Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Engro Elengy Terminal (Pvt.) Ltd. through Authorized Representative vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division and 6 others2017 PTD 959 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-26
  customs dutyadvance income taxFloating Storage and Regasification Unitcivil suit maintainabilitytax exemptionfiscal statute interpretationalternate remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil suit was instituted by the plaintiff, an LNG terminal operator, seeking declarations and permanent injunctions against the levy of customs duty and advance income tax on the import of a Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU). The core legal questions concerned the maintainability of a civil suit in light of statutory bars and alternative remedies, whether the FSRU qualified for total exemption from customs duty under S.R.O. 678(I)/2004 as a temporary import, and whether the plaintiff was exempt from advance income tax under S.R.O. 947(I)/2008 and the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Sindh High Court held that the civil suit was maintainable because the customs authorities failed to pass a speaking assessment order containing reasons under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act 1897, rendering appellate remedies ineffective and bypassing statutory ouster clauses. On the merits, the court held that the FSRU is classified as plant, machinery, and equipment under clause 2(a) of S.R.O. 678(I)/2004, attracting a 5% customs duty and exempt from sales tax, but does not qualify for complete exemption under temporary import condition (vii) of the said S.R.O. Finally, the orders refusing an exemption certificate for advance income tax were set aside and remanded for reconsideration in light of subsequent legislative changes and tax holidays.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil suit is maintainable when customs authorities make an assessment without providing a reasoned order as mandated by Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act 1897?
  • Does a Floating Storage and Regasification Unit imported by an LNG terminal operator qualify for total exemption from customs duty as a temporary import under condition (vii) of S.R.O. 678(I)/2004?
  • Whether an importer can bypass departmental appellate remedies under the Customs Act 1969 in the absence of a speaking assessment order or decision?
  • Are LNG terminal operators entitled to exemption from advance income tax at the import stage under the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 and relevant statutory regulatory orders?
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• Engineers Study Forum (Registered) and another vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2017 PLJ SC 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil review petitionreview jurisdictionerror apparent on the face of recordaudi alteram partemregulation of court proceedingsre-hearing of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil review petition was filed by the Engineers Study Forum (Regd) seeking review of a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The petitioners also filed a miscellaneous application seeking an opportunity for further hearing, alleging that their arguments were not fully heard. The core legal questions were whether the court is obligated to provide indefinite hearing time to counsel and whether the grounds raised by the petitioners satisfied the criteria for review jurisdiction. The Court dismissed the application for further hearing, holding that it is the function of the Court to regulate proceedings and ensure adequate, not infinite, time for arguments. The Court further dismissed the main review petition, ruling that review jurisdiction is limited to errors apparent on the face of the record and does not permit the re-hearing of a decided case. The Court emphasized that review cannot be used to re-argue points already consciously decided or to introduce new grounds not raised during the original proceedings, reaffirming that the power of review is strictly circumscribed by established legal principles.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to a fair hearing entitle a counsel to argue a case for an indefinite period or to their heartfelt satisfaction?
  • Is the court required to grant a re-hearing of a case under the guise of a review petition?
  • What are the permissible grounds for exercising review jurisdiction under the Supreme Court Rules 1980?
  • Can grounds not urged or raised at the time of the original hearing be introduced in a review proceeding?
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• Ellauddin and anothers vs The State2017 YLR 113 · Balochistan High Court · 2014-07-24
  narcotics controlchemical analysis delaydirectory rulesminor contradictionsconscious possessionburden of proofcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for transporting a large quantity of charas concealed in a vehicle, resulting in rigorous imprisonment for life. The core legal questions involved the effect of a delay in sending samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory beyond seventy-two hours, the impact of minor contradictions in witness testimonies, and the burden of proof regarding a specific defence plea of mistaken identity or false substitution. The Balochistan High Court held that the rules prescribing the seventy-two-hour timeframe for dispatching samples are directory rather than mandatory, and minor inconsistencies in evidence that do not shake the core incriminating testimony are not fatal to the prosecution. The Court affirmed that once the prosecution proves its case, the onus shifts to the accused to substantiate any special defence plea with cogent evidence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed and the conviction upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the requirement to send narcotic samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory within seventy-2 hours under the Control of Narcotic Substances Rules is mandatory or directory?
  • Does a delay in sending recovered contraband samples for chemical analysis vitiate the trial?
  • How should minor inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses be treated by the court?
  • What is the legal effect when an accused fails to substantiate a special defence plea after the prosecution discharges its initial burden of proof?
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• Ella-Ud-Din and another vs The State2017 P Cr. L J 85, 2017 YLR 113 · Balochistan High Court · 2014-07-24
  narcoticsconscious possessionchemical analysis delaydirectory vs mandatory rulescriminal appealburden of proofwitness contradictions
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for transporting 82 kilograms of charas. The appellants contended that the prosecution case was flawed due to a two-month delay in sending samples for chemical analysis, violating the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, and alleged contradictions in witness testimony. They also raised a plea of false implication. The Court held that the provisions of the 2001 Rules regarding the 72-hour dispatch of samples are directory, not mandatory, and do not override the substantive provisions of the 1997 Act. Furthermore, the Court distinguished between material contradictions and minor inconsistencies, ruling that the latter do not undermine the prosecution's case. The Court affirmed that when an accused raises a specific defence plea, the burden shifts to them to substantiate it with cogent evidence. Finding the prosecution's evidence consistent and the appellants' defence unsubstantiated, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction, establishing that conscious possession is attributable to the occupants of a vehicle containing concealed contraband.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, regarding the 72-hour dispatch of samples for chemical analysis mandatory or directory?
  • Does a delay in sending contraband samples for chemical analysis vitiate a trial under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • When does the burden of proof shift to the accused to substantiate a specific defence plea?
  • Are minor inconsistencies in prosecution witness testimony sufficient to discard the entire prosecution case?
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• Eid Muhammad vs The State2017 MLD 992 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-01-23
  Qatl-i-amdchance witnessesocular evidencedeath sentencecriminal appealimminently dangerous actsection 342 statementmurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence imposed by the trial court for the offence of murder. The core legal questions concern the credibility of ocular witnesses who were not named in the FIR, the validity of the trial proceedings regarding the recording of the accused's statement under section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether a single fatal knife blow to the thigh constitutes Qatl-i-amd or a lesser offence. The Court held that the conviction was sound, dismissing the appeal. It ruled that witnesses not named in the FIR are not automatically discredited if they are natural witnesses whose presence is justified. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the act of stabbing a vital artery, causing immediate death, falls squarely within the definition of Qatl-i-amd under section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as it is an act imminently dangerous in the ordinary course of nature. The Court also clarified that a typed certificate signed by the trial judge satisfies the requirements of section 364(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to name an eye-witness in the FIR automatically render their testimony unreliable?
  • Does a typed certificate signed by the trial judge satisfy the requirements of section 364(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an act resulting in a single fatal injury to a vital artery be classified as Qatl-i-amd under section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Are witnesses present at a public place during a crime considered 'chance witnesses' whose testimony must be discarded?
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• Eid Badshah vs State2017 PHC 592 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-31Read full judgment →
• Ehsanullah Khan vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 SHC 104 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-11
  constitutional petitioncivil servant promotionCentral Selection Boardfitness for promotionproforma promotionjudicial reviewservice recordsupersession
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant, challenged the Central Selection Board's (CSB) decision to supersede him for promotion to BS-20, alleging victimization and unfair assessment despite an excellent service record. The respondents argued the petition was barred by Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, as it concerned terms and conditions of service. The Court held that while it cannot substitute its judgment for the subjective evaluation of a selection board regarding fitness for promotion, it retains jurisdiction under Article 199 to ensure that objective criteria and statutory guidelines are strictly followed. Upon reviewing the record, the Court identified significant discrepancies in the CSB’s scoring, including inconsistent data and failure to correctly aggregate marks, which rendered the impugned decision a nullity. Given the petitioner's subsequent retirement, the Court declined to remand the matter to the CSB. Instead, it directed the respondents to process the petitioner’s claim for proforma promotion under the revised guidelines of the Finance Division’s Office Memorandum dated 18.09.2015, ensuring the assessment is conducted in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 to review a decision regarding the fitness of a civil servant for promotion?
  • Can a court interfere with the subjective evaluation of a selection board regarding a civil servant's promotion?
  • Are decisions regarding the fitness of a civil servant for promotion appealable before the Service Tribunal?
  • What is the effect of discrepancies in the scoring criteria used by a Selection Board on the validity of a promotion decision?
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• Ehsan-Ul-Haq alias Shani vs The State and others2017 SCMR 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-07
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryFIRcriminal investigationbail bondChallan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner, Ehsan-ul-Haq alias Shani, in a case involving murder charges under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner was not named in the initial FIR but was implicated during the investigation through a replacement of another accused. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner was not alleged to have caused the fatal injury to the deceased, and significant confusion existed in the investigation record regarding the attribution of firearm injuries to the co-accused. Furthermore, the investigation was finalized, and the Challan had been submitted, rendering the petitioner's continued physical custody unnecessary for investigative purposes. The Court held that the petitioner's case fell within the scope of 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and admitted the petitioner to bail subject to the furnishing of bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the introduction of an accused's name during investigation as a replacement for another accused, without direct attribution of the fatal injury, constitute a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the continued physical custody of an accused necessary for investigation purposes after the Challan has been submitted to the trial court?
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• Ehsan Ullah vs The State and another2017 YLR 2524 · Lahore High Court · 2016-08-17
  post-arrest bailsupplementary statementextra-judicial confessionfurther inquiryjoint confessioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for post-arrest bail filed under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case involving murder and abetment. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was not named in the initial First Information Report and was implicated only through a belated supplementary statement and an alleged joint extra-judicial confession, was entitled to bail. The Court held that the petitioner is entitled to bail, finding that the case against him requires further inquiry. The Court reasoned that a supplementary statement recorded after a significant delay holds little evidentiary value and cannot substitute the First Information Report. Furthermore, the Court established that a joint extra-judicial confession is prima facie inadmissible in evidence. Additionally, the Court noted the absence of a motive and the fact that the investigation was complete, rendering the petitioner's continued incarceration unnecessary. The key principle laid down is that the involvement of an accused in a heinous offence is not, by itself, a sufficient ground to refuse bail when the prosecution's case is otherwise weak and requires further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does a belated supplementary statement have evidentiary value comparable to a First Information Report?
  • Is a joint extra-judicial confession admissible in evidence?
  • Does the submission of a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 preclude the grant of bail?
  • Is the involvement of an accused in a heinous offence sufficient ground to refuse bail?
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• Ehsan Ullah vs Muhammad Farooq and another2017 P Cr. L J 169 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-01-27
  bail cancellationmurderfurther inquirypublic service vehiclecriminal justicetentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Shariat Court whereby the accused-respondent was released on bail in a case involving charges under sections 324, 337, 34, and 302 of the Azad Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the accused, who was the bus driver and alleged to have beaten the injured student and thrown him out of the bus rather than providing medical aid, was entitled to the concession of bail on the ground of further inquiry. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the tentative assessment of the clear and unambiguous prosecution evidence established reasonable grounds to believe the accused was connected with the commission of non-bailable offences, and his case did not fall within the ambit of further inquiry. The Supreme Court set aside the Shariat Court's judgment and recalled the bail granted to the accused-respondent, establishing that the brutal conduct of a public service vehicle driver in failing to aid an injured passenger and instead participating in further assault disentitles him to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a bus driver who participates in beating an injured passenger and throws him out of the vehicle is entitled to bail on the ground of further inquiry?
  • When can an appellate court recall the concession of bail granted by a lower court?
  • Does the failure of a public service vehicle driver to provide medical assistance to an injured passenger affect his entitlement to bail in a murder case?
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• Ehsan Ullah Shah and another vs National Accountability Bureau2017 PLD Sindh 402 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-04Read full judgment →
• Ehsan Ullah alias Ehsana vs State and others2017 PLJ Lahore 111 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-20Read full judgment →
• Ehlianemoza Masoot Gulmat through representatives and 2 others vs Ali2017 MLD 664 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-05-18Read full judgment →
• Efu Life Insurance Limited through Chief Manager vs Additional District2017 CLD 1575 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-02Read full judgment →
• Efu General Insurance Limited vs Executive Director/Securities Market2017 CLD 869 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-03-03Read full judgment →
• Education Department vs Custodian & 5 others2017 SCR 1276 · N/A · 2017-10-04Read full judgment →
• Ednan Syed and others vs Federal Government Employees' Housing2017 CLC 1002 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-28Read full judgment →
• Ednan Syed & others vs Federal Government Employees Housing2017 PLJ Islamabad 118, 2017 CLC 1002 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-28Read full judgment →
• DV Com Data vs Pakistan Telecommunication Authority through Chairman and another2017 PLD Islamabad 177 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-07
  Late Payment Additional FeeInitial Spectrum Feetelecommunication licensecontractual obligationpenaltyPakistan Telecommunication Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) demanding payment of a Late Payment Additional Fee at the rate of two percent per month on outstanding dues, primarily concerning the Initial Spectrum Fee for a Wireless Local Loop License. The core legal questions revolved around whether the Late Payment Additional Fee constituted a penalty barred under Section 74 of the Contract Act 1872, whether the appellant was exempted from payment due to lack of willful default or reliance on an alleged government policy directive, and whether the levy was authorized under the terms of the license agreement and the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996. The Islamabad High Court held that the Late Payment Additional Fee is a contractual obligation and functions as compensation for delayed payment rather than a penalty, and therefore is not hit by Section 74 of the Contract Act 1872. The Court affirmed that the licensee is strictly bound by the express terms of the license agreement freely entered into, and dismissed the appeal, upholding the PTA's order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Late Payment Additional Fee stipulated in a telecommunication license agreement constitutes a penalty under Section 74 of the Contract Act 1872?
  • Does the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority have the power under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996 to impose terms and conditions in a license beyond those explicitly enumerated in Section 21?
  • Can a licensee avoid the payment of Late Payment Additional Fee on the ground that the default in paying the Initial Spectrum Fee was not willful?
  • Do policy directives issued by the Federal Government under Section 8 of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996 have the effect of unilaterally modifying the terms of an existing license?
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• Dust Muhammad alias Dosoo vs The State2017 YLR 1320 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-02
  post-arrest bailpolice encounterfurther inquiryprohibitory clausepresumption of innocenceSection 324 PPCcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the accused, Dost Muhammad alias Dosoo, facing charges under Sections 324, 353, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from an alleged police encounter. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to bail given the prosecution's claims of an armed confrontation and subsequent recovery of unlicensed weapons. The court held that the accused was entitled to bail, determining that the prosecution’s case required further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court observed that the alleged encounter appeared suspicious, as the accused sustained specific firearm injuries while no police personnel were harmed, and no forensic evidence was produced to link the recovered weapons to the crime scene. Additionally, the court noted that Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was ineffective due to the absence of injuries to the complainant party. The court reaffirmed the principle that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and that the law cannot be stretched in favor of the prosecution at the bail stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of injuries to the complainant party render the application of Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 ineffective for the purpose of bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the prosecution's case regarding a police encounter appears suspicious and lacks forensic corroboration?
  • Does a case that does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 entitle an accused to the grant of bail?
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• Dubai Islamic Bank through Recovery Officer vs The State and another2017 CLD 417 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-11-18Read full judgment →
• Dubai Islamic Bank (Pvt.) Ltd. through Recovery Officer vs State and anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 538 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Dubai Islamic Bank (Pvt) Ltd through Recovery Officer vs The State and another2017 MLD 500 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-11-18Read full judgment →
• Dr. Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry vs Province of Punjab and others2017 PLC (C.S.) 583 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-19
  constitutional petitionsuspension ordercivil servantPEEDA Actmaintainabilityservice tribunalinterim order
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by a doctor seeking to set aside his suspension order passed by the competent authority following the death of a patient at Jinnah Hospital due to alleged medical negligence and lack of supervision. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner was rightly suspended under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 without a prior show-cause notice, and whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against an interim suspension order in view of the constitutional bar under Article 212. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the competent authority is empowered under Section 6 of the PEEDA Act, 2006 to suspend an employee where deemed necessary following a probe committee's inquiry, and that a constitutional petition against an interim suspension order of a civil servant is not maintainable as the proper remedy lies before the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against an interim suspension order passed against a civil servant?
  • Does the competent authority have the power to suspend an employee under Section 6 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 without a prior show-cause notice?
  • Is a constitutional petition barred under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 in matters relating to the terms and conditions of service?
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• Dr. Tariq Shamim Choudhry vs The State and 5 others2017 P Cr. L J 1048 · Federal Shariat Court · 2017-08-07
  Offence of Qazfcriminal revisioncross-examinationfailure to cross-examineHudood lawsappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition was filed under Article 203-DD of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and sections 435/439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge Chakwal, which dismissed the petitioner's private complaint under section 7 of the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance 1979. The core legal question was whether statements made by respondents during separate civil and family proceedings constituted the Offence of Qazf. The Federal Shariat Court dismissed the petition, holding that uncontroverted statements made in examination-in-chief which were not challenged in cross-examination are deemed admitted under Articles 132 and 133 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and that the allegations did not constitute Qazf under the circumstances of ongoing familial litigation and admitted facts. The key principle laid down is that failure to cross-examine a witness on a material fact amounts to an acceptance of that fact, precluding its use as a foundation for a Qazf complaint.

  Questions settled

  • Does failure to cross-examine a witness on a material fact deposed in examination-in-chief amount to an admission of that fact?
  • Whether statements made by parties in earlier judicial proceedings can form the basis for a complaint under the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance 1979 when not rebutted?
  • Does the Federal Shariat Court have revisional jurisdiction over non-Hudood matters such as fraud and forgery allegations joined in a complaint?
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• Dr. Shamshad Hussain Syed vs Muhammad Yaseen and another2017 CLC 513 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-03Read full judgment →
• Dr. Shama Hidayat vs Chairmain PSC2017 PHC 301 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-04-05Read full judgment →
• Dr. Shakeela through Attorney--- Applicant vs Dr. Akeel Ahmed2017 YLR 2224 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-19Read full judgment →
• Dr. Shahid Hasan Siddiqui vs State Bank of Pakistan and 30 others2017 CLD 1022 · Federal Shariat Court · 2016-12-14Read full judgment →
• Dr. Shabbir Hussain Hyderi through Attorney vs Syed Rizwan Hussain2017 MLD 953 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-20
  ejectment orderspecific performancelandlord and tenantconstitutional petitioncivil decreepossession restorationrent proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an ejectment order passed by a Rent Controller and upheld by an Additional District Judge, which resulted in the petitioner's eviction. The petitioner had simultaneously initiated civil litigation for specific performance of a contract regarding the same property. While the ejectment order was initially executed, the petitioner subsequently succeeded in obtaining a final decree from an appellate civil court declaring him the owner/purchaser of the property. The core legal question was whether the ejectment order could be sustained given the subsequent judicial determination of the petitioner's ownership. The Court held that once the petitioner successfully established his status as the owner/purchaser in a competent civil court, the underlying basis for the landlord-tenant relationship—and thus the ejectment order—was extinguished. The Court set aside the impugned ejectment orders and clarified that the petitioner is entitled to seek restoration of possession through the execution of his civil court decree or appropriate rent proceedings. The judgment affirms that while a tenant cannot generally resist ejectment merely by filing a suit for specific performance, a final decree in the tenant's favor regarding title supersedes prior rent-based ejectment orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does a final civil court decree declaring a tenant to be the owner/purchaser of a property invalidate a prior ejectment order based on a landlord-tenant relationship?
  • Can a tenant resist an ejectment order solely on the basis of a pending suit for specific performance of a contract?
  • What is the remedy for a party who has been evicted under a rent order but subsequently obtains a civil court decree declaring them the owner of the premises?
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• Dr. Sajjad Nazir vs Special Judge Rent Tribunal, Lahore and 2 others2017 [M] C.L.R. 1149 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-24Read full judgment →
• Dr. Naik Parveen and another vs District Co-ordination Officer, Multan and 4 others2017 CLC 1150, 2017 LHC 1862 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-03Read full judgment →
• Dr. Nadeem Rizvi and 7 others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 PLD Sindh 347 · Sindh High Court · 2016-07-04
  18th AmendmentdevolutionFederal Legislative ListConcurrent Legislative ListImplementation CommissionJPMCNICVDconstitutional petitionpith and substance
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Sindh High Court addresses constitutional petitions challenging the transfer and purported devolution of certain federal institutions—namely the Jinnah Post Graduate Medical Centre, the National Institute of Cardiovascular Diseases, the National Institute of Child Health, and the National Museum of Pakistan—from the Federation to the Province of Sindh following the enactment of the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010. The core legal questions revolved around whether these institutions fell within the scope of federal legislative entries or were validly devolved under Article 270AA of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and whether executive actions could override existing federal statutes. The Court held that the devolution process contemplated by the Eighteenth Amendment was strictly limited to matters on the omitted Concurrent Legislative List. Since the institutions in question did not relate to any omitted concurrent entries, the Implementation Commission acted beyond its constitutional remit in recommending their transfer, rendering the consequent executive notifications unlawful and unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Court held that key institutions constituted federal research and training institutes falling under Entry 16 of Part I of the Federal Legislative List, and that the National Institute of Cardiovascular Diseases could not be displaced by provincial legislation while operating under a valid federal ordinance. The petitions were accordingly allowed and the transfers declared void.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the transfer of institutions from the Federal Government to a Provincial Government pursuant to the 18th Amendment can be sustained if the subject matter does not relate to an omitted entry of the Concurrent Legislative List?
  • Whether Jinnah Post Graduate Medical Centre qualifies as a federal institute for research and professional training under Entry 16 of Part I of the Federal Legislative List?
  • Whether executive authority can be exercised to transfer a statutory body established and regulated under a federal law to a province so as to nullify the federal enactment?
  • Does the Implementation Commission constituted under Article 270AA(9) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 possess the authority to recommend the devolution of matters falling outside the scope of the omitted Concurrent Legislative List?
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• Dr. Munawar Ahmed and 4 others vs Muhammad Aslam and 23 others2017 MLD 84 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-05-19Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mumtaz Ahmed, etc. vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.K.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 17 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-01-16Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mumtaz Ahmed, etc vs Federation of Pakistan etc2017 [M] C.L.R. 917 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-01-16Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mukhtiar Ali Shah vs Ahmad Shah2017 YLR 2247 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-12-01
  defamationfreedom of presspublic servantcriminal revisioncomplaint dismissaljournalistic privilegeArticle 19
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order of the Additional Sessions Judge dismissing a defamation complaint filed by a medical doctor against a local journalist under Sections 500 and 501 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner alleged that a news report regarding irregularities at a public hospital defamed him. The core legal question was whether the journalist’s report on a government-led inspection of a public facility constituted actionable defamation. The Peshawar High Court upheld the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the journalist merely reported factual events concerning a public raid. The Court emphasized that the petitioner, as a public servant, is subject to public scrutiny, and the second exception to Section 499 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 protects good-faith opinions regarding the conduct of public servants. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that freedom of the press, guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, protects such reporting. Consequently, the Court ruled that no prima facie case of defamation existed, as the essential element of mens rea was absent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a complaint be dismissed under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without a preliminary inquiry?
  • Does the reporting of a public inspection of a government hospital by a journalist constitute defamation under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Are public servants exempt from public criticism regarding their official conduct under the second exception to Section 499 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the freedom of the press under Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 protect the reporting of factual events involving public institutions?
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• DR. Muhammad Zafar Shah vs Director Finance, Nishter Hospital, Etc.2017 LHC 1601 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-06Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Usman vs Comsats Institute of Information2017 PLC (C.S) 1434 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-31
  contractual employmentunauthorized absenceex-Pakistan leavescholarship bondwrit of mandamusbreach of contractwilful absence
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was instituted by Dr. Muhammad Usman against the COMSATS Institute of Information Technology seeking directions to notify his charge assumption, assign him duties as an Assistant Professor, release his salary, approve ex post facto ex-Pakistan leave for post-doctoral research in Sweden, and renew his service contract. The petitioner, having previously availed a scholarship for higher studies abroad under an agreement requiring him to return and serve the respondent for three years, stayed abroad beyond his sanctioned leave without authorization to pursue further research, despite repeated refusals and show-cause notices from the respondent. The core legal question was whether a contractual employee who remains absent from duty without sanctioned leave and violates scholarship bond conditions can compel an employer through a writ of mandamus to condone unauthorized absence and renew employment. The court held that an employee who stays abroad without sanctioned leave commits willful absence from duty, disentitling them to discretionary constitutional remedies. The court laid down the principle that no leniency or exception should be shown to scholarship holders who violate their bonds by unauthorized extensions of stay abroad.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee who remains abroad beyond sanctioned leave compel an employer through a writ of mandamus to condone unauthorized absence?
  • Whether an employee can claim a right to renewal of a fixed-term contractual employment after violating bond conditions?
  • Does the pendency of an appeal for leave justify an employee staying abroad beyond the sanctioned leave period?
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• Dr. Muhammad Tariq vs The State and others2017 SCMR 1944 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-09-07
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationdishonouring of chequeprohibitory clausedelay in lodging FIRleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal seeking to challenge the grant of post-arrest bail to respondent No. 2 by the High Court in a case involving an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions relate to whether unexplained delay in lodging a criminal complaint and the non-attraction of the prohibitory clause warrant the cancellation of post-arrest bail already granted by a competent court. The Supreme Court held that where the criminal complaint was instituted after an unexplained delay of over three years, the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the investigation is complete, a civil recovery suit is pending, and there is no allegation of misuse of bail, interference with the High Court's discretion to grant bail is unwarranted. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused. The key principles laid down include that considerations for grant of bail differ from those for its cancellation, and the court is generally slow to cancel bail after the submission of a challan when no abuse of concession is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unexplained delay in instituting a criminal complaint for an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is a relevant consideration in bail matters?
  • Does an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 attract the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in granting post-arrest bail when the investigation is finalized and no misuse of bail is alleged?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Sharif vs Military Estates Officer and another2017 P Cr. L J 1187 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-14
  contempt of courtmutation of propertyLetters of AdministrationHeirship Certificatepowers of Justice of the Peacemilitary estates
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a contempt application filed by the petitioner against the Military Estates Officer (respondent) for alleged non-compliance with court directions regarding the mutation of a leased bungalow in Karachi in the names of legal heirs. The core legal question was whether a Justice of the Peace is empowered to issue a valid Heirship Certificate for property mutation purposes and whether the respondent was justified in demanding Letters of Administration from a civil court. The Sindh High Court held that a Justice of the Peace lacks the statutory authority to issue an Heirship Certificate, as their powers are limited under the Code of Criminal Procedure to issuing identity certificates, verifying documents, or attesting them. Consequently, the Court found that the respondent complied with the previous order by deciding the mutation application, held that the demand for Letters of Administration was justified, and dismissed the contempt application while leaving the petitioner at liberty to approach the competent forum.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Justice of the Peace has the legal authority to issue an Heirship Certificate for the purpose of property mutation?
  • Does the demand for Letters of Administration by a Military Estates Officer for the mutation of a deceased person's property constitute contempt of court?
  • What are the statutory powers of a Justice of the Peace regarding the issuance or attestation of documents under the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Saeed---Petitioner vs Sardar Muhammad Akram and2017 MLD 1643 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-14Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Saeed vs Sardar Muhammad Akram and others2017 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-20Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Asif vs President Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd.2017 PLC (C.S.) 1076 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-01
  constitutional petitionreinstatement in servicedepartmental proceedingscriminal acquittalNAB referencemisconductbinding precedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Lahore High Court by the petitioner seeking reinstatement in service following his acquittal in a NAB reference, after he was previously dismissed under the Removal From Service (Special Power) Ordinance, 2000, and his departmental appeals and civil petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan were dismissed. The core legal question was whether an employee dismissed through departmental proceedings for negligence, inefficiency, and misconduct is entitled to reinstatement solely on the ground of subsequent acquittal in a criminal case involving different charges, and whether the High Court can interfere after the matter has been concluded up to the apex Court. The Court held that criminal acquittal does not substitute departmental proceedings where the charges are distinct, and that the High Court cannot reopen a matter already decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The key principle laid down is that criminal trials and departmental proceedings operate in distinct spheres, and a judicial acquittal in a criminal case has no direct bearing on departmental dismissal based on separate allegations of misconduct.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee dismissed from service through departmental proceedings is entitled to automatic reinstatement upon acquittal in a criminal case?
  • Can the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court be invoked to challenge a service matter already finalized by the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Does an acquittal in a NAB reference nullify departmental proceedings based on negligence, inefficiency, and misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Arshad vs Govt. of Punjab, etc.2017 PLC (C.S.) 1294, 2017 PLJ Lahore 163, K.L.R. 2017 Labour & Service Cases · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-19
  service lawcontractual appointmentage limitprincipal appointmentquo warrantoconstitutional petitioneducational institution
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenged the appointment and subsequent contract extensions of respondent No. 3 as Principal of the Government Central Model School, Lower Mall, Lahore. The core legal questions centered on whether a retired government servant could be appointed on contract past the maximum age limit without following prescribed competitive procedures, mandatory advertisements, and selection committee recommendations under the relevant statutory framework. The Lahore High Court held that the appointment of respondent No. 3 was made in clear violation of the West Pakistan Government Educational and Training Institutions Ordinance 1960 and the applicable regulations, as he had crossed the maximum age limit of 63 years, was not recommended by the Selection Committee, and was appointed without proper advertisement or competitive recruitment process. The court declared the appointment illegal, setting aside the impugned orders, and directed fresh appointments to be made in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retired government employee can be appointed on contract basis beyond the maximum age limit prescribed by the applicable service regulations?
  • Does an appointment to a public educational post require mandatory advertisement and a competitive recruitment process?
  • Whether an appointment made in deviation of the prescribed procedure under the West Pakistan Government Educational and Training Institutions Ordinance 1960 is sustainable in law?
  • Can a writ petition challenging the eligibility and appointment of a person to a public office be maintained?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Arshad vs Govt. of Punjab etc.2017 PLJ Lahore 163 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-19Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Arshad vs Government of Punjab through Secretary2017 PLC (C.S.) 1294 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-19
  contract appointmentpublic educational institutionage limitadvertisement of postconstitutional petitionillegal appointmentretired employee
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the appointment and subsequent contract extensions of the third respondent as Principal of the Government Central Model School, Lower Mall, Lahore, contending that the appointment violated applicable recruitment regulations, age limits, and procedural requirements. The core legal questions revolved around whether a retired government servant could be appointed on contract past the maximum age limit without following prescribed selection and advertising procedures, and whether the appointment by transfer was valid. The Lahore High Court held that the appointment and its extensions were illegal, as they bypassed mandatory competitive recruitment, advertisement, and age criteria stipulated in the governing regulations, and that the appointment of a retired individual without the recommendation of the selection committee could not be validated. The court laid down the principle that appointments to public educational institutions must strictly follow prescribed statutory procedures, including open advertisement and adherence to age limits, and that executive discretion cannot be used to bypass mandatory rules for re-employing retired personnel.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointment of a retired person on contract basis beyond the prescribed maximum age limit without advertising the post is lawful?
  • Does the appointment of a Principal by way of transfer dispense with the mandatory requirement of inviting candidates through proper procedure and selection committee recommendations?
  • Can an appointment made in violation of the governing regulations and without competitive recruitment be sustained under constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mirza Farrukh Hussain Baig, Additional Principal Medical Officer vs Secretary, Government of Punjab, Health Department, Lahore and anothers2017 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 105 · Punjab Service Tribunal
  disciplinary proceedingsde novo inquiryadministrative discretionservice tribunalreasoned orderdue processPEEDA Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking implementation of a previous Punjab Service Tribunal judgment that remanded a disciplinary case against the petitioner to the competent authority. The core legal question was whether the authority’s subsequent order for a de novo inquiry was validly passed. The Tribunal held that the authority’s order was unsustainable as it was passed ritualistically without assigning reasons, failing to discuss existing evidence, and denying the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal emphasized that administrative discretion, particularly under Section 13(6) of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act 2006, is not unbridled and must be structured. The key principle laid down is that under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act 1897, all administrative and quasi-judicial orders must be reasoned, transparent, and fair. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order, directing the authority to first analyze the existing record and, if a de novo inquiry is still required, to issue a show-cause notice and provide a hearing to the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order for a de novo inquiry by a competent authority under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act 2006 required to be a reasoned order?
  • Does Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act 1897 mandate that administrative authorities provide reasons for ordering a de novo inquiry?
  • Can a competent authority order a de novo inquiry without first analyzing the existing evidence or providing the accused an opportunity of being heard?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mehfooz Hussain, Asstt. Professor Ophthalmology, Peshawar vs Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary to Govt. Health Department, Peshawar & 5 others2017 PLJ Peshawar 320 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Dr. Masroor Elahi vs University of Veterinary and Animal Science and others2017 PLD Lahore 381 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-08
  plagiarism policyself-plagiarismprocedural due processstatutory rulesuniversity syndicateadministrative lawconstitutional petitionnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the penalties imposed on the petitioner by the University of Veterinary and Animal Sciences for alleged self-plagiarism, specifically a warning and a one-year ban on foreign research travel. The core legal questions concerned the statutory status of the Higher Education Commission (HEC) Plagiarism Policy and whether the university’s disciplinary proceedings adhered to procedural due process and the specific penalties authorized by that policy. The Court held that the HEC Plagiarism Policy, having been adopted by the Syndicate and approved by the Chancellor, is statutory in nature. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders, finding that the Syndicate failed to pass a well-reasoned order and that the penalty of a travel ban was not authorized under Clause 11 of the HEC Policy. The judgment reaffirms that public functionaries must act within the four corners of the law, provide reasoned decisions, and adhere to procedural propriety, as mandated by Article 4 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Any disciplinary action taken in violation of these principles or based on unauthorized penalties is void.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Higher Education Commission Plagiarism Policy considered statutory in nature?
  • Can a university impose a penalty not explicitly provided for in the governing plagiarism policy?
  • Does the failure of a university syndicate to provide a well-reasoned order violate the principles of procedural due process?
  • Are proceedings initiated under a misconception of law liable to be set aside?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Masroor Elahi vs University of Veterinary & Animal Science, etc2017 [M] C.L.R. 578 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-08
  self-plagiarismHEC Plagiarism Policyprocedural fairnessstatutory rulesuniversity disciplinary proceedingsnatural justiceconstitutional petitionreasoned order
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the university's disciplinary orders imposing penalties for self-plagiarism against the petitioner. The core legal questions concern whether the Higher Education Commission (HEC) Plagiarism Policy is statutory in nature and whether the disciplinary proceedings conducted by the university complied with procedural fairness and the specific requirements of the policy. The Court held that the impugned orders were illegal and set them aside. It found that the Syndicate failed to provide a well-reasoned order, violated procedural fairness by failing to grant the co-author an opportunity to be heard as mandated by the policy, and imposed a penalty (a travel ban) not authorized by the HEC Plagiarism Policy. The Court established that the HEC Plagiarism Policy is statutory in nature due to its broad efficacy and complementarity to the HEC Ordinance. Furthermore, public functionaries are constitutionally obligated to act with procedural propriety, apply their minds, and provide cogent reasons for their decisions, and disciplinary penalties must strictly adhere to the sanctions prescribed by the governing policy.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Higher Education Commission Plagiarism Policy considered statutory in nature?
  • Does the failure of a university syndicate to provide a well-reasoned order in disciplinary proceedings violate the principle of procedural propriety?
  • Can a university impose a disciplinary penalty that is not explicitly provided for in the governing HEC Plagiarism Policy?
  • Is a university required to provide an opportunity of hearing to a co-author under the HEC Plagiarism Policy when investigating plagiarism allegations?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Masroor Elahi vs University of Veterinary & Animal Science etc.2017 PLD Lahore 381, 2017 PLJ Lahore 429, 2017 LHC 493 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-08
  plagiarismself-plagiarismHEC Plagiarism Policyprocedural proprietynatural justiceconstitutional petitionuniversity disciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the legality of penalties imposed on the Petitioner, a professor, by the University of Veterinary and Animal Sciences for alleged self-plagiarism. The core legal questions concerned whether the Higher Education Commission (HEC) Plagiarism Policy constitutes statutory law, whether the university's disciplinary proceedings adhered to procedural fairness, and whether the imposed penalties were authorized by the policy. The Court held that the HEC Plagiarism Policy, having been adopted by the Syndicate and approved by the Chancellor, possesses a statutory character, making actions under it subject to judicial review. The Court found that the Syndicate failed to provide a well-reasoned order, violating principles of procedural propriety and natural justice. Furthermore, the Court noted that the penalty of a 'ban on foreign travel' was not prescribed under the HEC Policy. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders, establishing that public functionaries must act within the four corners of the law, provide cogent reasons for their decisions, and strictly adhere to the penalties prescribed by governing regulations.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Higher Education Commission Plagiarism Policy statutory in nature?
  • Can a university impose a penalty for plagiarism that is not explicitly provided for in the Higher Education Commission Plagiarism Policy?
  • Does the failure of a university Syndicate to provide a well-reasoned order in disciplinary proceedings constitute a violation of procedural propriety?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Masood-Ur-Rauf vs University of the Punjab through Vice-2017 PLC (C.S.) 250 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-02
  writ jurisdictionprobationertermination of servicenon-statutory rulesalternate remedyUniversity of the Punjablachesservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the termination of the petitioner, a Senior Medical Officer (Dental) at the University of the Punjab, arguing that the Vice-Chancellor lacked authority and that the termination violated principles of natural justice. The core legal questions concerned the maintainability of a writ petition against a university where service rules are non-statutory, the necessity of a formal inquiry for a probationer, and the impact of bypassing departmental remedies. The Lahore High Court held that the petition was not maintainable. The Court reasoned that the rules governing the University’s employees are non-statutory, and therefore, constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 cannot be invoked to challenge service terms. Furthermore, the Court held that a probationer terminated for unsatisfactory performance is not entitled to a show-cause notice or a regular inquiry. Finally, the Court affirmed that where statutory remedies like appeal or revision exist, a petitioner cannot bypass them to seek constitutional relief. The judgment reinforces the principle that courts will not interfere in service matters governed by non-statutory rules or where alternate remedies remain unexhausted.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable against a university regarding service matters governed by non-statutory rules?
  • Does the termination of a probationer for unsatisfactory performance require a formal show-cause notice or inquiry?
  • Can a petitioner bypass available departmental remedies like appeal or revision by filing a constitutional petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Kumail Abbas Rizvi vs University of Punjab, etc.K.L.R. 2017 Labour & Service Cases 15 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-20
  constitutional petitionservice terminationacceptance of resignationdignity of manspeaking orderdepartmental delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitutional petition was filed against the termination order issued by the University of the Punjab, which terminated the petitioner's service for alleged absence from duty instead of accepting his resignation tendered earlier. The petitioner submitted his resignation in August 2011 after completing his studies abroad, but the university administrative officials failed to process it due to internal inadvertence and inaction, subsequently treating him as absent and terminating his service. The core legal question was whether the university's failure to process a timely resignation and issuing an unreasoned termination order violated the petitioner's fundamental rights to dignity, fair trial, and due process under the Constitution. The Lahore High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the termination order and directing the university to accept the petitioner's resignation. The Court held that an administrative authority cannot visit a citizen with stigmatizing actions due to its own procedural lapses, and every termination order must contain explicit reasons to uphold the inviolable fundamental right to human dignity.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public authority treat an employee as absent and terminate his services when his timely submitted resignation was left unprocessed due to the department's own negligence?
  • Whether an administrative order of service termination passed without giving detailed reasons violates Article 14 and Article 10-A of the Constitution?
  • Can an individual be made to suffer adverse career consequences and social stigma due to inaction or administrative inadvertence on the part of state officials?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Kumail Abbas Rizvi vs University of Punjab and othersK.L.R. 2017 Labour & Service Cases 15, 2017 PLJ Lahore 250, 2017 PLC (C.S.) · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-20
  constitutional petitionresignationtermination of servicedignity of manspeaking orderdue processmaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed against the notification whereby the Respondent university did not accept the petitioner's resignation tendered in August 2011 and instead terminated his service in October 2015 on the ground of alleged absence from duty. The core legal questions involved whether a public authority can penalize an employee for its own administrative delay in processing a resignation and whether a non-speaking termination order violates fundamental rights to due process and human dignity. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner could not suffer prejudice due to the department's failure to process his timely resignation, and that terminating an employee without a speaking order and stigmatizing his reputation violates Articles 9, 10-A, and 14 of the Constitution. The Court laid down the principle that no citizen shall suffer due to administrative delays or omissions of government departments, and that public authorities must act fairly, give reasons for adverse actions, and safeguard the inviolable right to human dignity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee can be penalized or terminated for absence from duty when his resignation was withheld due to administrative delay by departmental officials?
  • Does a non-speaking termination order passed without detailed reasons violate the fundamental rights to fair trial and human dignity under the Constitution?
  • Whether a public authority is legally bound to process a resignation tendered by an employee within a reasonable time?
  • Can an employee suffer adverse consequences on account of the negligence or inaction of government departments?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Khushnood Ali Baz vs Govt of KPK etc2017 PHC 295 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-11Read full judgment →
• Dr. Kamran Jahangir vs Chancellor, Shifa Tameer-e-Millat University, etc.K.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-27Read full judgment →
• Dr. Kamran Jahangir vs Chancellor, Shifa Tameer-e-Millat University, etc2017 [M] C.L.R. 944 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-27Read full judgment →
• Dr. Joseph Wilson---Petitioner vs Federation of Pakistan through2017 P Cr. L J 1569 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-20
  Exit Control List (E.C.L.)Constitutional PetitionFundamental RightsFreedom of MovementDue ProcessOpportunity of HearingSpeaking OrderJudicial ReviewNational Accountability Bureau (NAB)Misuse of Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the placement of the petitioner's name on the Exit Control List (E.C.L.) by the Ministry of Interior on the recommendation of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The core legal question was whether such placement, without prior notice, opportunity of hearing, or a speaking order, violated the petitioner's fundamental rights and due process. The Islamabad High Court held that the freedom to travel abroad is a fundamental right under Articles 4, 9, and 15 of the Constitution, subject only to restrictions by due process of law. The Court found that the Ministry of Interior acted mechanically, failing to apply its independent mind, afford an opportunity of hearing, or record reasons for its decision, thereby infringing the petitioner's fundamental rights. The Court emphasized that mere pendency of an inquiry or investigation is not a sufficient ground for E.C.L. placement. Consequently, the Court set aside the memorandum and directed the immediate removal of the petitioner's name from the E.C.L.

  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Joseph Wilson vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior and others2017 IHC 158 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-09Read full judgment →
• Dr. Javed Iqbal and 2 others vs Askari Bank Limited through Attorney2017 CLD 1140 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-16
  recovery suitex parte decreeservice of summonsfinancial institutions recoverypetition for leave to defendfraud and misrepresentationlimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal is directed against the order of the Banking Court dismissing the appellants' application under section 12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 read with section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which sought to set aside an ex parte decree passed against them. The core legal questions involved whether the appellants were duly served with summons at their correct address, whether the ex parte decree was sustainable, and whether the application to set aside the decree was barred by limitation and lacked grounds of fraud or misrepresentation. The Lahore High Court held that the appellants were validly served through prescribed modes at their last known address, that the subsequent change of address was communicated to the bank and the rent deed executed well after the decree, and that the application under section 12 of the Ordinance and section 12(2) C.P.C. was time-barred and devoid of any proof of fraud or misrepresentation. The court dismissed the appeal in limine, affirming that failure to file a Petition for Leave to Defend within the statutory period rightfully led to the decree.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ex parte decree passed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 can be set aside without establishing fraud or misrepresentation under section 12(2) C.P.C.?
  • Does a change of address communicated to a bank after the institution of a recovery suit invalidate the service of summons effected at the defendant's last known address?
  • Whether an application to set aside a decree under section 12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 filed beyond the prescribed thirty-day period is maintainable?
  • Can a ground regarding a defendant being out of the country at the relevant time be raised for the first time in an appeal when it was never pleaded before the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Jagat Narain Subharti Charitable Trust and Anr. vs Union of India and Ors2017 SCInd 1316 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-08-30Read full judgment →
• Dr. Irfan Iqbal vs State2017 PLJ SC 137 · Appellate Jurisdiction
  Anti-Terrorism Actsentence reductionappellate jurisdictionrevisional jurisdictiongrave and sudden provocationdeath penaltycriminal appealSection 302 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a conviction under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, where the High Court, while dismissing the appellant's appeal, additionally convicted him under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court addressed three core questions: the legality of the High Court's additional conviction without notice, the applicability of Section 302(c), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and the appropriateness of the death sentence. The Court held that an appellate court cannot enhance a sentence or convict for a new offense without providing notice to the accused, as required by Section 439, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Regarding Section 302(c), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, the Court ruled that while the provocation was grave, it lacked the requisite 'suddenness' due to a time gap. Consequently, the Court set aside the additional conviction under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Applying the principle that partial satisfaction of exceptions to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 warrants leniency, the Court reduced the death sentence for the Anti-Terrorism Act offense to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court, while hearing an appeal against conviction, additionally convict and sentence an appellant for a new offense without issuing a prior notice?
  • Does a time gap between an initial provocation and the subsequent commission of an offense negate the element of 'suddenness' required for the application of Section 302(c), Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is a death sentence warranted when the conditions for an exception to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 are only partially satisfied?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Ikramullah Khan vs Khyber Pakhtunkahwa, Agricultural2017 PLC (C.S.) 615 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-02-04
  service matterassociate professor appointmentqualification equivalenceteaching experienceselection boardconstitutional jurisdictionbias of selection board member
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the recommendation and selection process for the post of Associate Professor (BPS-20) in Weed Science at the Agricultural University, Peshawar. The core legal questions involved whether candidates holding Ph.D. degrees titled in 'Agricultural Science' with specialization and thesis in 'Weed Science' met the advertisement criteria, how teaching experience should be calculated, and whether the inclusion of a purportedly biased departmental chairman vitiated the Selection Board's proceedings. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the petition, holding that agricultural science acts as an overarching umbrella discipline and the specific thesis and coursework in Weed Science satisfied the qualification requirement. The court further held that experience is the actual acquisition of knowledge through practical involvement rather than strictly salaried regular service, and that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to substitute the subjective assessment of expert selection bodies or entertain vague allegations of bias against a statutory member of a multi-member board. The key principle laid down is that High Courts under constitutional jurisdiction will not act as appellate bodies over the subjective evaluations and professional determinations of expert selection boards of statutory institutions unless clear mala fides or statutory violations are established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Ph.D. degree titled in Agricultural Science with a specialized thesis in Weed Science fulfills the qualification requirement for a post requiring a Ph.D. in Weed Science?
  • How should teaching experience be reckoned for academic appointments, and does it strictly require service on a regular paid basis?
  • Can the decision of a Selection Board be challenged and set aside under constitutional jurisdiction on the mere allegation of bias against a single statutory member?
  • To what extent can a High Court substitute its own opinion for that of a statutory selection body in matters of academic appointments and evaluations?
  Read full judgment →
• (1) Dr. Huma Jokhio and others (2) Dr. Ehsan Ali Palari (3) Dr. Shafiq Ahmed2017 SHC 265 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-01Read full judgment →
• Dr. Haroon Aziz Khan Babar vs Govt. of Punjab through Secretar Health2017 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 69 · Punjab Service Tribunal
  service appealcivil servantresignationdisciplinary proceedingsPEEDA Actwillful absencecontract appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal arises from proceedings initiated against the appellant, a cardiologist, under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act 2006, alleging willful absence from duty as a Medical Officer and resulting in the imposition of a minor penalty. The core legal question was whether the appellant remained a civil servant under the administrative control of the Health Department, Government of Punjab, after having tendered his resignation from the post of Medical Officer in September 2005 prior to assuming contract appointments in specialized cardiac institutes. The Punjab Service Tribunal held that the appellant had indeed resigned from his position as Medical Officer, which was substantiated by the departmental record and the absence of any demand for a No Objection Certificate when he joined subsequent contract posts. The Tribunal ruled that the disciplinary proceedings and the penalty imposed were illegal, void, and a nullity in law, as the appellant was no longer a civil servant subject to the said Act at the relevant time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who has resigned from a regular post remains a civil servant subject to disciplinary proceedings under the PEEDA Act 2006?
  • Does the failure of a department to demand a No Objection Certificate upon a fresh contract appointment substantiate the acceptance of a prior resignation?
  • Can disciplinary proceedings for willful absence be sustained against a person who is no longer under the administrative control of the department?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Fayyaz Ahmed Cheema vs Punjab Employees Social Security2017 YLR 576 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-12
  pensionary benefitsvested rightpast and closed transactionlocus poenitentiaecivil revisionaudit objectionrecovery from pension
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the appellate court's judgment which had reversed the trial court's decree in favor of the petitioner, a retired Medical Superintendent. The petitioner sought to declare illegal the department's attempt to recover alleged misappropriated amounts from his pension 6 to 7 years after his retirement, overriding an earlier departmental decision in his favor. The core legal question was whether the department could reopen a closed transaction and recover funds from a retired employee's pension years after retirement without proper notice and beyond the statutory limitation. The Lahore High Court held that the department could not initiate such proceedings or reopen past and closed transactions years after retirement, nor could it arbitrarily withhold vested pensionary rights without due process. The court established that pension is a vested right, that disciplinary proceedings against retired employees are subject to strict statutory time limits, and that past closed transactions protected by the principle of locus poenitentiae cannot be arbitrarily unsettled.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the department can recover alleged financial losses from a retired employee's pension years after retirement based on a subsequent audit objection?
  • Can past and closed departmental transactions that have attained finality be reopened by the authorities?
  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae bar authorities from rescinding an order that has already taken legal effect and created vested rights?
  • Is pension considered a bounty or an inalienable vested right acquired in consideration of past services?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Farzana Zaidi vs Syed Shahrukh Abbas and others2017 SHC 204 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-10Read full judgment →
• Dr. Farhat Naz vs Chairman Selection/Promotion Board, Ayub Teaching2017 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2017-01-24Read full judgment →
• Dr. Farhat Naz vs Chairman Selection/Promotion Board, Ayub2017 MLD 1842 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-12-13
  constitutional petitionservice matterselection boardmerit listpostgraduate experiencesenior registrar appointmentallocation of marks
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Peshawar High Court resolves two consolidated constitutional petitions filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, assailing the selection and appointment of the private respondent as Senior Registrar Medicine (BPS-18) at Ayub Teaching Hospital, Abbottabad. The core legal question concerned the validity of the allocation and adjustment of marks by the Selection Board regarding postgraduate experience and Registrar service, which altered the initial merit list prepared by the scrutiny committee. The Court held that the award of experience marks to the respondent in a subspecialty and during a period of extraordinary leave was unjustified under the relevant rules, and that the petitioner could not be arbitrarily deprived of her experience marks as Junior Registrar due to a subsequent unilateral cancellation of her appointment order by the institution. Consequently, the Court resolved the issue of mark allocation in accordance with the remand directions of the Supreme Court and referred the matter back to the competent selecting authority for fresh selection in light of its findings. The key principle laid down is that an employee cannot be penalized for administrative defaults of an institution, and experience gained during official leave on full pay cannot be excluded for merit evaluation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee can be penalized or deprived of experience credit for a defect or default on the part of the appointing institution in issuing an appointment order?
  • Can experience gained in a separate subspecialty or during a period of extraordinary leave without pay be counted towards postgraduate experience for appointment as Senior Registrar Medicine?
  • Whether the period of earned leave and maternity leave granted on full average pay can be excluded from a candidate's calculation of professional experience?
  • Does the High Court possess the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to review and resolve disputes concerning the allocation of marks by a selection committee in service matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Farhat Abbas and others vs Dr. Mehmood-Ul-Hassan and others2017 PLJ SC 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  medical faculty appointmentservice lawsub-specialty promotionultra viresPMDC regulationsteaching experiencestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals challenging a Peshawar High Court judgment that set aside the promotion of Dr. Farhat Abbas as an Associate Professor of Cardiology. The core legal question was whether the appellant, possessing an FCPS in Medicine, was eligible for the sub-specialty promotion under the Regulations for the Appointment of Faculty Professorial Staff/Examiners/Principals/Deans/Administrative Staff in Undergraduate & Postgraduate Medical & Dental Institutions of Pakistan, 2011. The respondents argued that only those with specific cardiology qualifications were eligible. The Supreme Court held that the promotion was valid. The Court interpreted Regulation 19 of the 2011 Regulations, which explicitly allows candidates with general qualifications (FCPS, MD, or MS in General Medicine or Surgery) to be appointed to sub-specialty positions provided they possess the requisite teaching experience. Furthermore, the Court established that once such a candidate attains the post of Assistant Professor in a sub-specialty, they are not subordinate to specific sub-specialty degree holders for subsequent promotions. Finding no basis to declare the regulation ultra vires the Pakistan Medical & Dental Council Ordinance, 1962, the Court set aside the High Court's decision and dismissed the original writ petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does Regulation 19 of the Regulations for the Appointment of Faculty Professorial Staff/Examiners/Principals/Deans/Administrative Staff in Undergraduate & Postgraduate Medical & Dental Institutions of Pakistan 2011 allow candidates with general medical qualifications to be appointed to sub-specialty positions?
  • Can a candidate holding a general medical qualification be promoted to Associate Professor in a sub-specialty if they have the requisite teaching experience?
  • Is Regulation 19 of the Regulations for the Appointment of Faculty Professorial Staff/Examiners/Principals/Deans/Administrative Staff in Undergraduate & Postgraduate Medical & Dental Institutions of Pakistan 2011 ultra vires the Pakistan Medical & Dental Council Ordinance 1962?
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• Dr. Faiza Asghar vs Nighat Nasir Sheikh, etc2017 PLJ Lahore 752 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-13
  defamationjurisdiction of civil courtsspecial law vs general lawreturn of plaintdamages for defamationouster of jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged an order of the trial court returning her plaint in a suit for damages for defamation filed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on the ground that the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ousted the jurisdiction of civil courts. The core legal question was whether the promulgation of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 implicitly or explicitly bars the jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain suits for damages for defamation under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Lahore High Court held that the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 does not contain any repealing clause or express provision ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts, and therefore an aggrieved person has concurrent remedies: either to file a civil suit under general law or to seek redress under the special law. The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the trial court for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 oust the jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain suits for damages for defamation under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Can the jurisdiction of civil courts be taken away in the absence of an express provision or necessary implication?
  • Does an aggrieved person have the option to pursue a civil suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or a remedy under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Faiza Asghar vs Nighat Nasir Sheikh and others2017 PLJ Lahore 752, 2017 PLD Lahore 884 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-13Read full judgment →
• Dr. Faisal Masud and anothers vs Umer Rasool, Director General, Lahore Development Authority, Lahore and another2017 SCMR 287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-02
  right to propertyLDAallotment of plotscompromisecompensationequivalent plotsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's dismissal of their writ petitions concerning the arbitrary replacement of their residential plots in Johar Town, Lahore, following a judicial compromise between the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) and certain housing schemes. The core legal question was whether the LDA could deprive property owners of their acquired plots and compensate them with plots of inferior location without violating the fundamental right to property. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that compensation for land acquired and subsequently compromised must satisfy the rule of equivalence in both size and location, meaning a plot on a 9-meter road cannot substitute for a plot on a 40-meter road. Consequently, the Court converted the petitions into appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and directed the LDA to allot alternative available plots of equivalent value and location (Plots Nos. 5A and 5B, Block R) to the petitioners within two months. The key principle laid down is that state authorities must strictly fulfill promises of equivalent compensation to protect citizens' fundamental right to property under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Lahore Development Authority is legally bound to provide plots of equivalent size and location when displacing property owners due to a judicial compromise?
  • Does the allotment of a plot on a 9-meter road satisfy the requirement of equivalent compensation for the deprivation of a plot located on a 40-meter road?
  • Does the deprivation of appropriately located property by a state authority violate the fundamental right to property enshrined under Article 23 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
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• Dr. Ehsan-Ul-Haq Khan and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 PLC (C.S) 679, 2017 P.S.C. 509, 2017 SCMR 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-11-30
  civil service seniorityinter se senioritydirect recruits vs promoteesBPS-18 promotionres judicataCivil Servants Act 1973Federal Service Tribunalindolence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerned a dispute over inter se seniority in BPS-18 between directly appointed civil servants and later-promoted officers. The respondents (Nos. 3 and 4) were originally senior to respondent No. 5 in BPS-17 as per the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) merit list. However, an altered 1992 seniority list led to respondent No. 5 being promoted to BPS-18 first in 1996. Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 challenged this late and, although the Service Tribunal restored their BPS-17 seniority in 2002, it declined to backdate their promotions. Meanwhile, the appellants were directly recruited to BPS-18 in 2007 after passing an FPSC examination that respondents Nos. 3 and 4 failed. Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were only promoted to BPS-18 in 2007 and subsequently claimed seniority over the direct inductees. The Supreme Court held that under Section 8(4) of the Civil Servants Act 1973, seniority in a promoted post takes effect from regular appointment. Because respondents Nos. 3 and 4 remained indolent and the earlier unappealed Tribunal decision operated as res judicata, their BPS-18 seniority could not supersede direct recruits appointed years prior.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prior unappealed judgment of the Service Tribunal declining retrospective promotion operate as res judicata against subsequent claims for backdated seniority?
  • Can civil servants promoted to a higher post claim seniority over direct recruits appointed years prior to their promotion under Section 8(4) of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Does indolence in challenging an altered seniority list prevent civil servants from unsettling established seniority positions of direct inductees?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Basharat Hassan Bashir vs Alternative Energy Development Board, etc.K.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 61 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-28Read full judgment →
• Dr. Basharat Hassan Bashir vs Alternative Energy Development BoardK.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 61, 2017 PLC (C.S.) 7 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-28
  constitutional petitionregularization of serviceMP scalestatutory regulationslocus poenitentiaepast and closed transactiontermination of servicedue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the termination of the petitioner’s services as Director General of the Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB). The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s regularization into a permanent scale was lawful and whether his termination, based on a Supreme Court judgment regarding the non-regularizability of MP-scale posts, was valid. The Court held that the petition was without merit. It determined that the petitioner’s initial appointment and subsequent regularization were made without adhering to mandatory procedures, such as open advertisement and competition. Consequently, the petitioner failed to establish a valid employment contract or a vested right to the position. Relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dr. Mukhtar Ahmed v. Muhammad Anees Saddozai, the Court held that MP-scale posts are special and cannot be regularized. The Court established the principle that appointments made in violation of statutory procedures are inherently illegal and cannot be protected by the doctrines of locus poenitentiae or past and closed transaction, as such protections do not apply to void-ab-initio appointments.

  Questions settled

  • Are Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB) Employees Service Regulations statutory in nature?
  • Can an appointment made without following due process, such as open advertisement and competition, be regularized?
  • Does the doctrine of past and closed transaction protect an appointment that was inherently illegal from its inception?
  • Are holders of posts created on MP Scales entitled to regularization?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Aurangzeb Aalamgir and others vs Province of Punjab and others2017 C.L.R. 169 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-01Read full judgment →
• Dr. Attaur Rehman vs The State & another.2017 PHC 908 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-20Read full judgment →
• Dr. Asim Hussain vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Interior2017 PLD Sindh 665 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-05Read full judgment →
• Dr. Anwar Zada vs The State and 2 others2017 P Cr. L J 1510 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-12-02
  post-arrest bailchild abuseprohibitory limbnon-compoundable offencecompromisemoral turpitudeheinous offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a bail petition filed by Dr. Anwar Zada seeking post-arrest bail in FIR No. 620 dated 10.9.2016 under sections 377 and 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 53 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare Act, 2010. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to bail given the heinous nature of the allegations involving the sexual abuse of an 11-year-old child and the existence of a purported compromise between the parties. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the bail petition, holding that the offense falls within the prohibitory clause of section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is heinous, relates to moral turpitude, and is non-compoundable, rendering a private compromise ineffective for granting bail. The key principle laid down is that in heinous, non-compoundable offenses involving child abuse, a compromise between the parties does not warrant the concession of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused charged with child sexual abuse under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare Act, 2010 is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Can a compromise between the parties serve as a ground for granting bail in a non-compoundable and heinous offense?
  • Does a statement recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 provide sufficient tentative connection of the accused to the crime for refusing bail?
  Read full judgment →
• (1) Dr. Amir Bux and 9 others (2) Dr. Mumtaz Ali Shar & 3 Others (3) Mukhtiar2017 SHC 74 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-30
  constitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionmaster and servantservice rulessacked employees reinstatementnon-statutory rulespublic sector employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition concerns employees of Sui-Southern Gas Company Limited (SSGCL) who sought placement in Grade-VI, arrears, and service benefits, claiming discrimination and violation of the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010. The petitioners, previously terminated and reinstated under the Act, argued they were demoted to Grade-III, contrary to the treatment afforded to other similarly situated employees. The core legal questions were whether the writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, could be invoked against SSGCL, and whether the petitioners were entitled to specific service grades. The Court held that while SSGCL is a 'person' amenable to writ jurisdiction due to its state-owned nature, the petitioners' service rules are non-statutory, rendering their employment governed by the principle of 'master and servant.' The Court determined that the petitioners' reinstatement had been fully complied with under the Act, and subsequent grievances regarding promotion and grading were internal administrative matters. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that service-related disputes involving non-statutory rules cannot be enforced through constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a public limited company, majority-owned by the Federal Government, a 'person' amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can employees of a non-statutory body enforce service-related grievances, such as promotion or grading, through a constitutional petition?
  • Does the principle of 'master and servant' apply to employees of a state-owned enterprise whose service rules are not statutory?
  • Can a petitioner claim a violation of the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010, after having already been reinstated and accepted the terms of service?
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• Dr. Akbar Shah, Consultant & Incharge Khyber Teaching Hospital, Peshawar vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Health and 3 others2017 PLJ Peshawar 329 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Dr. Akbar Rajpoot vs Sheikh Zayed Hospital2017 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 227 · Federal Service Tribunal · 2017-03-02
  service regularizationseniority listimplementation of judgmentdepartmental promotion committeeback benefitsservice tribunalcontempt of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a miscellaneous petition filed for the implementation of previous Federal Service Tribunal judgments dated 15.3.2003 and 6.11.2006 regarding the service regularization, seniority, and promotion of a Medical Officer at Sheikh Zayed Hospital. The core legal question was whether the respondent institution could lawfully delay or evade the implementation of final judgments and unilaterally alter the petitioner's seniority status without proper departmental procedures. The Tribunal held that the respondents had failed to comply with clear judicial directives and had improperly attempted to frustrate the finality of previous orders. The Tribunal emphasized that executive authorities cannot override or nullify court-declared rights through unilateral administrative actions. Consequently, the Tribunal accepted the petition, directing the respondents to implement the earlier judgments by granting the petitioner promotion to BS-18, BS-19, and BS-20 with effect from the specified dates, along with all consequential benefits, within 30 days. The decision reinforces the principle that judicial orders must be implemented in letter and spirit, and that 'consideration' for promotion requires a fair, bona fide, and honest application of mind.

  Questions settled

  • Can an autonomous body unilaterally alter a seniority list that has attained finality?
  • Whether executive authorities can override or nullify court orders through administrative actions?
  • Does the failure to implement a final judgment of a Service Tribunal warrant judicial intervention for enforcement?
  • What constitutes 'consideration' for promotion in the context of civil service law?
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• Dr. Abid Ali vs Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab and 3 others2017 PLC (C.S.) 488 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-11
  Intra Court AppealContract employmentExtension of contractVested rightConstitutional petitionMaintainabilityMaster and servantDiscriminationAbsence from dutyWrit Petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenged an order of a Single Judge dismissing a Writ Petition, and earlier administrative orders, seeking extension of the appellant's contract period as a Veterinary Officer. The core legal questions revolved around whether a contract employee has a vested right to claim extension of service, the maintainability of a Constitutional petition in a master-servant relationship, and allegations of discrimination. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant, appointed on a purely contract basis, had no vested right to claim extension of his contract period, particularly given Clause-7 of his employment contract which allowed termination without assigning reason. It was reiterated that in cases of master-servant relationships arising from contract employment, a Constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is generally not maintainable, with the appropriate remedy being an action for damages. The Court found the appellant's case distinguishable from his colleagues due to alleged unsatisfactory behavior and habitual absence, thus negating claims of mala fide or discriminatory treatment under Article 25 of the Constitution.

  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Abdul Qadir AKHUNDPlaintiff vs Ms. Shahila Perveen2017 MLD 666 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-08
  malicious prosecutionsuit for damageslaw of tortsinterim injunctionrejection of plaintdefamationworkplace harassmentomnisbudsman complaints
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an application for an interim injunction and the maintainability of a suit for damages filed by the plaintiff, a Chief Medical Officer, against the defendant, an airhostess, who had filed various administrative and departmental complaints against him and other staff members. The core legal question was whether a suit for damages under the law of torts for malicious prosecution is maintainable upon the mere filing of administrative complaints before ombudsman forums, prior to any formal prosecution concluding in the plaintiff's favor. The Sindh High Court held that a suit for damages based on malicious prosecution requires the co-existence of specific foundational conditions, including that the plaintiff was prosecuted, that the prosecution ended in their favor, and that it was malicious and without reasonable cause. The Court ruled that the mere filing of a complaint or application before an administrative authority or ombudsman does not constitute 'prosecution' and cannot sustain a suit for damages. Furthermore, granting an injunction to restrain a person from approaching a competent forum is barred under Section 56 of the Specific Relief Act. Consequently, the plaint was rejected.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere filing of a complaint or administrative application before an ombudsman constitute prosecution for the purpose of a suit for damages under the law of torts?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to maintain a suit for damages on the ground of malicious prosecution?
  • Can an interim injunction be granted to restrain a person from approaching a competent legal forum or authority with complaints?
  • Is a suit for damages maintainable when the plaintiff fails to specify and quantify special damages or properly classify the claimed amount as general damages?
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• Dr. Abdul Majeed Banday, Deputy Director (Admin), Directorate of Edu_1eb1450a2017 SC AJK 387 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-05-31Read full judgment →
• Dr. Abdul Jabbar Khatak through Attorney and another vs Iind Senior2017 PLD Sindh 438 · Sindh High Court · 2016-02-29
  defamation suitexclusive jurisdictionrejection of plaintspecial law vs general lawmalicious prosecutionconstitutional petitioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the orders of the Senior Civil Judge and the Additional District Judge, which refused to reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The underlying suit sought damages for malicious prosecution and defamation. The petitioners argued that under Section 13 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, the District Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction to try defamation suits, thereby ousting the Civil Court's jurisdiction. The Court held that the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, is a special law that prevails over the general law, and the word "shall" in Section 13 mandates that defamation cases be tried exclusively by the District Court. However, observing that the suit also included a claim for malicious prosecution, the Court noted that a plaint cannot be rejected piecemeal. Consequently, the Court declined to set aside the impugned orders but directed the trial court to frame a specific issue regarding the maintainability of the defamation claim in light of the statutory bar and decide it alongside other issues.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the District Court for the trial of defamation suits?
  • Can a plaint be rejected piecemeal under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if it contains multiple causes of action?
  • Does a special law enacted by the legislature take precedence over the general law regarding the jurisdiction of courts?
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• Dr, Aurangzeb Alamgir and others vs Province of Punjab and others2017 PLD Lahore 164 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-01Read full judgment →
• Dost Muhammad vs Additional Sessions Judge Barkhan at Rakhni and another2017 P Cr. L J 1654 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-05-31
  dormant caseindefinite adjournmentabsconding witnessescriminal trialpostponement of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by an accused person challenging the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Barkhan at Rakhni, whereby a criminal case was placed in a dormant file due to the non-availability of the complainant and eye-witnesses who were absconding in a murder case. The core legal question was whether a trial court has the legal authority under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to adjourn or postpone criminal proceedings for an indefinite period on the ground that key prosecution witnesses are fugitives from law. The Balochistan High Court held that while Section 344 empowers a court to adjourn proceedings for reasonable cause, such adjournments cannot be for an indefinite period, nor can a trial be kept pending indefinitely for the testimony of witnesses who are fugitives from justice. The impugned order was set aside and the trial court was directed to proceed with the matter expeditiously. The key principle laid down is that criminal proceedings cannot be adjourned indefinitely or placed in a dormant state due to the absence of absconding witnesses.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court place a criminal case in a dormant file for an indefinite period due to the non-availability of prosecution witnesses?
  • Does the absence of complainant or eyewitnesses who are fugitives from law constitute a reasonable cause for indefinite adjournment under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether criminal proceedings can be adjourned indefinitely under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Dost Muhammad & 1 another vs Fazal Sultan2017 CLD 1602, 2017 PHC 585 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-05Read full judgment →
• Dost Ahmad and another vs Fazal Subhan and 2 others2017 CLD 1602 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-05Read full judgment →
• DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited vs Director (Mscid), (SMD) Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan2017 CLD 1087 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-01-16Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and others vs Digicom Trading and others2017 PT D 1706 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-14Read full judgment →
• Divisional Forest Officer Wildlife Department District Gilgit vs Hashim2017 P Cr. L J 1040 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-08-29
  illegal search and seizurequashing of convictionhabeas corpusinherent powerssanctity of homesearch warrantwildlife preservationsummary trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged orders passed by the Sessions Judge, who had granted bail to the respondent after converting proceedings initiated under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 into bail proceedings. The respondent had been convicted summarily by a Magistrate following a raid on his residence by wildlife personnel. The core legal questions concerned the propriety of the Sessions Judge converting habeas corpus proceedings into bail proceedings and the legality of the underlying raid conducted without a search warrant. The Court held that subordinate courts lack the inherent power to convert Section 491 proceedings into bail proceedings, as such inherent jurisdiction is reserved for the High Court under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, the Court determined that the raid, conducted without a valid search warrant and in violation of the sanctity of the home, rendered the subsequent conviction a nullity. Consequently, the Court exercised its inherent powers under Section 561-A to quash the conviction, establishing that mandatory legal requirements for search warrants cannot be bypassed, and proceedings based on such illegalities are void ab initio.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Sessions Judge convert proceedings under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 into bail proceedings under Section 497?
  • Does the High Court possess the inherent power to quash a conviction where the underlying proceedings were conducted in violation of mandatory legal requirements?
  • Is a raid conducted by law enforcement without a search warrant legal?
  • Are subordinate courts empowered to exercise inherent powers to convert one type of legal proceeding into another?
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• District Nazim, Torghar and another vs Government of Khyber2017 CLC 784 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-06-13Read full judgment →
• District Education Officer and 2 others vs Zahid Mehmood and another2017 PLC (C.S.) 1009 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-09
  service matterexclusive jurisdictionconstitutional petitionouster of jurisdictionservice tribunalhuman rights commissionultra virescivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an order passed by the District Judge/Chairman Human Rights Commission, Sialkot, which reinstated a terminated employee. The core legal question is whether a District Judge, acting in the capacity of Chairman of a Human Rights Commission, possesses the jurisdiction to adjudicate service matters of civil servants, thereby overriding the exclusive jurisdiction of specialized tribunals. The High Court held that the District Judge lacked jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. The court set aside the order, ruling that the District Judge’s assumption of authority in this capacity was legally unfounded and ultra vires. The judgment reaffirms that under Article 175(2) and Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, jurisdiction must be expressly conferred by law. It establishes that service matters fall within the exclusive domain of Service Tribunals, and when a special law provides a specific forum and procedure for dispute resolution, general civil jurisdiction is ousted. Consequently, proceedings initiated in an unauthorized forum are void ab initio.

  Questions settled

  • Does a District Judge acting as Chairman of a Human Rights Commission have the jurisdiction to adjudicate service matters of civil servants?
  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 create an exclusive jurisdiction for Service Tribunals that bars the jurisdiction of civil courts?
  • Can a court assume jurisdiction in a matter where the statute has expressly provided a specific forum for redressal?
  • Is an order passed by a District Judge in a capacity not conferred by law or the Constitution legally sustainable?
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• Director, Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, Lahore Nawab GulPTCL 2017 CL. 730 · Customs Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions vs Robert Jodoin and others2017 SCMR 1444 · Supreme Court of CanadaRead full judgment →
• Director General EPA vs Messrs Sultan Industries Sialkot2017 CLD 1117 · Environmental Tribunal · 2017-02-01Read full judgment →