Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Muhammad Khurshid Khan vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2018 PHC 1388 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khan vs Province of Sindh through Home Secretary and 162018 MLD 142 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-14Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khan vs Muhammad Abbas and 15 others2018 CLC 292 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khan vs Director General, Lahore Development Authority etc.2018 [M] C.L.R. 652 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khan Soomro vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary2018 PLC (C.S.) 89 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-27
  Mid Career Management CourseMCMCconstitutional petitioncivil serviceseniority listpromotion zonenomination for training
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by a civil servant seeking a direction from the Sindh High Court to the respondents to nominate him for the 23rd Mid Career Management Course (MCMC) in BS-18, claiming discrimination and violation of service rules. The core legal question was whether a civil servant has a vested or fundamental right to be nominated for a mandatory promotional training course regardless of seniority and promotion zones. The Sindh High Court held that the nomination for the Mid Career Management Course is a matter of policy and depends on seniority and the promotion zone, and since the petitioner stood at serial number 54 while nominations had only been made up to serial number 52, he could not claim nomination as a matter of right. The court laid down the principle that nomination for mandatory training courses like MCMC is tied to seniority and promotion zones, and junior officers outside the promotion zone do not possess a vested or fundamental right to demand such nominations.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a vested or fundamental right to be nominated for the Mid Career Management Course (MCMC)?
  • Can an officer outside the promotion zone and lower in the seniority list claim nomination for a mandatory promotional course as a matter of right?
  • Whether the nomination of officers for the Mid Career Management Course by the provincial government is a matter of administrative policy?
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• Muhammad Khalid vs Muhammad Adnan Qureshi2018 CLC 585 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Kashif Siddiqui vs M/s Alternative Energy Development Board2018 SHC 1135 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-23Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Kamran vs Mst. Samera Majeed and others2018 YLR 1251 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-13
  Khuladissolution of marriagedowerHaq Mahrfamily court decreerestitution of dowerconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an appellate judgment by the Additional District Judge, Jhang, which modified a Family Court decree regarding the recovery of dower. The Petitioner sought to set aside the appellate court's decision that granted the Respondent wife a dower amount of Rs. 50,000, arguing that the marriage had been dissolved on the basis of Khula, which required the return of dower rather than its payment. The core legal question was whether a wife, having obtained a decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula subject to the return of dower, is entitled to claim that dower amount in subsequent proceedings. The High Court held that the appellate court erred by ignoring the condition attached to the Khula decree. The Court reaffirmed the principle that when a wife obtains a dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula, she is legally obligated to either remit the dower amount if unpaid or return it if received, and cannot subsequently claim it as a right. Consequently, the appellate judgment was set aside, and the original Family Court decree was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Is a wife entitled to claim dower after obtaining a decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula?
  • Does the proviso to Section 10(4) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 apply to dissolution of marriage on grounds other than Khula?
  • Can a Family Court dissolve a marriage on the basis of Khula without requiring the return of dower?
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• Muhammad Kamran Muneer vs University of Health Sciences through Vice Chancellor_Chairman2019 YLR 437, 2018 PLJ Lahore 893 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Kamran Bhatti vs The State2018 YLR 1554 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-11
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequehabitual offenderprohibitory clausetentative assessmentfinancial crime
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant, Muhammad Kamran Bhatti, sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning the dishonour of a cheque issued for the repayment of a loan. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail given the allegations of dishonest issuance of a cheque and his alleged status as a habitual offender. The Sindh High Court held that the ingredients of Section 489-F, P.P.C. were prima facie satisfied, as the cheque was issued for the fulfillment of an obligation and subsequently dishonoured. The Court emphasized that the mere fact that an offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not automatically entitle an accused to bail. Furthermore, the Court noted the applicant's conduct, including his history of similar offences and dilatory tactics before the trial court. Consequently, the bail application was dismissed, establishing that the grant of bail is not a universal rule and must be decided based on the specific facts and circumstances of each case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fact that an offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, automatically entitle an accused to bail?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to constitute an offence under Section 489-F, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a complainant pursue criminal proceedings under Section 489-F, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, instead of seeking recovery through a civil court?
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• Muhammad Kalu vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 28 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-31
  post-arrest bailstatutory baildelay in trialcriminal procedureconcealment of factsconduct of accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail was filed by the accused, charged under Sections 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, invoking the statutory ground under Proviso-II of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, citing delay in the conclusion of the trial. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on statutory grounds when the delay in trial proceedings was attributable to the conduct of the accused. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the statutory concession of bail is not an absolute right. It found that the delay was caused by the petitioner’s own failure to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and his previous conduct, including the concealment of material facts in prior bail applications. The Court established that where an accused contributes to the delay in trial, they cannot claim the benefit of the statutory provision. Consequently, the Court directed the trial court to conclude the proceedings expeditiously, potentially on a day-to-day basis.

  Questions settled

  • Is the statutory right to bail under Proviso-II of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, available to an accused if the delay in trial is attributable to their own conduct?
  • Does the concealment of material facts in previous bail applications disentitle an accused from claiming statutory bail?
  • Can a court direct a trial court to proceed on a day-to-day basis to ensure the expeditious conclusion of a trial?
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• Muhammad Kalim Khan vs SMBR, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 09 others2020 PLC (C. S. ) 844, 2018 PHC 1841 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-12-03
  constitutional petitionlachesdelayservice matterappointmentsenioritywrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a constitutional petition seeking appointment as a Patwari (BPS-5), claiming seniority over respondents who were appointed despite being lower on the merit list. The petitioner alleged that his name was improperly removed from the list of qualified candidates due to being overage without prior notice. The official respondents raised the objection of laches, noting that the petitioner's name was removed in 2009 and the appointments of the private respondents occurred in 2014, yet the petition was filed only in 2013, with no challenge raised against the removal or the appointments in the interim. The Court held that the petitioner failed to provide any plausible explanation for the significant delay in approaching the Court. Emphasizing that constitutional jurisdiction requires vigilance, the Court ruled that the petitioner was guilty of contumacious lethargy and inaction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed on the grounds of laches, as the petitioner failed to seek relief within a reasonable time, thereby disentitling himself to the exercise of the Court's extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be dismissed on the grounds of laches if the petitioner fails to provide a plausible explanation for the delay?
  • Does the failure to challenge an administrative order of removal from a candidate list for an extended period constitute contumacious lethargy?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to relief under Article 199 of the Constitution if they have been negligent in the prosecution of their cause?
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• Muhammad Kaleem vs The State & another2018 LHC 1225 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-21
  pre-arrest bailbail before arrestoil theftPARCO pipelinesuspicion as proofprevious convictionsuspended sentencemalafide intention
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought pre-arrest bail under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in respect of FIR No. 22 registered under Sections 462-B, 462-F, 379, and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Umar-Kot, District Rajanpur. The core legal question concerned whether pre-arrest bail could be confirmed where the accused was implicated solely on the basis of spy information, suspicion, and previous history, notwithstanding a suspended sentence in a previous case. The Lahore High Court held that suspicion, regardless of its strength, cannot take the place of legal proof, and a previous conviction whose sentence has been suspended has no bearing on the confirmation of pre-arrest bail, especially when the prosecution lacks any direct evidence. The court laid down the principle that implication based merely on suspicion and malafide intent warrants the confirmation of pre-arrest bail, as an appeal or revision against a conviction is a continuation of the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted when an accused is implicated solely on the basis of spy information and suspicion?
  • Does a previous conviction whose sentence has been suspended by the High Court affect the confirmation of pre-arrest bail in a subsequent case?
  • Can suspicion take the place of legal proof in criminal proceedings?
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• Muhammad Junaid Alam vs Federation of Pakistan through its Secretary, Islamabad & others2019 CLC 453, 2018 LHC 2310 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Juman vs The State and others2018 SCMR 318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-23
  qatl-i-amdreduction of sentencesentence already undergonemitigating circumstanceslegal sentenceremand of criminal appealsuspension of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged an order of the High Court of Sindh, which had maintained the respondents' conviction under Section 302(b) read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but reduced their life sentences to the period already undergone. The Supreme Court considered whether a court maintaining a conviction under Section 302(b), PPC can reduce the sentence to less than life imprisonment without altering the conviction to Section 302(c), PPC and recording mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court held that Section 302(b), PPC prescribes only two legal sentences: death or imprisonment for life as ta'zir. A sentence less than life imprisonment cannot be awarded under Section 302(b), PPC; any lesser sentence or reduction to period undergone is only lawful if the court consciously applies its mind, finds valid mitigating grounds, and formally converts the conviction to Section 302(c), PPC. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, suspended the trial court's sentence, granted bail, and remanded the jail appeal for fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court reduce a convict's sentence to the period already undergone while maintaining the conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is imprisonment for life the minimum legal sentence that can be imposed upon a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Must an appellate court formally convert a conviction from Section 302(b) to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and record mitigating reasons before awarding a sentence of less than life imprisonment?
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• Muhammad Juman vs State and others2018 SCMR 318, 2018 PLJ SC 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-23
  sentencing guidelinescriminal appealstatutory sentencingQatl-e-Amdreduction of sentenceappellate jurisdictionmechanical sentencing
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition challenging a High Court order that reduced the sentences of convicts, found guilty under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, to the period already undergone. The core legal question was whether an appellate court can reduce a sentence below the statutory minimum prescribed for a specific offence without converting the conviction to a provision allowing such reduction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s order was illegal because it reduced the sentence to already undergone while maintaining the conviction under Section 302(b), which mandates either death or life imprisonment. The Court emphasized that sentencing is not a mechanical exercise but requires a conscious application of mind to ensure the sentence is commensurate with the crime's gravity. The key principle laid down is that a court cannot impose a sentence outside the statutory parameters of the charging provision. To award a lesser sentence than those prescribed in Section 302(b), the court must first legally convert the conviction to Section 302(c), provided the circumstances warrant such a modification.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court reduce a sentence to already undergone while maintaining a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is a court permitted to impose a sentence outside the statutory parameters prescribed by the charging provision?
  • What is the legal requirement for an appellate court to reduce a sentence below the minimum prescribed by Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Muhammad Jibran Nasir, etc vs The State, etc2018 SCP 1122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-21
  criminal appealsuo motu jurisdictionde novo trialremandanti-terrorismreappraisal of evidencebail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an appeal against the conviction and death sentence for murder and related offences, alongside connected proceedings. The core legal questions relate to the reappraisal of evidence in a criminal appeal against conviction and the propriety of High Court proceedings concerning judgments of Anti-Terrorism Courts. The Supreme Court disposed of the criminal appeal and further converted related matters into a suo motu case under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The Court set aside a common judgment of the High Court of Sindh which had remanded a criminal case for a de novo trial, along with all post-remand proceedings and bails granted thereunder, directing that the original appeals and references be deemed pending before the High Court for fresh decision on merits by another bench. The key principle laid down is that improper remands and post-remand acquittals or bails in anti-terrorism cases can be set aside in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction to ensure matters are decided properly on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can convert criminal appeals into a suo motu case under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
  • Can an improper order of remand and subsequent post-remand proceedings passed by the High Court be set aside?
  • What is the legal status of bail granted to accused persons during invalid post-remand proceedings?
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• Muhammad Jibran Nasir and others vs The State and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 351, 2018 PLJ 180, 2018 PSC CRI 264, 2018 SCP 1075 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-09
  suo motu jurisdictionAnti-Terrorism Court jurisdictionArticle 184(3)de novo trialremand orderlocus standiECLterrorism definition
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arose from the decision of the Sindh High Court remanding a murder case from an Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) to an ordinary court for a de novo trial, holding that the offense was not one of terrorism. Members of civil society assailed the High Court's order before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court converted the matter into a Suo Motu Case under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside ATC jurisdiction and remanding the case, despite previous orders of the Supreme Court and High Court establishing ATC jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in ignoring earlier binding decisions of the Supreme Court and High Court confirming ATC jurisdiction, as well as misinterpreting procedural observations in a leave-refusing order. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and post-remand proceedings, ordering the private respondents back into custody and directing the High Court to decide the appeals on their merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court re-examine or overturn the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court after the Supreme Court has previously directed the trial to proceed under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 in the same case?
  • Can an observation made in a time-barred, leave-refusing order of the Supreme Court be construed as reopening a conclusively settled question of jurisdiction?
  • Does the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution operate independently of the pendency or prior adjudication of the same matter before other forums?
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• Muhammad Jibran Nasir and others vs State and others2018 PLJ SC 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-01
  suo motu jurisdictionanti-terrorism courtjurisdictionremandterrorist actjudicial reviewbinding precedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from the Supreme Court's conversion of criminal appeals into a suo motu case under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenging a common judgment of the High Court of Sindh which had set aside the convictions and sentences of the private respondents passed by an Anti-Terrorism Court, and remanded the case for a de novo trial before an ordinary court on the ground that the offense did not constitute terrorism. The core legal question was whether the High Court was legally justified in reopening and deciding the question of the Anti-Terrorism Court's jurisdiction contrary to earlier binding orders passed by the Supreme Court and the High Court in the same proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed a grave error by ignoring prior conclusive orders of the apex court and the High Court which had already settled that the offense fell within the ambit of Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The ratio decidendi is that a High Court in appellate proceedings cannot bypass or nullify earlier binding determinations of a superior forum through misinterpretation of routine leave-refusing observations. The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the High Court's judgment, reversed all post-remand proceedings, and directed the High Court to decide the pending appeals on their merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court could nullify earlier final orders of the Supreme Court and the High Court regarding the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • Do observations made in a leave-refusing order constitute a license for an appellate court to reopen a conclusively settled question of jurisdiction?
  • Whether an offense committed on a public road resulting in public panic and terror falls within the purview of Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
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• Muhammad Jawwad Haamid vs Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif Etc2019 P Cr. L J 665, PLJ 2018 Cr.C. 886, 2018 LHC 2170 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-26
  private complaintcriminal conspiracyabetmentSection 202 CrPCsummoning of accusedAnti-Terrorism Courtprima facie casecriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order passed by the Special Anti-Terrorism Court, Lahore, which declined to summon respondents 1 to 12 in a private complaint regarding the Model Town incident. The petitioner alleged criminal conspiracy and abetment against high-ranking officials. The High Court examined the scope of inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, noting that the trial court’s discretion to issue process is limited to determining if a prima facie case exists. The Court held that the allegations against the respondents were inconsistent with the petitioner's earlier FIR and written complaints, appearing as an afterthought lacking essential ingredients of criminal conspiracy or abetment. Consequently, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, ruling that summoning the respondents based on such unsubstantiated claims would constitute an abuse of process. However, the Court clarified that an order under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 is not a final judgment, and the trial court retains the power to summon additional accused under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 if credible incriminating material emerges during trial.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of an inquiry conducted under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a trial court summon additional accused persons under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if new incriminating material emerges during trial?
  • Does an order refusing to summon accused persons under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute a final judgment?
  • Are statements made before a Tribunal of Inquiry admissible in subsequent criminal proceedings?
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• Muhammad Jawad Hamid vs Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, etc2018 LHC 1465 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Javed vs Viiith Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad and 22018 P Cr. L J 1522 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-14
  illegal dispossessioncivil disputeland grabberqabza groupcriminal revisionpossessionmaintainability of complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged an order by the VIIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, which dismissed a complaint filed under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The Trial Court had dismissed the complaint on two grounds: first, that the dispute was of a civil nature; and second, that the respondent was not a member of a 'land mafia' or 'qabza group,' which it deemed a prerequisite for the Act's applicability. The High Court examined whether the Act required the accused to be a professional land grabber and whether the dispute was purely civil. While the High Court rejected the Trial Court's reasoning regarding the 'land mafia' requirement—clarifying that the Act applies to anyone who illegally dispossesses a lawful owner or occupier regardless of their background—it upheld the dismissal of the complaint. The Court held that the applicant failed to establish prior possession, and the dispute regarding title and occupation was essentially a civil matter requiring adjudication by a civil court of competent jurisdiction. The principle established is that while the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 does not require the accused to be a professional land grabber, it remains inapplicable to disputes where the complainant cannot demonstrate prior possession or where the matter is essentially a civil title dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Is it a prerequisite for the applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 that the accused must be a professional land grabber or member of a 'qabza group'?
  • Can a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 be maintained where the dispute is essentially one of civil title and the complainant fails to establish prior possession?
  • Does the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 apply to any person who illegally dispossesses a lawful owner or occupier, or is it restricted to a specific class of offenders?
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• Muhammad Javed vs The State through Advocate-General of Azad2018 P Cr. L J 1236 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-12-08
  summoning witnessesrecall of witnessescriminal revisionjudicial discretionmurder trialaffidavits
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition arose from concurrent judgments of the trial court and the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's application under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to recall and summon prosecution witnesses for cross-examination based on subsequent affidavits. The core legal question was whether the trial court's discretionary power to summon or recall witnesses under section 540 Cr.P.C. should be exercised to recall witnesses who have already been examined, where affidavits from impartial parties or the witnesses themselves are introduced post-testimony. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir dismissed the petition, holding that the discretion vested in the court under section 540, Cr.P.C. is subject to just exceptions and must not be exercised to fill lacunae in a case, encourage witnesses to change their loyalty due to pressure or ulterior motives, or open the floodgates to winning over witnesses. The key principle laid down is that while courts possess wide discretionary powers to summon witnesses for a just decision, such powers must be exercised on sound judicial principles and should not countenance attempts to subvert the trial process through post-testimony affidavits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the discretionary power under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be exercised to recall prosecution witnesses based on affidavits submitted after the recording of evidence?
  • Can the court's power to summon a witness under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be utilized to fill a lacuna in the case or to assist in winning over witnesses?
  • Is the refusal of a trial court to summon witnesses under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 open to interference when exercised on sound judicial principles?
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• Muhammad Javed vs Roshan Jahan and others2019 PLD Sindh 1, 2018 SHC 680 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Javed Iqbal Khan vs Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary and 5 others2018 PLC (C.S.) 1075 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-03-24
  writ petitionwaiting listregular appointmentad-hoc servicepleadingslachespublic service commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition filed under section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 sought a direction to the official respondents to issue a regular appointment notification for the petitioner as an Assistant Engineer Electricity (B-17) on the basis of a waiting list issued pursuant to an advertisement by the Public Service Commission. The core legal question was whether a candidate who stands at the top of a waiting list following directions of the Apex Court to disclose merit lists is entitled to regular appointment against a vacant post when initial selectees failed to join or vacate the post, and whether the petition was barred by laches. The High Court held that the petitioner, having successfully established his merit position on the waiting list and having properly explained the delay caused by the non-disclosure of the waiting list by the Commission, was entitled to regularisation. The court laid down the principle that parties are bound by their pleadings and cannot set up a new case at arguments, and that candidates on a waiting list are entitled to consideration and appointment against vacancies left by non-joining selectees.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a candidate on a waiting list is entitled to regular appointment against a vacancy created by a selectee who failed to join?
  • Does the failure of the Public Service Commission to timely disclose waiting lists constitute a valid explanation for delay to overcome the objection of laches?
  • Can parties be permitted to raise factual arguments or set up a case at hearing that differs from their written pleadings?
  • Is an ad-hoc appointee entitled to regularisation against a post that was not requisitioned to the Public Service Commission?
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• Muhammad Rafique vs Manager (Admn) TEVTA, Lahore and 4 others2018 PLJ Lahore 282 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Javed and others vs Zameer Haider and 2 others2018 YLR 1021 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-09-25
  circumstantial evidenceretracted confessionjudicial confessionblind murdercall data recordenhancement of sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment of the Balochistan High Court addresses criminal appeals against conviction and a criminal revision for the enhancement of a sentence arising from a murder case registered initially against unknown culprits. The core legal question involved the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, the evidentiary value of retracted judicial confessions, and the sustainability of convictions based thereupon in a blind murder case. The court held that the prosecution successfully established an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence—including hotel records, call data records, medical evidence, and voluntary judicial confessions—proving the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that a retracted judicial confession, if found upon inquiry to be entirely voluntary and true, can legally be taken into consideration against the maker and can even form the basis of a conviction when corroborated by surrounding circumstances and other independent pieces of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession form the basis of a conviction in a criminal trial?
  • Whether minor discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses are fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Is the non-recovery of the crime weapon fatal to the case of the prosecution when supported by other circumstantial evidence?
  • Under what circumstances can circumstantial evidence constitute an unbroken chain pointing solely to the guilt of the accused?
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• Muhammad Javed alias Junaid vs The State and three others2018 KLR Criminal Cases 36 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Javd Iqbal vs Province of Sindh & Others2018 SHC 1058 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-23Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jan vs Additional Session Judge II, Quetta and another2018 PLD Balochistan 102 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-03-19
  criminal acquittal appealmurderadministering poisoncircumstantial evidencemedical evidencepresumption of innocenceburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal was filed by the complainant against the judgment of the trial court whereby the respondent was acquitted of the charge under Section 302 Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the alleged murder of his wife by administering poison. The core legal question before the High Court was whether the trial court's acquittal order was perverse, arbitrary, or contrary to the material on record, and whether a conviction could be sustained on circumstantial presumptions and past conduct alone without corroborative medical or ocular evidence. The Balochistan High Court dismissed the appeal in limine, holding that the ocular testimony was merely based on assumptions of past mistreatment, none of the witnesses directly witnessed the crime, the chemical examiner report was negative for poison, and no external injuries were found on the deceased. The court reaffirmed the principle that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that a double presumption of innocence is attached to an acquittal order, which warrants no interference unless found arbitrary or capricious.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused can be convicted solely on the basis of presumptions and past conduct regarding the murder of his wife?
  • Does the burden of proof shift entirely to the accused when a murder takes place inside a residential house?
  • What evidentiary standards are required to interfere with an order of acquittal attached with a double presumption of innocence?
  • Is a negative chemical examiner report regarding poison sufficient to discredit allegations of unnatural death?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jan and another vs Mst. Bacha Begum alias Begum Shahzad2018 PLD Peshawar 173 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-21Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jamshed vs Election Appellate Tribunal and others2018 CLC 1330 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-29Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jamil vs Zahidullah alias Zohaib and 2 others2018 MLD 768 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jam vs Election Commission of Pakistan & others2018 SHC 750 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jalal-Ud-Din vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2018 YLR 2196 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jalal Khan Doltana and another vs The Election Tribunal2018 CLC 172 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Issa vs Chairman, National Accountability Bureau NAB2018 YLR 146 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-12-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Israr vs Govt. of KPK through Secretary Elementary &2019 PLC (C.S.) 1191, 2018 PLJ Peshawar 234 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-09-14
  Drawing Master certificateequivalency of certificatesconstitutional petitionequal protection of lawdiscriminatory treatmentpublic employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involves a constitutional petition filed by Muhammad Israr seeking appointment as a Drawing Master (DM) after being denied the post despite ranking high on the merit list, solely because his Inter Grade Drawing Examination (IDE) Certificate was issued by the Sindh Directorate of Schools Education, Hyderabad, rather than the Registrar Departmental Examination (RDE), Peshawar. The core legal question addressed by the larger bench is whether the IDE Certificate from Sindh is equivalent to the one-year DM Certificate of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Peshawar High Court held that certificates issued by recognized institutions in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa hold the same status, and discriminating against candidates possessing qualifications from other provinces violates the principle of equal protection of law. The court ruled that lacking any statutory rule declaring the certificates unequal, the petitioner could not be denied appointment, thereby reaffirming settled precedent and allowing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Inter Grade Drawing Examination Certificate issued by the Sindh Directorate of Schools Education is equivalent to the one-year Drawing Master Certificate of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa?
  • Does treating educational certificates from recognized institutions of different provinces disparately violate the right to equal protection of law under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a candidate be denied public employment on the sole ground that their professional certificate was obtained from a recognized institution in another province in the absence of prohibitory rules?
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• Muhammad Israil and 30 others vs Patreend Hydro Electric Project2018 CLC 411 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-11-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ismail vs Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, D.G. Khan2019 P Cr. L J 256, 2018 PLJ Lahore 939 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-12
  Anti-Terrorism Court jurisdictionhurt by corrosive substanceinterpretation of statutesdead bodytransfer of casecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenges an order passed by the Anti-Terrorism Court, Dera Ghazi Khan, which dismissed the petitioner's application under Section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, seeking the transfer of the case to a court of ordinary jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the application of Section 336-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, regarding hurt caused by a corrosive substance, is legally sustainable when such substance is applied to a dead body rather than a living person. The Court held that the definition of 'hurt' under Section 332 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 explicitly requires the victim to be a living person. Consequently, pouring acid on a corpse to conceal its identity does not constitute an offense under Section 336-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court established the principle that statutory provisions defining 'hurt' are inapplicable to dead bodies, and therefore, the case did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court. The impugned order was set aside, and the case was ordered to be transferred to a court of ordinary jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'hurt' under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply to acts committed against a dead body?
  • Can an offense under Section 336-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be established if a corrosive substance is applied to a corpse?
  • Is a case involving the desecration of a dead body triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ismail vs Royal PVC (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive2018 CLD 766 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ismail Shaikh & 116 others vs Province of Sindh & another2018 SHC 1190 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-17
  service seniorityregularization of contract employeespromotion eligibilitycivil servantsrecruitment rulesretrospective seniorityconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by 117 Water Management Officers seeking directions for their promotion from BPS-17 to the post of Deputy Director in BPS-18 within the Agriculture, Supply & Prices Department, Government of Sindh, and for the preparation of their seniority list. The petitioners were initially appointed on contract basis in 2005 under a development project and their services were later regularized pursuant to court orders under the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013. The core legal questions involved whether contract service could be counted for retrospective seniority and whether the petitioners, holding posts as Water Management Officers, were eligible under the relevant recruitment rules for promotion to Deputy Director posts reserved for Assistant Directors. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that contract employees cannot be termed civil servants prior to regularization, that seniority must be reckoned strictly from the date of regular appointment, and that retrospective regularization or seniority cannot be granted. Furthermore, the court held that under the applicable recruitment rules, the petitioners lacked the requisite cadre status and eligibility for promotion to BPS-18 Deputy Director posts. The key legal principles laid down are that ad-hoc or contract service does not count towards seniority, seniority takes effect solely from the date of regular appointment, and promotion cannot be claimed outside the designated hierarchy and qualifications prescribed by governing service rules.

  Questions settled

  • Can the period of service rendered on a contract or ad-hoc basis be counted towards seniority upon subsequent regularization?
  • Whether an appointment made on a contract or ad-hoc basis can be regularized retrospectively under Sindh civil service laws?
  • Are Water Management Officers in BPS-17 eligible for promotion to the post of Deputy Director in BPS-18 under the recruitment rules where such posts are specifically reserved for Assistant Directors?
  • Does a civil servant acquire a vested right to be considered for promotion without maintaining the statutory prerequisites of seniority and required length of service in the lower rank?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ismaeel vs Secretary Home Department, Government of Punjab and 5 others2018 PLD Lahore 114 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-28
  parolegood conduct prisonersconstitutional petitionsuspension of sentenceremission of sentenceprobation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged the legality of an order passed by the Government of the Punjab, Home Department, releasing certain convicted prisoners on parole under The Good Conduct Prisoners Probational Release Act, 1926. The petitioner, who was the complainant in the original criminal case wherein the private respondents were convicted, contended that Section 2 of the 1926 Act is subject to Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and that the prisoners were hardened criminals ineligible for release. The Lahore High Court held that parole authorized by the executive under Section 2 of The Good Conduct Prisoners Probational Release Act, 1926 is distinct from the suspension or remission of sentence under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and that the executive is fully competent to release prisoners on parole upon fulfillment of the conditions regarding antecedents and prison conduct. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the executive has the authority under The Good Conduct Prisoners Probational Release Act, 1926 to release prisoners on parole independently of Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • What is the distinction between probation granted under the Probation of Offenders Ordinance, 1960 and parole authorized under The Good Conduct Prisoners Probational Release Act, 1926?
  • Does the release of a prisoner on parole amount to the suspension or remission of a sentence under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Islam vs The State and other2018 MLD 90 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-03-03Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ishtiaq and another vs The State and another2018 P Cr. L J 237 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-02
  qatl-i-amddeath sentencebenefit of doubtwithholding of witnessocular accountcriminal appealmurder reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge at Jhelum convicting the appellants under Section 302(b) read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for the qatl-i-amd of the deceased and sentencing them to death, alongside a murder reference for confirmation of the death penalty. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt through ocular testimony, given discrepancies regarding the time and manner of occurrence, absence of a source of light, withholding of a crucial witness, and police exoneration of one co-accused. The Lahore High Court held that serious doubts permeated the prosecution's case, including contradictions in the presence of witnesses at night without a light source and the suppression of the actual tractor driver whose statement contradicted the FIR. The court laid down the principle that where substantive evidence suffers from massive failures and material witnesses are withheld, the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused, leading to the setting aside of the convictions and the acquittal of the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the withholding of a material eyewitness during trial attracts an adverse statutory presumption under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Can a conviction for qatl-i-amd be sustained when the time, manner of occurrence, and identity of the assailants are shrouded in serious doubt due to the absence of a source of light?
  • Whether the exoneration of a co-accused by the police during investigation affects the evidentiary value of the case against identically placed co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ishaque vs The State2018 YLR 786 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-30
  Qatl-e-amddeath sentence confirmationdefective chargedying declarationjudicial confessionocular evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for five counts of Qatl-e-amd and one count of Isqat-e-Janeen. The core legal questions concerned whether the trial court’s conviction was vitiated by a defective charge, the reliability of ocular evidence, and the admissibility of the appellant’s confessional statement and the victim’s dying declaration. The Court held that while the conviction for five murders was sound, the conviction under Section 338(c), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, must be set aside as it was not included in the formal charge, causing prejudice. The death sentences were confirmed, finding the evidence of eye-witnesses, corroborated by medical and ballistic reports, sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court laid down that a charge is not defective if the accused is not misled or prejudiced in their defense. Furthermore, minor procedural irregularities do not invalidate a voluntary confession, and a dying declaration, when proved free from influence, constitutes substantive evidence sufficient to support a conviction, even without corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court uphold a conviction for an offense not explicitly mentioned in the trial charge?
  • Does a minor procedural irregularity in the remand of an accused after a confession invalidate the confession itself?
  • Is a dying declaration made to a private person admissible as substantive evidence without corroboration?
  • Can a conviction be based on the testimony of related eye-witnesses if their evidence is consistent and corroborated by medical reports?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ishaque vs The State through P.O. Punjab and another2018 SCMR 1746 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-04
  post-arrest bailsingle blownight time occurrenceidentification in darknesstentative assessmentSection 337-D PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of post-arrest bail by the High Court in a case arising from FIR No. 240 of 2017 involving an offence under Section 337-D of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner inflicted a single knife blow to the victim's back following a dispute at a musical event. The primary legal issue was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the nature of the single injury on a vital part versus the circumstances of identification during a night-time incident. The Supreme Court granted leave and allowed bail to the petitioner. The Court held that since the incident occurred at night without any cited source of light and involved a general assault by multiple accused, the possibility of misidentification could not be ruled out. Additionally, the fact that only a single blow was inflicted without repetition was a material factor justifying the grant of bail. The Court affirmed that observations made in bail orders remain strictly tentative and do not prejudice trial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the lack of a specified light source at a night-time crime scene creates sufficient doubt regarding identification to justify granting post-arrest bail?
  • Does the infliction of a single blow without repetition constitute a relevant factor when considering an application for bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Irshad vs The State2018 YLR 356 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-11
  benefit of doubtocular testimonyhostile witnessfair trialmurder referenceappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction and death sentence imposed by an Additional Sessions Judge for the murder of a young woman. The prosecution alleged that the appellant entered the victim's house, slit her throat with a razor, and escaped, based on the ocular testimony of family members. The appellant denied the charge, citing the unnatural nature of the prosecution's story and the delay in reporting the crime. Upon review, the Court found the prosecution's narrative highly improbable, noting that the family members' failure to intervene during the attack and the delayed reporting of the crime—despite the police station's proximity—cast significant doubt on the case. Furthermore, the Court criticized the trial court's handling of the Investigating Officer, who was declared hostile and subjected to leading questions to rectify investigative errors, violating the statutory safeguards of a fair trial. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, and declined to confirm the death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court allow the prosecution to cross-examine its own witness to rectify investigative errors or to force the witness into a desired narrative?
  • Does a significant delay in reporting a crime, when the police station is in close proximity, undermine the credibility of the prosecution's case?
  • Is it permissible for a court to rely on testimony obtained through leading questions in violation of the statutory order of examination?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Irfan vs The State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1205, 2018 P Cr. L J 1319 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-31
  sodomyunnatural offenceforensic evidencemodern devicesocular accountcriminal revisiondelay in FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought revision of his conviction under section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, for committing carnal intercourse against the order of nature and filming the act, which had been upheld by the appellate court. The core legal questions involved whether absence of medical evidence is fatal to a charge of sodomy when modern forensic evidence and digital stills corroborate the ocular account, and whether forensic reports and digital evidence are admissible under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and provincial legislation. The Lahore High Court held that modern scientific methodologies, including forensic analysis of digital data under Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and section 9(3) of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency Act, 2007, can effectively substitute traditional clinical findings in proving a criminal charge. The court laid down the principle that courts must adopt a dynamic approach employing scientific methodologies alongside credible ocular accounts to ensure safe administration of criminal justice, and that initial delay caused by fear of embarrassing disclosures does not invalidate a truthful prosecution case.

  Questions settled

  • Can digital forensic evidence and generated stills substitute clinical medical findings in proving a charge under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
  • Whether modern scientific methodologies and electronic data are admissible under Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Does an initial delay in reporting a sexual assault due to fear of embarrassing disclosures by the accused adversely affect the prosecution case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Irfan vs Mst. Gul Afroz Jan (Deceased) through LRs and others2018 PLJ 553, 2018 SCMR 1199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-12
  Abadi DehShamilatcommon pathwayproprietary rightsexclusive possessionvillage common land
  Summary & questions settled

  The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a pathway or galli in an Abadi Deh is common land for village community use, or whether exclusive usage over years grants possessory and proprietary rights to certain residents. The respondents filed a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction claiming exclusive possession and proprietary interest over a pathway in an Abadi Deh, seeking to restrain the appellant from opening a gate onto it. The trial court decreed the suit, which was reversed by the appellate court but restored by the High Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and upholding the appellate court's decision. The Court held that pathways in an Abadi Deh form part of common land (Shamilat) meant for communal use by village residents, and mere prolonged usage by a resident without establishing exclusive possession or exclusion of others does not confer proprietary rights. Furthermore, opening a gate onto a public pathway that does not obstruct passage does not violate rights, affirming the public character of village pathways.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pathway or a galli in an Abadi Deh constitutes common land for the use of the village community?
  • Does the exclusive usage of a village pathway over the years by some residents grant them possessory and proprietary rights over the pathway?
  • Does the opening of a gate onto a common village pathway by a resident whose property abuts the pathway infringe upon the rights of other users?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Irfan vs Mst. Gul Afroz Jan (decd.) through LRs & others2018 PLJ SC 553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-12
  Abadi DehShamilatcommon landpathwaycommunal usepossessory rightssuit for declarationperpetual injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction regarding a pathway in an Abadi Deh. The respondents asserted exclusive usage and possession over the pathway for over two decades, claiming title under the principle that title in an Abadi Deh follows possession, and sought to prevent the appellant from opening a gate onto the pathway. The core legal question was whether a pathway in an Abadi Deh constitutes common land (Shamilat) for communal use or whether exclusive usage by certain residents grants them possessory and proprietary rights. The Supreme Court held that pathways in an Abadi Deh are part of the common land (Shamilat) intended for public and communal use by village residents. Mere long usage of a communal pathway does not constitute exclusive possession unless access by others has been effectively excluded. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court judgment and restoring the appellate court's dismissal of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does exclusive usage of a pathway in an Abadi Deh over time confer possessory or proprietary rights on a resident?
  • Is a public pathway in an Abadi Deh presumed to be common land (Shamilat) for the collective use of the village community?
  • Can a resident prevent another property owner abutting a communal pathway in an Abadi Deh from opening a gate onto that pathway?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Irfan vs D.P.O. etc2018 PLJ Peshawar 52 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-03Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Irfan vs D.P.O. and others2018 PLJ Peshawar 52, 2018 P Cr. L J 826 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-03
  quashment of FIRgambling offencespecial law versus general lawsearch and seizurejurisdiction of SHOconstitutional petitionKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Prevention of Gambling Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Peshawar High Court seeking the quashment of an FIR registered under sections 5 and 6 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prevention of Gambling Ordinance, 1978. The core legal question was whether a Station House Officer (SHO) is competent to conduct a raid and search a premises for gambling offences under Section 8 of the Ordinance without the supervision of a Magistrate of the First Class. The Court held that the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prevention of Gambling Ordinance, 1978 is a special law that overrides the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and that Section 8 specifically empowers only specified magistrates (currently Magistrates of the First Class, given the absence of District and Sub-Divisional Magistrates) to conduct searches and raids, rendering a search conducted solely by an SHO illegal and without jurisdiction. The Court established the principle that when the law requires an action to be taken in a particular manner, it must be done in that exact manner, and consequently accepted the petition and quashed the FIR.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an SHO is competent to conduct a search and raid under Section 8 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prevention of Gambling Ordinance, 1978 without the presence or supervision of a Magistrate of the First Class?
  • Does the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prevention of Gambling Ordinance, 1978 override the general provisions of search under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • What is the legal effect of conducting a search in violation of the specific procedural manner prescribed by a special statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Irfan Khan and others vs The Federation of Pakistan & others2018 SHC 1143 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-26
  constitutional petitionmaintainabilitydiscriminatory treatmentsalary packagemaster and servantequality of citizenspublic limited companyHouse Building Finance Corporation Limited
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, officers and executive cadre employees of the House Building Finance Corporation Limited (HBFCL), sought directions for the announcement of the salary package 2016-2017 and payment of allowances, alleging discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution because clerical and non-clerical staff had been granted these benefits while officers were excluded. The core legal questions involved whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 is maintainable against HBFCL, a public limited company, and whether the denial of the salary package to the officer cadre constitutes unconstitutional discrimination. The Sindh High Court held that the petition is maintainable as HBFCL is a body corporate performing functions in connection with the affairs of the State and under state control, and further held that excluding the officer cadre from the salary package while granting it to other staff lacks intelligible differentia and violates the equality command of Article 25. The court set aside the impugned decision and remanded the matter to the competent authority for fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is maintainable against a public limited company owned or controlled by the Government?
  • Does the denial of a salary package or revision in allowances to one category of employees while granting the same to other staff constitute discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution?
  • Whether the relationship between House Building Finance Corporation Limited and its officers is strictly governed by the master and servant rule barring writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Irfan and others vs The State and another2018 YLR 957 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-18
  murder referencejudicial confessionidentification paradebenefit of doubtextra-judicial confessioncircumstantial evidencecriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of Muhammad Irfan and the life imprisonment of Mudassar Hayat for the murder of Sultan Ahmad Ranjha. The prosecution relied on ocular accounts, extra-judicial confessions, a judicial confession, and the recovery of weapons. The Lahore High Court examined the evidence, noting that the FIR was initially registered against unknown persons and the appellants were implicated months later. The Court found the ocular evidence unreliable, characterizing the witnesses as chance witnesses with inconsistent testimonies. Furthermore, the judicial confession was deemed unreliable due to the Magistrate's failure to follow mandatory procedural safeguards, and the identification parade was flawed due to the significant delay and lack of specific role attribution. The forensic report regarding the recovered weapon was negative, failing to link it to the crime. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions were set aside, the appellants were acquitted, and the murder reference was answered in the negative, emphasizing that a single reasonable doubt entitles an accused to acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant delay between the occurrence and an identification parade render the identification evidence unreliable?
  • Can a judicial confession be relied upon if the recording Magistrate fails to observe mandatory procedural safeguards regarding the removal of police presence?
  • Is a negative forensic report regarding a recovered weapon sufficient to break the chain of evidence linking an accused to the crime?
  • Does the failure to attribute specific roles to accused persons during a test identification parade diminish its evidentiary value?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal, etc vs Senior Member Board of Revenue, etc.2018 [M] C.L.R. 638, 2018 KLR Labour & Service Cases 115 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs WAPDA through Chief Executive, LESCO, Lahore and 32018 PLJ Lahore 110 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-23Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs The State etc2019 MLD 982, 2018 LHC 2777 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-05
  murder referenceocular evidencemedical evidencechance witnessbenefit of doubtcriminal appealdeath sentenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence awarded by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jhang, for the murder of Imam Bakhsh. The appellant was convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of the ocular account, the impact of delayed FIR registration, the consistency of medical evidence with the prosecution's version, and the proof of motive. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found the eyewitnesses to be chance witnesses whose presence was improbable, noted significant improvements in their testimony, and observed that the medical evidence (specifically the absence of burning/blackening at the alleged firing distance) contradicted the ocular account. Furthermore, the motive was unproven, and the investigation supported the appellant's innocence. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitted the appellant, and answered the Murder Reference in the negative. The judgment reaffirms that material contradictions and medical evidence negating the ocular account render prosecution testimony unreliable.

  Questions settled

  • Does medical evidence showing burning and blackening around an entry wound negate an ocular account claiming the shot was fired from a distance of sixteen feet?
  • Can the testimony of eyewitnesses be relied upon when they are found to be chance witnesses and have made material improvements to their statements?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution fails to provide a plausible explanation for a significant delay in the registration of the FIR?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive weaken the overall case against an accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs The State and 2 others2018 P Cr. L J 515 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-11
  post-arrest bailabetment to murderconspiracyhabitual offenderfurther inquirystatement of co-accusedcriminal record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application in a murder case where the petitioner was accused of masterminding the killing of a spiritual leader to eliminate a political adversary and influence local body elections. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the evidence of conspiracy and his alleged role in abetting the crime. The Lahore High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that the petitioner was consistently implicated by the statements of witnesses and a co-accused, which established a prima facie case. The court affirmed the principle that while the statement of a co-accused may not be sufficient for conviction alone, it constitutes valid circumstantial evidence at the bail stage. Furthermore, the court ruled that because the investigation linked the petitioner to the offense and the charge carried capital punishment, the matter did not fall within the ambit of 'further inquiry' under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner's extensive criminal history was also noted as a factor suggesting habitual offending.

  Questions settled

  • Can the statement of a co-accused be used as circumstantial evidence to deny bail?
  • Does a history of multiple criminal cases justify the refusal of bail?
  • When does a criminal case fall within the ambit of 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs State, etc.PLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 294 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-06
  post-arrest bailnarcotic substancesfurther inquirycharas recoverycriminal antecedentsstatutory interpretationnet weight determination
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking post-arrest bail for the petitioner, Muhammad Iqbal, who was charged under Section 9(c) of The Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the alleged possession of 1250 grams of charas. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the uncertainty regarding the net weight of the recovered substance and whether the offense fell under Section 9(b) or 9(c) of the Act. The Court held that because the net weight of the recovered charas, excluding the packaging, remained a matter for trial, the case required further inquiry. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that mere allegations of a heinous offense do not justify continued incarceration when the accused is a first offender, the investigation is complete, and the trial is not imminent. Consequently, the Court admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail, ruling that the rigors of Section 51 of The Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, were not attracted in this instance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the uncertainty regarding the net weight of a recovered narcotic substance constitute grounds for further inquiry in a bail application?
  • Are the rigors of Section 51 of The Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, attracted when an accused establishes a case for further inquiry?
  • Is the mere allegation of a heinous offense sufficient to deny bail to a first-time offender whose investigation is complete?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs State etc.2018 PLJ Islamabad 17, 2018 KLR Criminal Cases 18 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 199 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-04
  post-arrest bailmedical boardfurther inquiryconflict between medical and ocular accountbenefit of the doubthurt case
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 127/2014 registered under Sections 337-A(i), 337-A(iii), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Vahova, District Dera Ghazi Khan, wherein the specific allegation against him was causing a sota blow to the complainant's nose. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 given the medical board's findings and conflict between ocular and medical accounts. The Lahore High Court held that the petition should be allowed as a medical board opined that the possibility of fabrication of the injury attributed to the petitioner could not be ruled out, creating a conflict with the ocular account and entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt. The court laid down the principle that where medical evidence casts doubt on the veracity of an injury attributed to an accused, creating a conflict with the ocular account, the case falls within the purview of further inquiry warranting the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a conflict between the ocular account and medical evidence justify the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Whether the opinion of a medical board regarding the possible fabrication of an injury creates a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt at the bail stage when the medical evidence contradicts the specific injury attributed to him?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs Mst. Nazia Iqbal and 4 others2018 CLC 875 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-11Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal S/o Abdul Wahab vs Noor Muhammad Chutani2019 PLD Sindh 490, 2018 SHC 982 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Haider vs Ist Adj, Karachi Central and others2018 PLJ SC 61, 2018 PLD Supreme Court 35 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-09
  tentative rent orderstriking off defencelandlord and tenantspecific performancedefault in rentejectment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from an eviction proceeding initiated under Section 15(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The Rent Controller had directed the petitioner to deposit tentative rent under Section 16(1) of the Ordinance, which the petitioner failed to do, leading to his defence being struck off and an eviction order being passed under Section 16(2). The petitioner contended that the relationship of landlord and tenant was disputed due to pending civil suits for specific performance and cancellation of a sale deed, and that the subsequent deposit of rent cured the default. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the issue of landlord-tenant relationship and the validity of the tentative rent order had already been conclusively decided against the petitioner in an earlier round of litigation. The Court reaffirmed that the mere pendency of civil suits does not exempt a tenant from complying with a tentative rent order, and that failure to comply with such an order must result in the statutory consequence of having the defence struck off.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a civil suit for specific performance or cancellation of a sale deed exempt a tenant from complying with a tentative rent order passed under Section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can a tenant deny the title of the landlord during the subsistence of the tenancy under Article 115 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Does a subsequent deposit of rent automatically cure a default committed in complying with a tentative rent order within the stipulated timeframe?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Haider vs 1st Adj, Karachi Central & others2018 SCP 1137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-21
  tentative rent orderevictionlandlord and tenant relationshipstriking off defenseestoppelspecific performancerented premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding an eviction order against the petitioner. The core legal question was whether a tenant could avoid compliance with a tentative rent order issued under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, by asserting that the landlord’s title was disputed due to pending civil litigation regarding specific performance and cancellation of sale deeds. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the mere pendency of civil suits concerning title does not exempt a tenant from complying with a tentative rent order. The Court affirmed that a tenant is estopped from denying the landlord’s title during the continuance of the tenancy. Furthermore, the Court held that failure to comply with a tentative rent order, once upheld, mandates the striking off of the tenant's defense and justifies an eviction order. The judgment reinforces the principle that procedural compliance with rent orders is mandatory and cannot be bypassed by collateral challenges to the landlord's ownership, ensuring the summary nature of rent proceedings remains intact.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a civil suit for specific performance or cancellation of a sale deed exempt a tenant from complying with a tentative rent order?
  • Can a tenant deny the landlord's title during the continuance of the tenancy?
  • What are the consequences of failing to comply with a tentative rent order under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Dawood and another vs Abdul Qayoom Hoth and another2018 YLR 1319 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-11Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and others vs Rab Nawaz and others2018 YLR 1813 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and others vs Pakistan Federal Secretary and others2018 PLD Lahore 418 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-11Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and 4 others vs Election Commission of Pakistan2018 PLD Peshawar 41 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-28Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and 2 others vs Govt. of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2018 PLJ Peshawar 111 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Imran vs Addl. Sessions Judge, Tehsil Jahanian, District2018 PLJ Lahore 616 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-14Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem vs The State2018 SCP 1117, 2018 P.S.C. (Cri) 530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-17
  murderocular testimonyabscondencemedical evidenceminor discrepancycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was tried and convicted for the murder of Muhammad Yaseen and for causing injuries to Mst. Zaitoon Bibi under the Pakistan Penal Code. The trial court sentenced him to death, which was subsequently converted to life imprisonment by the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan evaluated the appeal against the conviction, addressing contentions regarding delayed post-mortem, related witnesses, and discrepancies in weapon description. The core legal question concerned whether the ocular, medical, and circumstantial evidence, alongside recovery of the weapon and missing money, was sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that the consistent testimony of the injured eye-witness mother, natural presence of related witnesses, prompt abscondence of the appellant, and corroborative medical evidence firmly established the guilt. The appeal was dismissed, laying down that minor discrepancies in describing a weapon and natural delays in government hospital post-mortems do not vitiate otherwise consistent and unshaken ocular and medical evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the delay in conducting a post-mortem examination is sufficient to discard the entire ocular evidence in a murder trial?
  • Does a minor inconsistency in describing a weapon as a knife instead of a dagger vitiate the testimony of eye-witnesses?
  • What is the evidentiary significance of an accused absconding from his residence immediately following the commission of a crime?
  • Can the testimony of related and injured eye-witnesses be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship with the deceased?
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• Muhammad Imran vs Additional District Judge, Multan and 3 others2018 PLD Lahore 429 · Lahore High Court · 2017-07-21Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Imran Khan Chishti vs Province of Sindh and others2018 P.S.C. 760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-21
  repatriationappointment by promotionservice lawleave to appealgovernment employmentburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sindh High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's challenge regarding the annulment of his appointment. The petitioner, a government employee, contended that his appointment by promotion was valid and could not be annulled. Conversely, the respondents argued that the petitioner had been repatriated to his parent department in compliance with prior Supreme Court judgments, specifically in the cases of Contempt proceedings against the Chief Secretary Sindh and others (2013 SCM R 1752) and Ali Azhar Khan Baloch v. Province of Sindh (2015 SCM R 456). The core legal question was whether the petitioner's claim of appointment by promotion was substantiated by law or rules. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner failed to identify any specific rules supporting his claim of promotion and had inconsistently changed his stance regarding the nature of his initial appointment. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's judgment suffered from no legal infirmity, as the petitioner could not demonstrate a valid legal basis for his appointment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appointment be claimed as a promotion when the petitioner fails to cite the relevant rules governing such promotion?
  • Does a government employee have the right to challenge repatriation when it is ordered in compliance with binding Supreme Court precedents?
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• Muhammad Imran Afridi vs The State2018 SHC 508 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ikram vs District Judge, Sahiwal and 3 others2018 YLR 735 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Idress vs StatePLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 420 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-18
  statutory baildelay in conclusion of trialspeedy trialnarcotics recoverypost-arrest bailControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from a bail application filed by Muhammad Idress, who was implicated in case FIR No. 1461 dated 17.10.2015 registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 at Police Station Hayatabad, Peshawar, following the alleged recovery of 15 kilograms of charas from his vehicle. The petitioner sought post-arrest bail on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of his trial, the trial court having previously refused him relief. The Peshawar High Court examined the record and noted that despite the submission of the challan in April 2016 and the framing of the charge in May 2016, only four prosecution witnesses had been examined over a period exceeding one and a half years, with no significant delay attributable to the accused. Relying on binding precedents from the Supreme Court regarding the fundamental right to a speedy trial and statutory delay, the Court held that prolonged incarceration without conclusion of trial warrants the grant of bail. Consequently, the bail petition was accepted and the petitioner was admitted to bail subject to furnishing suitable sureties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in the conclusion of a trial before a Special Court constitutes a statutory ground for the grant of bail?
  • Does the right to a speedy trial under the law amount to a fundamental right of the accused?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the trial has been excessively delayed without fault on the part of the defence?
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• Muhammad Idrees Bugsra vs The State2018 MLD 1950 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Idrees and 12 others vs Muhammad Yamin and others2018 CLC 129 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrar Khan and another vs Capital Development Authority2018 IHC 121 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-09-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim vs The State2018 MLD 1963 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-09
  criminal appealexplosive substancesbenefit of doubtrecovery proceedingsindependent witnessesanti-terrorismacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 7(i)(ff) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, for the possession of an explosive substance, specifically a hand grenade. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the recovery of the explosive beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly given the reliance on police witnesses in a populated area and inconsistencies in the evidence. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case, citing the lack of independent witnesses despite the incident occurring in a populated area, unexplained delays in sending the recovered item to experts, and material contradictions between the testimonies of the complainant and the mashirs regarding the preparation of the recovery memo. Furthermore, the court noted that the recovered item lacked a detonator, rendering it inert. The court emphasized the principle that even a slight doubt in the prosecution's case entitles the accused to the benefit of the doubt, leading to the acquittal of the appellant and the setting aside of the trial court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses in a recovery proceeding from a populated area create reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when there are material contradictions between the testimonies of police witnesses regarding the preparation of the recovery memo?
  • Does an unexplained delay in sending recovered explosive material to an expert for analysis weaken the prosecution's case?
  • Is the benefit of the doubt applicable when the prosecution fails to prove the recovery of an explosive device beyond a reasonable doubt?
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• Muhammad Ibrahim vs The State and others2018 P Cr. L J 1490 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-24
  illegal dispossessionnon-prosecutiondischarge of accusedframing of chargecriminal complaintremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, read with Sections 561-A and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenged the orders of the trial court dismissing a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 for non-prosecution and discharging the accused after the charge had already been framed. The core legal question was whether a trial court can dismiss a complaint for non-prosecution and discharge an accused after a formal charge has been framed. The Peshawar High Court held that once a charge is framed in a complaint case, the trial court has no power to discharge the accused; the court must either acquit or convict the accused under Section 265-H of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the High Court declared the trial court's orders illegal, set them aside, and remanded the case back for a decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can dismiss a criminal complaint for non-prosecution and discharge the accused after a formal charge has been framed?
  • What is the legal effect of a dismissal for non-prosecution in a complaint case after the framing of a charge?
  • Can an accused be discharged under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 once a trial has progressed past the framing of a charge?
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• Muhammad Ibrahim through Attorney vs Province of Sindh through Chief2018 MLD 1099 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Estate Office and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 344 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-07
  civil revisiongovernment accommodationAccommodation Allocation Rules, 2002unauthorized occupationrejection of plaintdelegated legislationeviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged concurrent orders rejecting the petitioner's plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The petitioner, a Capital Development Authority (CDA) employee, sought to retain government accommodation previously allotted to his retired mother, relying on the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002. The core legal questions concerned whether a CDA employee is eligible for Estate Office accommodation and whether the Federal Government can extend statutory retention periods via notification. The Court held that the petitioner, as a CDA employee, was ineligible for Estate Office accommodation and that the suit accommodation could not be transferred to the CDA pool. Crucially, the Court ruled that the Federal Government cannot, under the guise of Rule 28, issue notifications that effectively amend or relax substantive provisions of the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002, regarding retention periods. Consequently, the Court affirmed the rejection of the plaint, emphasizing that unauthorized occupants are liable for eviction and that public functionaries must strictly adhere to statutory rules and Supreme Court precedents regarding accommodation allotments.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government amend or relax substantive provisions of the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002, through notifications issued under Rule 28?
  • Is an employee of the Capital Development Authority eligible for the allotment of government accommodation from the pool of the Estate Office?
  • Does the continued occupation of government accommodation by a family member after the expiry of the permissible retention period following a government servant's retirement constitute unauthorized occupation?
  • Can a civil court reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where the plaintiff lacks a legal right to the relief claimed?
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• Muhammad Hussain vs District and Sessions Judge, Mirpurkhas and 102018 YLR 1906 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain Mirza vs Province of Sindh through Home2018 MLD 1789 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-31Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain Cheema vs Govt. of Punjab, etc.2018 PLJ Lahore 610 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-03Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain Cheema vs Govt of Punjab, etc.2018 [M] C.L.R. 153 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-03Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain Cheema vs Government of Punjab and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 153, 2018 PLJ Lahore 610, 2018 PLC (C.S.) 1 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-03
  Vice-ChancellorPro-Vice-Chancellortemporary arrangementstatutory interpretationadministrative lawuniversity governancestop-gap appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the continuation of a temporary arrangement whereby the Chancellor assigned the duties of Vice-Chancellor of the Pir Mehr Ali Shah Arid Agriculture University, Rawalpindi, to Respondent No. 4 after the expiry of his tenure. The core legal question was whether this temporary arrangement, made under Section 14(9) of the Act, persists after the subsequent appointment of a Pro-Vice-Chancellor. The Court held that the temporary arrangement is a stop-gap measure intended only for the intervening period when the office of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor is vacant or the incumbent is unable to perform. The Court ruled that the appointment of a Pro-Vice-Chancellor automatically supersedes the temporary arrangement, as the Pro-Vice-Chancellor is statutorily mandated to perform the functions of the Vice-Chancellor. The judgment establishes that 'functions' and 'duties' are distinct; a temporary appointee performs limited 'duties,' whereas a Pro-Vice-Chancellor assumes the full 'functions' of the Vice-Chancellor. Consequently, the temporary arrangement terminated upon the appointment of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor, who must now perform the functions of the Vice-Chancellor until a regular appointment is made.

  Questions settled

  • Does a temporary arrangement for the duties of a Vice-Chancellor under Section 14(9) continue after the appointment of a Pro-Vice-Chancellor?
  • Is there a legal distinction between the 'functions' of a Vice-Chancellor and the 'duties' assigned to a temporary appointee?
  • When does a temporary arrangement made by the Chancellor for the performance of Vice-Chancellor duties automatically terminate?
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• Muhammad Humayun vs The Station House Officer (SHO) Police2018 P Cr. L J 450 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-09-22
  constitutional petitionregistration of FIREx-Officio Justice of the Peacestatutory dutypolice torturehierarchical remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenges the order of the Sessions Judge acting as Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace, which dismissed the petitioner's application under section 22-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking registration of a criminal case against an investigating officer for alleged torture and abuse. The core legal question was whether the Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace erred in dismissing the application where the petitioner failed to first approach the concerned Station House Officer and higher police authorities as mandated by law. The Balochistan High Court held that an aggrieved person must first approach the concerned Station House Officer and exhaust hierarchical police remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of the Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace under section 22-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court laid down the principle that failure to approach the Station House Officer at the first instance disentitles a petitioner from seeking a direction for the registration of an FIR from the Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace, and findings of the Justice of the Peace will not be interfered with under constitutional jurisdiction if based on proper appreciation of record and sound reasoning.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an aggrieved person can directly approach the Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace under section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without first approaching the concerned Station House Officer for registration of an FIR?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court interfere with an order passed by the Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is it mandatory to exhaust police hierarchy remedies before filing an application under section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Hayat vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 296 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-02
  pre-arrest bailnarcoticsfurther inquiryrecoverycriminal procedurebail
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought pre-arrest bail in connection with FIR No. 34/2017, registered under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the alleged recovery of 120 grams of charas from a bag purportedly abandoned by him while fleeing from police. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the prosecution's allegation that he escaped from the scene, thereby leaving behind the contraband. The Court held that the petitioner's case warranted further inquiry because he was not apprehended at the spot, and the identity of the person who fled remains a factual issue to be determined at trial. The Court emphasized that while Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, imposes an embargo on bail, this provision cannot be utilized to withhold bail as a form of punishment. Finding no prior criminal antecedents to discredit the petitioner, the Court allowed the petition and admitted the petitioner to pre-arrest bail subject to furnishing bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the embargo on bail under Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 preclude the grant of pre-arrest bail in all circumstances?
  • Is a case considered one of further inquiry when the accused was not apprehended at the spot but allegedly fled the scene?
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• Muhammad Hayat vs Muhammad Miskeen (Decd.) through LRs and others2018 SCMR 1441 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-13
  ejectmentpersonal bona fide uselandlord and tenantsole testimony of landlordconstitutional petitionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a tenant of a demise shop, challenged the dismissal of his Constitution Petition by the High Court, which had upheld the appellate court's decision reversing the Rent Controller's order and allowing the landlord's ejectment application. The ejectment was sought on the ground of personal bona fide use for establishing a son's business. The core legal questions revolved around whether the landlord successfully established personal bona fide need and whether a landlord is the sole judge of his own requirement. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the sole testimony of a landlord is sufficient to establish personal bona fide need if consistent with averments, and that a landlord is the best judge of his personal need and not subject to the tenant's dictation. The key principles laid down are that a landlord need only establish need for one son rather than all, and that the landlord has the sole choice and prerogative to select the premises that best suit his needs.

  Questions settled

  • Is the sole testimony of a landlord sufficient to establish personal bona fide need?
  • Must a landlord establish that the premises are required for the personal bona fide use of all his sons?
  • Does a tenant have the right to dictate which premises a landlord should use for his business?
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• Muhammad Hashim vs The State2018 SHC 562 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-16
  fund raisinganti-terrorismbenefit of doubtsearch and seizureindependent witnessescriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellant under Section 11-N of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for allegedly collecting funds for a banned organization and sentencing him to five years rigorous imprisonment. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution successfully established the essential elements of fund raising for terrorism and whether the recovery of receipt books was proved through reliable and legally compliant evidence. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove any link between the recovered receipt books and a banned organization, noted fatal contradictions in the testimonies of police witnesses, and observed a clear violation of the mandatory requirements of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding independent recovery witnesses. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of the doubt. The key principles laid down are that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, that mere recovery of religious institution receipt books without proof of terrorist affiliation does not constitute an offense under the Anti-Terrorism Act, and that non-compliance with the mandatory provisions for independent witnesses during searches vitiates the search proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether mere recovery of receipt books of a religious madrasah without establishing a connection to a banned organization is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 11-N of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Does the failure of police officials to associate independent inhabitants of the locality as mashirs during a house search violate the mandatory requirements of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 so as to vitiate the search?
  • What is the legal effect of material discrepancies and contradictions among police witnesses regarding the place of patrolling and the manner of recovery in a criminal trial?
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• Muhammad Hashim vs The State and others2018 YLR 1 · Lahore High Court · 2017-08-07
  suspension of sentenceanti-terrorism courtexplosive substancesbail pending appealproscribed organizationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the petitioners, Muhammad Hashim and Shakeel, seeking the suspension of their sentences awarded by the Anti-Terrorism Court, Rawalpindi, following their conviction under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. The petitioners had been sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment each. The core legal question was whether the statutory bar under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, against suspending sentences applied to the petitioners' case, given that the trial court had specifically found that the prosecution failed to prove the petitioners belonged to a proscribed organization or that their actions constituted terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Court held that the bar under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, was not attracted in this instance. Considering the short duration of the sentence, the period already served, and the lack of a terrorism finding, the Court exercised its discretion to suspend the sentences pending the appeal, subject to the furnishing of bail bonds. The key principle established is that where the prosecution fails to prove the elements of terrorism, the restrictive provisions regarding bail or suspension of sentence under anti-terrorism laws may not apply.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory bar under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to cases where the trial court has failed to prove the elements of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can a sentence be suspended pending appeal when the remaining sentence is short and the appeal is unlikely to be heard in the near future?
  • Does a case triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court ipso facto become a case of terrorism for the purposes of conviction and sentencing under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
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• Muhammad Haroon vs Province of Sindh through Member, Land2018 MLD 516 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs The State2018 MLD 927 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-11
  post-arrest bailForeign Exchange Regulation ActHundi Hawalaprohibitory clausedefective investigationnon-bailable offensecharge sheet
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, who was charged with offenses related to illegal foreign exchange operations under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail, considering the nature of the alleged offense, the status of the investigation, and procedural irregularities in the registration of the FIR. The court held that the alleged offense did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, establishing that in such cases, bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. The court further observed that the investigation appeared defective, as the FIR was lodged following a spot inspection without requisite magisterial authorization. Additionally, the prosecution’s failure to submit a final charge sheet despite repeated opportunities indicated a lack of urgency. Finding that the circumstances warranted further inquiry into the applicant's guilt under Section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the court granted the applicant post-arrest bail subject to the furnishing of solvent surety.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offense under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947, which does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, entitle an accused to bail as a rule?
  • Is an FIR lodged after a spot inspection without magisterial authorization considered defective and lacking evidentiary value?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to submit a final charge sheet within a reasonable time constitute grounds for granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Seraj Ahmed and 2 others2018 MLD 1333 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-01-15Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs NEPRA (National Electric Power Regulatory2018 CLC 1689 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-17
  Electric Inspectorlimitation perioddetection billAppellate Board NEPRAelectricity disputeresiduary limitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the Appellate Board of the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority, which affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint by the Electric Inspector on the ground of limitation. The core legal question revolved around the applicable period of limitation for filing a complaint before the Electric Inspector under Section 26 of the Electricity Act, 1910 and the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997. The Lahore High Court held that while neither statute prescribes an express limitation period for filing such a complaint, the aggrieved party must approach the forum within a reasonable time. The Court further held that Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies only to suits, whereas Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provides a three-year limitation period for applications where no other period is prescribed. Since the petitioner approached the Electric Inspector after an inordinate delay of nearly five years from the accrual of the cause of action, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What is the period of limitation for filing a complaint before an Electric Inspector under Section 26 of the Electricity Act, 1910?
  • Does Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 apply to complaints filed before an Electric Inspector?
  • Whether Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies as a residuary provision for complaints before an Electric Inspector?
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• Muhammad Hanif Sultan and others vs Pir Sultan Noor Ahmad2019 MLD 384, 2018 PHC 1756 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-30
  malicious prosecutiongeneral damagesrule of thumbcivil appealmental tortureloss of reputationmalafide prosecution
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a trial court judgment dismissing a suit for damages arising from malicious prosecution. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellants satisfied the mandatory ingredients for a malicious prosecution claim and whether they were entitled to damages despite failing to quantify exact financial losses. The Peshawar High Court held that the appellants successfully established that the criminal proceedings initiated against them were actuated by malice, stemming from a family dispute over "Gaddi Nasheeni," and concluded in their acquittal. The Court ruled that the trial court erred in dismissing the suit for lack of evidence regarding specific damages and for failure to serve legal notice, noting that such notice is not mandatory for this type of suit. Applying the "Rule of Thumb," the Court held that general damages for mental torture, agony, and loss of reputation can be awarded even without precise quantification. Consequently, the Court set aside the trial court's decree and awarded the appellants Rs. 1,000,000 in general damages.

  Questions settled

  • What are the mandatory ingredients required to maintain a suit for malicious prosecution?
  • Is the service of a legal notice mandatory before filing a suit for malicious prosecution?
  • Can a court award general damages for malicious prosecution if the plaintiff fails to quantify the exact financial loss?
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