Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• D.G. Khan Cement Company Limited, D.G. Khan through Managing Director2020 PLC 214, 2020 PLJ Tr.C. (Labour) 41 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2019-04-25
  workmanlabour court jurisdictionmanagerial capacitytermination of servicesupervisory dutiesgrievance petitionlabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the Punjab Labour Court, which accepted a grievance petition filed by the respondent against the termination of his services. The core legal question was whether the respondent, who held the position of Manager Excise at the time of his termination, qualified as a 'workman' under the relevant labour laws, thereby granting the Labour Court jurisdiction to adjudicate his grievance. The appellant contended that the respondent performed supervisory duties, including initiating Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs), recommending promotions, and approving leave for subordinates, thus excluding him from the definition of a workman. The Labour Appellate Tribunal, upon reviewing documentary evidence—including ACRs and leave applications initiated by the respondent—found that the respondent exercised supervisory authority and managed a section. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the respondent did not fall within the definition of a workman. The impugned judgment was set aside, and the grievance petition was dismissed, establishing the principle that an employee performing managerial and supervisory functions, such as initiating ACRs and recommending personnel actions, is not a 'workman' regardless of the nature of the establishment.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee performing supervisory duties like initiating ACRs and recommending promotions qualify as a 'workman'?
  • Can a Labour Court adjudicate a grievance petition filed by an employee who holds a managerial position?
  • Is an employee who supervises a department and manages subordinates considered a workman under labour laws?
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• D.G. Khan Cement Company Limited & another vs Federation of PakistanPTCL 2020 CL. 443, 2020 PTD 1186, 2020 LHC 1066 · Lahore High Court · 2020-02-28
  Super TaxIncome Tax Ordinance 2001Money BillArticle 73constitutional viresdouble taxationreasonable classificationlegislative competence
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated intra-court appeal was filed challenging the judgment of a learned Single Bench of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the appellants' writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity and vires of Section 4B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 regarding the imposition of Super Tax. The core legal questions before the High Court were whether Super Tax levied for the rehabilitation of temporarily displaced persons constitutes a 'tax' or a 'fee/cess', whether it could be validly enacted through a Money Bill under Article 73 of the Constitution, and whether it violates Article 25 by targeting specific high-earning entities or results in unconstitutional double taxation. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal, holding that Super Tax possesses all essential characteristics of a tax and does not require quid pro quo. The Court ruled that its enactment via a Money Bill under Article 73 was constitutionally valid, reasonable classification of high-income entities does not violate Article 25, and the Federal Legislature holds full power under Entry 47 of the Fourth Schedule to levy taxes on income.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inclusion of a specific public purpose in a revenue levy transform a tax into a fee or cess?
  • Can Super Tax under Section 4B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 be validly enacted through a Money Bill under Article 73 of the Constitution?
  • Does imposing higher tax rates on higher income brackets violate Article 25 of the Constitution?
  • Is the Federal Legislature empowered under Entry 47 of the Fourth Schedule to levy additional tax on income without resulting in unconstitutional double taxation?
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• D Watson Chemist vs Federation of Pakistan, etcPTCL 2021 CL. 137, 2020 PTD 2095, 2020 LHC 1988 · Lahore High Court · 2020-09-08Read full judgment →
• Criminal Petition No.251-L of 2020 vs The State, etc2020 SCP 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-20
  juvenile offenderstatutory baildetermination of ageJuvenile Justice System Act 2018post-arrest baildelay in trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the second bail application of the petitioner, a juvenile offender, filed on statutory grounds in connection with a murder case registered under sections 394 and 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved the applicability of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, whether the time spent determining the juvenility of the accused constitutes a delay attributable to him, and whether he is entitled to statutory bail after the prescribed detention period under the Act. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed bail, holding that the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 fully governed the case, that the determination of age by the court is a statutory obligation forming part of the proceedings and cannot be treated as a delay caused by the accused, and that detention exceeding six months without concluding the trial entitles a juvenile to statutory bail under section 6(5) of the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time spent in determining the age and juvenility of an accused person on his application can be termed as a delay occasioned by the act or omission of the accused so as to deprive him of statutory bail?
  • Does the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 apply to offences committed after its commencement?
  • Is a juvenile offender entitled to release on bail if his trial is not concluded within a continuous period of six months from detention under section 6(5) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018?
  • What is the responsibility of the police and the court regarding the determination of age under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018?
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• Crescent Star Insurance Limited vs Director (Insurance) Secp, Islamabad2020 CLD 1056 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2019-12-04Read full judgment →
• Crescent Star Insurance Limited vs Commissioner (Insurance) Secp, Islamabad2020 CLD 372 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2019-12-18Read full judgment →
• Crescent Star Insurance Limited through Official Representative vs Securities And Exchange Commission Of Pakistan and another2020 CLD 1250 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-24Read full judgment →
• Creative Electronics (Pvt.) Limited vs Government of Pakistan through Prime Minister and others2020 IHC 58 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-01-30Read full judgment →
• Constructors Association Of Pakistan through Secretary General vs Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC) through Chairman and another2020 PLD Islamabad 199 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-05-20Read full judgment →
• Coniston Limited Hong Kong vs Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd2020 CLD 751 · Sindh High Court · 2020-02-17Read full judgment →
• Complaint By Messrs Catkin Engineering Sale And Services (Pvt.) Limited2020 CLD 497 · Competition Commission of Pakistan · 2019-12-16
  Competition lawRestrictive trading conditionsTender procurementSection 37(2) enquiryBurden of proofNatural justiceDeceptive marketing practicesCompetition Commission of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a complaint filed by Messrs Catkin Engineering Sale and Services (Pvt.) Limited against the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Directorate of Agriculture Engineering, alleging that specific conditions in a tender for solar pumping systems were restrictive and anti-competitive under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2010. The Competition Commission of Pakistan initiated an enquiry under Section 37(2) of the Act, which concluded that no prima facie violation existed. During the proceedings, the complainant expressed a desire to withdraw the complaint, noting the project had already been awarded. The Commission rejected the complaint, finding it meritless. In its order, the Commission established key guidelines: first, natural justice requires providing a hearing to a complainant before disposing of a complaint where no violation is found; second, the initiation of an enquiry under Section 37(2) is not automatic upon filing a complaint but requires the complainant to be an 'undertaking' or 'registered association of consumers' and to provide prima facie evidence; and third, for deceptive marketing cases under Section 10, the burden of proof rests on the undertaking.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere filing of a formal complaint automatically trigger a mandatory enquiry under Section 37(2) of the Competition Act, 2010?
  • Is an opportunity of hearing required for a complainant before the Competition Commission of Pakistan rejects a complaint where no prima facie violation is found?
  • Who bears the burden of proof in cases involving deceptive marketing practices under Section 10 of the Competition Act, 2010?
  • What criteria must a complainant satisfy to initiate a formal enquiry under Section 37(2) of the Competition Act, 2010?
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• Commissioner-Ir, Zone-I, Ltu, Karachi vs Messrs International Brand (Pvt.)2020 PTD (Trib.) 2115 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-10-10Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Zone-1, Ltu, Karachi vs M/s. Industrial2020 SHC 844 · Sindh High Court · 2020-10-29Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Legal Division, Regional Tax Office, 40- Lawrence Road, Lahore, etc vs M/s Rafeh Limited2020 SCP 128, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 518, 2020 PTD 1657, 2022 PSC 1343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-15
  income tax referenceadvisory jurisdictionappellate jurisdictiondismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of appeallimitation periodIncome Tax OrdinanceLimitation Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court addressed a petition challenging the dismissal of an application for restoration of an Income Tax Reference, which had been dismissed for non-prosecution by the High Court. The core legal questions were whether an Income Tax Reference under Section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, invokes advisory jurisdiction and thus cannot be dismissed for non-prosecution, and what limitation period applies for its restoration. The Court held that the application under Section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, despite its common nomenclature, is appellate in nature, not advisory, and therefore can be dismissed for non-prosecution. Consequently, Article 168 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribes a 30-day period for readmission of an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution, is applicable, excluding the general Article 181. The petition was dismissed as the restoration application was filed after the prescribed limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application under Section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, appellate in nature or does it invoke advisory jurisdiction?
  • Can an Income Tax Reference filed under Section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, be dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • What is the period of limitation for filing an application for the restoration of an Income Tax Reference dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Does Article 168 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, apply to applications for restoration of an Income Tax Reference dismissed for non-prosecution?
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• Commissioner of Income Tax, Coimbatore vs Shri R.N. Jayaprakash2020 PCTLR 285 · Madras High Court · 2019-02-28Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Income Tax vs National Bank Of Pakistan2020 PT D 1815 · Sindh High Court · 2020-03-03Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax vs M. Pranuthi2020 PCTLR 241 · Madras High Court · 2019-03-21Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax vs Bank of Punjab and othersPTCL 2020 CL. 291, 2020 PTD 1 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-16
  income tax referencehybrid system of accountinginterest on securitiesaccrual vs receipt basissuspense accountbad debtspast practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This income tax reference under section 133(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, arose from an order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal regarding taxation of interest on securities, suspense account loans, bad debts, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir branch income for the assessment year 1998-1999. The core legal questions pertained to whether interest on securities should be taxed on a receipt basis or accrual basis, whether interest credited to suspense account loans is liable to tax, whether bad debts disallowance was justified, and whether the Appellate Tribunal properly handled the branch income issue. The Lahore High Court dismissed the reference applications, holding—based on binding precedents of the Supreme Court of Pakistan—that assessees were permitted to use a hybrid system of accounting under the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and that established past practices of accepting interest income on a receipt basis could not be arbitrarily departed from by the tax department. The key principle laid down is that the hybrid system of accounting is permissible under the law and consistent past practices regarding the computation of bank interest cannot be legally upset without valid justification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether interest on securities earned by a bank is taxable on a receipt basis or an accrual basis under the tax law?
  • Is an assessee permitted to use a hybrid system of accounting by mixing elements of accrual and receipt accounting methods?
  • Can the tax department depart from an established past practice of accepting interest income offered on a receipt basis without cogent reasons?
  • Does a reference application lie before the High Court on issues that do not raise a substantive question of law out of the Appellate Tribunal's order?
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• Commissioner Of Income Tax (Legal) Rto, Abbottabad vs Messrs Ed-Zublin2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 372, 2020 P C T L R 1243, 2020 P SC 1046, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-26
  tax referencelimitation periodclerical errorrectification of errorinherent jurisdictionreview jurisdictionconversion of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the High Court's dismissal of a Tax Reference as time-barred and the subsequent rejection of a review petition. The High Court had erroneously calculated the limitation period based on a misstamped receipt date on the Appellate Tribunal's order, despite the appellant's own pleadings indicating a later receipt date. The core legal question was whether the High Court, while exercising reference jurisdiction under the Income Tax Ordinance 2001, could rectify a clerical error regarding the date of service, or if it was strictly barred by the absence of review jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to correct an obvious clerical error. The Court established that the High Court should have treated the incompetent review petition as an application for rectification. Relying on the principle that courts possess the inherent power to convert one type of proceeding into another to ensure justice, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the High Court for a decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court possess inherent jurisdiction to correct obvious clerical errors in its orders while exercising reference jurisdiction under the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Can a court convert an incompetent review petition into an application for rectification to correct a clerical error?
  • Is the High Court barred from correcting a factual error regarding the date of receipt of an order if the party failed to file a formal application for condonation of delay?
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• Commissioner of Income Tax (Legal) Regional Tax Officer, Peshawar2020 PSC 393, PTCL 2020 CL. 1, 2020 PTD 278, 2020 SCMR 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-05
  Income Tax Ordinance 1979deemed incomegifts between partnersbanking channelsAssociation of Personsbook entriestax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the Income Tax Reference filed by the Revenue department. The Taxation Officer had treated certain amounts received by the respondent as gifts from fellow partners in an Association of Persons (AOP) as deemed income under Section 12(18) of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, on the ground that they were not transferred through banking channels. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, and the High Court all set aside the addition. The Supreme Court dismissed the department's appeal, holding that Section 12(18) is intended to capture gifts, loans, or advances received in cash otherwise than through banking channels or crossed cheques. Because no cash exchanged hands and the transactions merely authorized the respondent to withdraw sums from the donors' shares in the AOP via book entries, no immediate transfer of cash occurred. Consequently, the deeming provision under Section 12(18) was not attracted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the deeming provisions of Section 12(18) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 apply when a gift between partners in an AOP is executed via book entries without any actual exchange of cash?
  • Does an authorization enabling a partner to withdraw amounts from the share of other partners in a firm constitute a cash transfer requiring a crossed cheque under Section 12(18) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Rto, Hyderabad vs Sujnani Wine2020 PT D (Trib.) 1692 · Appellate Tribunal Inland RevenueRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Peshawar Zone, Regional Tax Office, Peshawar vs Syed Adnan Shah & another2020 PHC 434, 2020 PTD 2151, 2022 PCTLR 645 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-09-10Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Multan vs Messrs Hafeez Ghee And General2020 PTD 2025 · Lahore High Court · 2020-01-20
  sales tax referenceinput tax adjustmentcomposite unitsolvent extractionSRO 647(1)/2007tax return procedureSection 8-B Sales Tax Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This sales tax reference arose from a dispute regarding the adjustment of input tax by a composite industrial unit, comprising both a solvent extraction section and a ghee section. The Commissioner Inland Revenue challenged the Appellate Tribunal's decision, which permitted the respondent to adjust 100% of its input tax, despite Section 8-B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, generally limiting input tax adjustment to 90% of output tax. The core legal question was whether the respondent, as a composite unit, was entitled to the 100% adjustment exemption provided under SRO 647(1)/2007 for solvent extraction units. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, noting that the respondent qualified for the exemption for the majority of the period and that the tax return forms lacked separate columns to distinguish between 90% and 100% adjustment categories. The Court held that the taxpayer could not be deprived of its legitimate right to adjustment, and that any procedural lapse in filing did not justify denying the substantive right to adjustment, though it might warrant a penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Is a composite industrial unit entitled to 100% input tax adjustment if it meets the criteria for solvent extraction units under SRO 647(1)/2007?
  • Does the absence of specific columns in a tax return form for different adjustment percentages justify the denial of a taxpayer's substantive right to input tax adjustment?
  • Can a taxpayer be denied the right to adjust input tax solely due to procedural lapses in the filing of returns?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Ltu, Lahore vs M/s Pepsi Cola International2020 ATIR 8 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2020-06-30Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal Division, Regional Tax Office, Islamabad vs Messrs Pak Steel Re-Rolling MillsPTCL 2021 CL. 315, 2020 PTD 1252 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-05-13Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Large Tax Payers Unit, Legal Division, Lahore2020 PTD 904 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-02Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Faisalabad vs Messrs Mashallah Paper Board Mills, Faisalabad2020 PTD 384 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-20Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, (Legal, Islamabad) vs Messrs Wi-Tribe2020 PLJ SC 240, 2020 SCMR 420, 2020 PTD 769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-22
  Federal Excise Dutyinternet servicestax exemptiontelecommunication servicesfiscal interpretationtaxpayer rightsstatutory construction
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns whether internet service providers (ISPs) are liable to pay Federal Excise Duty (FED) on voice content transmitted through the internet, despite internet services being explicitly exempted from FED under the Federal Excise Act, 2005. The core legal question was whether the transmission of voice data via internet applications (like Skype or WhatsApp) constitutes a taxable telecommunication service, notwithstanding the statutory exemption for internet services. The Supreme Court held that the exemption granted to internet services in the Third Schedule of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 is absolute and does not distinguish between the nature, usage, or character of the data transmitted. The Court reasoned that ISPs charge for connectivity, not for specific applications used by customers, and no mechanism exists to segregate data consumption for taxation purposes. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that fiscal statutes must be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer, and exemptions cannot be restricted by extraneous interpretation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that internet services remain fully exempt from FED regardless of the content transmitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory exemption for internet services under the Federal Excise Act 2005 apply to voice content transmitted over the internet?
  • Can Federal Excise Duty be levied on internet services based on the nature or usage of the data transmitted?
  • Is an internet service provider liable for Federal Excise Duty on applications used by customers over the internet?
  • How should fiscal provisions regarding tax exemptions be construed in cases of ambiguity?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, (Legal), Islamabad vs M/s Wi-Tribe2020 P SC 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-22
  Federal Excise DutyInternet Service Providertax exemptionfiscal statute interpretationtelecommunication servicesstatutory construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a tax dispute regarding the liability of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to pay Federal Excise Duty (FED) on voice content transmitted through the internet. The core legal question was whether internet services, which are statutorily exempted from FED under the Federal Excise Act, 2005, lose that exemption when used for voice transmission, thereby attracting tax as telecommunication services. The Supreme Court held that the exemption granted to internet services under the Third Schedule of the Act is absolute and does not distinguish between the nature or usage of the internet facility. The Court reasoned that ISPs charge solely for connectivity, not for specific applications like voice or video calls, and the tax authorities lacked any mechanism to segregate data usage for taxation purposes. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that fiscal statutes must be construed literally in favor of the taxpayer. The key principle laid down is that where a statute grants a tax exemption without qualification, tax authorities cannot read extraneous restrictions into the provision or impose levies based on intendment rather than clear statutory language.

  Questions settled

  • Does the transmission of voice content through the internet negate the statutory exemption from Federal Excise Duty granted to internet services?
  • Can tax authorities impose Federal Excise Duty on internet services based on the specific usage or application of the internet facility by the consumer?
  • Is a fiscal provision of a statute to be construed in favor of the tax authority or the taxpayer in cases of ambiguity?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, (Legal), Islamabad vs Messrs Wi-Tribe2020 SCMR 420 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-22
  Federal Excise Dutyinternet servicestelecommunication servicestax exemptionfiscal statute interpretationvoice content transmission
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a tax dispute regarding whether the transmission of voice content via the internet attracts Federal Excise Duty (FED), despite internet services being explicitly exempted under the Federal Excise Act, 2005. The petitioner sought to levy FED on an internet service provider, arguing that voice transmission constitutes a taxable telecommunication service. The Supreme Court held that the exemption granted to internet services under the Third Schedule of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 is absolute and does not distinguish between the nature, usage, or character of the internet facility utilized. The Court observed that internet service providers charge solely for connectivity, not for specific applications like voice or video transmission, and that no mechanism exists to segregate data usage for taxation purposes. Emphasizing that fiscal statutes must be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer and that tax cannot be imposed based on intendment or ambiguity, the Court affirmed that the exemption applies to all internet-based telecommunication facilities. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, upholding the lower courts' findings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the transmission of voice content through the internet attract Federal Excise Duty when internet services are otherwise exempt?
  • Can Federal Excise Duty be levied on internet services based on the specific applications or content transmitted by the user?
  • Should fiscal provisions of a statute be construed in favor of the taxpayer in cases of ambiguity regarding exemptions?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, (Legal), Islamabad vs (M/s) Wi-Tribe2020 P C T L R 428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-22
  Federal Excise DutyInternet Service ProviderFiscal Statute InterpretationTax ExemptionTelecommunication ServicesStatutory Construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue challenging the exemption of internet services from Federal Excise Duty (FED). The core legal question was whether the transmission of voice content through internet services, provided by an Internet Service Provider (ISP), attracts FED despite the statutory exemption granted to internet services under the Federal Excise Act, 2005. The Supreme Court held that internet services are wholly exempted from FED under the Act, and this exemption applies irrespective of the nature, usage, or character of the internet facility utilized by the consumer. The Court reasoned that ISPs charge solely for connectivity, not for specific applications like voice transmission, and there is no statutory mechanism to segregate or tax specific data usage. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that fiscal provisions must be construed literally in favor of the taxpayer. The key principle laid down is that where a statute grants an exemption without qualification, no extraneous restrictions can be read into it, and any ambiguity in fiscal legislation must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer.

  Questions settled

  • Does the transmission of voice content through internet services attract Federal Excise Duty when internet services are statutorily exempted?
  • Can an exemption granted under the Federal Excise Act, 2005 be restricted based on the nature or usage of the internet facility?
  • Should fiscal provisions of a statute be construed in favor of the taxpayer in cases of ambiguity?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Raja Mazhar HussainPTCL 2020 CL. 485, 2020 PTD 1662, 2020 PTD 331 · Lahore High Court · 2019-12-03Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s. HIlal ChemicalsPTCL 2020 CL. 351 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-04Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s Three Star Rice FactoryPTCL 2021 CL.52, 2021 PTD 1, 2020 LHC 2205 · Select · 2020-02-17Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s Shamim Oil (Pvt.)PTCL 2020 CL.531, 2020 PTD 1169, 2020 LHC 441 · Lahore High Court · 2020-02-11Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Rashid And Saqib Trading2020 PLJ Lahore 459, 2020 PTD 782 · Lahore High Court · 2019-11-14Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Lahore Medical InstrumentsPTCL 2021 CL.560, 2020 PTD 1680 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-03Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Descon Engineering Limited, Lahore2020 PTD 873 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-07Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Arfat Oil Industries2020 PTD 1908 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-30Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Ashraf Sugar Mills Limited2020 PTD 962 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-18Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Sahiwal Zone vs Muhammad Safdar2020 PLJ Lahore 579 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Lyallpur Zone, Regional Tax Office, Faisalabad vs Messrs Certification Trends, 147-C, Peoples Colony, Faisalabad2020 PTD 2187 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-07Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Legal Division, Rto III Karachi vs Mst.2021 PLJ SC 140, 2020 P SC 1368, PTCL 2021 CL. 494, 2020 PTD 1383, 2020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-24
  wealth taxrevisional powerlimitation periodsuo motu powersrevenue intereststatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter addresses whether the limitation period prescribed for the exercise of revisional power by the Commissioner under Section 25(2) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 can be ascribed the one-year limitation period laid down in Section 25(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court examined whether an omission of a limitation period in Section 25(2) could be supplied by reference to Section 25(1) or by analogy to similar revenue-protection provisions like Section 17B. The Court held that Section 25(1) and Section 25(2) serve entirely different purposes—the former protects the assessee while the latter protects the revenue—and thus cannot share the same limitation period. Instead, looking at the legislative scheme and its successor provision, Section 17B, a reasonable limitation period of four years applies to the exercise of revisional power under Section 25(2). Consequently, the High Court and Tribunal decisions were set aside, and the Commissioner's order passed within four years was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the limitation period prescribed under Section 25(1) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 applies to the exercise of revisional power under Section 25(2) of the said Act?
  • Can a reasonable time limit be supplied by courts when a statute is silent about a limitation period for the exercise of a power?
  • What is the applicable limitation period for the Commissioner to exercise suo motu revisional powers under Section 25(2) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-I), Karachi vs M/s Faisal Bank Limited2020 P C T L R 1251, 2020 P SC 1240, 2020 PTD 1390, 2020 SCMR 1045, 2020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-09
  bad debttax write-offincome taxirrecoverable debtbanking companytax assessmenttest of reasonableness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns tax references regarding the write-off of bad debts by a banking company for the assessment year 2001-02 and tax year 2003. The core legal question was whether the respondent-bank was entitled to write off these debts and whether the determination of a 'bad debt' is at the sole discretion of the assessee or subject to an objective test of reasonableness. The Supreme Court held that the classification of a bad debt is not left to the unfettered discretion of the taxpayer. Instead, the assessee must demonstrate, through bona fide measures and evidence of failed recovery efforts, that the debt is irrecoverable. The Court affirmed the lower fora's factual findings, noting that the bank had pursued legal remedies, obtained decrees, and engaged in settlement proceedings, satisfying the test of reasonableness. The key principle laid down is that while the assessee's books of account are significant, the claim for a bad debt write-off must be supported by reasonable grounds demonstrating that lawful recovery steps have been exhausted and the debt is irrecoverable in the foreseeable future.

  Questions settled

  • Is the classification of a bad debt for tax purposes left to the sole discretion of the taxpayer?
  • What is the test for determining whether a debt is irrecoverable and qualifies as a bad debt under the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Does the concept of 'non-performing loan' under the Seventh Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 apply retrospectively to tax years prior to 2007?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-I) Ltu, Karachi vs Messrs Linde Pak2020 P C T L R 432, 2020 PSC 492, PTCL 2021 CL. 532, 2020 PTD 549, 2020 SCMR 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-25
  tax deductionfinance agreementejusdem generisstatutory interpretationinstrumentincome taxnoscitur a sociis
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a tax assessment dispute where the revenue department sought to classify a finance/loan agreement as an 'instrument' under Section 50(7D) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, thereby requiring the respondent-company to deduct tax on accrued mark-up. The core legal question was whether the phrase 'instrument of any kind' in the said provision encompasses bilateral finance/loan agreements, or whether it is restricted to unilateral debt instruments like bonds, certificates, or debentures. The Supreme Court held that the finance/loan agreement does not fall within the scope of Section 50(7D). Applying the principles of ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis, the Court determined that the general term 'instrument' must be construed in the context of the specific preceding items, which are all unilateral documents acknowledging debt. Consequently, a bilateral agreement containing reciprocal obligations does not share the same genus as the listed specific documents. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the respondent-company was not liable to deduct tax under the provision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'instrument of any kind' in Section 50(7D) of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 include bilateral finance or loan agreements?
  • How does the principle of ejusdem generis apply to the interpretation of general words following a list of specific items in a statute?
  • Are finance/loan agreements considered instruments of the same class as bonds, certificates, and debentures for the purpose of tax deduction under Section 50(7D) of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
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• Deen Muhammad vs Labour Appellate Tribunal and 2 others2020 PLJ Quetta 49, 2020 PLC 72, 2022 KLR Labour & Service Cases 76 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-05-13
  labour lawgrievance noticeindustrial relationsdismissal from servicemisconductstatutory interpretationmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a judgment of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had set aside a Labour Court’s order reinstating the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the grievance notice served by the petitioner satisfied the mandatory statutory requirements under the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Labour Appellate Tribunal correctly determined the matter. The court established that under Section 41(2) of the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010, a grievance notice must be served by the workman "himself" and cannot be validly served through legal counsel. Furthermore, the court emphasized that a valid grievance notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite for invoking the Labour Court's authority; since the petitioner failed to serve a notice specifically against his dismissal order, the petition was non-maintainable. Additionally, the court ruled that where an employee has admitted to misconduct, a formal inquiry is not required. The impugned judgment was found to be legally sound and free from perversity.

  Questions settled

  • Must a grievance notice under the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010 be served by the worker personally rather than through legal counsel?
  • Is a formal inquiry required for dismissal from service if the employee has admitted to the misconduct?
  • Does the failure to serve a valid grievance notice against a dismissal order render a labour petition non-maintainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal Division), Ltu, Islamabad vs Messrs2020 PTD (Trib.) 2163 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2020-02-17Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal Division) Rto, Islamabad vs M/s Pak2020 IHC 114 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Faisalabad Division, Faisalabad and another vs Allah2020 PLC (C.S.) 1276, 2020 SCP 160, 2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 76, 2020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-01
  service tribunal powersmisconductquantum of punishmentdismissal from servicegovernment propertyreduction of penaltydepartmental authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had reduced the penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon the respondent for illegally mutating Government land in favour of a private party to forfeiture of two years' approved service. The core legal questions involved the extent of the powers of the Service Tribunal under Section 5 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, and whether such powers to modify departmental penalties are unbridled or discretionary. The Supreme Court held that the powers of the Tribunal under Section 5 are neither discretionary nor unbridled, and cannot be exercised without valid, cogent, and judicially sound reasons. The Court laid down the principle that once misconduct—such as fraud or embezzlement involving government property—is established, the quantum of punishment is primarily the prerogative of the departmental authority, and the Tribunal cannot interfere with it lightly or take a lenient view unless the penalty is perverse or demonstrably disproportionate to the gravity of the offence.

  Questions settled

  • Are the powers of the Service Tribunal under Section 5 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 to modify departmental penalties discretionary and unbridled?
  • Can a Service Tribunal reduce a penalty imposed by a departmental authority for established misconduct without recording detailed, legally sustainable reasons?
  • Does the recovery of loss or the fact that government land was later taken back mitigate the severity of a government servant's established misconduct?
  • When is a Service Tribunal justified in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by a departmental authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector, Model Customs Collectorate vs Haji Abdul Razziq Special Judge2020 SHC 1080 · Sindh High Court · 2020-11-25
  customs actfiscal fraudacquittal appealdishonoured chequesecurity depositcriminal liabilityimport clearance
  Summary & questions settled

  This Special Criminal Acquittal Appeal challenged a trial court judgment acquitting the respondent of charges related to fiscal fraud under the Customs Act, 1969. The prosecution alleged that the respondent, an importer, furnished post-dated cheques as security for vehicle clearance, which were subsequently dishonored upon presentation, constituting an offence under Section 156(1) and Section 95A of the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether the dishonor of these security cheques, in the absence of an established outstanding liability or judicial authorization for encashment, constituted a criminal offence. The Sindh High Court upheld the acquittal, reasoning that the underlying liability for the security did not exist, and the Customs authorities had attempted to encash the cheques without proper adjudication or authorization. The court held that where the foundation of the prosecution case—the existence of a debt or liability—is absent, and the security was not liable for encashment, no criminal offence is made out. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming that the respondent could not be convicted for the dishonor of security instruments that were not legally due.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dishonor of a post-dated cheque furnished as security for customs clearance constitute an offence under the Customs Act, 1969, if no underlying liability exists?
  • Can Customs authorities unilaterally encash security cheques without prior adjudication of liability or specific judicial authorization?
  • Is an acquittal sustainable when the prosecution fails to establish the existence of an outstanding liability or debt against the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector Sales Tax vs Army Welfare TrustNizampur Cement Plant &2021 PLJ Peshawar 70, 2020 PHC 508, 2021 PTD 130, PTCL 2022 CL 382 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-09-09Read full judgment →
• Collector Sales Tax And Federal Excise, Peshawar vs Messrs Flying Kraft2020 PTD 776 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-03-11Read full judgment →
• Collector of sales Tax and Central Excise, Rawalpindi and others vs MessrsPTCL 2021 CL. 354, 2020 PTD 1275, 2022 PCTLR 1230 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-01-14Read full judgment →
• Collector Of Customs, through Deputy Collector of Customs vs Messrs2020 PTD (Trib.) 1592 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2013-05-07Read full judgment →
• Collector Of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Peshawar vs Muhammad Mashhood and others2021 PLJ Peshawar 54, 2020 PTD 1943 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-04-29Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, MCC, Peshawar vs Noor Akbar and another2020 PTD (Trib.) 1149 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2019-05-17Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Islamabad vs M/s Askari Cement (Pvt.) Ltd & another2020 PLJ SC 411, 2020 P SC 761, PTCL 2020 CL. 421, 2020 PTD 832, 2020 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-22
  customs classificationquasi-judicial functionsCentral Board of Revenuestatutory interpretationtribunal compositionrefractory bricksadministrative instructions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the classification of imported refractory bricks for customs duty purposes. The petitioner department sought to classify the goods under a higher duty bracket based on administrative instructions from the Central Board of Revenue. The respondents argued for a lower classification based on technical specifications regarding temperature resistance. The Customs Appellate Tribunal and the High Court upheld the respondents' classification, finding the goods met the criteria for the lower duty rate. The core legal question was whether the Central Board of Revenue's administrative instructions regarding product classification are binding on quasi-judicial forums and customs officers. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of classification disputes involves mixed questions of law and fact falling within the exclusive domain of the statutory customs hierarchy. The Court affirmed that the Central Board of Revenue cannot issue administrative directions that interfere with the quasi-judicial discretion of customs officers or tribunals. Furthermore, the Court rejected an objection regarding the composition of the Tribunal bench, noting that the relevant case was decided by a properly constituted bench. The petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Central Board of Revenue issue administrative instructions that interfere with the quasi-judicial functions of customs officers?
  • Does the resolution of a dispute regarding the determination of a PCT heading fall within the domain of the customs hierarchy?
  • Are customs authorities bound by administrative interpretations of the Central Board of Revenue when exercising quasi-judicial functions?
  • Is a Tribunal bench composition valid if the material facts and legal questions were addressed by a properly constituted bench in a parallel case?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector Of Customs, Appraisement (West) and others vs Messrs Marosh2020 SCMR 579 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-20
  customs dutyregulatory dutyimplied repealstatutory interpretationexemption notificationtaxationcustoms law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of imposing regulatory duties on imported goods previously granted exemptions under Statutory Regulatory Order (SRO) 497(1)/2009. The core legal questions were whether regulatory duty is distinct from customs duty, whether the exemption under SRO 497 extended to regulatory duties, and whether SRO 497 was impliedly repealed by the subsequent issuance of SRO 1035(1)/2017. The Supreme Court held that while regulatory duty is a distinct species of customs duty, the language of SRO 497, which exempted the "whole of customs duties" in excess of 37.5%, effectively shielded the respondents from the imposition of subsequent regulatory duties. Furthermore, the Court rejected the petitioners' argument of implied repeal, ruling that the doctrine requires clear repugnancy or an inability of two provisions to coexist. Since SRO 497 and SRO 1035 could operate simultaneously without absurdity, no implied repeal occurred. The key principle laid down is that the doctrine of implied repeal is a narrow canon of statutory interpretation, requiring strong evidence of incompatibility, and that exemptions phrased broadly as "whole of customs duties" encompass regulatory duties unless otherwise specified.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of implied repeal apply where two statutory regulatory orders can coexist without leading to absurd consequences?
  • Does an exemption from 'whole of customs duties' in a statutory regulatory order include an exemption from regulatory duties?
  • Is regulatory duty a distinct category of duty from statutory customs duty under the Customs Act 1969?
  • What are the necessary conditions for establishing the implied repeal of an earlier statutory provision by a later one?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs M/s. Z. A. Industries2020 SHC 1350, 2022 PTD 1918 · Sindh High Court · 2020-12-16Read full judgment →
• Collector Of Customs vs Messrs Byco Petroleum Pakistan and others2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 375, 2020 P C T L R 1107, 2020 P SC 1049, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-13
  customs duty exemptionSRO 678(I)/2004tariff classificationtug boatsstatutory interpretationimport tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the customs duty exemption status of three imported Tug boats. The core legal question was whether Tug boats, imported by the respondents for pushing oil vessels to the shore, fell within the scope of 'drilling and seismic (on shore or off shore) vessels' entitled to duty exemption under SRO 678(I)/2004, issued pursuant to Section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969. The Supreme Court held that the Tug boats did not qualify for the claimed exemption. The Court reasoned that the specific category in the SRO was limited to drilling and seismic vessels, which possess distinct functions, purposes, and Pakistan Customs Tariff (PCT) classifications compared to Tug boats, which are classified under PCT Code 8904.0000. Consequently, the Court established the principle that tax exemption notifications must be strictly construed according to the specific descriptions provided therein, and that goods falling under distinct tariff headings cannot be conflated with exempted categories based on broad or generalized interpretations of vessel types. The impugned judgment was set aside, and the appeals were allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Do Tug boats fall within the category of 'drilling and seismic (on shore or off shore) vessels' for the purpose of customs duty exemption under SRO 678(I)/2004?
  • Can goods classified under a distinct Pakistan Customs Tariff heading be included in an exemption category intended for a different type of vessel?
  • Must tax exemption notifications be strictly construed according to the specific descriptions provided therein?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs Customs Appellate Tribunal Bench-2020 PTD 209 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-23Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs through Assistant Collector of Customs vs Messrs M.2020 PTD (Trib.) 1135 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2019-03-05Read full judgment →
• Collector Of Customs Model Customs Collectorate (Preventive) Customs2020 PTD (Trib.) 1960 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2019-07-30Read full judgment →
• Collector of Custom FBR and another vs M/s Filtters Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd2021 PLJ SC 9, 2020 P SC 1364, PTCL 2021 CL. 359, 2020 PTD 1355, 2020 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-25
  tax exemptionsales taxstatutory interpretationtextile classificationcustoms tariffburden of prooffiscal statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a tax dispute regarding the eligibility of 'Artificial Filament Tow' for a sales tax exemption under S.R.O. 509(1)/2007. The respondent imported the item and sought exemption under the notification, which grants zero-rated sales tax to 'Textile and articles thereof' falling under Chapters 50 to 63 of the Pakistan Customs Tariff. The core legal question was whether the imported item, used for filter rods in cigarettes, qualified as a 'textile or article thereof' merely by falling within the specified PCT chapters. The Supreme Court held that the exemption is conditional upon the item being a textile or an article thereof, not merely falling within the listed chapters. The Court found that the imported item, used for cigarette filters, did not meet this description. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, emphasizing that tax exemptions must be construed strictly, and where an exempting provision is susceptible to two interpretations, the one against the taxpayer is preferred. The burden lies on the assessee to bring their case within the strict terms of the exemption.

  Questions settled

  • Does an item falling within the PCT chapters listed in an exemption notification automatically qualify for the exemption if it does not meet the descriptive criteria of the goods specified?
  • How should an exemption notification be interpreted when it is susceptible to two different interpretations?
  • Is 'Artificial Filament Tow' used for cigarette filter rods considered a 'textile or article thereof' for the purposes of sales tax exemption under S.R.O. 509(1)/2007?
  • Does the burden of proof lie with the taxpayer to bring their case within the strict terms of a tax exemption?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector Land Acquisition Haripur & another vs Col. Sardar Ahmad Yar2021 CLC 255, 2020 PHC 202 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-03-09Read full judgment →
• Cma Securities (Pvt.) Limited vs Commissioner (Smd), Secp, Islamabad2020 CLD 1051 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2019-09-26Read full judgment →
• Civil Aviation Authority vs Government of Punjab, etc2021 CLC 694, 2020 LHC 2938 · Lahore High Court · 2020-11-26Read full judgment →
• City Super Store-II, Islamabad vs The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Rto, Islamabad2020 PTD (Trib.) 1084 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-05-22Read full judgment →
• Cir, Rto, Islamabad vs Messrs Star Marketing (Pvt.) Ltd., Islamabad2020 PTD (Trib.) 1559 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2020-03-18Read full judgment →
• China Harbour Engineering Company Limited vs Karachi Port Trust &2020 SHC 78 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-18
  performance bank guaranteeautonomy principlefraud exceptiontemporary injunctionmaintainability of suitpower of attorneysubsequent ratification
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment from the Sindh High Court addresses an application for a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to restrain the encashment of a performance bank guarantee, alongside the question of the suit's maintainability due to a lack of authorization by the signatory. The core legal questions involved the autonomy principle of performance guarantees, whether disputes under the primary contract or the absence of proven default justify restraining bank guarantee encashment, and whether an incompetently filed suit without a valid power of attorney can be cured by subsequent ratification. Relying on established apex court jurisprudence, the court held that a bank guarantee is an independent, autonomous contract and its unconditional encashment cannot be restrained merely because of underlying contract disputes, pending arbitration, or absence of proof of default, absent clear fraud or irretrievable injustice. Furthermore, the court held that initiating a suit without proper authorization is an incurable defect that cannot be rectified by subsequent ratification. Consequently, the injunction application and the suit were both dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the encashment of an unconditional performance bank guarantee can be restrained by an injunction due to the existence of a dispute under the underlying contract?
  • Does the absence of proven default or a pending dispute regarding liquidated damages warrant an injunction against the call on a performance guarantee?
  • Can a suit instituted without valid authorization or a proper power of attorney be cured by subsequent ratification?
  • What are the precise exceptions under which a court may interfere with the encashment of an autonomous performance guarantee?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Secretary, Government Of The Punjab, Lahore and others vs Zia-Ur-2020 PLJ SC 260, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 475 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-13
  service matterservice tribunalpay and allowancesgovernment notificationbasic payspecial payrationalization of allowancescivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which directed the government to restore specific emoluments—one additional basic pay and fixed daily allowance—to a Traffic Warden. The core legal question was whether these emoluments constituted "basic pay" subject to annual increments or were variable allowances subject to government rationalization and freezing. The Supreme Court held that the respondent’s appointment letter, issued by the competent authority, promised emoluments "at par with Punjab Highway Patrol Police," not a fixed, immutable sum. The Court found that the Service Tribunal erred in classifying these special payments as "basic pay" under the Civil Services Rules. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the government possesses the lawful prerogative to rationalize and freeze allowances to maintain parity across departments. As the respondent failed to challenge the government’s 2011 notification that froze such allowances, he was not entitled to preferential treatment. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal’s judgment, ruling that the government’s action was within its legal authority and did not constitute discrimination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the government have the authority to freeze or rationalize special pay and allowances for civil servants?
  • Are 'additional basic pay' and 'fixed daily allowance' considered part of 'basic pay' under the Civil Services Rules?
  • Can a service tribunal grant relief based on an unaccepted offer letter when a subsequent appointment letter from the competent authority defines the terms of service?
  • Does the failure to challenge a government notification regarding the freezing of allowances preclude a civil servant from claiming those allowances?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, Lahore vs Muhammad Ali Saqib2020 SCMR 1245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-10
  service tribunaldismissal from serviceex parte inquiryburden of proofreinstatementPEEDA Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab challenges a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal whereby the respondent's dismissal from service was set aside and he was reinstated. The core legal question was whether a major penalty of dismissal from service could be sustained solely on the ground that the employee failed to participate in the inquiry proceedings, without the prosecution proving the allegations through evidence. The Supreme Court held that an order of dismissal cannot be passed merely because an employee did not join the inquiry proceedings, and that the prosecution remains under a legal duty to prove the charges through proper evidence. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision and dismissed the appeal, establishing that departmental authorities must independently scrutinize evidence rather than blindly rely on inquiry recommendations when allegations are unproven.

  Questions settled

  • Can an order of dismissal from service be passed solely on the ground that the employee failed to join the inquiry proceedings?
  • Is it incumbent upon the prosecution to prove allegations through evidence even if the accused employee does not participate in the inquiry?
  • Whether departmental authorities are required to independently scrutinize available evidence rather than solely relying on the recommendations of an Inquiry Officer?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Secretary, Government Of Balochistan, through EDO (Revenue), Kalat2020 CLC 1561 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-09-17Read full judgment →
• Chief Secretary, Government of Balochistan, Quetta and others vs Asmatullah Kakar2020 SCMR 1678 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-18
  service recorddate of birth correctioncivil servantservice tribunalsuperannuationestoppeldeclaratory decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the Balochistan Service Tribunal's judgment, which permitted a civil servant to alter his date of birth in service records based on a prior civil court decree. The core legal question was whether a civil servant can change their recorded date of birth decades after joining service, and whether a declaratory decree obtained without impleading the employer is binding on the government. The Supreme Court held that the date of birth recorded at the time of entry into government service is final and cannot be altered, except for clerical errors, as mandated by the Balochistan Government Initial Appointment to the Civil Service Posts (Age and Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2012. The Court emphasized that a civil court decree obtained without impleading the employer is not binding on the government. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the service appeal was hopelessly time-barred, as the respondent had acquiesced to the rejection of his request in 1991. The judgment reinforces the principle that service records are final and cannot be reopened based on belated, non-binding civil declarations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant alter their date of birth in service records after it has been initially recorded at the time of joining?
  • Is a declaratory decree regarding a date of birth binding on the government if the government was not impleaded as a party in the suit?
  • Does the doctrine of estoppel apply to a civil servant who fails to challenge the rejection of a date of birth correction request for decades?
  • Are service appeals maintainable when filed after an inordinate delay following the rejection of a representation?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Postmaster Faisalabad, Gpo and another vs Muhammad Afzal2020 P SC 1232, 2020 SCMR 1029 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-27
  Dismissal from serviceCompulsory retirementMisappropriationEmbezzlementService TribunalDepartmental inquiryPenalty modificationJurisdiction of TribunalGovernment Servants (E&D) Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that converted a postal clerk's penalty of dismissal from service to compulsory retirement, despite upholding departmental findings of misappropriation and embezzlement. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal, having affirmed the charges, could arbitrarily reduce the penalty without providing cogent reasons. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by modifying the penalty in an arbitrary and whimsical manner, especially when no legally sustainable reasons were assigned for such exercise of discretion. The Court reiterated that the Tribunal's power under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act to modify departmental orders must be exercised carefully, judiciously, and with recorded reasons. It also affirmed that a regular inquiry can be dispensed with if sufficient documentary evidence establishes the charge, provided the departmental authority records cogent and justiciable reasons. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Tribunal's judgment and restoring the original penalty of dismissal from service.

  Read full judgment →
• Chief Executive Officer, QESCO, Quetta, etc vs Khuda Bakhsh, etc2020 KLR Labour & Service Cases 27 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-10-14
  date of birth correctionservice recordlabour lawlimitationservice booksuperannuationgrievance petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the concurrent findings of the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had allowed a respondent employee's grievance petition seeking rectification of his date of birth in his service record. The core legal question was whether an employee is entitled to seek an alteration of their recorded date of birth after over thirty-three years of service, specifically near the verge of retirement. The High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the lower courts' orders. The Court held that the respondent's request was time-barred and legally impermissible, noting that the date of birth recorded at the time of joining service is final. The Court emphasized that an employee cannot be permitted to challenge the authenticity of their service record after an inordinate delay of decades, particularly when approaching retirement. The key principle laid down is that once an entry of date of birth is made in an official service book, no subsequent alteration is permissible, and such belated claims are void and of no legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee seek alteration of their date of birth in the service book after decades of service?
  • Is a grievance petition for correction of date of birth maintainable when filed near the date of superannuation?
  • Does the date of birth recorded at the time of joining government service constitute a final entry?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Executive Officer QESCO and another vs Azizullah, Commercial2020 PLJ Quetta 29, 2020 PLC 96 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-08-06
  constitutional petitiontime scale up-gradationlabor disputepepco notificationburden of proofconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges concurrent judgments of the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal, whereby the grievance application of the respondent employees under Section 41 of the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010 was allowed and they were held entitled to two-step time scale up-gradation. The core legal question concerns the entitlement of the respondents to time scale up-gradation based on official memoranda issued by PEPCO. The Balochistan High Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower forums were based on proper appreciation of record and that the petitioners failed to substantiate their objections or disprove the entitlement under the applicable notification. The High Court laid down the principle that mere assertion of documents in pleadings without producing evidence and proving them in accordance with the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is insufficient to displace an employee's established claim for statutory or notified financial benefits. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee working in BPS-15 is entitled to two-step time scale up-gradation under the PEPCO Office Memorandum dated 22.04.2013?
  • Does mere mentioning of documents in pleadings suffice without proving them in accordance with the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of the labour courts when no illegality or irregularity is pointed out?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Executive Officer Gujranwala Electric Power Company (GEPCO)2020 PLJ Tr.C. (Labour) 52 · Punjab Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• Chief Executive Officer Gujranawala Electric Power Company (Gepco)2020 PLC 158 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2020-01-13
  date of birth correctionsuperannuationcivil court decreelabour lawservice recordnecessary partylimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Labour Court judgment directing the appellant, Gujranwala Electric Power Company, to correct the respondent's date of birth in service records from 1956 to 1960. The core legal question was whether an employee, having remained silent for the duration of his service, could unilaterally alter his date of birth based on a civil court decree obtained against NADRA without impleading the employer. The Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside the lower court's judgment, holding that the civil decree was not binding on the employer as they were not a party to those proceedings. The Tribunal found the respondent's evidence unreliable, noting that NADRA records consistently reflected the 1956 date and that the respondent had failed to challenge his recorded age for decades. The key principle laid down is that a civil court decree for date of birth correction is ineffective against an employer if the employer was not impleaded in the suit, and an employee cannot seek to alter their date of birth after long service.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil court decree for the correction of an employee's date of birth binding on an employer who was not a party to the suit?
  • Can an employee seek to correct their date of birth in service records after a long period of service?
  • Does the failure to implead an employer in a suit for declaration of date of birth render the resulting decree ineffective against the employer?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Executive Officer and 2 others vs Khuda Bakhsh and 2 others2020 [M] C L R 1318, 2020 KLR Labour & Service Cases 27, 2021 PLJ Quetta 31, · Balochistan High Court · 2019-10-14
  service recorddate of birth correctionlabour lawservice bookbelated claimconstitutional petitionretirement age
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the judgments of the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had allowed an employee’s grievance petition to rectify his date of birth in his service record. The respondent, employed since 1983, sought to change his recorded date of birth from 1958 to 1962 after thirty-three years of service, alleging tampering. The core legal question was whether an employee is entitled to seek the alteration of their date of birth in the service book at the verge of retirement after decades of service. The High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the lower courts' orders. The Court held that once a date of birth is recorded in the service book at the time of joining, it becomes final and cannot be altered subsequently. Emphasizing the principle of finality, the Court ruled that an employee cannot challenge the authenticity of their service record after an inordinate delay, particularly when approaching retirement, as such belated claims are not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee seek the alteration of their date of birth in the service book after an inordinate delay of several decades?
  • Is a date of birth recorded in an employee's service book at the time of joining considered final?
  • Are courts permitted to entertain a grievance petition for the correction of a date of birth filed at the verge of an employee's retirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Commissioner Of Inland Revenue, Ltu, Islamabad and another vs Muhammad Javed Paracha and others2020 PLC (C.S.) 1207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-02
  service lawresignationwilful absencedisciplinary proceedingsgovernment servanttransferreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the removal from service of a government employee and instead accepted his resignation. The employee had been on extended leave for several years and, upon the expiry of his leave, requested a transfer to his native city, stating that his application should be treated as a resignation if the transfer was not granted. The department denied the transfer and the leave extension, subsequently initiating disciplinary proceedings for wilful absence and imposing the penalty of removal. The core legal question was whether the department was justified in initiating disciplinary proceedings for absence when the employee had effectively tendered a conditional resignation. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal correctly set aside the removal order, reasoning that once the employee had tendered his resignation, the department should have accepted it rather than initiating disciplinary action. The Court affirmed the principle that a government servant cannot dictate their place of posting and that an employee who has tendered a resignation without withdrawal has no valid basis for reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant claim a legal right to be posted at a place of their own choosing?
  • Is a department justified in initiating disciplinary proceedings for wilful absence when an employee has already tendered a conditional resignation?
  • Does an employee who has tendered a resignation and taken private employment have a valid claim for reinstatement into government service?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Ltu, Islamabad and another vs Muhammad Javed Paracha and athers2020 SCMR 1432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-02
  service tribunalresignationremoval from servicewilful absencegovernment servantleave extensionreinstatementcivil petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions arise out of a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal whereby the penalty of removal from service imposed on a government servant for wilful absence from duty was converted into acceptance of his resignation, while his prayer for reinstatement was rejected. The Supreme Court considered whether the department was justified in initiating disciplinary proceedings and imposing a major penalty of removal when the employee had explicitly conditioned his further absence on treating his communication as a resignation. The Court held that once an employee tenders a conditional resignation upon the expiry of leave and refusal of transfer, the department ought to have accepted the resignation rather than initiating protracted disciplinary proceedings for unauthorized absence. The Court further affirmed that a government servant cannot claim a matter of right to be posted at a native station and that an unwithdrawn resignation coupled with unauthorized absence precludes any claim for reinstatement. Leave to appeal was refused as no question of law of public importance was raised.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a department is justified in initiating disciplinary proceedings for unauthorised absence after an employee has tendered a conditional resignation upon the expiry of leave?
  • Does a government servant possess a legal right to claim posting or service at a station of their own choice?
  • Whether an employee who has tendered a resignation and taken private employment is entitled to reinstatement into government service?
  Read full judgment →
• Defence Housing Authority vs Lubna Nizami and another2021 CLC 1034, 2020 LHC 2768 · Lahore High Court · 2020-10-12Read full judgment →
• Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue Regional (Rto) Peshawar vs Paper2020 P C T L R 418, 2020 SCMR 105, 2020 P SC 264, 2020 PTD 429 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-01
  sales tax evasionsearch without warrantclandestine removal of goodstax fraudstatutory interpretationtax reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from appeals filed by the Department against the judgments of the High Court and the Appellate Tribunal, which had set aside sales tax proceedings against the respondent company on the ground that a raid and search conducted under section 40A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was illegal. The core legal question was whether section 40A was lawfully invoked and whether the precedent in the Mega Tech case was applicable to the facts where documents were seized from premises outside the registered business location. The Supreme Court held that the statutory requirements for invoking section 40A were substantially fulfilled, that urgency justified acting without a magistrate's warrant, and that the Mega Tech case was distinguishable because that search occurred at the taxpayer's actual business premises. The appeals regarding central excise duty were dismissed as not pressed, while the sales tax appeal was allowed, validating the Department's search and subsequent proceedings. The key principle laid down is that section 40A permits warrantless searches without a magistrate's permission when there is reasonable apprehension of the removal of documents kept at un-registered premises, and prior precedents concerning registered business premises cannot be blindly applied to distinct factual scenarios.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a warrantless search under section 40A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is lawfully invoked when records are maintained at premises other than the registered business location?
  • Does the time gap of one day between the receipt of secret information and the execution of a raid necessarily imply that there was sufficient time to obtain a search warrant from a Magistrate under section 40 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Whether the precedent established in the Mega Tech case applies to searches conducted at premises outside the business or manufacturing premises of a taxpayer?
  • What constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements for recording grounds of belief under section 40A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Peshawar vs Cantonment Board, Peshawar2021 MLD 346, 2021 PLJ Peshawar 79, 2020 PHC 504 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-06-24Read full judgment →
• Chelo and another vs The State2020 YLR 1406 · Sindh High Court · 2019-07-22
  post-arrest bailrapecommon intentionfurther inquirytentative assessmentfacilitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a post-arrest bail application filed by applicants Chelo and Herchand seeking bail in Crime No. 04 of 2019 registered at Police Station Taluka Umerkot under Sections 376 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the applicants, whose alleged role was limited to facilitation and standing guard while the main co-accused allegedly committed rape, are entitled to post-arrest bail pending trial. The Sindh High Court held that the applicants' role was one of further inquiry, noting that the victim was able to raise cries which attracted witnesses, and that a tentative assessment of the record warranted relief. The court granted post-arrest bail to the applicants, laying down the principle that the question of sharing a common intention and the tentative assessment of material for bail require avoiding deeper appreciation of evidence at the bail stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused alleged to have played a role of facilitation in a crime under Section 376 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is entitled to post-arrest bail when their actual participation requires further probe?
  • To what extent should a court conduct a deeper appreciation of evidence versus a tentative assessment while deciding a post-arrest bail petition?
  • Does the question of sharing a common intention generally fall within the scope of further inquiry warranting the grant of bail?
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• Chaudhry Bashir Ahmed vs HESCO2020 SHC 1188 · Sindh High Court · 2020-01-15Read full judgment →
• Chaudhary Ward Ayub and another vs Malik Rizwan Ahmed and others2020 PLD Islamabad 250 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-04-25Read full judgment →
• Chaudhary Muhammad Saeed son of Chaudhary Muhammad Saleem, r/o2020 SC AJK 126 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Chancellor, Mirpur University Of Science And Technology/President Azad2020 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 115 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-11-08Read full judgment →
• Chaklala Cantonment Board, Rawalpindi through its Executive Officer vs Ahmad Kamal Nasir & others2020 P SC 1374, 2020 PTD 1398, 2020 SCP 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-12
  TIP TaxCantonment Boardimmovable property valuationstamp dutytaxation powerstatutory authorization
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals, filed by four Cantonment Boards, challenge the valuation of immovable property for the assessment of Transfer of Immovable Property Tax (TIP Tax). The core legal question is whether Cantonment Boards possess the statutory authorization and legal mechanism to unilaterally determine and fix a higher market value of property for TIP Tax than the valuation table notified by the District Collector under the Stamp Act, 1899. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that Cantonment Boards lack explicit statutory authorization under the Cantonments Act, 1924, or a proper legal framework with criteria and public representation to unilaterally assess property value, violating the constitutional mandate of Article 77 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Court laid down the principle that taxation and valuation mechanisms imposing financial burdens must be strictly backed by clear statutory authorization, and administrative harmony in determining property valuation across federal, provincial, and local authorities is essential to avoid executive disorder and public inconvenience.

  Questions settled

  • Do Cantonment Boards have statutory authorization to unilaterally determine the value of immovable property for the purpose of assessing TIP Tax?
  • Can a tax be levied or assessed without an express authorization given by law under the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Does a lack of a legal mechanism, procedure, and criteria for fixing property market values render executive tax assessment invalid?
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• Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation and others vs Konish2020 PLD Supreme Court 261, 2020 PSC 635, 2020 SCP 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-24
  tort of negligenceduty of carecontemporaneous licenseeslicensor and licenseedamagescable layingcivil liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing the appeal of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. (PTCL) against a trial court decree awarding damages to the respondent, Konish, for the destruction of saplings and plants. Konish had entered into a contract with the National Highway Authority (NHA) in 1995 to plant and nurture trees along certain roads. Subsequently, NHA permitted PTCL to lay an underground optic fibre cable, during which PTCL's operations damaged Konish's plants. The core legal question concerned the duty of care owed between two independent licensees operating simultaneously on the same land under a common licensor. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a legal duty of care exists between contemporaneous licensees to ensure that the working of one license does not interfere with or damage the other, provided the latter licensee has actual or constructive notice of the prior licensee's operations. The Court laid down the principle that the Caparo test of foreseeability, proximity, and fairness applies to determine tortious liability in such circumstances, and a licensee working its grant later in time bears liability for resulting damage.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal duty of care owed by one licensee to another when both hold independent licenses to operate simultaneously on the same land under a common licensor?
  • Does the deposit of a security sum by a licensee with the licensor to cover potential damages absolve it from tortious liability towards another independent licensee?
  • Can knowledge of a third-party contractor employed by a licensee be imputed to the principal licensee for the purpose of establishing awareness of a prior licensee's operations?
  • How do the principles of foreseeability, proximity, and fairness apply to determine negligence between two independent parties without a direct contractual relationship?
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• Chairman, National Highway Authority and another vs M/s Moon Traders2020 IHC 78 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Chairman, National Highway Authority and another vs Messrs Moon2020 PLD Islamabad 361 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-04-20Read full judgment →
• Chairman, NAB through Prosecutor General vs Munawar Masih and another2020 KLR Criminal Cases 80, PLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Quetta) 688, PLD 2020 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• Chairman, Federal Land Commission vs Mst. Sanam Iqbal etc2020 LHC 1978, 2021 PLD Lahore 42 · Lahore High Court · 2020-09-16Read full judgment →
• Chairman Pwn vs Govt of KP2021 CLC 28, 2020 PHC 342 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-05-20Read full judgment →
• Chairman National Accountability Bureau through Prosecutor General, NAB, Islamabad vs Abdul Hakeem, General Manager Export, PSO, Karachi and 3 others2020 KLR Criminal Cases 170, 2020 PLJ Quetta 43, 2020 PLD Balochistan 10 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-10-03Read full judgment →
• Chairman and Managing Director, The Fertilizer's and Chemicals2020 P SC 560 · Supreme Court of IndiaRead full judgment →
• Ch. Shahid Mahmood vs NAB, etc2021 P Cr.LJ 71, 2020 LHC 1337 · Lahore High Court · 2020-05-07Read full judgment →