Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Mst. Saira Bano vs Syed Saqi Hussain Shah and others2018 MLD 444 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saima Malik vs Ministry of Capital Administration and Development and another2019 [M] C.L.R. 167, 2018 PLC (C.S.) 186 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-23
  regularization of servicesdaily wages employeesdiscriminatory treatmentCabinet Sub-CommitteeBPS-16 regularizationequality before lawwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a daily wages Trained Graduate Teacher (BS-16) at an educational institution under the Federal Directorate of Education, Islamabad, sought implementation of a notification dated 08.02.2013 issued by the Ministry of Capital Administration and Development regularizing her services pursuant to the approval of a Cabinet Sub-Committee. The respondents contested the petition, arguing that the Cabinet Sub-Committee lacked jurisdiction to regularize employees in BPS-16 and above under the governing Regularization Policy dated 29.08.2008, which was restricted to BPS-01 to BPS-15. The core legal question was whether the respondents could refuse to implement the regularization notification and discriminate against the petitioner while other similarly placed employees regularized by the same notification were granted relief. The Islamabad High Court held that the government could not take a paradoxical position by letting scores of similarly situated employees in BPS-16 and above work as regular employees while discriminating against the petitioner. The court ruled that since the notification holding the field had not been rescinded and similarly placed persons like Ms. Safia Bano had been granted regular status, the petitioner was entitled to the same treatment under Article 25 of the Constitution. The writ petition was allowed with a direction to implement the notification and post the petitioner against a permanent available post.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Cabinet Sub-Committee has the authority to regularize daily wages or contract employees in BPS-16 and above under the Regularization Policy dated 29.08.2008?
  • Can the government take a paradoxical position by regularizing some employees through a notification while denying the same benefit to similarly placed employees?
  • Does the denial of regularization to an employee while granting it to a similarly situated person violate the principle of equality under Article 25 of the Constitution?
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• Mst. Saima Bibi vs Additional Sessions Judge (East), Islamabad etc2018 [M] C.L.R. 1405, 2018 P Cr. L J 1328, 2018 IHC 70 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-30
  custody of minorhazanatsuckling babywomen prisonershabeas corpuswelfare of minorguardian and wards
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 read with Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was filed by an incarcerated mother seeking the recovery and custody of her ten-month-old suckling daughter, who was allegedly taken from her and handed over to private respondents while the mother faced trial for murder. The core legal question was whether an under-trial mother facing murder charges is disqualified from retaining the custody of her infant suckling child, particularly in light of Islamic injunctions, personal law, and prison rules. The Islamabad High Court held that pending the trial and final determination by the Guardian Court under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890, the mother cannot be deprived of the right of Hazanat for an infant suckling baby, and the state and prison authorities are obligated under Rule 326 of the Pakistan Prisons Code to permit women prisoners to keep their young children with them. The court laid down the principle that the welfare of a minor of tender age strongly favors maternal custody and breastfeeding, and allegations in a criminal trial—until proven—do not constitute a legal disqualification from temporary custody under habeas corpus proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an under-trial mother facing murder charges is disqualified from claiming the temporary custody of her infant suckling child under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a High Court issue directions in the nature of habeas corpus for the temporary custody of a minor pending adjudication of a guardian petition before the Guardian Court?
  • Does Rule 326 of the Pakistan Prisons Code permit women prisoners to keep their young children with them in prison?
  • What is the significance of Islamic injunctions and maternal breastfeeding regarding the right of Hazanat for an infant of tender age?
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• Mst. Safia Bibi and another vs Muhammad Akbar and others2018 PLD Lahore 758 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saeeda Bano Siddiqui vs Cantonment Executive Officer, Cantonment Board Malir, Karachi2018 SCMR 1616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-08-05
  Cantonment Boardcommercializationresidential leasezoningadministrative decisionland policypremium payment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment dismissing the petitioner's request to commercialize her residential plot within the Malir Cantonment area. The petitioner had previously been granted opportunities to commercialize her property but failed to pay the required premium within the extended deadlines, which expired on March 7, 2008. Subsequently, a revised policy was implemented, and the petitioner's 2010 application was rejected because her property did not fall within the designated commercial zone. The core legal question was whether the petitioner possessed an enforceable right to commercialization despite failing to meet payment deadlines and being situated outside the approved commercial zone. The Supreme Court held that commercialization is an administrative decision, not an inherent right. Since the petitioner failed to avail the concessions within the stipulated time and her property was outside the designated commercial zone, the refusal was lawful. The Court affirmed that parity cannot be claimed with other plots situated within valid commercial zones, thereby upholding the High Court's dismissal of the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a lessee claim commercialization of a residential property as a matter of right?
  • Does the failure to pay the required premium within the stipulated time period result in the lapse of a commercialization offer?
  • Can a property owner claim parity with other plots for commercialization if their property falls outside the designated commercial zone?
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• Mst. Saadia Andaleeb vs Mst. Farzana Zia and 5 others2018 [M] C.L.R. 1644, 2018 IHC 96 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-06-12
  release deedpardanashin ladyfraud and misrepresentationburden of proofregistered documentrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts which decreed a suit for declaration, partition, and permanent injunction filed by the respondents against the petitioner and her husband regarding an inherited house. The plaintiffs challenged a registered release deed dated 30.05.2009, through which they had relinquished their shares in the suit property in favor of their brother, alleging fraud, misrepresentation, and claiming the protection of pardanashin status. The core legal question was whether the educated female plaintiffs could avoid the registered release deed on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation without proving lack of understanding or capacity. The Islamabad High Court allowed the petition, holding that the plaintiffs were educated, mature, and capable of understanding the transaction, thereby disqualifying them from the special protections afforded to illiterate or pardanashin women. The Court laid down that a registered document carries strong sanctity, that failure to read an instrument before signing constitutes mere negligence rather than fraud, and that the revisional court may interfere with concurrent findings vitiated by misreading and non-reading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the protection and special presumptions attached to pardanashin or illiterate women are available to educated women capable of understanding the nature of a transaction?
  • Does the failure of a party to read a document before signing and thumb-impression it amount to fraud and misrepresentation sufficient to vitiate a registered release deed?
  • Whether registration of a document operates as public notice of its contents from the date of its registration?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Mst. Rudab Bibi vs The State2018 SHC 765 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-06
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeburden of proofstatutory concessionfraudSection 489-F PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the accused, Rudab Bibi, charged under Sections 406, 489-F, 109, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, in connection with an FIR involving allegations of fraud and the issuance of dishonoured cheques amounting to over 200 million rupees. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to bail given the specific allegations of dishonoured cheques and the statutory burden of proof under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court held that the applicant was not entitled to bail on merits, as the burden of proof regarding the honest issuance of the cheques rested on the accused, and the defense regarding misuse of cheques by a fiancé was insufficient at the bail stage. However, the Court granted bail based on the statutory concession provided to women under the first proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, subject to the condition of furnishing solvent surety equivalent to the value of the dishonoured cheques issued by the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 shift to the accused when a cheque is dishonoured?
  • Can a female accused be granted bail under the first proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 despite strong prima facie evidence of financial fraud?
  • Is the defense that blank cheques were misused by a third party sufficient to discharge the burden of proof under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at the bail stage?
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• Mst. Robina and others vs District Police Officer and others2018 YLR 665 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rizwana Shamim vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 80 · Federal Service Tribunal
  service appealprobationary perioddispensing with serviceunsatisfactory performancePakistan RangersFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a Sanitary Worker and subsequently an Instructor at the Pakistan Rangers Families Welfare Centre, challenged the order dispensing with her service during her probationary period. She had filed a departmental appeal which was rejected, and subsequently approached the High Court of Sindh, which remitted the matter to the Federal Service Tribunal. The core legal question was whether the appointing authority could lawfully dispense with the service of a probationer due to unsatisfactory performance under the applicable rules. The Tribunal held that under Rule 13(2) of the Pakistan Rangers Recruitment Rules 1968, the appointing authority is empowered to dispense with the services of a probationer whose work or conduct is deemed unsatisfactory, even prior to the expiry of the probationary period. The Tribunal laid down the principle that termination during probation based on unsatisfactory performance, in accordance with statutory recruitment rules, does not warrant interference by the Tribunal, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointing authority can dispense with the services of a probationer before the expiry of the probationary period due to unsatisfactory performance?
  • Does the termination of a probationer's service under Rule 13 of the Pakistan Rangers Recruitment Rules 1968 require formal disciplinary proceedings?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal interfere with the termination of a probationer whose work is deemed unsatisfactory by the competent authority?
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• Mst. Riaz Begum alias Razia vs Mst. Farzana and 3 othersPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 420, 2018 MLD 1714 · Federal Shariat Court · 2018-04-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rehana and another vs The State through Additional Advocate-2018 MLD 920 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-03
  post-arrest bailenticement of womanfree will marriagefurther inquiryNikah
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a post-arrest bail petition filed by Mst. Rehana and Dawood, who were implicated in FIR No. 73 dated 03.03.2017 registered under sections 496-A and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code at Police Station Dargai, District Malakand. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail given the circumstances of the alleged enticement and subsequent marriage. The Peshawar High Court held that the contents of section 496-A of the Pakistan Penal Code were not attracted against the female petitioner, especially considering her statement that she contracted marriage of her own free will and had previously filed a complaint against her parents. The court decided that the case fell within the scope of further inquiry into the guilt of the accused under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, granting both petitioners post-arrest bail subject to surety bonds. The key principle laid down is that where an adult female voluntarily contracts marriage and denies abduction, charges under section 496-A of the Pakistan Penal Code require further inquiry, making the accused persons eligible for bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the offense under section 496-A of the Pakistan Penal Code is attracted when an adult female states she contracted marriage of her own free will?
  • Are accused persons entitled to post-arrest bail when their case falls within the scope of further inquiry into their guilt?
  • Does a statement recorded under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by an alleged abductee carry weight in a bail application?
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• Mst. Rehana alias Muni vs The State2018 YLR 209 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-25
  post-arrest bailpre-arrest bailwhite-collar crimeproperty fraudoverseas Pakistanifabricated documentscheating
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses two connected bail applications arising from the same first information report, involving a post-arrest bail application for a female applicant and a pre-arrest bail application for a co-accused. The core legal question concerns whether the applicants are entitled to bail, particularly given allegations of white-collar crime involving fraudulent transfer of property belonging to an overseas Pakistani through fabricated identity documents and subsequent mortgage and sale maneuvers. The court held that sufficient, convincing, and tentative evidence connects the applicants to the serious offences, revealing a joint scheme to defraud an overseas Pakistani, thus disentitling them to pre-arrest or post-arrest bail despite the female applicant's gender. The key principle laid down is that persons involved in serious white-collar property fraud against overseas Pakistanis, where strong prima facie documentary evidence exists, are not entitled to the concession of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused involved in fabricating identity documents to usurp property belonging to an overseas Pakistani is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Does the first proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatorily grant bail to a female accused where strong prima facie documentary evidence of a serious crime exists?
  • Are white-collar offenders accused of property fraud entitled to extraordinary relief of pre-arrest bail without establishing malicious involvement or ulterior motive?
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• Mst. Razia Ameer vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan2018 CLD 289 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-22
  insurance appealliquidated damagesgroup insuranceinsurance tribunaldelay in payment
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, widow of a deceased government employee, challenged the order of the Insurance Tribunal dismissing her claim for liquidated damages regarding group insurance. The core legal question was whether legal heirs of a deceased employee are entitled to liquidated damages under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, even if the deceased was not a direct contracting party to the group insurance policy, and whether delay beyond ninety days warrants such damages. The Lahore High Court held that under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, it is an implied term of every insurance contract that if payment is not made within ninety days of completing requirements, liquidated damages must be paid unless the delay was due to circumstances beyond the insurer's control. The Court further ruled that the Tribunal erred in holding that the deceased was not a party to the contract, noting that group insurance benefits the family of the deceased employee. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the impugned order set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Are legal heirs entitled to liquidated damages under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, when insurance claim payments are delayed beyond ninety days?
  • Does the requirement of being a party to a group insurance policy bar the legal heirs of a deceased employee from claiming liquidated damages?
  • What constitutes an implied term regarding liquidated damages under every contract of insurance pursuant to the Insurance Ordinance, 2000?
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• Mst. Ravida vs Amjad and others2019 P.S.C (Crl.) 638, 2018 SCMR 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-13
  cancellation of bailabscondencemurderperverse orderprima facie casecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for the cancellation of bail granted by the Peshawar High Court to the respondents, who were accused in a murder case registered under Section 302 and Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion judicially in granting bail despite the presence of incriminating evidence and the respondents' prolonged abscondence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was perverse, as it ignored material evidence connecting the accused to the crime. The Court observed that the FIR was lodged promptly, assigning specific roles to the respondents, and that the medical evidence corroborated the prosecution's version. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the respondents' unexplained abscondence for fifteen months was a significant factor weighing against the grant of bail. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and recalled the bail granted to the respondents, reaffirming that bail should not be granted when there is prima facie evidence of guilt and a history of abscondence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the unexplained abscondence of an accused for a significant period justify the cancellation of bail?
  • Can a bail order be set aside if it ignores material evidence connecting the accused to the crime?
  • Does a prompt FIR minimize the chances of false implication in a murder case?
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• Mst. Rashida vs Mst. Zeenat and 4 others2018 PLD Balochistan 34 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-10-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rashida Begum and 3 others vs Habib Ur Rahman and 10 others2018 PLJ Peshawar 79, 2018 CLC 497 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-08-10
  compromise decreefraud and misrepresentationsection 12(2) CPCsummary dismissalframing of issuesconstitutional petitionlimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from concurrent decisions of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which sought to set aside a compromise decree dated 16.09.2004 on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. The core legal questions involve whether an application under section 12(2) can be dismissed summarily without recording evidence and whether provisions like Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to such proceedings. The Peshawar High Court held that an application under section 12(2) C.P.C. lacking specific, credible allegations of fraud or misrepresentation can be dismissed summarily without framing issues or recording evidence, to prevent protracted litigation and abuse of process. The court further held that while provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply mutatis mutandis, applications under section 12(2) do not strictly require a trial in every instance where the contents fail to inspire judicial confidence or disclose valid grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Can an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be dismissed summarily without recording evidence?
  • Whether the framing of issues is mandatory in every case arising from an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What is the applicable period of limitation for filing an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Are the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to proceedings initiated under section 12(2)?
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• Mst. Rasheedan Bibi and others vs Abdul Razzaq2018 MLD 19 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-14
  civil revisionex parte proceedingsmerger of interim orderslimitation periodright of audiencenatural justicepossession suitremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the judgments and decrees passed by the lower courts decreeing the respondent's suit for possession. The core legal questions involve the legality of initiating ex parte proceedings when a case is fixed only for arguments on a miscellaneous application, whether interim orders merge into the final judgment and can be challenged in an appeal against the final decision, and the applicable limitation period for setting aside an ex parte order. The Lahore High Court held that an interim order merges in the final judgment and can be challenged in an appeal against the ultimate decision, that no strict limitation of thirty days bars an application to set aside an ex parte order before the trial concludes, and that a defendant proceeded against ex parte retains the right to participate in subsequent proceedings. The court set aside the lower courts' judgments, accepted the application to set aside the ex parte order, and remanded the matter to the trial court for a decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does an interim order merge in the final judgment so that it can be challenged in an appeal against the ultimate decision?
  • What is the limitation period for filing an application to set aside an ex parte order passed during trial?
  • Can a defendant who has been proceeded against ex parte take part in subsequent proceedings of the suit?
  • Is it legally sustainable to pass an ex parte order in the main suit when the case was fixed only for arguments on a miscellaneous application?
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• Mst. Rasheeda Begum vs Habib-Ur-Rehman etc2018 PLJ Peshawar 79 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-08-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rani vs Pakistan International Airline Corporation & another2018 SHC 1161 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-03
  master and servantreinstatementrejection of plaintcivil suit maintainabilityspecific performance of contractwrongful dismissalstatutory corporation
  Summary & questions settled

  The present appellant assailed the order and decree of the learned Single Judge whereby her plaint in a civil suit against the Pakistan International Airline Corporation (PIAC) was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The appellant, an employee of PIAC, had been dismissed from service following an inquiry regarding shoplifting at Dubai Duty Free Shop. She challenged her dismissal by filing a civil suit seeking declaratory and injunctive reliefs for reinstatement. The core legal question was whether a civil court has jurisdiction to grant a decree of reinstatement for an employee of a government-owned statutory organization governed by non-statutory service rules, and whether such employment contracts are specifically enforceable. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that since PIAC's service regulations are non-statutory, the relationship between the corporation and its employee is strictly governed by the 'master and servant' principle. The court held that a contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, and the sole remedy for wrongful termination in such cases is a suit for damages, not reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil court has jurisdiction to decree the reinstatement of an employee of a statutory corporation whose service rules are non-statutory?
  • Does the principle of 'master and servant' bar the specific enforcement of a contract of employment?
  • Is a suit for declaration and injunction seeking reinstatement maintainable in a civil court for a pure contract of employment?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for an employee of a statutory corporation governed by non-statutory rules who is wrongfully dismissed from service?
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• Mst. Rahat Yasmeen vs Alam Khan and 2 others2018 PLJ Peshawar 104 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-11-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rafia Razzaq and another vs The State through Additional Advocate2018 PLJ Sh.C. (AJ&K) 18, 2018 MLD 841 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-02-02
  quashment of FIRinherent powers of High Courtfree-will marriagesui jurisjactitation of Nikahabuse of processcriminal proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed for the quashment of FIR No. 48/2017, registered under sections 10, 11, 16, and 19 of the Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Act and section 14 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings initiated against a couple for alleged illicit relations should be quashed when the female applicant, a sui juris adult, has affirmed her free-will marriage and a competent Family Court has already declared the conflicting Nikahnama, upon which the FIR was based, to be null and void. The Court held that the FIR must be quashed, as the allegations were rendered baseless by the Family Court's final judgment and the applicant's own categorical affirmation of her valid marriage. The Court established the principle that where a court concludes that an accused is innocent and conviction is impossible, it is duty-bound to exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to prevent the abuse of the process of law and secure the ends of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash an FIR without waiting for the trial court to pass orders under Section 249-A or 265-K?
  • Does a final judgment and decree by a Family Court declaring a Nikahnama null and void provide sufficient grounds to quash a criminal FIR based on that same Nikahnama?
  • Is the statement of an adult woman regarding her free-will marriage of vital importance in determining the validity of criminal charges related to Zina?
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• Mst. Popalzai and others vs Muhammad Asif Khan and 33 others2018 [M] C.L.R. 1484, 2018 CLC 1399 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-03-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Pervez Akhter and 6 others vs Raja Shoaib Malal and 3 others2018 CLC 1702 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Pervaiz Akhter and others vs Raja Shoaib Malal and others2018 IHC 25 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Parveen Akhtar and 4 others vs Judicial Magistrate Section 302018 YLR 985 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-06
  inherent jurisdictionquashing of proceedingssummoning orderprivate complaintabuse of process of lawrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking to set aside a summoning order dated 10.04.2017 passed by a Judicial Magistrate in a private complaint involving offenses under Sections 337-F(i), 427, 447, 506, 147, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. to quash a summoning order when an alternative remedy, such as a revision petition, is available. The Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that inherent powers under Section 561-A are extraordinary, discretionary, and to be exercised sparingly only when no other adequate remedy exists. The Court emphasized that these powers cannot be used as an alternative or additional remedy to bypass the ordinary course of criminal procedure. Furthermore, the Court established that a claim of innocence or the existence of a counter-version does not justify invoking inherent jurisdiction, as such matters must be adjudicated by the trial court during the trial process.

  Questions settled

  • Can the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked to challenge a summoning order when a remedy by way of revision is available?
  • Is the inherent power under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 an alternative or additional remedy to the ordinary course of criminal procedure?
  • Does the existence of a counter-version to a criminal complaint justify the quashing of proceedings under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Mst. Noor Jehan vs Muhammad Khan Khoso and another2018 YLR 1467 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nikhat Yasmin vs Pakistan International Airlines & others2018 SHC 1096 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nazima Khatoon vs Province Sindh and others2019 PLC (C.S) 817, 2018 SHC 437 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-02
  son quotaservice matterProvincial Ombudsmanwrit jurisdictionKarachi Metropolitan Corporationpublic employmentcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) to appoint the petitioner's son under a 'son quota' policy, allegedly derived from an Office Memorandum dated 09.04.1989. The core legal questions were whether this memorandum, originally a private settlement between the Karachi Development Authority and its union, was binding upon the KMC, and whether the Provincial Ombudsman possessed the jurisdiction to recommend such an appointment. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the memorandum was not binding on the KMC as it had not been formally adopted. Furthermore, the court determined that KMC employees are not civil servants, and the Provincial Ombudsman lacks the legal jurisdiction to adjudicate or issue binding recommendations in service-related matters. The key principle laid down is that private settlements between specific entities and their unions cannot be extended to other organizations without formal adoption, and the Provincial Ombudsman is statutorily barred from interfering in service matters or mandating public appointments.

  Questions settled

  • Is a private settlement agreement between an authority and its union binding on a separate municipal corporation?
  • Does the Provincial Ombudsman have jurisdiction to entertain and issue recommendations regarding service matters?
  • Are employees of the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation considered civil servants under the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nazima Bibi vs The State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 793, 2018 PLD Peshawar 138 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-05-04
  post-arrest bailsuckling babywelfare of childmurderstep-mothercriminal jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  The accused-petitioner, Mst. Nazima Bibi, sought post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 248 dated 28.10.2017 registered under Sections 302 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Bagnotar, Abbottabad, for the alleged murder of her step-daughter by slitting her neck and strangulation. The core legal question was whether a female accused having a suckling baby in jail is entitled to the concession of post-arrest bail on that ground alone in a heinous offence. The Peshawar High Court allowed the petition and granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner. The court held that the welfare of an innocent suckling child, who should not suffer the incompatible environment of a jail, constitutes a sufficient ground for granting bail to a female accused, without prejudice to the merits of the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a female accused having a suckling baby in jail is entitled to post-arrest bail in a murder case?
  • Does jail life constitute an incompatible environment for the welfare of a suckling child warranting the grant of bail?
  • Does the grant of bail amount to the acquittal of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nazia Anwar vs The State, etc.PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 355, 2018 SCMR 911, 2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-13
  murderdeath sentencecommutation of sentencemotivebenefit of doubtcriminal appealocular evidenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of her friend, Mst. Fahmeeda Bibi, under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned whether the evidence, particularly the unproven motive and inherent obscurities in the prosecution's narrative, warranted the capital punishment imposed by the lower courts. The Supreme Court, by a majority, upheld the conviction but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Court held that while the appellant's guilt was established, the prosecution failed to prove the alleged motive—a loan dispute—which remained uncorroborated and contradictory. The Court laid down the principle that when the prosecution asserts a motive but fails to prove it, such failure may mitigate the sentence of death. Furthermore, where the prosecution's story contains significant mysteries or inherent obscurities regarding the circumstances of the crime, the Court must exercise caution and is justified in withholding the death penalty in favor of life imprisonment, extending the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive warrant the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can a conviction be maintained when the prosecution's narrative contains inherent obscurities and mysteries?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a convict whose death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment?
  • Does the High Court have an obligatory duty under Section 375 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to record evidence when the prosecution's story is incomplete or doubtful?
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• Mst. Nazia Anwar vs The State and others2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 284, 2018 SCMR 911 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-13
  murderdeath sentence reductionunproven motivemitigating circumstancesappraisal of evidencecriminal appealbenefit of doubtimprisonment for life
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted by the trial court under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of her friend and sentenced to death, which conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court by a majority of two to one dismissed the appeal regarding the conviction but partly allowed it regarding the sentence, reducing the death penalty to imprisonment for life. The majority held that while the appellant's involvement was established, the prosecution's failure to prove the alleged motive of a financial dispute, coupled with inherent obscurities in the prosecution's narrative, warranted withholding the death sentence. A dissenting opinion favored a complete acquittal based on numerous doubts and the unproven nature of the prosecution's case. The key principle laid down is that when the prosecution asserts a motive for a murder charge but fails to prove it, such failure may serve as a mitigating circumstance to react against the imposition of the death penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove an asserted motive in a murder case serve as a valid mitigating circumstance to reduce a sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court regarding guilt can be maintained while altering the sentence on grounds of evidentiary obscurities?
  • Can an accused person be acquitted of a capital charge on the basis of probabilities and reasonable doubts arising from the prosecution's narrative?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasreen Akhtar vs The Secretary, Home Department, Government2018 P Cr. L J 7 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-02
  non-bailable warrantsabsconding accusedpolice reportcognizance of offenceinterim reportcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate dismissing applications for the issuance of non-bailable warrants (NBWs) against absconding accused persons in a criminal case registered under sections 395, 365-B, 376(2), and 337(i)A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Judicial Magistrate had refused to take cognizance and issue warrants, misinterpreting precedent regarding reports where accused persons are shown as absconders under section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate can refuse to process a police report under section 173 and decline to issue warrants of arrest merely because the accused are absconding. The Sindh High Court held that the Magistrate erred in law by failing to take cognizance or properly treat the police report as an interim report under section 344, and that the powers of police or private persons to arrest do not absolve the Magistrate from issuing NBWs upon submission of a challan. The petition was accepted, the impugned orders were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Magistrate to pass a speaking order on the section 173 report.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate can refuse to take cognizance or process a police report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 merely because the accused persons are shown as absconders?
  • Does the existence of police powers to arrest absconding offenders absolve the Magistrate from issuing non-bailable warrants upon submission of a challan?
  • How should a Magistrate treat a police report or charge sheet where all accused are shown as absconders under section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naik Parveen vs Jewan Khan2018 PLJ Lahore 813 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nafeesa Siddiqui and others vs Danish Rafique and others2019 C LC 1739, 2018 SHC 1067 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Musrat Abbas vs Province of Sindh and others2018 SHC 725 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-31
  civil servanttransfer and postingconstitutional jurisdictionservice tribunalouster of jurisdictionterms and conditions of servicewrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant, challenged a transfer notification issued by the provincial government, alleging it was arbitrary, politically motivated, and in violation of established legal principles regarding tenure and posting. The core legal question was whether the High Court possesses the constitutional jurisdiction to adjudicate a writ petition filed by a civil servant concerning transfer and posting matters, given the constitutional bar on such interference. The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It reasoned that matters pertaining to the terms and conditions of service, including transfer and posting, fall exclusively within the domain of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Court affirmed that transfer is an administrative prerogative of the government under the relevant civil service legislation. The key principles laid down are that the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 199 is ousted by Article 212 in service matters, and that a civil servant possesses no vested right to remain posted at a particular station for a specific tenure.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to interfere in the transfer and posting of a civil servant?
  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to remain posted at a particular station for a specific tenure?
  • Do matters relating to the transfer and posting of civil servants fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Muqaddas and Others vs Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Limited2018 SHC 402 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Muqaddas and 6 others vs Karachi Electric Supply Corporation2018 SHC 402, 2018 MLD 1054 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mehreen vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary2018 MLD 671 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mehfooza Bano vs M/s Haji Ahmed Memorial Dispensary and others2018 SHC 1112 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-12
  constitutional petitionconcurrent findingsmaster and servantcharitable service providercommercial establishmentjurisdiction of labour courttermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from concurrent findings of the Sindh Labour Court and the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's grievance application regarding her termination as a Junior Nurse from a dispensary. The core legal question was whether the respondent dispensary constituted a commercial establishment or employer subject to the Sindh Industrial Relations Act 2013, and whether an employer-employee relationship of a 'worker' existed under the statute, allowing the invocation of labour court jurisdiction against a charitable service provider. The court held that the respondent dispensary, registered for social welfare and providing basic medical treatment, is a charitable service provider and does not fall within the definition of a commercial establishment or employer under the Sindh Industrial Relations Act 2013. Consequently, labour laws are inapplicable, and concurrent findings of lower fora cannot be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction absent illegality or perversity. The key principles established are that charitable service providers operating without commercial intent are excluded from labour statutes, and High Courts will not disturb well-reasoned concurrent factual findings under constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a charitable service provider or dispensary falls within the definition of a commercial establishment under the Sindh Industrial Relations Act 2013?
  • Can an employee of a charitable welfare institution invoke the jurisdiction of the Sindh Labour Court under the Sindh Industrial Relations Act 2013?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of labour courts in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mehar Bano vs The President Executive Board Defence Officer2018 SHC 1090 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-29
  constitutional petitionservice terminationunauthorized absenceinquiry proceedingsmaster and servantstatutory authoritywrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The Petitioner challenged her termination from service as a teacher by the Respondent-Authority through a constitutional petition, alleging the action was arbitrary, without lawful jurisdiction, violative of constitutional provisions, and contrary to the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance 2000. The core legal question was whether the termination order and the subsequent fresh inquiry conducted pursuant to a court order were valid and sustainable, and whether the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court could be invoked to set aside the findings of the inquiry officer. The court held that the Petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to participate in the fresh inquiry conducted by an impartial inquiry officer, that the charges of prolonged unauthorized absence were substantiated by documentary evidence, and that no malice or procedural irregularity was established. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the petition on merits, holding that findings of fact arrived at by a duly conducted inquiry cannot be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction in the absence of illegality or material irregularity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with the findings of fact of an inquiry officer in its constitutional jurisdiction when the inquiry was conducted fairly and in compliance with court orders?
  • Does prolonged unauthorized absence from duty without the grant of leave constitute sufficient ground for termination of service in a statutory authority?
  • Whether an employee who fails to participate in a fresh departmental inquiry despite receiving notices can subsequently challenge the inquiry report on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Marvi Bhatti vs The State2018 MLD 1329 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-13
  narcotics possessionchain of custodychemical examiner reportbenefit of doubtcriminal appealsafe custodypolice contradiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal assails the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for the possession of charas and sentencing her to rigorous imprisonment. The core legal questions revolved around whether the prosecution successfully established the safe custody and unbroken chain of custody of the recovered narcotics, and whether the material contradictions and discrepancies in the police testimony warranted an acquittal. The Sindh High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, holding that serious gaps in the prosecution's case, including failure to prove safe transmission of the case property to the Chemical Examiner and contradictions among police witnesses regarding the seizure and sealing, created reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that the prosecution must strictly establish an unbroken, safe chain of custody for narcotics, and any material inconsistency or unexplained delay creates a reasonable doubt entitling the accused to an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the safe custody and unbroken chain of custody of narcotics warrant an acquittal?
  • Whether material contradictions between police witnesses regarding the recovery and sealing of contraband create a reasonable doubt?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when discrepancies undermine the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Marryam Bibi vs Mst. Murad Bibi and 7 others2018 MLD 984 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-10-31
  fraud vitiates proceedingsapplication under section 12(2) CPCcollusive decreeforged power of attorneylimitation periodconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition called in question the legality of concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether a decree obtained through a fraudulent and collusive suit, utilizing forged power of attorneys and affidavits without procuring the attendance of defendants or filing a written statement, is sustainable, and whether limitation runs against such a void decree. The Balochistan High Court held that fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings, and a decree obtained through misrepresentation and fraud is ab initio void, meaning no limitation runs against it. The court set aside the impugned judgments, decrees, and the original fraudulent decree, remanding the matter back to the trial court to proceed in accordance with law. The key principle laid down is that fraudulent transactions have no legal foundation, vitiate all subsequent proceedings, and allow for the condonation of delay when challenged immediately upon discovery.

  Questions settled

  • Does fraud vitiate judicial proceedings and render a decree obtained through misrepresentation ab initio void?
  • Does limitation run against a decree or order that has been procured through fraud?
  • Is a trial court bound to procure the attendance of defendants or require a written statement before decreeing a suit based on purported affidavits of renunciation?
  • Can lower courts ignore the admissions and rejoinders of original plaintiffs acknowledging that they never filed the suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Marina vs Province Sindh and others2020 PLC (C.S.) 220, 2018 SHC 748 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-01
  Primary School TeacherDistrict Recruitment CommitteeAppointment cancellationDomicile certificateSalary arrearsService lawConstitution petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitution petition challenged the non-payment of salary and the cancellation of the petitioner’s appointment as a Primary School Teacher (BPS-9) by the District Recruitment Committee (DRC). The petitioner, having successfully qualified the recruitment process, was appointed and joined service. The respondents subsequently cancelled her appointment, alleging she submitted her domicile certificate after the prescribed cut-off date. The core legal question was whether the DRC possessed the authority to cancel an appointment on such grounds after the candidate had already been appointed and commenced duties. The Court held that the cancellation was erroneous and legally unsustainable. It reasoned that the late submission of a domicile certificate did not constitute an inherent disqualification for the post. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that once a candidate has been selected, issued an offer letter, appointed, and has joined service, the DRC cannot arbitrarily revoke that appointment. Consequently, the Court directed the respondents to release the petitioner's salary, affirming that the right to receive remuneration for services rendered cannot be withheld without lawful justification.

  Questions settled

  • Can the District Recruitment Committee cancel an appointment after the candidate has been issued an offer letter and has joined service?
  • Does the late submission of a domicile certificate constitute an inherent disqualification for the post of Primary School Teacher?
  • Can the government withhold the salary of an employee who has been appointed and is performing duties?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Lala Rukh Bukhari vs Syed Waqar Ul Hassan Shah Bokhari and others2018 YLR 273 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Laiba Sultan vs Muhammad Nawaz and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-29
  child custodyGuardian and Ward Courtwelfare of the minorhabeas corpussummary jurisdictionminor's welfarecustody dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a custody dispute between a mother, an Afghan refugee, and her husband regarding their two minor children. The petitioner challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed her application under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which sought the recovery and custody of the minors. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly declined to exercise its summary jurisdiction in a habeas corpus-style petition regarding child custody, given the children's expressed aversion to the mother and concerns regarding her status as a refugee. The Supreme Court upheld the decision to relegate the parties to the Guardian and Ward Court. The Court held that summary proceedings under Section 491 are not the appropriate forum for determining complex custody disputes involving the welfare of minors, which require the recording of evidence. The key principle laid down is that the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration in custody matters, and such disputes are best resolved by the specialized Guardian and Ward Court, which can properly assess evidence and ensure the children's long-term well-being.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 the appropriate remedy for determining the permanent custody of minor children?
  • Can the High Court decline to exercise summary jurisdiction in a child custody matter if the welfare of the minors is better served by a Guardian and Ward Court?
  • Should a court consider the expressed aversion of minor children towards a parent when determining interim custody arrangements?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kulsoom and 3 others vs Sessions Judge, Mirpurkhas and 5 others2018 MLD 1484 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-19
  acquittal appealcompromiseQisas and Diyatscope of interference in acquittalmurderlegal heirs verification
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal arises from an order passed by the District and Sessions Judge, Mirpurkhas, whereby the respondents/accused were acquitted of charges under sections 302, 147, 148, 149, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a compromise reached between the parties. The core legal question before the High Court was whether the trial court erred in accepting the compromise under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and acquitting the accused, and whether grounds existed for the appellate court to interfere with the acquittal. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the legal heirs of the deceased had voluntarily entered into the compromise without any pressure or inducement, and that the trial court had followed all legal formalities, including verification of legal heirs. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court will exercise restraint and rarely interfere with an acquittal order unless the judgment is shown to be perverse, arbitrary, or suffering from gross misreading or non-reading of evidence resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with an acquittal order based on a compromise when the legal heirs have voluntarily waived their right of Qisas and Diyat?
  • What is the scope and criteria for interference by an appellate court in an appeal against an acquittal?
  • Whether a trial court commits any illegality by accepting a compromise between the parties after proper verification of the legal heirs of the deceased?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kousar Kamal vs Chairman, Customs, FBR and othersPTCL 2018 CL. 471, 2018 PTD 93 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kousar Kamal vs Chairman, Customs, FBR & OthersPTCL 2018 CL. 471 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kishwar Begum & Ors vs Rasheed Ahmed Qureshi & Ors2019 MLD 1044, 2018 SHC 1208 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khurshid Bibi, etc vs Nazar Abbas, etc2020 [M] C L R 192, 2018 YLR 2138, 2018 YLR 2138, 2018 LHC 1404 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khurshid Bibi and others vs Syed Fazal Abbas and others2018 YLR 2138 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khalida Bibi & another vs Muhammad Naeem2018 PHC 1854 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-12-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kausar vs The State2018 YLR 733 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-10-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Jamila Naheed vs Mrs. Samina Qasim2018 PLD Sindh 564 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Jameela Begum vs Qadeer Ahmad2018 YLR 66 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-06
  Parda Nasheengift mutationburden of proofcivil revisioninheritance rightsfraud and collusionilliterate womanconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from the dismissal of a suit challenging two gift mutations (Nos. 1307 and 1308) dated 29.06.1987, which transferred the petitioner's inherited property to her father and subsequently to her brother. The petitioner, an illiterate woman, alleged fraud and collusion. The lower courts dismissed the suit, citing lack of cause of action and maintainability. The core legal question was whether the beneficiary of a gift transaction involving an illiterate 'Parda Nasheen' woman bears the burden of proving the transaction's genuineness, and whether the lower courts erred in their findings. The High Court held that the burden of proof shifted to the respondent to establish the essential ingredients of a valid gift—offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession—which the respondent failed to do. The Court ruled that the mutations were void, as they were based on fraudulent transactions. The key principle laid down is that for transactions involving illiterate or 'Parda Nasheen' women, the beneficiary must affirmatively prove the transaction's validity, and concurrent findings of lower courts are not immune to interference in revision if based on misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof shift to the beneficiary when a gift transaction is challenged by an illiterate or Parda Nasheen woman?
  • Can a court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in its revisional jurisdiction if those findings are based on a misreading of evidence?
  • Is a mutation entry alone sufficient proof of title to property?
  • What are the essential ingredients of a valid gift under Muhammadan Law that must be proved by the beneficiary?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Irshad Bibi vs District Police Officer, etc2018 LHC 2775, 2019 P Cr. L J 436 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-12
  habeas corpuscustody of minorsuckling infantinterim custodytender ageGuardian Court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition seeking the recovery of her 13-day-old infant son from the illegal confinement of the child's father. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to grant interim custody of a suckling infant to the mother. The Court held that, in accordance with established Supreme Court precedents, the High Court may intervene in custody matters under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, provided the child is of tender age, has been recently removed from lawful custody, and there is a real urgency. Finding that the 13-day-old infant was a suckling baby recently separated from the mother, the Court ordered the immediate transfer of custody to the mother. The Court clarified that this order was an interim measure, and the father retained the liberty to approach the Guardian Court for a final determination regarding the permanent custody of the minor.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to determine the custody of a minor?
  • Under what specific conditions will the High Court grant interim custody of a minor in a habeas corpus petition?
  • Does an order of interim custody passed by the High Court under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 preclude the father from seeking permanent custody from the Guardian Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Irshad Begum vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan2018 CLD 1233 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-06
  insurance claimlimitation periodexclusion of timeInsurance Tribunalconstitutional petitionrejection of plaintgood faith
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the order of the Insurance Tribunal, Punjab, Lahore, which rejected the appellant's insurance claim as barred by time and dismissed her application for exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The core legal question was whether the time spent by the appellant pursuing constitutional petitions in the High Court due to the non-establishment of Insurance Tribunals should be excluded for limitation purposes. The Lahore High Court held that the appellant was diligently pursuing her remedy in good faith and could not be penalized for the Government's delay in establishing the Tribunals. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the Tribunal for a fresh decision after recording evidence. The key principle laid down is that time spent prosecuting bona fide proceedings in an alternate forum due to the absence of a specialized tribunal must be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time spent pursuing a constitutional petition in the High Court can be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 when specialized tribunals have not yet been established?
  • Can a litigant be penalized for the omission or inaction of the Government in timely establishing Insurance Tribunals?
  • Is the issue of limitation a mixed question of law and facts requiring the recording of evidence before summary rejection?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Iram Shahzadi vs Muhammad Imran-ul-Haq & others2018 LHC 1818 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Iqbal Bano vs Home Department & 2 others2019 P Cr. L J 532, 2019 PLJ Lahore 278, 2018 LHC 2869 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-06
  death penaltydeath row phenomenonpsychosisexecution of death warrantmental incapacitySchizophreniacriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought the suspension of her son's death sentence, arguing that his diagnosed psychosis (Schizophrenia), exacerbated by prolonged incarceration and the 'death row phenomenon,' rendered his execution dehumanizing and a violation of the Pakistan Prisons Rules 1978. The core legal question was whether a convict's mental illness, developed or worsened during long-term incarceration while awaiting execution, constitutes sufficient grounds to stay the execution of a death warrant. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the 'death row phenomenon' and resulting psychological trauma are inherent consequences of the death penalty and do not provide a legal basis for suspending an execution. The Court emphasized that it cannot reopen a case finally decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, nor can it mitigate the sentence based on psychological implications that are concomitant to the penalty itself. Relying on the precedent set in Safia Bano v. Home Department, the Court affirmed that such emotional disorders are insufficient to impede the execution of a lawfully imposed death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the development of psychosis or mental trauma during long-term incarceration on death row constitute a valid ground to suspend the execution of a death warrant?
  • Can a High Court revisit or stay the execution of a death sentence after the conviction has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Is the 'death row phenomenon' a legally recognized basis for mitigating a death sentence in Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Haseena vs The State2019 MLD 176, 2018 PHC 1707 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-08-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hajul through L.Rs. and others vs Nasarullah Malik and others2018 CLC 1564 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hafiza Samina Sultan vs Muhammad Abid and 2 others2018 MLD 923 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Gul Meena vs The State2018 MLD 1518 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-04
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlcharas recoverywelfare of minorprohibitory clausedelay in trialfemale accused
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Mst. Gul Meena, sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 9(C) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the alleged recovery of 6600 grams of charas from her direct personal possession while traveling in a passenger van with her minor son. The core legal question was whether a female accused from whose possession a huge quantity of narcotics falling within the prohibitory clause was recovered is entitled to post-arrest bail, particularly considering the welfare of her minor child lodged with her in prison and the delay in submission of the challan. The Peshawar High Court granted bail to the petitioner, holding that while the recovery of a huge quantity and the question of guilt are matters for the trial court, the welfare of the minor child languishing in prison and the delay in trial proceedings warrant the concession of bail. The key principle laid down is that the welfare and liberty of a minor child residing in prison with an accused mother can constitute a compelling ground for granting post-arrest bail, even in cases involving large quantities of narcotics under the prohibitory clause.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the presence of a minor child in prison with a female accused constitutes a ground for post-arrest bail in narcotics cases?
  • Does the recovery of a large quantity of narcotics falling within the prohibitory clause bar the grant of bail in all circumstances?
  • Whether delay in submission of challan entitles an accused to the concession of post-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Zainab vs Gulastar Hussain through LRs etc2018 PLJ Lahore 129 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fouzia Bibi vs Haji Ahmad2018 PLJ Lahore 377 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fatima Ali and another vs Mst. Rubina Ehtesham and 4 others2018 YLR 1891 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farzana Javed vs Mst. Nighat Sultana & others2019 CLC 687, 2018 SHC 832 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farhat Afza vs Government of Pakistan and others2018 P Cr. L J 370 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-22
  constitutional petitionforfeiture of propertydeath sentenceillegal orderrepealed statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking to set aside an order dated 19.3.1952 passed by the Sessions Judge Derajat, D.I. Khan, regarding the forfeiture of the immovable property of a deceased convict, Fazal Rehman Khan, and to release the property in favour of the petitioner, who claimed it through a registered will executed by the convict's sole legal heir. The core legal question was whether the forfeiture of a convict's property in death cases was legally competent under the law prevailing in 1952. The Peshawar High Court held that section 62 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which previously permitted the forfeiture of property in death cases, was repealed in 1921 by the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1921. Consequently, the court ruled that the impugned forfeiture order passed in 1952 was entirely without jurisdiction, illegal, and not sustainable in law, thereby accepting the petition to the extent of declaring the forfeiture order void while leaving the petitioner to seek remedy for the release of the property from the proper forum.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the forfeiture of immovable property of a convict in a death case was lawful in the year 1952?
  • Does section 62 of the Pakistan Penal Code authorize the forfeiture of property after its repeal by the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1921?
  • Is an order of forfeiture passed without statutory backing considered without jurisdiction and illegal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fakhra Yasmeen vs District Education Officer (W-Ee), Rawalpindi2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 116 · Punjab Service Tribunal
  bogus appointmentmisconductremoval from serviceinter-district transfervoid ab initioservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a Primary School Teacher, challenged her removal from service following disciplinary proceedings under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, on charges of misconduct and holding a bogus appointment and inter-district transfer. The inquiry officer concluded that the appellant's service book, first appointment, and inter-district transfer letters were fake, as verified by the Executive District Officer (Education), Pakpattan. The competent authority imposed the major penalty of removal from service, and the departmental appeal was subsequently rejected. The core legal question concerned the validity of an appointment secured through fraud and whether an initial void appointment gains legality over time. The Punjab Service Tribunal dismissed the appeal, holding that when an initial appointment is void ab initio, such an unlawful order does not become lawful by the efflux of time, and the principle of locus poenitentiae is not attracted where an appointment is secured by fraud and misrepresentation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appointment secured through fraud and misrepresentation can gain legality by the efflux of time?
  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae apply where an appointment or transfer order is found to be bogus?
  • Can a civil servant challenge disciplinary action for a fake appointment without providing tangible material to corroborate the authenticity of their appointment and transfer letters?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fahmida Bibi vs Abdul Bari and another2018 MLD 591 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-10-09Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ezat Sultana vs The State2018 YLR 2072 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-04-12
  post-arrest bailmurderconfessional statementexhumationbail for womenincriminating material
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by Mst. Ezat Sultana, who is charged under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Bibi Hajra. The petitioner sought bail on grounds of delayed FIR, lack of eyewitnesses, alleged mala fides, and her status as a woman under Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The State opposed the bail, highlighting that the deceased's body was exhumed following police investigation, revealing death by violence, and that the petitioner had recorded a confessional statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, alongside the recovery of the weapon of offense at her pointation. The Court held that while the petitioner is a woman, the discretion to grant bail cannot be exercised in her favor given the incriminating material, including her confession and the recovery of the weapon, which demonstrate active participation in the crime. Consequently, the Court dismissed the bail petition, ruling that the petitioner was not entitled to the concession of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the status of being a woman automatically entitle an accused to the concession of bail in a murder case?
  • Can bail be granted when there is a recorded confessional statement and recovery of the weapon of offense at the pointation of the accused?
  • Is the discretion under Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 absolute in cases involving capital punishment?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Eram Raza and 2 others vs Syed Mutaqi Muhammad Ali and another2018 MLD 727 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-28
  guardians and wardsinterim custodyinterlocutory ordermaintainabilityconstitutional petitionalternative remedyfamily courts actwelfare of minor
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an interlocutory order passed by a Family Judge granting temporary weekend and vacation custody of minor children to their father. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of a constitutional petition against an interim order in guardianship proceedings, the appealability of an order passed under Section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 in light of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964, and whether the principle of res judicata bars repeated applications for interim custody. The Sindh High Court held that orders passed under Section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act by a Family Court are appealable as 'decisions' under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act 1964, and therefore a constitutional petition is barred due to the availability of an alternate remedy of appeal before the District Court. The court further held that interim custody orders are tentative and can be modified upon a material change in circumstances, as the welfare of the minor remains paramount. The petition was consequently dismissed as non-maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against an interim order passed by a Family Court in guardianship proceedings when an alternate remedy of appeal is available?
  • Does an order passed under Section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 by a Family Court qualify as an appealable decision under Section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to successive applications for interim custody of minors under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bilqis Bano and another vs Pakistan Defence Officers Housing2019 P Cr. L J 962, 2018 SHC 825 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-17
  National Accountability Ordinanceproperty mutationcivil court jurisdictionaccountability courtbenamidarfreezing of propertymandatory injunctiontransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiffs sought a declaration of ownership and a mandatory injunction against the Defence Housing Authority (DHA), Military Estates Officer (MEO), and Cantonment Board Clifton (CBC) to mutate two properties in their names. The defendants refused, citing pending National Accountability Bureau (NAB) proceedings against the previous owners under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (NAO 1999). The core legal question was whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to determine if the transfer of these properties was prohibited by Section 23 of the NAO 1999, or if such jurisdiction vested exclusively in the Accountability Court. The Court held that the NAO 1999 is a special law providing an exclusive forum. Specifically, the proviso to Section 23 of the NAO 1999 allows for the transfer of property with the approval of the Accountability Court, thereby establishing that any grievance regarding property restraints under the NAO 1999 must be addressed by that Court. Consequently, the Civil Court's jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is barred, and the suit was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Civil Court have jurisdiction to decide if the transfer of property is prohibited by the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
  • Does the Accountability Court have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate claims regarding property restraints under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
  • Can a plaint be rejected in piecemeal under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a civil suit barred by Section 56(e) of the Specific Relief Act 1877 when it seeks to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by the Accountability Court?
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• Mst. Bilqees Barkat, etc. vs Member Board of Revenue J-V/CSC, etc.2018 [M] C.L.R. 130 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bilqees Barkat etc vs Member Board of Revenue J-V/CSC etc2018 PLJ Lahore 257 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bibi Halima vs The State through Additional Advocate General and 52018 MLD 1156 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bhagan etc vs Ghulam (deceased) through L.Rs and others2018 MLD 1892, 2018 LHC 1560 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bhagan and others vs Ghulam (deceased) through L.Rs, and others2018 MLD 1892 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Basmina vs Imran and others2018 MLD 870 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bano vs Mst. Robina and another2018 YLR 44 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bahre Falak vs Fazal Subhan and another2018 PLJ Peshawar 184, 2018 PHC 1326 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-18
  benami transactioncivil revisionsource of considerationconcurrent findingsdeclaration and possessionburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition was filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with paragraph 10 sub-paragraph 8 of the Shariah Nizam-e-Adal Regulation, 2009 against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts whereby the petitioner's suit for declaration, permanent injunction, and possession regarding certain immovable property was dismissed. The core legal question involved was whether the petitioner successfully proved that the suit property was purchased through a benami transaction using funds remitted by her late father to his brother, the respondent. The Peshawar High Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts suffered from no jurisdictional defect, material irregularity, or illegality, and that the petitioner failed to satisfy the essential legal criteria required to establish a benami transaction, such as proof of the source of consideration, custody of title deeds, possession, and motive. The court reaffirmed the settled principle that a benami transaction must be proven through cogent, legal, and unimpeachable evidence rather than suspicion.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential conditions required to prove a transaction to be benami?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts be interfered with in civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without showing a jurisdictional defect or material irregularity?
  • Does the burden of proof lie on the party raising the plea of benami transaction to adduce cogent and unimpeachable evidence?
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• Mst. Ayesha Shahid vs Additional District Judge and others2019 PLJ Lahore 484, 2018 MLD 1592 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ayesha Shabbir and others vs The Registrar Islamabad High Court, Islamabad and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 1026 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-06
  judicial service confirmationdepartmental examinationwrit jurisdictionprobation periodadministrative orderIslamabad Judicial Service Rulesjudicial comity
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, Civil Judges-cum-Judicial Magistrates, challenged the mandatory departmental examination requirement for their service confirmation, arguing that their probation period had expired and that the examination process was discriminatory and procedurally flawed. The core legal questions were whether the High Court could mandate such examinations after the initial probation period and whether the High Court’s administrative orders regarding judicial service conditions were subject to writ jurisdiction. The court dismissed the petitions, holding that confirmation under Rule 20(3) of the Islamabad Judicial Service Rules, 2011, is strictly conditional upon passing prescribed departmental examinations, regardless of the expiry of the probation period. The court further held that administrative orders issued by the High Court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199(5) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, as the High Court does not fall within the definition of a 'person' for such purposes. The judgment establishes that statutory conditions precedent, such as passing examinations, must be fulfilled for confirmation, and judicial comity precludes one bench from issuing writs against the administrative acts of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court's administrative order regarding judicial service conditions is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the expiry of a probation period automatically result in confirmation if a mandatory departmental examination has not been passed?
  • Can a High Court bench issue a writ against the administrative actions of the same High Court?
  • Is the requirement to pass a departmental examination a condition precedent for the confirmation of a Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ayesha Shabbir & others vs Registrar Islamabad High Court, Islamabad and others2018 PLJ Islamabad 28, 2018 PLC (C.S.) 1026 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-06
  departmental examinationprobation periodwrit jurisdictionjudicial service rulesadministrative orderconfirmation of serviceArticle 199
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, Civil Judges-cum-Judicial Magistrates, challenged notifications requiring them to appear for departmental examinations, alleging discrimination and claiming automatic confirmation upon the expiry of their probation period. The core legal questions concerned whether the High Court’s administrative orders regarding departmental examinations are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and whether the petitioners were entitled to confirmation despite failing the examination. The Court held that the writ petitions were not maintainable, as the administrative actions of the High Court, including the conduct of departmental examinations, are protected from writ jurisdiction under Article 199(5). The Court further clarified that the probation period is subject to the mandatory requirement of passing departmental examinations under the Islamabad Judicial Service Rules, 2011; thus, automatic confirmation does not occur upon the mere expiry of the probation period. The judgment affirms that the High Court’s administrative functions, when performed by the Court as an institution, are not subject to judicial review by the same Court.

  Questions settled

  • Are administrative orders issued by the High Court regarding departmental examinations subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Does the expiry of the maximum probation period under the Islamabad Judicial Service Rules, 2011, automatically result in the confirmation of a judicial officer?
  • Is the requirement to pass a departmental examination a mandatory condition precedent for the confirmation of a probationer under the Islamabad Judicial Service Rules, 2011?
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• Mst. Asmat Begum vs Muhammad Yousaf and 8 others2018 PLD Peshawar 38 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Asma Khursheed and another vs Station House Officer, Aabpara2018 P Cr. L J 674 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-18
  section 145 crpcdispossessionbreach of peaceconstitutional petitioncivil disputeattachment of propertypublic functionariesfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, challenging an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner/Sub-Divisional Magistrate under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, whereby their residential property was attached and sealed, leading to their dispossession. The core legal question concerned the lawful exercise of jurisdiction under Section 145 Cr.P.C. when the petitioners' possession was undisputed, civil proceedings were already pending, and no imminent apprehension of a breach of peace existed at the time of attachment. The Court held that proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. require strict jurisdictional prerequisites, including objective satisfaction regarding an imminent danger of a breach of peace, and cannot be used to dispossess persons who are in settled, undisputed possession or to bypass civil court adjudications. The Court declared the impugned sealing and dispossession illegal, without lawful authority, and ordered the immediate restoration of possession to the petitioners along with departmental inquiries against the responsible public functionaries.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate can exercise jurisdiction under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, in the absence of an imminent apprehension of a breach of peace?
  • Can the powers under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be invoked to evict persons who are in undisputed and settled possession of a property?
  • Does the pendency of a civil suit concerning the property oust the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to initiate attachment proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • What are the mandatory jurisdictional requirements for initiating proceedings and attaching property under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ashfan Shahid vs Adj and others2018 LHC 1166 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Anila Jalees and others vs Driver Shakurullah and another2018 MLD 1299 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-01
  Fatal Accidents Actcompensationrash and negligent drivingquantum of damagespecuniary lossex-parte decreecivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for compensation filed under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, by the legal heirs of a deceased individual who died in a road accident involving a vehicle owned and operated by the defendants. The core legal questions were whether the defendants were liable for the death due to rash and negligent driving and, if so, the appropriate quantum of compensation to be awarded to the legal heirs. The Court held that the defendants were liable, noting that while they filed a written statement, they failed to lead evidence to rebut the plaintiffs' case or substantiate their plea of contributory negligence. Consequently, the Court accepted the plaintiffs' evidence as un-rebutted. The Court determined that compensation should be calculated based on a 70-year life expectancy, adjusting for the deceased's self-employed status by deducting holidays and personal expenses. The key principle laid down is that in ex-parte proceedings or where defendants fail to lead evidence, the Court must rigorously scrutinize the plaintiff's evidence to ensure justice, while calculating pecuniary loss based on realistic working days and life expectancy.

  Questions settled

  • How should the court calculate compensation for a self-employed individual in a suit under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855?
  • What is the effect on a civil suit when the defendant files a written statement but fails to lead evidence?
  • Is the court required to independently scrutinize the plaintiff's evidence in an uncontested suit for damages?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amna Bi and 5 others vs Mst. Naseem Akhtar2018 CLC 748 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amina Khatoon and 5 others vs Mst. Nighat Jabeen and another2018 PLD Sindh 325 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-09Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amina Bibi and 2 others vs State through Additional A.G.2018 PLJ AJ&K 89 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-07-28
  quashment of FIRinherent powers of High Courtfree-will marriageNikahabductionsui-jurisabuse of process
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal miscellaneous application filed for the quashment of F.I.R. No. 61 of 2017 registered under Sections 10, 11, 16, and 19 of the ZHA at Police Station Islamgarh, on allegations of abduction and related offences. The core legal questions involve whether the High Court can quash an F.I.R. under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 prior to the submission of a police challan, and whether an F.I.R. regarding abduction should be quashed when the alleged victim appears before the court and affirms a valid free-will marriage (Nikah) with her co-accused as a sui-juris adult. The High Court held that its inherent powers under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. are wide, can be exercised at any stage including before challan submission to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, and that criminal proceedings must be quashed when conviction is impossible. The key principle laid down is that the statement of an adult female affirming her free-will marriage is of paramount importance in deciding such controversies, rendering allegations of abduction baseless and warranting quashment to prevent unnecessary harassment.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court quash an F.I.R. under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before the submission of a challan by the police?
  • Does the statement of an adult female affirming her free-will marriage render allegations of abduction in an F.I.R. baseless?
  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed by the High Court if it concludes that the conviction of the accused is impossible?
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• Mst. Almas Ismail vs Mst. Almas Ismail2018 SHC 758 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Alia Sehar vs Station House Officer Police Station Mureed Wala2018 PLJ Lahore 474 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-31Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aila Nawaz vs Judge Family Court Khanewal and 2 others2018 CLC 241 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-09
  family courtdowry articlesnecessary partyproper partyimpleadmentrecovery of dowryMuslim Family Courts Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a suit for the recovery of maintenance, dowry articles, and personal belongings against her husband and his father. The Family Court, upon the husband's application, ordered the deletion of the father's name from the suit, reasoning that such disputes are strictly inter se spouses. The petitioner challenged this order in the High Court. The core legal question was whether the father of a husband can be impleaded as a party in a suit for the recovery of dowry articles. The High Court held that the definition of 'party' under the West Pakistan Muslim Family Courts Act, 1964 is liberal and extensive, allowing for the inclusion of persons other than spouses if their presence is necessary for a proper decision or enforcement of a decree. The Court ruled that where dowry articles are alleged to be in the possession of the husband's father, he is a necessary and proper party. Consequently, the High Court set aside the Family Court's order, affirming that the father must remain a defendant to ensure effective adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can the father of a husband be impleaded as a party in a suit for the recovery of dowry articles?
  • What is the scope of the term 'party' under the West Pakistan Muslim Family Courts Act, 1964?
  • Does a Family Court have the authority to delete a party from a suit if they are considered unnecessary or improper?
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• Mst Gul Meena vs The State2018 MLD 1518, 2018 PHC 1427 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-04
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlfemale accusedwelfare of minorprohibitory clausedelay in challan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a female accused, sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 9(C) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the alleged recovery of 6600 grams of Chars from her personal possession. The core legal question was whether post-arrest bail should be granted to a female accused carrying a minor child in prison despite the recovery of a huge quantity of narcotics falling within the prohibitory clause. The Peshawar High Court held that while the recovery was huge and the matter required trial, the welfare of the minor child confined with the mother in prison, coupled with delay in submission of the challan, entitled the petitioner to the concession of bail. The key principle laid down is that the welfare of a minor child residing with an incarcerated mother in prison is a significant humanitarian factor that can tilt the balance in favor of granting bail in appropriate circumstances, without treating the case on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted to a female accused from whose direct possession a huge quantity of narcotics falling within the prohibitory clause was recovered?
  • Does the presence of a minor child in prison with an incarcerated mother constitute a ground for the grant of bail?
  • Whether delay in submission of the challan by the prosecution entitles the accused to the concession of post-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms.Khushnum Hormazd Muncherji vs Hormazd Rusi Muncherji2018 SHC 638 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-06Read full judgment →
• Ms. Shagufta Hashmat, etc. vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2018 PLC (C.S.) 619, 2018 [M] C.L.R. 302 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-01
  regularization of servicescivil servantsad hoc appointmentfundamental rightspublic sector recruitmentconstitutional petitionmerit-based appointmentdelegated legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated petition concerns the regularization of services for various contract, daily wage, and contingent employees, primarily teaching staff in public schools and colleges. The core legal questions addressed whether regularization policies, particularly a 2011 policy approved by the Prime Minister but not the Cabinet, could override the Civil Servants Act 1973 and the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973. The Court held that regularization policies cannot bypass primary or delegated legislation. It declared the 2011 'Committees Policy' illegal and void for lacking Cabinet approval and violating statutory recruitment procedures. The Court affirmed that appointments made without transparent, competitive processes, such as public advertisement, are void ab initio and do not confer a vested right to regularization. The key principle laid down is that public appointments must strictly adhere to statutory frameworks and merit-based, transparent selection processes. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the fundamental rights of students to receive quality education from qualified teachers supersede the individual claims of employees appointed through non-transparent, ad hoc methods.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government regularization policy override the provisions of the Civil Servants Act 1973 and the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973?
  • Does an ad hoc appointment made without a transparent, competitive process create a vested right to regularization?
  • Is a regularization policy approved by the Prime Minister without the approval of the Federal Cabinet legally valid?
  • Can the court enforce the regularization of employees in public sector entities if their initial appointment violated statutory recruitment rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms. Shagufta Hashmat and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet Division and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 619 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-01
  regularization of servicescontract employeescivil servantsinitial appointmentAPT Rules 1973transparency in public appointmentsfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Islamabad High Court addresses multiple petitions filed by contract, daily wage, and contingent staff—predominantly teaching staff in public schools and colleges—seeking the regularization of their services against permanent posts. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioners have a vested right to regularization based on previous executive policies, particularly a policy approved by the Prime Minister in 2011, and whether such appointments made without open competitive processes can be regularized in contravention of statutory rules. The court held that executive policies cannot override primary legislation or delegated statutory rules, that the 2011 policy lacked proper Federal Cabinet approval and was thus illegal, and that initial appointments made without transparency and statutory compliance are void ab initio. The court laid down key principles establishing that public sector appointments must strictly follow the Civil Servants Act 1973 and associated rules, that transparency and open competition are mandatory constitutional prerequisites for public employment, and that individual claims to regularization remain subservient to the fundamental rights of the public and students to fair, merit-based governance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an executive policy approved by the Prime Minister without the formal approval of the Federal Cabinet can override statutory rules governing civil servants?
  • Can contract or daily wage employees appointed without advertising posts and through non-transparent processes claim a vested right to regularization?
  • Whether appointments made in violation of the Civil Servants Act 1973 and the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973 are void ab initio?
  • Does the payment of public school teachers from a private Student Fund violate constitutional norms and statutory frameworks?
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• MS. Lamika Zuberi vs M/s. Logo Guru (Pvt.) Ltd. & 03 Others2018 SHC 1196 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-21
  content writerworkmanindustrial relationsstanding ordersjurisdiction of labour courtconstitutional petitionconcurrent findingstermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenged the concurrent judgments of the Sindh Labour Court and the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's grievance application regarding her termination from service as a content writer by the respondent-company. The core legal question was whether a content writer performing technical duties requiring imaginative and creative faculties falls within the definition of a "workman" under labor laws, thereby conferring jurisdiction upon the Labour Court. The Sindh High Court held that professionals whose work entails creative and imaginative faculties, such as content writers, do not qualify as "workmen" under Section 2(i) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 or Section 2(xxx) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 2002. Consequently, the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the grievance application, and the concurrent findings of the lower fora warranted no constitutional interference. The petition was dismissed accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a content writer whose duties entail creative and imaginative faculties qualifies as a workman under labor laws?
  • Does the Labour Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate a grievance application filed by an employee who is not a workman?
  • Is designation a conclusive factor in determining the status of an employee as a workman?
  • When can the High Court interfere in concurrent findings of lower labor fora under constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms. Khushnum Hormazd Muncherji vs Hormazd Rust Muncherji2018 PLD Sindh 492 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-06Read full judgment →