Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.
- PKP Exploration Limited and another vs Federal Board of Revenue through its Chairman, etc2021 PCTLR 1526, 2022 [M] CLR 58 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-18Read full judgment →
- Pir Muhammad and others vs Mehmood Khan and others2021 PLJ Quetta 165, 2022 CLC 1646 · Balochistan High Court · 2020-11-05Read full judgment →
- Pir Fazal Rabbani and others vs Ghulam Akbar and others2022 SCMR 703, 2022 PSC 1073 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a civil suit for declaration and specific performance regarding the sale of land. The appellants challenged the concurrent findings of the first appellate court and the High Court, which had decreed the respondents' suit. The core legal question was whether the respondents had sufficiently proven the sale transaction and their entitlement to the land, despite the subsequent cancellation of the relevant mutation by revenue officials. The Supreme Court observed that the respondents produced substantial oral and documentary evidence, including revenue records, confirming the sale transaction and the payment of consideration. The Court noted that the appellants failed to challenge the revenue entries or the possession status of the respondents' predecessor. The Court held that where a sale transaction is proven, consideration is paid, and possession is delivered, a suit for declaration is competent, even if the formal mutation was not finalized by revenue authorities. The Court affirmed the lower courts' findings, emphasizing that the respondents had successfully established their case through evidence, rendering the appeal devoid of merit.
Questions settled- Is a suit for declaration competent when a sale transaction is proven and consideration paid, even if the formal mutation was cancelled by revenue officials?
- Can a court uphold a decree for specific performance when the parties have completed their part of the contract despite the absence of a finalized mutation?
- Does the mere entry of a mutation that is subsequently cancelled confer rights on a respondent if the underlying sale transaction is otherwise proven?
- Pir Bux @ Peeru vs The State2021 SHC 54 · Sindh High Court · 2021-01-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an application for pre-arrest bail filed by the applicants, who were accused of attempting to commit sodomy against two prosecution witnesses. The applicants, having been denied pre-arrest bail by the trial court, approached the High Court under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, contending that they were falsely implicated due to political rivalry and highlighting a seven-day delay in the registration of the FIR. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to pre-arrest bail based on the grounds of malafide and the necessity for further inquiry. The Court held that the significant, unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, coupled with an additional day's delay in recording the statements of the prosecution witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, created reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution's case. Consequently, the Court confirmed the interim pre-arrest bail, establishing the principle that unexplained, substantial delays in criminal reporting and investigation, alongside allegations of political enmity, constitute valid grounds for granting pre-arrest bail on the basis of further inquiry.
Questions settled- Does an unexplained seven-day delay in lodging an FIR constitute a ground for granting pre-arrest bail?
- Can allegations of political rivalry between parties justify the grant of pre-arrest bail?
- Is a delay in recording statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 a relevant factor in bail adjudication?
- Pir Ali Shah through Legal Representatives and others vs Muhammad2021 MLD 1603 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-11Read full judgment →
- Phoenix Arc Pvt. Ltd vs Ketulbhai Ramubhai Patel2021 SCInd 50 · Supreme Court of India · 2021-02-03Read full judgment →
- Pharmacy Council of Pakistan through its President, Pharmacy Council2021 SC AJK 40, 2022 MLD 502 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2021-09-13Read full judgment →
- PESCO, Wapda House through its Chief Executive vs Ishfaq Khan and others2021 PLC 148, 2021 PLJ SC 261, 2021 P SC 810, 2021 SCMR 637, 2021 SCP 68 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, PESCO, challenged a High Court judgment that upheld the Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision granting promotion to respondents against a 5% quota reserved for graduate engineers. The respondents, serving as Upper Technical Subordinates, sought promotion to BPS-17 based on WAPDA policies, whereas PESCO maintained that its own rules designated the quota for direct induction rather than promotion. The core legal questions involved whether a Labour Court possesses the jurisdiction to strike down executive policies or compel a statutory body to adopt the rules of another entity, and whether a claim for promotion constitutes a 'guaranteed right' under industrial relations law. The Supreme Court held that the power to strike down policies or notifications as arbitrary or unconstitutional rests exclusively with the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court clarified that under Section 37(1) of the KPK Industrial Relations Act, 2010, a grievance petition is only maintainable for rights guaranteed by statute, award, or settlement, which does not include a claim for promotion under a policy. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower court's orders.
Questions settled- Does a Labour Court have the jurisdiction to strike down a policy or notification issued by a statutory body?
- Can a statutory body with its own rules be legally compelled to adopt the rules or policies of another separate statutory entity?
- Whether a claim for promotion qualifies as a 'right guaranteed or secured by law' under Section 37(1) of the KPK Industrial Relations Act, 2010?
- Which judicial forum has the exclusive power to strike down an executive order or policy that infringes upon individual rights or violates the Constitution?
- Pervez Laghari vs Mst. Naseema and another2021 YLR 2057 · Sindh High Court · 2020-08-21Read full judgment →
- Pervaiz Khan vs Bahria University2021 PLC 134 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 2020-08-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a former driver for Bahria University, challenged his termination before the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) after his previous writ petition in the High Court was dismissed for lack of maintainability. The core legal questions concerned whether the petition was time-barred and whether the failure to serve a mandatory grievance notice rendered the petition non-maintainable under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The respondent argued that the petition was filed over a year after the cause of action and that the university did not constitute an industry. The NIRC held that the petition was time-barred and non-maintainable. The Commission emphasized that the law of limitation is a statute of repose that must be strictly complied with. It further ruled that mistaken advice of counsel does not automatically constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay without specific, precise justification supported by evidence. Consequently, the petition was dismissed due to the expiration of the limitation period and the failure to serve the mandatory grievance notice required by statute.
Questions settled- Does mistaken advice of counsel automatically constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing a petition?
- Is the service of a grievance notice a mandatory condition precedent for filing a petition under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act 2012?
- Can a petition be maintained when it is filed after the expiry of the statutory limitation period?
- Pervaiz Ahmed Soomro vs P.O Sindh through Secretary Home Dept: &2021 SHC 1304 · Sindh High Court · 2021-12-16Read full judgment →
- Performance Automotive, (Pvt.) Ltd vs Akbar Adamjee & others2021 SCP 236, 2021 CLD 925, 2021 PCTLR 1447, 2021 PSC 1519, 2021 SCMR 1257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld a mandatory injunction directing the delivery of a custom-ordered luxury vehicle. The core legal question was whether specific performance could be granted for the delivery of movable property—specifically a custom-manufactured vehicle—where the petitioner argued the contract was terminated and damages were an adequate remedy. The Supreme Court held that the vehicle, being custom-made with specific color and interior specifications, constituted 'specific or ascertained goods' under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. Consequently, the Court affirmed that Section 58 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 empowers courts to order specific performance for such goods, denying the defendant the option to merely pay damages. The Court further ruled that because the buyer had fulfilled the contract terms and the seller's interest was adequately secured by a bank guarantee for disputed amounts, the lower court's grant of injunctive relief was legally sound and did not warrant interference.
Questions settled- Can specific performance be ordered for the delivery of movable property under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930?
- What constitutes 'specific or ascertained goods' for the purpose of granting specific performance?
- Does the availability of damages as a remedy preclude a court from granting specific performance for specific or ascertained goods?
- Can a court grant a mandatory injunction to secure the delivery of goods subject to a bank guarantee for disputed amounts?
- Pepsi Cola International (Private) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad etc2021 LHC 5626, 2022 PTD 51, PTCL 2023 CL. 60, 2022 PCTLR 1473 · Lahore High Court · 2021-10-13Read full judgment →
- Penta International vs Federation of Pakistan & Others2021 SHC 572 · Sindh High Court · 2021-09-08Read full judgment →
- Peeral Magsi and another vs The State2021 YLR 2412 · Sindh High Court · 2020-06-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence imposed by the trial court for murder and related offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given the existence of a counter-FIR and conflicting evidence regarding the aggressor. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case, noting that the eye-witnesses were interested, unreliable, and contradicted by medical evidence regarding the appellants' own injuries. The Court found the defense's version—that the deceased was killed during an altercation where the complainant party was also armed—to be plausible. Applying the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, the Court disregarded the prosecution's evidence. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the failure to put specific incriminating questions to the accused during their Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 examination precluded reliance on those facts for conviction. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions, extending the benefit of the doubt to the appellants and acquitting them of all charges.
Questions settled- Does the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus apply to criminal cases in Pakistan?
- Can an accused be convicted based on evidence not put to them during their examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Is an accused entitled to acquittal if a single circumstance creates a reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case?
- Must the evidence of interested witnesses be corroborated by independent evidence to sustain a conviction?
- Peer Deedar Ahmed Sarhandi vs The State2021 SHC 590 · Sindh High Court · 2021-10-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arose from a judgment by the Accountability Court convicting the appellant, former divisional head of the vigilance cell of Habib Bank Limited, under Sections 9(a)(iii), (iv) and (vi) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and sentencing him under Section 10(a) of the same Ordinance to 14 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine, following allegations of unauthorized release of impounded vehicles and embezzlement causing a colossal loss to the bank. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant expired. The core legal question was whether an appeal abates entirely upon the death of the appellant or whether it must be decided on merits where financial liabilities and fines affect the estate and legal heirs. The Sindh High Court held that while corporal punishments abate upon the death of a convict, the appeal must be decided on its merits to determine financial liabilities and recovery of fines from the estate devolving upon the legal heirs pursuant to Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Upon reviewing the merits, the court found the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, dismissed the appeal, and upheld the conviction and financial penalty.
Questions settled- Does a criminal appeal abate entirely upon the death of the appellant or must it be decided on merits when financial liabilities are attached to the estate?
- Can a fine imposed upon a convicted person under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 be recovered from the assets devolving upon his legal heirs after his death?
- Whether the unauthorized release of impounded vehicles by a bank official constitutes criminal breach of trust and corrupt practices under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
- Pawan Ajeesh & another vs The State2021 SHC 165 · Select · 2021-01-20Read full judgment →
- Pattoki Sugar Mills Limited vs Federation of Pakistan etcPTCL 2021 CL. 258, 2021 PLJ Lahore 363, 2021 LHC 69, 2021 PTD 587, 2022 [M] · Lahore High Court · 2021-01-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged the validity of a notification issued by the Federal Board of Revenue fixing the value of white crystalline sugar for sales tax purposes. The petitioner contended that the first proviso to Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, under which the notification was issued, was limited in scope to clause (g) regarding retail tax, and thus could not be applied to their supply. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the first proviso to Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, is an exception to the main provision of the section, rather than being confined to clause (g). The Court affirmed that the Board possesses the statutory authority to fix the value of taxable supplies generally. The key principle laid down is that a proviso functions as an exception to the general rule of the main enactment, and its scope must be determined by the legislative intent and the structure of the entire section, confirming the Board's broad power to fix values for taxable supplies.
Questions settled- Whether the first proviso to Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act 1990 is limited in scope to clause (g) or applies to the entire section?
- Does the Federal Board of Revenue have the authority to fix the value of taxable supplies under the first proviso to Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act 1990?
- What is the legal function of a proviso in statutory interpretation?
- Pathan Khan son of Gul Hassan Lolai vs The State2021 SHC 870 · Sindh High Court · 2021-07-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an application for the confirmation of pre-arrest bail in a criminal case involving allegations of attempted murder and other offenses. The core legal question is whether the applicant is entitled to pre-arrest bail despite being nominated in the FIR, particularly where there are discrepancies between the medical report and the prosecution's allegations, and where a pre-existing civil dispute suggests potential mala fide. The Court held that the applicant is entitled to bail, reasoning that the injuries were on non-vital parts and the medical evidence contradicted the prosecution's claim regarding the nature of the weapon and injury, necessitating a trial for determination. The Court emphasized that pre-arrest bail is a check on arbitrary police power and that the right to a fair trial under the Constitution requires courts to assess whether there is sufficient incriminating material to justify arrest, rather than solely requiring proof of mala fide. The principle laid down is that the necessity of arrest must be justified by the investigating officer, and where incriminating material is lacking or the arrest serves no useful purpose, bail should be granted.
Questions settled- Is the existence of a civil dispute between parties a valid consideration for the grant of pre-arrest bail?
- Does the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 require courts to move beyond the strict requirement of proving mala fide for pre-arrest bail?
- Is a police officer's power to arrest under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 permissive or obligatory?
- Can pre-arrest bail be granted when the medical evidence contradicts the prosecution's allegations regarding the nature of the injury?
- Parveen Akhtar and 2 others vs Akhlaq Ahmed and 2 others2021 CLC 1491 · Lahore High Court · 2021-06-15Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Water And Power Development Authority (Wapda), Wapda2022 SCMR 824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, concerning the petitioner's determination as an agent under Section 78 for a non-resident consultant/contractor for assessment years 1991-92, 1992-93, and 1993-94. The petitioner challenged a Commissioner's revisional order, which was non-appealable to the Appellate Tribunal, through a writ petition in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, accepting only the department's argument that the revisional order was not a mere recycling of a previous order. The Supreme Court, while agreeing with the High Court on the 'recycling' point, held that the High Court erred by not considering other legal grounds and questions raised in the writ petition. The Court emphasized that when a non-appealable revisional order is challenged via writ petition, the High Court must apply its mind to all grounds and questions of law presented. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the leave petition into an appeal and remanded the case to the High Court for determination of the remaining grounds, with the 'recycling' issue having attained finality.
Questions settled- Must a High Court consider all legal grounds raised in a writ petition challenging a non-appealable revisional order?
- Can a High Court dismiss a writ petition solely on one ground without addressing other legal questions raised?
- Does a determination by a High Court on a specific ground attain finality if not overturned by a higher court?
- Is a Commissioner's revisional order under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, appealable to the Appellate Tribunal?
- Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Islamabad and 2 others vs Wadero Lal Bux2021 CLC 1609 · Sindh High Court · 2020-12-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This second appeal was filed by the Ministry of Defence challenging the first appellate court's judgment and decree, which had set aside the trial court's dismissal of the respondent's suit for declaration, permanent injunction, and possession of 49-21 acres of land. The respondent claimed ownership by inheritance from his grandfather, asserting that the land was illegally occupied by the military. The appellants contended that the land was cantonment land classified as 'B-4' and owned by the Federal Government. The High Court set aside the first appellate court's judgment for failing to comply with the mandatory provisions of Order XLI, Rule 31 of the CPC. Deciding the case on its merits under Order XLI, Rule 24 of the CPC, the High Court held that the respondent failed to prove his title, as mere entries in revenue records do not establish ownership without a valid title document. Furthermore, since the land was located in a cantonment area, the Cantonment Land Administration Rules applied as special law, overriding general land revenue laws. The suit was also held to be hopelessly time-barred under the Limitation Act.
Questions settled- Whether the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure are mandatory for a first appellate court's judgment?
- Can a High Court decide the entire controversy of a case under Order XLI, Rule 24 of the CPC after setting aside an appellate court's judgment, rather than remanding it?
- Whether general land revenue laws apply to lands situated within cantonment areas governed by the Cantonment Act and Cantonment Land Administration Rules?
- Do simple mutation entries in revenue records establish a legal title to property in the absence of a valid title document?
- Is a court bound to dismiss a suit under Section 3 of the Limitation Act if it is found to be time-barred, even if the question of limitation was not actively agitated by the parties?
- Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd vs Muhammad Samiullah2021 SCP 186, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 1003, 2021 SCMR 998, 2022 PCTLR 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a Peshawar High Court judgment that ordered the reinstatement of a dismissed Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd (PTCL) employee. The respondent, originally hired as a daily-wage lineman in 1992 and regularized in 1998, challenged his dismissal for unauthorized absence via a constitutional petition. The High Court had held that the respondent was a public servant with statutory protection under the Pakistan Telecommunications (Reorganization) Act 1996. The Supreme Court identified two core questions: whether the respondent's employment terms were statutorily protected and whether PTCL constitutes a 'person' under Article 199(5) of the Constitution. The Court held that while PTCL is a 'person' amenable to writ jurisdiction, statutory protection only extends to former T&T Department employees transferred under the 1991 and 1996 Acts. Since the respondent was hired directly by the Corporation/Company on a non-statutory basis, his employment was governed by the principle of master and servant. Consequently, the constitutional petition was not maintainable, and the appropriate remedy lay with Labour Fora. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside.
- Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited vs Pakistan2021 IHC 116 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition challenges orders passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission, which set aside a bonus policy of the petitioner company and directed payment of bonuses in accordance with Standing Order 10-C of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The core legal question was whether a Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA) has the locus standi to initiate proceedings before the Commission regarding individual grievances of workmen concerning rights guaranteed under law, specifically alleging unfair labour practices under Section 31 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The Court held that the Commission lacked jurisdiction because the grievance related to individual rights under the Standing Orders Ordinance, which must be pursued under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, not Section 31. The Court established that a CBA cannot bypass the mandatory individual grievance procedure prescribed by law to enforce rights guaranteed to individual workmen. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside for jurisdictional defects, while the petitioner was held to its voluntary statement withdrawing the contested clauses of its bonus policy.
Questions settled- Does a Collective Bargaining Agent have the authority to initiate proceedings before the National Industrial Relations Commission for individual grievances of workmen?
- Can a grievance regarding the enforcement of rights guaranteed under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 be adjudicated as an unfair labour practice under Section 31 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
- What is the mandatory procedure for a workman to agitate an individual grievance regarding rights guaranteed by law under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
- Does the breach of a statutory provision like Standing Order 10-C of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 automatically constitute an unfair labour practice?
- Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited vs Federation Of Pakistan2021 CLC 159 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged a show-cause notice and a subsequent penalty order issued by a Regional General Manager of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) against the petitioner, a telecommunication company. The petitioner contended that the respondent lacked the jurisdiction to issue the notice or impose the fine, arguing that the authority to initiate penal proceedings under the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, and its associated regulations, had not been validly delegated to the officer in question. The core legal question was whether an officer could exercise penal powers without a specific, written delegation of authority from the PEMRA Authority as required by the statute. The Court held that the impugned notice and order were void ab initio and corum non judice because the respondent failed to produce any general or special order delegating the necessary powers. The Court affirmed the principle that rules and regulations are subservient to the parent statute and that statutory delegation of power must be strictly complied with for an officer to assume jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Can a regulatory officer initiate penal proceedings without a specific, written delegation of power from the parent authority?
- Does a regulation granting penal powers to an officer override the delegation requirements of the parent statute?
- Can a constitutional petition be maintained against a show-cause notice issued by an authority lacking jurisdiction?
- Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited vs Ch. Muhammad Yousaf2021 PLC (C.S.) 989, 2022 [M] CLR 1381 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Intra Court Appeal was filed by the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited challenging a Single Judge's order directing the grant of pensionary benefits to respondent No. 1. The respondent's services were terminated in 1978 under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, following disciplinary action. Prior to this, he had resigned from Pakistan Railways to immediately join the appellant's predecessor department. The core legal questions were whether the respondent's resignation from Pakistan Railways to join the appellant counted as continuous service for pension under Civil Service Regulation No. 418, and whether his subsequent 'termination' for misconduct barred him from receiving pensionary benefits under Section 19(3) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under Regulation 418, resignation to take up another qualifying appointment does not forfeit past service. Furthermore, since 'termination' is not a major penalty listed under Rule 4 of the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, and is distinct from 'dismissal' or 'removal', any ambiguity in the termination order must be strictly construed in favor of the employee.
Questions settled- Does a resignation from one public service appointment to immediately take up another qualifying appointment entail forfeiture of past service under Civil Service Regulation No. 418?
- Whether the term 'termination' used in a disciplinary order can be equated with 'dismissal' or 'removal' from service to deny pensionary benefits under Section 19(3) of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
- How should ambiguities in disciplinary penalty orders using non-statutory terms like 'termination' be interpreted in service law?
- Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited through Chief2021 CLC 965 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-08Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited through Authorized Person2021 PTD 2074 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-11Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Sugar Mills Association and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2021 IHC 294 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
- Pakistan Sugar Mills Association (Psma), Islamabad through Secretary2021 [M] C L R 90, 2021 P C T L R 39, 2021 PLD Islamabad 55 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-08-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellants challenged the constitution of an Inquiry Commission formed to probe sugar price hikes, citing procedural irregularities including the failure to publish notifications in the official gazette until after the report was submitted, the improper initiation of the summary by the Interior Division instead of the Cabinet Division, and the unauthorized addition of a member. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the appeal. While the Court expressed strong disapproval of the government’s disregard for the Rules of Business and statutory requirements, it held that these procedural lapses did not render the Commission’s proceedings coram non judice or void. Relying on the principle that statutory requirements for gazette notification are often directory rather than mandatory in the absence of demonstrated prejudice, the Court ruled that the public interest in investigating an essential commodity crisis outweighed technical procedural defects. The judgment established that while strict adherence to the Rules of Business and statutory notification requirements is expected, administrative negligence does not automatically invalidate an inquiry commission’s findings, particularly when the commission acts in the public interest.
Questions settled- Does the failure to publish a notification in the official gazette until after an inquiry commission submits its report render the proceedings coram non judice?
- Can the Federal Government's failure to strictly adhere to the Rules of Business regarding the moving of a summary by the correct Division be condoned in the exercise of writ jurisdiction?
- Does the Federal Government possess the inherent power to add members to an Inquiry Commission after it has been duly constituted?
- Is the requirement for publishing a notification in the official gazette mandatory or directory when the statute does not explicitly provide consequences for non-compliance?
- Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chairman vs Jan2021 PLD Sindh 241 · Sindh High Court · 2020-06-20Read full judgment →
- Pakistan State Oil Company Limited vs Messrs Jawed Pervaiz Enterprises2021 PLD Sindh 76 · Sindh High Court · 2020-09-30Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Services Limited vs Registrar Trade Unions and others2021 IHC 276 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition filed by Pakistan Services Limited impugned the order dated 30.04.2018 passed by the Registrar Trade Unions dismissing the petitioner's application for the cancellation of the registration of Pearl Continental Hotels National Labour Union and Pearl Continental Hotels Staff Union as industry-wise trade unions. The core legal question was whether the Registrar Trade Unions possessed the jurisdiction to register or cancel the registration of industry-wise trade unions under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, or whether such power exclusively vested in the National Industrial Relations Commission pursuant to the interpretation in Chevron Pakistan Lubricants (Private) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan. The court held that while the power to register and cancel industry-wise trade unions exclusively vests in the National Industrial Relations Commission under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, the prior registrations and orders passed by the Registrar Trade Unions under earlier regulations (such as Regulation 10 of the National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 2016) were not without jurisdiction ab initio, and the rule laid down in Chevron's case applies prospectively rather than retrospectively. The petition was disposed of with the observation that the impugned order would not prejudice the petitioner's pending appeal before the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission.
Questions settled- Does the power to register and cancel industry-wise trade unions exclusively vest in the National Industrial Relations Commission under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
- Do prior registrations of industry-wise trade unions by the Registrar Trade Unions under Regulation 10 of the National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 2016 become unlawful retrospectively after the judgment in Chevron Pakistan Lubricants' case?
- Does the Registrar Trade Union have the jurisdiction to entertain an application for the cancellation of an industry-wise trade union?
- Pakistan Reinsurance Company Limited vs Wafaqi Mohtasib2021 CLC 1075, 2021 SHC 216 · Sindh High Court · 2021-01-16Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Real Estate Investment And Management Company (Pvt.) Limited2021 CLD 518, 2021 CLC 488 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner filed a civil revision petition impugning an order passed by the Civil Court which allowed respondent No. 1's application for an interim injunction, directing the parties to maintain status quo at the project site and restraining the petitioner from encashment of a performance guarantee during pending arbitration proceedings. The core legal questions involved the legality of restraining the encashment of an unconditional performance guarantee and whether a service/construction contract could be negatively enforced by way of an injunction. The Islamabad High Court held that an irrevocable and unconditional performance guarantee operates independently of the underlying contract, and courts cannot interfere with its encashment unless exceptional circumstances like fraud or irretrievable injustice are demonstrated, particularly when the beneficiary is made the sole judge of default. Furthermore, the Court held that a construction contract cannot be specifically enforced under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and consequently, no injunction can be granted to prevent its breach under Section 56(f) of the Act. The High Court laid down the principle that unconditional bank guarantees must be honoured free from judicial interference, and temporary injunctions cannot be granted where the alleged loss is ascertainable and measurable in monetary terms.
Questions settled- Can a court restrain the encashment of an unconditional and irrevocable performance guarantee pending arbitration proceedings?
- Whether a construction or service contract can be specifically enforced or negatively enforced by means of an injunction under the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
- Is a loss that is ascertainable and measurable in terms of money considered an irreparable loss for the grant of a temporary injunction?
- Does the pendency of arbitration proceedings affect the unconditional right of a beneficiary to invoke a performance guarantee where the beneficiary is made the sole and final judge of default?
- Pakistan Oilfields Ltd vs Federation Of Pakistan and others2022 PTD 413, PTCL 2022 CL. 503, 2022 [M] CLR 841, 2022 PCTLR 897 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-11-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns writ petitions challenging show-cause notices issued by tax authorities to the petitioner, an oil exploration company, for further amendment of assessment orders for tax years 2005 and 2006. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner Inland Revenue possesses the authority to issue further notices for amending assessments when the previous assessment orders are already pending adjudication before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue. The court held that while Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, permits the amendment and further amendment of assessment orders, this power is subject to specific statutory limitations. Specifically, the court ruled that under Section 122(5AA), the Commissioner is barred from amending or further amending an assessment order regarding any subject matter currently in dispute before an appellate forum. Consequently, because the previous amendments were under active appeal, the impugned notices were found to be legally unsustainable. The court established the principle that the power to amend assessments is not absolute and is expressly restricted where the subject matter is sub judice before an appellate authority.
Questions settled- Under what circumstances is a writ petition maintainable against a show-cause notice issued by tax authorities?
- Does the Commissioner Inland Revenue have the power to further amend an assessment order if the subject matter is already pending in an appeal?
- What are the statutory limitations on the Commissioner's power to amend or further amend assessment orders under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
- Pakistan Oilfields Limited vs Government Holding (Pvt.) Limited and others2021 CLC 2114 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-05Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Mobile Communication Ltd vs Pakistan / Federation of Pakistan &2021 SHC 576, PTCL 2022 CL. 636 , 2022 PTD 266 · Sindh High Court · 2021-10-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the constitutional validity of the insertion of Serial No. 6A into Table-II of the First Schedule to the Federal Excise Act, 2005, via the Finance Act 2021, which imposed a federal excise duty on telecommunication services. The petitioners challenged this levy, arguing that the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan, specifically the amendment to Entry 49 of the Federal Legislative List, transferred the legislative competence to tax services to the provinces, thereby rendering the federal levy ultra vires. The respondents contended that the federation retained authority under Article 151 and various entries of the Federal Legislative List regarding inter-provincial trade and commerce. The Court held that the 18th Amendment effectively shifted the taxing power regarding the rendering or providing of services to the provinces. Consequently, the Court declared the impugned Entry 6A unconstitutional, ruling that the Federation lacks the legislative competence to impose such duties on services within a province that has already enacted its own sales tax legislation, such as the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011.
Questions settled- Does the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan divest the Federation of the legislative competence to impose excise duty on the rendering of services within a province?
- Can the Federation and a Province simultaneously exercise taxing power over the same taxing event of rendering or providing services?
- Does Article 151 of the Constitution authorize the Federation to levy taxes on services that are not inter-provincial in nature?
- Does the granting of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court against a judgment operate as a stay or suspension of the law declared in that judgment?
- Pakistan Mobile Communication Limited (Mobilink) and others vs Province2021 CLD 629 · Sindh High Court · 2020-12-22Read full judgment →
- Pakistan International Air Lines Corporation vs M/s Malikcrete Enterprises2021 IHC 320 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-09-14Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Engineering Council vs Federation Of Pakistan and others2021 MLD 453 · Lahore High Court · 2020-11-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This intra-court appeal addresses the legality of a 2% quota fixed by the Pakistan Engineering Council for holders of the Diploma of Associate Engineer (DAE) seeking admission to B.Sc. Engineering programs. The core legal questions involved whether the Pakistan Engineering Council acted within its statutory mandate under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976, in imposing the 2% quota and whether DAE holders are entitled to admission on par with F.Sc. students based on equivalence certificates issued by the Inter Board Committee of Chairmen and the Punjab Board of Technical Education. The Lahore High Court held that the Pakistan Engineering Council possesses the exclusive statutory authority to determine admission criteria and minimum qualifications for engineering education, including the regulation of reserved seats. The court ruled that the fixation of a 2% quota is a valid policy decision and does not constitute discrimination or violate Article 25 of the Constitution. The key principles laid down are that specialized statutory regulatory bodies have the final authority to set educational standards and admission quotas for their respective professions, and equivalence certificates granted by general boards do not override specialized professional admission regulations.
Questions settled- Whether the Pakistan Engineering Council is competent under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976, to fix a quota for DAE holders seeking admission to B.Sc. Engineering programs?
- Does an equivalence certificate issued by the Inter Board Committee of Chairmen override the admission criteria and regulations framed by the Pakistan Engineering Council?
- Whether the imposition of a 2% quota for DAE candidates against reserved seats violates the fundamental right to equality under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
- Is the fixation of a specific percentage limit for reserved seats by a professional regulatory body considered a policy decision immune from judicial interference?
- Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority, etc (in all cases). vs Ary2022 SCP 250, 2022 SCMR 1923, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 1577 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-07-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the legality of the appointment process for honorary positions, specifically the Chairperson and Members of the Council of Complaints (COC) under the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA). The core legal question was whether such honorary public offices must be filled through an open, advertised, and competitive process, or if the Government retains the discretion to headhunt candidates without public advertisement. The Supreme Court held that the appointment process for these offices must be transparent and competitive. The Court reasoned that public appointments, even those of an honorary nature, constitute a sacred trust and must adhere to constitutional guarantees of equality and non-discrimination. The Court clarified that while the Government may conduct a headhunt to identify eminent citizens, this process must run in parallel with a public advertisement to ensure a wide and inclusive pool of candidates. The key principle laid down is that constitutional imperatives of equality and transparency require all public appointments to be made through an open and competitive process to ensure meritocracy and public confidence.
Questions settled- Are appointments to honorary public offices required to be made through an open and competitive process?
- Does the constitutional guarantee of equality and non-discrimination apply to honorary public appointments?
- Can the Government conduct a headhunt for public appointments in parallel with a public advertisement process?
- Pakistan Electric Power Company vs Syed Salahuddin and others2022 SCMR 991, 2022 PCTLR 860, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 1107, 2022 PSC 1149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a High Court judgment that allowed a constitutional petition filed by two employees of the Quetta Electric Supply Company (QESCO). The respondents sought promotion to Superintending Engineer (BS-19) with retrospective effect from the date their juniors were promoted, rather than the later date assigned by the Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO) following a conditional performance evaluation. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution and whether the employees were governed by statutory rules. The Court held that QESCO and PEPCO are distinct corporate entities incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, and do not possess statutory service rules. The mere adoption of WAPDA rules for internal use does not confer statutory status upon them. Consequently, the relationship between the parties is governed by the principle of 'master and servant,' precluding the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction. The Court further found no evidence of malice in the Selection Board's decision to impose performance-based conditions on promotions. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside.
- Pakistan Broadcasters Association vs Federation of Pakistan & another2021 SHC 496 · Sindh High Court · 2021-08-13Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Beverage Ltd & Ors vs Fed. of Pakistan & Ors2021 SHC 470 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Pakistan Battery MFG Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Muhammad Fahad2021 CLC 1021 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-09Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Association of Private Medical & Dental Institutes vs Federation of Pakistan & others2021 SHC 180 · Sindh High Court · 2021-01-19Read full judgment →
- Pakistan Airline Pilots' Association through Honorary General Secretary and 4 others vs Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary for Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and another2021 PLC (C.S.) 860 · Sindh High Court · 2020-07-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a civil suit for declaration and injunction filed by the Pakistan Airline Pilots' Association (PALPA) and individual pilots challenging a notification issued by the Ministry of Interior under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 declaring employment in Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) to be an essential service, and challenging a notice issued by PIA de-recognizing PALPA as a representative body and terminating their working agreement. PIA filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 to stay the suit proceedings and refer the dispute to arbitration. The Sindh High Court held that the notification under the 1952 Act was validly issued with proper formation of opinion by the Federal Government, and that the dispute regarding the termination of the working agreement fell squarely within the arbitration clause of the agreement. The Court further held that service contracts and determinable agreements cannot be specifically enforced under the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and that the interim relief sought under Section 41 of the Arbitration Act was not maintainable in an ordinary civil suit. Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' injunction application and allowed PIA's application under Section 34, staying the suit proceedings.
Questions settled- Whether the Federal Government has the authority under Section 3 of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 to declare employment in PIA as an essential service?
- Does a dispute regarding the termination of a working agreement containing an arbitration clause fall within the scope of 'all disputes' for referral to arbitration?
- Can a contract of employment or working agreement without a termination clause be terminated by a party?
- Whether an interim injunction or protective order under Section 41 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 can be granted in an ordinary civil suit where no arbitration proceedings are independently pending under Section 20?
- Does registration of an association under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 confer a statutory right to act as a Collective Bargaining Agent or representative body for negotiating service conditions?
- Pakistan Airline Pilots Association through Honorary General Secretary and 4 others vs Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary for Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and another2021 MLD 1059 · Sindh High Court · 2020-07-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The plaintiffs, an association of pilots (PALPA) and individual pilots, filed a suit challenging a government notification declaring employment in Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) an essential service under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, and a notice by PIA terminating their Working Agreement. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the government notification and the arbitrability of the dispute regarding the agreement's termination. The court held that the government's notification was validly issued under the 1952 Act, as the government had formed the requisite opinion regarding essential services. Regarding the termination of the Working Agreement, the court ruled that the dispute was arbitrable under the agreement's arbitration clause. Furthermore, the court held that it could not exercise jurisdiction under Section 41 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, to grant interim relief in an ordinary civil suit where no arbitration proceeding was pending. The court affirmed that contracts lacking a termination clause are not perpetual but are determinable in nature. Consequently, the suit was stayed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
Questions settled- Can a government notification declaring employment as an essential service be challenged if the government has formed the requisite opinion?
- Is a dispute regarding the termination of a working agreement arbitrable if the agreement contains an arbitration clause?
- Can a court grant interim relief under Section 41 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, in an ordinary civil suit where no arbitration proceeding is pending?
- Does the absence of a termination clause in a contract render it perpetual or determinable?
- Parkash Lal vs Deputy Collector of Customs & others2021 SHC 1117, 2022 PTD 1506 · Sindh High Court · 2021-09-20Read full judgment →
- Pardeep Kumar and 17 others vs Den-I, Pakistan Railway, Sukkur and 52021 CLC 1771 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-11Read full judgment →
- Pak Qatar Family Takaful Ltd vs President of Pakistan & 02 others2021 IHC 102 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-10Read full judgment →
- Pak Gulf Construction (Pvt.) Limited, The Centaurus Mall, Islamabad vs Capital Development Authority through Chairman, Islamabad and others2021 SCMR 600 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-12-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon proceedings concerning civic administration, environmental management, and infrastructure development within the Islamabad Capital Territory, with the Chairman of the Capital Development Authority (CDA) in attendance to brief the Court. The core legal questions involve the execution of municipal duties by the CDA and the Municipal Corporation, Islamabad regarding urban sanitation, sewerage treatment, tree plantation, traffic management, and the resolution of parking and encroachment issues. The Court evaluated the steps taken by the CDA to operationalize sewerage treatment plants, enforce rules regarding parking areas and nurseries, remove encroachments, and construct pedestrian bridges and interchanges. The holding of the Court directs the relevant authorities to ensure the timely notification of necessary municipal rules and monitor ongoing urban improvement projects. The key principle laid down is that statutory bodies must proactively discharge their public duties concerning environmental preservation, urban sanitation, and civic amenities within their territorial jurisdiction.
Questions settled- What steps are required to be taken by the Capital Development Authority regarding the operation and capacity utilization of sewerage treatment plants in Islamabad?
- How does the Capital Development Authority propose to address the issue of parking congestion and parking on service lanes and roads?
- What measures are mandated for the protection, plantation, and maintenance of trees and green areas within the Islamabad Capital Territory?
- Pak Gulf Construction (Pvt) Limited, the Centaurus Mall, Islamabad vs Capital Development Authority through its Chairman, Islamabad and others2021 P T C L R 763, 2021 SCMR 600, 2021 SCP 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-12-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the ongoing judicial oversight of civic management and infrastructure development in the Islamabad Capital Territory, specifically regarding the performance of the Capital Development Authority (CDA). The core legal question involves ensuring the CDA’s compliance with judicial directives aimed at improving urban sanitation, environmental sustainability, and public convenience. The Court’s holding mandates the CDA to expedite the operationalization of sewerage treatment plants, enforce tree plantation drives, and address unauthorized encroachments in green areas. Furthermore, the Court directs the CDA to resolve parking crises on service lanes through expert consultation and to improve public infrastructure, including the installation of pedestrian bridges and public toilets. The key principle laid down is the affirmative obligation of municipal and development authorities to proactively manage urban resources, ensure the functional efficiency of public utilities, and maintain environmental standards in accordance with their statutory mandates. The Court continues to monitor these administrative actions to ensure the systematic improvement of living conditions and traffic management within the capital city.
Questions settled- What measures is the Capital Development Authority required to implement to improve sewerage treatment and water purification in Islamabad?
- How must the Capital Development Authority address the issue of unauthorized parking on service lanes and the lack of adequate parking facilities?
- What is the mandate of the Capital Development Authority regarding the preservation of green areas and the implementation of tree plantation drives in the capital?
- Pak Airlift Aviation Services vs Gulf Air B.S.C. & another2021 SHC 464 · Sindh High Court · 2021-01-20Read full judgment →
- Pak Airlift Aviation Services Attorney vs Gulf Air B.S.C.(C) and another2021 CLC 2080 · Sindh High Court · 2021-01-11Read full judgment →
- Pahal Khan (Deceased) through L.Rs vs Muhammad Iqbal (Deceased)2021 CLC 1668 · Lahore High Court · 2021-05-27Read full judgment →
- Pacha Khan vs The State etc2021 LHC 8008, 2022 PCr. LJ 833, PLJ 2022 Cr.C. 913 · Lahore High Court · 2021-12-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 and sentenced to life imprisonment for the alleged recovery of fifteen kilograms of heroin. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the prosecution evidence, the same officer acting as complainant and investigating officer, and the evidentiary value of the Chemical Examiner's report when not prepared on the prescribed form or original paper. The Lahore High Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, holding that a Chemical Examiner's report that fails to comply with the prescribed manner and format under Section 36 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 does not qualify as a conclusive proof of recovery and cannot be safely relied upon. The court laid down the principle that mandatory statutory requirements governing expert reports in narcotics cases must be strictly observed, and fatal flaws in the chemical analysis report or investigation vitiate the conviction.
Questions settled- Whether a Chemical Examiner's report not prepared in the prescribed manner qualifies as conclusive proof under Section 36 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
- Can a conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 be sustained when the chemical analysis report suffers from material defects and lack of original formatting?
- What is the evidentiary value of a Chemical Examiner's report that fails to state the percentage of morphine or specific characteristics of the analyzed substance?
- P.E.C.H., Society Limited through Assistant Administrative Officer vs Habib-2021 CLC 2011 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-26Read full judgment →
- Oxford University Press, Peshawar vs Inayat-Ur-Rehman and others2021 SCMR 321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from the High Court's decision to quash criminal proceedings against the respondents, who were accused of copyright infringement under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962. The High Court had held that the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) lacked jurisdiction to investigate these offences, as no nexus existed between the alleged violation and Federal Government affairs. The Supreme Court examined the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974, noting that Entry No. 26 of its Schedule explicitly empowers the FIA to investigate offences under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by effectively striking down or ignoring valid statutory provisions and a valid S.R.O. while exercising limited criminal jurisdiction. The Court determined that the validity of the Act and its Schedule could not be adjudicated in such proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, granting the respondents liberty to challenge the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974, through appropriate constitutional writ proceedings if they wished to contest the FIA's investigative authority.
Questions settled- Can the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, strike down or ignore the validity of a statute or its schedule?
- Does the Federal Investigation Agency have the legal competence to investigate offences under the Copyright Ordinance 1962?
- Is a criminal proceeding under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 the appropriate forum to challenge the constitutionality of the Federal Investigation Agency Act 1974?
- Overseas Pakistanis Foundation vs Messrs Joint Management (Pvt.)2021 CLC 1689 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-15Read full judgment →
- Orix Leasing Pakistan Ltd vs M/s. Muhammad Noor Dairies & 3 others2021 LHC 1980 · Lahore High Court · 2021-06-15Read full judgment →
- Orient Power Company (Private) Limited through its authorized officer vs Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited through its Managing Director2021 SCP 318 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a High Court judgment recognizing and enforcing a foreign arbitral award between a power company and a gas supplier. The core legal questions concerned whether an arbitration clause in a Gas Supply Agreement (GSA) extended to a subsequent Payment Agreement, whether 'Take or Pay' clauses constituted penalties under Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872, and whether the arbitral award violated public policy or resulted in unjust enrichment. The Supreme Court held that the Payment Agreement and GSA formed an 'indivisible whole,' thereby extending the arbitration clause to the Payment Agreement. The Court further held that 'Take or Pay' clauses create primary obligations to pay for services made available, rather than secondary obligations triggered by breach, thus falling outside the scope of Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the arbitral award did not constitute unjust enrichment nor violate public policy. The principle laid down is that 'Take or Pay' provisions in commercial contracts are valid, enforceable debt obligations, and courts should adopt a restrictive, pro-enforcement approach to foreign arbitral awards.
Questions settled- Does an arbitration clause in a main contract extend to a subsequent, inter-dependent agreement between the same parties?
- Are 'Take or Pay' clauses in commercial contracts considered penalty provisions under Section 74 of the Contract Act 1872?
- Can a party challenge the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award on the grounds of unjust enrichment?
- What is the scope of the public policy exception under the New York Convention for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards?
- Orient Power Company (Private) Limited through Authorized Officer vs Sui2021 PCTLR 1314, 2021 SCMR 1728, 2021 CLD 1069, 2022 PSC 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-08-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order recognizing and enforcing a foreign arbitral award concerning disputes between Orient Power Company (Appellant) and Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (Respondent) arising from a Gas Supply Agreement (GSA) and a subsequent Payment Agreement. The core legal questions involved the incorporation of an arbitration clause from the GSA into the Payment Agreement, the applicability of Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872 to 'Take or Pay' clauses, and whether the award violated public policy or amounted to unjust enrichment under the New York Convention. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the GSA and Payment Agreement formed an 'indivisible whole,' thus the GSA's arbitration clause extended to the Payment Agreement. It clarified that 'Take or Pay' clauses are primary obligations, not penalties, and therefore Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872 was not attracted. The Court also found no unjust enrichment and emphasized a restrictive interpretation of the public policy exception under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, stating that a mere disagreement with the quantum of an award does not constitute a public policy violation.
- Opto Circuit India Ltd vs Axis Bank & Ors2021 SCInd 48 · Supreme Court of India · 2021-02-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant challenged an order of the High Court of Karnataka which upheld the freezing of its bank accounts by the Directorate of Enforcement under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). The Supreme Court limited its review to whether the freezing of the bank accounts complied with the due process of law. The Court observed that while the authorities possessed the power to freeze accounts containing alleged proceeds of crime, such power under Section 17 of the PMLA is circumscribed by strict statutory procedures, including recording reasons in writing and forwarding them to the Adjudicating Authority. The Court rejected the respondent's argument that the power could alternatively be traced to Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, holding that when a special enactment provides a specific procedure, it must be followed to the exclusion of general law. Consequently, the Court quashed the freezing order for non-compliance with statutory safeguards, directing the banks to defreeze the accounts to facilitate the payment of statutory dues, while reserving liberty to the authorities to initiate fresh action in accordance with law.
Questions settled- Whether the power to freeze a bank account under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 must strictly comply with the procedural safeguards prescribed under Section 17 of the Act?
- Can an authority resort to the general power of seizure under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when a specific procedure is provided under a special enactment like the PMLA?
- Can an invalid statutory order be validated subsequently by supplementing fresh reasons in an affidavit before the court?
- Omer Waqas Qureshi and another vs Additional Sessions Judge, Islamabad East and 2 others2021 P Cr. L J 1265 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-10-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition impugned an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge acting as Ex-officio Justice of Peace, whereby an application under sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for registration of a first information report regarding alleged forgery and fraudulent transfer of a commercial plot was disposed of with directions for forensic analysis of documents prior to FIR registration. The core legal question was whether the Ex-officio Justice of Peace could legally issue directions contrary to or without evaluating a solicited police report that concluded no cognizable offence was made out and that the disputed property transfer had already been revoked. The Islamabad High Court held that while powers of the Ex-officio Justice of Peace are quasi-judicial, once a police report is requisitioned, it cannot be ignored or brushed aside without assigning tangible reasons. The Court laid down the principle that discarding a police report without analysis or explicit reasoning renders the order legally unsustainable, particularly when the underlying grievance has been resolved by revocation of the disputed transfer.
Questions settled- Whether an Ex-officio Justice of Peace is required to provide tangible reasons when passing an order contrary to a solicited police report?
- Can an Ex-officio Justice of Peace ignore or fail to evaluate a police report requisitioned during the proceedings on an application under sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Are the functions performed by an Ex-officio Justice of Peace under section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 executive, administrative, or quasi-judicial in nature?
- Omer Flour Mills vs Government Of Punjab and othersPTCL 2021 CL. 640, 2021 PTD 275 · Lahore High Court · 2020-11-16Read full judgment →
- Olx Classifieds Pakistan Against Pak Wheels Pvt.) Limited_ In the matter of vs N_a2021 CLD 1204 · Competition Commission of Pakistan · 2021-01-26Read full judgment →
- Oleo Corp. Pvt Ltd vs Fed. of Pakistan & Ors2021 SHC 107 · Sindh High Court · 2021-01-19Read full judgment →
- Oil and Gas Oil And Gas Development Company Limited, Ogdcl, Islamabad2021 PTD 1124 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-21Read full judgment →
- Oil And Gas Development Company Limited vs Admore Gas (Pvt.) Limited2021 CLC 1465, 2022 [M] CLR 696, 2022 PCTLR 764 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-25Read full judgment →
- N/A vs N/A2021 SHC 932 · Sindh High Court · 2021-10-29Read full judgment →
- Nusrat Jan vs The State and another2021 P SC (Crl.) 233 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2020-03-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the murder of her husband by administering poison. The core legal questions involved whether a conviction based on circumstantial evidence and a retracted confessional statement can be sustained in a murder-by-poisoning case, and whether failure to prove the direct purchase or possession of poison is fatal to the prosecution. The Supreme Court held that the chain of circumstantial evidence, corroborated by the medical evidence, the testimony of the deceased's children, and the appellant's conduct and confessional statement, sufficiently established guilt. The Court ruled that proving the physical purchase or possession of poison by the accused is not an absolute sine qua non for conviction in poisoning cases, provided the totality of circumstances points unerringly to the accused. Consequently, the Court maintained the conviction but reduced the sentence of life imprisonment to the period already undergone in view of mitigating circumstances.
Questions settled- Whether the prosecution must invariably prove the physical purchase and possession of poison by the accused to secure a conviction for murder by poisoning?
- Can a retracted confessional statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be relied upon for recording a conviction when corroborated by other reliable evidence?
- Whether an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR in a circumstantial murder case is fatal to the prosecution or can be considered as a mitigating factor in sentencing?
- Whether the testimony of the children of the deceased regarding the last moments and symptoms of the deceased can be treated as reliable corroborative evidence against a parent accused?
- Nozo vs The State2021 P Cr. L J 1729 · Balochistan High Court · 2021-02-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, for the alleged possession of an Improvised Explosive Device. The core legal questions concern the reliability of the prosecution's evidence regarding the recovery and chain of custody of the explosive material, and whether the trial was legally competent in the absence of the mandatory sanction for prosecution required by law. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to significant procedural lapses, including an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, failure to seal the recovered material at the spot, and an eighteen-day delay in transmitting samples to the forensic laboratory, which shattered the chain of custody. Furthermore, the Court held that the mandatory requirement for prior sanction for prosecution was not satisfied, rendering the trial proceedings void. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that the prosecution bears the burden of proving its case without doubt, and any failure to establish the chain of custody or obtain mandatory statutory sanctions entitles the accused to an acquittal.
Questions settled- Does the failure to seal recovered explosive material at the place of occurrence render the prosecution case doubtful?
- Is the prior sanction for prosecution mandatory for a trial under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908?
- Does an unexplained delay in transmitting forensic samples to a laboratory break the chain of custody?
- Can a trial proceed under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, if the mandatory sanction for prosecution was neither sought nor granted?
- Nosheen Naz, etc vs The State etc2021 IHC 98 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a post-arrest bail petition filed by three accused persons, Nosheen Naz, Sikandar Waseem, and Mohsin Waseem, who had previously been denied bail by the court of first instance. The petitioners sought bail before the High Court on the fresh ground that they were declared innocent following a statement recorded by the alleged abductee under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The High Court declined to entertain the petition on its merits. The Court held that, as a matter of judicial propriety, when a fresh ground for bail arises, the petitioners must first approach the court of first instance rather than the High Court. The Court reasoned that commenting on the merits of the new evidence at this stage could prejudice the case of either party. Consequently, the petition was disposed of with the direction that the petitioners should move the trial court to consider the fresh ground.
Questions settled- Should a bail petition based on a fresh ground be filed directly in the High Court or the court of first instance?
- Does a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute a valid fresh ground for seeking bail?
- Nosheeba Nazeer vs Sajjad Ahmed and 2 others2021 CLC 704, 2021 PLJ Lahore 25, 2021 LHC 18 · Lahore High Court · 2021-01-11Read full judgment →
- Noor-Ul-Haq etc vs State through A.A.G. and anotherPLJ 2021 Cr.C. 1618, 2022 YLR 537 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-09-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the convictions and sentences of two appellants, Noor-ul-Haq and Zakir Ullah, for the murder of Mst. Hajira Bibi. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given that all eyewitnesses resiled from their statements and the circumstantial evidence was weak. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to discharge its initial burden of proof. The court found that the forensic evidence (matching a pistol to a crime empty) was unreliable because the empty shell was not sent to the laboratory promptly, but was held by the police pending the recovery of the weapon. Furthermore, the court clarified that while the death of a vulnerable person in the accused's house shifts some onus to the accused to explain the circumstances, this does not shift the entire burden of proof or allow for conviction based on suspicion alone when the prosecution's own case is unproven. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions and acquitted both appellants, extending them the benefit of the doubt.
Questions settled- Does the failure to immediately send a crime empty to a forensic laboratory vitiate the evidentiary value of a subsequent matching report?
- Does the death of a vulnerable person in the accused's house shift the entire burden of proof to the accused?
- Can an accused be convicted solely on the basis of suspicion when the prosecution's eyewitnesses have resiled from their statements?
- Noor Ud Din and 4 others vs The Secretary Board Of Revenue Department2021 PLD Balochistan 5 · Balochistan High Court · 2020-09-16Read full judgment →
- Noor Sultan and others vs The State and others2021 P SC (Crl.) 521, 2021 SCMR 176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail in a case involving house trespass, murder, and multiple injuries. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners, acting in furtherance of a common object, entered the complainant's residence and attacked the inmates with conventional weapons, resulting in one death and four injuries. The petitioners argued that they were falsely implicated, that the use of conventional weapons reduced the gravity of the offense, and that the investigation was complete. The Supreme Court observed that the prompt reporting of the FIR minimized the risk of deliberation and noted that the occurrence took place inside the complainant's home. The Court held that since the trial had already commenced and prosecution witnesses were being recorded, it would be inappropriate to intervene or comment on the merits of the case as it might prejudice the trial. The Court reaffirmed the principle that it does not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of lower courts in bail matters once a trial is underway.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its discretion to grant bail when the trial has already commenced and witnesses are being recorded?
- Does the use of conventional weapons like a Sota or hatchet automatically reduce the gravity of an offense for the purpose of bail in a murder case?
- Can the promptness of an FIR be used as a factor to negate the plea of consultation or deliberation at the bail stage?
- Is it appropriate for an appellate court to determine individual liability in a case of common object while the trial is pending?
- Noor Shah vs The State2021 SHC 56 · Sindh High Court · 2021-01-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, Noor Shah, through Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, after being refused bail by the Special Judge (Narcotic) Shaheed Benazir Abad. The applicant was arrested with an alleged recovery of 2000 grams of charas and an unlicensed pistol. The core legal question revolves around whether the applicant is entitled to post-arrest bail on the ground of further inquiry considering the lack of independent witnesses, delay in chemical examination, prior alleged illegal custody, and statutory delay in the trial. The Sindh High Court held that the absence of independent witnesses, delayed chemical examination, prior custody, lack of apprehension of tampering, and prolonged incarceration without effective trial progress make out a case for further inquiry. The court laid down the principle that where circumstances like delayed chemical analysis, lack of independent corroboration, and prolonged custody without trial progress exist, bail should be granted on the basis of further inquiry.
Questions settled- Whether the absence of independent witnesses and delay in chemical examination of narcotics justify post-arrest bail on the ground of further inquiry?
- Does prolonged incarceration without effective progress in trial entitle an accused to bail in narcotics cases?
- Whether prior alleged illegal confinement by police is a relevant factor when considering a post-arrest bail application?
- Noor Shah vs State and anotherPLJ 2021 Cr.C. 1420 · Lahore High Court · 2021-03-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sought post-arrest bail for the petitioner in a case registered under Sections 377 and 367-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner and a co-accused kidnapped the victim, after which the co-accused committed carnal intercourse against the order of nature while the petitioner held the victim's hands. The Lahore High Court noted that the substantive act of carnal intercourse was attributed exclusively to the co-accused. The medical examination revealed no bruises or marks of injury on the victim's hands, and the victim omitted the petitioner's name and role when narrating the history of the occurrence to the examining doctor. Holding that the question of vicarious liability and the petitioner's role required deeper assessment through evidence at trial, the Court determined the case to be one of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the High Court admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail.
Questions settled- Does the omission of an accused's name by the victim when narrating the brief history of an occurrence to a medical officer make the case one of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Whether an absence of physical marks or injuries on a victim's hands creates grounds for further inquiry regarding an accused allegedly assigned the role of catching hold of the victim?
- Is mere involvement in a heinous offence a sufficient ground by itself to refuse post-arrest bail where the accused is otherwise entitled to it under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Noor Muhammad vs Province of Sindh and 02 others2021 SHC 826 · Sindh High Court · 2021-03-10Read full judgment →
- Noor Muhammad vs Additional Sessions Judge (GBV Court), Islamabad2021 P Cr. L J 904 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition impugned the orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge dismissing the petitioner's application for transfer of the case to the Sessions Court and the deletion of an offence under Section 377-B of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether a trial court can delete a charge or decline to add an offence recommended during investigation without a speaking order, without hearing the prosecution and complainant, and without assigning reasons. The Islamabad High Court held that orders deleting charges or deciding controversies must be speaking orders containing proper reasoning, and that failing to afford a hearing violates principles of natural justice and fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Court set aside the impugned orders and directed the trial court to decide the matter afresh through a speaking order after hearing all concerned parties, while noting the trial court's statutory competence under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to alter or add to charges at any stage before judgment.
Questions settled- Whether a trial court can delete an offence from a charge sheet without providing a speaking order and without hearing the prosecution and the complainant?
- Is an order deleting a charge or deciding a controversy in its entirety required to contain detailed reasons?
- Can a trial court alter or add to any charge at any time before the judgment is pronounced under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Do orders that are sketchy and devoid of reasons violate the principles of natural justice and fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Noor Muhammad Khan vs The State, etc2021 PHC 174 · Peshawar High Court · 2021-04-14Read full judgment →
- Noor Muhammad Khan vs The State and another2022 MLD 101 · Lahore High Court · 2021-07-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Lahore High Court through a petition filed under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, wherein the petitioner, Noor Muhammad Khan, seeks post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 195 dated 05.12.2010 registered under Sections 302, 324, 109, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Pai Khel, District Mianwali. The core legal question involves determining whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail given his nomination in a promptly lodged FIR with specific firearm imputations, corroborating medical evidence, recovery of the weapon of offence on his pointation, and his status as a fugitive from law for approximately ten years. The court holds that sufficient incriminating material connects the petitioner to the capital offence, and his case falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that an accused who is nominated in a prompt FIR with specific roles, supported by recovery and medical evidence, and who has remained a fugitive from law for a prolonged period, is not entitled to the concession of post-arrest bail.
Questions settled- Whether an accused nominated in a prompt FIR with specific firearm imputations is entitled to post-arrest bail?
- Does the prolonged status of an accused as a fugitive from law disentitle him to the grant of post-arrest bail?
- Whether recovery of the weapon of offence on the pointation of the accused constitutes sufficient incriminating material to deny bail?
- Noor Muhammad Khan through Legal Heirs vs The State and others2021 P Cr. L J 1758 · Peshawar High Court · 2021-04-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of the respondent in a murder case registered under sections 302/324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the trial court's acquittal was based on sound reasoning and whether the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the acquittal was justified. The court found significant material contradictions between the ocular account and the medical evidence, noting that the seat of injuries did not align with the prosecution's version of the incident. Furthermore, the court held that the prosecution failed to establish the safe custody of forensic evidence, specifically the recovered empties, rendering them unreliable. Additionally, the prosecution failed to substantiate the alleged motive. The court reaffirmed the principle that in an appeal against acquittal, the accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence, and where medical evidence conflicts with ocular testimony, the former prevails. Ultimately, the court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, necessitating the dismissal of the appeal.
Questions settled- Does medical evidence prevail when it conflicts with the ocular account of a crime?
- What is the effect of the prosecution's failure to prove an alleged motive on the overall case?
- Can forensic evidence be relied upon if the prosecution fails to establish its safe custody and chain of transmission?
- What is the standard of review for an appellate court when hearing an appeal against an acquittal?
- Noor Khan vs The State2021 KLR Criminal Cases 224, PLJ 2021 Cr.C. (FSC) 225, 2021 MLD 860 · Federal Shariat Court · 2020-12-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Federal Shariat Court on a preliminary hearing regarding the competence of an appeal filed against a conviction and sentence of death recorded by an Anti-Terrorism Court. The core legal question is whether an appeal against a final judgment of an Anti-Terrorism Court lies before the Federal Shariat Court or the High Court. The Court held that the appeal is not competent before the Federal Shariat Court because, under Section 25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, appeals against Anti-Terrorism Court judgments lie exclusively to the High Court. The Court laid down the principle that the Anti-Terrorism Act is a special law with an overriding effect, and where the principal offence is tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court, ancillary offences committed in the same series of acts are also triable and appealable under the framework of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Consequently, the Court ordered the case to be transferred to the High Court of Sindh.
Questions settled- Does an appeal against a final judgment of an Anti-Terrorism Court lie before the Federal Shariat Court or the High Court?
- Does the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 have an overriding effect as a special law?
- Are offences connected in the same series of acts triable and appealable under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
- Noor Khan vs StatePLJ 2021 Cr.C. (FSC) 225 · Federal Shariat Court · 2020-12-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the competency of an appeal filed before the Federal Shariat Court against a judgment rendered by an Anti-Terrorism Court. The appellant challenged a conviction and sentence, but the Court was confronted with the issue of whether it possessed the appellate jurisdiction to hear the matter, given that the conviction originated from an Anti-Terrorism Court. The Court examined the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, specifically Section 25, which mandates that appeals against final judgments of an Anti-Terrorism Court lie exclusively to a High Court. The Court held that the appeal was not competent before the Federal Shariat Court. It reasoned that the Anti-Terrorism Act is a special law with an overriding effect. Furthermore, the Court clarified that even where ancillary offences under the Pakistan Penal Code are involved, they remain triable by the Anti-Terrorism Court alongside scheduled offences, and appellate jurisdiction remains governed by the special statute. Consequently, the Court ordered the transfer of the appeal to the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court at Hyderabad, for adjudication.
Questions settled- Does an appeal against a final judgment of an Anti-Terrorism Court lie before the Federal Shariat Court?
- Does the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 have an overriding effect over other laws regarding appellate jurisdiction?
- Are offences under the Pakistan Penal Code tried alongside scheduled offences by an Anti-Terrorism Court subject to the appellate forum prescribed by the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
- Noor Elahi vs StatePLJ 2021 Cr.C. 1413, 2021 YLR 2430 · Lahore High Court · 2021-06-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant challenged his conviction and death sentence under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, arising from the recovery of 46.800 kilograms of heroin concealed in stones within a consignment booked for export. The Lahore High Court examined the evidence, noting that prosecution witnesses from the Anti-Narcotic Force remained consistent, consignment documents directly linked the appellant's firm, and the Chemical Examiner's report was positive. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecution successfully proved the charge and whether the death sentence was warranted. The Court held that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, maintaining the conviction. However, regarding the sentence, the Court held that the appellant's lack of previous criminal history constituted an extenuating circumstance justifying a lesser sentence. Consequently, the death sentence was altered to imprisonment for life, while the conviction, fine, and default sentence were upheld.
Questions settled- Whether the prosecution successfully proved the recovery of heroin and the appellant's connection to the export consignment under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
- Can a lack of previous criminal history serve as an extenuating circumstance to justify the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life in narcotics cases?
- Whether the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, can be extended upon the commutation of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
- Noor Bahar, etc vs The State2021 KLR Criminal Cases 183 · Peshawar High Court · 2021-04-09Read full judgment →
- Noor Bahar etc vs The State2021 PHC 82 · Peshawar High Court · 2021-04-09Read full judgment →
- Noor Aslam vs The State through P.G. and another2021 P SC (Crl.) 842 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged the Peshawar High Court's order cancelling the petitioner's bail in a case involving a murderous assault. The petitioner had been granted bail by an Additional Sessions Judge, but the High Court subsequently recalled this concession. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the trial court's discretionary order granting bail. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the trial court erred by ignoring the petitioner's prolonged abscondence and the severity of the injuries sustained by the victim, which prima facie attracted the provisions of Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court affirmed that while the grant of bail is a discretionary relief, such discretion must be structured on sound judicial considerations objectively deducible from the record. Specifically, in cases punishable with imprisonment of ten years or more, the disregard of these judicial considerations constitutes a strong ground for the cancellation of bail by a superior court, justifying interference with the initial order.
Questions settled- Can a superior court interfere with the discretionary grant of bail by a trial court if the trial court failed to consider relevant judicial factors?
- Does the prolonged abscondence of an accused constitute a relevant factor for the cancellation of bail?
- Is the disregard of sound judicial considerations in granting bail a sufficient ground for a High Court to cancel that bail?
- Noor Ali vs The State2021 SHC 170 · Sindh High Court · 2021-01-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an application for pre-arrest bail filed by the applicants, who were accused of forming an unlawful assembly and causing injuries to the complainant and a witness with various weapons, allegedly with the intent to commit murder. The applicants, having been refused pre-arrest bail by the Additional Sessions Judge, sought relief from the High Court under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to pre-arrest bail given the circumstances of the case. The Court held that the applicants were entitled to pre-arrest bail, confirming the interim bail previously granted. The ratio of the decision rests on the significant delay of 41 days in lodging the FIR, the police investigation finding several applicants innocent, and the existence of a prior dispute over landed property between the parties. The Court emphasized that such factors, particularly the unexplained delay and the findings of innocence by the investigating agency, warrant the grant of pre-arrest bail pending trial.
Questions settled- Does a significant delay in lodging an FIR justify the grant of pre-arrest bail?
- Can the findings of innocence by the police during investigation be a ground for confirming pre-arrest bail?
- Is pre-arrest bail appropriate when there is a pre-existing dispute over landed property between the parties?
- Noor Ahmed and others vs Gul Ahmed and others2021 YLR 1867 · Balochistan High Court · 2020-09-29Read full judgment →
- Noman Ali Bhatti vs Government of Sindh & 02 others2021 SHC 832, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1118 · Sindh High Court · 2021-03-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged the refusal of the Sindh Education Foundation (SEF) to extend the petitioner's contractual employment and his subsequent non-regularization. The petitioner, a contractual employee whose contract expired on June 30, 2018, sought reinstatement and regularization, arguing that his arrest in a NAB reference should not have precluded his continued service. The core legal question was whether a contractual employee possesses a vested right to service extension or regularization under the Sindh (Regularization of Ad-hoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013, and whether the non-renewal of such a contract without a hearing violates principles of natural justice. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the relationship between the parties is governed by the principle of master and servant. It ruled that a contractual employee has no vested right to extension or regularization once the contract period expires. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that it lacks appellate jurisdiction to interfere with administrative policy decisions regarding employment, and that the requirement of a hearing does not apply to the non-renewal of a temporary, expired contract.
Questions settled- Does a contractual employee have a vested right to the extension of their service contract upon its expiry?
- Can a court in writ jurisdiction interfere with the non-renewal of a contractual employee's service?
- Does the principle of natural justice require a hearing before the non-renewal of a temporary or contractual employment contract?
- Does Section 3 of the Sindh (Regularization of Ad-hoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013, grant an automatic right of regularization to all contractual employees regardless of contract expiry?
- Nizam-Ud-Din vs The State2022 YLR 828 · Sindh High Court · 2020-04-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant Nizam-ud-Din seeking bail in Crime No.103 of 2019 registered under sections 385/386/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 at Police Station Manghopir, Karachi. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to post-arrest bail in view of an inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, the grant of bail to co-accused on similar allegations, and the existence of other pending criminal cases against him. The Sindh High Court held that the unexplained delay of 54 days in lodging the FIR, the absence of any recovery from the applicant, and the grant of bail to co-accused on similar allegations brought the case within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that registration of other criminal cases without conviction did not disentitle him to bail. The court laid down the principles relating to the rule of consistency in bail matters and the irrelevance of unproven pending criminal cases prior to conviction.
Questions settled- Whether an unexplained delay of fifty-four days in lodging the FIR makes out a case for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail on the ground of the rule of consistency when co-accused facing similar allegations have already been granted bail?
- Can bail be refused to an accused solely on the ground that multiple other criminal cases are registered against him when he has not been convicted in any of them?
- Nishat Chunian Power Limited through Managing Director and others vs Federation Of Pakistan through Ministry of Water and Power Islamabad and 2 others2021 CLC 959 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-14Read full judgment →
- Nishan Ahmad alias Zeeshan vs Civil Judge and others2021 MLD 1613 · Lahore High Court · 2021-05-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the concurrent findings of the Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Court, which ordered the petitioner's eviction from the demised premises. The petitioner contended that the relationship of landlord and tenant had ceased due to an agreement to sell, and that a suit for specific performance regarding the property was pending before a civil court. The core legal question was whether a pending suit for specific performance or a claim of title by a tenant could override the statutory relationship of landlord and tenant under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009. The High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the rent proceedings and the suit for specific performance are distinct. The Court affirmed that under Section 10 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, a subsequent agreement to sell does not terminate a tenancy unless formally revoked before the Rent Registrar. The principle established is that a tenant cannot challenge the landlord's title during the subsistence of a tenancy agreement, and the doctrine of 'once a tenant, always a tenant' applies.
Questions settled- Does a pending suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell automatically terminate the relationship of landlord and tenant?
- Can a tenant challenge the title of the landlord during the subsistence of a tenancy agreement?
- What is the legal requirement for revoking a tenancy agreement under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009?
- Can proceedings in a rent matter be stayed pending the outcome of a separate suit for specific performance?
- Nisar Khan Khattak vs Haji Adam, Director General (Admin), Pemra2021 PLC (C.S.) 140 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged the appointment and subsequent promotion of respondent No.1 as General Manager and Director General (Admin) in the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), alleging violations of service regulations regarding experience relaxation and provincial quotas. The core legal questions involved whether a writ of quo warranto is maintainable against employees of PEMRA, whether PEMRA service regulations are statutory, and whether the petition suffered from laches and mala fides. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that PEMRA service regulations are non-statutory framed for internal consumption, its employees do not hold public offices for the purpose of a writ of quo warranto, and the petition was barred by the doctrine of laches as well as tainted with mala fides and personal grievances. The key principles laid down are that writ of quo warranto requires the office in question to be a substantive public office involving the exercise of sovereign functions, and internal service regulations of autonomous statutory bodies like PEMRA are non-statutory.
Questions settled- Does the post of General Manager in the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority constitute a public office for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Are the service regulations of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority statutory or non-statutory in nature?
- Whether a constitutional petition seeking a writ of quo warranto filed after an unexplained delay of four years is barred by the doctrine of laches?
- Can a writ of quo warranto be entertained when the petitioner is found to be acting with mala fides and personal grudges?
- Nisar Ali vs The State2021 SHC 880 · Sindh High Court · 2021-08-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a bail application filed by the applicants seeking confirmation of pre-arrest bail in a criminal case involving allegations of robbery and assault, registered under Sections 394 and 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions were whether the applicants were entitled to pre-arrest bail given the significant, unexplained six-month delay in lodging the FIR, the absence of independent evidence, and whether the alleged offenses fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the applicants were entitled to pre-arrest bail, confirming the interim relief previously granted. The Court reasoned that malafide intent could be inferred from the circumstances, particularly the unexplained delay in reporting the incident. Furthermore, the Court observed that the alleged offenses did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that incarceration would serve no useful purpose as the investigation was complete and the applicants were regularly attending the trial court.
Questions settled- Does an unexplained delay of six months in lodging an FIR constitute grounds for granting pre-arrest bail?
- Can malafide intent be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a case where direct evidence is unavailable?
- Does an offense punishable by up to five years imprisonment fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?