Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and others2017 SCMR 969, 2017 SCP 187, 2017 PLC (C.S.) 1304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-13
  Civil servant promotionCentral Selection Board (CSB)Promotion criteriaDiscretionary marksObjective assessmentService recordDue processFairnessSupersessionDeferment
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court dismissed appeals challenging a judgment of the Islamabad High Court, which had declared the Central Selection Board's (CSB) criteria for awarding 15 discretionary marks, including an overriding effect of 5 marks for "integrity/general reputation/perception," as illegal and violative of established legal principles. The core legal question concerned the legality and propriety of promotion criteria for civil servants, specifically whether subjective assessments by the CSB, overriding objective service records, were permissible. The Court held that the impugned process lacked a structured, objective criterion, leading to arbitrariness and a whimsical approach. It found that reliance on the personal knowledge of board members, without tangible evidence or disclosed reasons, to supersede officers who met objective thresholds based on their service dossiers, violated principles of fairness, due process, and procedural propriety. The Court directed the Establishment Division to re-evaluate all affected cases by withdrawing the overriding effect of the 5 marks and ensuring promotion decisions are based on objective criteria derived from service dossiers.

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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad, etc.2017 P.S.C. 488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-19
  Federal Tax Ombudsmanrepresentation to the Presidentreview powerstatutory remedytax administrationmal-administration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the scope of remedies available against orders passed by the Federal Tax Ombudsman under the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000. The core legal question was whether a representation to the President of Pakistan lies under Section 32 of the Ordinance against an order passed by the Federal Tax Ombudsman in a review petition. The court held that a statutory representation under Section 32 is exclusively competent against a recommendation of the Federal Tax Ombudsman made under Section 11 or a fresh recommendation resulting from a review order that sets aside the earlier decision. Conversely, an order simply dismissing a review petition without altering the original recommendation does not constitute a fresh recommendation and cannot be challenged via a representation to the President. The Supreme Court established the principle that statutory remedies such as a representation must be strictly construed according to the text of the governing enactment, dismissing the appeal and upholding the judgment of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a representation lie to the President of Pakistan under Section 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 against an order passed in review by the Federal Tax Ombudsman?
  • What types of decisions can be reviewed by the Federal Tax Ombudsman under Section 14(8) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000?
  • When does an order passed in review by the Federal Tax Ombudsman give rise to a competent representation before the President?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad2017 PLJ SC 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-19
  Federal Tax Ombudsmanstatutory representationpower of reviewmal-administrationRevenue Divisionadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the scope of the statutory remedy of representation under the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000. The core legal question was whether a representation to the President of Pakistan is maintainable against an order passed by the Federal Tax Ombudsman in a review petition, specifically where the original recommendation remains unchanged. The Supreme Court held that while Section 32 of the Ordinance provides a remedy of representation against a recommendation of the Federal Tax Ombudsman, this remedy is strictly construed. The Court clarified that a representation is only competent against a new recommendation passed pursuant to Section 11(1). If the Federal Tax Ombudsman, while exercising review powers under Section 14(8), dismisses a review petition without setting aside the original recommendation, such an order does not constitute a fresh recommendation and is therefore not subject to a representation before the President. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the statutory remedy is limited to substantive recommendations, not mere orders dismissing review petitions that leave the original recommendation intact.

  Questions settled

  • Is a representation to the President of Pakistan maintainable against an order of the Federal Tax Ombudsman dismissing a review petition where the original recommendation remains unchanged?
  • Does the power of review under Section 14(8) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 extend to findings, recommendations, and other orders?
  • Under what circumstances does an order passed by the Federal Tax Ombudsman in review proceedings become subject to a representation under Section 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad2017 PTD 1481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-19
  Federal Tax Ombudsmanrepresentation to the Presidentpower of reviewstatutory remedytax administrationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Federation of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the High Court which allowed a constitutional petition challenging an order passed by the President of Pakistan on a representation. The core legal question was whether the appellant department had the statutory remedy of a representation before the President of Pakistan against an order passed in review by the Federal Tax Ombudsman. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a representation under Section 32 of the Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 is competent only against a recommendation made under Section 11 or a new recommendation resulting from a review, but not against an order dismissing a review petition where the original recommendation was not set aside. The key principle laid down is that statutory remedies must be strictly construed according to the specific tenor and scope of the governing provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Revenue Division has the remedy of a representation before the President against an order passed in review by the Federal Tax Ombudsman?
  • Against which types of decisions of the Federal Tax Ombudsman is a representation competent under Section 32 of the Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000?
  • Does an order dismissing a review petition by the Federal Tax Ombudsman constitute a fresh recommendation for the purpose of filing a representation?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad2017 PLD Supreme Court 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-19
  Federal Tax Ombudsmanrepresentation to the Presidentpower of reviewtax lawstatutory remedyconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a tax dispute where the Federal Tax Ombudsman passed a recommendation in favor of respondent No. 1, which the appellant department sought to review rather than challenging via representation under Section 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000. After the review petition was dismissed, the appellant filed a representation to the President, which was accepted. The High Court allowed the respondent's constitutional petition against the President's order, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the appellant had the remedy of representation before the President against an order passed in review by the Federal Tax Ombudsman. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a representation under Section 32 of the Ordinance is only competent against a recommendation of the Federal Tax Ombudsman made under Section 11, or a new recommendation resulting from a review order that sets aside the earlier decision. An order merely dismissing a review petition without altering the original recommendation does not give rise to a fresh right of representation to the President. The key principle laid down is that statutory remedies must be strictly construed according to the specific tenor and provisions governing them.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Revenue Division has the remedy of representation before the President of Pakistan against an order passed in review by the Federal Tax Ombudsman?
  • What is the scope of the power of review vested in the Federal Tax Ombudsman under Section 14(8) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000?
  • Does the dismissal of a review petition by the Federal Tax Ombudsman constitute a fresh recommendation against which a representation can be filed under Section 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and another2017 P.S.C. Crl. 363, 2017 SCMR 965, 2017 SCP 798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-18
  unauthorized absencecompulsory retirementabsconsiondisciplinary proceedingsservice tribunalcivil servantcriminal case
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Federation of Pakistan against the judgment of the Service Tribunal, which had converted the major penalty of compulsory retirement of a civil servant into a minor penalty and ordered his reinstatement. The respondent civil servant remained absent from duty without authorization after being nominated in a murder case and going underground as an absconder. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated, and he was compulsorily retired. The core legal question was whether unauthorized absence from duty resulting from absylonsion or being a fugitive from law in a criminal case can be condoned and justified for setting aside departmental disciplinary action. The Supreme Court held that absconding from law does not constitute a valid or reasonable ground to justify unauthorized absence from duty, and condoning such absence would amount to rewarding unlawful conduct. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Service Tribunal's judgment, and restored the major penalty of compulsory retirement, establishing the principle that a civil servant's act of absconding cannot excuse unauthorized absence from service.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unauthorized absence from duty can be justified on the ground that the civil servant went underground as an absconder in a criminal case?
  • Can the act of absconsion or being a fugitive from law be regarded as a reasonable ground to explain absence from government service?
  • Whether the Service Tribunal is justified in converting a major penalty of compulsory retirement into a minor penalty based on an employee's involvement in criminal charges and subsequent absconsion?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and another2017 P.S.C. Crl. 363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  unauthorized absencecompulsory retirementdisciplinary proceedingsabsconsioncivil servantmajor penaltyservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a civil servant, was absent from duty without authorization following his involvement in a criminal murder case. Despite multiple notices to resume duty, he failed to respond, leading to disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of a major penalty of compulsory retirement. The Service Tribunal subsequently converted this major penalty into a minor penalty, citing his absconsion as justified due to the criminal charges and subsequent acquittal. The Federation of Pakistan appealed this decision. The Supreme Court held that the respondent's voluntary act of going 'underground' to evade law enforcement while facing criminal charges did not constitute a valid or reasonable ground to justify unauthorized absence from service. The Court emphasized that condoning such absence would improperly reward fugitive behavior and demonstrate a lack of trust in the judicial system. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Service Tribunal's judgment, and restored the major penalty of compulsory retirement originally imposed by the department.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absconsion of a civil servant to evade arrest in a criminal case constitute a valid ground for condoning unauthorized absence from duty?
  • Can a Service Tribunal interfere with a departmental major penalty imposed for unauthorized absence when the civil servant admits to being a fugitive from law?
  • Is the act of going underground to avoid criminal prosecution a reasonable explanation for failing to attend official duties?
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• Hijrat vs StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 155 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-07-03
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsheroin recoveryprohibitory clausequantum of sentencepre-trial conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a bail petition filed by the accused-petitioner seeking post-arrest bail in a narcotics case registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997, following the recovery of 1200 grams of heroin. The petitioner contended false implication, lack of independent witnesses, and the absence of an FSL report, arguing that the quantity recovered did not warrant the maximum sentence. The State opposed the bail, citing the petitioner's direct connection to the offence and the application of the prohibitory clause of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that while the accused was directly charged, the critical consideration for bail is the likelihood of the sentence at the conclusion of the trial rather than the maximum statutory penalty. Emphasizing that the quantum of sentence must be proportionate to the recovered contraband, the Court determined that denying bail would amount to pre-trial conviction. Consequently, the Court granted bail, establishing the principle that bail should be granted when the likely sentence is not the maximum statutory penalty and there is no prior criminal record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of 1200 grams of heroin automatically disentitle an accused to the concession of bail?
  • Should the court consider the maximum statutory sentence or the likely sentence when deciding a bail petition?
  • Is the absence of independent witnesses in a narcotics recovery case a ground for granting bail?
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• Federation of Pakistan and 20 others vs Dr. Muhammad Arif and 9 others2017 SCP 187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil service promotionCentral Selection Boarddiscretionary marksdue processservice dossierarbitrary administrative actionPerformance Evaluation Reports
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an Islamabad High Court judgment that declared the Central Selection Board's (CSB) promotion criteria for civil servants illegal. The core legal question was whether the Establishment Division could introduce a discretionary formula allocating 15 marks—including 5 overriding marks for integrity and reputation—that allowed the CSB to supersede officers based on members' personal knowledge rather than objective service records. The Supreme Court held that the impugned criteria were arbitrary, vague, and lacked the necessary structured objectivity, thereby violating the principles of fairness and due process. The Court affirmed that promotion decisions must be based on tangible, objective evidence found in an officer's service dossier, such as Performance Evaluation Reports and Training Evaluation Reports, rather than subjective, unrecorded impressions of board members. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, directing the Establishment Division to re-evaluate the affected officers' cases by removing the overriding discretionary marks and ensuring the process adheres to established promotion policies and objective criteria.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Central Selection Board override objective service records for civil servant promotions based on the subjective personal knowledge of its members?
  • Does the allocation of discretionary marks in promotion criteria without a structured, objective basis violate the principles of fairness and due process?
  • Is a civil servant who meets the prescribed eligibility threshold entitled to have their promotion considered based on tangible service records rather than arbitrary assessments?
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• Federal Service Tribunal Islamabad] Muhammad Yaqoob Malik vs Fgei2017 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 144 · Federal Service Tribunal
  service lawFederal Service TribunalFGEIemployment disputecivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal Islamabad involving Muhammad Yaqoob Malik and the Federal Government Educational Institutions (FGEI), cited as 2017 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 144. However, as no substantive judgment text, factual background, statutory references, or judicial reasoning were provided in the source record, a factual summary and evaluation of the core legal questions, the Tribunal's ratio decidendi, and the legal principles laid down cannot be formulated.

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• Federal Public Service Commission through Secretary vs Anwar-Ul-Haq2017 PLC (C.S.) 1445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-30
  up-gradationpromotionsubstantive gradeselection gradelength of servicejurisdiction of service tribunalcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) challenged a decision of the Federal Service Tribunal (FST) that had set aside an order declining the respondent's representation for the grant of BPS-19, directing his re-designation as Senior Private Secretary. The respondent originally entered service in 1978 and was eventually promoted to Private Secretary (BPS-17) in 2011, after which his post was upgraded to BPS-18 under an Office Memorandum. The core legal question was whether a civil servant could claim up-gradation to BPS-19 based on length of service computed from lower grades under the Establishment Division O.M. dated June 2, 1983, and whether up-gradation constitutes a promotion under the civil service laws. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that up-gradation is not a promotion and is personal to incumbents of isolated posts to address stagnation rather than a regular promotion governed by section 9(1) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. Furthermore, the Court held that the Service Tribunals lack jurisdiction to entertain matters relating solely to up-gradation, and that the respondent's service calculations were flawed as selection grades in lower substantive posts could not be computed as higher grade service for promotion or up-gradation eligibility.

  Questions settled

  • Whether up-gradation of a post constitutes a promotion under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain issues relating to the up-gradation of civil servants?
  • How is past service in lower grades and selection grades to be computed for determining eligibility for higher grades under the Establishment Division Office Memorandum dated June 2, 1983?
  • Can a civil servant claim up-gradation to a higher grade as a matter of right based merely on length of service?
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• Federal Board of Revenue, etc. vs M/s. Chenone Stores Limited2017 LHC 3661, 2018 PLJ 379, 2018 PTCL CL. 141, 2018 PTD 208, 2018 P.C.T.L.R. 78 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-17Read full judgment →
• Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education through Chairman vs Azam Ali Khan2017 YLR 906 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-23
  civil revisiondate of birth correctioneducational testimonialssuo motu revisional jurisdictionlimitationevidentiary valueadmission formbirth certificatename changedeclaration suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged the dismissal of an appeal as time-barred, which originally sought to overturn a civil court's judgment decreeing a change in the respondent's name and date of birth in educational testimonials. The core legal questions involved the evidentiary weight of documents for changing a date of birth in educational records and the revisional court's power to intervene when an appeal is dismissed on limitation grounds. The Islamabad High Court held that the civil court misread evidence and acted contrary to established law by giving preference to later-issued documents (birth certificate, Form-B, passport, CNIC) over earlier, admitted educational records (admission form, SSC certificate) for date of birth correction. The Court emphasized that strong, unimpeachable evidence, preferably pre-dating educational testimonials, is required for such changes. It further ruled that a revisional court can exercise its suo motu jurisdiction to set aside an illegal judgment and decree, even if an appeal against it was dismissed as time-barred. Consequently, the High Court set aside the lower courts' judgments and dismissed the respondent's civil suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a revisional court set aside an illegal judgment and decree if the appeal against it was dismissed as time-barred?
  • What evidentiary weight is given to documents for changing a date of birth in educational testimonials?
  • Do documents issued after educational testimonials, such as birth certificates or CNICs, hold greater evidentiary value for date of birth correction?
  • Is a suit for declaration seeking a change in the plaintiff's name maintainable under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
  • When is corroboration required for a birth certificate issued long after the alleged date of birth?
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• Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education through Chairman vs Abeer Masood2017 CLC 1085 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-14
  correction of date of birthrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsadmissibility of documentslimitationpresumption of truthCNIC
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment from the Islamabad High Court, delivered by Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, J., addresses a civil revision petition filed by the Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education challenging concurrent lower court judgments that decreed a suit for declaration in favor of the respondent, correcting her date of birth in educational certificates from 17.08.1992 to 17.08.1994. The core legal questions involved whether a suit for correction of date of birth is barred, whether objection to admissibility of documents can be raised subsequently, and whether concurrent findings of fact can be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction. The court held that CNIC and official birth certificates carry a presumption of truth and outweigh an admission form filled out due to parental illiteracy, that objections to documentary evidence cannot be raised for the first time if no objection was taken during trial, and that a plea of limitation cannot be raised for the first time in revisional jurisdiction. The court laid down the principle that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts cannot be interfered with under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without establishing perversity or arbitrariness, and genuine mistakes in academic records regarding dates of birth should be corrected if no prejudice is caused.

  Questions settled

  • Can an objection to the admissibility of documents in evidence be raised for the first time when no objection was made during trial?
  • Whether a plea of limitation can be raised for the first time before the High Court in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction?
  • Does a Computerized National Identity Card carry a presumption of truth regarding date of birth over an admission form entry?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts be interfered with under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without showing perversity or arbitrariness?
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• Fazal-Ur-Rehman and others vs Parveen Akhtar & others2017 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 111 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-06-07Read full judgment →
• Fazal-Ur-Rehman and 2 others vs Parveen Akhtar and 3 others2017 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 111, 2017 CLC 1546 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-06-07Read full judgment →
• Fazal Subhan And Another vs Chamnay and Another2017 MLD 2079 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-04-25Read full judgment →
• Fazal Rahim vs Akbar Ayub, etc2017 PHC 712 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-06-07Read full judgment →
• Fazal Mehmood Baig---Appellant vs University of Azad Jammu and2017 PLD Supreme Court (AJ&K) 50 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-06-08Read full judgment →
• Fazal Mehmood Baig vs The University of Aj&K & 11 others2017 SCR 1380 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-06-06Read full judgment →
• Fazal Majeed vs Muhammad Amar and another2017 P Cr. L J 71 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-12-15
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonyblood feudfirearms expert reportprompt FIRrelated witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with a connected murder reference for confirmation. The prosecution alleged that the appellant shot and killed the deceased due to a previous blood feud. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular testimony from related and interested witnesses, the corroborative value of prompt FIR lodging, medical evidence, and forensic matching of crime empties with the weapon recovered upon the appellant's prompt arrest. The Peshawar High Court held that the eyewitness accounts were natural, consistent, and corroborated by medical and forensic evidence, and that mere relationship does not discredit otherwise truthful witnesses. The court affirmed the conviction and death sentence, establishing that prompt reporting, corroborated ocular testimony, and positive firearms expert reports sufficiently prove a murder charge beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related and interested eyewitnesses can be relied upon for conviction in a murder case without independent corroboration?
  • Does a prompt lodging of the FIR eliminate the possibility of deliberation and false implication of an accused?
  • Whether a positive FSL report matching crime empties with the weapon recovered from the accused serves as strong corroborative evidence?
  • What is the evidentiary value of minor contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses during cross-examination?
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• Fazal Hussain vs The State2017 MLD 980 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-02
  murder appealbenefit of doubtocular accountnighttime identificationadverse inferencemedical evidence contradictionweapon recoveryacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by Fazal Hussain challenging his conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with compensation, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Alipur. The core legal questions pertained to the reliability of eyewitness testimony involving nighttime identification by torchlight where the torch was not recovered, contradictions between ocular and medical evidence, unexplained failure of the investigating agency to record the statement of a conscious injured victim who survived nine days, and the evidentiary value of weapon recovery lacking serological confirmation. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a shadow of doubt. The presence of one eyewitness was doubtful, the torchlight source was unproved, material improvements were made regarding the specific role of the appellant, and adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 arose from the failure to record the deceased's statement. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can nighttime identification of an accused be relied upon when the alleged source of light is neither seized by the police nor shown in the site plan?
  • What is the legal effect under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 when the investigating officer fails to record the statement of an injured victim who remained conscious and survived for multiple days before expiring?
  • Can a positive Chemical Examiner report on a recovered weapon be relied upon without a Serologist report confirming the origin of human blood, particularly where there was substantial delay in dispatch?
  • Does medical evidence provide corroboration if the primary ocular account lacks credibility and contradicts the injury location described in the medical report?
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• Fazal Hussain & another vs Muhammad Taj & 2 others2017 SCR 1050 · N/A · 2017-05-25
  free fightcommon intentiondouble jeopardysentence enhancementcriminal appealpremeditationvicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a criminal incident involving a dispute over property boundaries, resulting in the death of Abdul Khaliq and injuries to others. The trial court convicted the accused, but the Shariat Court subsequently reduced the sentences, leading to the release of the convicts after they served their time. The complainant appealed to this Court, seeking an enhancement of the sentences, arguing that the offence was premeditated and involved common intention. The Supreme Court examined the evidence and determined that the prosecution failed to establish premeditation or a common plan, characterizing the incident as a "free fight" where each participant was liable only for their individual acts. Consequently, the Court held that the sentences imposed were appropriate under the circumstances. Furthermore, the Court ruled that since the convicts had already served their sentences and been released, enhancing their punishment would violate the principle against double jeopardy. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that re-incarcerating individuals who have completed their legal sentences is unjust and legally impermissible.

  Questions settled

  • Does a 'free fight' negate the application of common intention under criminal law?
  • Can an appellate court enhance a sentence after the convict has already served the original sentence and been released?
  • Is it a violation of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to re-incarcerate a convict who has completed their sentence?
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• Fazal Dil vs Ghulam Qadir and others2017 PLJ Lahore 787 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-08Read full judgment →
• Fazal Akbar and another vs State through Superintendent Customs2017 PTD (Trib.) 492 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-04-13Read full judgment →
• Fayyaz Hussain vs State and anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 701 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-08
  post-arrest bailrapefurther inquiryevidentiary gapsfirst offenderFIR delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, Fayyaz Hussain, who was accused of rape in a case registered under Section 376(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail pending trial given the evidentiary gaps in the prosecution's case. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail, noting several critical factors: an unexplained thirty-two-hour delay in lodging the FIR, the finding of innocence regarding a co-accused during investigation, the absence of violence marks on the victim's private parts during medical examination, and the lack of any recovery from the petitioner. Furthermore, the medical opinion remained inconclusive pending a report from the Punjab Forensic Science Agency. The Court determined that the case required further inquiry within the meaning of Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court exercised its discretion to grant bail, establishing the principle that where prosecution evidence is weak or inconclusive, continued detention of a first-time offender is unjustifiable.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR constitute a ground for granting post-arrest bail?
  • Can the finding of innocence of a co-accused during investigation impact the case against the remaining accused for the purpose of bail?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail when the medical evidence is inconclusive and pending further forensic reports?
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• Fayyaz alias Fiazi vs The State2017 SCMR 2024 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-09
  murdercapital punishmentdeath sentence alterationlife imprisonmentocular evidencemedical corroborationsingle fire shotmitigating circumstanceunproved motive
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose out of the conviction and death sentence awarded to the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the trial court, subsequently confirmed by the Lahore High Court, for causing the death of the deceased by a firearm injury. The Supreme Court considered whether the conviction was justified on the evidence and whether the case warranted the imposition of capital punishment. Upon evaluating the ocular testimony of two eyewitnesses, fully corroborated by medical evidence, the Court affirmed that the prosecution had proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, regarding the quantum of sentence, the Court observed that only a single shot was fired without repetition and that the motive alleged by the prosecution suffered from an unreliable improvement. Consequently, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, maintaining the conviction under Section 302(b), PPC, but reducing the sentence of death to imprisonment for life, with compensation under Section 544-A and the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Can a death sentence for an offence under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be commuted to life imprisonment where only a single shot was fired without repetition?
  • Does an unreliable or improved motive serve as a mitigating circumstance to reduce a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Is a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 sustainable when ocular testimony is corroborated by medical evidence?
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• Fayyaz Ahmad, Traffic Warden vs Inspector General of Police Punjab, Lahore and 2 others2017 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 112 · Punjab Service Tribunal
  service appealdismissal from servicecriminal misconductdenovo inquiryright of cross-examinationPunjab Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974 by the appellant, a traffic warden, challenging his dismissal from service following departmental proceedings for alleged criminal misconduct involving a stolen motorcycle and a fake number plate. The core legal question was whether the departmental inquiry and subsequent penalty of dismissal were conducted in accordance with the mandatory statutory provisions and guidelines of the law, and whether the procedural lapses vitiated the proceedings. The Punjab Service Tribunal held that the inquiry officer failed to allow cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and ignored the mandatory provisions of Sections 10 and 11 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, thereby rendering the inquiry legally void. The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders, reinstated the appellant into service, and granted liberty to the competent authority to initiate fresh denovo proceedings if sufficient incriminating evidence existed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an inquiry officer to allow cross-examination of prosecution witnesses vitiate the inquiry under the PEEDA Act, 2006?
  • What are the legal consequences when an inquiry is conducted in disregard of Sections 10 and 11 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006?
  • Can a service tribunal set aside a departmental dismissal order and permit denovo proceedings where procedural irregularities are found?
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• Fayyaz Ahmad vs The State2017 SCP 983 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-17
  circumstantial evidencelast seen evidencecapital punishmentcriminal appealacquittalburden of proofreasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for the murder of the deceased, Zafar Iqbal, which resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment. The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, specifically the theory of 'last seen' evidence, alleging the appellant abducted the complainant's child and subsequently lured the deceased to his death. The Supreme Court re-appraised the evidence and found the prosecution's narrative riddled with improbabilities, including unexplained gaps in the chain of custody and contradictory timelines regarding the deceased's death. The Court held that for circumstantial evidence to support a capital conviction, it must form an unbroken chain connecting the accused to the crime, which was absent here. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that 'last seen' evidence requires corroboration from independent, unimpeachable sources, which the prosecution failed to provide. Concluding that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court set aside the lower courts' judgments, noting a serious miscarriage of justice, and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • What are the fundamental principles required to establish a case based on 'last seen' evidence?
  • Can a conviction for a capital charge be sustained solely on uncorroborated circumstantial evidence?
  • What is the standard of scrutiny required for circumstantial evidence in criminal cases?
  • Does the failure to provide an unbroken chain of evidence in a circumstantial case necessitate acquittal?
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• Fayyaz Ahmad Nadeem Butt and 15 others vs State Life Insurance2017 PLC 172 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-07
  Intra Court AppealAd hoc AllowanceCollective Bargaining AgentConstitutional jurisdictionAlternative remedyState Life Insurance CorporationUndertaking
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges the judgment of a learned Single Judge-in-Chambers dismissing the appellants' writ petition, which sought to challenge the withdrawal of a 50% Ad hoc Allowance granted to unionized staff of the State Life Insurance Corporation. The core legal question concerns whether the appellants could invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court against the withdrawal of an allowance that was conditionally granted as a prepayment adjustable against a forthcoming Collective Bargaining Agreement, and whether an alternate remedy existed before the National Industrial Relations Commission. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants had accepted the allowance subject to conditional undertakings making it adjustable against future wage agreements, and that they had an alternate forum to agitate grievances regarding collective bargaining settlements. The court laid down that employees who give explicit written undertakings accepting conditional prepayments subject to future CBA settlements cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction when those adjustments are enforced, especially where an alternate statutory remedy is available.

  Questions settled

  • Whether constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 can be invoked when an employee has signed an undertaking making an allowance adjustable against a forthcoming Collective Bargaining Agreement?
  • Does the withdrawal of a conditionally granted prepayment allowance pursuant to a Collective Bargaining Agreement constitute a violation of fundamental rights warranting constitutional interference?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against a statutory corporation's employment terms when an alternate remedy is available under industrial relations laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Faysal Bank Limited Through VP/Regional Manager Sam (N) Decree Holder2017 CLD 1028 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-22Read full judgment →
• Fayaz Muhammad and Others vs Kifayatullah and Another2017 NLR Civil 83 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-09-18Read full judgment →
• Fayaz Ali vs .Dr. Ahmad Khan Hoti and others2017 CLD 1158 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-03-14
  auction bidexecution petitiondecretal amountconfirmation of auctionbanking courtvested rightsatisfaction of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, challenges a Banking Court's order that consigned an execution petition to the record room after the judgment debtors satisfied the decretal amount. The core legal question was whether an auction purchaser, having submitted the highest bid, acquired a vested right to have the auction confirmed despite the judgment debtors subsequently paying the entire decretal amount before the court formally confirmed the sale. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the auction proceedings were never finalized or confirmed. Because the judgment debtors paid the full decretal amount with the court's permission, the decree was satisfied, and the execution petition was correctly consigned to the record room. The judgment affirms the established legal principle that an auction bid constitutes merely an offer and does not create any vested right in the property for the bidder until the court formally confirms the auction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a highest bid in an auction create a vested right in the property before the court confirms the auction?
  • Can an execution petition be consigned to the record room if the judgment debtor pays the entire decretal amount before the auction is confirmed?
  • Is a bid in an auction considered a final sale or merely an offer prior to judicial confirmation?
  Read full judgment →
• Fawad vs The State & another2017 PHC 915 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-26Read full judgment →
• Fawad Rehman and another vs The State2017 YLR 1957 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-09
  post-arrest bailforged CNICproperty disputecivil natureprohibitory clausefurther inquiryabatement
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicants sought post-arrest bail in a case involving allegations of fraud, forgery, and the creation of a bogus CNIC to usurp an immovable property. The core legal questions revolved around whether the offences fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the case warranted further inquiry under Section 497(2) given the civil nature of the underlying property dispute. The Sindh High Court held that the offences charged did not fall within the prohibitory clause, the dispute was essentially civil and sub judice, and the case called for further inquiry since the documentary evidence was already in the custody of the prosecution and there was no risk of tampering. The court laid down the principle that for offences punishable with imprisonment of less than ten years, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal an exception, applicable where no extraordinary circumstances such as risk of abscondence or tampering exist.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted when the offences charged do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a property dispute of a civil nature pending before a competent civil court make a criminal case one of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the grant of bail the general rule for non-bailable offences punishable with imprisonment of less than ten years?
  • Does the completion of investigation and submission of challan eliminate the apprehension of tampering with prosecution evidence for the purpose of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Fawad Ahsan etc vs Chairman Arbitration Council Islamabad2017 IHC 189 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-17Read full judgment →
• Fawad Ahsan and another vs Chairman, Arbitration Council, Islamabad and another2017 PLD Islamabad 364 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-16Read full judgment →
• Fauji Fertilizer Company Limited Employees Gratuity Fund vs Federation of Pakistan through Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others2019 P.C.T.L.R. 243, 2017 PTD 1544 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-19Read full judgment →
• Fatima vs The Federation of Pakistan through its Secretary Ministry of Commerce and 3 others2017 [M] C.L.R. 1102 · Balochistan High Court
  vested rightlegitimate expectationlocus poenitentiaerecruitment banpublic appointmentconstitutional petitionAghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Balochistan High Court by Fatima, who sought the issuance of an appointment order for the post of Manager (Legal) in the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan under the Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan package. The core legal questions involved whether a completed selection process creates a vested right and legitimate expectation preventing authorities from withholding appointment, and whether a subsequently imposed recruitment ban applies retrospectively to defeat accrued rights. The Court held that once a selection process is finalized and a merit list is published, a valid vested right accrues to the candidate, and the authority lacks the power under the doctrine of locus poenitentiae to retract or withhold appointment without lawful justification. Furthermore, government policies imposing recruitment bans operate prospectively rather than retrospectively and cannot annul completed selections. The Court issued a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to issue the formal appointment letter to the petitioner within one month.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a completed selection process and publication of a merit list creates a vested right for appointment?
  • Can a government policy imposing a ban on fresh recruitments be applied retrospectively to nullify completed selections?
  • Does the doctrine of locus poenitentiae permit public authorities to rescind an appointment process after decisive steps have been taken?
  • Whether withholding an appointment order without valid justification violates the doctrine of legitimate expectation and fundamental rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Fatima Rana vs Bilal Ahmad Bhatti, etc.2017 YLR 2330, 2017 PLJ Lahore 101 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-08Read full judgment →
• Fatima Rana vs Bilal Ahmad Bhatti and others2017 YLR 2330 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-08Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad vs Allah Ditta2017 [M] C.L.R. 475 · Lahore High Court · 2016-04-27Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad and 8 others vs Allah Ditta and 5 others2017 MLD 590 · Lahore High Court · 2016-04-27Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad and 11 others vs Allah Wasaya and 3 others2017 MLD 1787 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-07Read full judgment →
• Farzand Ali vs Muhammad Ishaq2017 LHC 4327 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-22
  pre-emptioncivil revisionlimitationTalb-e-MuwathibatTalb-e-Ishhadmisreading of evidenceconcurrent findingsregistered sale deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from a suit for possession through pre-emption concerning agricultural land. The trial and appellate courts decreed the suit in favor of the respondent. The petitioner challenged these concurrent findings, arguing that the suit was barred by limitation and that the respondent failed to prove the mandatory pre-emption demands (Talbs). The Court held that while the suit was filed within the limitation period—accounting for summer vacations—the lower courts committed material irregularity by misreading the evidence. Specifically, the respondent admitted during cross-examination that the story regarding Talb-e-Muwathibat was fabricated, and failed to prove the service of Talb-e-Ishhad notice. The Court affirmed that concurrent findings of fact are subject to interference in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when they result from misreading or non-reading of evidence. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgments and dismissed the suit, emphasizing that the failure to perform Talbs in the manner prescribed by law renders the claim unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Does the failure to raise the plea of limitation in the written statement preclude a party from raising it later?
  • Is a suit for pre-emption filed after the expiry of four months from the registration of the sale deed maintainable?
  • Does the failure to prove the service of the notice of Talb-e-Ishhad render a pre-emption suit liable to dismissal?
  Read full judgment →
• Farzana Begum & others vs Sohail Umer & another2017 SCR 420 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-01-18
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirybenefit of doubttentative assessmentbail cancellationcriminal appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Shariat Court releasing the accused-respondent on post-arrest bail in a case involving murder and other offences. The core legal question revolves around whether the accused was rightly granted bail under the principle of further inquiry when investigating officers concluded he was empty-handed and conflicting versions existed on the record. The Supreme Court held that the Shariat Court exercised its discretion properly upon a tentative assessment of the material, noting that reinvestigation by the police found the accused empty-handed, the weapon recovery was not on his pointation, and he sustained injuries during the occurrence. The Court laid down the principle that the benefit of the slightest doubt must be extended to the accused even at the bail stage, and where a case falls within the ambit of further inquiry, the grant of bail becomes a right rather than a mere concession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the benefit of doubt can be extended to an accused person at the stage of bail?
  • Does mere abscondence automatically disentitle an accused from the concession of bail if he is otherwise entitled to it?
  • When does the grant of bail become a right of the accused under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What degree of circumstances is required to cancel bail once it has been granted by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Farrukh Nisar vs Israr Ahmed2017 [M] C.L.R. 1310 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-12Read full judgment →
• Farrukh Nawaz Bhatti vs Federal Government through Prime Minister of Pakistan & 3 others2017 IHC 267 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-29
  quo warrantostatutory autonomyregulatory captureconflict of interestde facto doctrinepublic officeappointment procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a constitutional petition seeking a writ of quo warranto challenging the Federal Government's appointment of the Mayor of the Metropolitan Corporation, Islamabad, as an ex-officio Member and part-time Chairman of the Capital Development Authority (CDA). The core legal question was whether the Federal Government could bypass the statutory appointment process prescribed by the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, by appointing an elected official to the Board on an ex-officio and part-time basis. The Court held that the impugned notifications were illegal and ultra vires. It determined that the CDA is an autonomous regulatory body and appointments to its Board must strictly adhere to the fixed-term and qualification requirements of the Ordinance of 1960. The respondent’s appointment violated statutory disqualification clauses regarding conflict of interest and holding incompatible elected office. The judgment establishes that statutory regulatory bodies must maintain autonomy; appointments to key positions must be transparent, merit-based, and follow the specific procedures laid down by the governing statute, rather than being subject to the unfettered discretion of the executive.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government appoint a person to the Board of the Capital Development Authority on an ex-officio or part-time basis?
  • Does the doctrine of 'pleasure of the government' grant the executive unfettered discretion in appointing members to statutory regulatory bodies?
  • Is the office of the Chairman of the Capital Development Authority a public office subject to a writ of quo warranto?
  • Does a conflict of interest, as defined in the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960, disqualify a person from being appointed as a member of the Board?
  Read full judgment →
• Farrukh Akhtar and others vs The State and another2017 MLD 1190 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-29
  circumstantial evidencelast seen evidenceextra-judicial confessionbenefit of doubtmurder referencecriminal appealforensic report
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence awarded by the trial court for murder. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence—comprising 'last seen' testimony, an extra-judicial confession, and forensic reports—was sufficient to sustain a conviction. The High Court held that the evidence failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstances necessary to exclude every hypothesis of innocence. Specifically, the 'last seen' evidence was discarded due to an unexplained eight-day delay and lack of proximity in time and space. The extra-judicial confession was deemed unreliable, and the forensic report was rendered inconsequential due to the delayed dispatch of recovered weapons and casings to the laboratory. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions, acquitted the appellants, and answered the murder reference in the negative. The key principle laid down is that in cases relying solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish an irresistible nexus between the accused and the crime, ensuring that every hypothesis of innocence is excluded; otherwise, it is unsafe to maintain a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on circumstantial evidence if the chain of circumstances is incomplete?
  • Is a retracted extra-judicial confession sufficient to sustain a capital charge without independent corroboration?
  • Does a significant delay in recording 'last seen' evidence render it unreliable?
  • What is the effect of delayed dispatch of crime weapons and casings on the evidentiary value of a forensic report?
  Read full judgment →
• Farooq Yousaf Ghurki vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 PLD Lahore 159 · Lahore High Court · 2016-07-22Read full judgment →
• Farooq Mehndi vs The State and another2017 LHC 1069 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-15
  post-arrest bailmurdercommon intentionpre-trial punishmentrole of public prosecutorbail consistency
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by an accused charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The court first addressed the procedural issue of frequent adjournments requested by complainants to engage private counsel, clarifying that under Section 493 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Public Prosecutor is the primary authority responsible for prosecution, and private counsel only assists. Regarding the merits, the court noted that while the petitioner was alleged to be present at the crime scene with a weapon, no specific overt act was attributed to him. Furthermore, a co-accused with a more significant role (raising a lalkara) had already been granted bail, which remained unchallenged. The court held that the petitioner's case was on a better footing than the co-accused and that continued detention would constitute pre-trial punishment. Consequently, the court allowed the bail petition, emphasizing that the role of the accused was less culpable than that of the co-accused already released.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of a privately engaged counsel for the complainant override the authority of the Public Prosecutor under Section 493 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail if their alleged role is less significant than that of a co-accused who has already been granted bail?
  • Does continued detention of an accused without specific overt acts constitute pre-trial punishment?
  Read full judgment →
• Farooq Mehndi vs State and anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 610 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Farooq Ahmed vs State and anotherPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 185, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 484, 2020 SCMR 78, PLJ 2017 SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-06-09
  terrorismprivate enmitycompromiseDiyatAnti-Terrorism Actcriminal appealmens reajurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerns a petitioner convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 for a murder committed within court premises. Following a valid compromise between the petitioner and the legal heirs of the deceased, the Court addressed whether the conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 could be sustained given the motive of private enmity. The Supreme Court held that the compromise effectively resolved the murder charge, warranting acquittal under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Regarding the terrorism charge, the Court ruled that the conviction could not be sustained. It established the principle that while the location of an offense may confer jurisdiction upon Anti-Terrorism Courts, the substantive definition of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 requires proof that the act was designed to create fear, insecurity, or terror in society. Because the murder was motivated by private revenge rather than an intent to terrorize the public, it did not constitute terrorism, leading to the petitioner's acquittal on all counts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a murder committed within court premises automatically constitute an act of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Is the definition of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 based on the consequence of the act or the design of the accused?
  • Can a conviction under Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 be sustained if the underlying motive for the crime is private enmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Farooq Ahmed vs Custodian & others2017 SC AJK 464 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-12-20Read full judgment →
• Farooq Ahmad vs Additional District and Sessions Judge (West)2017 MLD 567 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-03
  Section 12(2) CPCrent restrictioncivil revisionfraud and misrepresentationinherent powersappellate jurisdictionIslamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to an appellate order dismissing a revision petition against a Rent Controller's decision. The petitioner, aggrieved by an eviction order, filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 before the Rent Controller, alleging fraud and misrepresentation. Upon dismissal, the petitioner appealed to the Additional District Judge, who rejected the petition, ruling that the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001, a special statute, provided no remedy of revision. The High Court addressed whether an order passed under Section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908, is revisable and whether an appellate court may convert an appeal into a revision. The Court held that while the Rent Restriction Ordinance is a special law, the Rent Controller possesses inherent power to address fraud via Section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Since such orders are not appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, they are subject to revision under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court established that appellate courts should treat mislabeled appeals as revisions to ensure justice, remanding the case for proper adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order passed by a Rent Controller on an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 subject to revision?
  • Can an appellate court treat an incorrectly filed appeal as a revision petition?
  • Does a Rent Controller have the inherent power to set aside an order obtained through fraud or misrepresentation?
  • Is an order passed under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Farmers Organization of Peer Mahal Distributary through V.P. vs Government of Punjab through Secretary (Irrigation) and others2017 MLD 1132 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-13Read full judgment →
• Farmers Organization of Peer Mahal Distributary through its VP vs Government of Punjab through Secretary (Irrigation), etcK.L.R. 2017 Revenue Cases 33 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan etc vs Digicom Trading etc2017 PLJ Lahore 969 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-14Read full judgment →
• Farmers Organization of Peer Mahal Distributary through its VP vs Government of Punjab through Secretary (Irrigation), etcK.L.R. 2017 Revenue Cases 33, 2017 LHC 911 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-13Read full judgment →
• Farkhanda Bibi etc vs Mehmood Munier etc2017 LHC 3590 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-15Read full judgment →
• Farid Ullah vs The State throughAdvocate General and anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 277, 2017 MLD 117 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-07-04Read full judgment →
• Farid Ullah vs State through Advocate General and anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 277 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-07-04
  post-arrest bailrule of consistencyfresh ground for bailsecond bail applicationco-accusedmaintainability of bail petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 387 and 506 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, Section 25 of the Telegraph Act 1885, and Section 7-H of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The petitioner's previous bail application had been dismissed, but he filed a subsequent petition based on the 'rule of consistency' following the Supreme Court's grant of bail to a co-accused. The core legal question was whether a second bail application is maintainable when based on a ground, such as the release of a co-accused, that was unavailable during the initial dismissal. The Court held that a subsequent bail application is maintainable if it presents a fresh ground not available at the time of the earlier dismissal. Finding that the petitioner's role was comparable to that of the co-accused who had already been granted bail by the Supreme Court, the Court admitted the petitioner to bail. The judgment affirms that the rule of consistency applies when a co-accused is released on bail, provided the petitioner's circumstances are sufficiently similar.

  Questions settled

  • Is a second bail application maintainable if it is based on a ground that was not available at the time of the dismissal of the first bail application?
  • Does the release of a co-accused on bail by the Supreme Court constitute a valid fresh ground for a petitioner to file a subsequent bail application?
  • Does the rule of consistency apply when the role of the petitioner is at par with a co-accused who has already been granted bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Farhat Abbas Shah vs The State2017 MLD 105 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-19
  dying declarationQatl-i-Amdcapital punishmentcorroborationmedical evidencecriminal appealmurder reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of his wife, an offence under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly relying on the dying declaration of the deceased. The court held that the prosecution's case was established through cogent and consistent evidence, including the dying declaration, which was corroborated by medical testimony and the recovery of incriminating material. The court affirmed that a dying declaration, when found to be truthful and corroborated by other evidence, is sufficient to sustain a capital charge. The court rejected the appellant's plea of innocence and his alternative theory of suicide, noting that the appellant failed to provide any credible evidence to discredit the medical officer or the circumstances surrounding the declaration. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal, upheld the conviction and sentence, and answered the murder reference in the affirmative.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for a capital charge be sustained solely on the basis of a dying declaration?
  • Is a dying declaration admissible under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 if the deceased is unavailable to testify?
  • Does the law require a specific quantum of evidence to prove a charge of murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Farhan vs The State and another2017 YLR 1605 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-27
  juvenile offenderdetermination of ageossification testschool admission certificatebirth certificatecriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenges the order of the Sessions Judge dismissing the petitioner's application under sections 5 and 7 of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000. The core legal question concerns the determination of the petitioner's age at the time of the occurrence to ascertain whether he qualifies as a juvenile. The court observed that a birth certificate entered long after the occurrence lacks probative force, while a school admission certificate alone is not conclusive proof of age. Holding that preference must be given to medical opinion when documentary evidence is inconclusive regarding an accused person's age, the court addressed the principles governing age determination in criminal trials.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a school admission certificate is conclusive proof of an accused person's age?
  • Which evidence is given preference when a controversy regarding the age of an accused person cannot be settled through conflicting documentary evidence and medical opinion?
  Read full judgment →
• Farhad' Khan vs Asad Zulfiqar & others2017 PLJ Islamabad 167 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-28Read full judgment →
• Farhad Alam vs The State2017 MLD 1804 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-07-29Read full judgment →
• Fareed Ahmed A. Dayo vs Chief Minister Sindh through Principal2017 PLD Sindh 214 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-22
  constitutional petitionexecutive authorityappointment of advisergood governanceultra viresparliamentary democracydelegation of powerspublic interest litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the appointment of an Adviser to the Chief Minister of Sindh and the subsequent allocation of the portfolio of Law, Enquiries, and Anti-Corruption Establishment, alongside appointments as Chairman of the Board of Governors for Law Colleges and Pro-Vice Chancellor of a law university. The core legal question was whether an Adviser, being an unelected individual, could exercise executive authority or hold ministerial portfolios under the Constitution. The Court held that the Constitution mandates executive authority be exercised solely by elected representatives. Consequently, the Court declared the appointment of the respondent as an Adviser with ministerial portfolios void ab initio. The Court ruled that provisions in the Sindh Government Rules of Business, 1986, and the Sindh Advisers (Appointment, Powers, Functions, Salaries, Allowances and Privileges) Act, 2003, permitting the delegation of executive powers to Advisers, were ultra vires. The judgment established that Advisers cannot exercise executive authority, and appointments must adhere to principles of probity, good governance, and merit, rather than arbitrary discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Adviser appointed under Article 130(11) of the Constitution exercise executive authority or hold a ministerial portfolio?
  • Are provisions in the Sindh Government Rules of Business, 1986, and the Sindh Advisers (Appointment, Powers, Functions, Salaries, Allowances and Privileges) Act, 2003, that allow delegation of executive powers to Advisers, ultra vires the Constitution?
  • Does the Constitution require that executive authority be exercised exclusively by elected representatives?
  • Can a court intervene in the appointment of an Adviser if the appointment lacks the requisite prudence and violates principles of good governance?
  Read full judgment →
• Faraz Alamgir vs Additional District and Sessions Judge VIII and 22017 YLR 994 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-21Read full judgment →
• Faqir Khan vs The State2017 MLD 35 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-02-16Read full judgment →
• Fancy Foundation vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi2017 PLJ SC 481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-13
  adventure in the nature of tradeincome from businesscapital gainstax exemptioncharitable trustburden of proofisolated transactionincome tax
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a charitable foundation, challenged the tax assessment on the surplus generated from the sale of immovable property, which the tax department classified as "income from business" under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether an isolated transaction of buying and selling property constitutes an "adventure in the nature of trade" under Section 2(11) of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the transaction did not constitute an "adventure in the nature of trade." The Court established that "business" generally connotes a continuous, systematic, and organized course of activity. While a single transaction can theoretically be an adventure in the nature of trade, the burden of proof rests on the tax department to provide concrete evidence of trading intent, which was absent here. The Court affirmed that the mere expectation of profit or the intention to resell does not automatically convert a capital investment into a business venture. Consequently, the surplus was not taxable as business income, and the assessment order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does a single, isolated transaction of buying and selling property constitute an 'adventure in the nature of trade' under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • On whom does the burden of proof lie to establish that a transaction constitutes an 'adventure in the nature of trade'?
  • Is the mere intention to resell property at a profit sufficient to classify a transaction as a business activity for tax purposes?
  • Does the definition of 'business' in the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 require a continuous or systematic course of activity?
  Read full judgment →
• Famia Ijaz and 2 others vs Ijaz Hameed and 2 others2017 SCMR 1843 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-09
  civil appealfamily maintenanceex parte decreeconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionalternative remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a family maintenance dispute where the appellants filed a suit for maintenance, resulting in an interim order and a subsequent decree under Section 17-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. Dissatisfied with the quantum, the appellants appealed, and the appellate court enhanced the maintenance ex parte. The private respondent filed an application to set aside the ex parte judgment and concurrently invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court through a writ petition to challenge the execution proceedings. The High Court allowed the writ petition. The core legal question was whether the High Court could competently exercise its constitutional jurisdiction while an application for setting aside the ex parte decree remained pending before the lower forum. The Supreme Court held that the writ petition was incompetent as alternative remedies were being pursued and no final order had been passed on the pending setting-aside application. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, revived the pending application for decision on merits, and allowed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction when an application for setting aside an ex parte judgment and decree is still pending before the lower forum?
  • Whether a writ petition challenging execution proceedings is competent while a remedy against the underlying ex parte decree is being pursued?
  Read full judgment →
• Falcon-I (Pvt.) Ltd. through Authorized Attorney vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and 5 others2017 YLR 1752 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-19
  necessary partyproper partyimpleadmentprocurement processcivil proceduretender awardvested interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application under Order I, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, filed by NLC Construction Solutions (Private) Limited to be impleaded as a party in a suit challenging a procurement process. The plaintiff challenged the method of awarding a license for cargo tracking and monitoring, alleging violations of the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 and Public Procurement Rules, 2004. The applicant, having been recommended for the license by the Licensing Committee, argued they were a necessary and proper party because a decision in the plaintiff's favor would directly affect their vested interest. The court held that while the official defendants are primarily answerable for the procurement process, the applicant is a proper party because a potential decree could directly prejudice their established interest as the recommended bidder. The court emphasized that a person whose interest is likely to be affected by the proceedings, even if no direct relief is claimed against them, may be impleaded to ensure the court can effectually and completely adjudicate all questions involved in the suit.

  Questions settled

  • What criteria determine whether a person is a necessary or proper party under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party whose interest is likely to be affected by a court decree be impleaded in a suit even if no direct relief is claimed against them?
  • Does the presence of a third party who has already been recommended for a contract tender constitute a necessary or proper party in a suit challenging that procurement process?
  Read full judgment →
• Falak Sher---Petitioner vs Province of Punjab and others---2017 SCMR 1882 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-25
  civil revisionconcurrent findings of factimmovable propertytitle claimleave to appealagreement to sell
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a civil revision filed by the petitioner regarding a property dispute. The petitioner claimed ownership of half of a piece of land based on an alleged agreement dated 17.12.1989, asserting that he had invested funds to make the land cultivable for the original allottee. Following the allottee's death, the petitioner alleged that the legal heirs agreed to transfer half the land to him. After failing in two successive rounds of litigation in civil courts and within the revenue hierarchy, the petitioner sought relief from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted concurrent findings of fact against the petitioner across all lower fora. The Court held that title to immovable property cannot be claimed solely on the basis of an agreement. Finding no illegality or irregularity in the decisions of the lower courts, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the concurrent findings and dismissed the petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Can title to immovable property be claimed solely on the basis of an agreement?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by lower courts in the absence of illegality or irregularity?
  • Is a second suit for declaration and consequential relief maintainable after the failure of a previous suit regarding the same property?
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• Faiz Rasul alias Faizi vs Province of Punjab through Secretary and another2017 YLR 134 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-02Read full judgment →
• Faiz Jalani alias Imran Mama vs The State and others2017 SCMR 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-08
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirylast-seen evidencecircumstantial evidencemurdercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was directed against an order of the Lahore High Court whereby post-arrest bail was refused to the petitioner in a murder case registered under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail considering the evidentiary worth of the material collected during investigation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the murder was unwitnessed, the petitioner was not named as a culprit in the FIR, the recovery of mobile telephone sets lacked identification marks connecting them to the deceased, and no connection was established between the recovered handcart and the crime. Holding that the remaining piece of last-seen evidence required deeper scrutiny regarding its proximity, the Court concluded that the case fell within the purview of further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the petitioner was admitted to bail, laying down the principle that tentative assessment of weak circumstantial and last-seen evidence can warrant post-arrest bail under the regime of further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unwitnessed murder with weak circumstantial evidence qualifies as a case for further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can unverified recoveries of mobile telephone sets and a handcart without identification marks serve as a strong basis to refuse post-arrest bail?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to post-arrest bail when named in the FIR merely as an acquaintance rather than a direct culprit?
  Read full judgment →
• Faiz Bakhsh alias Faizoo vs State, etcPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 879 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-31
  narcotic substancespossession of charascriminal appealbenefit of doubtcontradictions in evidencepolice testimonyacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for the alleged possession of Charas. The core legal question is whether the prosecution successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt that the narcotics were recovered from the conscious possession of the appellant. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish possession due to material contradictions in witnesses' testimonies, lack of corroboration, darkness at the time of the alleged identification, and discrepancies regarding the number of sealed parcels handed over to the Moharar. Consequently, the Court extended the benefit of doubt to the appellant and acquitted him. The key principles laid down include that the prosecution must prove conscious possession of narcotics beyond reasonable doubt, that contradictions in police testimonies and procedural lapses undermine the prosecution case, and that courts exercise extreme caution before relying solely on police officials' uncorroborated testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution successfully proved the conscious possession of narcotics beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Do material contradictions among prosecution witnesses regarding the recovery parcels vitiate the conviction?
  • Is it safe to maintain a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act based solely on uncorroborated police testimony during darkness?
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• Faisal Shahzad, etc vs State & anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 620 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-18
  circumstantial evidenceextrajudicial confessionQatl-e-Amdjoint confessioncriminal appealacquittalforensic evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life sentence imposed upon the appellants for the offence of Qatl-e-Amd under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The prosecution’s case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the "last seen" theory, recoveries of incriminating items, and an alleged extrajudicial confession. The core legal question was whether these circumstances were sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The court found the alleged extrajudicial confession to be a joint statement, rendering it inadmissible and unreliable. Furthermore, the court observed that the forensic evidence was compromised due to inconsistencies in the timing of the recovery of the weapon and casings relative to the arrests. Emphasizing that circumstantial evidence must form a coherent, unbroken chain that excludes every hypothesis of innocence, the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient. Consequently, the convictions were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted of all charges.

  Questions settled

  • Is a joint extrajudicial confession made by multiple accused persons admissible in evidence?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence that fails to exclude every hypothesis of innocence?
  • Does the recovery of incriminating items and forensic reports carry evidentiary weight if the timing of the weapon's recovery is inconsistent with the arrest?
  Read full judgment →
• (1) Faisal Shahzad (2) Sajjad Ali (3) Sharafat Begum (4)Jamil Afzal Khan vs2017 LHC 876 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-11
  murdercircumstantial evidenceextrajudicial confessionjoint confessionlast seenacquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Addl. Sessions Judge at Attock convicting the appellants under Section 302(b) read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for the Qatl-e-Amd of the deceased and sentencing them to imprisonment for life, alongside cross-appeals seeking acquittal of the co-accused and enhancement of sentences. In the absence of direct eyewitness testimony, the prosecution relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the theory of 'last seen', an extrajudicial confession, and subsequent recoveries of gold ornaments and a weapon. The core legal question before the Lahore High Court was whether the circumstantial evidence and extrajudicial confession presented by the prosecution formed an unbroken and unimpeachable chain of custody and events sufficient to sustain a capital conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held that the joint extrajudicial confession was inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence was fraught with improbabilities and contradictions, and the chain of custody for forensic items was compromised. Consequently, the High Court set aside the convictions, acquitted the appellants, and dismissed the connected appeal for enhancement and revision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a joint extrajudicial confession made by multiple accused persons is admissible in evidence?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence that lacks a coherent and unimpeachable chain of events?
  • Is evidence disbelieved with respect to an acquitted co-accused sufficient to support a conviction against remaining co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• (1) Faisal Shabbir (2) Manzoor Ahmad (3) The State vs (1) The State &2017 LHC 3399 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-19
  circumstantial evidencelast seen evidencebenefit of doubtcapital punishmentmurderrobberyforensic reportcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellants for murder and robbery. The prosecution's case rested primarily on circumstantial evidence, including the 'last seen' theory, alleged extra-judicial confessions, and recoveries of incriminating items. The core legal question was whether this circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly when forensic reports were negative and medical evidence regarding the time of death contradicted the prosecution's timeline. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances excluding all hypotheses of innocence. It found the witnesses' testimony implausible, noted that the alleged recoveries were inadmissible or non-probative, and observed that the medical evidence did not support the prosecution's narrative. Consequently, the Court ruled that the conviction was based on mere suspicion rather than evidentiary proof. The principle laid down is that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must demonstrate a complete nexus that excludes every hypothesis of innocence; suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute for legal proof in capital cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for a capital charge be sustained solely on the basis of suspicion when the prosecution fails to exclude all hypotheses of innocence?
  • Does a negative forensic report regarding a recovered weapon undermine the prosecution's case in a murder trial?
  • Is a disclosure statement leading to recovery admissible if the accused was already in police custody at the time of the alleged disclosure?
  • Does medical evidence regarding the time of death prevail over witness testimony in a criminal trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Faisal Qazafi vs National Accountability Bureau (NAB) through Chairman and 4 other2017 PLJ Peshawar 351 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Faisal Mir vs Election Commission of Pakistan etc2017 LHC 3386 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-13Read full judgment →
• Faisal Khan and 3 others vs The State and another2017 PHC 263, 2017 MLD 1220 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-03-24Read full judgment →
• Faisal Khan and 3 others vs The State & Amanullah Khan.2017 PHC 263 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-03-24Read full judgment →
• Faisal Farooq and 3 others vs SHO and another2017 CLD 1 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-26
  Exclusive jurisdictionBanking CourtFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001First Information Report (FIR)Quashment of FIRCriminal prosecutionPakistan Penal CodeCognizable offenceDouble jeopardyCriminal breach of trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses whether the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, creates an exclusive bar on initiating criminal proceedings under the Pakistan Penal Code or before the Federal Investigating Agency for matters related to financial institutions. The core legal question was whether the exclusive jurisdiction of Banking Courts, particularly under Section 7(4) of the Ordinance, ousts the general criminal law. The Lahore High Court held that while Banking Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over offences specifically defined in the Ordinance, this does not bar the registration of First Information Reports (FIRs) or initiation of criminal prosecution under the general law, such as the Pakistan Penal Code, if the ingredients of those offences are made out. The Court emphasized that FIR registration and taking cognizance are distinct concepts, and the Ordinance itself, through Section 20(1), permits 'any other action... under any other law'. The judgment clarified that offences under the Ordinance and general criminal law are distinct, even if arising from similar facts, and the doctrine of double jeopardy applies only if the offences are the same in fact and law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the exclusive jurisdiction of Banking Courts under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, bar the registration of FIRs or initiation of criminal proceedings under general criminal law?
  • Are the offences defined in the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the same as offences under the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can a person be prosecuted under both the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and the Pakistan Penal Code for acts arising from the same incident?
  • Is an Officer Incharge of a Police Station obligated to register an FIR if a cognizable offence under the Pakistan Penal Code is disclosed, even if the matter also relates to a financial institution?
  • When does the doctrine of double jeopardy, as enshrined in Article 13 of the Constitution and Section 403 Cr.P.C., apply to bar successive prosecutions?
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• Faheem Ullah vs The State2017 PHC 730 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-06-09Read full judgment →
• Fahad Noor Khan and another vs Election Commission of Pakistan2017 PLJ Lahore 440 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-07Read full judgment →
• Fahad Maqsood vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 [M] C.L.R. 1340 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-06Read full judgment →
• F.M. Textile Mills and others vs Federal Board of Revenue and others2017 PTD 1875 · Lahore High Court · 2017-07-06Read full judgment →
• F.G. Sir Syed College Rawalpindi vs Secretary, Ministry of. Defence, Government of Pakistan and 2 others2017 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 131 · Federal Service Tribunal · 2016-11-02
  review petitionservice tribunallimitationpromotionjurisdictiondepartmental representation
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arose from an order dismissing the petitioner's service appeal for want of jurisdiction regarding an up-gradation dispute. The review petitioner, a Demonstrator who possessed an M.Sc. in Geology rather than a prescribed relevant science subject, contended that his appeal was actually for promotion rather than up-gradation, and alleged discrimination and incorrect application of recruitment rules. The core legal questions involved the permissible scope of review under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, and the strict application of limitation principles in service matters where departmental representations are repeatedly filed after initial rejection. The Federal Service Tribunal dismissed the review petition, holding that a review cannot be used to re-open a finally decided matter on merits or re-agitate questions of law and facts. Furthermore, the Tribunal held that the underlying appeal was heavily barred by limitation, as continuous filing of successive departmental representations over decades does not extend the statutory period of limitation for approaching the Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be used to re-hear a matter on merits involving questions of law and facts?
  • Does the continuous filing of repeated departmental representations extend the period of limitation for filing a service appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • Whether the rule that no limitation runs against a void order is an inflexible rule that permits a party to sleep over its rights?
  Read full judgment →
• F M Textile Mills & others vs Federal Board of Revenue & others2017 PTD 1875, 2017 LHC 2656 · Lahore High Court · 2017-07-06Read full judgment →
• Extra Judicial ExecutionVictim Families Association (Eevfaa) and another2017 P.S.C. (Crl) 594 · Supreme Court of IndiaRead full judgment →
• Executive Engineer, Public Works Department (Highway Division) Bagh and 32017 SC AJK 189 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  service tribunaltermination of servicedepartmental inquiryopportunity of hearingcivil servantmisconductmajor penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from a judgment of the Service Tribunal whereby the respondent's termination from service was set aside. The core legal question was whether the respondent's removal from service without a formal inquiry and without being afforded an opportunity of hearing was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the termination order was issued in violation of law as no proper inquiry was conducted, no statements were recorded, and no proof of due service of notices was established. The Court affirmed the Service Tribunal's decision setting aside the termination, while clarifying that the departmental authority was not barred from initiating a fresh and proper inquiry into the alleged misconduct in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can be removed from service without conducting a proper departmental inquiry?
  • Does the imposition of a major penalty without providing an opportunity of hearing violate the law?
  • Can a departmental authority initiate a fresh inquiry after a termination order is set aside by the Service Tribunal?
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• Executive District Officer (Revenue) Bahawalpur and others vs Muhammad Attique and another2017 SCMR 399, 2017 PLC (C.S.) 1292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-07-21
  service appealantedated promotionDepartmental Promotion Committeeseniority-cum-fitnessillegal reservationSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal with leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, whereby respondent No. 1's service appeal was accepted and he was directed to be considered for antedated promotion as Naib Tehsildar from the date a vacancy was improperly reserved for another candidate. The core legal question was whether a civil servant can be denied promotion and whether an antedated promotion is justified when a vacancy is illegally reserved and the senior candidate is ineligible due to pending inquiries or being posted out of the district. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Departmental Promotion Committee acted with mala fide by illegally reserving a post for an ineligible candidate who was working out of the district, thereby bypassing the next eligible and senior person. The Court upheld the Tribunal's judgment and dismissed the appeal, establishing that manipulation in promotion processes to favour specific candidates through illegal reservation of posts vitiates the departmental action and justifies judicial intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee can claim consideration for promotion when a vacancy is illegally reserved for another candidate?
  • Does the reservation of a promotional post for an ineligible candidate working out of the district amount to mala fide?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a Service Tribunal's judgment that corrects an injustice in departmental promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• Executive Association of Habib Bank Limited vs Federation of Pakistan & 32017 SHC 97 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-17Read full judgment →
• Ex-Lance Naik Mukarram Hussain and others vs Federal Government, M_O Defence through Chief of the Army Staff and others2017 SCMR 580 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-23
  civil review petitionField General Court MartialPakistan Army Actcode of criminal procedurecompromisejurisdictiondeath sentencearmed forces
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from civil review petitions and a miscellaneous application seeking review of a prior judgment of the Supreme Court and permission to place on record a compromise with the legal heirs of the deceased. The petitioners, convicted and sentenced to death by a Field General Court Martial under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, argued that provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 regarding compromise are applicable, enabling their acquittal. The core legal question was whether ordinary criminal procedure provisions regarding compromises apply to convictions under special military laws, and whether the Supreme Court in its review jurisdiction can entertain such compromises or assume powers of pardon and remission specifically vested in military and executive authorities. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions and the miscellaneous application, holding that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to matters governed by special laws like the Army Act unless explicitly provided. The Court established that pardons, remissions, and suspensions are exclusively within the domain of the Federal Government or the Chief of Army Staff under the Army Act, and the Supreme Court cannot assume such jurisdiction, particularly in its limited review jurisdiction under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 applicable to matters governed by a special law such as the Pakistan Army Act, 1952?
  • Can the Supreme Court in its review jurisdiction accept a compromise between a convict and legal heirs to acquit a person tried and sentenced by a Field General Court Martial?
  • Who is empowered to grant pardons, remissions, and suspensions under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952?
  • What is the scope of review under Article 188 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
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• Ex-Lance Naik Mukarram Hussain and others vs Federal Government, M/oK.L.R. 2017 SC 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Field General Court MartialPakistan Army Act 1952compromisereview jurisdictionspecial lawSection 345 CrPCcoram non judice
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil review petitions and a civil miscellaneous application were filed seeking review of the Supreme Court's judgment upholding convictions and death sentences passed by a Field General Court Martial under the Pakistan Army Act 1952. The petitioners sought acquittal based on a compromise entered into with the legal heirs of the deceased, arguing that provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, specifically Section 345(2), applied by virtue of Section 1(2) Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that under Section 1(2) and Section 5(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Code does not apply to proceedings governed by a special law like the Pakistan Army Act 1952 unless explicitly provided. The power to grant pardons, remissions, or suspensions in such cases rests exclusively with the designated military authorities under Section 143 of the Pakistan Army Act 1952. Furthermore, court intervention regarding armed forces actions is restricted unless the proceedings suffer from mala fides, lack of jurisdiction, or are coram non judice, none of which applied here.

  Questions settled

  • Do the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to trials and offences governed by the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
  • Can the Supreme Court accept a compromise under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in cases tried under the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
  • Which authority holds the jurisdiction to grant pardons, remissions, or suspensions for sentences passed under the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
  Read full judgment →
• Ex-Lance Naik Mukarram Hussain and another vs Federal Government2017 PLJ SC 293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Field General Court MartialPakistan Army ActCode of Criminal ProcedureSpecial LawReview jurisdictionPardon and remissionJurisdictional error
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns Civil Review Petitions filed by individuals convicted and sentenced to death by a Field General Court Martial under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The petitioners sought to challenge their convictions by invoking the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, specifically arguing that a compromise reached with the legal heirs of the deceased should be accepted. The core legal question was whether the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, apply to proceedings under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, and whether the Court could exercise review jurisdiction to accept such a compromise. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, does not apply to matters governed by special laws like the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, unless specifically provided. The Court affirmed that under Section 143 of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, the authority to grant pardons or remissions rests exclusively with the Federal Government or designated military officers. Consequently, the Court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to interfere absent proof of mala fide, jurisdictional error, or coram non judice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to proceedings conducted under the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
  • Can the Supreme Court exercise review jurisdiction to accept a compromise in a case decided by a Field General Court Martial?
  • Who possesses the authority to grant pardons, remissions, and suspensions for convictions under the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court exercise jurisdiction over actions taken by the Armed Forces despite the bar in Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• (1) Ex-Lance Naik Mukarram Hussain (in CRP 87/15) (2) Ex-Gunner2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Field General Court MartialPakistan Army ActCode of Criminal ProcedureSpecial LawReview jurisdictionCompromiseJurisdictional bar
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil review petitions filed by individuals convicted and sentenced to death by a Field General Court Martial under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The petitioners sought to challenge their convictions by invoking the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, specifically arguing that a compromise reached with the legal heirs of the deceased should be accepted under Section 345(2) of the Code. The core legal question was whether the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, applies to proceedings under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, allowing for judicial intervention via compromise. The Court held that the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, is a special law, and pursuant to Sections 1(2) and 5(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Code does not apply to matters governed by special laws unless expressly provided. The Court affirmed that powers regarding pardons and remissions reside exclusively with the Federal Government or the Chief of Army Staff under Section 143 of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, ruling it lacked jurisdiction to entertain such compromises or interfere in the special military trial process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to proceedings conducted under the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
  • Can a court accept a compromise between a convict and legal heirs in a case tried by a Field General Court Martial?
  • Who possesses the authority to grant pardons, remissions, or suspensions under the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
  • Is the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 188 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 available to entertain compromises in military court convictions?
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• Ex-Constable vs Capital City Police Officer, Lahore and another2017 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 127 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 2016-10-07
  departmental enquirydismissal from servicemajor penaltyservice tribunalcriminal acquittalregular enquirynatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by an ex-constable challenging his dismissal from service following departmental proceedings under the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, for allegedly snatching cash at gunpoint. The core legal question was whether the departmental authority could impose a major penalty without conducting a regular enquiry, particularly when the appellant had been acquitted of the underlying criminal charge under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Punjab Service Tribunal held that the failure to conduct a regular departmental enquiry, where the appellant could cross-examine witnesses, rendered the dismissal unsustainable, especially given the appellant's acquittal in the criminal case. The Tribunal emphasized that departmental authorities cannot dispense with regular enquiries when serious allegations are denied. However, considering the circumstances and the potential for futile litigation, the Tribunal opted to modify the penalty rather than remand the case. The key principle laid down is that where a civil servant denies serious allegations forming the basis of departmental charges, a regular enquiry is mandatory, and extreme penalties should align with reformatory principles of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a departmental authority impose a major penalty on a civil servant without conducting a regular enquiry when the allegations are denied?
  • Does an acquittal in a criminal case under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically invalidate departmental proceedings based on the same facts?
  • Is a Service Tribunal empowered to modify a major penalty of dismissal into a lesser penalty if the original punishment is found to be disproportionate?
  Read full judgment →
• Etezaz Ud Din Ahmed vs Director/Hod (MSRD) Securities and Exchange2017 CLD 549 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2016-02-09Read full judgment →