Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s Standard Ice & Cold Storage, Lahore2022 LHC 2164, 2025 PTD 35 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-07Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s Lahore Rubber Store2022 LHC 7179 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-17Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s Be Be Jan Fabrics (Pvt) Ltd2022 LHC 2300, 2025 PTD 51 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-16Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Nishat Chunian Power Limited2022 PTD 1180 · Lahore High Court · 2021-11-03Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Master Tiles and Ceramic2022 PTD 1433 · Lahore High Court · 2021-10-18Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Descon Engineering Limited2022 PTD 1209 · Lahore High Court · 2021-06-08Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Mahvash and Jahangir Siddiqui2022 PTD 1806 · Sindh High Court · 2021-08-25Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Dawood Islamic Bank Limited (Now Burj2022 PTD 1474 · Sindh High Court · 2021-04-09Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Rto, Islamabad vs Pak Telecommunication2022 PTD 696, 2022 [M] CLR 890, 2022 PCTLR 1029 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Legal Zone, Lto vs M/s Sapphire Dairies2022 LHC 6849 · Lahore High Court · 2022-05-30Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Large Taxpayer Unit, Legal Division, Lahore2022 PTD 1161 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-07Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue etc vs Jahangir Khan Tareen and others2022 PLJ SC 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-15
  show-cause noticeconstitutional petitiondelegation of powersjurisdictionincome tax assessmentpremature petitiontax authoritiespublication of notifications
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court quashing a show-cause notice issued to the respondent under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, on the ground that the Additional Commissioner lacked jurisdiction and valid delegation of powers. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that constitutional petitions challenging mere show-cause notices at a premature stage are generally barred and that aggrieved parties must raise all factual and jurisdictional objections before the departmental authorities. The Court directed that the matter be remanded to the Additional Commissioner to first establish the proper statutory conditions regarding the delegation of authority under Section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, before proceeding on the merits. Additionally, the Court emphasized the statutory and constitutional obligation of tax authorities and public bodies to ensure proper publication of notifications and orders in the official gazette and official websites to avoid unnecessary litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition against a mere show-cause notice is premature when an adequate statutory remedy is available?
  • Can an Additional Commissioner proceed to amend a tax assessment without first establishing the validity of delegated authority under Section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the Federal Board of Revenue have a legal duty to publish tax jurisdiction notifications in the official gazette and on its official website?
  • Whether questions regarding the authenticity or existence of delegated powers should be raised before the departmental authority in the first instance rather than in writ jurisdiction?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue etc vs Jahangir Khan Tareen & othersPTCL 2022 CL. 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-15
  show cause noticewrit jurisdictionpremature petitiondelegation of powersincome tax assessmentjurisdictional erroralternative statutory remedypublication of notifications
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition, converted into an appeal, arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court that quashed a show cause notice issued under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to the respondent on the ground that the Additional Commissioner lacked jurisdiction. The core legal questions involved whether a constitutional petition against a mere show cause notice is premature and whether the Additional Commissioner was properly delegated powers under Section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter, holding that high courts should ordinarily not interfere at the premature stage of a show cause notice and that the recipient must first raise jurisdictional and other objections before the competent tax authority. The Court laid down the principle that writ petitions challenging show cause notices are generally premature and tend to bypass adequate statutory remedies, and directed the Federal Board of Revenue to ensure proper publication and online posting of all statutory notifications to prevent unnecessary litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is maintainable against a mere show cause notice issued by a tax authority?
  • Can an Additional Commissioner exercise powers of amendment of assessment without proper delegation of authority under Section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Should a taxpayer raise objections regarding jurisdiction and delegation before the departmental authority rather than invoking writ jurisdiction at a premature stage?
  • Are statutory rules, orders, and notifications required to be published in the official Gazette and posted on the official website to ensure public access?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue and others vs Jahangir Khan Tareen and others2022 PTD 232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-15
  show-cause noticeconstitutional petitiondelegation of authorityincome tax assessmentjurisdictionpremature petitiontax evasion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby a show-cause notice issued under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was quashed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against a mere show-cause notice at a premature stage, bypassing statutory remedies, and whether the delegable powers under Section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 were validly exercised. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that interference with a show-cause notice in writ jurisdiction is generally premature unless it is shown to be completely without jurisdiction or an abuse of process. The Court laid down the principle that aggrieved parties must raise all objections, including jurisdictional and delegated authority questions, before the departmental authority in the first instance, which must decide those preliminary conditions before proceeding on merits. Additionally, the Court stressed the mandatory publication of tax notifications in the official gazette and official portal to avoid unnecessary litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is maintainable against a mere show-cause notice issued by a tax authority?
  • Can an Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue issue a show-cause notice for amendment of assessment without establishing valid delegation of authority under Section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Is it mandatory for the Federal Board of Revenue to publish tax jurisdiction notifications and orders in the official gazette and on its official website?
  • What is the proper forum for a taxpayer to agitate questions regarding the assumption of jurisdiction or non-existence of delegated powers by a tax officer?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-1), Rto, Rawalpindi vs Tariq2022 PTD 1 · Lahore High Court · 2021-10-20Read full judgment →
• Commissioner (Legal Division) Large Taxpayers Units vs Pakistan2022 SHC 14 · Sindh High Court · 2022-01-25Read full judgment →
• Colony Textile Mills Limited, Ismailabad Multan through General Manager2022 PLJ Tr.C. (Labour) 61 · Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal
  labour appealreinstatementback benefitsresignationadverse inferencegrievance petitionindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This labour appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Labour Court, which reinstated a worker after declaring his resignation illegal. The appellant contended the grievance petition was procedurally flawed and that the worker had voluntarily resigned. The Tribunal examined whether the employer could rely on the resignation without producing the document and whether back benefits were automatically payable. The Tribunal held that the employer’s failure to produce the alleged resignation letter warranted an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. It affirmed the reinstatement, emphasizing that labour laws must be construed liberally to favor employees, discouraging non-suiting for technical defects. However, the Tribunal modified the lower court’s order regarding back benefits. It established that back benefits are not an automatic consequence of reinstatement; the burden lies on the employee to prove they remained unemployed during the period. Since the worker failed to establish this and evidence suggested he was gainfully employed elsewhere, the award of back benefits was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an employer to produce a document in their possession warrant an adverse inference under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Are back benefits automatically payable to an employee upon an order of reinstatement?
  • Is a grievance petition maintainable if the employee fails to specifically challenge a resignation letter in the pleadings?
  • Does the burden of proof regarding non-employment during the period of dismissal lie with the employee claiming back benefits?
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• Collector/Deputy Commissioner Gilgit and another vs Muhammad Issa2022 YLR 2343 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2021-12-01Read full judgment →
• Collector/Deputy Commissioner Gilgit and 2 others vs Adbul Wahid and 32022 YLR 2423 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2021-10-25Read full judgment →
• Collector, Sales Tax & Federal Excise, Regional Tax Office, Islamabad vs Customs, Central Excise and Sales Tax, Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad and another2022 IHC 152, 2024 PTD 275 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-05-09Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs The Bank of Punjab, LahorePTCL 2022 CL. 190, 2022 SCMR 1110, 2022 PCTLR 1570, 2022 PTD 831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-04
  income taxdividend incomebanking companyrate of taxFirst Scheduleleave to appeal refused
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal arose from tax references concerning whether dividend income received by The Bank of Punjab from Pakistani companies was taxable at the general company rate under paragraph A or the reduced rate under paragraph D of Part V of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court considered whether a banking company is excluded from the benefit of paragraph D simply because it is specifically named in paragraph A. The Court held that the general rates in paragraph A explicitly apply only where paragraph D is inapplicable, and since dividend income falls under paragraph D, the reduced rate governs. Relying on precedent established in the EFU General Insurance case, the Court affirmed that companies entitled to specific rate benefits cannot be denied them absent explicit legislative exclusion. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petitions with costs, criticizing the tax authorities for pursuing litigation despite concurrent findings by three forums and clear binding precedent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether income received by a banking company from declared or distributed dividends by Pakistani companies is taxable under paragraph A or paragraph D of Part V of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does the applicability of paragraph A of Part V of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, exclude incomes that are specifically governed by paragraph D?
  • Can a tax benefit provided under the First Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, be denied to a company in the absence of an express statutory exclusion?
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• Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Peshawar vs Messrs2022 PTD 1616 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-04-25Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Multan vs Aman Ullah2022 PTD 678, PTCL 2022 CL. 786 · Lahore High Court · 2021-09-27Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Jamrud Road, Peshawar vs Messrs Khyber Tea And Food Company and 2 others2022 PTD 1477 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-04-25Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Customs House, Jamrud Road, Peshawar vs Fahad Bin Firedoon2022 PTD (Trib.) 1027 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2019-03-10Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate (Mcc), Islamabad vs Messrs Sugi Duty Free Shop (Pvt.) Ltd. through Authorized Representative and another2022 PTD 1638 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-10-25Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Model Collectorate Of Customs (Preventive), Customs House, Karachi vs Niaz Muhammad and another2022 PTD 1174 · Sindh High Court · 2021-04-07Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Karachi vs Muhammad Shafiq2022 SCMR 2107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-10
  customs classificationHS Coderefund of customs dutyburden of proofgoods declarationstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the customs classification of an imported 'Hummer' vehicle. The respondent initially declared the vehicle under HS Code 8703.2490 and paid the associated duties. Subsequently, the respondent sought a refund, claiming the vehicle should have been classified under HS Code 8702.9090, which attracts lower duties, based on a certificate from 'American Limousine Sales' asserting a seating capacity of over ten persons. The Additional Collector dismissed the refund application, but the Customs Appellate Tribunal and the High Court reversed this decision. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the respondent met the burden of proof for a refund under Section 33 of the Customs Act, 1969. The Court held that the respondent failed to provide a manufacturer's certificate from General Motors to substantiate the seating capacity claim. Furthermore, the vehicle's history indicated a seating capacity of five, not ten. Consequently, the Court ruled that the respondent failed to prove the classification error, set aside the lower courts' decisions, and restored the Additional Collector's order dismissing the refund application.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie on the importer to establish that a goods declaration was submitted due to inadvertence, error, or misconstruction under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Is a certificate issued by a third-party seller sufficient to override a manufacturer's specifications regarding vehicle seating capacity for customs classification purposes?
  • Can a refund of customs duties be granted under Section 33 of the Customs Act, 1969, without evidence of inadvertence, error, or misconstruction?
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• Collector of Customs vs M/s. Abdullah Traders and othersPTCL 2022 CL. 420 · Sindh High Court · 2021-10-21Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs M/s Abdullah Traders2022 PCTLR 392 · Sindh High Court · 2021-10-22Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs Mr. Kristof W. Duwaerts2022 SHC 478 · Sindh High Court · 2022-10-26Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs Messrs Junaid Enterprises and others2022 PTD 1059 · Sindh High Court · 2020-12-24Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs Messrs Bnn Enterprises2022 PTD 1418 · Sindh High Court · 2021-01-20Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs Messrs Assas Enterprises2022 PTD 1485 · Lahore High Court · 2021-01-04Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs Messrs A.R. & Company2022 PTD 1408 · Sindh High Court · 2021-09-23Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs Alhaj Ajab Khan2022 SHC 11 · Sindh High Court · 2022-01-27Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs through Additional Collector of Customs, Karachi vs Messrs Samad Enterprises2022 PTD 796, 2023 PCTLR 1, PTCL 2022 CL. 781 · Sindh High Court · 2021-08-30Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs through Additional Collector of Customs vs Ms.2022 PTD 674, PTCL 2022 CL. 770 · Sindh High Court · 2021-12-07
  customs valuationlimitation periodservice of noticevaluation rulingshort levyfinal assessmentcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This Special Customs Reference Application challenged an order of the Customs Appellate Tribunal, which had condoned a delay in filing an appeal and ruled against the department regarding the recovery of short-levied duties. The core legal questions concerned whether the Tribunal lawfully condoned the delay in filing the appeal and whether Valuation Rulings could be applied to goods cleared outside the relevant statutory timeframes. The Court held that the Tribunal correctly condoned the delay because the respondent had not been properly served with the Order-in-Original, citing the principle that limitation periods commence from the date of knowledge when an aggrieved party is unaware of proceedings. Regarding the merits, the Court found that the department failed to establish the applicability of the Valuation Rulings, noting that the goods were cleared as a final assessment under Section 80 of the Customs Act, 1969, and that the department could not retrospectively apply rulings without clear evidence of clearance dates or compliance with the 90-day data rule. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application, affirming the Tribunal’s decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for filing an appeal commence from the date of the order or from the date the aggrieved party acquires knowledge of the order when they were not served?
  • Can a Valuation Ruling be applied to goods cleared outside the 90-day window prescribed by the Customs Rules?
  • Is a recovery action for short-levied duty sustainable under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969, when the goods were already cleared under a final assessment pursuant to Section 80?
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• Collector of Customs through Additional Collector of Customs vs Messrs2022 PTD 836 · Sindh High Court · 2021-02-26
  customs valuationvaluation rulingtransaction valueessential packingtare weightnet weight assessmentcustoms duty
  Summary & questions settled

  These reference applications impugned an order of the Customs Appellate Tribunal relating to the assessment of imported PVC Electric Insulation Tapes in jumbo rolls, specifically concerning whether the weight of the inner core packing should be included in the assessable net weight. The core legal question was whether the assessing officer could invoke Section 25(2)(b) of the Customs Act, 1969 to add the weight of essential packing when customs values had already been determined under Section 25-A via a Valuation Ruling. The Sindh High Court held that once a customs value is statutorily determined under Section 25-A, assessing officers cannot resort to the transactional value provisions or general additions under Section 25(2)(b). The Court laid down the principle that Section 25(2)(b) applies exclusively to assessments made under the transactional value method (Section 25(1)) and cannot be invoked when an assessment is governed by an existing Valuation Ruling that explicitly accounts for essential packing tare weight.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the weight of essential packing like an inner core can be added to the assessable weight under Section 25(2)(b) of the Customs Act, 1969 when goods are assessed pursuant to a Valuation Ruling under Section 25-A?
  • Does a Valuation Ruling issued under Section 25-A of the Customs Act, 1969 preclude the assessing officer from invoking general valuation methods under Section 25?
  • Whether the provisions of Section 25(2)(b) of the Customs Act, 1969 are exclusively applicable when goods are assessed under the transactional value method?
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• Collector Of Customs through Additional Collector of Customs vs Messrs2022 PTD 372 · Sindh High Court · 2021-10-21Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs through Additional Collector of Customs vs Customs2022 PTD 1153 · Sindh High Court · 2021-06-04Read full judgment →
• Collector Of Customs Preventive Model Customs Collectorate, Customs2022 P Cr. L J 480 · Sindh High Court · 2021-11-25
  acquittal appealnarcoticsbenefit of doubtchain of custodyfrivolous litigationprosecution evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal filed by the State through the Collector of Customs against an acquittal judgment passed by the Special Court (Control of Narcotic Substances) in a narcotics case. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt to warrant overturning the acquittal. The High Court found that the prosecution's evidence was riddled with material contradictions regarding the recovery, sampling, and handling of the alleged narcotics, and that the chain of custody was not established. The Court held that the acquittal was well-founded and that the appeal was frivolous, as the prosecution failed to identify any legal infirmity in the trial court's judgment. The Court emphasized that appeals against acquittal should only be filed when there are serious legal or factual defects, criticizing the mechanical filing of such appeals by state authorities. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and a cost was imposed on the appellant for filing a frivolous appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal against acquittal be maintained when the prosecution's evidence is riddled with material contradictions?
  • Is the failure to prove the safe custody of narcotics a ground for dismissal of a prosecution appeal against acquittal?
  • Does the filing of frivolous appeals against acquittal by state authorities warrant the imposition of costs?
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• Collector of Customs (Enforcement) vs Ara Detergents & Chemicals Fze &2022 SHC 188 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Collector Modell Custom Collectorate of Gawadar, Custom House2022 PLJ Quetta 175 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• Collector Land Acquisition City Development Project Muzaffarabad, Azad2022 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 114 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Civil Supply Officer, District Skardu vs Mehdi2022 MLD 2009 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2021-11-04
  criminal appeallimitation periodcondonation of delaydisposal of propertyacquittaltime-barred appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Skardu, which directed the Civil Supply Officer to return a recovered amount of Rs.246,737/- to the respondent. The respondent had previously been acquitted in a criminal case (FIR No.02/1997), and the trial court had ordered the return of the money under Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The appellant contended that the trial court acted arbitrarily and without proper notice. Upon review, the Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court observed that the respondent’s acquittal had been maintained by the apex court, confirming his entitlement to the recovered funds. Furthermore, the Court found the appeal was filed with a 50-day delay. The appellant failed to provide a sufficient explanation for this delay as required by Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908. Consequently, the Court held that the appeal was time-barred and not maintainable, affirming the trial court's order. The key principle established is that an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 requires a satisfactory explanation for each day of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal maintainable if it is filed beyond the statutory limitation period without a valid explanation for the delay?
  • What is the requirement for condoning a delay in filing an appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does the acquittal of an accused entitle them to the return of property recovered by authorities during the investigation?
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• Civil Revision No.216/2022 vs Nizam-ud-Din etc2022 LHC 1724 · Lahore High Court · 2022-02-28Read full judgment →
• Civil Aviation Authority through Director General, Karachi vs Muhammad2022 YLR 1348 · Sindh High Court · 2021-01-04Read full judgment →
• Church Missionary Trust Association through Authorized representative vs Federation Of Pakistan through Ministry of Religious Affairs, Islamabad and others2022 PLD Balochistan 36 · Balochistan High Court · 2021-09-07Read full judgment →
• Christopher Qayyum vs State and anotherPLJ 2022 Cr.C. 443 · Lahore High Court · 2021-10-26
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtocular evidencedying declarationdelayed FIRacquittalmurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for murder and attempted murder under Sections 302(b) and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt given the evidentiary inconsistencies. The Court held that the prosecution's case was fundamentally flawed due to an unexplained seventeen-hour delay in lodging the FIR, unreliable ocular testimony where witnesses repeatedly changed their accounts regarding the identity of the assailants, and a procedurally defective dying declaration lacking proper medical authentication. Furthermore, the Court determined that the motive was unsubstantiated and the recovery of the weapon was inconclusive. The Court reaffirmed the principle that the prosecution must prove its case on its own merits and cannot rely on the weaknesses of the defense. Consequently, finding the evidence shaky and replete with doubts, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellant, emphasizing that a single reasonable doubt entitles the accused to an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR undermine the credibility of the prosecution's case?
  • Can a dying declaration be relied upon if it lacks proper medical authentication?
  • Is the recovery of a weapon sufficient to sustain a conviction when the ocular account is unreliable?
  • Does the presence of injuries on a complainant's body automatically render them a truthful witness?
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• China Mobile Pakistan Limited (Cmpak Limited/Zone) through Legal2022 PLD Sindh 319 · Sindh High Court · 2021-11-08Read full judgment →
• Chief Revenue Authority/Member (Rs&Ep) Board Of Revenue Sindh,2022 PLD Sindh 47 · Sindh High Court · 2021-11-16Read full judgment →
• Chief Executive Officer, Peshawar Electric and Power Company (Pepco), WAPDA thr. its Chairman & others vs Sajeeda Begum 86 others, Gul Farah Jaan & others2022 SCP 286, 2023 PLJ 194, 2022 SCMR 2058 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-17
  territorial jurisdictionconstitutional petitionstatutory corporationgovernment servantsassistance packageservice matterswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions arose from two judgments of the Islamabad High Court directing the Peshawar Electric and Power Company (PESCO) and the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) to extend the benefits of the Prime Minister's Assistance Package of 2014 to the widows of their deceased employees. The petitioners argued that their employees are not civil servants, that they are governed by their own corporate rules and assistance packages, and that the High Court lacked territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 199 and the statutory frameworks of PESCO and WAPDA. The Court held that PESCO, being a public limited company with its registered office in Peshawar, was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court. Furthermore, the Court ruled that employees of corporate bodies like PESCO and WAPDA are not government servants, and the Prime Minister's Assistance Package applies exclusively to government employees unless expressly adopted by the respective corporate boards. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned judgments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to issue directions to a company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance 1984 whose registered office and operations are outside its territorial limits?
  • Are the employees of statutory corporations or government-owned public limited companies automatically classified as government servants for the purpose of federal assistance packages?
  • Can a High Court direct an independent statutory authority to apply the Prime Minister's Assistance Package to its employees when the authority has its own approved assistance package and has not adopted the federal package?
  • Does the constitutional bar under Article 212 of the Constitution apply to disputes concerning assistance packages that form part of the terms and conditions of service of WAPDA employees?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Engineer, Gujranwala Electric Power Company (GEPCO), Gujranwala2022 SCP 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  compulsory retirementregular inquirylaw of limitationvoid orderindustrial relationsnatural justiceestoppelservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals against a High Court judgment upholding the reinstatement of an employee compulsorily retired by GEPCO. The core legal questions involved the necessity of a regular inquiry for major penalties, the effect of the abatement of service tribunal proceedings on subsequent labour litigation, and the applicability of the law of limitation against allegedly void orders. The Court held that while not every disciplinary action requires a regular inquiry, allegations of misconduct involving disputed facts necessitate one to satisfy natural justice. The Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the Labour Court correctly reinstated the respondent due to the lack of such an inquiry. Furthermore, the Court established that the law of limitation is not a mere technicality; the doctrine that no limitation runs against a void order is not an inflexible rule, and parties cannot sleep on their rights. Additionally, the Court clarified that the mere acceptance of terminal dues does not automatically estop an employee from challenging an order of dismissal if the underlying charge of misconduct remains unproven.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acceptance of terminal dues by an employee automatically estop them from challenging an order of dismissal?
  • Is a regular inquiry mandatory in all disciplinary proceedings involving major penalties?
  • Does the principle that no limitation runs against a void order constitute an inflexible rule in legal proceedings?
  • Can an employer dispense with a regular inquiry when allegations of misconduct involve disputed questions of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Commissioner ICT vs Federation of Pakistan etc2022 IHC 66 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-04Read full judgment →
• Chaudhry Sugar Mills vs Competition Commission of Pakistan2022 CLD 1509 · Competition Appellate Tribunal · 2022-06-02Read full judgment →
• Chaudhry Parvez Elahi vs Deputy Speaker, Provincial Assembly of Punjab, Lahore and others2022 SCP 196, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 678, 2022 PLJ SC 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-07-26
  Chief Minister electionArticle 63AdefectionParliamentary PartyParty HeadDeputy Speaker rulingde facto doctrineratio decidendi
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging a ruling by the Deputy Speaker of the Punjab Assembly regarding the runoff election for the Chief Minister of Punjab. The core legal question was whether directions under Article 63A(1)(b) of the Constitution regarding voting in the Assembly are issued by the Party Head or the Parliamentary Party, and whether the Deputy Speaker lawfully excluded ten votes cast in favour of the petitioner based on a direction from the Party Head. The Supreme Court held that the Deputy Speaker's ruling was patently incorrect and erroneous, as directions under Article 63A(1)(b) pertain to the Parliamentary Party. Consequently, the exclusion of the ten votes was declared void and without lawful authority. The Court declared the petitioner, having secured 186 votes against 179 votes, to be the duly elected Chief Minister of Punjab. The judgment established that observations in prior decisions not forming part of the majority ratio decidendi do not constitute binding precedent, and parliamentary voting directions under Article 63A(1)(b) must strictly align with the constitutional text.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Party Head or the Parliamentary Party hold the authority to issue binding directions to members under Article 63A(1)(b) of the Constitution?
  • Can a Deputy Speaker exclude votes of assembly members during a runoff election for Chief Minister based on instructions issued by a Party Head?
  • Do non-majority observations in a Full Court judgment constitute binding precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis?
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• Chaudhary Khaqan Saadullah Khan vs Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior Islamabad and 2 others2022 PLJ Karachi 10 · Sindh High Court · 2021-06-03Read full judgment →
• Chaudhary Pervez Elahi vs Governor Punjab etc2022 LHC 8389 · Lahore High Court · 2022-12-23Read full judgment →
• Changaz Khan vs Mian Khan and 2 others2022 CLC 1966 · Balochistan High Court · 2021-10-25Read full judgment →
• Chanan alias Channu and others vs Hassan Raza and others2022 LHC 7356, 2024 CLC 2084 · Lahore High Court · 2022-09-27Read full judgment →
• Chairman, NAB through PG, NAB vs Nisar Ahmed Pathan & others2022 SCP 76, 2022 PLJ SC 270, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 475 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-22
  post-arrest bailpre-arrest bailcancellation of bailbenamidarcorruptionfurther inquiryperverse orderfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Chairman, National Accountability Bureau (NAB) against a High Court order granting pre-arrest and post-arrest bail to several respondents. The respondents were accused of abetting a former public office holder as benamidars or offering illegal gratification under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal question concerned the scope of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to interfere with bail orders and the standard for 'reasonable grounds' in NAB cases. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that interference is only warranted if an order is perverse or disregards settled bail principles. It clarified that in NAB cases, the standard for bail under Article 199 of the Constitution is derived from fundamental rights rather than Section 497 Cr.P.C. The Court established that where two plausible opinions exist, the one favoring the accused's liberty must prevail, and if the principal accused is granted bail, the same relief generally extends to alleged abettors.

  Questions settled

  • What are the specific grounds upon which the Supreme Court can interfere with a High Court order granting bail in its appellate jurisdiction?
  • Does the standard of 'reasonable grounds' for bail in NAB cases under Article 199 derive from Section 497 Cr.P.C. or the Constitution?
  • How should a court proceed when two reasonably plausible opinions can be formed regarding the incriminating material at the bail stage?
  • Is a co-accused alleged to have abetted a crime entitled to bail if the main accused has already been granted bail on similar material?
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• Chairman National Accountability Bureau through Prosecutor General2022 MLD 2061 · Balochistan High Court · 2022-08-17
  National Accountability Bureauassets beyond known sources of incomebenamidarappeal against acquittalburden of proofancestral propertymisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The High Court of Balochistan heard a Criminal Ehtesab Appeal filed by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) challenging the judgment of the Accountability Court-II, Balochistan, which acquitted the respondents of offences under Section 9(a)(v) and (xii), punishable under Section 10 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The prosecution alleged that respondent No. 1, a public servant, accumulated assets and maintained bank accounts disproportionate to known sources of income, utilizing respondent No. 2 as a benamidar. The core legal questions centered on whether the prosecution discharged its initial burden of proving disproportionate assets and whether sufficient grounds existed to interfere with an acquittal. The High Court dismissed the appeal in limine, affirming the acquittal. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove illegal gains, as evidence demonstrated that the properties were ancestral and the bank transactions were satisfactorily explained by legitimate joint family businesses and vehicle trading. The Court reiterated that an acquittal will not be disturbed absent perversity, complete illegality, or gross misreading of evidence causing a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the prosecution discharge its initial burden of proof in an assets-beyond-means reference where the defence shows that disputed properties are ancestral?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court interfere with a trial court's order of acquittal in an appeal against acquittal?
  • What is the effect on the prosecution's case when an investigating officer fails to record the statement of a key witness regarding the accused's legitimate business dealings?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman National Accountability Bureau through Prosecutor General Accountability, NAB Headquarters, Sector G-5/1, Islamabad vs Faraz Ahmed Sherwani and others2022 SCMR 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-09
  promotioncivil serviceadoption of rulesamendment by implicationdepartmental promotion committeenomenclature
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Chairman National Accountability Bureau (NAB), challenged the judgment of the High Court of Sindh which struck down the promotion of respondents to the post of Private Secretary (BPS-17) and directed NAB to re-visit their nomenclature under the Terms and Conditions of Service (TCS-2002). The respondents, originally appointed as Stenographers and later promoted as Personal Assistants (BPS-16), argued that the post of Private Secretary (BPS-17) was not formally part of TCS-2002 at the time of their promotion. The Supreme Court observed that although TCS-2002 did not initially list the post of Private Secretary (BPS-17), the post was created on a temporary and later permanent basis by adopting the federal civil servant rules under paragraph 14.08 of TCS-2002. The Court held that by adopting these rules, TCS-2002 stood amended by implication. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and validated the respondents' promotion to the post of Private Secretary (BPS-17).

  Questions settled

  • Whether service rules can be amended by implication through the adoption of federal civil servant rules under a residuary clause of an organization's terms of service?
  • Can employees challenge their promotion to a specific post if they previously admitted the existence and validity of such posts in prior litigation?
  • What is the legal effect of creating and filling temporary posts that are subsequently converted into permanent posts by adopting government rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman NAB thr. P.G, Accountability vs Nasar Ullah2022 SCP 98, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 1014, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-19
  post-arrest bailNational Accountability Bureaudelay in trialfair trialdue processpresumption of innocencefundamental rightsNAB Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The Chairman, National Accountability Bureau (NAB), sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment granting post-arrest bail to respondents in a NAB reference concerning alleged fake appointments and embezzlement. The High Court granted bail based on the lack of incriminating evidence and inordinate delay in concluding the trial. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, declining leave to appeal. The Court held that insufficient incriminating material itself entitled respondents to bail. Furthermore, an unjustified delay of nearly four years without commencement of trial violates fundamental rights to a fair trial and due process under Articles 4, 9, and 10A of the Constitution. The statutory bar on bail under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, is balanced by Section 16(a)'s requirement for day-to-day, expeditious trial. When trial is excessively delayed without fault of the accused, the statutory restriction on bail becomes flexible. Guidance on what constitutes inordinate delay may be drawn from the general criminal law framework (Section 497 Cr.P.C.).

  Questions settled

  • Does inordinate and unexplained pre-trial delay violate the constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution?
  • Can post-arrest bail be granted in NAB cases on the ground of prolonged delay in trial despite statutory restrictions against bail?
  • How does the non-compliance with the statutory requirement of a day-to-day trial under Section 16(a) of the NAB Ordinance affect the bar on granting bail?
  • Can courts draw guidance from the third proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. to determine what constitutes unconscionable delay in special law proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Parvez Elahi vs The Deputy Speaker Provincial Assembly of Punjab, Lahore, etc2022 SCP 194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-07-23
  Article 63-Aelection of Chief Ministerparliamentary party directionparty headDeputy Speaker rulingfiduciary capacityconstitutional governance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a constitutional petition challenging the ruling of the Deputy Speaker of the Provincial Assembly of Punjab dated 22.07.2022 regarding the election of the Chief Minister. The core legal question revolves around the interpretation of Article 63-A(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, read with the Supreme Court's previous judgment dated 17.05.2022 in Presidential Reference No.1 of 2022, specifically whether the direction to members of a parliamentary party for voting is to be issued by the parliamentary party itself or by the head of the political party. The Supreme Court observed that the respondents were currently unable to justify the Deputy Speaker's ruling, leaving the status of the Chief Minister-elect under a cloud. Consequently, pending further hearing, the Court arranged by consent that the respondent continue to perform duties as Chief Minister strictly in a fiduciary capacity as a trustee with curtailed administrative powers to avoid a constitutional vacuum. The Court granted time to the respondents to file concise statements and adjourned the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a direction to members of a parliamentary party for voting under Article 63-A of the Constitution of Pakistan is to be issued by the parliamentary party or by the head of the political party?
  • Can a Chief Minister whose election is under a constitutional cloud continue to exercise full administrative powers pending the determination of the petition?
  • Whether the votes cast contrary to the direction of the parliamentary party in the election of the Chief Minister must be disregarded pursuant to Article 63-A?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Saleem vs Ch. Abdul Razzaq2022 LHC 7824 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-05Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Saddique vs The Secretary Cooperative etc2022 LHC 1606, 2022 MLD 1081 · Lahore High Court · 2022-02-10Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Ashraf vs Malik Muhammad Muzaffar Khan etc2022 LHC 6166, 2022 CLC 2045 · Lahore High Court · 2022-08-18
  election appealnomination papersscrutiny of nominationdisclosure of assetsrectification of defectbye-electionReturning Officersubstantial defect
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns election appeals challenging the acceptance of a candidate's nomination papers for a bye-election by the Returning Officer. The core legal question is whether a candidate may rectify omissions in their nomination papers, specifically regarding the disclosure of a spouse's assets, during the scrutiny process, and whether such an omission constitutes a "substantial" defect requiring rejection under the Election Act, 2017. The Election Tribunal dismissed the appeals, holding that the Returning Officer correctly exercised their discretion under Section 62(9)(d)(ii) of the Election Act, 2017. The Tribunal determined that the omission was not of a substantial nature and that the candidate had voluntarily sought to rectify the error within the prescribed timeframe. The judgment affirms the principle that the Returning Officer has the authority to allow candidates to remedy non-substantial defects in nomination papers. The legislative intent behind these provisions is to prevent the disenfranchisement of candidates for inadvertent errors, provided such corrections are made promptly and do not stem from dishonest concealment or fraudulent intent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a candidate rectify omissions in their nomination papers during the scrutiny process?
  • Does the failure to disclose a spouse's assets in nomination papers constitute a substantial defect requiring rejection under the Election Act, 2017?
  • Does the Returning Officer have the authority to allow the remedy of non-substantial defects in nomination papers during the scrutiny stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Asghar Ali vs Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice Of Peace2022 P Cr. L J 366 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-14
  Section 145 CrPCland disputepossessionbreach of peacesecond FIRcivil court jurisdictioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a land dispute in Islamabad where proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 were initiated to prevent a breach of peace. The petitioner challenged orders passed by the Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge, arguing that the Magistrate misread the record regarding possession and that civil litigation was pending. The core legal questions were whether the Magistrate exceeded jurisdiction by adjudicating property rights and whether a second FIR could be registered for the same incident. The Court held that the Magistrate’s order was a valid, tentative determination of possession intended solely to maintain public order, not a final declaration of title, which remains the exclusive domain of the civil court. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that, per established precedent, a second FIR cannot be registered for the same occurrence, though an Investigating Officer may record a cross-version. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed as the impugned orders contained no legal infirmity. The principle established is that Section 145 proceedings are limited to preventing breach of peace and do not empower a Magistrate to adjudicate substantive property rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Magistrate have the authority to adjudicate title rights during proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a Magistrate's order regarding the custody of property under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 considered a final declaration of title?
  • Can a second FIR be registered for the same incident that is already the subject of an existing FIR?
  Read full judgment →
• Celmore Technologies (Pvt) Ltd, Islamabad vs Commissioner Inland2022 ATIR 15 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2022-09-28
  stay of recoveryillegal recoverycoercive measuresbank account attachmenttax refundAppellate Tribunal Inland Revenuedue processcontempt of courtmaladministration
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant taxpayer filed miscellaneous applications seeking the refund of funds unlawfully recovered from its bank accounts by the revenue department through coercive measures while a stay extension application was pending and an ad-interim stay order was operative before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue. The core legal questions involved whether the recovery of disputed tax demands via coercive action under Section 140 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 during the subsistence or pending renewal of a stay order is bad in law, and whether the Tribunal possesses the ancillary power to order the refund of unlawfully recovered tax. The Tribunal held that the recovery was illegal, highhanded, and in direct violation of binding judicial precedents and due process, and affirmed that it possesses the inherent and incidental statutory power to direct the refund of tax recovered unlawfully. The key principles laid down are that revenue authorities cannot resort to coercive recovery while an appeal or stay application is legitimately pending or protected by a stay order, and that the Appellate Tribunal is fully empowered to order restitution to make its stay jurisdiction effective.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the revenue authorities can resort to coercive recovery of a disputed tax demand while an application for extension of a stay order is pending before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue?
  • Does the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue possess the ancillary and incidental power to direct the refund of tax recovered unlawfully by the revenue authorities during the pendency of an appeal?
  • Whether the initiation of recovery proceedings under Section 140 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 by a Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue without a valid delegation of power from the Commissioner is void ab-initio?
  • Whether the non-compliance of a stay order passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue by tax officials amounts to contempt of court and maladministration?
  Read full judgment →
• Captain S.M. Aslam vs Karachi Building Control Authority through Chief2022 YLR 1672 · Sindh High Court · 2021-10-12Read full judgment →
• Captain (R) Muhammad Safdar vs Inspector General of Police, Khyber2022 PCRLJ 1342 · Peshawar High Court · 2021-12-22
  quashment of FIRSection 196 CrPCseditionwaging war against Pakistanabuse of processpolitical criticismpre-arrest bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arose out of a constitutional writ petition seeking the quashment of a First Information Report (FIR) registered under Sections 121, 121-A, 124-A, 131, 153, 505, and 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside related petitions for pre-arrest bail and disclosure of cases. The police registered the FIR based on an unverified social media video clip of a press conference conducted by the petitioner criticizing government policies and leadership. The core legal questions involved whether the registration and cognizance of offences under Chapter VI and Section 505 PPC were barred under Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without prior authorization from the Federal or Provincial Government, and whether political criticism equates to waging war against the State. The Peshawar High Court held that Section 196 Cr.P.C. strictly bars proceedings without requisite governmental authority, and that criticizing the government does not constitute waging war or inciting mutiny without incriminating material. The Court quashed the FIR as an abuse of process.

  Questions settled

  • Can an FIR be lodged for offences under Chapter VI of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 without prior authorization or complaint from the Federal or Provincial Government under Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does severe political criticism of government policies by a citizen constitute the offence of waging war against Pakistan under Section 121 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a criminal case under Sections 121, 121-A, and 124-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained solely on an unverified social media video clip without forensic analysis or corroborative incriminating material?
  Read full judgment →
• Capt. Muhammad Ali Khan vs Port Qasim Authority & Others2022 SHC 360 · Sindh High Court · 2022-08-30
  seniorityregularizationlachescontractual employmentdate of joiningservice regulations
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a constitutional petition seeking precedence in seniority over private respondents regarding employment at the Port Qasim Authority (PQA). The core legal question is whether seniority in service should be determined based on antecedents preceding regular service, such as a pre-employment assessment sheet, or from the date of regular appointment and joining. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that a belated challenge to seniority lists is barred by laches and that service rendered prior to regularization has no impact on seniority, which flows from the date of regular appointment and joining as per applicable regulations and governing principles. The court laid down the principle that undue delay in challenging seniority lists manifests acquiescence, and that regular service seniority must be reckoned from the effective date of joining rather than prior contractual evaluations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether seniority in a post can be determined upon antecedents preceding service rendered prior to regularization?
  • Does an unduly belated challenge to seniority lists render a petition liable to dismissal on the ground of laches?
  • Whether service rendered prior to regularization has any impact on the determination of seniority?
  Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority, through its Chairman and another vs M/s.2022 [M] CLR 89 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority vs Commissioner C.D.a, etc2022 IHC 16 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-01Read full judgment →
• Cantonment Board, Sargodha through Executive Officer Cantonment2022 YLR 1171 · Lahore High Court · 2021-07-23Read full judgment →
• Bushra Bibi and others vs Additional District Judge and others2022 CLD 900 · Lahore High Court · 2021-09-30Read full judgment →
• Bushra Bibi alias Buchu vs State and anotherPLJ 2022 Cr.C. 1060 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-31
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsheroine recoveryprevious convictionprohibitory clauseControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition filed by Bushra Bibi alias Buchu seeking post-arrest bail in case F.I.R. No. 1311 dated 11.11.2021, registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 at Police Station City Hafizabad, involving the alleged recovery of 1250 grams of heroin. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a case for further inquiry and post-arrest bail given the slight excess over one kilogram, the pending forensic report, and her status as a previous convict on probation. The Lahore High Court held that the case fell within the prohibitory clause as it swung between Section 9(b) and 9(c) due to potential wrapper weight reduction, the forensic report was awaited, and previous conviction did not bar bail. The court laid down the principle that uncertainty in contraband weight, awaiting forensic reports, and prolonged incarceration without prospect of early trial warrant the grant of post-arrest bail, even where the accused has a previous conviction on probation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the recovered narcotic weight slightly exceeds the threshold and the wrapper weight is in question?
  • Does a previous conviction on probation strictly debar an accused from being released on post-arrest bail?
  • Whether the absence of a forensic report at the bail stage entitles the accused to further inquiry under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Bursshane LPG (Pakistan) Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary /2022 SHC 312 · Sindh High Court · 2022-06-18Read full judgment →
• Brig (R) Ghulam Hafeez through his legal heirs, etc. vs Brig (R) Abdul Hadi, etc2022 LHC 8499 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Board Of Intermediate And Secondary Education, Bahawalpur etc vs Sher2022 PLJ SC 35 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  regularizationdaily wagerspublic advertisementopen meritservice rulesgood governance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions filed by the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Bahawalpur, challenging the regularization of daily wage employees, including Data Entry Operators, Junior Clerks, Drivers, and others, who had served for extended periods through artificial breaks. The High Court had decided in favor of the employees and regularized their services. The core legal question pertained to the regularization of daily wagers against available posts without violating statutory recruitment rules. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and held that the available posts must be filled through public advertisement in accordance with the rules, rather than direct regularization. However, to balance equities and recognize their past service, the Court directed that the daily wagers be granted a maximum of five percent additional marks for their past service when evaluated on open merit. Additionally, the Court directed the Board to revisit its policy on daily wagers to ensure good governance and prevent protracted litigation. The key principle laid down is that daily wage employees cannot be regularized bypassing public advertisement and statutory recruitment rules, but can be accorded weightage for past service in open competition.

  Questions settled

  • Can daily wage employees of a statutory board be regularized without public advertisement of posts?
  • Whether daily wagers competing on open merit can be granted additional marks for past service?
  • Does the practice of maintaining employees on daily wages with artificial breaks violate principles of good governance?
  Read full judgment →
• Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education, Multan through Chairman2022 LHC 7195 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Bismillah Khan vs The State2022 MLD 1002 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2021-12-04
  suspension of sentencecriminal revisionbail pending appealstatutory periodshort sentencemisuse of bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal miscellaneous petition filed by the petitioner, Bismillah Khan, seeking the suspension of his sentence pending the final adjudication of his criminal revision petition. The petitioner had been convicted by the trial court for offences under sections 380 and 457 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and his appeal was subsequently dismissed by the Sessions Judge. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's sentence should be suspended given the anticipated delay in the hearing of his revision petition due to winter court vacations. The Court held that since the petitioner remained on bail during the trial without misusing the concession, and considering the sentence was relatively short, there was a high probability that the revision petition would not be heard within six months. Consequently, the Court invoked the principle under section 426(1-M)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which entitles a convict to bail if the appeal or revision is not decided within the statutory period, and allowed the suspension of the sentence pending the final decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence be suspended pending a criminal revision petition if the court is closed for winter vacations?
  • Is a convict entitled to bail if their appeal or revision is not decided within the statutory period of six months?
  • Does the lack of misuse of bail during the trial period support a request for suspension of sentence pending appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Bismillah Din vs The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through its Chief2022 PHC 540 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Bilquees Khalid and another vs Federation of Pakistan through Federal2022 CLC 2002 · Sindh High Court · 2021-04-22Read full judgment →
• Bilqees vs The Secretary, Wafaqi Mohtasib Ombudsman's Secretariat and 2 others2022 PLC (C.S.) 235 · Sindh High Court · 2021-03-04
  quot-warrantodeputationabsorptionappointment by transfercivil servantrepatriationWafaqi Mohtasibseniority
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition before the Sindh High Court challenged the permanent absorption and subsequent promotion of respondent No.3, an employee originally belonging to the Women Development Department, Government of Balochistan, into the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman)'s Secretariat, Islamabad. The core legal questions revolved around whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib is competent to permanently absorb a deputationist by way of transfer under Rule 14 of the Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariat Officer's Service Rules, 2009, and whether such absorption violates the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding deputation and absorption. The Court held that permanent absorption of a deputationist or civil servant from another department/cadre into an organization not regulated in that manner, without a competitive process and outside the scope of valid recruitment rules, is illegal and contrary to the dicta of the Supreme Court. The Court laid down the principle that appointment by transfer is a temporary arrangement and does not contemplate permanent absorption, and that deputationists have no vested right to permanent absorption or to remain on a post indefinitely, and must be repatriated to their parent departments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib is competent to permanently absorb a deputationist by appointing her or him by transfer in the Establishment of the Wafaqi Mohtasib?
  • Can a civil servant of a non-cadre post be transferred out of cadre to be absorbed into a cadre post meant for recruitment through a competitive process?
  • Does Rule 14 of the Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariat Officer's Service Rules, 2009 contemplate or permit the permanent absorption of a deputationist in the transferee department?
  • Does a deputationist have a vested right to remain on a post indefinitely or claim permanent absorption in another department?
  Read full judgment →
• Bilal vs The State2022 PHC 340 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-08-31Read full judgment →
• Bilal Shah Bakhat vs The President Askari Bank, Islamabad and others2022 PLC 29 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 2020-08-11
  workman statusindustrial relationswrongful terminationback benefitsjob descriptionclerical dutiesNIRC jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an OG-II Officer at a bank, challenged an order by the NIRC Single Member Bench which dismissed his grievance petition for lack of jurisdiction, ruling he was not a "workman." The core legal question was whether the appellant’s status as a "workman" should be determined by his designation or his actual job duties. The NIRC held that the appellant was indeed a "workman," as his duties involved clerical tasks like opening accounts and clearing cheques, and he lacked managerial or supervisory powers such as hiring or firing staff. The court emphasized that designation is not the sole criterion for determining employment status; rather, the nature of work performed is the decisive factor. Furthermore, the court found the appellant’s termination illegal because it was executed without the mandatory inquiry required by law. Consequently, the appellate bench set aside the impugned order, reinstated the appellant in service, and granted him back benefits, reaffirming that procedural compliance in termination is essential under the applicable labor statutes.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee's designation as an 'Officer' automatically exclude them from the definition of a 'workman'?
  • Is the nature of duties performed the primary test for determining whether an employee is a 'workman'?
  • Is a formal inquiry mandatory under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, before terminating a workman for misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Bilal Moeen Butt Alias Bilal Hussain Butt vs The State and another2022 PCRLJ 1657 · Lahore High Court · 2021-09-30
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequefurther inquiryprohibitory clausebusiness relationshipdishonest intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a request for post-arrest bail by the petitioner, who is accused of issuing a dishonoured cheque under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to bail given the nature of the business relationship between the parties and the evidentiary status of the alleged dishonest intention. The Court observed that the petitioner had made substantial payments to the complainant, indicating a regular and smooth business relationship, which renders the element of dishonest intention at the time of cheque issuance a matter requiring further inquiry by the trial court. Furthermore, the Court noted that the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the petitioner has been incarcerated since July 2021 without a trial conclusion in sight. Consequently, the Court held that further incarceration would serve no useful purpose and granted bail, establishing the principle that where the element of dishonest intention is debatable due to prior business dealings, the case warrants further inquiry, justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a regular business relationship between parties render the element of dishonest intention in a Section 489-F case a matter of further inquiry?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail if the alleged offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can previous criminal cases where no conviction was secured be sufficient grounds to deny post-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Bilal Hussain (Deceased) through L.Rs vs President, National Bank Of Pakistan (Nbp), Head Office, I. I. Chundrigarh Road, Karachi and others2022 SCMR 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-16
  bank employeedisciplinary proceedingscompulsory retirementdepartmental inquirymaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the compulsory retirement of the appellant, a Branch Manager of the National Bank of Pakistan, following disciplinary proceedings for irregularities and procedural violations. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant suffered discrimination regarding the penalty compared to a co-accused, whether monetary loss was established, whether a regular inquiry was conducted, and whether the penalty order was passed by a competent authority. The Supreme Court held that the appellant, holding a higher supervisory responsibility as Branch Manager, was lawfully subjected to a major penalty while the co-accused faced a lesser penalty, that monetary loss and a regular inquiry were substantiated by the record, and that the communication of the order by subordinate officers indicated the competent authority had acted. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the validity of the disciplinary action.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a bank employee serving as a Branch Manager can be subjected to a higher penalty than a co-accused subordinate for procedural violations?
  • Does the communication of a disciplinary penalty order by administrative officers imply that the competent authority passed the order?
  • Whether the absence of demonstrable monetary loss invalidates a disciplinary action for procedural irregularities in banking service?
  Read full judgment →
• Bilal Azam vs Muhammad Haq Nawaz, etc2022 LHC 4751, PLJ 2022 Cr.C. 1549, 2024 PCRLJ 645 · Lahore High Court · 2022-06-17
  post-arrest bailconditional bailarshcriminal revisionjudicial discretionbail conditions
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order by an Additional Sessions Judge that granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner subject to the condition of depositing 'arsh' (compensation). The petitioner contended that the law does not permit imposing financial conditions for bail. The core legal question was whether a criminal court possesses the authority to impose conditions, such as the payment of compensation, when granting bail, given that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 does not explicitly provide for such conditions. The Court held that criminal courts have the authority to impose reasonable conditions while granting bail. Relying on Section 401(4-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Court reasoned that criminal courts can pass conditional orders that restrict liberty or impose liability. The Court affirmed that such conditions are permissible if they are not illegal or unreasonable, and either accepted by the accused or independent of their will. The petition was dismissed, upholding the trial court's authority to impose the condition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a criminal court have the authority to impose conditions, such as the payment of compensation, when granting post-arrest bail?
  • Can a criminal court pass a conditional order that restricts the liberty of an accused or imposes liability upon their property?
  • Is the imposition of a condition while granting bail permissible under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Bilal Ahmed vs State and anotherPLJ 2022 Cr.C. 469 · Lahore High Court · 2021-07-16
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequenon-prohibitory clausedocumentary evidencebail principles
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a request for post-arrest bail by the petitioner, Bilal Ahmed, who was charged under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in connection with the dishonour of a cheque amounting to Rs. 10,000,000. The core legal question before the Lahore High Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of post-arrest bail given the nature of the offence and the evidentiary status of the case. The Court held that the prosecution's case rested entirely on documentary evidence already in its possession, eliminating any risk of tampering. Furthermore, the Court determined that the offence under Section 489-F does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court granted bail, reiterating the established legal principle that in cases falling outside the prohibitory clause, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. The Court emphasized that the mere involvement of a large financial amount does not constitute sufficient grounds to deny bail, absent exceptional circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the involvement of a large financial amount sufficient ground to refuse post-arrest bail in a case involving a dishonoured cheque?
  • Should bail be granted when the prosecution's case is based entirely on documentary evidence already in its possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Bilal Ahmed vs Chairman, State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and 3 others2022 PLC (C.S.) 1472 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-08
  Intra-Court Appealdowngradingperformance evaluationArea Managerservice regulationsestoppelterms of service
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant filed an Intra-Court Appeal against a single judge's judgment dismissing his writ petition, which had challenged his downgrading from Area Manager Category "A" to Category "B" by the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan due to failure to meet the annual First Year Premium quota. The core legal question was whether such downgrading was permissible under the State Life Employees (Service) Regulations, 1973 and the express terms of the appellant's appointment letter. The High Court dismissed the Intra-Court Appeal, upholding the Judge-in-Chambers' decision. The Court held that Regulation 4 of the Regulations explicitly empowers the employer to review employee performance and take measures, including emolument reduction or curtailment, if performance falls short of prescribed standards. Furthermore, as the appellant accepted his appointment with express terms allowing potential downgrading based on performance evaluations, he was estopped from challenging those agreed conditions of service.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer downgrade an employee based on performance evaluation pursuant to service regulations and express terms of appointment?
  • Is an employee who accepts an appointment letter specifying conditions for performance-based downgrading estopped from challenging such action?
  • Does Regulation 4 of the State Life Employees (Service) Regulations, 1973 authorize performance review and consequential re-classification of Area Managers?
  Read full judgment →
• Bilal Ahmad vs The State and another2022 MLD 1577 · Lahore High Court · 2021-12-15
  criminal appealdying declarationocular accountmurder convictionevidentiary valueacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for murder. The core legal questions concern the reliability of the ocular account and the admissibility and evidentiary value of the alleged dying declaration. The trial court had convicted the appellant primarily based on the dying declaration, despite rejecting the ocular testimony due to material contradictions between the FIR and the trial statements. The High Court held that the conviction could not be sustained. It found the ocular account unreliable due to significant deviations from the initial FIR regarding the number of assailants. Furthermore, the court ruled the dying declaration suspicious, noting the presence of interested witnesses during its recording and evidence suggesting it was obtained on a blank paper. The court reaffirmed the principle that a dying declaration is a weak form of evidence requiring careful scrutiny for physical capacity, absence of prompting, and opportunity to identify the assailant. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Is a dying declaration considered a strong or weak type of evidence in criminal proceedings?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on medical evidence alone if the direct ocular evidence is disbelieved?
  • What are the essential considerations for a court when evaluating the reliability of a dying declaration?
  • Does the presence of interested witnesses during the recording of a dying declaration affect its credibility?
  Read full judgment →
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