Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Pakistan through Chairman FBR and others vs Hazrat Hussain and others2018 SCMR 939 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-14
  constitutional exemptionPATAadvance income taxsales taximportationArticle 247(3)jurisdictioncustoms dutyMaster Foam caseEntry 49 Federal Legislative Listpost-dated chequesdiscretionary powersconstitutional interpretationstatutory interpretationtaxation law
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard appeals concerning the levy of advance income tax and sales tax on goods imported through Karachi but intended for consumption in Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). The core legal question was whether these taxes could be imposed given Article 247(3) of the Constitution, which exempts PATA from federal/provincial laws unless specifically directed. The Court held that neither the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, nor the Sales Tax Act, 1990, applies to PATA, and thus the Customs Department lacks jurisdiction to collect these taxes on PATA-destined goods, its role being merely that of a collecting agency. The Court clarified that the levy is on sales and purchases of goods, not independent taxable events for import or production, disagreeing with the interpretation in the *Master Foam* case regarding Entry 49 of the Federal Legislative List. The *Master Foam* judgment was deemed *per incuriam* or confined to its specific facts. The Court upheld the Peshawar High Court's mechanism allowing release of goods against post-dated cheques, subject to verification of consumption in PATA, emphasizing that discretionary powers must be exercised uniformly and non-discriminatorily, and that statutes must yield to the Constitution in case of conflict.

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• Pakistan through Chairman F.B.R. and others vs Hazrat Husssain and others2018 P.C.T.L.R. 389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  tax immunityProvincially Administered Tribal Areasadvance income taxsales taxconstitutional interpretationdiscretionary powerimport duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the liability of importers operating in Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) to pay advance income tax and sales tax on goods imported through Karachi. The core legal question was whether the Customs Department could levy these taxes on goods destined for PATA, given the constitutional immunity under Article 247(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court held that since the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and the Sales Tax Act, 1990 do not extend to PATA, the Department lacks jurisdiction to collect such taxes on goods intended for processing and consumption within those areas. The Court affirmed a mechanism requiring importers to provide post-dated cheques to secure the release of goods, pending verification of their consumption in PATA. The key principle laid down is that while the Department may conduct factual inquiries to prevent misuse, it cannot arbitrarily impose taxes in non-taxable zones. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that discretionary powers regarding tax exemptions must be structured, consistent, and exercised without discrimination to ensure good governance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Customs Department have the jurisdiction to collect advance income tax and sales tax on goods imported for consumption in Provincially Administered Tribal Areas?
  • Can the Customs Department demand taxes on goods imported through a taxable area if the final destination and consumption of those goods are in a non-taxable area?
  • Is the discretionary power of the government to grant or refuse tax exemptions subject to the requirement of being structured and exercised in a non-discriminatory manner?
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• Pakistan through Chairman F.B.R. and others vs Hazrat Hussain and others2018 P.C.T.L.R. 389, 2018 P.S.C. 802 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  tax exemptionPATAconstitutional immunityimport dutysales taxadvance income taxburden of proofdiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the authority of the Federal Board of Revenue to collect advance income tax and sales tax on goods imported through Karachi by businesses located in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). The core legal question was whether the constitutional immunity granted to PATA under Article 247(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 exempts such imports from federal tax levies. The Supreme Court held that since the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and the Sales Tax Act, 1990 do not apply to PATA, the Customs Department lacks jurisdiction to collect these taxes on goods destined for and consumed within those areas. The Court affirmed a procedural mechanism allowing the release of goods against post-dated cheques, pending verification of consumption in PATA. The key principle laid down is that while the Department may conduct factual inquiries to prevent tax evasion, the initial burden of proof rests on the importer to establish the goods are for PATA, shifting to the Department to prove any subsequent diversion or fraud.

  Questions settled

  • Does the constitutional immunity under Article 247(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 exempt goods imported for consumption in Provincially Administered Tribal Areas from federal income and sales tax?
  • Does the Customs Department have the jurisdiction to collect advance income tax and sales tax on goods imported through a taxable area if the final destination and consumption of those goods are in a non-taxable area?
  • How should the burden of proof be allocated between an importer and the tax authorities when determining whether imported goods are intended for consumption in a non-taxable area?
  • Can the government exercise discretionary powers to grant or refuse tax exemptions without a structured, uniform policy?
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• Pakistan through Chairman F.B.R. & others vs Hazrat Hussain and others2018 PLJ SC 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  PATA exemptionadvance income taxsales tax on importsconstitutional immunitytax jurisdictionconsumption certificatediscretionary powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals regarding the imposition and collection of advance income tax and sales tax at the import stage by the Customs Department on raw materials imported by industrial units located in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). The core legal question is whether tax statutes like the Income Tax Ordinance and Sales Tax Act apply to PATA under Article 247(3) of the Constitution, and whether the Customs Department can collect advance income tax and sales tax on goods destined for and consumed within PATA. The Supreme Court held that since tax laws do not extend to PATA without a proper directive under the Constitution, the Revenue Department lacks jurisdiction to levy and collect income tax and sales tax for operations conducted within PATA. The Court affirmed that while the Department may conduct factual inquiries to verify the destination and consumption of goods, the High Court's mechanism allowing the release of goods against post-dated cheques and consumption verification certificates was valid. The key principle laid down is that constitutional exemptions applicable to PATA override federal tax laws at the import stage, and the Department bears the burden of establishing fraud if it alleges misuse of such exemptions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether federal tax laws such as the Income Tax Ordinance and Sales Tax Act apply to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas without a directive under Article 247(3) of the Constitution?
  • Can the Customs Department collect advance income tax and sales tax on goods imported for manufacturing and consumption within PATA?
  • Whether the Revenue Department has the authority to demand taxes at the port of entry when the final destination and consumption of the imported goods is exclusively within a non-taxable area like PATA?
  • Whether discretionary powers of tax authorities and the granting of exemptions must be exercised in accordance with the principles of good governance and non-discrimination?
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• Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trusts vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2018 PLJ SC 27, 2018 P.S.C. 11 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-04
  Zakat deductionsahib-e-nisabPension Fundstatutory interpretationtax liabilityautonomous bodycharitable organization exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the compulsory deduction of Zakat from the Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust’s Pension Fund by the Zakat and Ushr Department. The core legal question was whether the Trust qualified as a 'sahib-e-nisab' liable for Zakat under the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980, or if it was exempt as a government-owned entity or a charitable organization. The Supreme Court held that the Trust is an autonomous body, not wholly owned by the Federal Government, and failed to meet the statutory requirements for charitable exemption. The Court ruled that the Trust, by possessing the Pension Fund, falls within the ambit of the charging section, as the Ordinance uses the terms 'owns or possesses' disjunctively. Consequently, the Trust is liable for Zakat regardless of whether it holds the funds as a liability for beneficiaries. The Court also rejected the argument of double taxation, clarifying that Zakat is levied on the entity holding the assets at the relevant time, and dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court’s decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does an autonomous trust created by government notification qualify as a 'sahib-e-nisab' under the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980?
  • Does the term 'possesses' in the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980, create a liability for Zakat even if the entity does not hold legal ownership of the assets?
  • Are funds held by a trust for the benefit of employees exempt from Zakat as a liability rather than an asset?
  • Does the deduction of Zakat from a pension fund constitute double taxation if the beneficiaries are later liable for Zakat on the same amounts?
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• Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2018 PLJ SC 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-04
  zakat deductionsahib-e-nisabpension fundtruststatutory corporationcharitable organizationdouble taxationownership and possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the High Court dismissing the appellant's constitutional petition against the compulsory deduction of zakat from the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Employees' Pension Fund managed by the Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust. The core legal questions involved the status of the Trust as a 'sahib-e-nisab' under the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980, whether the Pension Fund constitutes an asset or a liability, whether the Trust qualifies for charitable exemption, and whether such deduction amounts to double taxation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Trust is an independent body not wholly owned by the Federal Government, fails to meet the statutory criteria for charitable exemption, and legally owns and possesses the assets comprising the Pension Fund. The Court laid down that to qualify as a 'sahib-e-nisab' under Section 3 of the Ordinance, ownership and possession are disjunctive, meaning a person or entity that possesses the assets is liable to pay zakat regardless of whether those assets are held for beneficiaries, and that prior deduction from a trust does not constitute double taxation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust falls within the definition of sahib-e-nisab under Section 2(xxiii) of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980?
  • Does the compulsory deduction of zakat apply to an entity that possesses assets as a trustee even if the beneficial ownership vests in others?
  • Whether an institution or trust claiming charitable exemption from zakat must strictly fulfill the registration and approval requirements under Section 2(xxiii)(i) of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980?
  • Does the deduction of zakat from a trust holding a pension fund amount to double taxation when distributed to pensioners?
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• Qadratullah & Ors vs Prov of Sindh & Ors2018 SHC 879 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-09Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. vs M. Rafique and 2 others2018 PLC (C.S.) 169 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-25
  sacked employeesreinstatementbogus appointmentlimitation periodconstitutional petitionservice lawstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an order passed by a Review Board reinstating the respondent into service. The core legal questions concern whether the respondent, whose appointment was alleged to be bogus, qualified for relief under the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010, and whether the application for reinstatement was filed within the mandatory statutory limitation period. The Court held that the impugned order was unsustainable. It observed that the respondent’s name was absent from the official recruitment list approved by the Establishment Division, indicating a bogus appointment. Crucially, the Court found that the respondent failed to demonstrate compliance with Section 3 of the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010, which mandates that applications for reinstatement must be filed within ninety days of the Act's enactment. As the respondent failed to prove the timely filing of the application, the Court set aside the reinstatement order. The judgment affirms that statutory limitation periods for seeking reinstatement are mandatory and that constitutional courts generally avoid determining disputed questions of fact regarding the validity of appointments.

  Questions settled

  • Is the requirement to file an application for reinstatement within ninety days under the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 mandatory?
  • Can a court in constitutional jurisdiction determine the veracity of a disputed appointment?
  • Does the failure to file a reinstatement application within the statutory period prescribed by the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 disentitle a claimant to relief?
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• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. through General Manager2018 PLJ Islamabad 287 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited through General2018 PLJ Islamabad 287, 2018 PTD 946 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-15Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited through authorized2018 PLC (C.S.) 510 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-31
  pensioninterim reliefinjunctionvoluntary separation schemeland disputecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an interlocutory order passed by a Single Judge of the Sindh High Court, whereby applications under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 were allowed, restraining the appellant Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) from stopping the pension of the respondent retired employees and directing the release of accumulated arrears and monthly pension. The core legal question was whether the employer could withhold or adjust rent from the retirees' pensions during the pendency of a civil suit concerning title and occupation of the residential quarters. The court held that pension is not a bounty but compensation for past services, and stopping it during the pendency of litigation causes grave financial distress, establishing a prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the employees. The appellate court affirmed the interim injunction, holding that the single judge correctly applied the principles of interlocutory relief without prejudging the main suit, and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employer can withhold or adjust rent from the pension of retired employees during the pendency of a suit concerning property occupation?
  • Whether the stoppage of pension constitutes a valid interim measure in disputes involving retirement benefits?
  • Whether the principles for granting interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. are satisfied when pension payments are unilaterally stopped by an employer?
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• Pakistan Telecom Mobile Ltd vs Muhammad Idrees Hadi and Ors2018 SHC 948 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-12
  workman statusresignation under duressreinstatementconstitutional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsindustrial relationsback benefitsburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitutional Petition challenged the concurrent orders of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC), which reinstated the Respondent-employee and declared his resignation void. The Petitioner-Company contended that the Respondent voluntarily resigned following allegations of misconduct and that he did not qualify as a "workman" due to his administrative duties. The core legal questions were whether the resignation was obtained under duress and whether the Respondent fell within the definition of a "workman." The Court held that the resignation was indeed obtained under duress and coercion, rendering it void ab initio. Regarding the status of the employee, the Court affirmed that the nature of duties performed, rather than mere designation or salary, determines whether an individual is a "workman." Since the Respondent performed manual duties without supervisory authority, he qualified as a workman. Furthermore, the Court ruled that it cannot interfere with concurrent findings of fact by competent fora in its constitutional jurisdiction absent material irregularity. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the reinstatement order and the finding that the resignation was not voluntary.

  Questions settled

  • Does the designation of an employee determine their status as a 'workman' under labor laws?
  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by the National Industrial Relations Commission in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is a resignation obtained under duress and coercion legally valid?
  • What is the primary criterion for determining whether an employee falls within the definition of a 'workman' under labor legislation?
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• Pakistan Stone Development Company Ltd. vs Muhammad Yousaf and another2018 PLJ Islamabad 256, 2018 KLR Civil Cases 395 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Stone Development Company Ltd. through Chief Executive2018 PLJ Islamabad 256 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Stone Development Company Limited through Chief Executive2018 CLC 877 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-16Read full judgment →
• Pakistan State Op Ltd vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi2018 P.C.T.L.R. 311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-03
  presumptive taxdeemed incomehandling agentimport of oilconfiscatory taxationcustoms clearancetax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Pakistan State Oil Ltd. (PSO), challenged its liability to pay presumptive tax under Section 80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 for the assessment years 1996-97 and 1997-98. The revenue authorities asserted that PSO was the importer of refined petroleum products because the import documentation, including Letters of Credit and Bills of Entry, was in its name. PSO contended it acted merely as a handling agent for the Government of Pakistan, which had contracted directly with a Swiss supplier. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeals, holding that the Government of Pakistan was the actual owner and importer of the oil, as title to the cargo passed to the Government prior to entering Pakistan's territorial waters. The Court reiterated that 'import' refers to the physical act of bringing goods into the country, not the procedural documentation. Furthermore, the Court noted that taxing a handling agent on the entire value of the cargo, resulting in a tax liability ten times its actual commission, violates constitutional limits against confiscatory taxation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a handling agent executing import documentation on behalf of the Government can be legally classified as the 'importer' for the purposes of presumptive tax under Section 80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
  • Does the term 'import' under Pakistani tax and customs law refer to the physical bringing of goods into the country or the procedural documentation required for clearing the goods?
  • Can the legislature's power to tax under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be exercised to the point of confiscation, such as creating a tax demand that vastly exceeds the actual income earned?
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• Pakistan State Oil Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi2018 SCMR 894 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-03
  presumptive taximportdeemed incometax on incomehandling agentconfiscatory taxationconstitutional limits of taxationIncome Tax Ordinance 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals, by leave of the Court, examine whether Pakistan State Oil Ltd. (PSO) was liable to pay presumptive tax as an importer under section 80C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, or whether it merely acted as a handling agent for the Government of Pakistan. The core legal questions concern the proper identification of the importer of refined petroleum products under a direct contract between the President of Pakistan and a foreign supplier, and the constitutional limits on imposing a deemed income tax demand that exceeds the actual income received. The Supreme Court held that the Government of Pakistan was the actual owner and importer of the goods, as title passed prior to the entry of the vessels into Pakistani territorial waters, rendering PSO's procedural handling and documentation insufficient to classify PSO as the importer. The Court laid down that "import" carries its natural meaning of physically bringing goods into the country, and that the legislature cannot exercise its taxing power to the point of confiscation by levying a tax that drastically exceeds an assessee's actual income, thereby violating fundamental rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agent appointed by the Government to handle imports can be treated as an importer for the purpose of presumptive tax under section 80C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • What is the legal definition and true import of the word 'import' in the context of customs and tax laws in Pakistan?
  • Does the legislature have the power to impose a tax on deemed income that exceeds 100 percent of the actual income, amounting to confiscation of property?
  • Can procedural documentation such as Bills of Entry and Letters of Credit override the substantive contractual ownership of goods in determining liability for import taxes?
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• Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd. vs Messrs Gillani (Pvt.) Ltd. and another2018 MLD 1770 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-26Read full judgment →
• Pakistan State Oil Company Limited vs (1) M/s. Gillani (Private) Limited (2)2018 MLD 1770, 2018 SHC 665 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-26Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Real Estate Investment and Management Company (Pvt) Ltd.2018 [M] C.L.R. 875, 2018 IHC 3, 2018 PLD Islamabad 115 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-30
  arbitration agreementappointment of arbitratorallegations of fraudterritorial jurisdictionlocus standiassignment of contractsole arbitratorcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals challenge orders referring a dispute to arbitration and appointing a two-member tribunal. The core legal questions concerned the standing of an assignor to resist arbitration, the territorial jurisdiction of the court, the impact of unsubstantiated fraud allegations on arbitration, and the validity of a multi-member tribunal under a silent arbitration clause. The Court held that an assignor who has divested its rights lacks standing to challenge arbitration. It affirmed that territorial jurisdiction is established where the services were performed. Regarding fraud, the Court ruled that bare, unsubstantiated allegations do not constitute sufficient cause to refuse arbitration; specific prima facie evidence is required. Finally, the Court held that where an arbitration agreement is silent on the number of arbitrators, the default rule under the First Schedule of the Arbitration Act, 1940, mandates the appointment of a sole arbitrator. Consequently, the Court modified the trial court’s order to appoint a sole arbitrator, establishing that appellate courts possess the authority to rectify procedural defects in the appointment of arbitral tribunals.

  Questions settled

  • Does an assignor who has transferred all rights and liabilities under a contract have the locus standi to resist a reference to arbitration?
  • Can a party defeat an arbitration clause by making bare, unsubstantiated allegations of fraud against the other party?
  • Where an arbitration agreement is silent on the number of arbitrators, does the Arbitration Act, 1940, mandate the appointment of a sole arbitrator?
  • Does an appellate court have the power to appoint a sole arbitrator when the trial court erroneously appointed a multi-member tribunal?
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• Pakistan Railways Employees Cooperative Housing Society Ltd.2018 PLJ Quetta 122 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-06-22Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Poultry Association vs Competition Commission of Pakistan2018 CLD 759 · Competition Appellate Tribunal · 2016-09-28Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Pharmacists Association vs Province of Punjab and 3 others2018 PLJ Lahore 747, 2018 LHC 478, 2018 [M] C.L.R. 1756, 2018 PLC (C.S.) 1063 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-09
  locus standiaggrieved personconstitutional petitioncontract appointmentpharmacists recruitmentservice mattersmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 was filed by the Pakistan Pharmacists Association, challenging the recruitment process initiated by the Punjab government for appointing Pharmacists (Field Force) on a contract basis under the Drugs Act, 1976 and the Punjab Drugs Rules, 2007. The petitioner association contended that the recruitment was unlawful, ultra vires, and violated fundamental rights. The respondents raised preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the petition and the petitioner's lack of locus standi, asserting that the petitioner was not an aggrieved party and that the recruitment aimed to enforce a zero-tolerance policy against spurious drugs. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that an association of professionals lacks locus standi under Article 199 to maintain a writ petition concerning individual employment, appointments, or service matters unless a direct personal or individual legal right of the association or its members has been infringed. The court established that the right foundation for a constitutional petition must be a personal and individual right, and third-party associations cannot challenge administrative recruitment processes where neither the association nor its members participated or suffered direct injury.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an association of professionals has the locus standi under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 to challenge a public sector recruitment or service matter on behalf of its members?
  • Can a professional body be considered an 'aggrieved person' when neither it nor its individual members have participated in or been directly affected by the challenged recruitment process?
  • Does the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court extend to resolving disputed questions of fact regarding the internal management and legal status of a registered association?
  • Are service matters and individual public appointments actions in rem or actions in personam for the purpose of maintaining a constitutional petition?
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• Pakistan Medical and Dental Council vs Muhammad Fahad Malik etc2020 P SC 846, 2018 SCMR 1956, 2018 SCP 1052, 2018 SCP 1057, 2019 SCP 71 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-12
  Pakistan Medical and Dental CouncilOrdinance lapse and repealCouncil of Common Interestscentralized admission programde facto doctrinetrichotomy of powersdelegated legislationmedical admissions
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses multiple appeals and petitions concerning the constitution, composition, and regulatory powers of the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC), the validity of various amending Ordinances and the MBBS and BDS (Admissions, House job and Internship) Regulations, 2016, and the necessity of approval from the Council of Common Interests (CCI). The core legal questions involved whether Parliament's legislative powers and delegated regulations require prior approval of the CCI, the survival of textual amendments made by temporary Ordinances upon their lapse or repeal, and the status of previous office-bearers. The Court held that Parliament has unfettered authority to legislate on matters in the Federal Legislative List without CCI's prior approval, that delegated regulations similarly do not require CCI approval, and that amendments introduced by lapsed or repealed Ordinances do not survive beyond the life of the Ordinance, thereby reviving the prior statutory position. The Court laid down that executive Ordinances cannot permanently alter primary statutes without legislative enactment, protected day-to-day past actions under the de facto doctrine, dissolved the existing council, and established an ad-hoc council to conduct fresh elections.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prior approval of the Council of Common Interests is required for legislation or delegated regulations enacted in respect of matters enumerated in the Federal Legislative List?
  • Do textual amendments made to a permanent statute by means of an executive Ordinance survive the lapse or repeal of that Ordinance?
  • Whether the power to promulgate Ordinances under Article 89 of the Constitution of Pakistan empowers the Executive to make permanent alterations to primary legislation without parliamentary enactment?
  • What is the extent of protection afforded to actions taken by a regulatory body whose foundational constituent instrument has lapsed under the de facto doctrine?
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• Pakistan Medical and Dental Council through its President and 3 others vs Muhammad Fahad Malik etc and 10 others2020 P SC 846, 2018 SCP 1052, 2019 SCP 71, 2018 SCP 1057 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-12
  Pakistan Medical and Dental CouncilPMDCAd-hoc CouncilAdministrative governanceRegulatory body dissolutionSupreme Court intervention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the governance and administrative legitimacy of the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC). The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan involved the validity of the existing PMDC structure and its Executive Committee. Upon reviewing the petitions and appeals, the Court held that the existing PMDC and its Executive Committee were to be dissolved immediately. The Court exercised its authority to constitute an ad-hoc Council to manage the affairs of the PMDC until fresh elections or appointments could be conducted in accordance with the law. The Court appointed a specific body of members, including a former Supreme Court Judge as Chairman and various high-ranking health and academic officials as members, to oversee the transition and ensure the continued functioning of the regulatory body. The Registrar of the PMDC was directed to continue their duties during this interim period. The decision establishes the principle that the Supreme Court may intervene in the administrative structure of a statutory regulatory body to ensure its lawful functioning when the existing governance framework is found to be deficient or non-compliant with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court dissolve a statutory regulatory body and appoint an ad-hoc council to manage its affairs?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to restructure the governance of the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council?
  • Is the Registrar of the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council permitted to continue working following the dissolution of the Council by the Supreme Court?
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• Pakistan Medical and Dental Council and Others vs Muhammad Fahad2018 SCP 1057, 2018 SCP 1052 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-12
  PMDCstatutory bodyadministrative governancead-hoc councilregulatory oversightjudicial intervention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the governance and administrative affairs of the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC). The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed several civil appeals and petitions regarding the functioning of the PMDC. The core legal question involved the authority of the Court to intervene in the management of a statutory regulatory body due to ongoing administrative issues. The Court held that the existing PMDC and its Executive Committee were to be dissolved immediately. To ensure the continuity of essential functions and regulatory oversight, the Court exercised its jurisdiction to constitute an ad-hoc Council. This ad-hoc body, composed of various high-ranking judicial, legal, and medical officials, was tasked with managing the affairs of the PMDC until fresh elections or appointments could be conducted in accordance with the law. The key principle established is the Court's power to intervene in the governance of statutory bodies to prevent administrative paralysis and ensure the proper discharge of public duties during transitional periods.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to dissolve a statutory body like the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council?
  • Can the Supreme Court constitute an ad-hoc council to manage the affairs of a statutory body pending new elections?
  • What is the legal status of an ad-hoc council appointed by the Supreme Court to run a regulatory body?
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• Pakistan Match Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Collector of Sales Tax and Federal Excise, Peshawar2018 PTD 441 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-06Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Bar Council through Chairman and others vs Federal2018 PLJ SC 815, 2018 SCMR 1891 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-08-31
  legal educationPakistan Bar CouncilHigher Education CommissionLaw Graduate Assessment TestLaw Admission Testaffiliating universitiesdisaffiliation of law collegesstructural reforms
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional matter addresses the declining standards of legal education in Pakistan and establishes comprehensive structural reforms. The core legal question revolves around the enforcement of the rule of law and the regulatory powers of the Pakistan Bar Council and the Higher Education Commission over law colleges and universities imparting legal education. The Supreme Court held that rigorous standards are essential for legal training, approving various recommendations and issuing binding directions. The Court ordered the restoration of the Law Graduate Assessment Test (LAW-GAT) and introduced a Law Admission Test (LAT), specified recognized affiliating universities and their territorial jurisdictions, banned evening classes and three-year LL.B. programmes in favor of a five-year program, established strict faculty qualifications, and mandated the disaffiliation or closure of sub-standard and unauthorized law colleges. The key principles laid down emphasize that the judicature and the bar share a constitutional duty to maintain professional standards, and that regulatory bodies must rigorously oversee legal education institutions to safeguard the administration of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Pakistan Bar Council and the Higher Education Commission have the regulatory authority to enforce standards in legal education and mandate admission and assessment tests?
  • Can universities and institutions not recognized by the Pakistan Bar Council impart legal education at the LL.M. and Ph.D. levels?
  • What are the prescribed qualifications for permanent and visiting faculty members at law colleges offering LL.B. programmes?
  • Is the three-year LL.B. programme validly phased out in favor of a mandatory five-year LL.B. programme along with a ban on evening classes?
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• Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation vs Muhammad2018 PLC (C.S.) 427, 2018 PLJ Lahore 443, 2018 LHC 171 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-18
  intra-court appealcontractual employmenttermination of servicenatural justiceaudi alteram partemfair trialdue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal was filed by the Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation (PASSCO) against the judgment of a learned Single Judge who had allowed the writ petitions of the respondents. The respondents, contractual employees of PASSCO, were terminated from service via an order stating they ceased to be employees with immediate effect, following an inquiry report that alleged irregularities in their recruitment process. The core legal question was whether the termination of contractual employees based on allegations of irregularity, without a show-cause notice, personal hearing, or formal inquiry as recommended in the inquiry report, was legally sustainable. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that even in contractual matters, where serious allegations are leveled, the employer cannot terminate services with a single stroke of pen without affording an opportunity of fair trial and personal hearing. The Court ruled that such unilateral termination violated the principles of natural justice and the fundamental rights of due process and fair trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public sector corporation terminate contractual employees on allegations of recruitment irregularities without affording them a personal hearing or a show-cause notice?
  • Does the termination of contractual employees without following the formal inquiry procedure recommended in an inquiry report violate Article 4 and Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether the principle of natural justice applies to the termination of contractual employees of a public entity when serious allegations of irregularity are made against them?
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• Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. through Regional Manager vs Miss Shazia Noor and another2018 MLD 209 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-05Read full judgment →
• Pak Telecom Mobile Limited vs Federation of Pakistan & others2018 PLJ Lahore 235 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Pak Leather Crafts Limited and others vs Al-Baraka Bank Limited2019 CLD 659, 2018 SHC 1076 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-19
  limitation periodcertified copytime requisitefinancial institutions recoverycondonation of delaybanking court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, challenging a Banking Court judgment and decree. The primary question before the Sindh High Court was whether the appeal was barred by limitation, specifically turning on the interpretation of 'time requisite' for obtaining a certified copy under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, read with its sub-section (5). The High Court held that the appeal was time-barred because the appellants failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptitude by waiting 38 days to deposit the estimated copying fee without offering any valid explanation. The ratio laid down is that sub-section (5) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 did not alter the established principle that a litigant must demonstrate due diligence and lack of control over delays during the process of obtaining certified copies, and failure to deposit estimated costs promptly disentitles the applicant from excluding that period as 'time requisite'.

  Questions settled

  • Does the addition of sub-section (5) to Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 change the requirement that a litigant must act with due diligence when obtaining a certified copy?
  • Can a litigant exclude the period spent delaying the deposit of estimated copying fees in the computation of limitation for filing an appeal?
  • What constitutes 'time requisite' under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for obtaining certified copies of judgments and decrees?
  Read full judgment →
• Pak Gulf Construction Private Limited and another vs Abdul Hamid Baig2018 IHC 169 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-14
  arbitration awardbreach of contractproperty disputepayment schedulelimitation periodconstruction agreementspecific relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a civil court judgment that made an arbitration award a rule of court regarding a property dispute. The core legal question was whether the respondent (purchaser) was entitled to compensation for construction delays under the agreements, despite failing to adhere to the agreed payment schedules, and whether the arbitrator erred in granting such relief. The High Court held that the arbitrator committed legal misconduct by ignoring explicit contractual clauses prohibiting the stoppage of installment payments. The Court determined that the developer’s obligation to deliver possession was conditional upon the purchaser's timely payments. Consequently, the respondent’s failure to maintain the payment schedule disentitled them to compensation or the return of payments without deduction. The Court established that an arbitration award that disregards clear contractual obligations regarding payment defaults is unsustainable. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the objections to the award were sustained, and the impugned judgment and decree were set aside, as the respondent’s breach of the payment terms invalidated their claim for damages and interest.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party's presence in court when an arbitration award is filed constitute notice for the purposes of the limitation period for filing objections?
  • Can a purchaser unilaterally stop installment payments due to a developer's delay in construction?
  • Does an arbitration award that ignores explicit contractual terms regarding payment obligations constitute legal misconduct?
  • Is a developer's obligation to hand over possession of property conditional upon the purchaser's timely payment of installments?
  Read full judgment →
• Pak Elektron Ltd. and another vs Federal Board of Revenue and others2018 PTD 778 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-13Read full judgment →
• Pak Elektron Limited & another vs Federal Board of Revenue & others.2018 PTD 778, PTCL 2018 CL 59 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-13Read full judgment →
• Pak China Sost Port Joint Company (Pvt.) through Yuan Jiamin Chairman2018 KLR S.C. 11 · Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit BaltistanRead full judgment →
• Pahar Khoso and others vs The State and others2018 P Cr. L J 1240 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-02
  capital punishmentmurderbenefit of doubtdelayed FIRheadlight identificationinterested witnessesindependent corroborationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the trial court's judgment convicting the appellants under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing them to death, alongside connected acquittal appeals and a death sentence confirmation reference. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular testimony based on vehicle headlight identification at night, the consequences of an unexplained 48-hour delay in lodging the FIR, the effect of deep-seated civil and criminal land litigation between the parties creating a double-edged motive, and whether interested and inimical witnesses could sustain a capital conviction without independent corroboration. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to material contradictions, delayed reporting after consultation, weak identification evidence, and the acquittal of co-accused on similar evidence. The court laid down the principle that a single circumstance creating a reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding the accused's guilt entitles them to the benefit of doubt as of right, and that disbelieved eyewitness testimony regarding co-accused cannot be relied upon against remaining accused without unimpeachable independent corroboration. The convictions and sentences were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether identification of accused persons under the headlight of a vehicle at night constitutes a reliable and sufficient source of identification without corroboration?
  • Does an unexplained delay of 48 hours in lodging the First Information Report, coupled with pre-existing litigation and consultation, render the prosecution case doubtful?
  • Can eyewitness testimony that has been disbelieved with respect to certain co-accused be safely relied upon to convict other co-accused without independent corroboratory evidence?
  • Whether a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right?
  Read full judgment →
• P.T.V. Employees' Ittehad Union, Punjab through Secretary vs Federation2018 PLC 136, 2018 PLD Lahore 160 · Lahore High Court · 2015-07-03
  Industrial Relations Act 2012trans-provincial establishmentseighteenth amendmentlegislative competencecollective bargaining agentfederal legislative list
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment by the Lahore High Court addressed a challenge to the constitutional validity of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (IRA 2012), following the devolution of the subject of labour to the provinces under the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The core legal question was whether the Parliament (Majlis-e-Shoora) possessed the legislative competence to enact IRA 2012 for the Islamabad Capital Territory and trans-provincial establishments and industries, or whether the subject fell exclusively within provincial domain. The Court held that IRA 2012 is intra vires the Constitution and constitutes a valid piece of legislation. The ratio is that while general labour legislation falls within provincial autonomy post-the Eighteenth Amendment, the Parliament retains legislative competence under various entries of the Federal Legislative List (including inter-provincial trade, corporations with objects not confined to one province, implementation of international treaties, and matters relating to the Federation) to legislate for trans-provincial establishments and the Islamabad Capital Territory, ensuring the protection of fundamental rights under Article 17 of the Constitution and preventing administrative chaos.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 is ultra vires the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 following the abolition of the Concurrent Legislative List by the Eighteenth Amendment?
  • Does the Parliament have the legislative competence to enact labour laws applicable to trans-provincial establishments and the Islamabad Capital Territory?
  • Whether federal legislation governing trans-provincial trade unions and industrial relations conflicts with the provincial autonomy granted to the provinces?
  • Are the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 protected under the entries of the Federal Legislative List relating to inter-provincial trade and commerce and international treaty obligations?
  Read full judgment →
• P.T.V. Employees Ittehad Union, Punjab through Secretary vs Federation2018 PLC 136 · Lahore High Court · 2015-07-03
  vires of statutelegislative competencetrans-provincial establishmentsEighteenth Amendmentindustrial relationscollective bargaining agentpith and substancefederal legislative list
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an Intra-Court Appeal and several Writ Petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (IRA 2012). The core legal question was whether the Parliament possessed the legislative competence to enact the IRA 2012 following the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which abolished the Concurrent Legislative List and devolved labour subjects to the provinces. The Court held that the IRA 2012 is intra vires the Constitution. Applying the doctrine of "pith and substance" and the principle of liberal construction of legislative entries, the Court determined that the Federation retains legislative authority over trans-provincial establishments and the Islamabad Capital Territory. This authority is derived from various entries in the Federal Legislative List, including those concerning inter-provincial trade and commerce, international treaty implementation, and matters relating to the Federation. The Court emphasized that federal and provincial labour laws can coexist harmoniously. Furthermore, it reasoned that striking down the IRA 2012 would undermine the fundamental right to freedom of association and create administrative chaos for entities operating across multiple provinces, thereby necessitating a uniform federal regulatory framework.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Parliament have the legislative competence to enact labour laws for trans-provincial establishments after the Eighteenth Amendment?
  • Is the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 ultra vires the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can federal and provincial labour laws coexist harmoniously in the post-Eighteenth Amendment legal framework?
  • Does the doctrine of pith and substance apply when determining the constitutionality of federal legislation involving trans-provincial entities?
  Read full judgment →
• Overseas Pakistanis Foundation, Islamabad vs Joint Management (Pvt)2018 IHC 135 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-13Read full judgment →
• Osman Yasin vs Defence Housing Authority through Administrator and 72018 YLR 3 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-27Read full judgment →
• Orangzaib vs The State2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-04
  abduction for ransomextortionreappraisal of evidencecriminal appealsentence reductionwrongful conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted by the trial court for murder and abduction for ransom, receiving death sentences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. On appeal, the High Court acquitted the appellant of the murder charge but upheld the conviction for abduction for ransom, reducing the sentence to life imprisonment. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court re-evaluated the evidence, noting the prosecution failed to prove the appellant's involvement in the abduction or the demand for ransom. The only evidence established was that the appellant drove the vehicle where the victim was held, which the Court held constituted extortion under Section 383 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, rather than abduction for ransom. Given that the appellant had already served twelve years in custody—far exceeding the three-year maximum sentence for extortion—the Court set aside the previous convictions and sentences. The Court held that the appellant's actions fell under the definition of extortion and ordered his immediate release, having already served the maximum permissible sentence for that offense.

  Questions settled

  • Does driving a vehicle containing a victim held by co-accused constitute abduction for ransom or extortion under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can an appellate court substitute a conviction for a lesser offense when the evidence does not support the original charge of abduction for ransom?
  • Is a sentence of imprisonment for life sustainable when the proven facts only establish an offense punishable by a maximum of three years?
  Read full judgment →
• Opi Gas (Private) Limited through General Manager vs United Energy2018 CLC 279 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-10Read full judgment →
• Omni Capital Management (Pvt.) Limited vs Commissioner (Securities2018 CLD 1061 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2017-11-02Read full judgment →
• Omair Ali vs The State2018 KLR Criminal Cases 175 · Lahore High Court
  murderbenefit of the doubttest identification parademedical contradictionsanti-terrorismcriminal appealeyewitness reliability
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, and other related provisions for the murder of a police constable during a sudden nighttime motorcycle ambush. The core legal questions involve the reliability of a belated test identification parade, discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence, and the benefit of the doubt in poorly investigated cases. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the assailants beyond reasonable doubt given the momentary nature of the surprise attack, lack of a reliable light source, delayed identification parade where suspects were exposed, and contradictions between the crime report and medical evidence regarding the number and trajectories of the fire shots. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions and death sentences, acquitted the appellants on the basis of benefit of the doubt, and dismissed the sentence enhancement revision. The key principle laid down is that criminal convictions cannot rest on moral certainty or weak investigative foundations, and a sudden, brief nocturnal assault coupled with delayed identification and medical contradictions entitles the accused to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a belated test identification parade holds significant evidentiary value when suspects have been exposed to witnesses?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when material contradictions exist between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the number and nature of fire-arm injuries?
  • Does a sudden and brief nocturnal encounter without sufficient light weaken the reliability of subsequent assailant identification?
  • Is an accused entitled to an acquittal when the prosecution case suffers from investigative flaws and leaves room for reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Omair Ali and others vs The State and others2018 KLR Criminal Cases 175, 2018 LHC 179, 2018 P Cr. L J 1224 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-17
  benefit of doubtocular evidencemedical evidence contradictiontest identification paradecriminal appealdeath sentence confirmationforensic evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence imposed by the trial court for murder and terrorism-related offenses. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in light of significant discrepancies in ocular, medical, and forensic evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution's case was fundamentally flawed. The Court noted that the ocular account was contradicted by medical evidence regarding the number and nature of wounds, and the identification parade was conducted after an inordinate delay, rendering it unreliable. Furthermore, the Court found the police's failure to act during the alleged incident and the absence of a sufficient light source to identify the assailants created insurmountable doubts. Emphasizing that convictions cannot be sustained on moral satisfaction alone, the Court ruled that the appellants were entitled to the benefit of the doubt. Consequently, the convictions were set aside, the death sentence was not confirmed, and the appellants were acquitted, establishing the principle that a conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, free from material contradictions and procedural irregularities.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant delay in conducting a test identification parade render the identification evidence unreliable?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the ocular account is diametrically contradicted by medical evidence?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution's case relies on evidence that is fraught with doubts and inconsistencies?
  Read full judgment →
• Om Prakash Agarwal Since Deceased THR. LRS. & Ors vs Vishan Dayal2018 SCInd 121 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-10-12Read full judgment →
• Olas Khan and others vs Chairman NAB through Chairman and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-23
  post-arrest bailNAB Referenceconstitutional jurisdictionouster of jurisdictioncorruptionnon-obstante clausebail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses the jurisdiction of High Courts to grant bail in cases under the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO), 1999. The matter arose from a Peshawar High Court decision that granted bail to one accused while declining it to another under Section 497 Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court clarified that while Section 9(b) of the NAO, 1999, contains a non-obstante clause that excludes the application of general bail provisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), including Sections 497 and 498, it cannot oust the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Courts. The Court held that High Courts possess the power to grant bail in NAB cases exclusively under Article 199 of the Constitution, not under the Cr.P.C. or Section 17(c) of the NAO. On the merits, the Court upheld the refusal of bail to a Project Director due to prima facie evidence of colossal financial loss to the national exchequer, while maintaining the bail granted to a Deputy Director where only connivance was alleged and no direct corruption was established.

  Read full judgment →
• Oil Industries Pakistan (Pvt) Limited vs (1) Abdul Rehman and others (2)2019 PLC 140, 2018 SHC 670 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-30
  labor disputeunlawful terminationdue processfair trialconstitutional petitionreinstatementcompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged judgments passed by the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Sindh Labour Court, which had awarded compensation to the private respondents in lieu of reinstatement after finding their oral termination unlawful. The core legal questions involved whether the respondents were terminated without inquiry and due process, and whether the Labour Court's decisions were sustainable. The Sindh High Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower forums regarding the unlawful termination of the respondents without holding a full-fledged inquiry or providing an opportunity of hearing were unexceptionable. The Court affirmed that right to a fair trial and due process is a fundamental right under the Constitution, and that an employer cannot terminate a permanent employee without establishing charges through proper proceedings. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the petitions and maintained the award of compensation in lieu of reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee can be verbally terminated from service without holding a formal inquiry and providing a chance of personal hearing?
  • Can the High Court interfere in concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labor forums under its constitutional jurisdiction without showing any material irregularity?
  • Whether compensation in lieu of reinstatement can be awarded by the appellate tribunal where relations between the parties have become estranged?
  Read full judgment →
• Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority through Secretary vs Sui Southern2019 PLJ SC 222, 2019 P.S.C. 51, 2018 SCMR 1012 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-27
  regulated activitynatural gasexclusive jurisdictionlicensee and consumer disputegas connectionregulatory authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh concerning a dispute over the refusal of a gas connection for captive power generation. The core legal question was whether the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority possesses exclusive jurisdiction under the relevant statutory framework to hear and resolve disputes between licensees and consumers regarding regulated activities such as the transmission, distribution, and sale of natural gas. The Supreme Court held that the sale and supply of natural gas constitute a regulated activity under the law, and the regulatory authority has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate such disputes, including matters of connection and disconnection of service. The Court further held that parties who submit to the authority's jurisdiction without objection are estopped from subsequently challenging it. Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed, and the unsustainable portion of the High Court's judgment declaring the regulatory proceedings to be without jurisdiction was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes between licensees and consumers regarding regulated activities?
  • Can the sale and distribution of natural gas be classified as a regulated activity requiring a license under the law?
  • Are parties who participate in proceedings before the regulatory authority without objection estopped from later challenging its jurisdiction?
  • Do the provisions of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 have an overriding effect over conflicting provisions in other laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Oil & Gas Development Company Limited, Jinnah Avenue, Islamabad, through Chairman and another vs Muhammad Ilyas Mian2018 CLC 1666 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-01Read full judgment →
• OGDCL and another vs Muhammad Ilyas Mien2018 [M] C.L.R. 585 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-01Read full judgment →
• OGDCL and another vs Muhammad Ilyas Mian2018 CLC 1666, 2018 [M] C.L.R. 585, 2018 KLR Civil Cases 204 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-01Read full judgment →
• Official Assignee of Karachi vs Mrs. Fauzia Tariq and 2 others2018 CLD 1205 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-22Read full judgment →
• Office World vs The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, R.T.O.-II, Karachi2019 P.C.T.L.R. 231, 2018 PTD 2170 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2018-04-10Read full judgment →
• Ocean Pakistan Limited vs Additional Commissioner, Inland Revenue, etc2018 P.C.T.L.R. 283 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-15Read full judgment →
• Ocean Pakistan Limited through Chief Executive Officer, Islamabad vs Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, (Audit-I), Islamabad and 2 others2018 PCTLR 283, 2018 PTD 996 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-15Read full judgment →
• Obaidullah Jan Babat and 2 others vs Speaker, Balochistan Assembly2019 [M] C.L.R. 1166, 2019 [M] C.L.R. 1232, 2019 KLR Civil Cases 422, 2018 CLC · Balochistan High Court · 2018-05-21Read full judgment →
• N/A vs N/A2018 P.S.C. 1369 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-30
  suo motu jurisdictionloan write-offbanking courtfinancial institutionsrecovery of financesattachment of assets
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a suo motu action taken by the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the write-off or waiver of loans by financial institutions and banking companies to determine if such actions were bona fide or constituted an abuse of power. A high-powered judicial commission was appointed, which submitted a report analyzing numerous cases and ultimately identifying 222 cases for further proceedings. The core legal question concerned the appropriate mechanism and terms for addressing these written-off loans to balance interests and recover public monies. The Court held that a uniform formula should be applied across the board and adopted a moderate option recommended by the Commission. The Court established a two-fold option scheme: first, borrowers may deposit 75% of the differential between the amount sanctioned and the amount recovered to close proceedings; second, those declining face a reference to the Banking Court under Section 8(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, with immediate attachment of assets of the borrowers and their directors. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court can direct specialized Banking Courts to look behind loan write-offs under specific statutory parameters while bypassing ordinary limitations and procedural bars in suo motu implementation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court in suo motu proceedings can direct Banking Courts to review loan write-offs by looking behind financial circulars?
  • Can borrowers be granted an option to deposit a percentage of the differential between sanctioned and recovered loan amounts to avoid further recovery proceedings?
  • Whether the assets of borrowers, directors, and controlling shareholders can be attached upon opting for Banking Court proceedings under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • On whom does the onus lie to establish that a written-off loan does not fall within the parameters of Section 8(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Nusrat Abbas vs Nighat Parveen, etc.2018 CLC 1115, 2018 [M] C.L.R. 569 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-27
  Section 12(2) CPCwithdrawal of suitfraud and misrepresentationinheritancerejection of plaintrecording of evidencecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil writ petition concerns the maintainability of an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, filed after the withdrawal of a suit for declaration regarding inheritance. The core legal question was whether an application under Section 12(2) CPC alleging fraud and misrepresentation—specifically that the withdrawal was induced by false promises made outside court—can be summarily dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC without recording evidence. The High Court dismissed the petition, affirming the lower appellate court's decision that the application could not be rejected summarily. The court held that where an application under Section 12(2) CPC raises disputed questions of fact, such as allegations of fraud or misrepresentation, the court must record evidence rather than deciding the matter summarily. Furthermore, the court clarified that misrepresentation under Section 12(2) is not restricted to conduct occurring within the courtroom. Finally, it established that an application under Section 12(2) functions as a substitute for a fresh suit, rendering the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC applicable to such proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be summarily dismissed when it raises disputed questions of fact?
  • Does the scope of misrepresentation under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 extend to conduct occurring outside the court?
  • Is an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable against an application filed under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Nusrat Abbas vs Nighat Parveen and others2018 CLC 1115 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-27Read full judgment →
• NTL (Private) Limited vs TNT (U.A.E.), LLC2018 CLC 1437 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-23Read full judgment →
• Nouman Azmat vs S.A. Rehman & Sons through Proprietors and 6 others2018 CLC 2020 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-09
  interim injunctioncivil revisionlocal commission reporteasement rightunauthorized constructiondiscretionary order
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from a suit for permanent and mandatory injunction filed by the petitioner against the respondents, alleging unauthorized construction and illegal encroachment by the private respondents on a street adjacent to the petitioner's property without the approval of the Sialkot Cantonment Board. The trial court dismissed the petitioner's application for interim injunction based on a local commission report which indicated no encroachment or reduction in street width. The appellate court upheld this decision, finding that the construction was being carried out for repair within the old structure pursuant to valid permission from the Cantonment Board. The core legal question concerns whether the courts below erred in refusing the interim injunction. The Lahore High Court dismissed the revision petition in limine, holding that the petitioner failed to establish the foundational ingredients for interim injunctive relief—specifically, a prima facie case, irreparable loss, and balance of convenience. The court reiterated that discretionary orders of lower courts based on tentative assessment of record and local commission reports warrant no interference in revisional jurisdiction unless perverse or arbitrary.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients an applicant must prove to secure an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a revisional court interfere with the concurrent findings and exercise of discretion by the courts below regarding the refusal of an interim injunction when supported by a local commission report?
  • Is an interim injunction granted when construction is raised in accordance with valid permission from a local authority and does not narrow down a public street?
  Read full judgment →
• Not vs Not2018 PLD Supreme Court 72 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-30
  freedom of speechelectronic media regulationincitement to violencewrit of the stateconstitutional obligationshate speechpublic order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the aftermath of a protest sit-in, where the Court examined reports from law enforcement and intelligence agencies regarding the violence, destruction of property, and the role of media in inciting unrest. The core legal questions addressed were the State's duty to account for loss of life and property, the limitations on freedom of speech and press, and the obligations of electronic media under statutory law. The Court held that the State must provide comprehensive data on casualties and property damage across all provinces. It emphasized that while freedom of speech is a fundamental right, it is not absolute and is curtailed when used to incite violence, promote extremism, or undermine national security and religious values. The Court affirmed that media outlets must comply with regulatory frameworks prohibiting inflammatory content. Key principles laid down include the inviolable obligation of citizens to obey the Constitution, the prohibition of violence and hate speech in the name of religion, and the State's authority to regulate media to maintain public order and the writ of the State.

  Questions settled

  • Does the freedom of speech and press under the Constitution allow for the broadcast of content that incites violence or undermines national security?
  • Are electronic media broadcasters legally obligated to ensure their programming does not encourage extremism, militancy, or hatred?
  • Does the State have the authority to hold media outlets accountable for broadcasting inflammatory content that threatens the writ of the State?
  • Is loyalty to the State and obedience to the Constitution an inviolable obligation of every citizen, including media personnel and public figures?
  Read full judgment →
• Norang vs The State, etc2018 KLR Criminal Cases 223 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-25
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryforensic analysisDNA evidence72-hour ruleabductionmedico-legal examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail in a case involving an alleged offence under Section 365-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the conflicting versions of events provided by the prosecutrix and the lack of corroborative evidence. The Court observed that the prosecutrix had repeatedly changed her stance regarding the alleged abduction and her safety, and that the husband's own written statement in a separate civil suit contradicted the abduction claim. Additionally, a co-accused facing similar allegations had already been granted bail. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner's involvement required further inquiry and admitted him to bail. Furthermore, the Court addressed the '72-hour rule' applied by the Punjab Forensic Science Agency for DNA analysis in sexual assault cases. It ruled that this policy is outdated and scientifically unsupported, as sperm cells can be detected well beyond 72 hours. The Court directed the Agency to revisit and upgrade its analysis protocols to ensure critical evidence is not discarded based on arbitrary technical limitations.

  Questions settled

  • Is a case of abduction subject to further inquiry when the prosecutrix provides multiple, contradictory versions of the occurrence?
  • Can bail be granted to an accused when a co-accused with similar allegations has already been enlarged on bail?
  • Is the 72-hour policy for DNA analysis in sexual assault cases by the Punjab Forensic Science Agency scientifically sound and legally sustainable?
  • Does the delay in conducting a medico-legal examination of a victim in sexual assault cases justify the exclusion of forensic evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Nooral Khan vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief2018 CLC 990 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-29Read full judgment →
• Noor-Ul-Basar vs Sher Ali2018 CLC 323 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-30Read full judgment →
• Noor-Ud-Din and others vs National Database and Registration2018 PLC (C.S.) 68 · Balochistan High Court · 2016-12-29
  date of birthCNIC correctioncivil servantconstitutional jurisdictionService Tribunalwithdrawal of petitionterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment disposes of a series of constitutional petitions filed by employees of Frontier Corps Balochistan and Pakistan Army seeking correction of their dates of birth in their Computerized National Identity Cards (CNICs) issued by NADRA. The core legal questions involve whether the High Court can correct dates of birth in CNICs through constitutional petitions, whether matters concerning dates of birth of civil servants fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution, and the effect of unconditional withdrawal of previous petitions under Order XXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The court held that the determination of a civil servant's date of birth relates to the terms and conditions of service, barring the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 212 of the Constitution in favor of the Federal Service Tribunal. Furthermore, the court held that the petitions were not maintainable due to the unconditional withdrawal of prior constitutional petitions without permission to file afresh. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court correct the date of birth of a civil servant in a Computerized National Identity Card through a constitutional petition?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction regarding matters relating to the date of birth of a civil servant under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What is the effect of unconditional withdrawal of a constitutional petition without permission to file a fresh one on the same cause of action under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether a civil servant can bypass the Federal Service Tribunal to approach the High Court for the alteration of a date of birth affecting superannuation.
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Zaman vs the State2018 PHC 1360 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-25Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs The State2018 YLR 1332 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-03
  benefit of doubtmurderocular evidencemedical evidence contradictionchance witnessdelayed FIRcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the murder of his wife under Section 302-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given the evidence presented. The Lahore High Court found the prosecution's case to be riddled with significant doubts. Specifically, the Court noted a substantial, unexplained delay in the post-mortem examination, indicating the FIR was not lodged promptly. Furthermore, the Court identified material contradictions between the ocular account and medical evidence, as the witnesses described the weapon as a wooden club, while the medical report indicated injuries caused by a sharp-edged weapon. The Court also deemed the eye-witnesses to be chance witnesses whose presence at the scene was implausible and uncorroborated. Holding that the prosecution failed to establish the motive and that the recovery of the weapon was suspicious, the Court laid down the principle that even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitles an accused to acquittal as a matter of right, not grace.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant delay in conducting a post-mortem examination undermine the prosecution's claim that an FIR was lodged promptly?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when there is a material contradiction between the ocular account of the weapon used and the medical evidence regarding the nature of the injuries?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right if only a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the motive for a crime necessitate the acquittal of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs The State and another2018 P Cr. L J 928 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-29
  pre-arrest bailbail before arrestvicarious liabilitycommon intentionmala fidetentative assessmentcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Lahore High Court through a petition filed under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, whereby the petitioner sought pre-arrest bail in case FIR No. 210/17 registered at Police Station Ahmadpur Sial, District Jhang, concerning offences under Sections 337-A(i), 337-A(iii), 337-F(i), 337-L(2), and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to confirmation of pre-arrest bail given the nature of the injury attributed to him, the question of vicarious liability, and allegations of mala fide implication. The court held that since the specific injury attributed to the petitioner fell under Section 337-A(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which is a bailable offence, and given his status as an elderly, previously non-convicted person who had joined the investigation, mala fide implication by spreading the net wide could not be ruled out. The court laid down the principle that tentative assessment at the pre-arrest bail stage applies where a bailable offence is attributed and the question of common intention under Section 34 requires evidence at trial, making custodial interrogation unnecessary, especially when recoveries have lost relevancy.

  Questions settled

  • Can pre-arrest bail be confirmed when the primary injury attributed to the accused falls under a bailable section of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Whether the question of sharing common intention and vicarious liability should be determined at the bail stage or by the trial court after recording evidence?
  • Does the possibility of mala fide implication by spreading the net wide justify the confirmation of pre-arrest bail for an elderly and previously non-convict petitioner?
  • Is custodial interrogation necessary for the sole purpose of effecting a stale recovery after a significant lapse of time?
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• Noor Muhammad vs Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, Khuzdar and 5 others2018 MLD 1529 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-02-27
  hostile witnesscross-examinationresiled statementsummoning of witnessesdouble murdercriminal revisionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition and criminal revision challenge orders passed by the trial court refusing to declare prosecution witnesses hostile and dismissing an application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The core legal questions involve whether the prosecution should be permitted to cross-examine witnesses who resile from their previous statements and whether the court is bound to summon material witnesses for a just decision of the case. The Balochistan High Court held that witnesses who resile from their statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be properly dealt with by allowing cross-examination if declared hostile, and that applications under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be decided with reasoned orders. The court laid down the principle that denying the prosecution an opportunity to cross-examine resiled witnesses or declining to summon essential witnesses without proper reasons causes serious prejudice to the case, warranting the setting aside of such orders and remand for a fresh decision in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution is entitled to cross-examine prosecution witnesses who resile from their earlier statements recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a trial court decline an application filed under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without recording proper reasons?
  • Does the refusal to declare resiled witnesses hostile and to deny an opportunity of cross-examination cause prejudice to the prosecution case?
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• Noor Muhammad vs Sajjad Akhtar and 3 others2018 PLJ Quetta 39 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-06-12Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Gul Muhammad and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 308 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-16
  criminal appealmurderretracted confessionbenefit of doubthostile witnessesweapon recoveryacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Kohat, convicting the appellant under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his brother and sentencing him to imprisonment for life along with compensation. The core legal questions involved the reliability of a retracted judicial confession, the evidentiary value of doubtful weapon recovery, and the impact of key prosecution witnesses, including the complainant and the widow of the deceased, turning hostile or exonerating the accused during the trial. The Peshawar High Court held that a retracted confession loses its corroborative and evidentiary value in the absence of independent, reliable ocular or circumstantial evidence, and that contradictory recoveries of weapons cannot sustain a conviction when material witnesses recant their police statements. The court laid down the principle that when close family members as key prosecution witnesses retract their allegations, admit to police pressure, and exonerate the accused, and corroborative evidence is shattered, the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, warranting acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession sustain a conviction without strong and independent corroborative evidence?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a weapon recovery when police officials and marginal witnesses contradict each other regarding the presence of private witnesses?
  • Whether the testimony of material prosecution witnesses exonerating the accused can be the basis for setting aside a conviction?
  • Does the failure of chemical examiners to confirm blood grouping render the recovery of an alleged weapon of offence doubtful?
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• Noor Muhammad vs District Judge, Kasur and another2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 111, 2018 KLR Labour & Service Cases 92 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 2017-01-30
  service appealmisappropriationembezzlementdismissal from servicede novo inquiryPunjab Civil Servants (E&D) Rulesmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal arose from the dismissal of the appellant, a Naib Nazir, from service on charges of misappropriation and embezzlement of a decretal amount of Rs. 1,500,000 deposited in a civil suit. Following an initial inquiry and a remand for de novo inquiry by the Punjab Service Tribunal, a fresh regular inquiry was conducted wherein the prosecution produced oral and documentary evidence establishing the receipt and embezzlement of the funds by the appellant. The core legal question was whether the charge of misconduct and embezzlement was duly proved and whether the inquiry proceedings suffered from any legal infirmity. The Tribunal held that the prosecution successfully proved the charges through independent witnesses and documentary evidence, and that the appellant was afforded full opportunity of defense and cross-examination which he failed to avail. The appeal was consequently dismissed, establishing that public servants entrusted with court funds bear a high standard of accountability and that proven embezzlement warrants dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the charge of embezzlement against a court official is legally established when supported by corroborative oral and documentary evidence?
  • Does a failure by the accused to cross-examine prosecution witnesses when opportunity is provided vitiate the inquiry proceedings?
  • Whether a de novo inquiry conducted in pursuance of a tribunal's remand order cures previous procedural defects?
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• Noor Muhammad vs District Judge Kasur and another2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 111 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 2017-01-30
  misconductembezzlementservice appealdenovo inquirydisciplinary proceedingsNaib Nazirmajor penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal concerns the dismissal of the appellant, a Naib Nazir in the Civil Courts, for the misappropriation of a decretal amount of Rs. 1,500,000/- entrusted to him. Following a preliminary inquiry and a subsequent denovo inquiry ordered by the Punjab Service Tribunal, the appellant was found guilty of misconduct and inefficiency for failing to deposit the funds into the government treasury. The core legal questions addressed whether the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with due process, specifically regarding the appellant's right to cross-examine witnesses and the validity of the evidence presented. The Tribunal held that the charges of embezzlement were substantiated by independent witness testimony and documentary evidence, including a receipt signed by the appellant. The court rejected the appellant's claims regarding procedural irregularities, noting he failed to avail himself of opportunities to cross-examine witnesses. The Tribunal affirmed the dismissal, emphasizing that a public servant entrusted with public funds bears an onerous responsibility, and failure to discharge this duty constitutes gross misconduct warranting major penalties.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a public servant to deposit court-entrusted funds into the government treasury constitute misconduct?
  • Can a disciplinary authority impose a major penalty based on a denovo inquiry where the appellant was provided an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses but failed to do so?
  • Is a forensic analysis of a signature mandatory in disciplinary proceedings when independent witness testimony corroborates the authenticity of the document?
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• Noor Muhammad and another vs State etcPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 275 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-24
  murder referencecommon intentionmitigating circumstancesdeath sentence commutationbenefit of doubtlalkarasudden affaircriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arose from a trial court judgment convicting two appellants, Noor Muhammad and Riaz, for murder and attempted murder. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of evidence for conviction, the applicability of common intention under Section 34, and the appropriateness of the death sentence. The High Court upheld the conviction of Noor Muhammad for murder but set aside his conviction for attempted murder, noting he caused no injury to the injured party. Crucially, the Court commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment, citing the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive, the sudden nature of the occurrence, and the inconsequential recovery of the weapon. Regarding Riaz, the Court acquitted him, finding the allegation of 'lalkara' unreliable and noting the possibility of false implication. The Court laid down the principle that common intention requires a pre-arranged plan and prior concert, which was absent here as the incident was a sudden affair. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that when prosecution fails to prove a specific motive, it serves as a mitigating circumstance against capital punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove a specific motive constitute a mitigating circumstance for the reduction of a death sentence?
  • Can an accused be held vicariously liable under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for a sudden, unplanned occurrence?
  • Does the relationship of witnesses with the deceased automatically disqualify them from being considered truthful witnesses?
  • Is a joint 'lalkara' sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction in a murder case?
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• Noor Muhammad Advocate through Special Attorney vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Local Government Election and Rural Development Department, Civil Secretarial Peshawar and 12 others2018 CLC 1257 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-25
  no-confidence motioncasting votepresiding officerlocal governmentstatutory interpretationcasus omissus
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses writ petitions challenging a no-confidence motion passed against the District Nazim and Naib Nazim of District Council Torghar under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act, 2013. The core legal question was whether a presiding officer of a local council can cast a vote on a no-confidence motion, or whether their voting right is restricted only to breaking a tie. The Peshawar High Court held that a presiding officer, being an elected member of the council, is entitled to vote on a no-confidence motion, as the Act contains no express restriction barring them from voting or limiting their vote to ties, and courts cannot read unexpressed limitations into clear statutory provisions. The court established that statutory interpretation must adhere to the plain meaning of unambiguous legislative words without supplying a casus omissus, thereby upholding the validity of the no-confidence motion passed by the required two-third majority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a presiding officer of a local council cast a vote on a motion of no-confidence under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act, 2013?
  • Whether the voting right of a presiding officer in a local council meeting is restricted only to a case of equality of votes or a tie?
  • Does the Local Government Commission have the mandate to set aside or approve a no-confidence motion passed against a Nazim or Naib Nazim?
  • Is it permissible for courts to read unexpressed limitations or supply a casus omissus into clear and unambiguous statutory provisions?
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• Noor LPG Co. (Pvt.) Limited vs Oil & Gas Development Company Limited, etc2018 LHC 427 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-27Read full judgment →
• Noor LPG Co. (Pvt.) Limited vs Oil & Gas Development Company Limited2018 CLC 1369 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-27
  LPG pricingSignature BonusOGRACouncil of Common Interestsregulatory regimeconstitutional jurisdictionpetroleum policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns the legality of "Signature Bonus" charged by Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) producing companies, such as Oil & Gas Development Company Limited, for awarding LPG lifting contracts. The core legal question was whether such bonuses, being over and above the base price, require regulation by the Oil & Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) under the current legal framework. The Court held that the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Production and Distribution) Policy, 2016, and the subsequent amendment to Rule 18 of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Production and Distribution) Rules, 2001, established a comprehensive regulated regime for LPG pricing, superseding the previous deregulated framework of 2013. Consequently, the judgment in Tez Gas (Private) Limited v. Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (PLD 2017 Lahore 111) is no longer binding. The Court ruled that Signature Bonus constitutes a component of the supply chain price and must be regulated by OGRA. It further emphasized that policies approved by the Council of Common Interests possess constitutional force, mandating strict compliance by public functionaries to protect consumer interests.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Production and Distribution) Policy, 2016, mandate the regulation of Signature Bonus by the Oil & Gas Regulatory Authority?
  • Is the judgment in Tez Gas (Private) Limited v. Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (PLD 2017 Lahore 111) binding regarding LPG pricing disputes arising after the implementation of the 2016 Policy?
  • Does the Oil & Gas Regulatory Authority have the legal authority to regulate the margins of marketing and distribution companies under the amended Rule 18 of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Production and Distribution) Rules, 2001?
  • Are policies approved by the Council of Common Interests binding on public functionaries and institutions?
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• Noor Bibi and 13 others vs Meer Muhammad alias Meer Jan and 4 others2018 CLC 87 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-08-18Read full judgment →
• Noor Ali vs Assistant Collector (Afu) and another2018 PTD 816 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-12-18Read full judgment →
• Noor Alain Khan vs Abdul Wahab etc.2018 PHC 1305 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-11
  murdercapital punishmentsolitary eyewitnessinterested witnessbenefit of the doubtmedical jurisprudenceFIR evidentiary valuecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Karak, convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to death for murder, alongside a connected murder reference. The core legal questions involved the credibility of a solitary, interested eyewitness, the evidentiary value of an FIR lodged after preliminary police investigation, the nexus between the recovered weapon and the crime, and the standard of proof required for a capital conviction based on circumstantial and medical contradictions. The Peshawar High Court held that when an FIR is recorded after a preliminary inquiry it loses its sanctity, that the uncorroborated testimony of a solitary interested witness cannot sustain a capital sentence, and that medical evidence contradicting the site plan coupled with missing crime empties creates insurmountable doubts in the prosecution's case. The court laid down the principle that a single reasonable doubt arising from contradictions and lack of corroboration entitles the accused to an acquittal as a matter of right, thereby accepting the appeal, setting aside the conviction, and answering the murder reference in the negative.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of a solitary interested witness can be made the sole basis for a conviction on a capital charge?
  • Does an FIR recorded after conducting a preliminary police inquiry lose its evidentiary sanctity and probative worth?
  • Can a confession made before a police officer regarding the use of a specific weapon be admitted into evidence under the law?
  • Is an accused entitled to an acquittal as a matter of right when material contradictions exist between ocular evidence and medical reports?
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• Noor Ahmed and another vs Deputy Commissioner, Kharan and 3 others2018 PLJ Quetta 133 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-05-17Read full judgment →
• Noor Ahmad vs The State & another2019 P Cr. L J 655, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 567, 2018 LHC 3114 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-18
  rash and negligent drivingQatl-i-Khataidentification paraderevision petitionappreciation of evidencetraffic accidentdefective investigationbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenges the judgments of the lower courts whereby the petitioner's conviction and sentence under Section 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for Qatl-i-Khata in a fatal road accident were upheld. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the petitioner's identity as the driver and proved the essential ingredients of rash and negligent driving beyond a reasonable doubt. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the petitioner through credible evidence, noting that the eyewitnesses did not know him prior to the incident, no identification parade was held, and dock identification was valueless under the circumstances. Furthermore, the court held that mere high speed or verbal assertions do not suffice to prove rash or negligent driving without independent, objective evidence regarding the road conditions and traffic. The revision petition was accepted, the judgments of the lower courts were set aside, and the petitioner was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether dock identification by witnesses who only had a fleeting glimpse of an accused stranger without a prior identification parade is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction?
  • Does the mere high speed of a vehicle by itself establish rash and negligent driving under Section 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to conclusively prove a charge of rash and negligent driving resulting in death?
  • Can an accused be convicted on the basis of suppositions and without independent evidence connecting him to the alleged crime?
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• Noor Ahmad vs Azad Khan2019 CLC 486, 2018 PHC 1752 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-25
  civil revisionrecovery suitleave to defendsummary suittriable issueconditional leavenegotiable instruments
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition, filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenged an order passed by the Additional District Judge-V, D.I. Khan, whereby the respondent's application for leave to defend a recovery suit filed under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was accepted conditionally upon the deposit of one-fourth of the suit amount. The core legal question was whether the defendant had made out a case for grant of leave to defend and whether such leave should be made conditional upon depositing the full suit amount or a portion thereof. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the revision petition, holding that the defendant's plea regarding a forged arbitration agreement and denial of the issuance of cheques raised a bona fide triable issue. The Court affirmed that trial courts possess discretionary power under Order XXXVII Rule 3(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to grant leave to defend unconditionally or on terms, provided such conditions are not harsh or oppressive, and that conditional leave requiring the deposit of a fraction of the amount or furnishing of security is legally sound.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a defendant is entitled to leave to defend a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when a plausible defence raising a triable issue is disclosed?
  • Can the trial court grant leave to defend conditionally upon the deposit of a portion of the suit amount or the furnishing of security?
  • What are the governing principles for granting or refusing leave to defend in a summary suit based on a negotiable instrument?
  • Whether the imposition of conditions for leave to defend under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 must avoid being harsh, unjust, or oppressive?
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• Nomsa Ellen Dladla and others vs City of Johannesburg and others2018 SCMR 453 · Constitutional Court of South Africa · 2017-12-01Read full judgment →
• Noman Junejo through Authorised Attorney and another vs Federal2018 PLD Sindh 1 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-06Read full judgment →
• Noman Ahmed and others vs Mst. Sobia Farooq and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 67 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-21Read full judgment →
• Nizam-Ud-Din and 2 others vs The State through NAB2018 MLD 1755 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-06-07Read full judgment →
• Nizam alias Nizamuddin vs The State2018 MLD 595 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-29
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtocular evidencemedical evidencecontradictionsacquittalreasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment sentence imposed by the trial court under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given the conflicting ocular and medical evidence. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case, citing significant discrepancies between the medical report and the ocular testimony regarding the seat of injuries and the time of death. Furthermore, the court noted unexplained delays in recording witness statements, contradictions regarding the transportation of the deceased, and the failure to recover alleged stolen property or conduct forensic analysis on recovered items. Emphasizing that the prosecution’s case was riddled with doubt, the court laid down the principle that material contradictions between ocular and medical evidence, coupled with a failure to prove the motive and the lack of forensic corroboration, entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt, necessitating an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a material contradiction between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the seat of injuries and time of death warrant the acquittal of an accused?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution fails to recover the alleged stolen property and fails to provide forensic evidence to corroborate the ocular account?
  • Does an unexplained delay in recording the statements of eye-witnesses undermine the credibility of the prosecution's case?
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• Nizam Ahmed Chaudhary through Attorney vs Defence Officers Housing2018 CLC 1009 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-07Read full judgment →
• Nisra Ahmed Shaikh & Ors vs Province of Sindh & Others2018 SHC 1078 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-29Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmed vs Pakistan National Shipping Corporation and another2018 PLC (C.S.) 166 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-16
  service appealprovident fundterminal benefitscompromise agreementrecovery suitKIBOR ratedelayed payment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a service dispute between an employee and the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation regarding the calculation of terminal benefits. Following a prior compromise agreement where the respondent agreed to pay all legal dues, including provident fund, by September 1, 2002, the appellant received the principal amount but initiated litigation claiming additional profit on the provident fund for the period between his resignation and the actual payment date. The trial court decreed a partial amount for gratuity and travel allowance but denied the claim for profit on the provident fund, a decision upheld by the appellate court. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to profit on the provident fund amount for the period during which the payment was delayed beyond the agreed timeline. The High Court held that since the payment was delayed, the appellant was entitled to profit on the principal amount for the period of delay. The court allowed the appeal, directing the respondent to pay the calculated profit at a rate of ten percent per annum, plus interest at the KIBOR rate until realization.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee entitled to profit on provident fund amounts for the period during which payment was delayed beyond the agreed settlement date?
  • Can an appellate court entertain a claim for leave encashment if it was not pleaded before the lower appellate court?
  • What is the appropriate rate of profit to be applied on delayed terminal dues when the employer fails to pay within the agreed timeframe?
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• Nisar Ahmed Afzal vs Muhammad Sarwar and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 1573, 2020 [M] C L R 106, 2018 IHC 98 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-04Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmad vs Judge Banking Court and others2018 CLD 1325 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-02Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmad Japanwala vs City District Government, Karachi through District Co-ordination Officer2018 YLR 1341 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-02Read full judgment →
• Nisabullah alias Gulap vs Awal Haq Khan and 4 others2018 PHC 1400, 2018 MLD 1571 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-13Read full judgment →
• Nisab Ullah alias Gulap vs The State etc2018 PHC 1400 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-13Read full judgment →
• Nighat Munir vs Madam Humera & others2018 SHC 894 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-03Read full judgment →