Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• State through Advocate-General Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar vs Saqlain and 2 othersPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 411 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• State through Additional Advocate General AJK, Muzaffarabad etc vs Rustam Khan & others2017 P.S.C. (Crl.) 793, 2017 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 181 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• State of Gujarat vs Maliben Nathubhai2017 SCInd 382 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-02-01Read full judgment →
• State of Gujarat and Another vs The I.R.C.G. and Others2017 SCInd 1286 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-08-29
  communal riotspublic interest litigationex gratia assistancesecularismreligious placespublic law remedycompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment directing the State of Gujarat to compensate for the repair and restoration of religious places damaged during 2002 communal riots, and appointing Special Officers to adjudicate claims. The core legal question was whether the State could be compelled to use public funds for the repair of religious places without violating Article 27 of the Constitution of India, and whether the High Court could create a new forum for such compensation. The Supreme Court held that while the State has an obligation to maintain law and order and protect religious places as a facet of secularism, the High Court's creation of a new, unmanageable forum for compensation was inappropriate. Instead, the Court accepted a scheme formulated by the State of Gujarat providing ex gratia assistance for damaged religious places, limited to actual repair costs and subject to reasonable conditions. The principle laid down is that while the State may provide limited financial assistance for the restoration of religious places damaged in riots to promote communal harmony, such assistance must be reasonable, non-discriminatory, and not constitute a substantial appropriation of public funds for religious promotion, thereby adhering to the secular mandate of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Can the State be compelled to use public funds for the repair of religious places damaged in communal riots?
  • Does the provision of ex gratia assistance by the State for the repair of religious places violate Article 27 of the Constitution of India?
  • Can a High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, create a new forum for the adjudication of compensation claims?
  • Is the protection of religious places a facet of secularism under the Indian Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation, etc vs Mst. Shazia Mir Arshad2017 PLJ Lahore 928 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-17Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation vs Co-operative Insurance Society of Pakistan2017 [M] C.L.R. 1043 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-12Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan vs Director Insurance, SECP and another2017 CLD 502 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2016-06-22Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan vs Commissioner2017 CLD 1515 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2017-04-04Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Zonal2017 CLD 1483 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-17
  life insurance claimrepudiation of insurance policyconcealment of material factsnatural justiceliquidated damagesstatutory limitation periodinsurance tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the Insurance Tribunal’s decision directing the State Life Insurance Corporation to pay policy proceeds to a nominee following the death of the insured. The core legal question was whether the insurer could repudiate the policy on grounds of fraudulent concealment of pre-existing medical conditions after the statutory two-year limitation period, and whether the repudiation was procedurally flawed. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the insurer failed to substantiate allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment of material facts at the time of the policy's issuance or revival. Relying on Section 80 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, the Court affirmed that an insurer cannot challenge a policy after two years unless it proves deliberate, fraudulent suppression of facts known to the insured. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the principle of natural justice, specifically the right to a hearing, applies to insurance claim repudiations. Consequently, the insurer’s failure to provide such a hearing rendered the repudiation illegal. The Court also upheld the award of liquidated damages under Section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 due to the insurer's unjustified delay in processing the claim.

  Questions settled

  • Can an insurance company repudiate a policy on grounds of misrepresentation after the expiry of two years from the date of issuance?
  • Is an insurance company required to afford a right of hearing to a claimant before repudiating an insurance claim?
  • Does the failure to pay insurance proceeds within ninety days entitle the claimant to liquidated damages under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000?
  Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through its Chairman etc vs Mst. Sardar Begum and 28 others2017 SCP 793 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  place of suinginsurance contractinsurance actspecial law vs general lawjurisdiction of civil courtreturn of plaintoriginal civil jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter addresses the correct place of suing for claims arising from insurance contracts executed under the repealed Insurance Act, 1938. The core legal question was whether suits relating to insurance policies should be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade (Civil Court) pursuant to Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or in the principal Civil Court of Original jurisdiction (District Court or designated High Courts) as defined under Section 2(6) read with Section 46 of the Insurance Act, 1938. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the special provisions of the Insurance Act, 1938 override the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure by virtue of Section 4(1) of the Code. The Court ruled that suits for relief regarding insurance contracts must be filed in the District Court or the relevant High Court possessing original civil jurisdiction, rather than in the Civil Court. The key principle laid down is that where a special law prescribes a specific forum and place of suing, general procedural rules regarding the hierarchy of courts of lowest grade stand eclipsed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether suits relating to insurance contracts executed under the repealed Insurance Act, 1938 are to be filed in the Civil Court or the principal Civil Court of Original jurisdiction in a district?
  • Do the provisions of a special law regarding the place of suing override the general provisions of Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does Section 4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 eclipse the application of Section 15 when in conflict with a special enactment?
  • Whether the definition of 'Court' under Section 2(6) of the Insurance Act, 1938 applies to suits for relief under Section 46 of the said Act?
  Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman and others vs Mst. Sardar Begum and others2017 CLD 1080, 2017 SCMR 999, 2017 SCP 793 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-28
  insurance lawplace of suingjurisdictionprincipal Civil CourtDistrict Courtrepealed statutespecial law vs general laworiginal jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from multiple petitions challenging the jurisdiction of District Courts to entertain suits relating to insurance contracts executed under the repealed Insurance Act, 1938. The petitioners contended that pursuant to Section 46 of the Act and Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), such suits must be filed in the court of the lowest grade, namely the Civil Court. The Supreme Court examined the interplay between Section 2(6) and Section 46 of the Insurance Act, 1938. The Court held that Section 2(6) specifically defines 'Court' as the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district (the District Court) or a High Court exercising original civil jurisdiction. Applying Section 4(1) of the CPC, the Court ruled that the special law overrides the general provisions of Section 15 CPC. Consequently, the Court affirmed that suits for relief in respect of insurance policies must be filed in the District Court, or the Sindh or Islamabad High Courts depending on pecuniary value, and not in the Civil Court. The petitions were dismissed.

  Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan through Chief Manager, Peshawar vs Securities &K.L.R. 2017 S.C. 627 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  winding upcompanies ordinanceregulatory liabilitypromoterpenal statute interpretationmisfeasancestate bank of pakistansecp
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) can be held liable or proceeded against under Sections 412 and 413 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, in the course of winding-up proceedings of the Islamic Investment Bank Limited. The core legal question was whether regulatory bodies and central banks acting in their statutory capacities qualify as 'promoters' or persons taking part in the 'promotion or formation' of a company, or are otherwise subject to penal liability for alleged negligence in supervision and regulation leading to insolvency. The Supreme Court held that the SBP and SECP are statutory regulators and cannot be construed as 'promoters' or persons carrying on the business of a company with intent to defraud under Sections 412 and 413. The ratio decidendi is that penal provisions in company law must be strictly construed according to their plain text and context, and regulatory authorities do not fall within the ambit of delinquent directors, officers, or promoters contemplated by the statute. The court laid down the principle that judges cannot create liability or supply omissions in statutes through expansive interpretative techniques.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the State Bank of Pakistan or the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan can be proceeded against under Sections 412 and 413 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 as promoters of a company?
  • Do statutory regulatory bodies and central banks fall within the definition of persons who take part in the promotion or formation of a company under Section 412 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Are Sections 412 and 413 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 penal provisions that must be strictly construed?
  • Does regulatory negligence by a central bank or corporate regulator in supervising a financial institution create personal or institutional liability under winding-up provisions for company damages?
  Read full judgment →
• (1) State Bank of Pakistan through Chief Manager, Peshawar (2) M/sK.L.R. 2017 S.C. 627, 2017 SCP 975 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-27
  winding upcompanies ordinancedelinquent directorsmisfeasancepromoter liabilitystate bank of pakistansecppenal statutes
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) can be held liable under sections 412 and 413 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, in the course of winding up a company for alleged failure to properly regulate and supervise the institution. The core legal question is whether statutory regulators and central banks fall within the definition of persons who take part in the 'promotion or formation' of a company or carry on its business with fraudulent intent. The Supreme Court held that regulatory authorities and central banks cannot be deemed promoters or business operators under these provisions, and that sections 412 and 413—being penal in nature—must be construed strictly. The Court ruled that neither SBP nor SECP are liable under the said sections for mere regulatory negligence or failure to prevent insolvency, thereby setting aside the lower courts' orders that had declared applications against them maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the State Bank of Pakistan or the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan can be proceeded against as 'promoters' under sections 412 and 413 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Does regulatory negligence or failure to prevent a company's insolvency render a statutory regulator or central bank personally liable for the company's debts during winding-up proceedings?
  • How should penal provisions within company legislation be interpreted when determining liability against statutory authorities?
  • Are statutory regulatory bodies and central banks covered under the phrase 'taken part in the promotion or formation of the company'?
  Read full judgment →
• State and another vs Abdur Rahim and another2017 P Cr. L J 1075 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-08-22
  appeal against acquittalacquittalprivate complaintappellate jurisdictionpresumption of innocencefutile exercise
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal filed by the State under section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge Ghizar pursuant to an application under section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question involves determining whether the trial court was justified in acquitting the accused where the primary eye-witness disowned the first information report and examined prosecution witnesses failed to connect the accused with the crime. The court held that no material flaw, misreading, or non-reading of evidence existed in the trial court judgment, and emphasized that an acquittal multiplies the presumption of innocence. Furthermore, the court noted procedural defects in filing a joint appeal by the State and complainant. The appeal was dismissed as meritless, maintaining the acquittal order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal against acquittal can be filed jointly by the State and the complainant?
  • What are the parameters to deal with an appeal against acquittal compared to an appeal against conviction?
  • Can a trial court acquit an accused under section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when key witnesses fail to connect the accused to the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Standard Chartered Bank, etc. vs Law favours the vigilant and not the indolent2017 P.C.T.I.R 517 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-16
  financial institutionsrecovery of financesexecution proceedingsadvance rentlease deedbanking court
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an order passed by the Banking Court in execution proceedings directing the appellant to deposit future monthly lease rentals of a property in court, notwithstanding that the appellant had already paid advance rent for two years to the judgment-debtor. The core legal question was whether the Banking Court could competently direct the deposit of monthly rent in court despite the prior payment of advance rent through a valid banking transaction and without declaring the lease deed void under the applicable statute. The Lahore High Court held that while the Banking Court possesses the power to declare a lease deed void under Section 23 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, it erred in directing the appellant to deposit monthly rent in court after advance rent had already been duly paid. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the respondent bank was directed to recover the rent amount from the Rent Tribunal where the appellant had subsequently been depositing it.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Banking Court can direct a lessee to deposit future monthly rent in court after advance rent has already been paid to the judgment-debtor?
  • Can a Banking Court declare a lease deed void under Section 23 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 prevent a court from ordering a lessee to pay rent into court under execution proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Ltd. through Senior Manager2017 PTD 1585 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-29
  amortizationgoodwillintangible assetsbusiness amalgamationIncome Tax Ordinance 2001Banking Companies Ordinancetax deduction
  Summary & questions settled

  The Petitioner, a banking company, challenged orders denying the amortization of "goodwill" acquired during a business amalgamation under Section 24 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether goodwill qualifies as an "intangible" under Section 24(11) and if the Petitioner, having acquired a business as a going concern, was entitled to amortize this expenditure. The Court held that goodwill constitutes incorporeal property and qualifies as an "intangible" within the meaning of Section 24(11), relying on the Supreme Court's precedent in Dr. M.B. Ankalsaria. The Court further determined that the amalgamation constituted the acquisition of a business as a whole, rather than a mere transfer of assets, thereby entitling the Petitioner to claim amortization. The judgment establishes that goodwill, when acquired as part of a going concern, is an amortizable intangible asset under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and that the tax treatment of such acquisitions must be viewed holistically rather than as isolated capital transactions.

  Questions settled

  • Is goodwill an intangible asset within the meaning of Section 24(11) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Whether a taxpayer who acquires a business as a going concern is entitled to amortize the goodwill associated with that business under Section 24 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the acquisition of shares followed by an amalgamation constitute the acquisition of a business as a going concern for the purposes of claiming amortization of goodwill?
  Read full judgment →
• Standard Capital Securities (Pvt.) Limited vs Director/Hod (MSRD)2017 CLD 1073 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-03-05
  securities regulationsegregation of clients assetsnet capital balancepenaltystock exchange membersappeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under Section 33 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 against an impugned order passed by the Respondent imposing a penalty on the Appellant for irregularities in Net Capital Balance calculations, failure to maintain Know Your Customer and Customer Due Diligence policies, failure to segregate clients' assets, failure to maintain proper books of accounts, and imposing late payment charges. The core legal question concerned whether the Appellant violated the regulatory framework regarding the handling and segregation of clients' assets and proper record-keeping under the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 and associated rules. The appellate bench held that while the Appellant failed to maintain proper segregation of clients' assets during the inspection period, a lenient view could be taken because the Appellant subsequently made demonstrable efforts to improve its systems. Consequently, the bench set aside the monetary penalty while directing strict future compliance with the applicable statutory framework. The key principle laid down is that while unauthorized use and failure to segregate clients' funds severely threaten market integrity, appellate bodies may exercise leniency and set aside penalties where a broker subsequently undertakes verifiable remedial measures to achieve regulatory compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to maintain segregation of clients' assets warrants the imposition of a penalty under the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969?
  • Can an appellate authority set aside a monetary penalty imposed by the Commission while taking a lenient view of subsequent compliance efforts?
  • Does the use of clients' funds to finance other clients or own investments violate the regulatory framework governing stock exchange brokers?
  Read full judgment →
• Spectre Consulting Limited vs MT "Everrich 6" & others2017 SHC 330 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-12Read full judgment →
• South African Diamond Producers Organisation vs Minister of Minerals and Energy N.O. and 5 others2017 SCMR 1949 · Constitutional Court of South AfricaRead full judgment →
• Soofia Munir and anothers vs Judge, Family Court (West), Islamabad2017 MLD 214 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-05-03Read full judgment →
• Syed Kousar Abbas Shah and 2 others vs The State2017 YLR 2327 · Sindh High Court · 2016-04-25Read full judgment →
• Soneri Bank Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan2017 PLC 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-11
  constitutional petitionstatutory remedyexhaustion of remediesPayment of Wages Actcommercial establishmentjurisdictional factmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a constitutional petition filed by a bank challenging an order passed by an authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and the vires of the said Act, without first exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 17 of the Act. The High Court dismissed the petition regarding the challenge to the authority's order due to the failure to avail the appellate remedy, while retaining the challenge to the vires of the section. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition is maintainable when a statutory remedy is bypassed, particularly when the petitioner alleges the order is void. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, as a commercial establishment, falls within the purview of the Act, and determinations regarding whether an individual is a 'workman' constitute findings of fact. Such findings must be challenged through the prescribed appellate procedure rather than via constitutional jurisdiction on the plea that the determination is void. The Court affirmed that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass statutory remedies for factual disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against an order passed under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, if the statutory remedy of appeal has not been exhausted?
  • Does a bank fall within the definition of a 'commercial establishment' under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936?
  • Can findings of fact regarding an individual's status as a 'workman' be challenged in constitutional jurisdiction on the ground that the determination is void?
  Read full judgment →
• Soneri Bank Limited vs Messrs Multan Rice Mills and others2017 CLD 1731 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-14Read full judgment →
• Sona Khan alias Sonhra vs The State2017 MLD 388 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-30
  murderdeath sentenceeye-witness testimonyrelated witnessesprompt FIRrecovery of weaponmedical corroborationmotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and death reference arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Sona Khan alias Sonhra, under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Ghulam Fareed by stabbing him with a knife. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through ocular testimony, prompt lodging of the First Information Report, recovery of the crime weapon at the spot, and medical corroboration, and whether the relationship of the eyewitnesses to the deceased rendered their testimony unreliable. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the charge through consistent eyewitness accounts, prompt reporting, positive chemical examiner reports, and medical evidence establishing death by sharp-edged weapon injuries. The court reaffirmed that mere relationship of witnesses to a deceased does not make them interested witnesses unless animus is shown, and that direct ocular evidence corroborated by medical findings warrants upholding the conviction. The death sentence was confirmed as no mitigating circumstances were found.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses can be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship with the deceased?
  • Does prompt lodging of the First Information Report exclude the chance of false implication in a murder trial?
  • What is the evidentiary value of motive when direct ocular evidence of the crime is available?
  • Whether the normal penalty of death is justifiable when an accused commits murder with a sharp-edged weapon in a cruel manner without mitigating circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohrab Khan Marri Khuda Bakhsh vs The State2017 PLJ SC 458, 2017 SCMR 669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-15
  misappropriation of public fundsaccountability courtquantum of sentencezero tolerance for corruptionNational Accountability Ordinancecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals filed by two public officials, a collecting officer and a supervisory officer, against their conviction and sentencing for the misappropriation of public funds collected as market committee fees. The appellants challenged the quantum of their sentences, having previously been found guilty by the Accountability Court and the Balochistan High Court for defalcating Rs. 4.2 million. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether, given the established guilt of the appellants, there were sufficient grounds to reduce the sentences imposed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that no reduction in sentence was warranted. The Court emphasized that corruption poses an existential threat to the national economy and the survival of the State. It laid down the principle that in cases of proven corruption involving public funds, courts must adopt a policy of zero tolerance, applying strict sentencing standards rather than leniency, to deter the erosion of state resources and ensure the welfare of the citizenry as envisioned by the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the misappropriation of public funds by a market committee official warrant a reduction in sentence upon appeal?
  • Should courts apply lenient sentencing standards to public officials convicted of corruption?
  • Is the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 applicable to acts of corruption committed prior to its enactment?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohrab Khan Marri and another vs The State2017 PLJ SC 458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-15
  misappropriationpublic fundsquantum of sentencecorruptionmarket committee feeNational Accountability Ordinancezero tolerance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the trial court and the High Court convicting the appellants for the misappropriation of public funds collected as market committee fees. The core legal question concerns the appropriate quantum of sentence for public officials convicted of massive financial corruption under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and whether leniency should be extended. The Supreme Court held that given the established guilt of the appellants in defalcating public money and the crippling effect of corruption on the national economy, no leniency or reduction in sentence is warranted, and zero tolerance must be applied. The key principle laid down is that courts must apply strict standards and show no mercy to individuals convicted of major corruption, as it threatens the survival and economic stability of the State.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leniency in sentencing should be extended to public officials convicted of massive financial misappropriation and corruption?
  • Does widespread economic corruption justify the imposition of strict standards and maximum sentences by the courts?
  • Whether concurrent findings of guilt by the trial court and the High Court warrant interference regarding the conviction when leave was granted solely on the quantum of sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Zubair and 3 others vs Dildar Ali Khan and another2017 MLD 836 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-12-14
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirymedical evidencecause of deathcardiac arrestcriminal revisionbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenged the order of the District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Bhimber, which rejected the petitioners' post-arrest bail application in a case involving charges under the Azad Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the medical evidence regarding the cause of death and the nature of the alleged injuries. The Court held that the petitioners were entitled to bail, setting aside the lower court's order. The ratio of the decision rests on the medical report, which indicated the deceased died of cardiac arrest without any visible signs of violence, thereby casting doubt on the prosecution's version of events. The Court established that where medical evidence creates doubt regarding the cause of death, the case falls within the purview of "further inquiry" under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the principle that bail should not be withheld as a form of punishment, and that in cases of further inquiry, the concession of bail cannot be denied.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be granted when the medical report suggests the cause of death was cardiac arrest rather than physical assault?
  • Does the absence of visible injuries on a deceased's body justify the grant of bail in a murder case?
  • Is bail to be withheld as a form of punishment for an accused?
  • Does a case fall under the category of further inquiry when the medical evidence contradicts the prosecution's version of the cause of death?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Waqar alias Sohaila vs The State and others2017 SC MR 325 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-22
  post-arrest baildouble murderprohibitory clauseocular accountmedical evidencefugitive from lawbail stage
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arises from a double murder case registered under FIR No. 150 of 2013 at Police Station Housing Colony, District Sheikhupura. The petitioner sought bail after being accused of firing at the deceased, Mubashar Bhatti, alongside co-accused. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to the grant of post-arrest bail given the specific allegations and the evidentiary record. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner was specifically nominated in the FIR with a distinct role attributed to him, and the police investigation had found him guilty. Furthermore, the Court noted the petitioner remained a fugitive from law for a significant period. Regarding the petitioner's argument concerning discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence, the Court held that such matters require deeper appreciation of evidence, which is not permissible at the bail stage. The Court affirmed that the alleged offences fall within the prohibitory clause of the relevant procedural law, thereby disentitling the petitioner to bail, and left the final determination of guilt to the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Is a deeper appreciation of evidence permissible at the bail stage?
  • Does the fact that an accused remained a fugitive from law affect the consideration of a bail petition?
  • Does an offence falling within the prohibitory clause of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically disentitle an accused to bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Farooq vs Farzana Rafique and others2017 YLR 1300 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-15
  family court jurisdictionenhancement of maintenanceex-parte proceedingsconstitutional petitionconcurrent findingsexecuting court powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which dismissed the Petitioner's application to set aside ex-parte proceedings and an order enhancing maintenance allowance. The core legal questions were whether the Executing Court improperly amended a final decree by enhancing maintenance and whether the Petitioner was entitled to relief despite his conduct. The High Court held that the application for enhancement was filed before the Family Court, not the Executing Court, despite a mislabeled headnote, and that the Family Court retains jurisdiction to enhance maintenance even after a decree is passed. The Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, noting the Petitioner's failure to demonstrate illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error. The key principle laid down is that the Family Court possesses inherent jurisdiction to entertain applications for the enhancement of maintenance allowance post-decree without requiring the institution of a fresh suit, as the Family Court retains exclusive jurisdiction over maintenance matters and related issues, ensuring that the adequacy of maintenance can be addressed as circumstances evolve.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Family Court have the jurisdiction to enhance maintenance allowance after a final decree has been passed?
  • Is it necessary to file a fresh suit for the enhancement of maintenance allowance if the previously granted rate becomes insufficient?
  • Can a mislabeled headnote on a court order defeat the substantive rights of a party if the underlying application was filed before the correct forum?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Baig Noori vs High Court of Sindh through Registrar and 2 others2017 PLC (C.S.) 1142 · Sindh High Court · 2016-06-30
  quo warrantopublic officeHigh Court establishmentcontractual appointmentupgradation of postconcurrence of Administration Committeere-employment of retired person
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition seeking a writ of quo warranto challenged the contractual appointment of respondent No. 2 as Chairman Inspection Team (BPS-22) in the Sindh High Court Establishment. The core legal questions were whether a writ of quo warranto lies against High Court employees despite the bar under Article 199(5) of the Constitution, whether the post constituted a public office, and whether the creation, upgradation, and contractual appointment complied with the Sindh High Court Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2006. The High Court held that the bar in Article 199(5) does not apply to quo warranto proceedings questioning whether a public office is held under valid legal authority. The court ruled that the office of Chairman Inspection Team performs duties of a public nature and constitutes a public office. Upgrading the post and changing its nomenclature amounted to creating a new BPS-22 post, which required mandatory concurrence from the Administration Committee under Rule 4, which was lacking. Furthermore, contractual hiring without demonstrating non-availability of other suitable candidates violated Rule 5 and settled Supreme Court dictums deprecating re-employment of retired persons. Consequently, the appointment notification was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ of quo warranto maintainable against an officer or employee of a High Court despite the bar contained under Article 199(5) of the Constitution?
  • Does the position of Chairman Inspection Team in a High Court establishment constitute a public office for the purpose of issuing a writ of quo warranto?
  • Can a post in BPS-16 or above be created or upgraded in the High Court establishment without the concurrence of the Administration Committee under Rule 4 of the 2006 Rules?
  • Can a retired officer be re-employed on a contract basis in the High Court establishment without establishing the non-availability of other suitable candidates under Rule 5 of the 2006 Rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Azam & 3 others vs Abrar Azam & 3 others2017 SCR 718 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-05-11
  inter se senioritycivil servicequota systeminitial recruitmentselection for appointmentAzad Jammu and Kashmirservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the determination of inter se seniority among Assistant Commissioners (BPS-17) in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Management Group. The core legal question was whether a civil servant’s seniority should be determined by their general merit position in the initial Public Service Commission examination or by the date of their actual selection for appointment, particularly when appointments are made under a quota-based system. The Service Tribunal had ruled that the respondent’s seniority should be based on his merit position. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir set aside this judgment, holding that the "selection for appointment" is the governing criterion under the relevant service rules. The Court reasoned that because the respondent was appointed later than the appellants—following a High Court direction and not in the initial selection batch—he could not claim seniority over those selected earlier. The Court established that in quota-based recruitment, mere merit position is insufficient; the actual selection for appointment constitutes the operative event for determining seniority, ensuring that those selected in earlier batches rank senior to those selected later.

  Questions settled

  • Does the general merit position assigned by the Public Service Commission automatically determine inter se seniority for civil servants appointed under a quota-based system?
  • Is the date of selection for appointment the primary factor for determining seniority under the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977?
  • Can a candidate appointed later in compliance with a court order claim seniority over candidates selected in an earlier batch for the same grade?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Aslam vs The State2017 YLR 1383 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-01
  criminal appealmurder convictionbenefit of doubtdying declarationocular evidencemedical evidenceabsconsionprivate complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant for murder and related offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a private complaint. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given the alleged discrepancies between the ocular account and medical evidence, and the reliability of the dying declaration. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the case, noting material contradictions in the testimony of eyewitnesses regarding the nature of injuries and the distance of firing, which were inconsistent with medical reports. Furthermore, the court found the dying declaration unreliable due to procedural lapses and lack of independent verification. The court reiterated that absconsion is not substantive proof of guilt and that the prosecution must stand on its own evidence rather than relying on the weakness of the defense. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, emphasizing that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitles an accused to acquittal as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when there are material contradictions between ocular testimony and medical evidence?
  • Is absconsion considered a substantive piece of evidence to prove guilt in a criminal case?
  • What are the requirements for a dying declaration to be accepted as reliable evidence?
  • Does the prosecution's failure to prove its case allow an accused to be acquitted even if the defense of alibi is not fully established?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Aslam vs The State and another2017 MLD 4 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-30
  pre-arrest bailcompromiseattempted rapenon-bailable offencejudicial discretionvictim forgiveness
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought pre-arrest bail in a case involving allegations of attempted rape under sections 376 and 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether bail could be granted in a non-bailable and allegedly uncompoundable offence where the complainant and the victim had voluntarily entered into a compromise, forgiven the accused, and expressed a desire not to prosecute. The Court held that while the offence was serious, the voluntary compromise and the victim's willingness to forgive the accused constituted valid grounds for granting bail in the interest of justice and equity. The Court reasoned that if the complainant party is no longer willing to pursue the matter, the judicial system should not force them to continue hostilities. Consequently, the Court confirmed the ad-interim pre-arrest bail, emphasizing that the parties' will to settle the matter outside of court should be respected, and the final determination of the offence's gravity remains a matter for the trial court after evidence is recorded.

  Questions settled

  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted in a non-bailable offence if the complainant and victim have entered into a compromise?
  • Should a court force a complainant to continue prosecution when they have voluntarily forgiven the accused?
  • Is a private compromise between parties a relevant consideration for the court when deciding on a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Asghar vs State & anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-04
  pre-arrest bailagricultural pesticidecriminal liabilitymala fidelicensed dealersubstandard qualityvicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by Sohail Asghar, who was accused in an F.I.R. registered under the Agricultural Pesticide Ordinance, 1971, following the recovery of substandard pesticide samples from his shop. The core legal question was whether a licensed dealer of pesticides could be held criminally liable for the substandard quality of products manufactured by a third party, where the dealer had not tampered with the original seals. The Court observed that the petitioner held a valid license and was merely a dealer of products from a renowned manufacturer. Crucially, the prosecution failed to array the manufacturer as an accused and did not allege that the petitioner had tampered with the product seals. The Court held that the petitioner, as a dealer, could not be held responsible for manufacturing defects, and the prosecution's attempt to arrest the dealer while ignoring the manufacturer indicated mala fide. Consequently, the Court confirmed the pre-arrest bail, establishing the principle that a licensed dealer is not vicariously liable for the substandard quality of sealed products manufactured by others.

  Questions settled

  • Can a licensed dealer of pesticides be held criminally liable for the substandard quality of products manufactured by a third party?
  • Does the failure to array the manufacturer of substandard goods as an accused, while pursuing the dealer, constitute mala fide on the part of the prosecution?
  • Is a dealer of pesticides responsible for the quality of goods if the seals of the products remain untampered?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed Jan vs Siraj Ahmed Jan and others2017 IHC 276 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-04Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed and another vs Justice of Peace/Additional Sessions2017 P Cr. L J 1314 · Lahore High Court · 2016-07-21
  Justice of Peacecivil disputecriminal jurisdictionabuse of processcontractual obligationcognizable offenceregistration of FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges an order passed by a Justice of Peace directing the Station House Officer to proceed in accordance with law regarding a property transaction dispute. The petitioners allegedly induced the respondent to purchase a plot of land by misrepresenting its commercial status, leading to a dispute over the earnest money paid. The core legal question was whether a Justice of Peace should direct police intervention in a matter that is essentially a civil dispute involving contractual obligations and alleged misrepresentation. The Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned order, holding that the dispute was civil in nature and did not warrant criminal prosecution. The Court established that while civil and criminal remedies can coexist, criminal jurisdiction should not be invoked to settle civil scores or resolve contractual breaches. It emphasized that not every broken promise or moral wrong constitutes a crime, and where a dispute is clearly actionable in civil courts, recourse to criminal law to subdue an adversary constitutes an abuse of process that must be discouraged.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Justice of Peace direct the registration of a criminal case in a matter that is essentially a civil dispute?
  • Does the existence of a civil remedy bar the invocation of criminal jurisdiction in cases of contractual breach?
  • Is it an abuse of process to use criminal proceedings to settle civil scores between parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed and 7 others vs Province of Sindh through Secretary and 22017 PLC (C.S.) 510 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-01
  judicial officersAdditional District and Sessions Judgeretrospective operationofficial gazettenotificationeligibility criteriaconstitutional petitionSindh Judicial Service Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was brought before the Sindh High Court by serving judicial officers challenging the rejection of their candidature for the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge. The core legal questions involved whether serving judicial officers were eligible to apply under the unamended rules prior to the official notification of an amendment barring them, and whether a statutory rule amendment can operate retrospectively prior to its notification and publication in the official gazette. The Court held that an amendment to rules cannot operate retrospectively to impair vested or existing rights before it is formally notified and published, and since the petitioners applied before the cut-off date and prior to the issuance and publication of the amendment, they were qualified and eligible to participate. The key principle laid down is that rules or notifications curtailing or extending rights take effect from the date of their issuance or publication in the official gazette, and cannot affect applications lawfully submitted under prior prevailing rules before such operational date.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amendment to the Sindh Judicial Service Rules excluding judicial officers from direct recruitment takes effect from the date of the Full Court recommendation or from the date of its notification and publication in the official gazette?
  • Does the submission of an application for a advertised post before the cut-off date create a valid right to participate in the selection process when rules are subsequently amended?
  • Can a notification curtailing or extending the rights of citizens operate with retrospective effect prior to its formal publication?
  • Whether a writ petition is maintainable against an administrative or consultative order of the High Court Establishment involving the violation of rules and infringement of fundamental rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed & others vs Province of Sindh & others2017 PLC (C.S.) 510, 2017 PLJ Karachi 7 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-01
  judicial service rulesretrospective effectofficial gazetteadministrative notificationdirect recruitmentjudicial revieweligibility criteria
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the rejection of the petitioners' candidature for the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge. The petitioners, serving judicial officers, applied for the post before the cutoff date of July 15, 2016. Their applications were rejected based on an amendment to Rule 8(1)(d) of the Sindh Judicial Service Rules, 1994, which excluded serving judicial officers from direct recruitment. The core legal question was whether the amendment, notified on July 26, 2016, and published in the official gazette on September 22, 2016, could apply retrospectively to disqualify candidates who had applied before the amendment's notification. The Court held that the amendment could not be applied retrospectively to disqualify candidates who had already applied by the cutoff date. The Court affirmed that a notification takes effect from the date of its publication in the official gazette, not from the date of its signing or the date of a Full Court resolution. The key principle laid down is that administrative notifications curtailing or extending rights cannot operate retrospectively and only become effective upon publication in the official gazette.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative notification curtailing or extending rights be given retrospective effect?
  • Does a notification take effect from the date of its signing or the date of its publication in the official gazette?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against an administrative order passed by the High Court administration involving the infringement of fundamental rights?
  • Does the submission of an application for a post before a rule amendment create a vested right to be considered under the unamended rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Adeeb Bachani and others vs The State though NAB and others2017 PLD Sindh 415 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-10Read full judgment →
• Sohail A. Salam Mughal---Petitioner vs VII Additional District Judge,2017 P Cr. L J 1619 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-05
  superdaricustody of vehicleregistered ownerconstitutional petitiontitle disputecriminal procedurerestoration of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitutional Petition challenged the orders of the lower courts, which dismissed the petitioner's application for the restoration of a vehicle on superdari basis. The petitioner claimed ownership of the vehicle, which was registered in the name of his ex-wife, asserting that he was in possession of it at the time of seizure. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, despite not being the registered owner, was entitled to the custody of the vehicle under Section 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts committed no illegality in granting custody to the registered owner. The Court affirmed the principle that while Section 523 empowers a Magistrate to grant custody to the person entitled to possession, the registered owner is generally considered the person entitled in the absence of contrary evidence. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that criminal courts are not the proper forum to adjudicate disputes regarding title or ownership of property, which must be resolved by a competent civil court.

  Questions settled

  • Is a criminal court the appropriate forum to determine the title or ownership of a seized vehicle?
  • Does a Magistrate have the authority to grant the custody of a seized vehicle to the registered owner under Section 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a person claim custody of a vehicle on superdari basis based on alleged ownership when the vehicle is registered in the name of another person?
  Read full judgment →
• Soba Khan vs The State and Another2017 NLR Criminal 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-04
  post-conviction bailsuspension of sentencevicarious liabilityacquittal of co-accusedtentative assessment of evidenceunlawful assembly
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his petition for suspension of sentence and grant of post-conviction bail by the Lahore High Court during the pendency of his appeal against life imprisonment for murder. The core legal question concerned the principles governing the grant of post-conviction bail under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, particularly when similarly charged co-accused had been acquitted on the same evidence and where a single firearm injury was attributed to multiple persons. The Supreme Court held that Section 426 CrPC is in pari materia with Section 497 CrPC, and the appellate court must make a tentative assessment of evidence to prevent unjustified incarceration, especially where co-accused facing identical allegations have been acquitted. The Court laid down that denial of bail in such fit cases constitutes patent injustice, and the rule requiring extra care in post-conviction bail is a rule of caution rather than a strict legal bar.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is in pari materia with Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the grant of bail at the post-conviction stage?
  • Can a convict be denied bail when similarly charged co-accused on the same set of evidence have already been acquitted?
  • To what extent can an appellate court conduct a tentative assessment of evidence while considering an application for suspension of sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the absence of reparatory arrangements in law for wrongful incarceration require the courts to exercise extraordinary caution in denying post-conviction bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Soba Khan and another vs The State and another2017 P Cr. L J 211 · Balochistan High Court · 2016-11-23
  life imprisonmentenhancement of sentenceinjured witness testimonyabscondencemitigating circumstancesubstitution theoryland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of a criminal appeal filed by the convict challenging his conviction and life sentence under Section 302(b) PPC, alongside a criminal revision petition filed by the complainant seeking enhancement of the sentence to capital punishment. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, along with co-accused, attacked the deceased and an injured witness following an ongoing land dispute, causing fatal injuries. The Balochistan High Court evaluated the ocular evidence, injured witness testimony, medical reports, and the prolonged abscondence of the appellant for over three years. The Court held that the testimony of an injured eye-witness is reliable and carries strong evidentiary value. It further observed that close relatives would not normally substitute an innocent person for the real culprit, and abscondence without plausible explanation constitutes strong corroborative evidence of guilt. Finally, because multiple accused were involved and it could not be conclusively determined whose blow inflicted the fatal head injury, life imprisonment was deemed appropriate. Both the appeal and revision petition were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of an injured eye-witness can form the basis for conviction in a murder trial?
  • Whether prolonged abscondence by an accused soon after the crime serves as an incriminating piece of evidence?
  • Can the evidence of close relatives of the deceased be disregarded solely on the ground of their relationship?
  • Whether uncertainty as to which of multiple co-accused delivered the fatal blow constitutes a mitigating factor justifying life imprisonment instead of the death penalty?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraj-ur-Rehman Jasra vs Government of Punjab, etc.K.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 316 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-24Read full judgment →
• Siraj-Ur-Rehman Jasra vs Government of Punjab etc2017 PLJ Lahore 911 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-25Read full judgment →
• Siraj-Ur-Rehman Jasra vs Government of Punjab and others2017 PLC (C.S.) 1361 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-25
  recruitment policyage eligibilitycut-off dateadministrative fairnesslegitimate expectationPunjab Public Service Commissioncivil service recruitment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns writ petitions challenging the Punjab Public Service Commission's (PPSC) imposition of a specific cut-off date (01.01.2017) for determining age eligibility for the post of Assistant District Public Prosecutor. The core legal question was whether the PPSC could enforce this statutory cut-off date, derived from Rule 18(2) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Services) Rules, 1974, after years of ignoring it in previous recruitment cycles, without providing adequate public notice of the policy change. The Court held that the PPSC’s past negligence in failing to apply the rule created a practice that misled applicants. Consequently, the Court allowed the petitions, granting a one-time exemption to allow candidates to qualify based on the application deadline of 14.09.2017. The Court established the principle that while statutory bodies are bound by recruitment rules, they cannot suddenly enforce long-ignored provisions without transparent public notice, as doing so prejudices applicants who relied on established past practices. Future compliance with the rules must be accompanied by proper public dissemination.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory body enforce a long-ignored rule regarding recruitment eligibility without providing prior public notice?
  • Does a consistent past practice of a public service commission create a legitimate expectation for candidates regarding age eligibility criteria?
  • Is the Punjab Public Service Commission required to publicize its policy decisions regarding recruitment criteria to the general public?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraj vs State, etc.PLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 266 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-01-20Read full judgment →
• Siraj ur Rehman Jasra vs Government of Punjab, etc2017 LHC 3184, 2017 PLJ Lahore 911 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-25Read full judgment →
• Siraj Ahmad vs Registrar Lahore High Court Lahore.2021 MLD 1234, 2017 LHC 595 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-24Read full judgment →
• Sinotec Co. Limited vs Province of Sindh & others2017 SHC 322 · Sindh High Court · 2017-09-15
  public procurementWorld Bank guidelinespre-qualificationtender awardinterlocutory injunctionjudicial reviewconflict of lawslowest bidder
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit was filed seeking a declaration that the acceptance of the financial bid of defendant No.6 for the Sindh Barrages Improvement Project was in violation of the Sindh Public Procurement Rules 2010, along with applications for injunctive relief and suspension of the letter of acceptance. The core legal questions involved whether the Sindh Public Procurement Rules 2010 or the World Bank Procurement Guidelines applied to the international donor-funded project, whether the pre-qualification and bidding process was transparent and lawful, and whether the plaintiff was entitled to interlocutory injunctions. The Sindh High Court held that pursuant to Rule 5 of the Sindh Public Procurement Rules 2010, where rules conflict with obligations under an international financial institution agreement, the international guidelines prevail, rendering the provincial rules inapplicable. The court further held that the tender and pre-qualification process conducted under World Bank guidelines with the World Bank's concurrence was fair, transparent, and free from mala fides, and that the plaintiff, whose bid was substantially higher than the successful lowest bidder, had failed to make out a prima facie case for injunctive relief. Consequently, the court dismissed the interlocutory applications, establishing that international financing guidelines override inconsistent local procurement rules in donor-funded public projects.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Sindh Public Procurement Rules 2010 apply to public procurement projects financed by international financial institutions when inconsistent with international loan agreements and guidelines?
  • Does a procurement process conducted and approved in accordance with World Bank Procurement Guidelines override local provincial procurement rules?
  • Whether a disappointed bidder with a higher financial offer has a vested right to challenge a tender awarded to a substantially lower responsive bidder in the absence of established mala fides?
  • What are the prerequisites for granting an interlocutory injunction in commercial tender disputes concerning major public infrastructure projects?
  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Rural Support Organization (Srso) through Authorised Attorney2017 PLD Sindh 79 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-24Read full judgment →
• Sindh Revenue Board through its Chairman, Government of Sindh and another vs The Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan through its Airport Manager, Jinnah International Airport, Karachi2017 [M] C.L.R. 1054 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  federalismprovincial taxationsales tax on servicesconstitutional interpretationCivil Aviation Authorityintergovernmental immunitylegislative competenceFederal Legislative List
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition filed by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) challenging the imposition of sales tax on services by the Sindh Revenue Board under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011. The core legal question was whether a provincial legislature is constitutionally competent to impose sales tax on a federal regulatory authority performing functions enumerated in the Federal Legislative List. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the CAA performs functions within the exclusive sphere of the Federal Legislature, including the regulation of civil aviation and air navigation. The Court reasoned that the provincial legislature cannot tax the operations of a federal regulatory body, as doing so would interfere with federal constitutional powers and undermine the Federation. The Court affirmed the principle that provincial legislatures must operate within their allotted sphere and cannot encroach upon federal legislative domains. Consequently, the Court declared that the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 and its associated Rules are void to the extent they attempt to impose sales tax on the CAA, as such taxation is contrary to the constitutional distribution of powers.

  Questions settled

  • Does a provincial legislature have the constitutional power to impose sales tax on services provided by a federal regulatory authority like the Civil Aviation Authority?
  • Are the functions performed by the Civil Aviation Authority within the exclusive legislative domain of the Federal Legislature?
  • Does the imposition of provincial sales tax on a federal body constitute an unconstitutional interference with federal functions?
  • Can the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 validly impose tax on services provided by the Civil Aviation Authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Revenue Board through its Chairman, Government of Sindh and another vs Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan through its Airport Manager, Jinnah International Airport, Karachi2017 PLJ SC 558 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales tax on servicesfederal legislative listprovincial autonomyinter-governmental immunityregulatory authorityconstitutional competencecivil aviation authorityEighteenth Amendment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether the Sindh provincial legislature and revenue board are constitutionally empowered to impose sales tax on services provided by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), a federal regulatory authority established under the Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority Ordinance, 1982. The Sindh High Court had allowed the CAA's petition and quashed the tax demands, relying on inter-governmental immunity and an analogy with earlier jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the ultimate result but on different constitutional grounds. The core legal question centered on whether provincial tax authorities can levy sales tax on a federal regulatory body performing functions enumerated in the Federal Legislative List. The Court held that the CAA performs sovereign, regulatory, and statutory functions within the exclusive legislative and executive domain of the Federation under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Consequently, provincial legislation attempting to tax such federal instrumentalities violates the distribution of legislative powers under Article 142(a) and encroaches upon federal subjects. The key principle laid down is that provincial legislatures lack the constitutional competence to levy sales tax on the statutory functions and services of federal regulatory authorities, as doing so undermines the Federation and exceeds provincial taxing powers.

  Questions settled

  • Does a provincial legislature have the constitutional competence under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to impose sales tax on services provided by a federal regulatory authority like the Civil Aviation Authority?
  • Whether statutory duties and regulatory functions performed by a federal body under the Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority Ordinance, 1982 constitute taxable services under provincial sales tax laws?
  • Does the insertion of the exception for sales tax on services in Item 49 of the Federal Legislative List by the Eighteenth Amendment empower a province to tax federal instrumentalities?
  • Can provincial revenue authorities levy taxes that directly burden or interfere with the execution of powers by the Federal Government and its statutory organs?
  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Revenue Board through Chairman Government of Sindh and another vs The Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan through Airport Manager2017 SCMR 1344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-29
  constitutional lawfederalismprovincial autonomysales tax on servicesCivil Aviation Authorityfederal regulatory bodylegislative competenceintergovernmental immunityArticle 165(1) of the ConstitutionEighteenth Amendment
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard an appeal challenging a Sindh High Court decision that declared the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) not liable to pay sales tax on services under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, and Rules, 2011. The core legal question was whether the Sindh Legislature possessed the constitutional power to impose sales tax on services provided by CAA, a federal regulatory body, and if CAA was exempt under Article 165(1) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision that CAA was not liable, but for different reasons. The Court held that a province cannot impose sales tax on CAA, as it performs functions within the exclusive domain of the Federal Legislature and is a federal regulatory authority. Taxing such an entity would impede federal functions, violate the federal structure, and contravene Article 142(a) of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that the power to tax involves the power to destroy, and the insertion of "except sales tax on services" in Article 49 of the Federal Legislative List did not grant provinces the power to tax federal entities.

  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Revenue Board through Assistant Commissioner vs Messrs2017 PTD 1225 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-23
  sales taxtax penaltyassessment ordertax liabilitySindh Revenue Boardreference applicationtaxable services
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application arose from an order of the Appellate Tribunal, Sindh Revenue Board, which had partially set aside penalties imposed on a taxpayer. The core legal question was whether a penalty for non-payment of sales tax under Serial No. 3 of the Table under Section 43 of the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, could be validly imposed in the absence of a formal assessment order determining the tax liability under Section 23 of the same Act. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, reasoning that the imposition of a penalty for non-payment of tax presupposes a determination of the tax liability itself. Since no assessment order had been passed under Section 23 to establish the specific amount of tax due, the penalty under Section 43 could not be legally sustained. Consequently, the Court dismissed the reference application in limine, affirming that a penalty for non-payment of tax cannot be imposed without a prior assessment determining the actual tax liability.

  Questions settled

  • Can a penalty for non-payment of sales tax be imposed under Section 43 of the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, without a prior assessment order under Section 23 of the same Act?
  • Is a formal determination of tax liability a prerequisite for imposing penalties for non-payment of tax under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011?
  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Revenue Board through Assistant Commissioner vs Messrs Habib2017 PTD 1141 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-28Read full judgment →
• Sindh Revenue Board through Assistant Commissioner vs Askari Bank2017 PTD 2456 · Sindh High Court · 2017-09-11Read full judgment →
• Sindh Institute of Urology and Transplantation through Authorized2017 PTD 603 · Sindh High Court · 2015-10-06Read full judgment →
• Silk Bank Limited (Formerly Saudi Pak Commercial Bank Limited)2017 CLD 496 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-09Read full judgment →
• Sikander Mustafa Khan and 6 others vs Head of Department2017 CLD 759 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-03-30Read full judgment →
• Sikander Ali Solangi vs StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Karachi) 971 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-05
  criminal appealmurder convictionreasonable doubtwitness credibilitymaterial contradictionsacquittalprosecution evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and compensation under Section 344-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt given the evidence presented. The High Court observed substantial contradictions in the testimonies of the complainant, eyewitnesses, and police officials regarding the timing of the incident, the arrival at the hospital, the post-mortem procedures, and the recovery of the weapon. The court held that the prosecution witnesses were dishonest and the case appeared tainted by malice, likely stemming from an existing enmity. Consequently, the court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The judgment reinforces the principle that where prosecution evidence is riddled with material contradictions and lacks credibility, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of material contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses warrant the acquittal of an accused in a murder case?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution evidence is found to be tainted by malice and lacks corroboration?
  • What is the effect on the prosecution's case when the medical evidence and the testimonies of eyewitnesses regarding the timing and circumstances of a crime are in direct conflict?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikander Ali Qureshi vs Chairman, National Accountability Bureau2017 P Cr. L J 269 · Sindh High Court · 2015-12-29
  post-arrest bailmedical groundsNational Accountability Bureaucorruption and corrupt practicesSub-RegistrarCapital Value Taxfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 seeking the quashment of a pending inquiry, medical board constitution, and post-arrest bail. The petitioner, a Sub-Registrar, was accused by the National Accountability Bureau of registering 422 sale deeds with malafidely lesser amounts collected for Capital Value Tax, Stamp Duty, and Registration Fee, causing a loss to the government exchequer. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on merits and on medical grounds given his chronic illnesses and the documentary nature of the evidence. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution prima facie failed to show a criminal act of a financial nature under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999, considering clarification letters regarding tax collection procedures and delays in initiating action. The court ruled that the case fell within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and granted bail both on merits and due to the petitioner's acute sickness and need for specialized medical treatment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail when the prosecution's case is entirely based on documentary evidence already in the custody of investigative authorities?
  • Does a chronic and acute sickness requiring specialized medical treatment that cannot be provided within jail premises entitle an accused to bail on medical grounds?
  • Whether the failure of authorities to provide a plausible explanation for a prolonged delay in initiating inquiry proceedings constitutes a ground for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Sher vs ZTBL & another2017 PHC 1202 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-07Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Khan, etc. vs The State, etc.K.L.R. 2017 Criminal Cases 23 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-28
  murderbenefit of doubtante-timed FIRinterested witnessesmedical and ocular contradictionabscondencecriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Sections 302(b), 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside a connected criminal revision for sentence enhancement. The core legal questions involve the credibility of interested eyewitnesses, the legal effect of an ante-timed First Information Report, contradictions between medical and ocular evidence, and the evidentiary value of abscondence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to glaring discrepancies, an ante-timed FIR, lack of safe custody of recovered weapons, and failure to produce a crucial independent witness. Consequently, the court laid down that an ante-timed FIR loses its authenticity and renders the prosecution version doubtful, and mere abscondence cannot substitute for substantive incriminating evidence. The appeal was accepted, the convictions and sentences were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted on the benefit of the doubt, while the revision petition for enhancement was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ante-timed First Information Report loses its value and authenticity in criminal trials?
  • Can an accused be convicted solely on the basis of abscondence in the absence of substantive incriminating evidence?
  • What is the evidentiary consequence when medical evidence contradicts the ocular account regarding the seat and nature of injuries?
  • Whether an adverse inference can be drawn under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 for withholding a natural independent witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Ilyas and anothe vs State and anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 836 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-21
  post-arrest bailprinciple of consistencyexplosive substancesanti-terrorismcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves post-arrest bail applications arising from FIR No. 44 dated 9.5.2016 registered under Sections 7 and 9 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance 1965, and Section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act at Police Station CTD, District Multan, following the alleged recovery of explosive substances from the petitioners. The core legal question is whether the petitioners are entitled to post-arrest bail on the ground of consistency when their co-accused, facing similar allegations and circumstances, has already been granted bail by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Lahore High Court held that the principle of consistency applies squarely to the petitioners since the prosecution failed to distinguish their case from that of the co-accused. Consequently, the court admitted the petitioners to post-arrest bail. The key legal principle laid down is that where co-accused persons face identical allegations and circumstances, the principle of consistency mandates that the benefit of bail granted to one must be extended to the others.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the principle of consistency applies when granting post-arrest bail to co-accused persons facing similar allegations?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail if a co-accused with identical recovery allegations has already been granted bail by the Supreme Court?
  • Does failure by the prosecution to distinguish a petitioner's case from a released co-accused warrant the grant of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Hayat Khan through L.Rs, and others vs Mst. Khatoon alias2017 CLC 664 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-13
  civil procedureex parte decreeinheritanceIslamic law of inheritancewillconstitutional petitionlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges orders passed by lower courts dismissing an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which sought to set aside an ex parte judgment and decree dating back to 1969. The core legal question revolves around whether an ex parte decree affecting inheritance rights can be sustained when based upon an unproven and invalid will that purports to bequeath the entire estate contrary to Islamic law, and whether lower courts failed to exercise jurisdiction by dismissing the application on procedural technicalities without examining the legality of the underlying will. The Lahore High Court held that the trial and revisional courts committed material irregularities by ignoring the mandatory legal duty to examine the validity of the will and failing to protect undisputed inheritance rights against technicalities. The court established the principle that inheritance rights protected by Shariah cannot be defeated by limitation or mere procedural defaults, and that an ex parte decree premised on a bequest exceeding one-third of the estate without the heirs' consent is legally unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ex parte decree can be sustained when it is granted on the basis of a will that bequeaths the entire property in violation of Islamic law?
  • Can legal heirs be deprived of their valuable right of inheritance on the basis of procedural technicalities or mere non-appearance?
  • Whether a revisional court is duty-bound to take cognizance of a serious legal infirmity and jurisdictional defect apparent on the face of the record?
  • Does the law of limitation defeat the right of succession in matters of inheritance governed by Shariah?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Ali vs Principal Chandka Medical College, Larkana and 22017 PLC (C.S.) 562 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-27
  constitutional petitionleave vacancytermination of serviceres judicatalachesservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a constitutional petition seeking restoration and confirmation of his employment as a Chowkidar/Peon, along with back benefits, claiming he had been appointed on a temporary basis in 1982 and 1984. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, whose services were terminated in 1985 upon the return of regular employees from leave, could maintain a second petition for the same relief based on alleged discriminatory treatment compared to other employees. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. It observed that the petitioner's previous petition for the same relief had already been dismissed. Furthermore, the Court held that an appointment made strictly on a leave vacancy basis creates no vested right to permanent employment or restoration. The key principle laid down is that a petition seeking relief previously denied in earlier proceedings is barred, and an employee appointed against a temporary leave vacancy cannot claim a legal right to continued service or regularization once the regular incumbent returns.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee appointed against a leave vacancy claim a right to permanent restoration?
  • Is a second constitutional petition maintainable for the same relief previously dismissed by the Court?
  • Does a news report regarding other employees provide a valid legal basis for claiming restoration of service?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Ali vs Ali Akber2017 CLD 508 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-18Read full judgment →
• Sifat Ullah vs the State2017 PHC 294 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-04-03Read full judgment →
• Sidney Green vs The Law Society of Manitoba Federation of Law Societies of Canada2017 SCMR 1070 · Supreme Court of CanadaRead full judgment →
• Shri Venkateshwara University Through its Registrar and Another vs Union2017 SCInd 1278 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-09-01Read full judgment →
• (1) Shozab Shah & 2 others (2) Altaf Raza & 2 others (3) Mst.Noor Habib (4)2017 LHC 4466 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-29
  murderdeath sentencebenefit of doubtocular accountmotiveprivate complaintappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the convictions and death sentences of the appellants under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, recorded by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sheikhupura, arising out of a private complaint regarding a double murder. The core legal questions involved the credibility of the ocular account, the plausibility of the alleged motive, the evidentiary value of recoveries, and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution case was fraught with serious doubts, contradictions, and unnatural circumstances, including questionable presence of eyewitnesses, unproven motive, and failure of forensic corroboration. Consequently, the court extended the benefit of doubt to the appellants, set aside their convictions, acquitted them of the charges, and answered the murder reference in the negative. The key legal principles laid down are that when the prosecution's foundational elements such as motive and eyewitness presence are rendered unnatural and doubtful, and where recoveries do not support the crime, convictions for capital punishment cannot be sustained, and the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated ocular account of an interested witness can sustain a conviction for capital punishment when the presence of the witness is unnatural?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to establish a plausible motive weaken the case against the accused in a capital trial?
  • Whether information leading to the alleged disposal of weapons in a canal constitutes admissible information under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Can adverse inferences be drawn under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 when forensic comparison of recovered casings and weapons is not undertaken?
  Read full judgment →
• Show Cause Notice Issued to Pakistan Bahria Town (Pvt.) Limited_ In the matter of vs N_a2017 CLD 881 · Competition Commission of Pakistan · 2017-01-27Read full judgment →
• Show Cause Notice Issued to Messrs Society of Accounting Education2017 CLD 1057 · Competition Commission of Pakistan · 2016-12-14Read full judgment →
• Show Cause Notice Issued to Messrs JCR-Vis Credit Rating Company2017 CLD 1003 · Competition Commission of Pakistan · 2017-01-27Read full judgment →
• Shoukat Rasheed and others vs The State through NAB2017 P Cr. L J 696 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-10-19
  acquittal at early stagecriminal revisionnational accountabilityillegal investigationtrial expedition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed criminal revision petitions against the dismissal of their petitions under section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by the Accountability Court Gilgit-Baltistan, which had refused to acquit them of charges under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in refusing acquittal under section 265-K, Cr.P.C., given alleged illegalities in the investigation and low probability of conviction. The court held that section 265-K, Cr.P.C., is an exception where discretion should be exercised only if there is no possibility or probability of conviction, and summary proceedings should not be used to stifle prosecution at an infancy stage when factual controversies require trial. The court laid down the principle that while section 265-K permits early acquittal without recording evidence when no case for conviction exists, it cannot be invoked prematurely to resolve complex factual controversies, though protracted trials warrant expedited proceedings. The revision petitions were dismissed in limine with a direction to conclude the trial within three months.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be invoked to stifle a prosecution case at its infancy stage?
  • What are the mandatory prerequisites for a court to exercise discretion for acquittal under section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can legal and factual controversies regarding the validity of an investigation be resolved through summary proceedings in a revision petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Shoaib-Ur-Rehman and 2 others vs Abdul Hadi and 13 others2017 PLJ Peshawar 38 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-01-04Read full judgment →
• Shoaib Warsi and another vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 PLD Sindh 243 · Sindh High Court · 2016-07-01
  post-arrest bailillegal arrestillegal detentionNAB OrdinanceAnti-Terrorism Actconstitutional petitionauthorization of inquiryauthorization of investigationinordinate delay in trialmisuse of authoritycorruptionfundamental rightsfair trialdue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment concerns two constitutional petitions seeking post-arrest bail for petitioners Shoaib Warsi and Zuhair Siddiqui, former officials of SSGCL, who were arrested by Pakistan Rangers Sindh under Section 11EEEE(1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and subsequently handed over to NAB authorities. The core legal questions revolved around the legality of their initial arrest and ninety-day detention without a court order, the validity of NAB's authorization for inquiry and investigation concerning Reference No. 19/2016, compliance with constitutional safeguards under Article 10, and the impact of inordinate delay in the trial proceedings. The Sindh High Court granted bail, holding that the arrest and detention were patently illegal and without lawful authority, as there was no proper authorization for inquiry or investigation by the Chairman NAB specific to the allegations in Reference No. 19/2016 at the time of their arrest or transfer to NAB custody. The court found that the petitioners were not issued call-up notices under Section 19 of the NAB Ordinance, 1999, nor confronted with allegations, violating due process. Furthermore, the inordinate delay of over a year in the trial, with no charge framed or witnesses examined, coupled with the lack of specific incriminating material connecting the petitioners to the alleged corruption or personal benefit, constituted sufficient grounds for bail. The court emphasized that NAB authorities must act strictly in accordance with law, ensuring proper authorization, tangible evidence, and respect for fundamental rights to liberty and fair trial, and that undue haste or mala fide actions render proceedings dubious.

  Read full judgment →
• Shoaib Farooq vs Secretary Forests Department, Muzaffarabad and 62017 [M] C.L.R. 1623 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-12-24
  death packagecivil servants appointmentfinance department competencerules of businessmandatory advertisementcontract appointmentwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition filed under Section 44 of the AJ&K Interim Constitution Act, 1974 sought to set aside the appointment orders of private respondents as Junior Clerks and to direct the official respondents to appoint the petitioner under the "Assistance Package For Families Of Government Employees Who Die In Service" dated 12.09.2006. The core legal question was whether the Finance Department's office memorandum providing for contract employment without advertisement for deceased employees' families has the force of law and overrides statutory service rules. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Finance Department lacks competence under the Rules of Business to regulate civil service appointments and that the memorandum violates the AJ&K Civil Servants Act, 1976 and the AJ&K Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977. The court laid down the principle that any policy decision, instruction, or office memorandum altering the terms and conditions of civil servants or providing alternative modes of recruitment contrary to statutory service rules is without lawful authority and void, and that all initial appointments must be made on merit through the prescribed selection committee after public advertisement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Finance Department possess the legal competence under the Rules of Business to provide a mechanism for employment in government service?
  • Whether an office memorandum or assistance package issued by the Finance Department can override the provisions of the AJ&K Civil Servants Act, 1976 and rules framed thereunder?
  • Can initial appointments to civil posts in grade BS-1 to BS-15 be made without public advertisement of the vacancies?
  • Does an assistance package for families of government employees who die in service carry the force of law if it violates statutory appointment procedures?
  Read full judgment →
• Shoaib Farooq vs Secretary Forests Department and 6 others2017 PLJ AJ&K 180 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-12-24
  civil service appointmentdeath packagestatutory rulesrecruitment procedureadhoc appointmentFinance Department competencewrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the appointment of private respondents as Junior Clerks and sought the petitioner's appointment under the 'Assistance Package for Families of Government Employees Who Die In Service' (Death Package) dated 12.09.2006. The core legal question was whether an office memorandum issued by the Finance Department, providing for employment without advertisement, could override the statutory framework governing civil service appointments. The Court held that the Finance Department lacks the competence to establish mechanisms for government employment, as such authority is vested in the government under the AJ&K Civil Servants Act, 1976. The Court ruled that the 'Death Package' memorandum, insofar as it bypasses mandatory recruitment procedures, is ineffective and violative of the AJ&K Civil Servants Act, 1976 and the AJ&K Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977. The key principle laid down is that any policy or instruction contrary to established service rules, issued by an authority lacking rule-making competence, holds no legal force, and all civil service appointments must strictly adhere to the prescribed statutory selection and advertisement procedures.

  Questions settled

  • Does an office memorandum issued by the Finance Department providing for employment without advertisement have the force of law?
  • Is the Finance Department competent to prescribe mechanisms for government employment under the Rules of Business, 1985?
  • Can an adhoc appointment be made without advertising the post in accordance with the AJ&K Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977?
  • Does an assistance package for families of deceased employees override the statutory requirements for civil service appointments?
  Read full judgment →
• Shireen Arshad Khan, Chairperson Aik Hunar Aik Nagar (Ahan) vs Director, (Corporatization and Compliance Department) Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan2017 CLD 531 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2016-07-12
  show cause noticepenal proceedingsnot-for-profit companyremuneration prohibitionsecurities and exchange commission of pakistannatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under section 33 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 against an order passed by the Respondent imposing a penalty and directing a refund of unauthorized amounts received by the Appellant, the Chairperson of a not-for-profit company, allegedly in violation of Rule 6(4)(ii) of the Companies (General Provisions and Forms) Rules, 1985. The core legal question was whether penal proceedings and an impugned order could be sustained against the Appellant when no show cause notice was directly issued or served upon her in accordance with mandatory legal requirements. The appellate bench held that issuing a show cause notice only to the company, with a mere instruction for circulation to directors, does not fulfill the statutory requirement of serving notice on the individual person against whom penal action is taken. Consequently, the appellate bench set aside the impugned order as void and without lawful authority. The key principle laid down is that personal service of a show cause notice to the individual concerned is a mandatory prerequisite under section 476(3) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 before any penal liability or fine can be legally imposed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a penal order passed against an individual director or chairperson is valid when the show cause notice was issued solely to the company?
  • Does the issuance of a show cause notice to a company constitute valid service upon its individual directors for the purpose of imposing personal penalties under the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Can penal action be sustained against a person who was not served with a show cause notice in accordance with section 476(3) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  Read full judgment →
• Shero and 23 others vs Secretary Defence Islamabad Pakistan and 32017 YLR 1417 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-11-30
  declaration and possessionrevenue recordmisreading of evidenceownership titlelandlord and tenantrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a suit for declaration, possession, and recovery of rent regarding the suit property, claiming ownership based on revenue records. The trial court returned the plaint regarding the claim of rent for lack of jurisdiction over landlord-tenant matters, but found in favor of the petitioners on ownership and other material issues. On appeal, the District Judge dismissed the suit and rejected the plaint, holding that the petitioners failed to prove their title and that the land was government property. The petitioners filed a revision petition before the Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court. The High Court held that the appellate court misread the revenue records and erred in reversing the findings on ownership without cross-objections from the respondents. The revision petition was accepted, setting aside the lower appellate court's judgment, and a decree for ownership was granted in favor of the petitioners while maintaining the trial court's order regarding the claim for rent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can reverse findings on ownership without a proper cross-objection or challenge by the opposing party?
  • Does a trial court lack jurisdiction to adjudicate rent claims in a suit involving a dispute over ownership between alleged landlords and tenants?
  • Whether entries in revenue records reflecting mutations and proprietary rights sufficiently establish ownership when left unrebutted?
  Read full judgment →
• Sherin vs State and anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 334 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-11-18
  post-arrest bailineffective firingcommon objectfurther inquiryabscondencecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the accused, Sherin, who was charged under Sections 302, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in connection with a murder case. The petitioner sought bail after his initial application was rejected by the Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was attributed an ineffective role of firing at the complainant, was entitled to bail despite allegations of common intention and a history of abscondence. The Court held that the petitioner's case fell within the scope of 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the determination of his specific role and common intention required the recording of evidence. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that abscondence does not operate as a bar to the grant of bail when the case otherwise falls within the ambit of Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court accepted the bail application, subject to the furnishing of bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does an allegation of ineffective firing in furtherance of a common object warrant further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  • Can bail be granted to an accused person who has absconded if the case otherwise falls within the scope of further inquiry?
  • Is the attribution of an ineffective role of firing sufficient to deny bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheraz vs The State2017 P Cr. L J 561 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-02
  post-arrest bailforeigners actforged passportnational statusfurther inquirydocumentary evidencepakistani citizenship
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant Sheraz against the rejection of his earlier bail plea by the Sessions Judge, Malir at Karachi. The applicant was charged under sections 420, 468, 471, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sections 3(2), 13, and 14 of the Foreigners Act 1946, and rules 3 and 4 of the Foreigners Order 1951, after being offloaded from a flight on suspicion of holding a forged passport and disputing his Pakistani nationality. The core legal question concerned whether post-arrest bail should be granted when the prosecution's case rests on documentary evidence, when the applicant's nationality requires further inquiry, and when state functionaries involved have not been proceeded against. The Sindh High Court allowed the bail application, holding that where a case depends on documentary evidence already in the prosecution's possession with no risk of tampering, where the applicant's nationality is supported by various official documents pending verification, and where no action is taken against potentially complicit state functionaries, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when a criminal case entirely depends on documentary evidence already in the possession of the prosecution?
  • Does a genuine dispute regarding the national status of an accused who produces official identity documents make the case one of further inquiry warranting bail?
  • Does the failure to investigate or take action against state functionaries allegedly involved in issuing disputed documents entitle an accused to the concession of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Wali vs Sakhawat Dar and others2017 P.S.C. (Crl.) 915 · Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit Baltistan · 2017-09-09
  criminal appealmurderconfessionrecoveryjuvenile trialacquittaldeath sentence conversionappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a judgment of the Chief Court which acquitted the respondents of murder charges, setting aside the trial court's conviction. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of inculpatory judicial confessions recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the evidentiary value of recoveries made pursuant to Article 40 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and the implications of conducting a joint trial of a juvenile without adhering to special juvenile procedures. The Supreme Appellate Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case against the primary respondent beyond a reasonable doubt through consistent testimonies, voluntary confessions, and corroborative recoveries. However, concerning the juvenile respondent, his acquittal by the Chief Court was maintained due to the failure to conduct a separate trial under juvenile laws. The court laid down principles regarding the admissibility of recoveries under Article 40, the evaluation of inculpatory confessions, and the mandatory nature of separate trials for juveniles in criminal administration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether inculpatory confessions recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can form the basis of a conviction when corroborated by recoveries and ocular testimony?
  • Does the failure to conduct a separate trial for a juvenile accused vitiate the trial proceedings against them?
  • Whether the death sentence can be converted to life imprisonment in view of mitigating circumstances and the overall facts of the case?
  • Are weapon and dead body recoveries admissible under Article 40 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984 on the pointation of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Shah vs Alam Sher2017 CLC 378 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-02-24Read full judgment →
• Sher Salam through L.Rs, and anothers vs Sher Alam and 8 others2017 CLC 152 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-04-11Read full judgment →
• Sher Rehman vs State2017 PHC 936 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-09Read full judgment →
• Sher Rehman vs Mst.Kharo & others2017 PHC 1030 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-17Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad vs The State and another2017 MLD 870 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-08
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryprinciple of consistencycross-casevicarious liabilitymurdercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition concerns an application for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, who is charged under sections 302, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, in connection with a murder and assault case. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to bail based on the principle of consistency with co-accused, the completion of the investigation, and the existence of a cross-case involving injuries to the accused. The Lahore High Court granted the petitioner post-arrest bail. The court held that since the investigation was finalized and the challan submitted, the petitioner's physical custody was unnecessary. Furthermore, the court observed that the petitioner's case was analogous to co-accused already granted bail, and the existence of injuries on the accused side, despite a questionable medical board report, necessitated further inquiry into the guilt of the accused. The court affirmed the principle that where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a case requires further probe into the guilt of the accused, bail under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of consistency apply when granting post-arrest bail to a co-accused whose role is similar to those already released?
  • Is the physical custody of an accused necessary for investigation once the challan has been submitted under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the existence of injuries on the accused side in a cross-case constitute grounds for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Jamal & others vs Wali Sardar alias Ali Sardar & others2017 SCP 1020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-21
  public interest litigationfundamental rightsfreedom of movementright to liferight to educationdharnaSupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court upon an application for adjournment due to road blockades caused by a public demonstration or dharna in the capital city of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The core legal question concerns the infringement of citizens' fundamental rights, including the right to life, freedom of movement, and the right to education, due to the unauthorized blocking of public highways and roads by protesters. The Court held that the prevailing situation involving the blocking of public thoroughfares and hindrance of access to courts, hospitals, and schools constitutes a matter of public interest prima facie infringing fundamental rights under the Constitution. Consequently, the Court took cognizance of the matter under Article 184(3) of the Constitution and issued notices to key state functionaries, including the Attorney General for Pakistan, Secretary Interior, and Secretary Defence, directing them to submit reports on measures taken to protect and enforce constitutional rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does the blocking of public highways and roads by protesters infringe upon the fundamental rights of citizens under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the Supreme Court take cognizance under Article 184(3) of the Constitution when public access to courts, schools, and hospitals is impeded by widespread protests?
  • What obligations do state functionaries have to ensure the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights during public demonstrations?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Hakeem vs The State2017 SHC 222 · Sindh High Court
  explosive substancesunlicensed armsbenefit of doubtcontradiction in recoverysection 342 statementanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellant under Section 23(1)-A of the Sindh Arms Act 2013, Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act 1908, and Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the prosecution's evidence regarding the recovery of unlicensed weapons and explosives, material discrepancies in identifying the explosive device, and the legal effect of omitting to put material documents to the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Sindh High Court held that glaring contradictions between the recovery memos and inspection reports—specifically confusing a hand grenade with a rifle grenade—alongside failures to confront the accused with crucial reports during his Section 342 statement, were fatal to the prosecution's case. The court laid down the principle that material discrepancies in identifying recovered items and omissions in recording a statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. create appreciable doubt, warranting the extension of the benefit of doubt and acquittal of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a discrepancy between the recovery memo describing a hand grenade and the inspection report examining a rifle grenade is fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Does the failure to confront an accused with material inspection reports during the recording of his statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 preclude such documents from being used as evidence?
  • Whether material contradictions regarding weapon and explosive descriptions warrant extending the benefit of the doubt to the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Badshah etc. vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary States2017 PLJ Peshawar 86 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Sher Ali vs State2017 PHC 850 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-20
  Qatl-i-amdbenefit of doubtchance witnesspost-mortem reportcapital punishmentcriminal appealFIR delaywitness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence awarded to the appellant for the Qatl-i-amd of the deceased. The core legal questions concern the reliability of eyewitness testimony, the impact of significant discrepancies between the FIR and medical evidence, and the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a capital conviction. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution case was riddled with fatal flaws, including the post-mortem examination occurring prior to the registration of the FIR, which undermined the foundation of the case. Furthermore, the court noted that the eyewitnesses were chance witnesses whose presence was doubtful, and that material improvements were made in their statements to align with medical findings regarding the entry wound. The court emphasized that when an alleged motive remains unproven, the prosecution must suffer the consequences. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, establishing the principle that discrepancies, contradictions, and improvements in prosecution evidence, coupled with an unproven motive, entitle an accused to the benefit of the doubt, regardless of prior abscondence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a post-mortem examination conducted prior to the registration of an FIR invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when material improvements are made to witness statements to align with medical evidence?
  • Is the abscondence of an accused sufficient grounds for conviction in the absence of reliable evidence?
  • What is the legal consequence when a motive is alleged in an FIR but remains unproven at trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Afzal etc vs The State2017 PHC 599 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-17Read full judgment →
• Shell Pakistan Limited through duly constituted AttorneyApplicant vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and 2 others2017 CLC 244 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-03Read full judgment →
• Shell Employees Union through General Secretary vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary and another2017 PLC 19 · Sindh High Court · 2016-04-27
  Workers' Participation FundWorkers' Welfare FundTrade UnionCollective Bargaining AgentAccrued InterestLabour LawStatutory Interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a dispute between a trade union and a company regarding the distribution of interest and profits accrued on the Workers' Participation Fund (WPF). The core legal question was whether the interest accrued on investments made by the Board of Trustees from the surplus of the WPF should be distributed among the workers or transferred to the Workers' Welfare Fund (WWF). The Court held that the accrued interest and profits must be distributed among the workers. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the Court determined that the scheme under the Companies Profits (Workers Participation) Act, 1968, mandates that the entire income of the fund, including capital gains and accrued interest, is intended for the workers. The Court rejected the contention that such interest should be transferred to the WWF, clarifying that only amounts remaining after unit allocation are transferred to the WWF. Consequently, the Court ordered that any interest previously credited to the government be refunded to the Board of Trustees for distribution to the workers, thereby affirming the workers' entitlement to the benefits derived from the fund's investments.

  Questions settled

  • Does the interest accrued on investments made by the Board of Trustees from the surplus of the Workers' Participation Fund belong to the workers?
  • Is a trade union an 'aggrieved person' for the purpose of challenging the distribution of funds under the Companies Profits (Workers Participation) Act, 1968?
  • Should the profit or markup accrued on the investment of the Workers' Participation Fund be transferred to the Workers' Welfare Fund or distributed among the workers?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Mehdi and 2 others vs The State and 4 othersK.L.R. 2017 Criminal Cases 116, 2017 P Cr. L J 488 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-08-19
  preventive jurisdictionbreach of peacemandatory procedurequashment of proceedingsattachment of propertymagisterial powersSection 112 Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging the legality of proceedings initiated by the Tehsildar/Magistrate 1st Class, Shiger, who bound down the petitioners under Sections 107/151, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and ordered the attachment of disputed property under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, following a police complaint regarding a land dispute. The core legal question was whether the Magistrate acted in accordance with the mandatory procedural requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before passing such orders. The Court held that the Magistrate acted in a hasty and slipshod manner by failing to issue a notice under Section 112, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which is a mandatory prerequisite for initiating proceedings under Section 107. Consequently, the Court quashed the orders of the Tehsildar and the subsequent dismissal of the revision petition by the Additional Sessions Judge. The judgment establishes that failure to adhere to the mandatory procedure prescribed in Section 112 renders the entire proceedings a nullity in the eyes of the law.

  Questions settled

  • Is the issuance of an order under Section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 a mandatory prerequisite for initiating proceedings under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the failure to follow the mandatory procedure prescribed in Section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 render the entire proceedings a nullity?
  • Can a Magistrate bind down parties and attach property under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without complying with the mandatory notice requirements of Section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Irfan Aziz vs Lt. Col. (R) Dr. Saeed Ahmed Sheikh2017 [M] C.L.R. 349 · Lahore High Court · 2016-06-03
  summary suitleave to defendlimitation periodcivil revisionGeneral Clauses Actdiscretionary reliefcomputation of time
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges an order of the Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, which granted unconditional leave to appear and defend a suit filed under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The petitioner contended that the leave petition was time-barred under Article 159 of the Limitation Act, 1908, as it was filed on the eleventh day after service of summons. Additionally, the petitioner argued that the trial court should have imposed conditions on the grant of leave. The Court addressed whether the calculation of the ten-day limitation period includes the date of service and whether conditions are mandatory for such leave. Holding that the petition was timely, the Court applied Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, ruling that the word "from" in the statute requires the exclusion of the first day of the period. Furthermore, the Court held that granting leave to defend is a discretionary power, and the trial court is not legally obligated to attach conditions if a prima facie case is established, ensuring the defendant receives a fair opportunity to defend.

  Questions settled

  • Does the ten-day limitation period for filing a petition for leave to appear and defend a suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 include the day of service?
  • Is a court legally obligated to attach conditions when granting leave to appear and defend a suit under the summary procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • How should the first day of a limitation period be computed when the statute uses the word 'from'?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Haroon Buksh vs Shaikh Tahir Buksh and 2 othersP D 2017 Sindh 563 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-10Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Arifur Rehman and another vs The SHO P.S. Khuram and another2017 PHC 783 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-24Read full judgment →