Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Qutib vs State2019 MLD 162, 2018 PLJ FSC 98 · Federal Shariat Court · 2018-08-08
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtcross-examinationappreciation of evidencepolice encounteracquittalburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for offences under Sections 398, 324, and 353 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in light of significant contradictions in the ocular testimony of police witnesses. The Federal Shariat Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the essential ingredients of the alleged offences. The court observed that the trial judge ignored critical cross-examination where police witnesses admitted that no independent witnesses were associated, no police personnel were injured, and no physical evidence like empty shells was recovered. The court held that cross-examination is a fundamental legal engine for truth-discovery and cannot be disregarded. Reaffirming the golden principle of criminal jurisprudence, the court ruled that the prosecution must prove its case beyond the shadow of a reasonable doubt. Finding the prosecution's narrative doubtful due to the absence of corroborative evidence and the existence of a tribal dispute, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, granting him the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to associate independent witnesses in a public place create a reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case?
  • Is the trial court required to consider the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses when evaluating the credibility of the prosecution's case?
  • Should the benefit of doubt be granted to an accused when the prosecution fails to prove the essential ingredients of the charged offences?
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• Qutbuddin vs Collector of Customs, MCC, Islamabad. and 2 others2018 PTD (Trib.) 326 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2016-10-18Read full judgment →
• Qurban Hussain Raja vs Federation of Pakistan and 2 others2018 CLC 1006 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-23Read full judgment →
• Quarban Ali Khan, Member Provincial Assembly (Mpa), PK-16, Nowshera vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2018 PLD Peshawar 192, 2018 PHC 1617 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-05-17Read full judgment →
• Quarban Ali Khan vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others2018 PLD Peshawar 192 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-05-17Read full judgment →
• Quami Islamia Public School and College vs Board of Intermediate2018 YLR 457 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-25Read full judgment →
• Qazi Zain-Ul-Abadeen vs University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir2020 [M] C L R 174, 2019 PLJ AJ&K 9, 2018 PLC (C.S.) 1098 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-05-21
  service lawselection criteriaretrospective legislationmala fideaccrued rightsuniversity appointmentmerit list
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition concerns the selection process for the post of Lecturer in Mathematics at the University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The petitioner challenged the appointment of the private respondent, arguing that she was improperly awarded five extra marks for a Gold Medal in her M.Sc. degree, despite the selection criteria requiring such distinction to be in the 'required degree' (M.Phil.). The core legal question was whether the respondent was entitled to these marks under the prevailing assessment proforma and whether a subsequent university notification, which retroactively deleted the 'required degree' condition, could validate her appointment. The Court held that the respondent was ineligible for the extra marks because the criteria at the time of the advertisement explicitly restricted such benefits to the required degree, which she lacked. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the university's subsequent notification, issued to retroactively alter qualification criteria, was mala fide and ineffective against the petitioner's accrued rights. The Court established the principle that selection criteria cannot be amended retrospectively to prejudice candidates whose rights have already crystallized under the prevailing rules at the time of advertisement.

  Questions settled

  • Can a university retrospectively amend selection criteria to benefit a specific candidate after the selection process has commenced?
  • Does a requirement for 'distinction' in a recruitment proforma apply to any academic degree or only to the degree specifically required for the post?
  • Is a notification issued by a university to retroactively change qualification criteria valid if it prejudices the rights of other candidates?
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• Qazi Syed Tariq-Ud-Din vs N.I.B. Bank Ltd. and others2018 PLJ Tr.C. (NIRC) 192 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 2017-01-02
  restoration of casecondonation of delaydismissal in defaultnon-prosecutiondilatory conducttime-barred applicationNational Industrial Relations Commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an application for recalling an order dismissing a case in default and for condonation of delay, filed before the National Industrial Relations Commission. The core legal questions involved whether sufficient cause was shown for the applicant's non-appearance and for the delay in filing the restoration application beyond the prescribed limitation period. The Commission held that the application was hopelessly time-barred and that the grounds urged regarding the counsel's preoccupation and the applicant's absence were neither cogent nor sufficient to excuse the default. Relying on established jurisprudence, the Commission reaffirmed that the law favors the vigilant and not the indolent, that mere engagement of a counsel does not absolve a litigant from pursuing their case diligently, and that a party cannot rely solely on a counsel's failure to inform them of proceedings. Consequently, both the application for restoration and the application for condonation of delay were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for restoration of a case dismissed in default can be entertained when it is hopelessly time-barred?
  • Does the mere engagement of a counsel absolve a litigant from diligently pursuing their case?
  • Is the failure of a counsel to inform their client about proceedings considered a sufficient ground for condonation of delay?
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• Qazi Mushtaq Ahmed vs Chairman, National Accountability Bureau2018 YLR 134 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-20Read full judgment →
• Qazi Badr-ul-Wahab and others vs Land Acquisition Collector, Provincial2018 PHC 1831 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-05Read full judgment →
• Qayum Nawaz and others vs District Police Officer, D.I.Khan and others2018 PCRLJ 1345, 2018 PHC 1477 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-05
  quashment of FIRconstitutional petitioncognizable offenceSection 164 statementabductionwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking the quashment of FIR No. 204, registered under Sections 496-A and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, at Police Station Yarik, D.I. Khan. The petitioners contended that the alleged abductee had married the accused of her own free will, as evidenced by her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and that the FIR was lodged with malafide intent. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to quash an FIR when the allegations involve a cognizable offence and the defense relies on a statement that has not yet been subjected to cross-examination. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the FIR disclosed a cognizable offence requiring investigation and trial. It established the principle that constitutional jurisdiction for quashment is not appropriate where the defense's case relies on evidence, such as a Section 164 statement, that has not yet been tested through cross-examination in a competent court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court quash an FIR under its constitutional jurisdiction when the allegations constitute a cognizable offence?
  • Is a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, sufficient grounds to quash an FIR before it has been subjected to cross-examination?
  • Should a constitutional petition be entertained for the quashment of an FIR when the matter requires the recording of pro and contra evidence at trial?
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• Qayum Nawaz and others vs District Police Officer, D.I. Khan and others2018 P Cr. L J 1345 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-05
  quashment of FIRconstitutional petitioncognizable offenceSection 164 statementabductionwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking the quashment of FIR No. 204, registered under Sections 496-A and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, at Police Station Yarik, D.I. Khan. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to quash an FIR when the petitioners allege that the alleged abductee had entered into a marriage of her own free will, as evidenced by her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the FIR disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence, which necessitates a proper investigation and the recording of evidence. The Court emphasized that a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, taken in the absence of the complainant, cannot be treated as conclusive proof at the pre-trial stage, as it has not yet been subjected to cross-examination. Consequently, the Court ruled that the matter must be adjudicated through a full trial rather than through a summary quashment proceeding.

  Questions settled

  • Can an FIR be quashed under Article 199 of the Constitution when it discloses a cognizable offence?
  • Is a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sufficient grounds to quash an FIR without trial?
  • Should the High Court interfere in criminal investigations where the determination of facts requires cross-examination of witnesses?
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• Qayum Khan vs District Coordinator Officer (D.C.O.), Kohat and 212018 YLR 1945, 2018 PHC 1582 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-13Read full judgment →
• Qayum Khan vs DCO Kohat etc2018 PHC 1582 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-13Read full judgment →
• Qasim vs The State and another2018 P Cr. L J 795 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-20
  post-arrest baildelay in FIRfurther inquiryprevious non-convictspeedy trialtentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Lahore High Court through a petition filed under section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking post-arrest bail in respect of FIR No. 226/17 registered under sections 337-A(iii), 337-L(2), 337-F(i), and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Rajoa, District Chiniot. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail considering the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the nature of the attribution, the applicability of prohibitory clauses, and the statutory provisions concerning previous non-convicts. The court held that the case falls within the purview of further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, noting an unexplained eight-day delay in the FIR, the tentative nature of the injury attributed, the applicability of section 337-N(2), Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for a previous non-convict, and the hardship of prolonged incarceration without trial progress. Consequently, the petition was allowed and bail was granted to the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained delay in the registration of an FIR constitutes a ground for further inquiry in a post-arrest bail petition?
  • Does section 337-N(2) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 protect a previous non-convict from a sentence of imprisonment under certain hurt offences?
  • Can an accused be kept in jail for an indefinite period when the investigation is complete and trial has not concluded?
  • Whether the maximum punishment prescribed for an offence or the likely punishment under the facts and circumstances should be considered while deciding bail?
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• Qasim Ali vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 CLC 1562 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-03Read full judgment →
• Qamaruddin vs Imdad Hussain2019 YLR 498, 2018 SHC 980 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-14Read full judgment →
• Qamar Shahid Siddiqui vs The Province of Sindh & others2018 SHC 1192 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-18
  repatriation of civil servantappointment by transferpermanent absorptioncivil service cadredeputationistservice ruleshorizontal movement
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant serving in the Provincial Institute of Teachers Education (PITE), challenged letters proposing his repatriation to his parent department, the Bureau of Curriculum and Extension Wing. The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s 'appointment by transfer' to PITE constituted permanent absorption, thereby preventing his repatriation. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the impugned repatriation was lawful and in compliance with Supreme Court precedents. The Court ruled that 'appointment by transfer' under the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974, does not confer permanent status or absorption into the transferee department. Such appointments are temporary, and upon the expiration of the term, the civil servant must return to their parent department. The judgment affirmed that horizontal movement between cadres is restricted and that the Rules cannot be utilized to bypass the scheme of the Act or to grant permanent absorption where none is legally provided. Consequently, the petitioner, as a deputationist, possessed no vested right to remain in the transferee department indefinitely.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appointment by transfer under the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974, confer permanent status or absorption in the transferee department?
  • Can a civil servant be permanently absorbed into a transferee department through horizontal movement between cadres?
  • Does a deputationist have a vested right to remain in a transferee department indefinitely?
  • Is the repatriation of a civil servant to their parent department lawful when the appointment in the transferee department was made by transfer?
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• Qamar Aziz etc vs Government of the Punjab, etc2019 PLC (C.S) 932, 2018 LHC 2408 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-04
  recruitment policyeducational equivalenceHigher Education Commissionpolicy matterservice eligibilityjudicial reviewconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order by the Secretary, School Education Department, which refused to accept the petitioners' "Shahadat-ul-Almia" sanad as equivalent to a Master's degree for recruitment to the posts of ESE, SESE, and SSE (Arts). The core legal question was whether the government is bound by an equivalence certificate issued by the Higher Education Commission (HEC) when determining eligibility criteria for public employment. The Court held that the determination of educational qualifications and eligibility criteria for government posts is a policy matter within the exclusive domain of the employer. Consequently, the Court ruled that HEC equivalence certificates, issued under the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002, are intended for academic evaluation and are not binding on the government for recruitment purposes. The Court affirmed that courts should not interfere in policy decisions regarding service eligibility unless they are proven to be arbitrary, mala fide, or violative of fundamental rights. Accordingly, the petitions were dismissed, upholding the government's authority to prescribe specific qualifications for its service.

  Questions settled

  • Is the government bound by an equivalence certificate issued by the Higher Education Commission when prescribing eligibility criteria for public employment?
  • Does the prescription of educational qualifications for government posts constitute a policy matter immune from judicial interference?
  • Can a candidate claim a vested right to be considered for a government post based on an HEC equivalence certificate?
  • Does the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002 empower the HEC to mandate recruitment qualifications for government departments?
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• Qalandri Bibi vs Mst. Irum Bibi& others2019 YLR 86, 2018 PHC 1690 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-06-13Read full judgment →
• Qalandar Ali Khan and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ vs Azam Khan and another2018 MLD 1585 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-13
  dying declarationcriminal appealbenefit of doubtmedical certificatecross-case evidencemurder convictionevidentiary value
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentence of the appellants for murder under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned the evidentiary value of a dying declaration recorded without a medical certificate confirming the deceased's fitness, and whether evidence from a separate cross-case could be considered without being formally introduced. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The court ruled that a dying declaration is unreliable when the medical report lacks an endorsement regarding the declarant's consciousness, and oral testimony at trial cannot rectify this documentary omission. Furthermore, the court emphasized that evidence from a cross-case cannot be read into the current proceedings unless formally brought on record. Finding the dying declaration suffered from inherent infirmities and the prosecution case lacked corroborative evidence, the court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, granting them the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Is a dying declaration admissible if the medical report fails to certify the declarant's consciousness at the time of recording?
  • Can oral testimony given at trial rectify the absence of a medical certificate regarding a declarant's fitness in a dying declaration?
  • Can evidence from a cross-case be considered in a criminal trial if it was not formally brought on the record of the current case?
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• Qaiser vs The State2018 PTD 1961 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-06-11Read full judgment →
• Qaiser vs The State etc2018 PHC 1455, 2018 PLD Peshawar 121 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-19Read full judgment →
• Qaiser vs The State and another2018 PLD Peshawar 121 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-19
  concurrent sentencesconsecutive sentencesinherent powers of High Courtsentencing discretionnarcotics offencequashment of order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sought to challenge an order of the Additional Sessions Judge-III, Mardan, which declined to direct that the petitioner's sentences in two separate narcotics cases run concurrently. The core legal question was whether the court should exercise its discretion under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to order concurrent sentences for a convict already undergoing imprisonment. The Court held that while Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 establishes consecutive sentences as the general rule, concurrent sentences are an exception to be exercised based on judicial discretion. This discretion depends on factors such as the conduct of the convict, the heinousness of the crime, and the injury caused to the individual and society. Finding that the petitioner had committed similar offences at different times, demonstrating a lack of reform, the Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the petitioner failed to justify a departure from the general rule of consecutive sentencing.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to order concurrent sentences?
  • Is the default rule under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for sentences to run consecutively or concurrently?
  • What factors should a court consider when exercising its discretion to order concurrent sentences under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Qaiser Iqbal and19 others vs Province of Punjab through Secretary, Home Department2018 PLD Lahore 34 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-21
  Model Town incidentjudicial commission inquiry reportpublic documentright to informationconstitutional petitionfundamental rightsjudicial proceedingsrule of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 was filed by the legal heirs of persons killed and injured in the Model Town Lahore incident of June 2014, seeking directions to the Government of Punjab to provide and make public the inquiry report prepared by a Judicial Tribunal (One-Man Tribunal comprising a judge of the Lahore High Court) constituted under the West Pakistan Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance, 1969. The core legal questions were whether the inquiry report constitutes a public document and whether the aggrieved citizens have a right to access and have it made public under Article 19A of the Constitution and the Punjab Transparency and Right to Information Act, 2013. The Lahore High Court held that proceedings before the Tribunal are judicial proceedings under the Ordinance and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, rendering the resulting report a public document under Article 85 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The Court ruled that in matters of immense public importance touching upon fundamental rights and the rule of law, the report must be made public. The petition was allowed, directing the authorities to publicize and provide copies of the inquiry report to the aggrieved petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Whether proceedings conducted by a Tribunal constituted under the West Pakistan Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance, 1969 qualify as judicial proceedings?
  • Is an inquiry report prepared by a Judicial Tribunal considered a public document under Article 85 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Do the legal heirs of victims of a public tragedy have an enforceable right under Article 19A of the Constitution of Pakistan and the Punjab Transparency and Right to Information Act, 2013 to obtain and demand the publication of a judicial inquiry report?
  • Can a constitutional petition filed by aggrieved direct legal heirs be maintained independently despite the pendency of earlier petitions filed by persons without a direct nexus to the incident?
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• Qaiser Abbas and 8 others vs The Province of Punjab and 2 others2018 PLC (C.S.) 310 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-22
  waiting listrecruitmentvested rightconstitutional petitionpublic employmentpolice recruitmentservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the failure of the Punjab Police to appoint petitioners from a waiting list for Police Constable positions, instead opting to re-advertise vacancies. The core legal question was whether candidates on a waiting list possess a vested, enforceable right to appointment and whether the government is legally compelled to exhaust a waiting list before initiating fresh recruitment. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that a waiting list does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment. The ratio established that a waiting list is merely a contingency mechanism operative only when a selected candidate fails to join within a prescribed period; it is not a mandatory source of recruitment. The Court affirmed that absent a specific statutory rule requiring the maintenance or utilization of a waiting list, the employer retains the discretion to re-advertise vacant posts. The right of a wait-listed candidate is weak and unenforceable unless supported by a specific rule or executive order having the force of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a candidate on a waiting list have a vested, enforceable right to be appointed to a government post?
  • Is an employer legally obligated to maintain a waiting list for recruitment in the absence of a specific rule?
  • Can a government department re-advertise vacant posts instead of utilizing an existing waiting list?
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• Qaim Ali Shahani vs Chief Minister Secretariat & others2018 SHC 715 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-25Read full judgment →
• Qadir Bux Hajano vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 991 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-17
  murder referencedeath sentence confirmationcapital punishmentdecapitationocular evidencemedical corroborationstatutory compensationta'azir
  Summary & questions settled

  The High Court of Sindh considered a criminal appeal along with a murder reference under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenging the conviction and death sentence awarded to the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his sister-in-law. The prosecution alleged that after being released from jail in a prior zina case involving the deceased, the appellant attacked her in broad daylight with a hatchet, decapitated her, and fled with her severed head. The appellant contested the ocular testimony, motive, medical corroboration, and voluntary nature of his confession. The High Court held that the prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt via consistent eyewitness testimonies, medical findings, positive chemical examiner reports, and recovered weapon evidence. Furthermore, decapitating the victim in a brutal manner for revenge eliminated grounds for leniency, justifying the death penalty as normal punishment. The court dismissed the appeal, confirmed the death sentence under Section 302(b), PPC, and directed payment of compensation under Section 544-A, Cr.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Whether brutal conduct such as decapitating a victim for revenge excludes the application of mitigating circumstances against a death sentence?
  • Is a trial court obligated under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to record written reasons if it fails to award compensation to the legal heirs of a deceased upon convicting the accused?
  • Can minor contradictions in eyewitness testimonies be disregarded when ocular evidence is consistently corroborated by medical and recovery evidence?
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• Qadeer Hussain, Senior Scale Stenographer, Office of the District &2018 SC AJK 6 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  service lawpromotionseniorityselection boardjudicial serviceservice tribunalmerit-based appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the promotion of a Stenographer to the post of Civil Judge. The appellant challenged the appointment of a junior colleague, arguing that the Selection Board ignored his seniority and experience without justification. The Service Tribunal dismissed the appeal, reasoning that it could not substitute its opinion for that of the Selection Board. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred in its approach. The Court established that while the Selection Board's opinion is significant, the Tribunal is empowered under the Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunals Act, 2016, to set aside or modify orders resulting from arbitrary recommendations. The Court emphasized that when candidates possess equal credentials, seniority is a vital factor in determining merit. Because the Selection Board failed to provide reasons for ignoring the appellant and relied on flawed working papers, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter for a fresh, lawful determination by the Selection Board, ensuring that all relevant factors, including seniority, are properly considered.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Service Tribunal set aside an appointment order based on arbitrary recommendations by a Selection Board?
  • Is seniority a relevant factor in determining merit for promotion when candidates possess equal credentials?
  • Does an employee retain seniority in a higher grade if they were senior in the lower grade prior to promotion?
  • Can the acquisition of a law degree prior to another candidate be used as a sole basis for determining seniority?
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• Qabil Khan vs VTH Additional Sessions Judge South, Karachi and others2018 P Cr. L J 1027 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-09
  illegal dispossessionagreement to sellforcible dispossessionlawful ownercriminal revisionpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application impugns an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge dismissing a criminal complaint filed under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The applicant alleged that he entered into an agreement to sell for the subject property, paid the full consideration, obtained possession, and was subsequently forcibly dispossessed by the respondent, resulting in the death of his father during the incident. The core legal question was whether section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, was attracted to the proceedings where the applicant claimed possession based on an agreement to sell. The court held that section 3 requires the complainant to be a lawful owner or occupier, and since the applicant failed to establish a valid, enforceable legal claim of possession or ownership under the circumstances, the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act were not attracted. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, ruling that a mere agreement to sell without proper enforcement or lawful possession does not bring a dispute within the ambit of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is attracted when a claimant fails to establish lawful ownership or lawful possession of the subject property?
  • Can a transferee claim the protection of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as a weapon when possession is not under a proper, legal, and enforceable contract?
  • Whether the revisional court can interfere with a trial court order dismissing a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 when the complainant fails to prove initial lawful possession?
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• PWD Employees Union (Cba) through President vs Director Labour2018 PLC 48 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2017-08-25
  interim injunctiontrade union registrationprima facie caselabour lawbalance of convenienceirreparable lossindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Labour Court, Quetta, which rejected the appellant's petition and application for an interim injunction regarding the registration of a rival trade union. The appellant, representing a registered trade union, alleged that the respondent had illegally registered a competing union using a fraudulent list of members, including deceased and retired workers, in violation of the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010. The core legal question was whether the appellant had established the necessary ingredients—a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss—to warrant the grant of an interim injunction. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the appellant failed to demonstrate these essential ingredients through the material presented. The Tribunal affirmed the Labour Court's decision, emphasizing that the validity of the registration and the allegations of a bogus membership list could not be presumed true without leading clear evidence. The key principle laid down is that for the grant of an interim injunction, a court must perform a tentative assessment of the three ingredients rather than a deep appreciation of evidence, and the burden lies on the applicant to establish them.

  Questions settled

  • What are the three essential ingredients required to be established for the grant of an interim injunction?
  • Is a deep appreciation of evidence required at the stage of deciding an application for an interim injunction?
  • Can the registration of a trade union be challenged solely on the basis of allegations without leading clear evidence?
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• Punjab Public Prosecution Department and another vs Muhammad2018 PLD Supreme Court 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-22
  Anti-Terrorism Actpersonal vendettajurisdiction of special courtsinterpretation of penal statutesterrorism vs ordinary crimeJoint Investigation Team reportcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment upholding the transfer of a criminal case from an Anti-Terrorism Court to an ordinary court. The core legal question was whether an incident arising from a personal land dispute, involving firearm injuries and death, constituted an act of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Supreme Court held that the case was not triable under the Act, 1997, as the incident lacked the requisite "design" to create terror, panic, or insecurity among the general public. The Court affirmed that while the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 covers acts designed to overawe the state or public, crimes stemming from personal vendettas do not automatically fall within its purview. The Court emphasized that jurisdiction must be determined on a case-to-case basis by examining the specific facts, circumstances, and material collected. Furthermore, it established that penal statutes must be interpreted in a manner favoring the accused, and that police investigation reports, such as those from a Joint Investigation Team, constitute mere opinions rather than substantive evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a crime committed due to personal enmity or vendetta automatically fall within the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • What criteria must courts use to determine if an offence falls under the purview of Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Is a report prepared by a Joint Investigation Team admissible as substantive evidence in a criminal trial?
  • How should penal statutes be interpreted when there are two possible interpretations regarding the jurisdiction of a court?
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• Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank Limited through President Head2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Labour) 65 · Labour Appellate Tribunal
  contractual employeetermination of servicegrievance petitionmaster and servantmaintainability of appealextension of contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the trial court's judgment allowing a grievance petition filed by a respondent employee against the termination of her services. The core legal questions involve whether the respondent was a regular employee or a contractual worker, whether her services were lawfully terminated upon the non-extension of her contract, and whether the appeal was maintainable having been filed by an allegedly unauthorized person. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the respondent was engaged on a clear contract basis for a fixed term, which was repeatedly extended upon her own applications, and that her services were lawfully dispensed with upon the competent authority's refusal to grant a further extension, as governed by the terms of her employment. Furthermore, procedural technicalities regarding the authorization to file the appeal should not non-suit a party when the intent and subsequent documentation manifest proper delegation. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the trial court's judgment and dismissed the grievance petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee appointed on a fixed-term contract basis can claim regular employment status upon the expiry and non-extension of the contract?
  • Does an appeal filed on behalf of a corporate entity or bank become non-maintainable due to the initial omission of a formal authorization document, where the person signing is otherwise authorized?
  • Whether the non-extension of a fixed-term employment contract constitutes unlawful termination of service requiring reinstatement?
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• Punjab Healthcare Commission vs Mushtaq Ahmad Chaudhary etc2019 [M] C.L.R. 1462, 2018 PLD Lahore 762, 2018 LHC 1511, 2018 PLJ Lahore 984 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-06Read full judgment →
• Punjab Healthcare Commission vs Mushtaq Ahmad Chaudhary and others2018 PLD Lahore 762 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-06Read full judgment →
• Punjab Beverages Co. Pvt. Ltd vs FBR etc.PTCL 2018 CL. 199 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-22Read full judgment →
• Punjab Beverages Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federal Board of Revenue and othersPTCL 2018 CL. 199, 2018 PTD 1251 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-22
  Sales Tax Actshow-cause noticedelegation of powersjurisdiction of tax authoritiesstatutory interpretationtaxing statuteadministrative function
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a batch of writ petitions challenging the authority of Deputy Commissioners Inland Revenue to issue show-cause notices under Section 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal question was whether the power to issue such notices, vested in the Commissioner Inland Revenue, could be delegated to subordinate officers like the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue. The petitioners contended that the Act does not permit such delegation and that the Board or Commissioner cannot confer powers not explicitly granted by law. The Court, following the precedent established in 'Messrs Hamza Nasir, Wire v. Federation of Pakistan and others' (2018 PTD 1071), held that the power to issue show-cause notices is a statutory function that cannot be delegated by the Commissioner to subordinate officers at their discretion. The Court affirmed that while the Board or Commissioner may assign administrative functions, they cannot delegate substantive statutory powers unless expressly authorized by law. Consequently, the impugned show-cause notices were set aside, with liberty granted to the authorities to issue fresh notices in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Sales Tax Act 1990 authorize the Commissioner Inland Revenue to delegate the power to issue show-cause notices under Section 11 to a Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue?
  • Can the Federal Board of Revenue or a Commissioner confer statutory powers upon an officer that are not explicitly granted to that officer by the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  • Is the power to issue a show-cause notice under Section 11 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 a delegable administrative function?
  Read full judgment →
• Public Interest Foundation & Ors vs Union of India & Anr2018 SCInd 99 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-09-24Read full judgment →
• Public at large through Molvi Muhibullah and others vs Govt. of Khyber2019 YLR 586, 2018 PHC 1810 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-30Read full judgment →
• Provincial Housing Authority vs Wazir Khan2019 PLJ Peshwar 45, 2019 YLR 369, 2018 PHC 1808 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-30Read full judgment →
• Provincial Government through Chief Secretary Gilgit Baltistan and 182018 YLR 2417 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-07-19Read full judgment →
• Provincial Government through Chief Secretary G.B. and 4 others vs Kamous Khan and 57 others2018 YLR 1948 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-06-09Read full judgment →
• Provincial Government Gilgit-Baltistan through Chief Secretary and 22018 CLC 36 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2017-06-21Read full judgment →
• Province of the Punjab through Member Judicial-V/Chief Settlement2018 KLR Revenue Cases 65, 2018 PLJ Lahore 1094, 2018 YLR 2073, 2018 LHC · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-26Read full judgment →
• Province of the Punjab through Member Judicial-V/Chief Settlement2018 YLR 2073 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-26Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh and others vs Muhammad Taqi Shah2018 SCMR 1607 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-14
  deceased civil servant quotapublic service commissionmerit-based recruitmentservice lawconstitutional petitionequal protection of lawSindh Civil Servants Rulesdirect appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  The Province of Sindh appealed a High Court judgment that directed the appointment of the respondent to a BPS-17 post under the deceased civil servant quota with seven annual increments. The respondent's father, a teacher, died in 2007, and the respondent sought appointment based on a 2002 notification that allowed direct appointments in BPS-11 to 20 for children of deceased servants. The Supreme Court examined the evolution of Rule 10-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, noting that subsequent amendments in 2008 and 2011 restricted such appointments to BPS-16 and 17, subject to qualifying tests by the Public Service Commission. The Court held that bypassing the competitive process of the Public Service Commission violates the principles of transparency and merit-based selection. It further ruled that such exemptions are discriminatory and violative of the right to equal treatment under Article 25 of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's direction for direct appointment.

  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab, etc. vs Haseeb Ullah Khan2018 PLJ Lahore 844 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-08Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab vs Qaisar Iqbal and others2018 PLD Lahore 198 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-05
  Right to InformationJudicial InquiryModel Town IncidentPublic ImportanceFundamental RightsFair TrialProportionality TestIntra Court Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These Intra Court Appeals arose from a Single Bench judgment directing the Government of Punjab to release a judicial inquiry report (the 'Model Town incident' report) authored by a one-man Tribunal. The Government challenged the maintainability of the writ petition, citing the availability of an alternative remedy under the Punjab Transparency and Right to Information Act, 2013, and argued that the report was not a public document. The Court held that while the Tribunal was a fact-finding body and its report was not a 'public document' under Article 85 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, nor were its proceedings strictly judicial, the right to access the report was a fundamental right under Article 19-A of the Constitution. The Court applied the 'proportionality and balancing test,' determining that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the government's concerns regarding 'public order' or 'administration of justice.' The Court dismissed the appeals, ordering the immediate release of the report to the respondents and its publication within 30 days, while clarifying that the report should not prejudice the ongoing criminal trial.

  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through Secretary Punjab Public Prosecution2018 PLD Supreme Court 178, 2018 PLJ SC 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-22
  Anti-Terrorism Actjurisdiction of special courtspersonal vendettamens reacriminal trialinterpretation of statutesJoint Investigation Team report
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment upholding the transfer of a criminal case from an Anti-Terrorism Court to an ordinary court. The core legal question was whether the alleged offence, arising from a private land dispute and involving indiscriminate firing, constituted an act of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the case was not triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court. The Court established that terrorism offences require a specific mens rea and a design to create terror, panic, or insecurity in the public at large. Personal vendettas or private disputes, absent such design, do not constitute terrorism. Courts must assess the specific facts, circumstances, and material on record—not merely the FIR's allegations—to determine jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that when a penal statute is ambiguous, the interpretation favoring the accused must be adopted, and that reports by Joint Investigation Teams are merely opinions and not substantive evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a criminal act committed due to personal enmity or vendetta automatically fall within the purview of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • What factors must a court consider when determining whether an offence is triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • Is a report submitted by a Joint Investigation Team admissible as substantive evidence in a criminal trial?
  • Should a penal statute be interpreted in favor of the prosecution or the accused when two interpretations are possible?
  Read full judgment →
• Prosecutor General Accountability, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad vs Naseem ur Rehman, Ex-Mna & two others2018 PHC 1612 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-05-09Read full judgment →
• Professor Dr. Maqbool Ashraf vs Chief Minister, Punjab, Lahore and another2019 KLR L&S Cases 107, 2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 243 · Punjab Service Tribunal
  service appealback benefitsreinstatementcompulsory retirementexonerationintervening periodspent on duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service appeal filed by a Professor of Ophthalmology against the decision of the Competent Authority to treat his period of absence from service as 'leave of the kind due' following his reinstatement. The appellant had been compulsorily retired on charges of willful absence, but was subsequently exonerated and reinstated. The core legal question was whether the intervening period between his compulsory retirement and reinstatement could be treated as leave of the kind due, or if it should be treated as a period spent on duty with full back benefits. The Tribunal held that since the appellant was exonerated of all charges, the period of absence could not be attributed to his fault. Relying on Rule 7.3 of the Civil Service Rules, Punjab (Volume-I) and established Supreme Court precedents, the Tribunal ruled that an employee exonerated from departmental charges is entitled to have the period of absence treated as duty. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order, directing that the intervening period be treated as 'spent on duty' with full entitlement to back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period of absence following an employee's compulsory retirement and subsequent exoneration can be treated as 'leave of the kind due'?
  • Is an employee who is exonerated from departmental charges entitled to back benefits for the period they remained out of service?
  • Under what circumstances should the period of absence from duty be treated as 'spent on duty' upon reinstatement of a government servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Prof. Jawaid Mohsin Malik and others vs Federation of-Pakistan through Secretary M_o Federal Education and Professional Training and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 846 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Prof. Jawaid Mohsin Malik and others vs Federation of Pakistan2018 IHC 28 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-22Read full judgment →
• Prof. Jawaid Mohsin Malik and 7 others vs Federation of Pakistan2018 PLD Islamabad 274 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-09Read full judgment →
• Prof. Jan Muhammad Memon vs Governor of Sindh and Ors2018 SHC 685 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-16Read full judgment →
• Prof. Dr. Zafar Iqbal vs Province of Punjab, etc.2018 PLJ Lahore 448 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-16Read full judgment →
• Prof. Dr. Zafar Iqbal vs Province of Punjab, etc2018 LHC 60 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-16Read full judgment →
• Prof. Dr. Zafar Iqbal vs Province of Punjab and others2018 LHC 60, 2018 PLJ 448, 2018 PLC (C.S.) 267 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-16
  Vice-Chancellor appointmentSearch Committeesubject expertagricultural expertpublic sector universityshortlistingconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves constitutional petitions challenging the appointment process of the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Agriculture, Faisalabad. The core legal questions concerned whether the prior advertisement for the post was vitiated by being issued before the constitution of the Search Committee, and whether a renowned economist holding a doctorate in development economics qualified as a subject/field expert in agriculture to sit on the Specialized Search Committee. The Lahore High Court held that while the earlier advertisement could be relied upon subject to processing by the new Search Committee, the inclusion of the economist as an agricultural expert was invalid because he lacked the requisite highest academic degree and substantial direct experience in the specialized field of agriculture. The Court laid down the principle that a subject or field expert on a search committee must hold the highest academic degree in the specific subject alongside substantial, direct, and contemporary experience in that field, rather than generalist or related economic expertise. The petitions were consequently allowed, setting aside the shortlisting and directing the reconstitution of the Search Committee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an advertisement for the post of Vice-Chancellor issued prior to the constitution of a Search Committee is legally valid?
  • What qualifications and experience are required for a person to qualify as a subject/field expert on a Search Committee for a specialized university?
  • Does a degree and background in development economics qualify an individual as an agricultural subject expert for the University of Agriculture?
  • What is the effect of an improperly constituted Search Committee on the shortlisting of candidates for a public university post?
  Read full judgment →
• Prof. Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Zafar vs The Province of Punjab through Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Agriculture Department, Lahore etc2019 [M] C.L.R. 670, 2019 PLC (C.S.) 63, 2018 LHC 1550 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-05
  Pro-Vice-Chancellorsuperannuationtenure postage of retirementintra court appealadditional dutiesacquiescence
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges an order passed by a learned Single Judge dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant against the terms of his nomination as Pro-Vice-Chancellor. The core legal question revolves around whether the nomination of a Professor as Pro-Vice-Chancellor under Section 15-A of the University of Agriculture Faisalabad Act, 1973 constitutes a tenure post of three years unaffected by the age of superannuation, or if it is merely an assignment of additional duties subject to retirement age under Section 41. The court held that the nomination as Pro-Vice-Chancellor is not a tenure appointment but an assignment of additional duties given to a Professor, and therefore, upon reaching the age of superannuation, the incumbent ceases to hold the office. The key principles laid down are that nomination to the office of Pro-Vice-Chancellor does not create a tenure post independent of the regular service and retirement age of a Professor, and that a person cannot challenge a notification after accepting its benefits and suffering from laches.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the nomination of a Professor as Pro-Vice-Chancellor under Section 15-A of the University of Agriculture Faisalabad Act, 1973 constitutes a tenure post?
  • Does a Pro-Vice-Chancellor cease to hold office upon reaching the age of superannuation prescribed under Section 41 of the University of Agriculture Faisalabad Act, 1973?
  • Can a petitioner challenge the terms of a notification after accepting the office and enjoying its benefits without prior protest?
  Read full judgment →
• Prof. Dr. Adnan Mehraj vs Azad Government of State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary and 5 others2018 PLC (C.S.) 197 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-07-08
  writ petitionquo warrantoappointment of principalmedical collegeexecutive committeelocus standiestoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition filed under section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 challenged the notification of appointment of the private non-petitioner as Principal of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Medical College, Muzaffarabad. The core legal questions revolved around whether the appointment was issued in accordance with law and whether the petitioner had locus standi to challenge it after participating in the selection process. The High Court held that the Executive Committee which recommended the appointment had ceased to function and stood dissolved under Section 7(5) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Medical Colleges (Governing Body) Act, 2014, making the appointment without lawful authority. The Court laid down that while a candidate who participates in a selection process is ordinarily estopped from challenging it after failing to succeed, this principle does not apply when the resulting appointment is found to be completely without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Executive Committee constituted prior to the enactment of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Medical Colleges (Governing Body) Act, 2014 retains the authority to recommend appointments after the promulgation of the said Act?
  • Does a candidate who participates in a selection process lose the locus standi to challenge an appointment that is subsequently found to be without lawful authority?
  • Is an appointment made upon the recommendations of a defunct committee legally sustainable under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Medical Colleges (Governing Body) Act, 2014?
  Read full judgment →
• Principal, Helper Public School/College, Quetta and another vs Moulvi2018 PLC 228 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2017-08-24
  labour lawtermination of servicedue processnatural justiceworkmanshow-cause noticeindustrial dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Labour Court judgment that reinstated a teacher terminated from a private school. The core legal questions concerned whether the respondent qualified as a "workman," whether the school constituted an "industry," and whether the termination procedure violated due process. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the termination was illegal because the appellants failed to conduct an inquiry or provide the respondent a reasonable opportunity to be heard, violating the principles of natural justice and Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Tribunal affirmed that the respondent performed manual and clerical duties, qualifying him as a "workman," and that the school, as a fee-charging entity, fell within the scope of labour protections. The key principle laid down is that termination without a proper inquiry and a reasonable opportunity to defend against allegations constitutes an act of unfair labour practice and a violation of due process, regardless of the specific industrial classification of the employer, as employees are entitled to statutory protections against arbitrary dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee be terminated without an inquiry or opportunity to be heard?
  • Does a teacher in a private school qualify as a "workman" under labour laws?
  • Is an institution that charges fees and employs more than twenty workers considered an industry?
  • Does the failure to provide a reasonable time to reply to a show-cause notice violate due process?
  Read full judgment →
• Principal Government College of Technical Training Institute vs Sabir Hussain and others2018 PLJ Lahore 532 · Lahore High Court
  intra-court appealTEVTA employeecivil servantstatutory bodyservice regulationsregularization of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal was filed under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 to challenge an order modifying a previous writ petition decision which had regularized the service of an employee of the Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA) as a civil servant. The core legal question was whether employees of TEVTA are civil servants and whether Rule 17-A of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 applies to them. The Lahore High Court held that TEVTA is a statutory body corporate governed by its own Act, rules, and service regulations, and its employees are public servants rather than civil servants. Consequently, civil servant rules do not apply to them. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order modifying the regularization as a civil servant was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of the Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA) are civil servants?
  • Does Rule 17-A of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 apply to employees of TEVTA?
  • Can employees of statutory corporations be considered civil servants under the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Prime Capital Management (Pvt.) Limited vs Commissioner (SMD), SECP, Islamabad2018 CLD 1332 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2018-07-03Read full judgment →
• Premier Systems (Pvt.) Ltd. and Others vs Federation of Pakistan and Others2018 PTD 861, PTCL 2018 CL. 206 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-07
  regulatory dutyFederal CabinetMustafa Impexdelegated legislationultra viresFinance Act 2017Article 98Money Bill
  Summary & questions settled

  Constitutional petitions were filed challenging the vires of an amendment made to Section 18(3) of the Customs Act, 1969 by the Finance Act, 2017, which substituted the 'Federal Government' with the 'Board, with approval of Federal Minister-in-charge', as well as the validity of SRO 1035(1)/2017 levying regulatory duties. The core legal question was whether delegated legislative functions, specifically the power to impose regulatory duties and taxes, can be statutory conferred upon subordinate authorities or an individual Minister instead of the Federal Government (the Cabinet) under Article 98 of the Constitution and the binding principles in Mustafa Impex. The High Court held that while Article 98 allows the conferment of executive functions on subordinate authorities, quasi-legislative powers such as levying tax cannot be delegated or conferred on any authority subordinate to the Federal Government. The Court declared the amendment to Section 18(3) and SRO 1035(1)/2017 ultra vires the Constitution and of no legal effect, ordering refunds or adjustments for duties paid thereunder.

  Questions settled

  • Can the statutory power to levy regulatory duties or taxes be conferred upon a subordinate authority or an individual Minister instead of the Federal Cabinet?
  • Does Article 98 of the Constitution permit the Parliament to transfer delegated legislative powers to officers or authorities subordinate to the Federal Government?
  • Is an amendment to fiscal provisions in the Customs Act through a Finance Act passed as a Money Bill constitutionally valid under Article 73 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Premier Systems (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 P.C.T.L.R. 883 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-15Read full judgment →
• Premier Battery Industries Private Limited vs Karachi Water and Sewerage2018 P.S.C. 194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  public interest litigationlocus standiprocurement processconstitutional petitionbuilt operate and owneligibility criteriabona fides
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of its Constitutional petition challenging a public notice issued by the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KW&SB) for a power project. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had locus standi to challenge the procurement process and whether the process violated the Sindh Public Procurement Act, 2009 and the Sindh Public Procurement Rules, 2010. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner lacked locus standi as it failed to meet the mandatory eligibility criteria, such as experience and financial turnover, and did not participate in the bidding process. Furthermore, the Court rejected the petitioner's attempt to characterize the matter as public interest litigation, finding it to be personal interest litigation aimed at obstructing a legitimate project. The Court affirmed the principle that public interest litigation must be transparently bona fide, not a vehicle for private or vested interests, and that courts must exercise caution to prevent speculative or malicious litigation from hindering executive functions. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petitioner who fails to meet the eligibility criteria for a procurement process have locus standi to challenge the public notice inviting expressions of interest?
  • What are the parameters for determining whether a matter qualifies as public interest litigation under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can a party that has not participated in a procurement process challenge the validity of the process in a Constitutional petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Premier Battery Industries Private Limited vs Karachi Water and Sewerage Board and others2018 SCMR 365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-07
  locus standipublic interest litigationconstitutional petitionprocurement lawsexpression of interestjudicial reviewbona fides
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition against a public notice issued by the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KW&SB) for an Expression of Interest (EOI) regarding a power project. The petitioner alleged violations of the Sindh Public Procurement Act, 2009 and the Sindh Public Procurement Rules, 2010, claiming insufficient time and lack of transparency. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner lacked locus standi, as it failed to meet the technical and financial eligibility criteria for the project and did not participate in the process. The Court further determined that the petition did not qualify as bona fide public interest litigation, as it was motivated by the petitioner's own economic interests rather than the public good. The Court affirmed that constitutional jurisdiction must be exercised with circumspection to prevent speculative or malicious litigation from obstructing executive functions. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition, concluding that the EOI process complied with the relevant procurement laws, and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party that fails to meet the eligibility criteria for a project have locus standi to challenge the procurement process?
  • Can a petition motivated by private economic interests be entertained as public interest litigation?
  • What are the parameters for the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction in public interest litigation?
  • Does the failure to participate in a procurement process bar a party from subsequently challenging the validity of the notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Premier Battery Industries Private Limited vs Karachi Water &2018 P.S.C. 194, 2018 SCMR 365, 2108 PLJ SC 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-07
  locus standipublic interest litigationconstitutional petitionpublic procurementexpression of interestjudicial reviewprequalification process
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing its constitutional petition, which challenged a public notice issued by the Karachi Water & Sewerage Board (KW&SB) inviting expressions of interest for a power project. The petitioner alleged violations of the Sindh Public Procurement Act, 2009 and the Sindh Public Procurement Rules, 2010. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner lacked locus standi, as it failed to meet the technical and financial criteria for the project, did not submit an expression of interest by the deadline, and lacked the requisite business objects in its memorandum of association. The Court further held that the petition did not qualify as public interest litigation, as it was motivated by the petitioner's personal economic interest rather than a genuine public cause. The Court emphasized that constitutional jurisdiction must be exercised with circumspection to prevent speculative or malicious litigation from obstructing executive functions. Finding no merit in the allegations of procedural illegality, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party that fails to meet eligibility criteria for a public project have locus standi to challenge the procurement process?
  • Can a petition motivated by private economic interests be entertained as public interest litigation?
  • What are the parameters for the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction in matters of public interest litigation?
  • Is the court required to interfere in executive procurement processes where no violation of statutory rules is demonstrated?
  Read full judgment →
• Pravesh Kumar Sachdeva vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.2018 SCInd 55 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-09-13Read full judgment →
• Pradeep Bisoi @ Ranjit Bisoi vs The State of Odisha2018 SCInd 115 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-10-10
  dying declarationSection 161 CrPCadmissibility of evidencecause of deathcriminal appealSection 32 Evidence Actpolice statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the Orissa High Court's judgment upholding the appellant's conviction under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code. The core legal question was whether a statement recorded by an Investigating Officer under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be admitted as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, despite the victim dying months later. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction. The Court held that a statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is admissible as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act if it relates to the cause of death or circumstances of the transaction resulting in death. The Court clarified that such statements are relevant regardless of whether the declarant expected death at the time, and the admissibility is not affected by the duration between the statement and the death. Section 162(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly carves out this exception, allowing such statements to be used as evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statement recorded by a police officer under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be treated as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act?
  • Does a statement lose its status as a dying declaration if the victim dies a significant amount of time after the statement was made?
  • Does the fact that a statement was not initially recorded as a dying declaration preclude it from being used as one after the victim's death?
  • Is a medical certificate regarding the victim's fitness of mind a mandatory requirement for a dying declaration to be admissible?
  Read full judgment →
• Powai Panchsheel Co op Hsg. Society & Anr vs Maharashtra Housing Area2018 SCInd 123 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-10-12Read full judgment →
• Postal Life Insurance (Pli), Lahore vs Muhammad Anwar and others2018 CLD 271, 2018 SCMR 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-18
  insurance claimInsurance Tribunaljurisdictionbody corporatePostal Life Insurancereturn of plaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an insurance claim filed by the respondent against the petitioner, Postal Life Insurance, which was initially presented before a civil court but subsequently returned under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for lack of jurisdiction. The Insurance Tribunal constituted under the Insurance Ordinance 2000 adjudicated the claim and ruled in favor of the respondent, a decision upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Insurance Tribunal possessed the requisite jurisdiction to hear and decide insurance claims against the Postal Life Insurance, considering its status under the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that since the Pakistan Postal Services Management Board is established as a body corporate under the Pakistan Postal Services Management Board Ordinance 2002 with the statutory function to operate the Postal Life Insurance, the matter falls squarely within the purview of section 171(2) of the Insurance Ordinance 2000, thereby vesting jurisdiction in the Insurance Tribunal. The key principle laid down is that the Postal Life Insurance management board constitutes a body corporate capable of being sued and subject to the jurisdiction of the Insurance Tribunal under the Insurance Ordinance 2000.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Insurance Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and decide insurance claims against the Postal Life Insurance?
  • Does the Pakistan Postal Services Management Board qualify as a body corporate under the law?
  • Whether the management and operation of Postal Life Insurance falls within the purview of section 171(2) of the Insurance Ordinance 2000?
  Read full judgment →
• Port Qasim Authority vs Industrial Management & Investment Company2018 SHC 1212, 2020 CLC 721 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-24Read full judgment →
• Popular Sports Ltd. and 24 others vs Assistant Registrar of Companies, SECP Lahore and another2018 CLD 268 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2017-05-18
  company registrationname resemblanceSECPremandcorporate lawadministrative ordertrademark dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against an order issued by the Assistant Registrar of Companies, SECP, directing twenty-five companies (the Appellants) to change their names due to inadvertent registration, as their names bore a close resemblance to the already registered 'Popular Group of Companies'. The Appellants challenged the order, arguing that the matter regarding the similarity of the trademark 'Popular' was already sub judice before the trademark authority, thereby ousting the Commission's jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the Registrar properly exercised powers under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, in ordering the name change without fully evaluating the competing claims of the parties. The Appellate Bench found that critical aspects of the case had not been adequately considered by the Respondent, as both parties had not been afforded a sufficient opportunity to present their respective cases. Consequently, the Appellate Bench set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the Respondent for a fresh decision within sixty days, emphasizing the necessity of evaluating all relevant records and evidence for just adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan have the authority to order a company to change its name due to resemblance with another entity?
  • Is a matter regarding trademark similarity sub judice before a trademark authority a bar to the Commission's jurisdiction to regulate company names?
  • Can an appellate authority remand a case to the Registrar if the initial order failed to consider all relevant aspects and evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Plastic Crystals, etc. vs Bolan Bank Limited2018 P.C.T.L.R. 418 · Lahore High Court · 2010-03-05Read full judgment →
• Pir Munawar Shah vs Habib-Ur-Rehman and 4 others2018 CLC 1901 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-27
  specific performancelimitation periodcontract to sellrevisional jurisdictionadmissibility of documentsburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition is directed against the appellate court judgment that set aside the trial court decree in favor of the petitioner in a suit for specific performance of a contract. The core legal questions involved the proof of the contract to sell, the admissibility of documents, and the limitation period for filing a suit for specific performance. The Peshawar High Court held that the plaintiff must prove his case on the strength of his own evidence, that secondary evidence without the original is inadmissible, and that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, as it was brought more than three years after the cancellation of the mutation. The petition was accordingly dismissed, upholding the appellate court's findings.

  Questions settled

  • When does the period of limitation begin to run for a suit for specific performance of a contract where no specific date is fixed for performance?
  • Can a plaintiff succeed in a suit for specific performance on the basis of weaknesses in the defendant's case?
  • Is a photocopy of a document admissible in evidence if exhibited without objection?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent or appellate findings of fact under revisional jurisdiction without a jurisdictional defect?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Kalimullah and another vs Province of Sindh and others2018 SHC 678 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-11Read full judgment →
• Pir Ishfaq Ahmed vs Deputy Commissioner/Land Acquisition Collector,2018 CLC 449 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-30Read full judgment →
• Pir Bux and 4 others vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 742 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-16
  criminal appealconvictionacquittalbenefit of doubtcontradictory evidencemedical evidencewater rotation dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Naushero Feroze, whereby the Appellants were convicted and sentenced under sections 148, 149, 337-F(i), 337-U, and 337-H(2) of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proved its case against the Appellants beyond a reasonable doubt in the face of major contradictions among eye-witnesses, unproved motive, and doubtful medical evidence. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the guilt of the Appellants due to material contradictions regarding the incident, exaggeration in testimonies, lack of corroborative evidence, and unexplained flaws in the medical and police records. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and the Appellants were acquitted of the charges. The key legal principle laid down is that where eye-witnesses contradict each other on basic facts, medical evidence is inconsistent, and motive remains unproved, the prosecution case becomes doubtful, entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt and acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether material contradictions among eye-witness testimonies regarding the core incident are sufficient to cast serious doubt on the prosecution case?
  • Does the failure to produce consistent and reliable medical evidence in assault cases weaken the prosecution?
  • Whether unproved motive and lack of corroborative evidence warrant the acquittal of the accused?
  • Is an accused entitled to an acquittal when the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Phonix Security Service (Pvt.) Ltd vs Muhammad Abdullah and others2018 PLC 37 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-17
  payment of wagesovertimeannual leavededucted wageslabour lawwrit jurisdictionlocus standiFactories Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-writ petitions challenging a judgment of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal regarding claims for unpaid wages, overtime, and annual leave. The core legal questions involved the competence of the petitioner company to file the writ, the entitlement of the worker to overtime, the correct application of statutory provisions regarding annual leave carry-forward, and the classification of wage claims as either delayed or deducted. The Court held that the petitioner’s writ petition was incompetent as it was filed by an unauthorized person. On merits, the Court affirmed the worker's entitlement to overtime based on admissions. Regarding annual leave, the Court held that Section 49-B(2) of the Factories Act, 1934, cannot be used to curtail a worker's contractual leave entitlements where those entitlements exceed statutory minimums, due to the protective provisions of Section 49-A(2). Furthermore, the Court clarified that the employer's failure to pay agreed wages constitutes deducted wages rather than delayed wages, justifying higher compensation under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The judgment of the Labour Court was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Can a company initiate legal proceedings through an individual not authorized by a board resolution or articles of association?
  • Does Section 49-B(2) of the Factories Act, 1934, permit an employer to curtail a worker's contractual annual leave entitlements that exceed the statutory minimum?
  • Does the failure to pay the full agreed salary constitute deducted wages or delayed wages under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936?
  • Can a court interfere in a labour tribunal's findings regarding overtime when there is clear evidence of work performed beyond duty hours?
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• Petition for Grant of Letter of Administration to DR. Mohammad2018 SHC 509, 2018 CLC 639 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-23Read full judgment →
• Petition by Mst. Sultana Begum for Letters of Administration under2018 YLR 2685 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-14Read full judgment →
• Pervez Arshad & Muhammad Junaid Arshad vs Rauf Textile & Printing Mills2019 CLD 72, 2018 SHC 808 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-11Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Iqbal vs Faisal Akram2018 CLC 1239 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-30
  specific performancelimitation periodtime of the essencecontractual obligationssecond appealnotice of refusalstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal challenged concurrent findings of lower courts that decreed a suit for specific performance of a contract. The core legal question concerned the application of Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, specifically whether the suit was time-barred. The High Court held that Article 113 provides two distinct scenarios: if a date for performance is fixed, limitation runs from that date; if no date is fixed, it runs from the date the plaintiff has notice of refusal. The Court clarified that the doctrine of "time being of the essence" is irrelevant to determining which part of Article 113 applies. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Court determined that even if no date was fixed, the plaintiff’s own testimony indicated he had notice of the defendant's refusal years before filing the suit. Consequently, the suit was time-barred. The Court emphasized that the Limitation Act must be construed strictly, and equitable or discretionary relief cannot be granted to overcome statutory limitation periods. The impugned judgments were set aside, and the suit was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of time being of the essence affect the determination of which part of Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applies to a suit for specific performance?
  • When no date for performance is fixed in a contract, from what point does the limitation period under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, begin to run?
  • Can discretionary relief under the Specific Relief Act, 1877, be granted if a suit is filed after the expiration of the statutory limitation period?
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• Pervaiz Haider Khan vs The State and others2018 P Cr. L J 77 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-16
  criminal appealjudgment contentsanti-corruptionevaluation of evidencespeaking orderremand of casecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, whereby the appellant was convicted and sentenced under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The core legal question was whether the trial court's judgment complied with the mandatory requirements of section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the evaluation of evidence and the recording of reasons. The Lahore High Court held that the impugned judgment merely summarized testimonies without evaluating the evidence in light of the cross-examination, thus failing to meet the mandatory requirements of section 367, Cr.P.C. The court laid down the principle that a judicial verdict must be a speaking order containing points for determination, a decision thereon based on a thorough examination of evidence, and strong reasoning, and that non-compliance with section 367, Cr.P.C. is an incurable illegality rendering the judgment nugatory. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the judgment was set aside, and the case was remanded for rewriting.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judgment that merely summarizes prosecution witnesses without evaluating evidence satisfy the requirements of section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 curable under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What are the essential elements required to be contained in a criminal judgment under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Pepsi Cola International (Private) Limited through Authorized Officer vs The Punjab Environmental Protection Agency through Director General and others2018 CLD 1429 · Punjab Environmental Tribunal · 2018-07-16Read full judgment →
• Pehlwan Ali vs Sindh Appellate Tribunal and another2018 SHC 548 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-14
  labour lawfull and final settlementpayment of wagesconstitutional jurisdictiongratuityappellate tribunalworkmen's compensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had modified a compensation award previously granted to the petitioner by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and upheld by the Labour Court. The petitioner, a former employee, sought unpaid legal dues including gratuity and bonuses. The core legal question was whether the Appellate Tribunal acted within its lawful authority in revising the award after finding that the petitioner had already received his dues and signed a full and final settlement receipt. The High Court held that the Appellate Tribunal’s decision was legally sound and based on a proper appreciation of evidence regarding the payment of the decretal amount. The Court affirmed that it cannot interfere with factual findings arrived at by a competent forum in the absence of illegality, infirmity, or material irregularity. The principle laid down is that where an employee has received full and final settlement of dues, subsequent claims for compensation are unsustainable, and the High Court will not disturb factual determinations made by appellate labour forums under its constitutional jurisdiction absent clear legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with factual findings of a Labour Appellate Tribunal in its constitutional jurisdiction absent material irregularity?
  • Does the receipt of a full and final settlement by an employee preclude subsequent claims for additional legal dues?
  • Is a Labour Appellate Tribunal authorized to modify a compensation award if evidence indicates the decretal amount has already been paid?
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• Peer Muhammad Ghoas Gillani and another vs Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government through its Chief Secretary and others2018 PLJ AJ&K 65 · High Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Parks and Horticulture Authority vs Muhammad Saleem2018 PLC (C.S.) 12 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-02
  Intra Court Appealconstitutional petitiondoctrine of substantial complianceincomplete application formemployees children quotaright of livelihood
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges the order of a learned Single Judge who allowed a constitutional petition filed by Respondent No. 1 regarding his appointment to the post of Mali under the employees' children quota. The core legal question was whether the rejection of the respondent's job application for being incomplete due to missing photographs, despite a good faith submission within time, was justified. The court held that the doctrine of substantial compliance is attracted where there is no apparent mala fide and a right of livelihood is involved, meaning minor omissions do not invalidate an otherwise timely and substantial application. The court laid down that technical deficiencies in job applications should not defeat substantive rights, particularly when the essential purpose of the application is fulfilled and the applicant is otherwise eligible under a reserved quota.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for public employment can be rejected solely on the ground of minor omissions when the doctrine of substantial compliance applies?
  • Does an incomplete job application create a factual controversy barring the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether the children of retired employees are entitled to consideration under the reserved employees' children quota when their applications substantially fulfill the requirements?
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• Park View Enclave (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Financial Officer vs Capital2018 CLC 947 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-27Read full judgment →
• Park View Enclave (Private) Limited vs Capital Development Authority2018 CLC 947, 2018 KLR Civil Cases 30, 2018 PLJ Islamabad 124 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-27Read full judgment →
• Park View Enclave (Private) Limited through Financial Officer, Lahore vs Capital Development Authority through its Chairman and 2 others2018 PLJ Islamabad 124 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Papoo Khan vs Province of Sindh & others2018 SHC 912 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-05
  regularization of adhoc appointmentsuspension vacancyprisons departmentbasic educational qualificationpublic service commissionvested rightconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a constitutional petition seeking a declaration that he was validly appointed as an Assistant Superintendent Prison on a regular basis under the Sindh Civil Servants (Regularization of Adhoc Appointment) Act, 1989, or alternatively under the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013, along with related seniority and promotion benefits. The core legal questions involved whether an adhoc appointment made against a suspension vacancy without possessing the prescribed qualification of graduation for the upgraded post (BS-16) could be regularized retrospectively. The Sindh High Court held that the petitioner's initial appointment was made irregularly against a temporary suspension vacancy without adhering to recruitment rules or possessing the mandatory graduation qualification for BS-16, and thus no vested right to regularization accrued. The court established that adhoc appointments made in violation of procedure and without requisite qualifications cannot be regularized, and posts in BS-16 must be filled through transparent competitive processes via the Public Service Commission as mandated by the Constitution. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an adhoc appointment made against a temporary suspension vacancy be regularized retrospectively?
  • Whether an employee who does not possess the prescribed educational qualification for an upgraded post can claim regularization as a matter of right?
  • Are appointments to posts in Basic Pay Scale 16 and above mandatory through the Public Service Commission under the Constitution?
  • Does an adhoc employee derive a vested right to regularization solely on the basis of continuous service without fulfilling statutory recruitment rules?
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• Pankaj Jain vs Union of India and another2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 315 · Supreme Court of India
  Section 88 Cr.P.C.judicial discretionbail bondnon-bailable warrantcriminal procedurestatutory interpretationappearance of accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the Allahabad High Court, which challenged the trial court's refusal to release the appellant on a bond under Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The core legal question was whether Section 88, which empowers a court to take a bond for appearance from a person present in court, is mandatory or discretionary, and whether it could be invoked by an accused to avoid the regular bail process. The Supreme Court held that Section 88 is an enabling provision vesting judicial discretion in the court, not a mandatory obligation. The Court affirmed that the word 'may' in Section 88 signifies discretion, and it cannot be used as a substitute for bail, particularly where non-bailable warrants have already been issued against the accused. The key principle laid down is that Section 88 does not confer an absolute right on an accused to be released on a bond; rather, it is a discretionary power to be exercised based on the facts and circumstances of each case.

  Questions settled

  • Is the power of a court to take a bond for appearance under Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, mandatory or discretionary?
  • Can an accused person claim release on a bond under Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as a matter of right?
  • Does the issuance of a non-bailable warrant against an accused preclude the exercise of discretion under Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?
  • Is Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, a substitute for the regular bail procedure in non-bailable offences?
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• Panin Muhammad and others vs Mst. Safia Bibi and others2018 PLJ Peshawar 76, 2018 MLD 1128 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-28
  partition decreenecessary partyrevisional jurisdictioncivil revisionnon-joinder of partiesprayer for relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from a dispute where the petitioners challenged orders directing them to pay a substantial sum of money as a condition for partition, despite the petitioners not being parties to the original suit. The core legal questions were whether a court can grant a decree for partition in the absence of a specific prayer for such relief in the plaint, and whether a court can impose liabilities on persons who were never impleaded as parties to the litigation. The Peshawar High Court held that the trial court erred by passing a partition decree without a corresponding prayer in the plaint and by imposing financial liabilities on non-parties. The Court emphasized that a decree for partition cannot be passed against persons who are not parties to the suit. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders, ruling that the petitioners were unnecessarily dragged into litigation and that the lower courts acted beyond their jurisdiction by binding non-parties to the proceedings and imposing arbitrary financial conditions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court pass a decree for partition if the plaint does not contain a specific prayer for partition?
  • Can a court impose financial liability or partition obligations on persons who were not impleaded as parties to the suit?
  • Does Order XX Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 permit a court to pass a decree for partition against a person who is not a party to the proceedings?
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• Panin Muhammad & others vs Mst. Safia Bibi and others2018 PLJ Peshawar 76 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-28
  civil revisionpartition decreenecessary partynon-joinder of partiesprayer for reliefrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision challenges orders passed by the trial and appellate courts concerning a partition decree. The respondents originally filed a suit for declaration and possession without a prayer for partition, yet a partition decree was granted. The petitioners, who were not impleaded as parties to the original suit, were subsequently subjected to proceedings for a final decree of partition and ordered to pay a significant sum of money, despite the absence of a valid compromise or legal basis. The core legal questions were whether a court can grant a decree for partition in the absence of a specific prayer for such relief, and whether a person who is not a party to a suit can be bound by a partition decree or ordered to pay sums thereunder. The Court held that the impugned orders were unsustainable, noting that a decree for partition cannot be granted without a prayer for it, and that a court cannot bind non-parties to a suit. The principle established is that a court lacks jurisdiction to pass a partition decree where no such relief is sought, and it cannot impose obligations on individuals who were never impleaded as parties to the litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant a decree for partition if the original plaint contains no prayer for such relief?
  • Can a court impose financial obligations or partition orders upon individuals who were not impleaded as parties to the suit?
  • Does Order XX Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 allow for a partition decree against a person who is not a party to the proceedings?
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• Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) through Chief Resident Representatives vs Messrs CCI-Ag, an Imi Company, Im Link-II and 2 others2018 MLD 82 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-18Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd vs Competition Commission of Pakistan and others2018 CLD 984 · Competition Commission of Pakistan · 2018-03-27
  competition lawexemption extensionmaximum retail priceminimum retail pricedistribution agreementanti-competitive practicecigarette industry
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed against an order issued by the Director General (Exemptions) granting a conditional extension of an exemption to the appellant under competition law. The core legal question concerned whether the imposition of conditions relating to the printing of minimum or maximum retail prices on cigarette packs aligns with the statutory framework governing competition and prevents anti-competitive practices. The appellate bench held that printing the maximum retail price is a pro-competitive practice that protects consumers, whereas minimum price fixing distorts market competition and serves as a quasi-entry barrier. The court set aside the contested condition and directed the issuance of a fresh extension subject to the condition that the parties shall not fix the minimum resale price of the products subject to the distribution agreement. The key principle laid down is that the legislative intent under the relevant tax and competition frameworks mandates the printing of the maximum retail price rather than the minimum price to ensure consumer protection and fair market competition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the printing of minimum retail prices or maximum retail prices on consumer products promotes fair competition?
  • Can the Competition Commission of Pakistan impose conditions prohibiting the fixing of minimum resale prices when granting an exemption?
  • Does the statutory framework for tobacco taxation contemplate the printing of maximum retail prices or minimum prices?
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• Pakistan Tobacco Board vs Shah Hussain and others2018 PHC 1640, 2019 PLJ Peshawar 1 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-05-14
  trans-provincial establishmentNational Industrial Relations CommissionLabour Court jurisdictionindustrial relationsexecution of judgmentconstitutional amendmentrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses a labour revision petition filed by the Pakistan Tobacco Board (PTB) against the dismissal of its applications for the return of complaints filed by its former contractual employees. The respondents had previously secured reinstatement orders from the Labour Court, and subsequently filed implementation complaints under section 37(6) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2010. The core legal question was whether the Provincial Labour Court retained jurisdiction to execute judgments or entertain complaints concerning a trans-provincial establishment after the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The Peshawar High Court held that since the PTB is a trans-provincial establishment operating across multiple provinces, the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) possesses exclusive jurisdiction under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, which overrides provincial labour legislation in such matters. The court established the principle that jurisdiction over trans-provincial establishments and their related enforcement or contempt proceedings vests exclusively in the NIRC, rendering provincial labour courts incompetent to proceed with complaints concerning employers with operations in more than one province.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Provincial Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain implementation complaints regarding a trans-provincial establishment under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have exclusive jurisdiction over employers or establishments having branches in more than one province?
  • Can the National Industrial Relations Commission withdraw proceedings or applications relating to unfair labour practices from a provincial Labour Court?
  • What is the effect of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, on the powers of provincial labour courts regarding trans-provincial entities?
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• Pakistan Tibbi Pharmaceuticals Manufacturers vs Fed. of Pakistan and Ors2018 SHC 471, 2018 SHC 482 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-26Read full judgment →