicationincome tax auditlimitation periodfrivolous litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of best judgment assessments initiated by the Commissioner Inland Revenue against the respondent for tax years 2005 and 2006. The core legal question was whether an assessment under Section 121(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, could be framed when a valid return had already been filed and deemed assessed under Section 120 of the same Ordinance, and whether amendments introduced via Section 177(10) applied retrospectively. The Supreme Court held that for the tax years in question, the legislative scheme did not permit the cancellation or amendment of a deemed assessment order through Section 121. The Court affirmed that amendments to the law, specifically those regarding procedural powers, cannot be applied retrospectively to past tax years. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the limitation period under Section 122(2) had expired, and the department failed to provide the taxpayer with a proper opportunity for a hearing. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, with the Court cautioning the department against filing frivolous litigation on matters already settled by authoritative judicial precedent.

  Questions settled

  • Can an assessment under Section 121(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, be made where a deemed assessment order already exists under Section 120?
  • Do amendments to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, regarding procedural powers apply retrospectively to tax years prior to the amendment?
  • Does the expiration of the limitation period under Section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, bar the initiation of assessment proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs M_s Descon Engineering Limited, Lahore2022 LHC 3034 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs Messrs Tariq & Sons, Lahore2022 PTD 1455 · Lahore High Court · 2022-02-01Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs Messrs HNR Company (Pvt.)2022 SCMR 1240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-24
  best judgment assessmentdeemed assessmentretrospective applicationincome taxstatutory limitationtaxpayer rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of best judgment assessment orders issued by the tax department for tax years 2005 and 2006. The core legal question was whether the department could invoke Section 121(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, to override returns that were already deemed assessed under Section 120 of the same Ordinance, and whether amendments introduced via the Finance Act, 2010, including Section 177(10), applied retrospectively. The Supreme Court held that the department could not retrospectively apply these amendments to override deemed assessments. Relying on established precedent, the Court affirmed that Section 121(1)(d) did not apply to cases where valid returns had been filed and deemed assessed under Section 120 prior to the 2010 amendments. The Court further noted that the limitation period under Section 122(2) had expired, rendering the action time-barred. The key principle laid down is that statutory amendments do not operate retrospectively to affect settled assessments, and the tax department is cautioned against re-agitating issues already authoritatively decided by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the tax department invoke Section 121(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to override a deemed assessment made under Section 120?
  • Do the amendments to Section 177(10) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 introduced by the Finance Act, 2010 apply retrospectively?
  • Is a best judgment assessment valid if initiated after the five-year limitation period prescribed in Section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs Coca Cola Pakistan Limited, Lahore2022 LHC 4794, 2022 PTD 1400 · Lahore High Court · 2022-06-16
  withholding taxroyaltyservicesapportionment of deductionssubordinate legislationreference applicationincome taxrebate
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application under Section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 addresses two core legal questions: whether a rebate paid for exclusive product sales at outlets constitutes 'services' subject to withholding tax under Section 153 or 'royalty' under Section 2(54), and whether Rule 13 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002 is mandatory for apportioning expenses under Section 67 of the Ordinance. The Lahore High Court held that the payment made as a rebate for acquiring exclusive sale rights does not constitute 'services' rendering it liable to withholding tax under Section 153(1)(b), but rather falls within the definition of royalty and a deduction against sales, and further noted that tax withholding is impracticable where no actual payment occurs. On the second question, the Court held that Rule 13 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002 is mandatory and provides the proper mechanism for the apportionment of common expenditures under Section 67 based on gross receipts, affirming that subordinate legislation validly advances the parent statute without inconsistency. The Court answered the first question in favor of the taxpayer and the second in favor of the revenue department.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amount paid as a rebate for acquiring exclusive sale rights of a brand at outlets constitutes 'services' subject to withholding tax under Section 153 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Is Rule 13 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002 mandatory for the apportionment of common expenditures under Section 67 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can tax withholding under Section 153 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 be legally required where no actual, physical, or practical payment takes place and the transaction is merely a rebate?
  • What is the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court while hearing a reference application under Section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 regarding the vires of statutory provisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs Asif Kamal2022 SCP 66, 2022 SCMR 1091, PTCL 2022 CL.480, 2022 PTD 965 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-16
  tax auditshow cause noticeincome tax referenceappellate tribunal inland revenuerevenue litigationprocedural compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue against the respondent regarding a tax dispute for the tax year 2012. The petitioner challenged an order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which had ruled in favor of the respondent, and a subsequent High Court order that relied on a precedent case, Commissioner Inland Revenue v Falah ud Din Qureshi. The core legal questions involved whether the show cause notice was issued within the prescribed statutory period and whether the audit report was properly shared with the respondent, providing him an opportunity to respond. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner failed to provide necessary documentation or answers to these fundamental queries. Furthermore, the Court noted that the precedent relied upon by the High Court had already been upheld by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court held that there was no illegality in the impugned orders requiring interference. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, with the Court expressing strong disapproval regarding the lack of preparedness and assistance provided by the Federal Board of Revenue in court proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the tax department to provide necessary documentation and answer queries regarding the issuance of a show cause notice warrants the dismissal of a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue's decision final when the tax department fails to demonstrate any illegality or error in the impugned order?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Federal Board of Revenue, Karachi vs Muhammad Mustafa GigiPTCL 2022 CL. 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Money BillLegislative ProcedureIncome Support LevyConstitutional InterpretationFederal Consolidated FundSenate of PakistanTaxation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns five hundred and eighty-one petitions seeking leave to appeal against High Court judgments that declared the Income Support Levy Act, 2013 unconstitutional. The core legal question was whether the Act, which imposed a levy for poverty alleviation, constituted a 'Money Bill' under Article 73(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, thereby allowing it to bypass the Senate. The Supreme Court held that the Act did not meet the criteria for a Money Bill as it was social legislation rather than a tax measure, and it failed to establish a dedicated fund for its stated objectives, meaning collected funds would merge into the Federal Consolidated Fund. Consequently, the Act required passage by both Houses of Parliament under Article 70. Because the Act was not transmitted to the Senate for voting, it never validly became law. The Court affirmed the principle that legislative procedures prescribed by the Constitution must be strictly adhered to, and that bypassing the Senate in non-Money Bill legislation violates the constitutional rights of the provinces and the principles of representative democracy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Income Support Levy Act, 2013 constituted a 'Money Bill' under Article 73(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can legislation that does not qualify as a Money Bill be enacted without being transmitted to the Senate for voting?
  • Does the failure to include a saving clause in a repealing statute render proceedings initiated under the repealed law void?
  • Are funds collected under a levy that does not specify a dedicated fund automatically part of the Federal Consolidated Fund?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Federal Board of Revenue, Karachi vs Muhammad Mustafa Gigi and others2022 PLD Supreme Court 420, PTCL 2022 CL. 346, 2022 PCTLR 1548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-28
  Money Billlegislative procedureconstitutional interpretationIncome Support LevySenate of PakistanFederal Consolidated Fundtaxation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Income Support Levy Act, 2013, which was enacted through the Finance Act, 2013. The core legal question was whether the Act constituted a "Money Bill" under Article 73(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, thereby allowing it to bypass the Senate. The Supreme Court held that the Act was not a Money Bill but rather social legislation aimed at poverty alleviation. Consequently, it was required to follow the ordinary legislative procedure under Article 70 of the Constitution, necessitating passage by both the National Assembly and the Senate. Because the Act was not transmitted to the Senate for voting, it never validly became law. The Court emphasized that constitutional legislative procedures must be strictly adhered to, and mislabeling legislation as a Money Bill to bypass the Senate is unconstitutional. The Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that actions taken pursuant to an invalidly enacted law are legally unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Income Support Levy Act, 2013 qualify as a Money Bill under Article 73(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is legislation that bypasses the Senate by being incorrectly introduced as a Money Bill valid under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the failure to designate funds collected under a statute as 'expenditure charged' upon the Federal Consolidated Fund render the statute's stated objectives unachievable under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Faisalabad vs M/s. Engineers AssociatedPTCL 2022 CL. 569 · Lahore High Court · 2022-05-17Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, etc vs Jahangir Khan Tareen & others2022 P C T L R 350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-15
  writ jurisdictionshow cause noticedelegation of powerstax assessmentpremature petitionexhaustion of remediesjurisdictional errorIncome Tax Ordinance 2001
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that quashed a show cause notice issued by the tax authorities to the respondent regarding unexplained agricultural income. The core legal question concerns the propriety of invoking writ jurisdiction to challenge a show cause notice at a premature stage and the validity of the delegation of authority to the Additional Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition, as the taxpayer should first exhaust the departmental remedies provided under the tax laws. The Court emphasized that interference with show cause notices at the initial stage is generally impermissible, as the recipient can raise jurisdictional objections before the issuing authority. Consequently, the matter was remanded with directions for the Additional Commissioner to first establish the conditions of delegated authority under the relevant statute before proceeding on the merits. Furthermore, the Court underscored the necessity for the Federal Board of Revenue to ensure the official publication of all notifications to prevent unnecessary litigation and uphold the right to information.

  Questions settled

  • Should a High Court exercise writ jurisdiction to quash a show cause notice at a premature stage?
  • Is a taxpayer required to exhaust departmental remedies before challenging a show cause notice in a constitutional petition?
  • Must tax authorities establish the validity of delegated authority under the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 before proceeding on the merits of a case?
  • Does the failure to publish notifications in the official gazette impact the transparency of tax authority actions?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Corporate Zone, Regional Tax Office, Faisalabad vs Messrs Niagra Mills (Pvt.) Ltd2022 PTD 978, 2022 PCTLR 1459 · Lahore High Court · 2022-01-24Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-II, Rto, Gujranwala vs M/s Crystal2022 LHC 6750 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, Regional Tax Office, Quetta vs M/s.2022 PLJ Quetta 168 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, Regional Tax Office, Quetta vs Messrs Saindak Metals Ltd. Quetta, Tax Payer 20062022 PTD 1290 · Balochistan High Court · 2021-12-08Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I vs Messrs Excell Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd2022 PTD 1535 · Sindh High Court · 2020-11-20Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Toyota Walton Motors and others2022 PTD 1035 · Lahore High Court · 2022-01-27Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited2022 PTD 1135, 2022 PCTLR 1463 · Lahore High Court · 2021-11-18Read full judgment →