Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• The State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs M/s Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd2017 SCInd 1362 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-12-14Read full judgment →
• The State and others vs Ehsanuilah and 3 others2017 P.S.C. (Crl.) 956 · Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit Baltistan · 2017-08-21
  bail cancellationprohibitory clausetentative assessmentdaylight murderfurther inquiryprinciple of consistency
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from an impugned order of the Chief Court granting bail to the respondents. The petitioners sought cancellation of bail, contending that the respondents were directly nominated in a promptly lodged FIR for a daylight murder, with weapons recovered from their pointation and consistent eye-witness accounts supported by medical evidence. The respondents defended the grant of bail, arguing false implication, non-compliance with statutory recovery provisions, and entitlement to bail on the principle of consistency. The Supreme Appellate Court held that the prosecution had prima facie connected the respondents to the offense through tangible evidence and statements of injured and eye-witnesses falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court reiterated that deeper appreciation of evidence is impermissible at the bail stage and that bail must be refused where reasonable grounds exist to believe the accused committed an offense punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned bail order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether deeper appreciation of evidence is permissible at the bail stage?
  • Can bail be granted when the accused are directly nominated in the FIR with specific roles attributed by eye-witnesses and corroborative recoveries?
  • Does the lack of a post-mortem report automatically make a murder case one of further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the scope of tentative assessment of evidence while deciding bail petitions in heinous offenses?
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• The State and another vs Fakhar Alam2017 YLR 2487 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-06-10Read full judgment →
• (1) The State (2) Riaz Ahmad. vs (1) Riaz Ahmad.(2) The State.2017 LHC 1478 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-21
  murderbenefit of doubtcriminal appealmurder referenceinjured witnessappreciation of evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Riaz Ahmad, who was tried and convicted by the trial court under section 302(b) and section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murders of three women and for causing injuries to his son. The core legal question before the Lahore High Court was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, given the improbability of an elderly man single-handedly overpowering and murdering three victims inside a room without resistance, coupled with material contradictions and the doubtful testimony of the injured witness. The High Court held that the prosecution suppressed true facts and failed to establish a plausible motive or the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the court extended the benefit of the doubt, accepted the appeal, set aside the conviction and death sentence, acquitted the appellant, and answered the murder reference in the negative. The key principle laid down is that the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution to establish guilt beyond a shadow of doubt, and an injured witness's testimony is not invariably truthful when surrounding circumstances and medical evidence render the prosecution narrative improbable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an injured witness must always be accepted as truth regardless of surrounding improbabilities?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused to explain a crime when the prosecution fails to establish a plausible motive?
  • Can a conviction for multiple murders be sustained when the prosecution story is unnatural and contradictory?
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• (1) The State (2) Muhammad Tariq etc (3) Muhammad Afzal. vs (1)2017 LHC 1505 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-12
  Qatal-i-Amdcommon intentionunlawful assemblycompromisedeath sentence conversionprejudice to accusedcharge omissionmurder reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals and a murder reference arising from convictions for the murder of two women. The core legal questions involved the application of sections 34, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, the effect of omitting a specific charge under section 34 PPC, and the validity of a compromise entered into by legal heirs. The Lahore High Court held that the absence of a formal charge under section 34 PPC did not vitiate the trial, as the appellants were fully aware of the allegations and had adequate opportunity to defend themselves. Regarding the compromise, the Court affirmed that while it may be considered for sentencing, it should not be accepted mechanically in cases of brutal, heinous crimes motivated by property disputes. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals against conviction but, acknowledging the compromise as a mitigating factor, converted the death sentence of one appellant to life imprisonment. The Court emphasized that section 34 PPC is evidentiary, and its application is permissible even if not explicitly charged, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a specific charge under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 vitiate a criminal trial if the accused had notice of the allegations?
  • Can an appellate court convert a death sentence to life imprisonment based on a compromise with legal heirs?
  • Is the omission of a charge under section 34 PPC curable under sections 535 and 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What criteria must a court apply when considering a compromise in a case involving a heinous crime?
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• The Punjab Employees Social Security Institution vs Zulfiqar Ali and 2 others2017 PLD Lahore 457, 2017 LHC 703 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-28
  social security contributionprovincial ombudsmanjurisdictionalternative statutory remedymaladministrationconstitutional petitiondemand notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenged orders passed by the Provincial Ombudsman and the Governor of Punjab, which had directed the Punjab Employees Social Security Institution (PESSI) to withdraw the name of Respondent No. 1 from association with PESSI following a demand notice for social security contributions. The core legal question was whether an employer can bypass the specific statutory remedies available under Sections 57 and 59 of the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance 1965 to challenge a contribution demand notice by directly approaching the Provincial Ombudsman. The Lahore High Court held that where a statute provides a specific forum and procedure for the redressal of a grievance, it must be pursued through that mechanism, and the Ombudsman lacks jurisdiction to entertain matters where adequate statutory remedies exist. The Court set aside the impugned orders as passed without jurisdiction, establishing that bypass of an efficacious statutory remedy vitiates subsequent proceedings and that orders passed without jurisdiction by an Ombudsman are amenable to judicial review under constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employer can bypass statutory remedies under Sections 57 and 59 of the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance 1965 to approach the Provincial Ombudsman regarding a contribution demand notice?
  • Does the Provincial Ombudsman have jurisdiction to investigate matters where an alternate adequate statutory forum is provided under a special law?
  • Can the High Court exercise constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to set aside an order passed by the Provincial Ombudsman without jurisdiction?
  • Whether a failure to follow the prescribed manner for doing a legal act renders the subsequent proceedings illegal and without lawful authority?
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• The Pakistan Mutual Insurance Co. (Guarantee) Ltd. through Chief2017 CLD 264 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2016-01-11Read full judgment →
• The Pakistan Mutual Insurance Co. (Guarantee) Ltd. through Chief2017 CLD 248 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2016-01-11Read full judgment →
• The Open International University for Complimentary Medicine, Siri2017 CLC 1215 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-31Read full judgment →
• The Federal Government through Secretary Interior, Government of Pakistan vs Ms. Ayyan Ali and others2017 SCMR 1179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-21
  Exit Control Listterritorial jurisdictionfundamental rightsright to travelmala fidecontempt of courtfederal government jurisdictionECL policy
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federal Government challenged a Sindh High Court judgment that struck down a third notification placing the respondent's name on the Exit Control List (ECL). The petitioner argued that the High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction because the notification was issued in Islamabad following a Lahore High Court order. The Supreme Court rejected this, holding that the Federal Government functions nationwide and a cause of action arises where the aggrieved party's rights are affected—in this case, Karachi, where the respondent resides and was prevented from traveling. On merits, the Court observed that the petitioner repeatedly issued new notifications on grounds (money laundering, tax liability, and murder investigation) that did not satisfy the criteria under the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010. The Court reaffirmed that mere pendency of a criminal case or registration of an FIR does not justify restricting a citizen's fundamental right to travel. Finding the government's actions to be mala fide and in defiance of previous judicial directions, the Court upheld the High Court's decision to remove the respondent from the ECL.

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• The Federal Board of Revenue etc. vs M/s Chenone Stores Ltd.2017 LHC 3661 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-17Read full judgment →
• The District Education Officer and 2 others vs Zahid Mehmood and another2017 PLC (C.S.) 1009, 2017 PLJ Lahore 500, 2017 LHC 1014 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-09
  service matterjurisdiction of district judgehuman rights commissionarticle 212 of the constitutioncivil servantservice tribunalouster of jurisdictionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges an order passed by the District Judge/Chairman Human Rights Commission, Sialkot, which reinstated a terminated civil servant. The core legal question is whether a District Judge, in the capacity of Chairman of a Human Rights Commission, possesses the jurisdiction to adjudicate service matters and reinstate a civil servant. The High Court held that the District Judge acted without lawful authority. The court ruled that service matters concerning civil servants fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of Service Tribunals established under Article 212 of the Constitution, or Labour Courts where applicable. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside as void and without jurisdiction. The judgment reaffirms that Article 212 of the Constitution creates an absolute bar on the jurisdiction of civil courts and other forums regarding the terms and conditions of service of civil servants. Furthermore, it establishes that where a special law prescribes a specific forum and procedure for dispute resolution, that procedure must be strictly followed, and any assumption of jurisdiction by an unauthorized forum is illegal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a District Judge acting as Chairman of a Human Rights Commission have the jurisdiction to adjudicate service matters of civil servants?
  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 create an absolute bar on the jurisdiction of civil courts regarding the terms and conditions of service of civil servants?
  • Can a court or forum assume jurisdiction over a matter where a special law has already provided a specific forum and procedure for redressal?
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• The Contractors Association KPK vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2017 PHC 663 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-12Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Tianshi International Pakistan Co2017 SHC 542 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-07Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Muhammad AslamPTCL 2019 CL. 385, 2019 PTD 381, 2017 LHC 2910 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-11Read full judgment →
• The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Pakistan (CPSP) vs The Fop2017 PLJ Islamabad 292, 2017 CLC 1306 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-09Read full judgment →
• The College of Physician and Surgeons of Pakistan (CPSP). vs The Fop, etc.2017 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-09Read full judgment →
• The Collector, Model Customs Collectorate and 2 others vs Messrs2017 PTD 2123 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-03
  customs dutycivil suit maintainabilitytax assessmentstatutory baroriginal civil jurisdictionspecialized appellate forumouster of jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves High Court Appeals against judgments by a Single Judge of the Sindh High Court, who entertained suits challenging tax assessments and exemption claims under the Customs Act, 1969, and the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal question was whether a civil suit is maintainable to challenge such tax determinations, given the express bar under Section 217 of the Customs Act, 1969, and the existence of a comprehensive statutory appellate hierarchy. The Court held that such suits are not maintainable. It ruled that the Single Judge, exercising original civil jurisdiction, lacked the authority to entertain these matters as the Customs Act, 1969, provides a self-contained mechanism for dispute resolution. The Court established that Section 217 of the Customs Act, 1969, and Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, expressly bar civil courts from interfering in tax assessment matters. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned judgments, emphasizing that parties must exhaust statutory remedies rather than bypassing them through civil suits.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil suit maintainable to challenge tax assessments or exemption claims under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does Section 217 of the Customs Act, 1969, bar the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters relating to tax assessment and levy?
  • Can a party bypass the statutory appellate hierarchy provided under the Customs Act, 1969, by filing a civil suit?
  • Does a Single Judge of the High Court exercising original civil jurisdiction have the authority to entertain suits regarding tax disputes excluded by special taxing statutes?
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• The Collector, Model Customs Collectorate & others vs M/s. Naveena2017 SHC 299 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-03Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala, etc. vs M/s. SuperAsia MohammadK.L.R. 2017 S.C. 542, 2017 PLJ SC 599, PTCL 2017 CL. 736, 2017 PTD 1756, 2017 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-31
  sales tax adjudicationstatutory limitationmandatory vs directorytax assessmentadministrative delaystatutory interpretationreasonable time
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals regarding whether the statutory time limits for passing adjudication orders under Sections 11 and 36 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 are mandatory or directory. The respondents, manufacturing units, challenged orders passed by tax authorities beyond the prescribed time frames. The Supreme Court held that the provisions are mandatory, as the use of the word "shall" and the legislative history of inserting these time limits clearly indicate an intent to curb administrative delays. Consequently, orders passed beyond the stipulated period, without valid extensions, are invalid. The Court further clarified that while the Federal Board of Revenue possesses the power under Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 to extend time, this authority is not unfettered. Such extensions must be granted within a reasonable period, which the Court defined as six months from the lapse of the original statutory time limit. The principle established is that statutory time frames for adjudication are mandatory, and administrative extensions must be exercised within reasonable, defined limits to prevent the obliteration of vested rights.

  Questions settled

  • Are the time limits for passing adjudication orders under Sections 11 and 36 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 mandatory or directory?
  • Does the Federal Board of Revenue have unfettered power under Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 to extend time limits for adjudication?
  • What constitutes a reasonable time for the exercise of extension powers by the Board under Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  • Does the use of the word 'shall' in a statutory provision regarding time limits necessarily render the provision mandatory?
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• The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala, etc. (in CAs 682/08 & 131/11)PTCL 2017 CL. 736 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-31
  sales taxlimitation periodmandatory vs directoryadjudication proceedingsshow cause noticestatutory interpretationtax assessmentcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns whether the statutory limitation periods prescribed for passing adjudication orders under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 are mandatory or directory. The core legal question is whether an order passed by tax authorities beyond the specified timeframe—including permissible extensions—is void. The Supreme Court held that the provisions are mandatory. The Court reasoned that the legislative use of the word 'shall,' combined with the clear intent to curb administrative delays, indicates that these timeframes are binding. Consequently, orders passed outside these limits are invalid. However, the Court clarified that Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 grants the Federal Board of Revenue an overriding power to extend time. To prevent abuse, the Court established that this power must be exercised within a 'reasonable time,' defined as six months following the expiry of the statutory period and any initial extensions. The key principle laid down is that while statutory time limits for adjudication are mandatory, the Board’s power to condone delay under Section 74 is subject to a reasonable time constraint to protect taxpayer rights.

  Questions settled

  • Is the limitation period for passing an adjudication order under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 mandatory or directory?
  • Does the use of the word 'shall' in a statutory provision necessarily render it mandatory?
  • Can the Board exercise its power under Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 to extend time indefinitely?
  • What is the reasonable time limit for the Board to exercise its power under Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
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• The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala, etc vs M/s. Super Asia MohammadK.L.R. 2017 S.C. 542 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales taxlimitation periodmandatory vs directoryshow-cause noticeadjudicationextension of timeFederal Board of Revenuestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from appeals concerning whether the limitation periods prescribed for completing adjudication proceedings and passing orders-in-original under Section 11 and erstwhile Section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 are mandatory or directory in nature. The core legal question addresses the true construction of the statutory timeframes and the scope of extension powers vested in the tax authorities and the Federal Board of Revenue under Section 74 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the provisions prescribing time limits for passing orders under Section 11 and erstwhile Section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 are mandatory, and any order passed beyond the stipulated period without valid extension or exclusion of time is invalid. The key principles laid down include that the use of the word 'shall' combined with the legislative intent to curb delays renders limitation periods mandatory, that the Collector may grant extensions up to the maximum permitted limit even after the initial period expires, and that while the Federal Board of Revenue possesses overriding powers under Section 74 to extend time, such powers must be exercised within a reasonable period of six months.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the limitation period contained in the first proviso to Section 36(3) and Section 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for passing an adjudication order is mandatory or directory in nature?
  • Can the Collector grant an extension of time after the expiry of the initial statutory limitation period under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • What is the extent and time limitation of the powers of the Federal Board of Revenue to grant extensions under Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Does the non-compliance with the mandatory timeframes for passing an order under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 render the resulting order invalid?
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• The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala, etc and others vs M/s. Super Asia2017 SCP 923 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-27
  sales tax adjudicationlimitation periodmandatory versus directory provisionsshow cause noticeextension of timepast and closed transactions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter addresses whether the limitation periods prescribed in the first provisos to erstwhile Sections 11(4) and 36(3) and current Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for passing orders-in-original are mandatory or directory in nature. The Supreme Court held that the provisions specifying timeframes for passing adjudication orders are mandatory, and any orders passed beyond the stipulated period, or permitted extensions, are invalid and void. The Court also interpreted the scope of extension powers granted to the Collector and the Federal Board of Revenue under Section 74 of the Act, ruling that while the Board has overriding powers to extend time, such powers must be exercised within a reasonable timeframe of six months. Consequently, appeals where orders were passed beyond the statutory limitation without valid extensions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the limitation period prescribed in the first provisos to erstwhile Sections 11(4) and 36(3) and current Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for passing an adjudication order is mandatory or directory in nature?
  • Can a Collector grant an extension of time after the expiry of the initial limitation period under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • What is the extent and limitation of the powers of the Federal Board of Revenue to grant extensions of time under Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Does the failure to pass an order within the statutory timeframe render the adjudication order invalid?
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• The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others vs Messrs Super2017 PTD 1756 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-31
  sales tax assessmentlimitation periodmandatory vs directorystatutory interpretationtax adjudicationreasonable timevested rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns tax appeals regarding whether the limitation periods for passing assessment orders under sections 11 and 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 are mandatory or directory. The core legal question is whether orders passed by tax authorities beyond these statutory time frames are valid. The Supreme Court held that the provisions are mandatory, as the use of the word 'shall' and the legislative intent to curb administrative delay necessitate strict compliance. The Court ruled that orders passed beyond the prescribed period, absent valid extensions, are invalid. Key principles laid down include that while the Board possesses overriding power under section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 to grant extensions, this power is not unfettered. It must be exercised within a 'reasonable time,' defined by the Court as six months following the expiry of the statutory period and any authorized extensions. The judgment emphasizes that statutory time frames cannot be ignored, and reading in 'special circumstances' is impermissible, as it would constitute judicial legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Are the time limits for passing assessment orders under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 mandatory or directory?
  • Does the Board have the power to extend time limits for assessment orders under section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • What constitutes a reasonable time for the Board to exercise its power to extend limitation periods under section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Can a court read 'special circumstances' into a statute to excuse non-compliance with a mandatory time limit?
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• The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others vs Messrs Super2017 SCMR 1427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-31
  Sales TaxLimitation PeriodMandatory ProvisionDirectory ProvisionStatutory InterpretationExtension of TimeAdjudication ProceedingsShow Cause NoticePast and Closed TransactionTax Assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses appeals concerning sales tax assessments where adjudicating authorities issued orders-in-original beyond statutory time limits. The core legal question was whether the limitation periods prescribed in the first provisos to erstwhile sections 11(4) and 36(3) and current section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, for passing assessment orders, are mandatory or directory. The Supreme Court held that these provisions are mandatory. Consequently, orders passed beyond the stipulated time periods, without proper extension, are invalid. While the Collector/Commissioner can extend time under the provisos, this extension is limited (e.g., maximum 90 days, making total 135 days from show cause notice). The Court further clarified that Section 74 of the Act provides an overriding power to the Board (or empowered Commissioner) to permit extensions, but this power must be exercised within a reasonable time of six months after the lapse of the periods under the provisos, and the granted extension itself cannot exceed six months, to prevent infinite extensions and uphold vested taxpayer rights.

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• The Collector of Customs, Model Custom Collectorate, Hyderabad. vs Messrs Byco Petroleum (Pvt.) Ltd. and 3 othersPTCL 2017 CL. 823 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-30Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Customs, Model Custom Collectorate, Hyderabad2017 PTD 1297 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-30Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Customs through Additional Collector (Law) vs Messrs2017 PTD 2474 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-22
  provisional assessmentcustoms classificationmis-declarationredemption finestatutory limitationPCT headingcustoms duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application arises from a dispute regarding the classification of imported goods and the subsequent imposition of penalties. The applicant department challenged the Customs Appellate Tribunal's order, which had set aside the imposition of redemption fines and penalties on the respondent. The core legal questions concerned whether the goods were correctly classified under the proposed PCT heading and whether the Tribunal erred in holding that the goods were released under provisional assessment proceedings pursuant to Section 81 of the Customs Act, 1969. The Court held that because the department failed to finalize the provisional assessment within the statutory period prescribed by Section 81(4) of the Customs Act, 1969, the provisional determination attained finality by operation of law. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the determination of PCT headings is the sole function of customs officers, and an importer's citation of a specific heading does not constitute mis-declaration under the Customs Act, 1969. Consequently, the Court dismissed the reference application, finding no evidence of mis-declaration to justify the penalties imposed by the department.

  Questions settled

  • Does the citation of a wrong PCT heading by an importer constitute an act of mis-declaration under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • What is the legal consequence if the customs department fails to finalize a provisional assessment within the period stipulated in Section 81 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Is the determination of a PCT heading the sole responsibility of customs officers or the importer?
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• The Collector of Customs Lahore. vs M/s. Advance Energies, Gulberg,PTCL 2017 CL. 761 · Customs Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab through Attorney vs Institute of Leadership and Management through Secretary and another2017 CLD 1784 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-05Read full judgment →
• The Asian Mutual Insurance Company (Guarantee) Limited vs Director2017 CLD 293 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2016-01-28Read full judgment →
• Thatta Cement Company Ltd., Karachi vs The Commissioner Inland2017 P.C.T.L.R. 832 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2017-01-02Read full judgment →
• Thal Ltd. through duly Authorized Attorney and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 PTD 1683 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-08Read full judgment →
• (1) Thal Limited and another (2) White Pearl Jute Mills Limited (3) Sargodha2017 SHC 142 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-08Read full judgment →
• Tez Gas (Private) Limited and others vs Oil and Gas Regulatory2016 LHC 3231, 2017 PLD Lahore 111 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-23Read full judgment →
• Tehsil Municipal Officer Gagra vs Syed Salar Jehan and 3 others2017 YLR 290 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-08-29Read full judgment →
• (1)Teesta Atul Setalvad (2) Javed Iftekher Ahmed Anand (3) Citizens2017 SCInd 1366 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-12-15
  bank account freezingseizure of propertycriminal breach of trustcheatinginvestigationforeign contributionsuspicious transactions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal appeals challenging the refusal to de-freeze the bank accounts of the appellants, which were seized by the investigating officer under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in connection with an FIR alleging criminal breach of trust, cheating, and misappropriation of donations meant for riot victims. The core legal questions concern the scope and applicability of Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 regarding the freezing of bank accounts, whether prior notice is mandatory before such seizure, and whether such bank accounts can be seized when circumstances create a suspicion of the commission of an offence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that a police officer has the wide power under Section 102 to seize any property, including bank accounts, that is found under circumstances creating suspicion of the commission of an offence, and that prior notice to the account holder is not required under the statute. The key principles laid down are that bank accounts constitute 'property' under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and that an investigating agency may freeze them without prior notice when material reveals direct links or suspicious transactions connected to the crime under investigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a bank account of an accused or related entity can be seized as 'property' under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?
  • Is it mandatory for a police officer to issue prior notice to an account holder before freezing a bank account under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?
  • Can the police seize bank accounts under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the absence of a direct link or suspicion of commission of an offence?
  • Does the power of a police officer to investigate and seize accounts under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 get fettered by the provisions of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976?
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• Tayyab Javed vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Defence, Ministry of Defence and 5 others2017 MLD 223 · Sindh High Court · 2016-06-06Read full judgment →
• Tauqeer Abbas vs The StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 8, 2017 P Cr. L J 848 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-30
  Zina-bil-JabrDNA evidencebenefit of doubtcriminal appealacquittalforensic analysissexual assault
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offence of Zina-bil-Jabr under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in light of conflicting forensic evidence. The trial court had initially convicted the appellant based on the complainant's testimony and medical evidence indicating sexual intercourse. However, upon appellate review, the High Court observed that while the medical examination confirmed sexual intercourse, the DNA analysis report explicitly excluded the appellant as the source of the semen found on the victim's clothing. Furthermore, the court noted the existence of prior enmity between the parties. Consequently, the appellate court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The key principle laid down is that where scientific DNA evidence excludes an accused from being the source of biological material found on a victim, such evidence creates a reasonable doubt that must be resolved in the accused's favour.

  Questions settled

  • Does a DNA report excluding an accused as the source of biological material provide sufficient grounds for acquittal in a Zina-bil-Jabr case?
  • Can the uncorroborated testimony of a complainant be relied upon when scientific evidence contradicts the prosecution's case?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt when forensic evidence creates a reasonable uncertainty regarding their involvement in the crime?
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• Tauqeer Abbas vs StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 8 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-30
  zina-bil-jabrrapeDNA test reportbenefit of doubtcriminal appealacquittalmedical evidencecorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhakkar, whereby the appellant Tauqeer Abbas was convicted under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to ten years rigorous imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, along with three unknown persons, forcibly committed zina-bil-jabr with the complainant, Mst. Razia Bibi. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution proved the charge of rape beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in light of conflicting medical evidence, the absence of independent corroboration, and a DNA test report. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to prove its case beyond a shadow of doubt, noting that the DNA report explicitly excluded the appellant as the source of the genetic material found on the victim's clothing, and that the victim's testimony lacked necessary independent corroboration. Consequently, the court accepted the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant, establishing the principle that a reasonable doubt arising from scientific evidence like DNA profiling must be resolved in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does an exclusionary DNA test report providing scientific doubt warrant the acquittal of an accused charged with rape?
  • Can a conviction for zina-bil-jabr be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim when contradicted by scientific evidence?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a DNA profiling report in sexual assault cases when it excludes the accused?
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• Tasir Ullah vs State2017 PHC 998 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-24Read full judgment →
• Tasawar Abbas Tanveer vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 SHC 100 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-11
  Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act 2010constitutional petitionreinstatementservice lawparity of treatmentvoluntary retirement scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition sought the reinstatement of the petitioner into the service of the Trading Corporation of Pakistan, along with back benefits, based on alleged discrimination compared to other employees reinstated under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, appointed in 1989 and retired in 1998, satisfied the statutory criteria for relief under the Act and whether he was entitled to parity with a colleague who had been reinstated. The Court held that the petitioner did not qualify for relief because he failed to meet the mandatory, concurrent conditions regarding appointment and termination dates prescribed by the Act. Specifically, the petitioner’s appointment did not fall within the qualifying period of November 1, 1993, to November 30, 1996, unlike his colleague whose reappointment occurred within that window. The Court affirmed that the Act’s benefits are strictly limited to those meeting these specific temporal requirements. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, with the Court noting that its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is not to be exercised where substantial justice has already been served.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee qualify for reinstatement under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act 2010 if their appointment date falls outside the statutory period of November 1, 1993, to November 30, 1996?
  • Can an employee claim parity with others reinstated under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act 2010 if their employment history does not meet the Act's specific temporal criteria?
  • Is the High Court's discretionary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 exercisable when substantial justice has already been achieved through a Review Board?
  Read full judgment →
• Tarique Aziz Shaikh vs Habib Bank Limited through Attorney and another2017 CLD 406 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-23
  limitation periodcondonation of delaybanking court appealspecial lawfinancial institutions recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a first appeal filed under section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, challenging a judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court in a recovery suit. The appellant also filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The core legal question was whether the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 are applicable to an appeal filed under section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The court held that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to appeals preferred under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, because the Ordinance is a special law that prescribes its own period of limitation and excludes the applicability of remaining provisions of the Limitation Act under section 29(2)(b). The key principle laid down is that the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be availed of in proceedings under a special law unless expressly made applicable, and appeals filed beyond the prescribed period under the special statute are liable to be dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 applicable to an appeal filed under section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
  • Whether an application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 is maintainable in proceedings under a special law that prescribes its own period of limitation?
  • What is the period of limitation for filing an appeal against a judgment and decree of a Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Tarique Ahmed Solangi vs Province of Sindh through Secretary2017 MLD 2005 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-08Read full judgment →
• Tariq vs The State2017 SCMR 1672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-18
  MurderAppeal against convictionAcquittal of co-accusedOcular accountIndependent corroborationConfessional statementCompromiseFalse implicationAppraisal of evidenceCriminal justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned an appeal against the appellant's conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302(b)/34, P.P.C. for murder. The core legal questions were whether the conviction could be sustained when the eye-witness account, attributing similar roles, was disbelieved for the majority of co-accused who were subsequently acquitted, and whether a co-accused's statement recorded under Section 342, Cr.P.C., later exposed as maneuvered due to a compromise and subsequent acquittal, could be relied upon. The Supreme Court held that a conviction cannot be sustained solely on ocular account disbelieved for the majority of co-accused with similar roles, especially when independent corroboration is lacking. It further ruled that a confessional statement under Section 342, Cr.P.C. made by a co-convict, later acquitted on compromise, cannot be relied upon against another accused. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Read full judgment →
• Tariq vs The State and another2017 P Cr. L J 1556 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-21
  post-arrest bailabductiongang-rapefurther inquiryevidentiary valuecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the petitioner, Tariq, who is charged under Sections 365-B and 376(2) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the alleged abduction and gang-rape of a married woman. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the evidentiary record, specifically the victim's statements and the circumstances of the case. The court dismissed the bail application, holding that the petitioner failed to make out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court emphasized that the victim, a married mother, had consistently corroborated the FIR in her statements under Sections 161 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and during her medical examination. The court established the principle that where circumstances remain unchanged following the dismissal of a pre-arrest bail application, previous observations on the merits of the case retain their efficacy and relevance in post-arrest bail proceedings, particularly when the offence involves serious allegations like gang-rape.

  Questions settled

  • Does the consistency of a victim's statements under Sections 161 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 preclude a finding of 'further inquiry' for the purpose of bail?
  • Can observations made during the dismissal of a pre-arrest bail application be considered in subsequent post-arrest bail proceedings if the circumstances remain unchanged?
  • Is an accused charged with gang-rape entitled to bail when the victim has consistently maintained the allegation in statements to the police and a magistrate?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq vs State, etc.PLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 191 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-12
  post-arrest bailnarcotic drugchemical examiner reportfurther inquiryCNSAcharas recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 9(c) of The Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the alleged recovery of 1230 grams of Charas. The core legal questions involved whether the recovery fell strictly under Section 9(c) or 9(b) given ambiguity regarding the weight of the packaging, the evidentiary value of an awaited Chemical Examiner report, and the effect of previous mere registration of a case without conviction. The Lahore High Court held that the case required further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, particularly due to the ambiguous weight of the recovered substance, the absence of a Chemical Examiner report, and delayed trial. The Court laid down the principle that ambiguity regarding whether the weight of narcotics includes packaging, along with delayed receipt of a chemical report and lack of prior convictions, makes out a case for further inquiry warranting the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when ambiguity exists as to whether the weight of the recovered narcotic includes the packaging material?
  • Does the absence of a Chemical Examiner's report constitute a ground for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Does the mere registration of a previous criminal case without conviction disentitle an accused from the concession of bail?
  • Whether the prohibitory clause of Section 51 of The Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 is attracted when the tentative assessment points towards further inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq vs State & 1 another2017 PHC 582 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-05Read full judgment →
• Tariq Siddique vs Addl. Rent Controller, etc.)2017 LHC 2284 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-03Read full judgment →
• Tariq Siddique vs Additional Rent Controller, etc2017 [M] C.L.R. 1739 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-03Read full judgment →
• Tariq Saleem and others vs Sohail Shakil Faruqi and others2017 PLD Sindh 381 · Sindh High Court · 2016-04-29Read full judgment →
• Tariq Nasim Jan and others vs Al-Hamra Hills (Pvt.) Limited and others2017 CLD 1442 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-19Read full judgment →
• Tariq Nasim Jan and others vs Ai-Hamra Hills (Pvt.) Limited and others2017 [M] C.L.R. 1014 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-29Read full judgment →
• Tariq Nasim Jan & others vs Al-Hamra Hills (Pvt.) Limited & others2017 LHC 2616 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-19Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood etc vs State2017 PHC 846 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-13Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehboob vs Government of Punjab, etc.K.L.R. 2017 Criminal Cases 66 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-27Read full judgment →
• Tariq Iqbal alias Tariq vs The State2017 SCMR 594 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-11-24
  criminal appealquantum of sentencedeath penaltymurder during robberyjudicial confessionextra-judicial confessionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the High Court upholding the appellant's conviction and death sentence under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with convictions under Sections 449, 392, and 411, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for house trespass, robbery, and the murder of a woman during a daylight robbery. Leave to appeal was limited solely to examining the quantum of the sentence. The core legal question was whether the appellant deserved the death penalty or a lesser sentence under the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court held that since the merits of the case and the question of guilt were not pressed, the factual findings regarding the appellant's guilt, trespass, robbery, recovery of stolen articles, and both judicial and extra-judicial confessions stood conclusively settled. The Court ruled that the brutal manner of the murder, involving ten knife blows inflicted on a young woman inside her own home during a robbery, demonstrated extreme cruelty, leaving no ground for leniency. The appeal against the sentence was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellant who does not press the merits of the case can challenge the quantum of sentence before the Supreme Court?
  • Does the commission of murder during the course of a robbery justify the imposition of the death penalty?
  • Whether multiple stab wounds inflicted during a house trespass robbery constitute mitigating circumstances or warrant the death sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Hussain and others vs State and othersPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 194 · Lahore High Court
  murder trialbenefit of doubtmedical and ocular conflictsuppression of genesiscriminal appealdeath sentence referenceacquittaldelayed FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants for murder and attempt to commit murder. The core legal questions involve the credibility of the ocular testimony, the presence of eyewitnesses, the corroborative value of delayed FIRs and medical evidence contradictions, and the proof of motive. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to glaring contradictions between the ocular testimony and medical evidence, suppressed genesis of the occurrence, doubtful presence of the complainant, delayed FIR and statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and inconclusive forensic recovery reports. Consequently, the court laid down that where material contradictions exist between medical and ocular evidence and the true genesis of an incident is suppressed, the prosecution case collapses, entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right. The appeal is accepted, convictions are set aside, the death sentence is not confirmed, and the appellants are acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conflict between medical evidence and ocular testimony is fatal to the prosecution case?
  • Does suppression of the true genesis of an occurrence by eyewitnesses render their testimony untrustworthy?
  • What is the legal effect of an unexplained delay in recording statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • When is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right in criminal jurisprudence?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Hussain and others vs Government of Balochistan through Secretary Education Department and 2 others2017 PLC (C.S.) 1222 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-04-03
  leave encashmentaudit objectionservice mattersmaintainability of constitutional petitionalternate remedystatutory board employeesBalochistan Text Book Board Ordinance XI of 1977
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, employees of the Balochistan Text Book Board, challenged the recovery notices issued to them for refunding leave encashment amounts received for the calendar years 2012 to 2015 following an audit objection. The core legal question was whether the employees were legally entitled to leave encashment during active service under the applicable legal framework of the Board and whether the constitutional petition was maintainable in light of available departmental remedies. The Balochistan High Court held that in the absence of validly framed Board leave rules during the relevant period, the Revised Leave Rules for Civil Servants under Balochistan Government, 1978 applied, which permitted encashment only upon retirement. The Court further held that the impugned decisions of the Board's advisory body/directors granting the facility were without legal mandate and that the petitioners had an alternate remedy of departmental representation which they failed to exhaust. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as non-maintainable and devoid of merit. The key principle laid down is that statutory boards lacking specific internal leave rules must follow applicable government civil servant leave rules, and writ petitions in service matters are not maintainable when an adequate alternate departmental remedy exists.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Balochistan Text Book Board entitled to leave encashment during active service in the absence of specific board leave rules?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to entertain a service petition when an alternate departmental representation is available?
  • Whether the Board of Directors or Advisory Council possesses the power to frame rules without the authority and mandate prescribed under the Balochistan Text Book Board Ordinance XI of 1977?
  • Do the Revised Leave Rules for Civil Servants under Balochistan Government 1978 permit encashment of leave during service prior to superannuation?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Durrani and another vs StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Karachi) 1054 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-27
  post-arrest bailheinous offencedeeper appreciation of evidencerule of consistencyhuman traffickingcomfort girlexpeditious trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a joint post-arrest bail application filed by two applicants, Tariq Durrani and Saquib Ali, who were charged under Sections 371-A, 371-B, 376, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following allegations of forcing the complainant to work as a 'comfort girl' in a guesthouse. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to bail given the nature of the allegations and the principle of consistency, as the guesthouse owner had previously been granted bail. The Court held that the bail application should be declined. The Court reasoned that the allegations against the applicants were serious, heinous, and directly implicated them, distinguishing their case from that of the guesthouse owner, against whom no specific allegations were made. Furthermore, the Court established that arguments regarding the absence of other victims or customers at the scene constitute a deeper appreciation of evidence, which is impermissible at the bail stage. Consequently, the Court dismissed the bail application but directed the trial court to expedite proceedings, specifically recording the complainant's statement within two months.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of consistency apply to bail applications when the co-accused's role is distinguishable?
  • Is the absence of corroborative evidence, such as the recovery of other victims or customers, a ground for bail at the pre-trial stage?
  • Can a court engage in a deeper appreciation of evidence while deciding a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Ali vs State and anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 188 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-16
  pre-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustmala fide intentionafterthoughtbail confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for pre-arrest bail arises from FIR No. 366/2016 registered at Police Station Chahlyak, District Multan, under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning allegations of criminal breach of trust involving mobile phones valued at Rs. 23,26,650/-. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was implicated alongside a co-accused, met the criteria for pre-arrest bail given the nature of the transaction and the evidence presented. The Court observed that the underlying agreement was executed solely between the complainant and the co-accused, Jaffar Abbas, and that the subsequent implication of the petitioner appeared to be an afterthought. Furthermore, the Court found that the essential ingredients of criminal breach of trust under Section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 were prima facie absent. Consequently, the Court confirmed the ad-interim pre-arrest bail, holding that the petitioner's incarceration would serve no useful purpose for the prosecution, especially as he had already joined the investigation. The decision emphasizes that where criminal liability is not clearly established and mala fide intent is suspected, pre-arrest bail is appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of the essential ingredients of criminal breach of trust under Section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 justify the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  • Can a petitioner be granted pre-arrest bail when the prosecution's case appears to be an afterthought and based on mala fide intentions?
  • Is pre-arrest bail appropriate when the accused has already joined the investigation and incarceration would serve no useful purpose?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Ahmed---Appellant vs The State---Respondent2017 P Cr. L J 1652 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-10
  fresh forensic analysischemical examiner reportnarcotics trialcase propertyburden of proofControl of Narcotic Substances
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, facing trial before the Special Court (CNS) Rawalpindi for possession of Acetic Anhydride under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, challenged the trial court's order declining his request for a fresh forensic analysis of the seized contraband by an alternative laboratory. The core legal question was whether an accused person undergoing trial for a narcotics offense is entitled to demand a fresh forensic analysis of case property through a private or alternative laboratory at their own expense based on alleged flaws in the initial report. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal in limine, holding that prosecution is a State function with a presumption of genuineness, and these powers cannot be delegated to private enterprises chosen by the accused. The court laid down the principle that requests for fresh forensic analysis are often dilatory tactics aimed at tampering with case property, and since the onus to prove the charge rests entirely on the prosecution, an accused denying the charge cannot shift the burden or demand alternative testing methodologies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person facing a narcotics trial can demand a fresh forensic analysis of seized contraband through an alternative laboratory of their choice?
  • Does the denial of a forensic report cast any onus on the accused to establish his innocence through fresh testing methodologies under Article 119 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Can the statutory powers of prosecution and state forensic evaluation be delegated to private enterprises chosen by an accused person confronting indictment?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanzeela Butt vs Additional District Judge Sargodha etc2017 LHC 4455 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-06Read full judgment →
• Tanvir Ahmad vs The State2017 YLR 469 · Lahore High Court · 2016-04-27
  murdercapital sentencemitigating circumstancesocular evidenceprivate complaintpolice investigation reportbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the appellant was sentenced to death for the murder of Ghulam Abbas. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular evidence, the impact of an unproven motive, and the appropriateness of the capital sentence given the circumstances. The Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt through consistent eyewitness testimony, despite the failure to establish the alleged motive and the absence of recovery of the weapon. The Court affirmed the conviction but found the death sentence excessive, citing the lack of proven motive and the fact that the incident involved a single shot. Consequently, the Court converted the death sentence to imprisonment for life, invoking the principle that even a single extenuating circumstance justifies a lesser sentence. The judgment reinforces that police investigation reports declaring an accused innocent are not binding on courts and that minor discrepancies in testimony do not necessarily invalidate credible eyewitness accounts.

  Questions settled

  • Is a police investigation report declaring an accused innocent binding upon the trial court?
  • Does the failure to prove a motive in a murder case necessarily lead to the acquittal of the accused?
  • Can a death sentence be converted to life imprisonment based on the existence of a single extenuating circumstance?
  • Does the non-recovery of a weapon of offence invalidate direct ocular evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanveer-ul-Haq Shaheen vs Azad Government & 7 others2017 SCR 1059 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-06-13
  service appealpromotionseniorityaggrieved personservice tribunaldeputation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave is directed against the judgment of the Service Tribunal which dismissed the appellant's service appeal challenging departmental promotion notifications. The core legal question was whether a civil servant who was not qualified at the relevant time and failed to challenge foundational promotion orders and attain finality of necessary challenges can maintain a service appeal against the promotion and transfer of rival employees. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was not competent because the appellant was not an aggrieved person lacking the requisite qualification at the relevant time, and the relevant promotion notifications had not been effectively challenged. The key principle laid down is that under the relevant service laws, a civil servant cannot challenge the promotion or appointment of another unless they show they were qualified and had a right to be considered for the post at the relevant time, making them an aggrieved person.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant not possessing the requisite qualification at the relevant time can challenge the promotion of a rival employee?
  • Can a service appeal be maintained against a promotion notification when the foundational promotion order has not been challenged and has attained finality?
  • Who qualifies as an aggrieved person to maintain an appeal before the Service Tribunal under Section 4 of the Service Tribunal Act 1975?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Hussain vs The State and another2017 MLD 1073 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-14Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Hidayatullah Hashmi and another vs Mst. Fozia Naheed and others2017 SHC 386 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-15Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Fatima , Muhammad Mehrban , Kamran Hafeez ,Mubarak Hussain Q_057d20fa2017 P.S.C. 1192 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  service tribunalprocedural compliancecertified copyregistrar dutyscrutiny of appealmandatory ruleslitigant rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against the dismissal of service appeals by the Service Tribunal for failure to attach certified copies of impugned orders, as required by Rule 7(e) of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1976. The core legal question is whether an appeal is rendered incompetent for non-compliance with Rule 7(e) when the Registrar, mandated by Rule 10 to scrutinize appeals upon presentation, fails to identify the deficiency and entertains the appeal. The Court held that while the requirement to file certified copies under Rule 7(e) is mandatory, the Registrar has a statutory duty under Rule 10 to scrutinize the memorandum of appeal. If the Registrar fails to point out deficiencies and proceeds to register the appeal, the litigant cannot be penalized for this administrative error. The Court established the principle that no litigant should suffer due to the act or omission of a court or public functionary. Consequently, the appeals were restored to be heard on their merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the Registrar to scrutinize an appeal under Rule 10 of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1976, preclude the dismissal of the appeal for non-compliance with Rule 7(e)?
  • Is the requirement to file a certified copy of the impugned order under Rule 7(e) of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1976, mandatory?
  • Can a litigant be penalized for the failure of the court or its office to perform a mandatory duty of scrutiny?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Aziz vs Additional District Judge and others2017 YLR 802 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-10Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Ahmed vs Additional District Judge and others2017 LHC 755 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-15Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Ahmad, Ex-Constable No. 20497, District Police, Lahore vs Capital2017 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 127, K.L.R. 2017 Labour and Service Cases 158 · Punjab Service Tribunal
  dismissal from serviceregular enquirynatural justiceservice tribunalcriminal acquittaldepartmental proceedingsproportionality of punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an ex-constable, challenged his dismissal from service following departmental proceedings under the Punjab Police (E&D) Rules, 1975, regarding allegations of robbery. The core legal question was whether the departmental authority could impose a major penalty without conducting a regular enquiry, particularly when the appellant had been acquitted of the underlying criminal charge under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Tribunal held that the failure to conduct a regular departmental enquiry, where the appellant could cross-examine witnesses, rendered the dismissal unsustainable, especially given the appellant's acquittal in the criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the Tribunal found the penalty of dismissal disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. The key principle laid down is that when serious allegations are denied by a civil servant, a regular departmental enquiry is mandatory to satisfy the requirements of natural justice; dispensing with such an enquiry, especially after a criminal acquittal on the same facts, is legally flawed. Consequently, the Tribunal partially accepted the appeal, converting the dismissal into a lesser penalty of forfeiture of one year of approved service and ordering reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Is a regular departmental enquiry mandatory before imposing a major penalty on a civil servant who denies serious allegations?
  • Can a departmental authority dismiss a civil servant based on allegations for which they have already been acquitted by a criminal court without conducting a separate regular enquiry?
  • Does the failure to provide an opportunity for cross-examination during departmental proceedings violate the principles of natural justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Tania Naseer vs Muhammad Zubair and 2 others2017 YLR 1481 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-03-21Read full judgment →
• Tania Naseer vs Muhammad Zubair & others2017 YLR 1481, 2017 PLJ Quetta 50 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-03-21Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain vs The State and 3 others2017 P Cr. L J 1559 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-02
  C-class reportpolice investigationspeaking ordermagisterial scrutinycriminal procedurefinal report
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application challenged an order passed by a Judicial Magistrate, which accepted a police report classifying a case under 'C-class' (neither true nor maliciously false). The complainant alleged that his brother, a private employee of SEPCO, suffered serious injuries due to the negligence of SEPCO officials who directed him to work on a live 11,000 KV power line. The core legal question was whether the Magistrate's order accepting the police's C-class report was legally sustainable and whether it constituted a 'speaking order.' The High Court held that the Magistrate's order was proper and did not require interference. The Court affirmed that while a Magistrate is not bound by a police report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Magistrate is not required to pass an exhaustive, detailed judgment when agreeing with such a report, as they are not conducting a trial. The Court concluded that the incident, as narrated by the complainant, was implausible given the specialized nature of the work involved, and the Magistrate had sufficiently scrutinized the available material.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Magistrate required to write an exhaustive, detailed order when agreeing with a police report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a Magistrate bound by the findings of a police report submitted under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a Magistrate accept a police report classifying a case as 'C-class' without conducting a full trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain vs Principal Secretary to Chief Minister, etc2017 PLJ Lahore 670 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-16Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain vs Principal Secretary to Chief Minister and others2021 KLR Civil Cases 128, 2017 PLJ Lahore 670, 2017 PLC (C.S.) 981 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-16
  additional chargeappointment of Director GeneralChild Protection and Welfare Bureauviolation of statutory rulesconstitutional petitionservice groups
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the appointment of respondent No. 3 as Director General of the Child Protection and Welfare Bureau, Punjab, on an additional charge basis through a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the appointment of a person not belonging to the specified service groups and on an additional charge basis violated the governing statute and rules. The court held that the appointment was contrary to the statutory rules prescribing specific service groups for the post and that neither the Act nor the rules provided for an appointment on an additional charge. Consequently, the appointment was declared without lawful authority and set aside. The key principle laid down is that statutory appointments must strictly adhere to the prescribed method of recruitment and qualifications, and holding critical administrative posts on a prolonged additional charge basis without legal sanction constitutes poor governance and is illegal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an officer belonging to a group other than the prescribed service groups can be appointed as Director General of the Child Protection and Welfare Bureau?
  • Does the Punjab Destitute and Neglected Children Act 2004 or its rules permit the appointment of a Director General on an additional charge?
  • What is the legal status of an appointment made in violation of the prescribed recruitment rules and statutory provisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain and anothers vs The State and another2017 YLR 436 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-07
  criminal appealocular evidenceSection 342 statementbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidencemurder referenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellants, Talib Hussain and Khalid Mahmood, for the murder of three individuals. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through ocular testimony, medical evidence, and recoveries, and whether a conviction could be sustained solely on the basis of an accused's statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the prosecution evidence is discredited. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution's ocular account was unreliable, citing inconsistencies between the site plan and witness testimony, as well as an unexplained delay in reporting the incident. The Court established the principle that when prosecution evidence is rejected in its entirety, the statement of an accused recorded under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 must be accepted or rejected as a whole. It cannot be bifurcated to accept only the inculpatory parts. Consequently, as the prosecution failed to prove its case independently, the appellants were acquitted, and the murder reference was answered in the negative.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be recorded based solely on the statement of an accused under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the prosecution evidence is disbelieved?
  • Should the statement of an accused recorded under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be accepted or rejected in its entirety?
  • Is it legally permissible to accept the inculpatory part of an accused's statement while rejecting the exculpatory part?
  Read full judgment →
• Tajammul Khan vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief2017 PLC (C.S.) 246 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-12-10
  writ petitionservice tribunaldepartmental appealcompulsory retirementpolice misconductefficiency and discipline rulesmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, serving as Deputy Superintendents of Police, were compulsorily retired from service after being proceeded against for misconduct under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 2011, in connection with an abduction case. Aggrieved by the penalty, they filed departmental appeals to the Chief Secretary and simultaneously approached the Peshawar High Court through writ petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, arguing that the Service Tribunal was non-functional. The core legal question was whether writ petitions against departmental penalty orders are maintainable when departmental appeals are still pending and before the expiry of the statutory period provided under the rules, despite the temporary non-functionality of the Service Tribunal. The High Court dismissed the petitions in limine as premature and non-maintainable, holding that statutory timelines for exhausting departmental remedies and approaching the Service Tribunal cannot be bypassed through writ jurisdiction in the absence of extraordinary urgency, and that pending departmental appeals must first reach their statutory conclusion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 is maintainable against an order of compulsory retirement when departmental appeals are still pending before the competent authority?
  • Does the non-functional status of a Service Tribunal automatically grant an aggrieved civil servant the right to bypass statutory departmental remedies and approach the High Court immediately?
  • Whether the time provided under a special statute for the disposal of departmental appeals can be curtailed through the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad vs Munir Khan etc2017 PHC 1275 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-14Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad vs Mubashir Ahmed2017 YLR 95 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-05-25
  specific performanceagreement to sellrevisional jurisdictionearnest moneypossessionmortgagecontract enforceability
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition arises out of concurrent civil suits concerning a dispute over an agreement to sell land measuring 10 Marlas. The respondent filed a suit for declaration, specific performance, perpetual injunction, and alternative possession based on an agreement dated 07.03.2000, while the petitioner filed a rival suit for cancellation of the same agreement on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, and non-payment of the balance consideration. The trial court decreed the respondent's suit for specific performance and dismissed the petitioner's suit, which was largely upheld by the first appellate court. The core legal questions involved the enforceability of an agreement to sell signed only by the vendor, whether time was the essence of the contract, and whether the agreement was void due to an existing mortgage. The Peshawar High Court held that the agreement was a valid and enforceable contract under the Contract Act 1872 and Specific Relief Act 1877, that delivery of possession and execution were proven by cogent evidence, and that the petitioner's allegations of fraud and non-payment were unsubstantiated. Consequently, the High Court dismissed both revision petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for specific performance maintainable in respect of a contract or agreement signed only by the vendor without the signature of the vendee?
  • Whether an agreement to sell becomes void if the subject property is under mortgage at the time of the agreement?
  • Can an agreement to sell be declared void on the ground of non-payment of remaining sale consideration when time was not the essence of the contract?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts on the execution of an agreement to sell are open to interference in revisional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahira Zaib vs Ghaffar Ahmed and 2 others2017 CLC 96 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-05-25
  child custodyguardianshipwelfare of the minorsecond marriageintelligent preference
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arose from concurrent judgments of the lower courts appointing the respondent-father as the guardian of a minor child, Rehan Ahmed, and dismissing the appellant-mother's application for guardianship. The core legal question concerned who among divorced parents, both having contracted second marriages, is entitled to the custody of a minor child, and where the welfare of the minor lies. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Shariat Court, and appointed the appellant-mother as the guardian. The Court held that while personal law accords presumptive entitlement of custody to the father after a certain age, the paramount and overriding consideration in all matters of guardianship and custody is the welfare of the minor. The Court emphasized that where both parents have contracted second marriages, the father resides abroad without having maintained the child, and the minor is sufficiently mature to express an intelligent preference—in this case, wishing to remain with the mother—the welfare of the minor dictates that custody should remain with the mother.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the welfare of a minor lies with the father or the mother when both parents have contracted second marriages?
  • Can the preference of a minor old enough to form an intelligent opinion be considered in determining custody?
  • Does the mere fact that a father resides abroad entitle him to the custody of a minor child over the mother?
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• Tahir Yaq00b, Ex-Constable No. 8643/C, Lahore vs Superintendent of2017 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 211 · Punjab Service Tribunal
  disciplinary proceedingscompetent authorityvoid orderlimitation periodservice appealpolice servicecoram non judice
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an ex-constable, challenged his dismissal from service, which was imposed following departmental proceedings under the Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000. The core legal question was whether the Superintendent of Police, who initiated the proceedings and imposed the penalty, was the 'competent authority' under the relevant law. The Punjab Service Tribunal held that under Section 2(1)(aa) of the Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, only the District Head of Police (the CCPO in this case) was authorized to initiate disciplinary proceedings and impose penalties on a constable. The Tribunal determined that the Superintendent of Police lacked the legal competence to act as the disciplinary authority. Consequently, the initial dismissal order was declared void ab initio (coram non judice), rendering subsequent appellate and revisional orders unsustainable. The Tribunal further held that the law of limitation does not apply to void orders. The appeal was accepted, the dismissal set aside, and the matter remanded to the competent authority for fresh proceedings in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the law of limitation run against an order passed by an incompetent authority?
  • Who is the competent authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a police constable under the Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000?
  • What is the legal effect of a disciplinary order passed by an authority lacking the statutory power to do so?
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• Tahir vs Late Jehangir Khan through his LRs2017 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2017-02-27Read full judgment →
• Tahir Rizwan vs First Punjab Modaraba, etc2017 [M] C.L.R. 1514 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-06Read full judgment →
• Tahir Rizwan vs First Punjab Modaraba through Branch Manager and 32017 CLD 1752 · Lahore High Court · 2016-06-06Read full judgment →
• Tahir Rizwan vs First Punjab Modaraba etc.2017 LHC 2900 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-06Read full judgment →
• Tahir Mehmood vs Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vehari and 2 others2017 YLR 1453 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-16Read full judgment →
• Tahir Mahmood vs The State/Anti Narcotics Force through Regional2017 YLR 524 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-18
  narcotics possessionconscious knowledgedeath sentence conversioncomplainant as investigating officerchain of custodyfirst offenderControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals filed by three appellants against their conviction and death sentences imposed by the Special Court, Control of Narcotic Substances, for the possession of a large quantity of heroin. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution successfully established the appellants' conscious possession of the narcotics, whether the procedural objections regarding the complainant acting as the investigating officer and the non-association of public witnesses invalidated the trial, and whether the chain of custody of the samples was compromised. The Court held that the prosecution provided cogent evidence of recovery, and the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of possession under the special law. The Court affirmed that a complainant can act as an investigating officer if no prejudice is shown, and that the non-association of public witnesses does not vitiate proceedings under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. While upholding the convictions, the Court converted the death sentences to life imprisonment, citing the appellants' status as first-time offenders.

  Questions settled

  • Can a complainant in a narcotics case also act as the investigating officer?
  • Does the non-association of public witnesses in a recovery proceeding under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Is the presumption of conscious knowledge applicable to occupants of a vehicle found transporting narcotics?
  • Does the failure to produce the vehicle used for transporting narcotics at trial necessarily result in an acquittal?
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• Tahir Javed @ Tara vs The State2017 SCMR 1946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-18
  criminal appealmurder referenceshort orderlack of detailed judgmentremand of casedeposed judgesreduction of sentencesuspension of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan setting aside a short order of the Lahore High Court. The appellant, Tahir Javed @ Tara, along with a co-accused, had been convicted under sections 302(b), 324, and 337-D of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the trial court. The High Court, through a short order, dismissed the appeals and maintained the convictions while reducing the appellant's death sentence to life imprisonment, without writing a detailed judgment due to a administrative circular concerning deposed judges. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court could sustain a conviction and sentence without a detailed reasoned judgment from the High Court. The Supreme Court held that it is improper to scrutinize evidence in the absence of detailed reasons from the High Court. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the short order, and remanded the case back to the High Court for a fresh decision on the appeals and the murder reference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can uphold a conviction and sentence in the absence of a detailed reasoned judgment from the High Court?
  • What is the legal effect of a High Court disposing of a criminal appeal through a short order without recording detailed reasons?
  • Can an appellate court remand a criminal case back to the High Court for a fresh decision when no detailed judgment was authored due to administrative circulars concerning deposed judges?
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• Tahir Javaid vs Deputy Custodian & others2017 SCR 293 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-10-21
  dismissal from servicecompulsory retirementproportionality of punishmentservice tribunal delayhabitual absenteeex-parte inquirycomplete justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a Peon in the office of the Custodian of Evacuee Property, was dismissed from service on 08.06.2009 after being found guilty of absence from duty in an ex-parte inquiry. His appeal before the Service Tribunal was dismissed on 12.11.2014, after an inexplicable delay of nearly three years in delivering judgment. He appealed by leave to the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The core legal questions involved the legality of the Service Tribunal's delay and change of bench, and whether the penalty of dismissal was proportionate to the proved misconduct. The Supreme Court held that while the Service Tribunal's delay was a grave violation of the administration of justice, remanding the matter after seven years would cause undue hardship; instead, exercising its inherent powers to do complete justice, the Court held that the penalty of dismissal was disproportionate to the charge of absence for an employee with over two decades of service. The Court laid down the principle that administrative punishments must be rational, proportionate, and compatible with the gravity of the proven allegations, and substituted the penalty of dismissal with compulsory retirement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a delay of three years by the Service Tribunal in announcing judgment violates the principles of the administration of justice?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a penalty of dismissal from service into compulsory retirement to meet the ends of justice?
  • Is the penalty of dismissal from service proportionate to the charge of absence from duty for an employee with over twenty years of service?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can exercise its inherent powers to decide a service matter conclusively instead of remanding it back after protracted litigation?
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• Tahir Azam vs The State2017 YLR 2484 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-08-25Read full judgment →
• (1) Syndicate, University of Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Others (2) Dr.2017 SC AJK 467 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-12-21Read full judgment →
• Syedah Imammah Ali and 5 others vs Muhammad Yaqoob and 3 others2017 MLD 806 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-20Read full judgment →
• Syeda Sakina Riaz vs Federation of Pakistan and another2017 SHC 30 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-13Read full judgment →
• Syeda Neelam Altaf and 4 others vs Secretary, Government of Punjab, School Education Department, Lahore 3 others2017 PLJ Lahore 98 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-13Read full judgment →
• Syed Zahir Shah and another vs Syed Muhammad Ali Shah Bacha and others2017 YLR 630 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-11-23
  civil revisiondeclaration suittamleek namainheritance mutationconcurrent findingsrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts whereby the respondent-plaintiff's suit for declaration and perpetual injunction regarding ancestral land was decreed. The core legal question concerns the validity of competing property claims based on inheritance, tamleek nama, and an alleged dower mutation, alongside the limitation period and the limits of revisional interference. The Peshawar High Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the authenticity of the plaintiff's title documents, supported by public records and unchallenged tenancy evidence, while the petitioners failed to prove the disputed dower mutation or possession, suffered from no illegality, misinterpretation, or jurisdictional defect. Consequently, the court dismissed the revision petition, affirming that concurrent findings of fact based on proper appraisal of evidence cannot be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts be interfered with in civil revisional jurisdiction without showing any misinterpretation or non-appraisal of evidence?
  • Whether a plaintiff's title established through registered inheritance mutations and tamleek nama prevails in the absence of cogent proof supporting a stale competing dower mutation?
  • Does the failure of a party to produce supporting deeds and material witnesses invalidate their claim to disputed ancestral property?
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• Syed Zahir Hussain and Wajahat Ali vs State2017 PHC 991 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-20Read full judgment →
• Syed Yasir Shah, etc vs StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 397 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-12-21
  post-arrest bailmurdercircumstantial evidenceunwitnessed occurrencecriminal liabilityprima facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail petition filed by three accused persons, Syed Yasir Shah, Syed Bilal Shah, and Syed Shamshad Shah, in connection with an FIR registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mst. Sofia Gillani. The core legal question was whether the accused were entitled to the concession of bail given the circumstantial evidence presented. The Court observed that the prosecution's case relied on a chain of events, noting that the accused had taken the deceased from her parents' house on the date of the alleged murder. Furthermore, the Court highlighted a significant contradiction in the prosecution's narrative: the accused allegedly returned to the complainant's house two days after the murder, claiming the deceased missed her child, despite the fact that she was already deceased. The Court held that these circumstances, despite the occurrence being unwitnessed, sufficiently linked the accused to the crime. Consequently, the Court denied the bail petition, ruling that the accused were prima facie involved in the brutal offence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to deny bail in an unwitnessed murder case?
  • Does the presence of a contradictory narrative in an FIR affect the grant of bail?
  • Are accused persons entitled to bail when prima facie evidence links them to the commission of the offence?
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• Syed Yasir Shah and others vs The State and anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 397, 2017 MLD 825 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-12-21Read full judgment →
• Syed Waqar Hussain Gillani etc. vs State through Advocate General2017 PLJ Sh.C. (AJ&K) 1 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-06-06
  suspension of sentencestatutory delaybail pending appealstatutory rightappellate court discretioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves applications filed by convict-petitioners for the suspension of their sentences and grant of bail pending appeal before the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The convict-petitioners were convicted under Sections 302(c)/34 and 458 of the Azad Penal Code and Section 20 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir EHA, receiving ten years of rigorous imprisonment among other sentences. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioners are entitled to bail and suspension of sentence on the ground of statutory delay under Section 426(1-A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure when their appeal has not been decided within two years of conviction. The Court held that since the statutory period of two years had elapsed without the delay being attributable to the petitioners, and they did not fall within the disqualifying exceptions, they had earned a statutory right to be released on bail. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court must release a convicted person on bail if their appeal is not decided within the statutory timeframe, provided the delay is not caused by the appellant and they are not hardened criminals or previously convicted offenders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a convict is entitled to suspension of sentence and bail on the ground of statutory delay under Section 426(1-A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the appeal is not decided within two years?
  • Does the appellate court have the obligation to examine whether the delay in the decision of an appeal was occasioned by an act or omission of the appellant before granting bail?
  • Are persons accused or convicted of crimes excluded from statutory bail under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if they are considered hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminals?
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