Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Arfan Akram vs StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-03
  murdercriminal appealforensic evidenceeyewitness testimonyconvictionabscondenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from a conviction for the murder of Irshad Bibi, who was shot dead outside her home. The petitioner, the deceased's son-in-law, was convicted by the trial court under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with the sentence subsequently commuted to life imprisonment by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had successfully proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, given the evidence presented, including eyewitness testimony and forensic reports. The Supreme Court examined the record, noting the prompt reporting of the incident, the reliability of the natural witnesses, and the positive forensic evidence linking the recovered weapon to the crime scene. The Court held that the prosecution had proven its case to the hilt, finding no grounds to interfere with the conviction. The judgment reinforces the principle that consistent, natural eyewitness testimony, corroborated by forensic evidence and the accused's unexplained abscondence, is sufficient to sustain a conviction in a murder case.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of a natural witness who is an inmate of the crime scene sufficient to sustain a conviction?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon wedded with forensic casing provide corroboration for a murder charge?
  • Does the abscondence of an accused person militate against their defense during trial?
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• Aqeel Shahzad and others vs Government Of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others2020 PLC (C.S.) 1190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-22
  service regularizationmarket committee employeesfundamental rightspublic servantsservice structurearbitrary terminationstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against the Peshawar High Court's judgments regarding the regularization of services for employees of the Peshawar Market Committee. The core legal question was whether long-serving employees, appointed between 1994 and 2010 under erstwhile laws, were entitled to regularization or if their services could be terminated due to the absence of a formal service structure at the time of their initial recruitment. The Supreme Court held that the termination of these employees was illegal and oppressive, particularly given their long, unblemished service records and the protection afforded by Rule 71(v) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Agricultural Produce Markets General Rules, 2011. The Court emphasized that the appointing authority under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Agricultural and Livestock Produce Markets Act, 2007, is the Market Committee, and that long-serving employees cannot be treated as 'rolling stones' or subjected to fresh recruitment processes. The ratio established is that existing employees are entitled to protection and absorption under the new regulatory framework, and arbitrary termination of such employees violates their fundamental rights and the specific protections provided by the governing rules.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of a Market Committee considered public servants under the law?
  • Does Rule 71(v) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Agricultural Produce Markets General Rules, 2011, protect existing employees from termination?
  • Can the government terminate long-serving employees on the grounds that their initial appointments lacked a formal service structure?
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• Aqeel Shahzad and others vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secreatry, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others2020 SCMR 1425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-22
  Market Committee employeesregularization of servicetermination of servicepublic servantsstatutory rulesservice structurePeshawar Market Committeefundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals arose out of conflicting Peshawar High Court judgments concerning the termination and regularization of long-serving employees of the Peshawar Market Committee appointed between 1994 and 2010. The government and the Market Committee contended that the initial appointments were made without a formal service structure or statutory instructions, justifying their termination and fresh recruitment under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Agricultural and Livestock Produce Markets Act, 2007, and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Agricultural Produce Markets General Rules, 2011. The Supreme Court held that the employees were lawfully appointed by the competent authority and had rendered unblemished service for decades. Terminating them while initiating fresh recruitment violated their fundamental rights and contravened Rule 71(v) of the Rules 2011, which explicitly protects existing employees by allowing them to continue in service or be absorbed. Consequently, the Court set aside the termination orders and directed the authorities to consider regularizing the appellants' services in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does Rule 71(v) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Agricultural Produce Markets General Rules, 2011 protect existing employees from termination upon the notification of a new service structure?
  • Can long-serving Market Committee employees appointed by a competent authority be terminated solely on the ground of an absent initial service structure?
  • Whether an order of termination issued in violation of statutory service rules protecting existing staff is legally sustainable?
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• Aqeel Feroz vs Shahid Jamil Sethie2020 MLD 1669, 2020 IHC 112 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-06-08
  specific performanceagreement to sellearnest moneyequitable reliefclean hands doctrinereadiness and willingnessdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular First Appeal arises from a judgment and decree passed by the Senior Civil Judge-II, Islamabad-East, which dismissed the appellant's suit for specific performance, permanent, and mandatory injunction regarding a sale agreement dated 02.04.2005. The core legal questions involve whether the appellant was ready and willing to perform his obligations under the agreement, whether the plaintiff in a specific performance suit must deposit the balance sale consideration to show bona fides, and whether equitable relief should be denied due to the plaintiff's conduct and delay. The court held that specific performance is an equitable and discretionary relief, and a plaintiff who fails to demonstrate readiness by depositing the balance sale consideration when directed or delays performance is disentitled to such relief under the maxims of equity. The court affirmed the dismissal of the suit for specific performance but modified the decree to order the return of the earnest money along with bank markup/interest to balance the equities between the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Is a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of a contract required to deposit the balance sale consideration in court to demonstrate bona fides?
  • Can specific performance be denied on the grounds of delay and inequitable conduct of the plaintiff?
  • Whether the grant of specific performance is a matter of right or a discretionary relief based on equity?
  • Should a vendor returning earnest money after a prolonged period be ordered to pay markup or interest at the bank rate?
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• Aqal Khan vs The State and another2020 SCMR 1431 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-03
  post-arrest bailmurdercommunity of intentionfurther inquirycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition, converted into an appeal, arises from the refusal of lower courts to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner, Aqal Khan, who was implicated in a murder case along with his co-accused brother. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner, allegedly sharing a community of intention and accused of recovering the deceased's pistol subsequent to the incident, is entitled to post-arrest bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the co-accused singularly targeted the deceased during an unanticipated encounter, and the first information report lacked details regarding the alleged snatching of the deceased's gun. Consequently, the Court ruled that the cumulative circumstances of the case brought the petitioner's matter within the scope of further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The appeal was allowed, and the petitioner was granted bail subject to furnishing requisite security bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a co-accused without a direct fatal attribution is entitled to post-arrest bail when the case falls within the purview of further inquiry?
  • Does the absence of details in the first information report regarding a recovered weapon constitute grounds for bail under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Application For Release Of Funds To Be Paid By Bahria Town To The Government Of Sindh Pursuant To Order Dated 21.3.2019_ In the matter of vs N_a2020 SCMR 2122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-20
  fund utilizationBahria Townimplementation benchpublic utility projectssupervisory commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from applications filed by the Advocate General for Sindh, the Attorney General for Pakistan, and the Malir Development Authority regarding the utilization of substantial funds and accrued profit/markup deposited by Bahria Town pursuant to an earlier order of the Supreme Court dated 21.03.2019. The core legal question concerned the mechanism, supervision, and governance framework for the disbursement and utilization of these funds for public utility projects in the Province of Sindh. The Court held that the funds should be disbursed and utilized under the supervision of a high-powered commission composed of voting and non-voting members, headed by a Chairman, with all major decisions and project selections subject to the final approval of the Implementation Bench of the Supreme Court. The key principle laid down is that large-scale public funds generated through court directives must be administered through a transparent, structured commission subject to continuous judicial oversight and compliance mechanisms.

  Questions settled

  • How should funds deposited by Bahria Town pursuant to the Supreme Court order be utilized and supervised?
  • What is the composition and tenure of the high-powered commission established for the disbursement of funds?
  • Are the decisions of the commission regarding project selection and financial matters subject to the approval of the Supreme Court's Implementation Bench?
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• Anwar vs The State2020 MLD 841 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-10-29
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtocular evidenceidentification paradeforensic reportdeath sentenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in light of alleged discrepancies in ocular testimony, identification procedures, and the recovery of the crime weapon. The Court held that the prosecution's evidence was shaky, untrustworthy, and failed to inspire confidence. Key discrepancies included contradictory statements regarding the visibility during the incident, the duration of firing, and the identification of the accused. Furthermore, the Court noted that the identification parade was procedurally flawed as it was supervised by a police officer rather than a judicial magistrate, and the delayed forensic analysis of the recovered weapon rendered it unreliable. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reaffirms the principle that in criminal cases, any doubt in the prosecution's evidence must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right, not grace.

  Questions settled

  • Does an identification parade supervised by a police officer rather than a judicial magistrate lose its evidentiary value?
  • What is the effect of delayed forensic analysis of a crime weapon and empty shells on the prosecution's case?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when ocular witnesses provide contradictory accounts regarding the visibility and duration of an incident?
  • Is the benefit of doubt in criminal cases a matter of right or grace for the accused?
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• Anwar Khan vs Chairman WAPDA, WAPDA House and 2 others2020 PLC (C.S.) 136 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-05-06
  constitutional petitionmaintainabilitystatutory ruleswrit jurisdictionPESCOpublic employment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a constitutional petition before the Peshawar High Court seeking a declaration that the refusal of the respondents to appoint him against the vacant post of Driver was illegal, and prayed for a direction for his appointment. The core legal question addressed was whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is maintainable against the Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO) in the absence of statutory rules or violation of any law or constitutional right. The Court held that PESCO is a company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance and lacks statutory rules, and since the petitioner failed to point out the violation of any statutory rules, law, or constitutional right, the constitutional petition was not maintainable. The key principle laid down is that the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked against a corporate entity lacking statutory rules when no statutory violation or infringement of a constitutional right is established.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against PESCO in the absence of statutory rules?
  • Can the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court be invoked without establishing the violation of a legal or constitutional right?
  • Does the refusal to appoint a person to a post in a non-statutory body give rise to a valid claim under Article 199 of the Constitution?
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• Anwar alias Saud Khan Bugti vs The State2020 MLD 786 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-21
  post-arrest bailaerial firingfurther inquirymurdercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant Anwar alias Saeed Khan Bugti in Sessions Case No.408 of 2018 arising from Crime No.35 of 2018 registered at Police Station Taluka for offences under sections 302, 324, 148, 149, and 337H(2) of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to post-arrest bail when specific roles of causing fatal injuries were attributed to co-accused, and the only role assigned to the applicant was making aerial firing while leaving the scene of the incident. The Sindh High Court held that the case of the applicant falls within the ambit of subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as no injury was attributed to him and his case called for further inquiry. The court laid down the principle that where an accused is not assigned any active role of causing injuries to the deceased or injured witnesses and merely allegedly indulged in aerial firing upon leaving the scene, his case warrants further inquiry under section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, entitling him to post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused assigned only the role of aerial firing while leaving the scene of the crime is entitled to post-arrest bail under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the absence of any specific injury attributed to an accused bring his case within the scope of further inquiry?
  • Can long incarceration combined with a tentative assessment of a minor role justify the grant of bail in a case under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Anwar Ali vs District Magistrate Dir Upper & others2020 PLD Peshawar 44, 2020 PHC 12 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-05Read full judgment →
• Anwar Ahmad vs Iqbal Ahmad and others2020 YLR 1967 · Sindh High Court · 2019-10-31Read full judgment →
• Anurag Soni vs State of Chhattisgarh2020 P SC (Crl) 897 · Supreme Court of India · 2019-04-09
  rapefalse promise to marryconsent on misconception of factbreach of promisecriminal appealpresumption of absence of consent
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment and order of the High Court of Chhattisgarh confirming the conviction of the appellant-accused for the offence of rape under Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether sexual intercourse obtained on a false promise to marry constitutes rape or mere breach of promise, and whether the prosecutrix's consent was vitiated under Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code due to a misconception of fact. The Supreme Court held that if the accused had no intention to marry the prosecutrix from the very inception and obtained consent by making a false promise, such consent is vitiated by a misconception of fact, amounting to rape under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court laid down that a distinction must be drawn between a mere breach of promise and a false promise given from the outset with mala fide intent. Consequently, the conviction was upheld, though the sentence of imprisonment was reduced from ten years to the minimum prescribed period of seven years.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sexual intercourse obtained on the basis of a false promise to marry amounts to rape under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code?
  • Does consent given by a prosecutrix under a misconception of fact regarding marriage vitiate consent pursuant to Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code?
  • What is the distinction between a mere breach of a promise to marry and a false promise made from the inception with mala fide intent?
  • When does Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act apply regarding the statutory presumption of absence of consent in prosecutions for rape?
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• Anti-Narcotics Force, Rawalpindi through Regional Director vs Ali Shah2021 YLR 429, PLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Lahore) 1729 · Lahore High Court · 2020-10-20
  narcoticsconfiscation of vehicleinnocent ownerburden of proofControl of Narcotic Substances Actcustody of vehicle
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order passed by the Special Court (CNS), Rawalpindi, which granted the custody of a vehicle to its owner, the respondent, and dismissed the Anti-Narcotics Force's application for its confiscation. The vehicle had been seized during the investigation of a narcotics case, but the accused persons were subsequently acquitted. The core legal question was whether the vehicle could be confiscated under Section 32 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, despite the owner not being an accused and the lack of evidence regarding his knowledge of the vehicle's illicit use. The Court held that the vehicle could not be confiscated. It affirmed the trial court's order, reasoning that the prosecution failed to prove the owner's knowledge of the criminal activity. The key principle laid down is that under Section 32 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, the confiscation of a vehicle used in narcotics trafficking is conditional upon proving that the owner had knowledge that the vehicle was being used for the commission of the offence; absent such proof, an innocent owner is entitled to the return of their property.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vehicle used in a narcotics offence be confiscated under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, if the owner was unaware of the illicit activity?
  • Does the burden of proof lie on the prosecution to establish that a vehicle owner had knowledge of the crime before the vehicle can be confiscated?
  • Is an innocent owner entitled to the return of a vehicle seized during a narcotics investigation after the accused are acquitted?
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• Anti-Narcotics Force Regional Directorate Sindh through Deputy Director2020 YLR 1453 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-05
  appeal against acquittalnarcotics controldelayed chemical examiner reportnon-association of public witnessessafe custody of case propertydouble presumption of innocencebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal challenged the judgment of the trial court acquitting the respondent of charges under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, relating to the alleged recovery of eleven kilograms of Charas. The core legal questions involved the reliability of police testimony without independent corroboration, the failure to associate public witnesses despite availability, unexplained delays in transmitting samples to the chemical examiner, and the strict criteria for interfering with an acquittal order. The Sindh High Court held that the trial court's evaluation of evidence—highlighting missing daily diary entries, contradictions regarding the transport, absence of safe custody of samples, and lack of independent verification under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—was based on a possible and plausible view. Reaffirming that a double presumption of innocence attaches to an acquittal, the court ruled that appellate interference is unwarranted unless the impugned judgment is perverse, arbitrary, or suffering from gross misreading of evidence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained delay in sending recovered narcotic samples to the chemical examiner renders the report unreliable?
  • Does the failure of law enforcement to associate public witnesses during an alleged recovery in a populated area vitiate the proceedings?
  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with an order of acquittal simply because a different view of the evidence is possible?
  • Is the omission to mention departure diary entries in the FIR and recovery mashirnama fatal to the prosecution's case?
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• Anthony Roy (Deceased) through Legal Heirs vs Prime Minister Of Islamic2020 PLJ SC 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-23
  service tribunaldismissal from servicegross negligencepublic procurementdepartmental inquiryrailwaysoverpayment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing an appeal filed by the deceased appellant, a Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer in Pakistan Railways, against his dismissal from service for alleged fraud, embezzlement, and gross negligence in procuring and verifying bills for Bitumen Tape. The core legal questions involved whether due process was followed during the departmental inquiries and whether the charges of financial embezzlement and negligence were substantiated by the record. The Supreme Court held that while there was no evidence of direct misappropriation, embezzlement, or personal enrichment by the appellant, the charges of gross negligence, carelessness, and failure to perform duties diligently—resulting in a significant financial loss to the public exchequer through open-ended tender quantities and unverified bill approvals—were fully established through three successive inquiries. Consequently, the Court upheld the penalty of dismissal from service and dismissed the appeal, establishing the principle that gross negligence and supervisory failure in public procurement justify the extreme penalty of dismissal even in the absence of direct proof of personal misappropriation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the penalty of dismissal from service can be sustained on the ground of gross negligence and carelessness when direct evidence of embezzlement or personal misappropriation is lacking?
  • Does an open-ended tender quantity in public procurement contracts resulting in overpayment constitute sufficient ground for disciplinary action?
  • Whether minor procedural defects in a preliminary fact-finding inquiry vitiate subsequent formal departmental inquiries where the accused was given full opportunity of defense?
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• Anthony Roy (decd) through Legal Heirs vs The Prime Minister of Islamic2020 PLC (C.S.) 959, 2020 P SC 1246, 2020 SCMR 1053, 2020 SCP 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-23
  service tribunaldismissal from servicegross negligenceembezzlementdepartmental inquiryopen-ended tenderPakistan Railways
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing an appeal filed by the deceased appellant against his dismissal from service for alleged fraud and embezzlement of public funds in connection with the procurement of Bitumen Tape by Pakistan Railways. The core legal question was whether the appellant was rightly found guilty of embezzlement and whether his dismissal was sustainable based on the record. The Supreme Court held that while there was no evidence of direct misappropriation, embezzlement, or personal enrichment by the appellant, the record firmly established gross negligence, carelessness, and failure to perform official duties diligently by leaving tender quantities open-ended and mechanically verifying bills for unsupplied material, resulting in substantial financial loss to the exchequer. The Court ruled that the penalty of dismissal was fully sustainable on the ground of gross negligence and upheld the Tribunal's judgment. The key principle laid down is that a public servant can be legally penalized with dismissal from service for gross negligence and dereliction of duty resulting in financial loss, even in the absence of direct proof of personal embezzlement or misappropriation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public servant be dismissed from service for gross negligence and financial loss in the absence of direct proof of personal embezzlement?
  • Does keeping tender quantities open-ended and failing to verify utilized materials constitute actionable professional misconduct?
  • Whether the findings of multiple departmental inquiries affirmed by the Service Tribunal warrant interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of legal or factual error?
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• Ansar and another vs State, etcPLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Lahore) 289 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-10
  pre-arrest bailcross-version casefurther inquiryrecovery of weaponsmala fidecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a request for pre-arrest bail under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, arising from a cross-version criminal case involving offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question addressed is whether the petitioner is entitled to pre-arrest bail in a situation where both parties sustained injuries during the same occurrence, and whether the prosecution's need for recovery of weapons constitutes sufficient grounds for refusal. The Court held that in cases involving counter-versions of the same incident, the matter necessitates further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to determine the aggressor, a task reserved for the trial court after evidence is recorded. Furthermore, the Court established that the necessity of recovery does not automatically preclude the grant of pre-arrest bail, as investigation can proceed without custodial interrogation. Consequently, the Court confirmed the petitioner's pre-arrest bail, emphasizing that the prosecution's need for recovery does not override the entitlement to bail when the case requires a deeper judicial probe.

  Questions settled

  • Does a cross-version case where both parties sustained injuries constitute grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the need for recovery of a weapon a sufficient legal ground to refuse pre-arrest bail?
  • Can the element of mala fide for pre-arrest bail be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a case?
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• Anjuman-e-Khuddam-ul-Qur'an, Faisalabad through Dr. Abdul Sami,2020 PLD Supreme Court 390, 2020 P SC 1214, 2020 SCP 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-14
  waqfnamaregistered documentcourt feeburden of proofcontumacious conductspecific reliefregistration manual
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that had set aside concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts regarding the validity of a registered waqfnama. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the waqfnama, the admissibility of certified copies of registered documents, and the consequences of the plaintiff's failure to pay court fees. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its assessment of evidence, particularly regarding the comparison of thumb impressions on the original document versus the certified copy, which is a natural consequence of the registration process under the Registration Manual. The Court ruled that the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proof to rebut the sanctity of a registered document. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the plaintiff's contumacious failure to pay the requisite court fees warranted dismissal. The judgment reaffirms that registered documents carry a presumption of validity, requiring strong, cogent evidence to rebut, and that courts must strictly enforce the payment of court fees, as failure to do so, even if initially overlooked by lower courts, is a ground for dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere fact that a defendant did not press the issue of deficient court fees at trial relieve the court of its obligation to ensure the correct court fee is paid?
  • Can a court dismiss a suit, appeal, or revision for non-payment of court fees if the plaintiff was not previously granted an opportunity to make up the deficiency?
  • Does the difference in the placement of thumb impressions and endorsements between an original registered document and its certified copy necessarily indicate forgery?
  • Is a suit for cancellation of a document under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, the appropriate remedy when a plaintiff alleges that a registered document was executed by an imposter?
  • Does the failure to mention CNIC numbers of the transferor or transferee in a waqfnama render the document invalid?
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• Anjum Rehmat and another vs Squadron Leader (R) Shaikh Ghulam Sadiq2020 CLC 1555 · Sindh High Court · 2020-02-27Read full judgment →
• Anjum Badar vs Province of Sindh and Others2020 SHC 238 · Sindh High Court · 2020-03-12Read full judgment →
• Anjleena vs SSP District Umerkot & others2020 SHC 780 · Sindh High Court · 2020-10-05Read full judgment →
• Anis Ibrahim vs The State through Advocate-General, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Muzaffarabad and another2021 PLJ SC (AJ & K) 39, 2020 P SC 1315, 2020 MLD 1424 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-11-05
  direct appealcriminal appealpetition for leave to appeallimitation periodconversion of appealanti-terrorismmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court which partly accepted appeals against the trial court's conviction under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Anti-Terrorism Act, 2014, setting aside the sentence under section 37 while maintaining the rest. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the competency of a direct appeal against the High Court's judgment. The core legal question was whether a direct appeal is competent against a High Court judgment upholding a conviction, and whether a time-barred application to convert such a non-maintainable direct appeal into a petition for leave to appeal can be entertained. The Supreme Court held that a direct appeal in criminal matters is only competent under Article 42(11) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, where the High Court has reversed an acquittal and sentenced the accused to death or imprisonment for life, and since the High Court merely upheld the conviction, a direct appeal is not maintainable. Furthermore, an application to convert a direct appeal into a petition for leave to appeal filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation is barred by time and cannot be entertained without sufficient explanation or an application for condonation of delay. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as non-maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Is a direct appeal to the Supreme Court competent against a High Court judgment that upholds a conviction passed by the trial court?
  • Can a time-barred application for the conversion of an incompetent direct appeal into a petition for leave to appeal be entertained without a proper explanation or application for condonation of delay?
  • What are the precise conditions under Article 42(11) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 for filing a direct criminal appeal before the Supreme Court?
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• Anees-Ur-Rehman vs Messrs Faysal Bank Limited through Manager2020 CLD 473 · Sindh High Court · 2019-10-07Read full judgment →
• Anees-ur-Rehman vs Faysal Bank Limited through Manager2020 P C T L R 1382 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-15Read full judgment →
• Anees Ahmad Khan vs The State2020 P Cr. L J 268 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-07-18
  post-arrest baildishonour of chequeguarantee chequeprohibitory clausefurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition filed by Anees Ahmad Khan seeking post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 198/18 registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Karachi Company, Islamabad, relating to the dishonour of a cheque. The core legal question was whether a guarantee cheque attracts the penal provisions of Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail when the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause. The Islamabad High Court held that the offence under Section 489-F does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, where grant of bail is the rule and refusal an exception, and further that provisions of Section 489-F are not attracted in cases involving guarantee cheques. Consequently, the petition was allowed and the petitioner was granted post-arrest bail. The key principles laid down are that guarantee cheques do not fall within the ambit of Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, creating a case for further inquiry, and that bail should generally be granted for offences outside the prohibitory clause.

  Questions settled

  • Does a guarantee cheque fall within the penal provisions of Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the grant of bail a rule and refusal an exception for offences not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the issuance of a guarantee cheque that is dishonoured make the case one of further inquiry under criminal law?
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• Andleeb Sahir Butt, Deputy Director, Public Relation Information2021 [M] C L R 421, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 421 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-07-29
  writ of quo-warrantopast and closed transactionservice matterappointment validityfrivolous petitionlocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a writ petition under section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, challenging the basic induction order and subsequent promotions of private respondent No.7 up to the post of Director General Public Relations B-20, alleging lack of qualification and fraudulent appointment. The core legal question was whether a settled appointment and past closed transactions confirmed by the Apex Court could be re-litigated through a fresh writ petition or a writ of quo-warranto decades later. The High Court held that the initial appointment of the private respondent had already attained finality having been declared valid by the Apex Court in previous litigation, and a writ of quo-warranto was not maintainable when the respondent was no longer holding the initial post and had been duly promoted. The court laid down the principle that past and closed transactions affirmed by the Supreme Court cannot be reopened through subsequent petitions by related parties, and filing frivolous belated service challenges constitutes an abuse of the process of law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appointment declared valid by the Apex Court can be re-challenged in a subsequent writ petition?
  • Can a writ of quo-warranto be maintained against a public servant who no longer holds the initial contested post having been subsequently promoted?
  • Whether a past and closed transaction concerning service appointments can be reopened after decades through a fresh constitutional petition?
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• Andaleeb Sahir Butt, Senior Most Deputy Director Information, DGPR, Aj&K, Muzaffarabad vs Azad Govt. of the State of Jammu & Kashmir through its Chief Secretary, Aj&K, Muzaffarabad and 12 others2020 P SC 156 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Anas Ahmed vs Federation of Pakistan and others2020 SHC 1310 · Sindh High Court · 2020-12-11Read full judgment →
• Anant kumar Parshotam vs Mem. of Managing Comt. Narayan Temple2020 SHC 247 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ana Khalid and 3 others vs The Vice-Chancellor University Of Education, Lahore and others2020 MLD 750 · Lahore High Court · 2019-12-09Read full judgment →
• Amshad Ali vs StatePLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 445 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-12
  narcoticschain of custodybenefit of doubtsafe transmissionchemical examiner reportcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the alleged possession of contraband charas. The core legal questions concern whether the prosecution successfully established the chain of custody for the recovered narcotics and whether the evidence presented was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Peshawar High Court found significant contradictions in the prosecution's case, including discrepancies in the motorcycle registration number, failure to produce the motorcycle as evidence, and a failure to prove the safe custody and transmission of samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL). Specifically, the court noted the absence of the official who transmitted the samples and the failure to examine the police official responsible for the Malkhana. Consequently, the court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that any break in the chain of custody or lapse in the control of possession of narcotic samples vitiates the reliability of the chemical report and entitles the accused to an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to prove the safe custody and transmission of narcotic samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory vitiate the prosecution's case?
  • Is the accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right when the prosecution's evidence contains significant contradictions?
  • Must the prosecution produce independent evidence to establish the safe custody of recovered contraband in the police Malkhana?
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• Amjad Mehmood vs Government Of Punjab through Chief Secretary and 62020 PLC (C.S.) 375 · Lahore High Court · 2019-06-14
  recruitment policyinterview marksjudicial reviewexecutive discretionpublic employmentRescue 1122
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Computer Telephone Wireless Operator (BPS-11) in the Punjab Emergency Service (Rescue 1122), challenged the validity of Clauses 8 and 9 of the Recruitment Policy 2010 of Rescue 1122. Under the policy, candidates for the post of Rescue and Safety Officer (BPS-16) were required to secure at least 50% marks in the interview, which evaluated traits such as appearance, communication skills, physique, clarity of speech, and manners. Having passed the written test but failed the interview, the petitioner argued that the interview criteria were unreasonable and that his existing service gave him a preferential right. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the formulation of recruitment policies and selection criteria falls within the exclusive domain of the executive. The Court ruled that judicial review of executive actions is limited to instances of proven mala fides or violations of fundamental rights, neither of which was established here, especially given the emergency nature of the department's services.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the courts can interfere with the recruitment policy and selection criteria formulated by an executive department in the absence of mala fides or violation of fundamental rights?
  • Does an existing lower-grade employee possess a preferential right to induction in a higher post advertised on open merit?
  • Can a candidate who passes a written test challenge the validity of interview qualifying marks after participating in the selection process and failing?
  Read full judgment →
• Amjad Khan vs Muhammad Irshad (decd) thr. his LRs2021 P SC 120, 2020 SCMR 2155, 2020 SCP 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-28
  Code of Civil Procedurewitness productionsummoning of witnessesconstitutional jurisdictionappellate discretionOrder XVI Rule 1 CPCwitness listcivil litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an Islamabad High Court judgment that reversed an appellate court's order permitting the petitioner to produce witnesses despite a failure to file a timely witness list. The core legal question was whether the embargo under Order XVI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies to witnesses produced voluntarily by a party without invoking the court's summoning power. The Supreme Court held that the embargo in Order XVI Rule 1 CPC is limited to witnesses summoned through the court's process and does not extend to witnesses produced voluntarily by parties on the day of evidence recording. The Court emphasized that the purpose of the rule is to prevent surprise, which is not jeopardized by voluntary production of witnesses related to existing pleadings. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ruling that the High Court improperly interfered with the appellate court's valid exercise of discretion. The principle established is that parties may voluntarily produce witnesses without a prior list, provided they do not cause surprise to the opposing party.

  Questions settled

  • Does the embargo in Order XVI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to witnesses produced voluntarily by a party without invoking the court's summoning power?
  • Under what circumstances should a High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with the discretion exercised by lower courts?
  • Is there a legal distinction between calling a witness through the court and producing a witness voluntarily in civil proceedings?
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• Amjad and another vs The State2020 YLR 1856 · Sindh High Court · 2019-11-25
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryprohibitory clauserecovery proceedingsnon-compliance with Section 103 Cr.P.C.hazardous materialGutkha
  Summary & questions settled

  This bail application concerns two applicants charged with the possession of hazardous Gutkha under Sections 269, 270, and 337-J of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to post-arrest bail given the alleged procedural irregularities in the police investigation and the nature of the offense. The Court held that the applicants were entitled to bail, noting that the prosecution failed to associate any private witnesses during the recovery proceedings, thereby violating the mandatory requirements of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, the Court observed a suspicious five-hour delay in reporting the incident and determined that the ingredients of Section 337-J of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 required determination through trial evidence, rendering the case one of further inquiry. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution fails to comply with mandatory procedural requirements regarding recovery and the ingredients of the offense remain to be established at trial, the case warrants further inquiry, entitling the accused to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate private witnesses during a recovery violate the mandatory requirements of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a charge under Section 337-J of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 automatically fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a case be considered one of further inquiry when the ingredients of the charged offense require evidence to be determined at trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Amjad and another vs The State and another2020 SCMR 2084 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-19
  murderbenefit of doubtsuppression of injuriesself-defenceocular accountcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the petitioners under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, while altering the death sentence to imprisonment for life for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution successfully established its case beyond a reasonable doubt in the face of suppressed injuries sustained by the accused and alternative versions of the incident involving a cross-version plea of self-defense and defense of honour. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that massive suppression of injuries endured by the accused and the screening of material witnesses cast grave doubts on the veracity of the ocular account, rendering the prosecution story improbable. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that the suppression of material facts and injuries on the person of the accused fatally undermines the prosecution case, and the benefit of any reasonable doubt arising therefrom must be extended to the accused, resulting in their acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of firearm injuries sustained by the accused on the same occasion fatally undermine the prosecution case?
  • Whether the benefit of doubt should be extended when the prosecution fails to explain injuries on the person of the accused?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code be sustained when the manner of occurrence is shrouded in doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Amjad alias Billa and another vs The State2020 P Cr. L J 991 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-28
  blasphemydeath sentencebenefit of the doubtdelayed FIRmandatory investigationcriminal appealocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and capital sentence reference arise from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under sections 295-C and 296 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing them to death, following an incident during a Mehfil-e-Milad where they were alleged to have created a disturbance, caused injuries, and uttered derogatory remarks. The core legal questions involved the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the belated addition of Section 295-C, the violation of mandatory investigation procedures under Section 156-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the reliability of the ocular account. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the charge beyond a reasonable doubt due to material contradictions, belated improvements, and procedural illegality in the investigation. The court laid down that criminal charges, especially under capital offenses involving blasphemy, require strict proof, mandatory compliance with special investigation procedures, and that any unexplained delays and glaring identification flaws entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained and considerable delay in lodging the first information report cast doubt on the veracity of the prosecution version?
  • What is the legal effect of conducting an investigation under Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in violation of the mandatory rank requirement specified in Section 156-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether material improvements and the belated addition of major penal provisions after several months can form the basis of a capital conviction?
  • Is an accused entitled to acquittal when independent eyewitnesses fail to identify them prior to trial and the core elements of the crime remain unproven?
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• Amjad Ali vs Mst. Shaheen Bibi and others2020 MLD 2011 · Lahore High Court · 2020-09-09Read full judgment →
• Amjad Ali vs Dr. Taqdees Naqaish and others2020 P Cr. L J 1583 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-07-16
  medical negligencecriminal negligenceQatl-e-Khataacquittalprivate complaintcommon intentionpost-arrest bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Judicial Magistrate passed in a private complaint, whereby respondents were acquitted under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 from charges relating to the death of the appellant's wife following a caesarean section. The core legal questions involved whether the medical practitioners were criminally negligent, amounting to Qatl-e-Khata under Section 318 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 applied to establish common intention. The Islamabad High Court held that every medical mishap or adverse outcome does not constitute criminal negligence, and liability requires proof of gross negligence or reckless disregard, which was absent in this case, particularly since the disciplinary body ultimately withdrew the censure finding no negligence. Furthermore, no pre-arranged plan or common intention under Section 34 was established. Consequently, the court upheld the acquittal and dismissed the appeal, ruling that no probability of conviction existed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether every medical mishap or death during medical treatment amounts to criminal negligence under Section 318 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What degree of negligence must be proved to establish criminal liability of a doctor for Qatl-e-Khata?
  • Can a trial court acquit an accused under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when there is no probability of conviction?
  • What are the essential prerequisites for the application of Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in medical negligence cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Amjad Ali vs Dr. Taqdees Naqaish and 5 othersPLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 1323 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-07-16
  medical negligencecriminal negligenceQatl-e-Khataacquittalcommon intentionprivate complaintpost-arrest bailquashing of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Judicial Magistrate, Islamabad-West, whereby respondents-doctors were acquitted under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a private complaint charging them with offenses under Sections 319, 322, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 following the death of the appellant's wife from complications after a caesarean section. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in acquitting the accused under Section 249-A CrPC on the ground that no case of criminal negligence or common intention was made out. The Islamabad High Court held that medical mishaps do not automatically attract criminal liability unless gross negligence or reckless disregard is established, and that the prosecution failed to prove any pre-arranged plan or common intention under Section 34 PPC, or any specific unlawful act leading to Qatl-e-Khata under Section 318 PPC. The court affirmed the acquittal, laying down the principle that criminal prosecution of medical professionals requires clear expert or medical opinion of gross negligence, and that every unfortunate medical outcome does not constitute a culpable criminal act.

  Questions settled

  • Whether every medical mishap or death during hospital treatment amounts to criminal negligence under Section 318 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What degree of negligence must be proved to hold a medical professional criminally liable for Qatl-e-Khata?
  • Can Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be invoked against multiple doctors without proof of a pre-arranged plan or prior meeting of minds?
  • Whether the trial court was justified in acquitting the accused under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when no probability of conviction existed?
  Read full judgment →
• Amjad Ali Khan vs The State, etc2020 KLR Supreme Court 246, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 299, 2020 P SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-13
  superdarinarcoticscase propertyconfiscationvehicle registrationphysical verificationopen transfer letterinterim custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition and its reversal of a trial court's order granting 'superdari' (temporary custody) of a vehicle seized in a narcotics case. The petitioner claimed ownership based on an open transfer letter and subsequent registration after the vehicle's seizure. The Supreme Court addressed whether a vehicle involved in an offence under the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997 (CNSA) can be released on superdari and whether its title can be transferred during trial. The Court held that under Section 74 of the CNSA, general provisions of the Cr.P.C. regarding custody do not apply. A vehicle may only be released to a lawful owner who is not an accused, associate, or relative, and who had no knowledge of the offence. Furthermore, the Court ruled that once a vehicle becomes case property, there is a freeze on its legal title; any transfer by the Motor Registration Authority during trial is without lawful authority. The petition was dismissed.

  Read full judgment →
• Amir Shehzad and another vs Additional District Judge, Khanewal and others2020 CLC 1125 · Lahore High Court · 2019-11-05Read full judgment →
• Amir Muhammad vs Waliullah Khayal2020 PLD Peshawar 158 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-03-06Read full judgment →
• Amir Hassan vs The State2020 SHC 650 · Sindh High Court · 2020-08-17
  post-arrest bailGutka and Manpuri Actprohibitory clausepolice witnessesfurther inquirycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, Amir Hassan, who was charged under sections 4, 5, and 8 of the Sindh Prohibition of Preparation, Manufacturing, Storing, Sale and Using of Gutka and Manpuri Act, 2019, following the recovery of alleged Gutka sachets. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail pending trial, given the nature of the offences and the evidentiary circumstances. The court held that the applicant was entitled to bail, noting that the prosecution's case relied entirely on police witnesses without independent corroboration or mashirs of recovery. The court emphasized that the offences charged did not fall within the prohibitory clause of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that continued incarceration pending trial, where the accused is no longer required for investigation, serves no useful purpose. The key principle laid down is that where evidence is solely based on police officials and the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause, the scale of justice tilts in favor of granting bail to avoid unjustified incarceration pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of independent witnesses or mashirs of recovery entitle an accused to bail when the prosecution case rests solely on police officials?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail if the offence charged does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should an accused be kept in custody pending trial when they are no longer required for further investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Amin Jan vs The State, etc2020 MLD 1707, PLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 1201, 2020 PHC 144 · Peshawar High Court · 2020-02-14Read full judgment →
• Ameer Shah vs The State2020 SHC 538 · Sindh High Court · 2020-08-07
  criminal appealhurtocular evidencemedical corroborationdelay in FIRacquittal of co-accusedinterested witnessesappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal jail appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 336 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for causing permanent visual impairment to the injured by a crystal glass blow to the eye. The core legal questions involve the appreciation of ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence, the explanation of delay in lodging the FIR through a Justice of Peace order under Section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the acquittal of co-accused vitiates the conviction of the main appellant on the same evidence. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt through consistent ocular testimony and supporting medical evidence, and that the delay in the FIR was satisfactorily explained. The court affirmed the conviction, establishing that the mere relationship of witnesses does not discredit their testimony and that differential treatment of co-accused based on distinct roles is legally sound.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular testimony of injured and related witnesses can sustain a conviction when supported by medical evidence?
  • Does a delay in lodging the FIR vitiate the prosecution case when the delay is explained by resort to Section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the acquittal of co-accused persons automatically result in the acquittal of the main appellant tried on the same set of evidence?
  • Does the mere relationship of private witnesses to the victim render their testimony unreliable without proof of bias or enmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Ameer Nazim Hussain vs Shafique and others2020 SC AJK 104 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2020-11-26Read full judgment →
• Ameer Khan & Others vs Province Of Sindh & Others2020 SHC 1368 · Sindh High Court · 2020-12-18Read full judgment →
• Ameer Bux vs P.O Sindh & Others2020 SHC 694 · Sindh High Court · 2020-08-19Read full judgment →
• Ameer Bakhsh vs The State2020 MLD 783 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-09-20
  bail before arrestpre-arrest bailinstigationfurther inquirydirect approach to high courtcriminal proceduremurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal bail before arrest application filed by the applicant Ameer Bakhsh, seeking pre-arrest bail in FIR No.61 of 2019 registered at City Police Station Dera Murad Jamali under sections 302, 109, and 37 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the applicant, who was not present at the scene of the crime and was only charged with instigation, was entitled to confirmation of pre-arrest bail, and whether the High Court could directly entertain a bail application bypassing the trial court. The Balochistan High Court held that under exceptional circumstances, such as existing tribal enmity, an accused may directly approach the High Court instead of the Sessions Court. Furthermore, since the applicant was not present at the spot and the allegation of instigation required further inquiry, the court confirmed the ad-interim pre-arrest bail. The key principles laid down are that pre-arrest bail is designed to protect innocent persons from humiliation, that exceptional circumstances justify bypassing the trial court to approach the High Court directly for bail, and that a case of further inquiry is made out where an accused not present at the scene is charged solely with abetment or instigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused directly approach the High Court for pre-arrest bail instead of first approaching the trial court under exceptional circumstances?
  • Does an accused charged solely with instigation, and who was absent from the scene of the crime, make out a case for further inquiry justifying pre-arrest bail?
  • What are the foundational presumptions governing the concept of pre-arrest bail in criminal jurisprudence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ameer Ali vs The State2020 SHC 568 · Sindh High Court · 2020-08-10Read full judgment →
• Ameer Alam vs The State2020 MLD 847 · Sindh High Court · 2019-10-31
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryrecovery of hazardous materialGutkhanon-compliance with section 103 CrPCbailable offencespresumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This bail application arose from the arrest of the applicant for the alleged possession of Gutkha and Mawa, registered under sections 269, 270, and 337-J of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to post-arrest bail given the circumstances of the recovery and the nature of the alleged offences. The High Court observed that the prosecution failed to associate independent witnesses despite the public location of the incident, violating section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, the court noted discrepancies in the timing of the police report and the distance traveled. The court held that sections 269 and 270 are bailable, and regarding section 337-J, the essential ingredients required for conviction remained to be determined at trial, rendering the case one of further inquiry. Consequently, the court granted bail, reiterating the principle that the law cannot be stretched in favor of the prosecution at the bail stage and that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses in a recovery case constitute grounds for further inquiry under section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Are offences under sections 269 and 270 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 bailable?
  • Does the mere possession of Gutkha and Mawa satisfy the ingredients of section 337-J of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Ambreen Khatoon and others vs Mumtaz Bibi and others2021 PLJ SC 77, 2020 SCMR 643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-05
  inheritance mutationrevenue recordlegal heirscivil court jurisdictionwrit jurisdictionres judicatalegitimacy of marriage
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that directed Revenue authorities to incorporate the names of the respondents as legal heirs of the deceased, Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din Hasan, in the Revenue Record. The core legal question was whether the Revenue authorities could refuse to implement the findings of civil courts of competent jurisdiction which had already established the status of the respondents as the widow and son of the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the Revenue authorities are bound by the decisions of civil courts and cannot ignore established judicial findings regarding inheritance. The Court affirmed that the respondents' status as legal heirs was conclusively proven through evidence, including DNA testing and official records. The key principle laid down is that Revenue authorities lack the legal authority to disregard or refuse to implement final judgments of civil courts of competent jurisdiction, and such attempts to deny the rights of rightful heirs through technicalities constitute an abuse of the legal process.

  Questions settled

  • Are Revenue authorities legally bound to implement the findings of civil courts of competent jurisdiction regarding inheritance?
  • Can Revenue authorities refuse to update inheritance mutations when the status of legal heirs has been conclusively determined by civil courts?
  • Does the failure of Revenue authorities to implement a final civil court judgment regarding heirship constitute an abuse of the legal process?
  Read full judgment →
• Ambreen Khatoon & Others vs Mumtaz Bibi & Others2020 SCP 36 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-13
  inheritance mutationlegal heirscivil court decreerevenue authoritiesbinding judicial findingsdna evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition and directed revenue authorities to incorporate respondents No. 1 and 2 as legal heirs of the late Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din in the revenue record. The core legal question revolved around the status of respondents No. 1 and 2 as the lawful widow and son of the deceased, and whether revenue authorities could refuse to implement final judicial findings confirming that status. The Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact by courts of competent jurisdiction—supported by oral and documentary evidence, birth register entries, DNA test results, and CNICs—conclusively established the respondents as the legal heirs. The Court ruled that decisions of competent civil courts are binding on revenue authorities, and such authorities have no legal justification to refuse implementation of judicial decrees. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's order, emphasizing that technicalities cannot be exploited to perpetrate the disinheritance of widows and orphans, and accordingly dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether revenue authorities are bound to implement the final judgments and decrees of civil courts of competent jurisdiction regarding inheritance and legal heirship?
  • Can revenue authorities refuse to correct inheritance mutations when the status of the claimants as legal heirs has been conclusively determined by the civil courts?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding parentage and marriage, supported by DNA evidence and official records, can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Amb vs The State2020 YLR 300 · Federal Shariat Court · 2019-04-29
  criminal appealdacoityidentification paradeforensic science laboratory reportocular testimonyrecovery of weaponSection 103 CrPCbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for dacoity with murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given the reliance on ocular testimony and weapon recovery. The Federal Shariat Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, holding that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The Court established that in-court identification of previously unknown culprits is unreliable without a prior formal identification parade or descriptive benchmark. Furthermore, the Court ruled that unexplained delays in recording witness statements under Section 161 and Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 render such testimony unsafe. Regarding forensic evidence, the Court held that sending crime weapons and empty shells to the laboratory together after the weapon's recovery, rather than separately, creates suspicion of tampering and discredits the report. Finally, the Court emphasized that medical evidence is merely confirmatory, not corroborative, and cannot identify an accused, while failure to associate independent witnesses for recovery violates Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is an in-court identification of an accused reliable when no formal identification parade was conducted for unknown culprits?
  • Does the simultaneous submission of a recovered weapon and crime-scene empty shells to a forensic laboratory invalidate the forensic report?
  • Can medical evidence serve as corroborative evidence to identify an accused in a criminal trial?
  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses from the locality during a recovery violate Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Amb vs StatePLJ 2020 Cr.C. (FSC) 181 · Federal Shariat Court · 2019-04-24
  dacoity-murderocular testimonyidentification paradeforensic science laboratory reportrecovery of weaponchance witnesscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a trial court judgment for a dacoity-murder incident. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of identification evidence in a dark-night occurrence, the validity of recoveries made without independent witnesses, and the evidentiary value of forensic reports where the crime weapon and empty shell were sent for analysis simultaneously. The Federal Shariat Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found the ocular testimony unreliable due to the absence of an identification parade, unexplained delays in recording witness statements, and the inherent improbability of identifying assailants from a moving vehicle at night. Furthermore, the court discredited the recovery of the weapon due to non-compliance with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and criticized the forensic procedure of sending the weapon and empty shell together, which raises suspicion of tampering. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, establishing that simultaneous submission of crime weapons and casings for forensic analysis undermines the integrity of such evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is the simultaneous submission of a recovered crime weapon and a crime scene casing to a forensic laboratory sufficient to invalidate the forensic report?
  • Does the failure to conduct an identification parade for unknown suspects identified only in court render the identification unreliable?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the recovery of a crime weapon violates the mandatory requirements of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is medical evidence considered a corroborative piece of evidence that can independently connect an accused to a crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah vs The State2020 SHC 348 · Sindh High Court · 2020-05-08
  post-arrest bailarmed robberystatutory delaytentative assessmentfurther inquiryCovid-19 pandemic
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by an accused charged with armed robbery under Sections 392 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The accused was apprehended at the scene with stolen items and weapons, and the F.I.R. was registered promptly. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail based on claims of a fabricated case and statutory delay, particularly in light of the Covid-19 pandemic. The Court held that the application for bail must be dismissed. It determined that the prosecution presented sufficient tangible evidence linking the applicant to the offence, and the arguments raised did not warrant further inquiry. Regarding the claim of statutory delay, the Court held that the applicant failed to demonstrate the requisite period of detention under the Third Proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that bail cannot be granted on the ground of statutory delay without meeting the specific temporal requirements of the law, and that pandemic-related concerns do not automatically override the legal standards for custody regulation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a pandemic justify the relaxation of statutory requirements for bail based on delay?
  • What is the minimum period of detention required to invoke the ground of statutory delay under the Third Proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an accused claim entitlement to bail on the ground of statutory delay within four months of the alleged offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah Khan vs The State2020 MLD 1926 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-11-14
  white-collar crimemisappropriationextra-judicial confessionaccountability courtpension fraudburden of proofcorruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the Accountability Court, which convicted the appellant, a bank officer, for misappropriating public funds through fraudulent pension bills. The core legal question concerned the sufficiency of evidence—specifically the weight of extra-judicial confessions and documentary proof—to sustain a conviction for white-collar crime. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt through corroborated documentary evidence and the appellant's own extra-judicial confession, which was found to be voluntary and true. The court affirmed that the appellant’s failure to provide a credible defense regarding the source of deposited funds further solidified the conviction. A key principle laid down is that the standard of 'benefit of doubt' applied in ordinary criminal cases is not strictly applicable to white-collar crimes involving corruption, where the court must adopt a reformation-oriented approach to suppress national evils while ensuring no miscarriage of justice. The court emphasized that public functionaries misusing their office for financial gain must be held strictly accountable to protect the public interest.

  Questions settled

  • Can an extra-judicial confession serve as the basis for a criminal conviction when corroborated by attending circumstances?
  • Does the principle of 'benefit of doubt' apply to white-collar corruption cases in the same manner as ordinary criminal cases?
  • Is a bank officer liable for misappropriation when pension funds are withdrawn using forged signatures and bogus vouchers?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah Khan vs Ahtisham Khan and 3 others2020 P Cr. L J 152 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-19
  acquittal appealdishonoured chequecriminal breach of trustdouble presumption of innocencemisreading of evidencedelay in FIRcommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal challenged the judgment dated 12.07.2017 passed by the Xth Judicial Magistrate, Malir Karachi, whereby respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were acquitted under section 245(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case arising from FIR No. 229 of 2014 registered under sections 489-F, 406, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question revolved around whether the trial court erred in acquitting the accused of charges relating to the issuance of a dishonoured cheque and criminal breach of trust, despite the prosecution's evidence. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the scope of interference against an acquittal is narrow, as the accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence. The Court found that material contradictions existed in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, an unexplained delay of ten months occurred in lodging the FIR, and a civil suit for the cancellation of the cheque was pending, rendering the prosecution case doubtful. Consequently, the trial court's judgment of acquittal was maintained, reaffirming the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with an acquittal unless the judgment is perverse, arbitrary, or suffering from gross misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of interference by an appellate court in an appeal against an acquittal?
  • Does the issuance of a dishonoured cheque under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 stand established when material contradictions exist regarding its delivery and a civil dispute is pending?
  • What effect does an unexplained delay of ten months in lodging an FIR have on a criminal prosecution?
  • When should the benefit of doubt arising from contradictions in prosecution witness statements be extended to an accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah & 03 others vs Province of Sindh and 04 others2020 SHC 884 · Sindh High Court · 2020-10-26Read full judgment →
• Amanat Ali Mangi vs S.H.O P.S Hassan Wahan And Others2020 SHC 686 · Sindh High Court · 2020-08-18Read full judgment →
• Aman-Ul-Haq vs State through Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2020 P Cr. L J 1263 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-06-18
  narcotics controlgovernment analystchemical examiner reportmandatory provisionschain of custodyspecial lawconstitutional petitionstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the legality of narcotics testing laboratories and the qualifications of Government Analysts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The core legal question was whether the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, particularly regarding analyst qualifications and reporting protocols, are mandatory, and whether non-compliance invalidates chemical analysis reports used for convictions. The Court held that these provisions are mandatory. It directed the provincial government to appoint qualified analysts meeting the criteria in Rule 3 and to ensure laboratories strictly follow the testing protocols prescribed in Rule 6. The Court established that the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, as a special law, overrides general provisions like Section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, a chemical report failing to adhere to the statutory protocols or prepared by an unqualified person is unreliable and cannot serve as conclusive proof of an offense. The integrity of the chain of custody and strict adherence to statutory rules are essential for the safe administration of criminal justice.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, regarding the qualifications of Government Analysts mandatory?
  • Does the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, override the general provisions of Section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the admissibility of chemical reports?
  • What are the consequences of a failure to follow the testing protocols prescribed in Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001?
  • Is a chemical analysis report prepared by an unqualified person sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Aman Ullah vs State, etcPLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Lahore) 393 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-22
  pre-arrest baildishonoured chequecivil disputemala fidecriminal liabilitySection 489-F PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for pre-arrest bail concerns an FIR registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving the alleged dishonour of three cheques valued at Rs. 3,000,000. The petitioner contended that the dispute was essentially civil in nature, arising from a long-standing business relationship and a prior suit for the cancellation of the cheques, rather than the repayment of an existing loan. The Court observed that the cheques appeared to be issued for potential future obligations rather than existing ones, a foundational element required for an offence under Section 489-F. Finding that the criminal proceedings were potentially motivated by mala fide intent to settle a civil dispute, and noting that the investigation was complete with no further recovery required from the petitioner, the Court confirmed the pre-arrest bail. The judgment reaffirms that civil disputes cannot be converted into criminal cases and that mala fide intent for pre-arrest bail can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil dispute regarding business transactions be converted into a criminal case under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the issuance of a cheque for a potential future obligation sufficient to constitute an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • How can the element of mala fide be established at the stage of pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Aman Ullah Khan vs Muzaffar Khan and others2020 YLR 1356 · Lahore High Court · 2020-01-16Read full judgment →
• Aman Ud Din vs Muhammad Khan and othersPLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Quetta) 685, 2020 P Cr. L J 338 · N/A · 2019-09-24
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationattempt to murdertentative assessmentjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a criminal bail cancellation application filed by the complainant challenging the order of the Sessions Judge, Killa Abdullah, Chaman, whereby post-arrest bail was granted to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in a case registered under sections 324, 147, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether the post-arrest bail granted to the accused persons warrants cancellation on the grounds of perversity or gross illegality. The court held that considerations for the cancellation of bail are distinct from those for its grant, requiring strong, exceptional grounds and substantive proof, and that since the injury was on a non-vital part of the body and the matter of applicability of penal provisions was subject to trial, interference with the bail-granting order was unwarranted. The key principle laid down is that liberty once granted cannot be curtailed lightly without establishing that the bail-granting order is perverse, patently illegal, or resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • What are the distinct principles and grounds required for the cancellation of bail once it has been granted by a competent court?
  • Does an injury on a non-vital part of the body without a repetition of fire negate the prima facie intention of qatl-i-amd under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the High Court should interfere with a discretionary order of bail granted by the trial court when no misuse of the concession has been alleged?
  Read full judgment →
• Altamush Saeed vs Govt. of Punjab etc2021 CLC 898, 2020 LHC 3336 · Lahore High Court · 2020-12-24Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain vs The State2020 P Cr. L J 1419 · Lahore High Court · 2019-12-04
  acid throwingcriminal appealreasonable doubtdying declarationchance witnesschild witnessocular evidencecapital sentence reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for the murder of his wife and daughter and causing grievous hurt via acid throwing, under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt given the reliance on ocular testimony, a dying declaration, and recovery evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the case, citing significant discrepancies in the ocular account, the unreliability of chance witnesses, and the failure to prove the motive. Furthermore, the court found the dying declaration dubious due to the victim's physical inability to identify the assailant and noted contradictions in medical evidence. The court emphasized that when prosecution witnesses are disbelieved regarding one co-accused, they cannot be relied upon for another without independent corroboration. Consequently, the court acquitted the appellant, establishing that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind necessitates acquittal, regardless of the heinous nature of the alleged offence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on the testimony of a child witness without strong corroborative evidence?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused based on the disbelief of prosecution witnesses preclude the conviction of another accused on the same evidence without independent corroboration?
  • Is a dying declaration admissible and reliable if the victim suffered injuries that likely impaired their ability to identify the assailant?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to explain a significant delay in reporting a crime necessitate a strict scrutiny of the evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain vs State through National Accountability Bureau2020 YLR 1493 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2019-11-21Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain vs Federal Public Service Commission through its Chairman2020 PLC (C.S) 1558, 2019 [M] C.L.R. 1707 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-07-30
  limitation periodcondonation of delayspecial lawFederal Public Service Commissionpromotional examinationcivil servantsubordinate officetime-barred appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an appeal filed under Section 7(3)(d) of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977, impugning the Federal Public Service Commission's order dated 30.06.2011, which dismissed the appellant's review petition against the rejection of his candidature for the Section Officers' Promotional Examination-2010 due to his employment in a subordinate office. The core legal question before the court was whether the delay of six years in filing the appeal could be condoned under Section 5 or Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, when the special statute prescribes a strict limitation period of thirty days. The court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to special laws where its application is not expressly extended, and its operation is further excluded by Section 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act. Furthermore, the court held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies exclusively to suits and applications, and cannot be invoked to exclude time spent pursuing remedies in wrong forums regarding appeals. The appeal was consequently dismissed as hopelessly time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to proceedings under a special law that prescribes its own period of limitation without making Section 5 applicable?
  • Can the time spent prosecuting a wrong remedy in a wrong forum be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for the purpose of filing an appeal?
  • Does the definition of 'suit' under Section 2(10) of the Limitation Act, 1908 encompass appeals for the applicability of Section 14?
  Read full judgment →
• Altaf Ahmed S/O Gul Hassan Shaikh vs The State2020 MLD 1676, 2020 SHC 272 · Sindh High Court · 2020-04-06
  accountability appealcorruption and corrupt practicesmisappropriation of fundsghost shopvoluntary returnimpersonation pleabogus vouchers
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal accountability appeal was filed against the judgment of the Accountability Court convicting the appellant under Section 10 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, read with serial numbers 4 and 5 of the schedule, sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment and fine for corruption and corrupt practices. The prosecution case alleged that the appellant, working as an electrician in TMA Sehwan Sharif, fraudulently acted as a contractor, received illegal payments through bogus vouchers and ghost shops, and deposited misappropriated funds into personal bank accounts. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the charges of corruption, fraudulent misappropriation, and operation of fake bank accounts beyond a reasonable doubt. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully established its case through trustworthy oral and documentary evidence, including bank account opening documents containing the appellant's genuine photographs and CNICs, while rejecting the appellant's unproven plea of impersonation and fake signatures. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution successfully proved the charge of corruption and corrupt practices under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 beyond a reasonable doubt?
  • Can an accused sustain a plea of impersonation and forged signatures without taking legal steps during trial such as moving an application for signature verification?
  • Whether bank account documents containing the accused's actual CNIC and photograph are sufficient to disprove a claim that the account was opened by others without the accused's knowledge?
  Read full judgment →
• Allied Bank Limited through Authorized Attorneys vs Messrs Shah Nawaz2020 CLD 1037 · Lahore High Court · 2020-02-12Read full judgment →
• Allaudin vs State through Prosecutor-General NAB, Islamabad and another2020 P Cr. L J 819 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-15
  accountability courtframing of chargecriminal appealcorruption and corrupt practicesdue processremandvague charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction and sentence rendered by an Accountability Court under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The appellant, a former Postmaster, was convicted for allegedly embezzling public funds through fake pension arrears. The core legal question is whether a conviction is sustainable when the trial court fails to specify the exact clause of Section 9 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, under which the accused is charged, thereby rendering the charge vague. The Court held that the framing of a precise charge is essential to ensure the accused is not misled and can effectively prepare a defense. Because the trial court failed to cite the specific clause of Section 9, the accused was prejudiced in his defense. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case for a fresh trial, allowing the parties to decide whether to record new evidence or rely on the existing record after the framing of a specific, legally compliant charge.

  Questions settled

  • Is a conviction sustainable if the trial court fails to specify the exact clause of Section 9 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, under which the accused is charged?
  • What is the legal consequence when an accused is misled in their defense due to a defective or vague charge?
  • Does the failure to specify the exact statutory provision in a charge sheet constitute a material defect requiring the setting aside of a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Yar vs StatePLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Lahore) 89 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-24
  circumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtidentification paradedelayed FIRQatl-e-AmdSection 103 Cr.P.C.capital chargecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder and abduction of the complainant's brother. The core legal question is whether the prosecution successfully established guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case, as the evidence was riddled with fatal flaws. The Court observed that the FIR and witness statements were significantly delayed without plausible explanation, rendering them unreliable. Furthermore, the identification parade was deemed a futile exercise as the accused was already known to the witnesses. The medical evidence regarding the time of death contradicted the prosecution's timeline, and the identity of the deceased remained unproven due to the withholding of DNA evidence. Additionally, the recoveries were conducted in violation of mandatory statutory requirements, and the pointation of the crime scene was inadmissible as it was already known. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, affirming that the benefit of doubt is a right, not a concession.

  Questions settled

  • Does the late recording of statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without a plausible explanation render the evidence unreliable?
  • Is a test identification parade valid if the accused's particulars were already known to the witnesses?
  • Can a conviction for a capital charge be sustained when the prosecution fails to establish the identity of the deceased?
  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses during recoveries violate the mandatory provisions of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Warrayo vs Mst. Ladan and 3 others2020 MLD 334 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-13
  criminal acquittal appealjudicial confessiondelayed FIROaths Actpolice custodyappellate interferencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal challenged the judgment of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tharparkar, which acquitted the respondents of murder charges under Sections 302, 201, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned the admissibility of a judicial confession recorded in violation of procedural safeguards and the validity of an acquittal based on delayed FIR reporting and lack of corroborative evidence. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court's acquittal was based on a plausible view of the evidence. The Court found the judicial confession inadmissible because it was recorded on oath in violation of Section 5 of the Oaths Act 1873, the accused was returned to police custody post-confession, and the Magistrate failed to ensure the accused understood the proceedings. Furthermore, the 14-day delay in lodging the FIR without explanation rendered the prosecution's case doubtful. The Court reaffirmed the principle that an appellate court should not interfere with an acquittal unless the trial court’s reasoning is perverse or wholly unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Is a judicial confession recorded on oath admissible in evidence?
  • Does returning an accused to police custody after a judicial confession invalidate the confession?
  • Should an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment if the trial court's view is plausible?
  • What is the legal effect of a significant unexplained delay in lodging an FIR?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Waris vs The State and another2020 YLR 2222 · Lahore High Court · 2020-06-04
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirydacoityidentification paradeprohibitory clausetentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, Allah Waris, who was implicated in a case of dacoity and robbery. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given that he was not named in the FIR, his identification occurred after his arrest, and the evidentiary value of the recovered items was questionable. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail. The Court reasoned that the petitioner's identification was potentially compromised due to his prior exposure to the complainant party, and the recovery of currency and a weapon did not definitively connect him to the crime at the tentative assessment stage. Furthermore, the Court noted that the prosecution witnesses had failed to appear despite the issuance of warrants, and the added offence under section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 did not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court determined the case warranted further inquiry, establishing that in non-prohibitory offences, bail is the rule and refusal is the exception.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of currency of a general pattern during investigation provide sufficient grounds to deny bail?
  • Is a case considered one of further inquiry when the identification of the accused is contested due to prior exposure to the complainant?
  • Does the addition of an offence not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 entitle an accused to bail as a rule?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakhio vs Muhammad Usman and 2 others2020 CLC 1331 · Sindh High Court · 2019-02-11
  malicious prosecutionplaint rejectionOrder VII Rule 11 CPCbenefit of doubtdamages suitcivil revisionacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Revision Application challenged the dismissal of an appeal, which had upheld the rejection of a plaint for damages arising from malicious prosecution under Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The applicant had been acquitted in a criminal case, but the acquittal was based on the benefit of doubt due to the prosecution's failure to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, not on a finding that the case was false. The High Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that for a suit of malicious prosecution, it is crucial to establish that the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause and with malice, and that the criminal proceedings were found to be false, not merely resulted in an acquittal on benefit of doubt. The court also noted the absence of particulars of damages in the plaint. Finding no illegality or jurisdictional defect, the Revision Application was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit for damages for malicious prosecution be maintained where the criminal acquittal was based on benefit of doubt?
  • What are the essential ingredients for establishing a suit for damages on account of malicious prosecution?
  • Is it necessary to show that the criminal case was false to succeed in a malicious prosecution claim?
  • Can a plaint for malicious prosecution be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC if key ingredients are missing?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakhio son of Gul Muhammad Jamali vs Ali Asghar son of Kamal2020 SHC 1194 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Allah Rakha vs The State through P.G. Punjab and another2020 SCMR 1063 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-07
  Criminal Breach of TrustCivil NazirMisappropriation of FundsReduction of SentenceAnti-CorruptionConcurrent Sentences
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by a former Civil Nazir seeking reduction of his sentence following convictions under anti-corruption and penal provisions for misappropriating official funds. The petitioner had been convicted under sections 409, 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as well as section 5(2)C of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, receiving a maximum sentence of ten years' rigorous imprisonment under section 409 alongside coordinate five-year sentences. The High Court maintained the conviction and sentences. Counsel for the petitioner limited the challenge to requesting a reduction of the ten-year sentence under section 409 to five years to match the coordinate charges. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner had made partial restitution, had suffered dismissal from service, experienced prolonged proceedings since 2015, and faced severe stigma. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that reducing the sentence under section 409 to five years' rigorous imprisonment, running concurrently with coordinate charges and with benefit of pre-trial custody, was conscionable and appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the maximum sentence of imprisonment under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be reduced to match the quantum of sentences awarded on coordinate charges?
  • Whether factors such as partial restitution of misappropriated funds, dismissal from service, and prolonged trial constitute valid mitigating circumstances for sentence reduction?
  • Can the Supreme Court reduce a substantive sentence of imprisonment while dismissing a criminal petition against conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha vs The State and another2020 LHC 1146 · Lahore High Court · 2020-02-19
  falsus in uno falsus in omnibusrapeabductionbenefit of doubtperjurycriminal appealacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence for abduction and rape under sections 363 and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, whether the victim's testimony was reliable, and whether the rule of 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' should be applied. The Court held that the prosecution's case was riddled with inconsistencies, including an unexplained delay in reporting, failure to produce key witnesses, and a lack of medical corroboration. Furthermore, the Court found the victim's testimony unreliable, particularly as it was disbelieved regarding the acquitted co-accused. The Court set aside the conviction, acquitting the appellant and granting him the benefit of doubt. A key principle laid down is that the rule of 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' (false in one, false in all) is an integral part of Pakistani criminal jurisprudence; if a witness is found to have lied on a material aspect, their testimony must be rejected entirely, and the witness should be prosecuted for perjury.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the rule of 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' is applicable in criminal cases in Pakistan?
  • Can a conviction be maintained solely on the testimony of a victim if that testimony is found to be self-contradictory or lacks independent corroboration?
  • Does the failure to produce a material witness allow the court to draw an adverse presumption under Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Is a delay in reporting a crime to the police fatal to the prosecution's case if no plausible explanation is provided?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha Mehmood Mughal alias A.R. Mehmood Mughal vs Government2020 LHC 357, 2020 PLD Lahore 515 · Lahore High Court · 2020-03-04Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha (decd) thr. LRs & others vs Additional Commissioner2021 PLJ SC 68, 2020 P SC 673, 2020 SCMR 502, 2020 SCP 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-04
  writ jurisdictionlachesrejection of plaintsettlement authoritiesbar of jurisdictioncivil suit competencyland allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition filed by the petitioners. The matter originated from a dispute over land allotments made to Jammu and Kashmir refugees, where the original allottee's entitlement was reduced in 1970. The petitioners, claiming as purchasers, initially filed a civil suit, which resulted in the rejection of the plaint under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a writ petition in 2002 challenging the 1970 order. The core legal question was whether a writ petition is maintainable against a settlement authority's order simply because a civil suit was deemed incompetent, and whether the writ petition was barred by laches. The Supreme Court held that the writ petition was rightly dismissed. It affirmed that the bar on civil court jurisdiction does not automatically confer writ jurisdiction upon the High Court, especially absent proof of coram non judice or excess of authority. Furthermore, the Court upheld the dismissal based on the principle of laches, noting the 32-year delay in challenging the original order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the incompetence of a civil suit automatically grant the High Court jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition regarding the same subject matter?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained against an order passed by settlement authorities after a delay of 32 years?
  • Under what circumstances can the jurisdiction of a civil court be superseded by a special forum under a statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Jurio vs Commandant/Principal Cadet College Sanghar2020 SHC 480 · Sindh High Court · 2020-08-05Read full judgment →
• Allah Jurio & Others vs The State2020 SHC 1104 · Sindh High Court · 2020-11-27
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryFIR delayabductionmatrimonial disputecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a bail application filed under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by the applicants, who were accused of trespassing into the complainant's house, abducting two women, and causing injuries to a prosecution witness. The applicants sought post-arrest bail after being refused by the Sessions Court, arguing their innocence, the existence of a prior matrimonial dispute, the delayed registration of the FIR, and the minor nature of the injuries sustained. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to bail on the grounds of further inquiry and mala fides. The High Court held that the five-hour delay in lodging the FIR, the fact that the alleged abductees returned to their parents on the same day, the minor nature of the injuries, and the existing matrimonial dispute between the parties collectively established a case for further inquiry. Consequently, the Court granted post-arrest bail to the applicants, subject to the furnishing of surety bonds, emphasizing that unexplained delays and surrounding circumstances warrant relief pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in the registration of an FIR constitute grounds for further inquiry in a bail application?
  • Can the existence of a prior matrimonial dispute between parties be considered a factor in granting post-arrest bail?
  • Is the return of alleged abductees to their parents on the same day of the incident a relevant factor for the court to consider when deciding on bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta etc vs Chief Settlement Commissioner Punjab etc2020 PLJ Lahore 534, 2021 YLR 635, 2020 LHC 1877 · Lahore High Court · 2020-09-08Read full judgment →
• Allah Dino Khan Bhayo vs Election Commission of Pakistan etc2020 PLD Supreme Court 591, 2021 PLJ SC 33, 2021 P SC 283, 2020 SCP 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-04
  Article 62(1)(f)election disqualificationReturning Officerjudicial declarationdue processreview petitionsummary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition concerns whether a 2007 summary finding by a Returning Officer, which disqualified the petitioner from contesting elections due to a fake educational certificate, constitutes a "declaration by a court of law" under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, as amended in 2010. The petitioner challenged his subsequent disqualification by the Election Commission of Pakistan, which relied on this earlier finding. The Supreme Court held that a Returning Officer’s summary proceedings, which lack the recording of evidence and the right of cross-examination, do not meet the criteria of a "court of law." Consequently, such a finding cannot trigger the permanent disqualification mandated by Article 62(1)(f). The Court emphasized that a judicial declaration under this Article requires due process, including a fair trial and reasoned judgment. Since the Returning Officer’s finding lacked these essential judicial attributes, it could not operate as a permanent bar to the petitioner's eligibility. The review petition was allowed, and the previous disqualification order was recalled, though the underlying allegation of dishonesty remains open for future adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Does a summary finding by a Returning Officer during the scrutiny of nomination papers constitute a 'declaration by a court of law' for the purposes of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the doctrine of res judicata be applied to a finding made by a Returning Officer in summary proceedings?
  • What are the essential attributes required for a forum to be considered a 'court of law' for the purpose of issuing a disqualification declaration under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dina and 21 others vs Ikhtiar Khan and another2021 KLR Revenue Cases 23, 2020 CLC 963 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-12-06Read full judgment →
• Allah Bux Khan Unar vs Sohail Anwar Siyal & Others2021 MLD 49, 2020 SHC 242 · Sindh High Court · 2020-03-16Read full judgment →
• All Swat Sabzi Mandi Association through President vs Secretary Local2020 CLC 1955 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-12-17
  unregistered associationlocus standifreedom of trade and businessNo Objection Certificatevegetable marketlocal governmentconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged the orders of the Tehsil Municipal Officer and the Secretary Local Government Khyber Pakhtunkhwa refusing to grant a No Objection Certificate (NOC) and license to an unregistered association for establishing a private vegetable market at a self-selected site in Swat. The core legal questions pertained to the maintainability of a constitutional petition by an unregistered association, the extent of the fundamental right to freedom of trade and business under Article 18, and the authority of local administrations to regulate markets and refuse NOCs based on public interest and environmental feasibility. The Peshawar High Court held that an unregistered association lacks the legal personality and locus standi to institute a writ petition or espouse individual members' grievances. Furthermore, the Court held that the fundamental right to carry on a trade or business under Article 18 is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions, licensing systems, and public policy considerations such as environmental impact and urban traffic management. The petition was consequently dismissed as both incompetent and meritless.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unregistered association of persons has the legal capacity and locus standi to maintain a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Does the fundamental right to freedom of trade and business under Article 18 of the Constitution prevent the government from regulating markets through a licensing system?
  • Whether the refusal of a No Objection Certificate for establishing a private market based on environmental unsuitability and traffic concerns constitutes a lawful restriction?
  • Can an unregistered association file a writ petition for the redressal of personal and individual grievances of its members?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Sher vs The State2020 SHC 1256 · Sindh High Court · 2020-12-07
  suspension of sentencebail pending appealSindh Arms Actshort sentenceappellate relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for the suspension of sentence and release on bail pending the hearing of an appeal against a conviction under the Sindh Arms Act. The appellant was convicted by the trial court for the possession of an unlicensed 12-bore country-made pistol and sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine. The core legal question before the High Court was whether the sentence should be suspended and the appellant released on bail during the pendency of the appeal, given the relatively short duration of the sentence and the likelihood of delay in the appellate proceedings. The Court held that because the sentence was short and the appeal was unlikely to be heard in the near future, it was appropriate to suspend the operation of the impugned judgment. Consequently, the Court granted the application, ordering the appellant's release on bail subject to the furnishing of surety and a personal recognizance bond. The judgment reaffirms the principle that suspension of sentence is generally appropriate where the sentence is short and the appellate hearing is not imminent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence be suspended pending the disposal of an appeal if the sentence is of a short duration?
  • Is the consent of the State a relevant factor in granting bail pending appeal?
  • Does the likelihood of delay in the appellate hearing justify the suspension of a sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Sher Rahu vs The State2020 SHC 120 · Sindh High Court · 2020-02-03
  dishonoured chequecriminal revisionbenefit of doubtfraudulent issuance of chequeacquittalmaterial contradictions
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application arises from concurrent judgments of the trial court and appellate court convicting and sentencing the applicant under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the issuance of a dishonoured cheque. The core legal question before the High Court was whether the prosecution successfully established all ingredients of the offence under Section 489-F, particularly the issuance of a cheque with dishonest intention for the repayment of a loan or fulfillment of an obligation, beyond reasonable doubt. The Sindh High Court allowed the revision application and set aside the lower courts' judgments, holding that the prosecution's case was fraught with material contradictions, an unexplained inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, and a lack of proof regarding the existence of a legally enforceable obligation or loan at the time of issuing the cheque. The court laid down the principle that mere issuance of a dishonoured cheque does not constitute an offence under Section 489-F unless it is conclusively established that it was issued with a dishonest intention for the repayment of a loan or the discharge of an obligation, and that any reasonable doubt arising in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients that must be proved by the prosecution to sustain a conviction under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the mere issuance of a cheque that is subsequently dishonoured automatically constitute an offence under Section 489-F PPC without proof of dishonest intention or obligation?
  • To what extent does an unexplained inordinate delay in lodging an FIR affect the credibility of a prosecution case involving a dishonoured cheque?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when material contradictions and discrepancies exist in the prosecution's evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Shan and 3 others vs The State through Additional Advocate General, Mirpur2020 MLD 594 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-02-28
  revision petitioncross-examinationclosure of righttrial court proceedingsconduct of counselrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenges an order passed by the Tehsil Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Barnala, whereby the right of cross-examination of the petitioners-accused regarding prosecution witness No.3 was closed due to the non-availability and refusal of the petitioners' counsel to conduct the cross-examination. The core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in closing the right of cross-examination and whether revisional interference was warranted. The High Court held that while negligence of an advocate binds the client and courts must regulate proceedings and maintain judicial dignity against unbecoming conduct, in the interest of justice a final opportunity should be afforded to the accused. The court accepted the revision petition, set aside the impugned order conditionally, and directed the trial court to provide one final opportunity for cross-examination, stipulating that failure to avail it would revive the closure order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court is justified in closing the right of cross-examination upon the repeated failure and refusal of the accused's counsel to cross-examine a prosecution witness?
  • Does the negligence or improper conduct of an advocate bind the party who engaged him in judicial proceedings?
  • Can the High Court interfere in its revisional jurisdiction to set aside an order closing the right of cross-examination in the interest of justice?
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• Ali Raza vs State etcPLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Lahore) 1768 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-07
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryattempted rapeevidentiary gapscriminal procedurebail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the accused, Ali Raza, in connection with FIR No. 234 dated 01.10.2018, registered under Sections 376 and 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Tanda, District Gujrat. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the evidentiary gaps in the prosecution's case regarding the alleged attempted rape. The Court observed significant discrepancies, including the absence of a medico-legal certificate to substantiate violence, a four-day delay in reporting the incident, and a contradiction regarding the presence of an accomplice, which the complainant later retracted via affidavit. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner was unarmed and allegedly faced by the complainant and two male witnesses, raising doubts about the prosecution's narrative. Consequently, the Court held that the case warranted further inquiry into the petitioner's guilt. The principle laid down is that where the prosecution's case suffers from material contradictions and evidentiary gaps, the accused is entitled to the benefit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a medico-legal certificate in an alleged sexual assault case constitute grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can material contradictions in the complainant's statement regarding the presence of accomplices justify the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the prosecution's case against them requires further inquiry into their guilt?
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• Ali Raza vs Abdul Wahab & another2020 KLR Criminal Cases 302 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-03Read full judgment →
• Ali Nawaz Shahwani and Brothers through Proprietor and another vs Government of Balochistan through Secretary C&W Department, Quetta and 2 others2020 [M] C L R 1589, 2021 PLJ Quetta 35, 2020 PLD Balochistan 21 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-10-16Read full judgment →
• Ali Nawaz and 4 others vs The State2020 YLR 1843 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-20
  kidnapping for ransomcriminal appealidentification paradebenefit of doubtanti-terrorismacquittalrecovery on pointationFIR delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court, Hyderabad, which convicted the appellants for kidnapping for ransom under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the appellants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given the alleged evidentiary irregularities. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case, citing significant gaps in the evidence. Specifically, the court noted that the delay in registering the FIR was fatal, the recovery of the abductees on the appellants' pointation was suspicious, and the identification parade was conducted improperly, failing to adhere to established judicial precedents. The court emphasized that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a shadow of doubt, and any single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellants, reaffirming that the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution and that procedural lapses in identification and investigation undermine the reliability of the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in the registration of an FIR in kidnapping cases automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • What are the legal requirements for conducting a valid identification parade in criminal cases?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the recovery of abductees on the pointation of the accused is found to be suspicious?
  • Is the benefit of doubt a matter of grace or a right of the accused when a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt?
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• Ali Murtaza and Others vs Province Of Sindh and Others2020 SHC 1184 · Sindh High Court · 2020-01-16Read full judgment →
• Ali Murad Sipio vs Employees' Old Age Benefits Institution and 03 others2020 SHC 964 · Sindh High Court · 2020-10-27
  service lawpromotioneligibility criteriaconstitutional jurisdictionadministrative policyvested rightEOBI
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an employee of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI), filed a constitutional petition challenging the withholding of his promotion to the post of Deputy Director. The core legal question was whether the EOBI could lawfully mandate capacity-building training as a prerequisite for promotion and whether the petitioner’s failure to pass such training justified withholding his promotion. The petitioner argued that the training requirement was illegal, discriminatory, and violated his constitutional rights. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that promotion is not a vested right and that the determination of eligibility criteria, including training requirements, falls within the exclusive administrative and policy-making domain of the employer. The Court distinguished between eligibility and fitness, noting that the former relates to service conditions while the latter is a subjective evaluation. Consequently, the Court ruled that it would not interfere in the administrative policy of the EOBI, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate any discrimination or violation of law regarding the training requirement.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee have a vested right to promotion that precludes an employer from setting mandatory training requirements?
  • Is the determination of promotion eligibility criteria an administrative matter beyond the scope of judicial interference under constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can a court interfere with an employer's policy requiring capacity-building training for promotion if the policy is applied uniformly?
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• Ali Murad and another vs Aga Khan Health Service Pakistan through Chief Executive and 7 others2020 CLC 326 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-09-02Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad vs The State2020 P Cr. L J 1104 · Balochistan High Court · 2020-01-03
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtocular accountcontradictionsweapon recoveryballistic expertacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to rigorous life imprisonment, along with other offences. The core legal question concerns the reliability of the ocular testimony, medical evidence, and weapon recovery in establishing the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Balochistan High Court held that the prosecution's case was replete with material contradictions regarding the presence of eyewitnesses, unexplained delays in lodging the FIR and seeking medical treatment, and tainted recovery of the alleged weapon of offence. The court established that a single reasonable doubt regarding the presence of an eye-witness is sufficient to discard their testimony entirely, and that an accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Is a single doubt regarding the presence of an eye-witness at the crime scene sufficient to discard their testimony as a whole?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a weapon recovery and ballistic report when dispatched to the forensic expert with a considerable delay after the accused's arrest?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused attributed a similar role affect the conviction of the remaining appellant on the same set of evidence?
  • Must the benefit of doubt be extended to an accused as a matter of right when the prosecution's case contains material contradictions?
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• Ali Muhammad vs Learned Addl Session JUdge2020 SHC 138 · Sindh High Court · 2020-02-07Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad Turab vs Federation Of Pakistan and 2 others2020 PLD Islamabad 454 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-07-16
  Exit Control Listfundamental rightsfreedom of movementdue processmechanical orderconstitutional petitionright to travel
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the placement of the petitioner's name on the Exit Control List (ECL) by the Ministry of Interior. The petitioner, an Islamic scholar, argued that the action was arbitrary, mala fide, and violated his fundamental right to travel. The core legal question was whether the respondent could restrict the petitioner's movement based on unverified allegations of being an 'anti-Pakistan character' without due process or criminal proceedings. The Court held that the impugned memorandum was issued in a mechanical manner, lacking cogent evidence or justification, and failed to meet the requirements of Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Consequently, the Court set aside the memorandum and ordered the removal of the petitioner's name from the ECL. The judgment affirms that the right to travel is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, which cannot be abridged arbitrarily or mechanically without due process, and that mere allegations or pending inquiries do not constitute sufficient grounds for ECL placement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere pendency of an inquiry or investigation justify placing a citizen's name on the Exit Control List?
  • Is the right to travel abroad a fundamental right protected under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can the Federal Government place a person on the Exit Control List without providing reasons or an opportunity for a hearing?
  • Does an order issued by the Ministry of Interior under the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981, require compliance with Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897?
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