Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s Haral Textile Mills Limited2016 LHC 1604 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Haral Textile Mills Limited2016 P.C.T.L.R. 641, 2016 PTD 2253 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-09Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise, Ltu,Karachi vs M/s. Pak2016 P.S.C. 311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  curative statuteremedial legislationretrospective operationsales tax appealauthorization defectpending proceedingspast and closed transactions
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from an order of the High Court of Sindh dismissing a sales tax appeal filed by the department on the ground that it was not filed by an authorized officer. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether sub-section (11) of Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, introduced via the Finance Act, 2006, is retrospective, curative, and remedial in nature so as to cure defects in appeals or references that were not pending before an appellate forum or court at the time of its enactment. The Supreme Court held that while the provision is indeed curative and remedial and applies to pending proceedings before any court including the Supreme Court, its plain wording explicitly requires that the reference or appeal must be pending at the time the provision comes into force. Since the appeal before the High Court had already been decided prior to the enactment and was no longer pending, the defect in filing could not be cured, and the finality of the High Court's order remained undisturbed. The key principle laid down is that curative and remedial statutes operate retroactively for pending proceedings, but they cannot reopen past and closed transactions or apply to proceedings that have already attained finality unless express legislative intent dictates otherwise.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sub-section (11) of Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is curative and remedial in nature?
  • Does the curative effect of Section 47(11) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 extend to appeals pending before the Supreme Court?
  • Can a remedial and curative statute be applied to proceedings that have already attained finality prior to its enactment?
  Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise, Ltu, Karachi vs Messrs2016 PTD 867 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-12-18
  Sales Tax Actcurative statuteremedial legislationretrospective operationpending proceedingsstatutory interpretationunauthorized filing
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a High Court order that dismissed a Sales Tax Appeal for being filed by an unauthorized officer. The core legal question was whether Section 47(11) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990—introduced by the Finance Act, 2006 to cure defects in unauthorized filings—applied retrospectively to proceedings that had already attained finality. The Supreme Court held that while remedial and curative statutes are generally interpreted liberally to advance the legislative intent and apply to pending proceedings, they do not disturb past and closed transactions unless the legislature explicitly provides otherwise. The Court determined that the phrase "and the reference or appeal is pending" in Section 47(11) is a mandatory condition. Consequently, because the appeal before the High Court was not pending when the Finance Act, 2006 came into force, the curative provision did not apply to validate the unauthorized filing. The finality of the High Court’s order remained undisturbed. The Court affirmed that courts cannot treat statutory conditions as surplusage, and remedial laws cannot reopen finalized litigation absent clear legislative intent.

  Questions settled

  • Does a curative statute apply to litigation that has already attained finality prior to its enactment?
  • Can a court treat the requirement of 'pendency' in a remedial statute as surplusage?
  • Does Section 47(11) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 apply to appeals that were not pending at the time of its enactment?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chief Executive, Barex Limited, 41-Jail Road, Lahore Barex Limited, 41-Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• The Chief Executive Officer, RH Misbah Securities (Private) Limited vs N/ASecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• The Chief Executive Officer, M.R.a Securities (Pvt.) Limited vs N/AReview Later · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• The Chief Executive Officer, Bawa Securities (Pvt) Limited vs N/ASecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• The Chief Executive M/s Brothers Textile Mills Limited vs NotSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• The Chief Executive M/s Amin Spinning Mills Limited vs NotSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• The Chairman, WAPDA and 4 others vs Messrs Sitara Marbles Industry2016 YLR 205 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-10-31Read full judgment →
• The Board of Directors, The Karachi Stock Exchange (Guarantee) Ltd., vs N_aSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• The Bank OFCPUNJABthrough Principal Officer/Constituted Attorney vs Rab2016 CLD 760 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-12Read full judgment →
• The Bank of PUNJABthrough Branch/Chief Manager vs Messrs Khan2016 CLD 29 · Lahore High Court · 2014-10-27
  recovery of financeleave to defendstatement of accountcomputer generated accountsprimary evidencebanking suitletter of creditdemand finance
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff bank filed a recovery suit under Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, seeking Rs. 144,802,140/- against the defendants for defaulted Demand Finance (DF) and Letter of Credit (LC) facilities. The defendants challenged the suit on grounds of unauthorized institution, lack of certified statements of account under the Banker’s Books Evidence Act, 1891, and non-disbursal of funds. The Court held that under Section 10 of the Ordinance, a defendant must specifically plead their accounts and append current account statements to rebut the bank's claim; a mere denial is insufficient. The Court clarified that computer-generated accounts constitute primary evidence, exempting them from the certification requirements of Section 2(8) of the 1891 Act, which applies only to copies. Finding that the defendants failed to raise substantial questions of fact or law and had previously admitted liabilities in correspondence, the Court dismissed the leave to defend (PLA) and decreed the suit for Rs. 114,792,163.97 with costs of funds.

  Read full judgment →
• The Bank of PUNJABthrough Branch/Chief Manager vs Messrs Global2016 CLD 215 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-10Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab vs Sardar Dildar Ahmad Cheema2016 CLD 1955 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-03
  recovery suitfinancial institutionsleave to defendrescheduling agreementstatement of accountmarkupprincipal amount
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff-Bank instituted a recovery suit against the defendant under section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for the recovery of outstanding finance facilities based on finance agreements and a settlement agreement. The defendant filed an application for leave to defend the suit, raising objections regarding non-disbursement of the total facility, invalidity of documents, and the maintainability of the suit. The core legal question was whether the defendant raised any bona fide dispute regarding the finances availed and repayments made to warrant granting leave to defend. The Lahore High Court held that the defendant failed to specifically plead and provide supporting accounts as mandated by law, and that the settlement agreement was a valid rescheduling of the debt. The court dismissed the defendant's leave application and decreed the suit in part for the principal amount without markup for the grace period, establishing that both parties in banking suits must strictly and specifically plead their accounts under the Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a defendant in a banking suit is required to specifically plead accounts and disputed amounts in an application for leave to defend?
  • Does a rescheduling agreement require fresh disbursement of finance under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a plaintiff-bank claim markup over a rescheduled total amount in the absence of an authorizing agreement or bifurcation of principal and markup?
  • Is a statement of account verified in accordance with the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891 sufficient when the defendant fails to point out illegal entries?
  Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab vs Messrs Magic River Services and 4 others2016 CLD 171 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-11
  financial institutionrestructuring of financeleave to defendbankers' books evidencerecovery of financemarkupcorporate liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit was filed by the plaintiff bank under Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, seeking recovery of over Rs. 90 million against the defendants following default on restructured finance facilities. The defendants filed an application for leave to defend, challenging the certification of accounts, the authority of the person instituting the suit, the charging of markup on restructured facilities without fresh disbursement, and the inclusion of a sister concern as a defendant. The Court held that the suit was competently instituted by an authorized attorney, and the statements of accounts were duly certified under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891. The Court affirmed that restructuring of finance constitutes valid consideration, making the customer liable for markup even without fresh disbursement. However, the Court found that the bank had improperly charged markup beyond the contract period for a running finance facility and ordered the deletion of defendant No. 2, who was neither a borrower nor a surety. The suit was decreed for the adjusted amount, excluding the improperly charged markup.

  Questions settled

  • Does the restructuring of a finance facility constitute valid consideration to support a claim for markup without fresh disbursement of funds?
  • Is an officer holding a power of attorney required to produce additional authorization to institute a suit under Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a sister concern be impleaded as a defendant in a recovery suit if it is neither a principal borrower nor a surety?
  • Are statements of accounts certified by a branch manager compliant with the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891?
  Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab vs Dewan Salman Fibre Limited2016 SHC · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-30Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Punjab vs Arif Ali Shah Bukhari2016 CLD 1301 · Sindh High Court · 2015-12-10
  recovery of financesleave to defendfinancial institutionrestructuring agreementbanking courtpower of attorneypromissory notesummary decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for the recovery of finances filed by a financial institution against a customer under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The core legal questions involved the competence of the person instituting the suit, the validity of the authorization documents, and whether the defendant raised substantial questions of law or fact warranting unconditional leave to defend. The defendant alleged that the suit was filed without proper board resolution and that the documents were obtained in blank. The Court held that the suit was competently instituted, noting that the term "otherwise" in Section 9(1) of the Ordinance allows for broad authorization methods. It further held that the defendant failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 10(4) and (5) of the Ordinance regarding the leave to defend application. The Court affirmed that restructuring agreements are facilities that become ineffective upon the customer's failure to adhere to their terms. Consequently, the application for leave to defend was rejected, and the suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiff.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'otherwise' in Section 9(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, permit authorization for instituting a suit beyond a formal power of attorney?
  • Is a restructuring agreement enforceable if the customer fails to comply with its specific terms and conditions?
  • What are the consequences of a defendant's failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 10(4) and (5) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, in a leave to defend application?
  • Can a defendant challenge the validity of a document on the ground that it was signed in blank when the defendant has acted upon that document?
  Read full judgment →
• The Azad Govt. of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, through its Chief2016-SC AJK-56 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• The Asian Mutual Insurance Company (Guarantee) Limited vs DirectorAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• The Administrator General Zakat. Central Zakat Administration, Islamabad & Others vs Pakistan Insurance Corporation THR. Its Secretary, Karachi & Others2016 PLD Supreme Court 468, 2016 P.S.C. 421, 2016 NLR Civil 259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-15
  Zakat and UshrSahib-e-Nisabstatutory corporationtax exemptionbeneficial ownershipcorporate liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment exempting the Pakistan Insurance Corporation from the charge and collection of Zakat under the Zakat & Ushr Ordinance 1980. The core legal question was whether the respondent Corporation, which is not wholly owned by the Federal Government, qualifies as a 'Sahib-e-Nisab' subject to Zakat levy. The Supreme Court examined Section 1(2) of the Ordinance, which restricts the applicability of Zakat to Muslim citizens of Pakistan or entities where the majority of shares or beneficial ownership is held by such citizens. The Court held that since the majority equity of the respondent Corporation is held by the Federal Government—which is itself exempt from the definition of 'Sahib-e-Nisab' under Section 2(xxiii)(a)—the Corporation fails the test of liability under Section 1(2). Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the respondent Corporation is not liable for Zakat. The principle laid down is that for an artificial juristic person to be liable for Zakat, its majority ownership must rest with Muslim citizens of Pakistan or persons qualifying as 'Sahib-e-Nisab'.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statutory corporation with majority Federal Government ownership qualify as 'Sahib-e-Nisab' under the Zakat & Ushr Ordinance 1980?
  • What are the requirements for an artificial juristic person to be liable for the charge and collection of Zakat under the Zakat & Ushr Ordinance 1980?
  • Is a corporation whose majority equity is held by the Federal Government liable for Zakat?
  Read full judgment →
• The Administrator General Zakat, Central Zakat Administration, Islamabad2016 P.S.C. 421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Zakat and Ushr OrdinanceSahib-e-Nisabstatutory corporationFederal Government exemptionmajority shareholdingMuslim citizens of Pakistantax exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh which exempted the respondent Pakistan Insurance Corporation from the charge and collection of Zakat under the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980. The core legal question was whether the respondent Corporation, a statutory body not wholly owned by the Federal Government, falls within the definition of 'Sahib-e-Nisab' under Section 2(xxiii) of the Ordinance and is thus liable to pay Zakat. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a joint reading of Section 1(2) and Section 2(xxiii)(a) of the Ordinance dictates that Zakat recovery applies only where the majority of shares or beneficial ownership is held by Muslim citizens of Pakistan, or where the entity qualifies as a Sahib-e-Nisab. Since the respondent Corporation's majority equity is held by the Federal Government—which is expressly excluded from the definition of Sahib-e-Nisab—and not by Muslim citizens of Pakistan, it does not meet the criteria for Zakat assessment and remains exempt.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statutory corporation whose majority equity is owned by the Federal Government qualify as a Sahib-e-Nisab under the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980?
  • Is an artificial juristic person whose majority shares are owned by the Federal Government liable to the charge and collection of Zakat?
  • How do Section 1(2) and Section 2(xxiii) of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 interact in determining the tax liability of corporate entities?
  Read full judgment →
• Tez Gas (Private) Limited etc vs Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority etc.2016 LHC 3231 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-23Read full judgment →
• Tez Gas (Private) Limited and others vs Oil and Gas Regulatory2017 PLD Lahore 111 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-23Read full judgment →
• Terrance Williams vs Pennsylvania2016 SCMR 1561 · Supreme Court of United States
  judicial recusaldue processstructural errorpost-conviction reliefprosecutorial biasconstitutional lawdeath penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a constitutional challenge regarding judicial recusal in a post-conviction relief proceeding. The core legal question was whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a judge to recuse themselves from adjudicating a case if they had significant, personal involvement in a critical decision regarding the defendant's case while previously serving as a prosecutor. The Supreme Court held that due process is violated when a judge who previously had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision in the defendant's case participates in the adjudication of that same case. The Court established an objective standard for recusal based on an unconstitutional risk of actual bias, emphasizing that the appearance of neutrality is essential for public legitimacy and the rule of law. Furthermore, the Court held that a due process violation arising from a failure to recuse constitutes structural error, meaning it is not subject to harmless-error review, regardless of whether the judge's vote was dispositive. Consequently, the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was vacated.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Due Process Clause require a judge to recuse when they had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision in the defendant's case?
  • Is a due process violation arising from a judge's failure to recuse subject to harmless-error review if the judge's vote was not dispositive?
  • Does the participation of a judge with an unconstitutional risk of actual bias constitute structural error?
  • What is the objective standard for determining whether a judge must recuse under the Due Process Clause?
  Read full judgment →
• Tehsil Municipal Officer TMA Gujrat vs Amjad Hussain etc2016 LHC 3938 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-29
  regularizationdaily wagesworkmanstanding orders ordinancetehsil municipal administrationjurisdiction of labour courtback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated constitutional petition addressed whether daily wage and work-charged employees of the Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA) could approach Labour Courts for regularization and service benefits, and whether TMA fell within the definition of an industrial or commercial establishment. The core legal questions involved the jurisdiction of labour forums over local council employees governed by statutory rules and the status of employees performing permanent nature duties with artificial breaks. The Lahore High Court held that TMA activities, particularly involving water and sewage works, constitute a construction industry under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, making the employees workmen entitled to invoke labour laws. The Court ruled that artificial breaks in service cannot deny employees permanent status after completing the requisite statutory period, and that government functionaries cannot bypass limitation laws without proper applications for condonation. Consequently, the petitions filed by the TMA were dismissed, while the employee's petition for back benefits was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Tehsil Municipal Administration falls within the definition of a construction industry under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can daily wage employees performing duties of a permanent nature claim the status of permanent workmen after completing the statutory period despite artificial breaks in service?
  • Whether the jurisdiction of Labour Courts is ousted in respect of employees of local councils governed by statutory service rules?
  • Are government functionaries entitled to preferential treatment or condonation of delay in filing appeals without showing sufficient cause and formal applications?
  Read full judgment →
• Tehsil Municipal Administrator, Faisalabad vs Muhammad Saleem and others2016 SCMR 2009 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-07-22
  dismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of appeallimitation periodCode of Civil Proceduregeneral adjournmentvoid ab initioappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged a High Court order dismissing their application for restoration of an appeal, which had been previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The central legal question concerned whether an appeal could be dismissed for non-prosecution under Order XLI, Rule 17(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the record did not indicate the appeal was specifically fixed for hearing on that date, and the subsequent impact on the limitation period for restoration. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal order was void ab initio because the court failed to establish that the appeal was fixed for hearing, rendering the dismissal outside the scope of Order XLI, Rule 17(1). Consequently, the Court ruled that Article 168 of the Limitation Act 1908, which governs dismissals under Rule 17, was inapplicable. Instead, the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 applied, providing a three-year limitation period. The Court established that a court must ensure an appeal is explicitly fixed for hearing before exercising the power to dismiss for non-appearance, emphasizing that such dismissal is a discretionary, not mechanical, act.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal be dismissed for non-prosecution under Order XLI, Rule 17(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the appeal was not specifically fixed for hearing on that date?
  • Does the dismissal of an appeal for non-prosecution in the absence of a fixed hearing date constitute a valid order under Order XLI, Rule 17(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Which article of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to an application for restoration of an appeal when the dismissal for non-prosecution was not made under Order XLI, Rule 17(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• TechnicalMessrs Creative Electronics (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Collector of Customs2016 PTD (Trib.) 536 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-01-22
  customs dutyconcessionary SROcapital goodsadjudication time-barmisclassificationtax evasionstatutory limitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an Order-in-Original passed by the Collector of Customs (Adjudication-II), Karachi, which alleged that the appellant, an importer of electronic meter components, evaded duties and taxes through misdeclaration and misclassification of goods. The core legal questions were whether the imported components qualified for the concessionary duty rate under S.R.O. 575(1)/2006, whether the adjudication proceedings were time-barred under Section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969, and whether the issuance of a second show-cause notice for the same goods and period was legally permissible. The Customs Appellate Tribunal held that the imported parts and accessories used for manufacturing electricity meters fell within the definition of capital goods under S.R.O. 575(1)/2006, thus entitling the appellant to the concessionary rate. Furthermore, the Tribunal found the adjudication order to be a nullity because it was passed well beyond the statutory time limits prescribed by Section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969, and the purported extension by the Federal Board of Revenue was granted after the statutory period had already expired. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and the show-cause notice.

  Questions settled

  • Do components used for the manufacture of electronic meters qualify as capital goods under S.R.O. 575(1)/2006?
  • Can an adjudication order passed after the expiry of the statutory period prescribed by Section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969 be sustained?
  • Is it legally permissible to issue a second show-cause notice for the same goods and the same period after a previous notice has been issued?
  • Does an extension of time granted by the Federal Board of Revenue after the statutory limitation period has expired validate an otherwise time-barred adjudication order?
  Read full judgment →
• Technical-IMessrs Khyber Tea and Food Company and another vs Collector of Customs and another2016 P.C.T.L.R. 232, 2016 PTD (Trib.) 80 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-08-06
  value addition sales taxadvance income taxcustoms jurisdictionmanufacture definitionimport of black tearecovery of short-levied taxsales tax special procedures rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue challenged an Order-in-Original passed by the Additional Collector of Customs (Adjudication-I), Karachi, which demanded short-paid value addition sales tax and advance income tax on imported black tea consignments. The core legal questions revolved around whether the appellants possessed manufacturing facilities to qualify for tax exemptions under the Sales Tax Special Procedures Rules, 2007, and whether customs authorities possessed the lawful authority and jurisdiction to recover short-levied sales tax and income tax. The Tribunal held that mixing and blending tea falls within the statutory definition of 'manufacture' under Section 2(16) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, making the adjudicating officer's reliance on a contrary inspection report unsustainable. Furthermore, the Tribunal held that customs officers lacked the jurisdiction to initiate recovery proceedings for sales tax under the repealed Section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, or to recover short-levied income tax under Section 148 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, since customs powers are strictly limited to the collection of advance tax at the import stage rather than its subsequent recovery. The appeal was allowed and the impugned order set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mixing and blending of imported black tea constitute 'manufacture' or 'produce' under Section 2(16) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Did the customs authorities have the lawful jurisdiction to initiate recovery proceedings for short-levied sales tax under the erstwhile Section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Are customs officers empowered under Section 148 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, to recover short-paid advance income tax after the import stage?
  • Can customs authorities invoke Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969, to demand and recover sales tax dues?
  Read full judgment →
• Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority through Chief Operating Officer and another vs Hafiz Naseer and 2 others2016 PLC 360 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-23
  labour court jurisdictionregularization of servicedaily wage employeeseducational institutionindustrial establishmentwrit jurisdictionproject-based employment
  Summary & questions settled

  These writ petitions challenge the concurrent findings of the Punjab Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which ordered the regularization of services for employees of the Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA). The core legal questions were whether TEVTA constitutes an "industrial" or "commercial" establishment under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010, and whether daily-wage, project-based employees are entitled to regularization. The Court held that TEVTA is an educational institution, not an industrial or commercial establishment. It determined that manufacturing activities within its workshops are merely ancillary to its primary purpose of imparting technical education and training. Consequently, the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the grievance petitions. Furthermore, the Court ruled that daily-wage, project-based employees do not acquire the status of permanent employees merely by receiving monthly salaries. The key principle laid down is that an institution primarily engaged in education does not become an industry due to incidental manufacturing, and daily-wage, project-based employment does not confer a right to regularization. The impugned judgments were set aside, and the grievance petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an educational institution that maintains a workshop for training purposes considered an 'industrial establishment' under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act 2010?
  • Does the receipt of a fixed monthly salary by a daily-wage employee automatically confer the status of a permanent employee?
  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Do daily-wage, project-based employees have a legal right to regularization of service?
  Read full judgment →
• Technical and Ubaid Rubbani, Member GeneralMessrs Colony Sugar2016 CLD 1429 · Environmental Tribunal · 2015-04-14Read full judgment →
• Technical and Ubaid Rubbani, Member GeneralMessrs Colony Sugar2016 CLD 1271 · Environmental Tribunal · 2015-04-14Read full judgment →
• Technical and Muzaffar Mahmood, Member GeneralDISTRICT Officer2016 CLD 778 · Environmental Tribunal · 2015-12-14Read full judgment →
• Tbeghulam Muhammad Ali vs Province of Sindh throughSecretary Home2016 MLD 65 · Sindh High Court · 2014-11-12Read full judgment →
• Taza Qul vs StatePLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 78 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-12-09
  narcotics smugglingcriminal appealnon-production of case propertychain of custodyreasonable doubtacquittalControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 for the alleged possession of 10 kilograms of charas. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt despite the failure to produce the case property during the trial. The Peshawar High Court held that the conviction was unsustainable because the prosecution failed to produce the recovered contraband or the vehicle before the trial court, and there was no record of any court-authorized destruction of the evidence. Furthermore, the court noted a lack of evidence linking the forensic samples to the alleged recovery and questioned the unexplained choice of a distant forensic laboratory. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reinforces the principle that in criminal cases, the failure to produce case property or establish a clear chain of custody, especially when the recovery is disputed, renders a conviction unsafe and requires acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to produce the recovered contraband before the trial court vitiate a conviction in narcotics cases?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution fails to establish a link between the forensic laboratory report and the recovered samples?
  • What is the legal consequence of failing to produce the vehicle used in the commission of an offense during the trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Tauseef Riaz---Applicant vs The State2016 YLR 2671 · Sindh High Court · 2016-07-01
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaymurderprohibitory clausetrial delaycriminal procedurebail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the accused, Tauseef Riaz, facing trial for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The applicant sought bail on merits and on the statutory ground of delay, asserting that the trial had not concluded within two years. The High Court examined whether the delay was attributable to the prosecution or the defense. Upon reviewing the trial court's diary sheets, the Court observed that numerous adjournments were requested by the defense, thereby contributing to the delay. Furthermore, the Court noted that substantial progress had been made, with most material witnesses already examined. Consequently, the Court held that the statutory benefit of bail due to delay is unavailable when the delay is occasioned by the accused's own acts or omissions. The Court affirmed that deeper appreciation of evidence is impermissible at the bail stage when the trial is near completion. The bail application was dismissed, with a direction to the trial court to conclude the proceedings within two months.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to statutory bail under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the delay in trial is attributable to the defense?
  • Can a court conduct a deeper appreciation of evidence at the bail stage when the trial is near completion?
  • Does the mere passage of two years without the conclusion of a trial automatically entitle an accused to bail under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Tauseef Mirza vs Collector of Customs (Appraisement) and 2 others2016 PTD 548 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-02Read full judgment →
• Tauqeer Ahmad vs The State and others2016 MLD 798 · Lahore High Court · 2015-07-27
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryabscondenceextra-judicial confessionmurderevidentiary valuecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by an accused charged under sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the complainant's nephew. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the evidentiary gaps, the nature of the prosecution's case, and the accused's prior abscondence. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, finding the case to be one of further inquiry. The Court noted that the FIR failed to mention the key witness who allegedly saw the accused disposing of the body, despite that witness's statement being recorded the same day. Furthermore, the medical expert could not determine the cause of death, and the evidentiary value of the extra-judicial confession and the sole witness was deemed weak. The Court laid down the principle that mere abscondence of an accused does not automatically disentitle them to bail, nor does it override other rights of the accused, particularly when the investigation is complete and further detention serves no useful purpose.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere abscondence of an accused person automatically preclude the grant of bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the prosecution's case relies on evidence deemed to be of a weak nature, such as an extra-judicial confession and a sole witness?
  • Can bail be granted when the investigation is complete and the accused's further detention would serve no useful purpose?
  Read full judgment →
• Tauqeer Abid vs Divisional Superintendent Pakistan Railways, Multan2016 PLC 326 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-23
  regularization of servicecontract employeepermanent workmandiscriminatory treatmentfundamental rightsservice lawStanding Orders Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a contract-based Ticket Collector, filed this writ petition challenging the refusal of the respondent-department to regularize his services despite his long-term employment and the regularization of similarly situated employees under the Prime Minister Family Assistance Package. The core legal question was whether a contract employee performing duties of a permanent nature for an extended period attains the status of a permanent workman and whether the denial of regularization constitutes discriminatory treatment. The Court held that the petitioner had attained the status of a permanent workman by afflux of time, as the nature of his work was permanent. The Court emphasized that the nature of the work, rather than the contract label, determines employment status. Relying on established Supreme Court precedents, the Court ruled that denying regularization to the petitioner while granting it to others similarly placed violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 2-A, 4, and 25 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the respondents were directed to regularize the petitioner's service.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contract employee performing duties of a permanent nature for an extended period attain the status of a permanent workman?
  • Is the denial of regularization to a contract employee, while granting it to similarly placed employees, a violation of fundamental rights?
  • What is the primary factor in determining whether a workman is a permanent workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Does the judgment of a larger bench of the Supreme Court prevail over a judgment of a smaller bench when resolving legal controversies?
  Read full judgment →
• Tasneem Gul vs Azad Jammu and Kashmir2016 PLC (C.S.) 510 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-06-22
  writ of prohibitionlocus poenitentiaevested rightsadvance incrementsservice rulesombudsman decisionres inter alios acta
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the potential withdrawal of three advance increments granted to the petitioner, a Headmistress, for acquiring an M.Ed. degree. The core legal questions were whether the government could rescind a validly granted financial benefit after it had taken legal effect and created vested rights, and whether an Ombudsman's decision, to which the petitioner was not a party, could be enforced against her. The Court held that the respondents were prohibited from withdrawing the increments, as the petitioner had acquired a vested right under the applicable 1989 service rules, which were in force at the time of her qualification. The Court affirmed the principle of locus poenitentiae, ruling that an authority cannot rescind an order once it has created legal rights. Furthermore, the Court held that the Ombudsman's decision was not binding on the petitioner because she was not a party to those proceedings. Consequently, the Court issued a writ of prohibition against the respondents but declined to quash the Ombudsman's decision, noting its lack of applicability to the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Can an authority withdraw a valid order once it has taken legal effect and created vested rights?
  • Is a decision by an Ombudsman binding on a person who was not a party to the proceedings?
  • Do amendments to service rules apply retroactively to benefits granted under previous rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Taskeen Naz Naseem Akhtar Azad Government of the State of Jammu2016 PLC (C.S.) 1151 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-05-19
  civil service retirementpublic interesteducational qualificationaudi alteram partemservice tribunalpensionary benefitscompulsory retirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against Service Tribunal judgments that reinstated retired Middle Pass Primary Teachers. The core legal question was whether the government could validly retire these civil servants for failing to acquire mandatory matriculation qualifications, despite their long service, and whether such retirement violated the principle of audi alteram partem. The Supreme Court held that the retirement orders were lawful and in the public interest. The Court reasoned that the teachers were appointed with clear conditions to improve their qualifications, which they failed to fulfill despite decades of notice and opportunity. Consequently, the Court ruled that the requirement of providing an opportunity of hearing was satisfied because the teachers were fully aware of the grounds for their retirement. The Court affirmed that under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants Act, 1976, the government has the authority to retire civil servants after 25 years of service in the public interest to ensure educational standards. The Service Tribunal's decision was set aside, and the retirement notifications were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government retire a civil servant in the public interest after 25 years of service for failing to meet mandatory educational qualifications?
  • Does the principle of audi alteram partem require a formal hearing when the grounds for retirement are already known to the civil servant?
  • Are retirement orders issued to civil servants for failing to meet qualification conditions valid if the condition was a prerequisite for the initial appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• Taseer Khan vs Islamabad Electricity Supply Company2016 C.L.R. 210 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Taseer Khan vs Islamabad Electricity Supply Company (IESCO) through Executive Engineer2016 C.L.R. 210, 2016 YLR 1679 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-19Read full judgment →
• Tasawar Mehmood vs The State and another2016 LHC 2396 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-13
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycommon intentionvicarious liabilityinvestigation reporttwo versions of the case
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a request for post-arrest bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case involving charges under Sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was found innocent by the investigating officer and whose involvement was based on general allegations of shared common intention without specific injury attribution, was entitled to bail. The Court held that the case against the petitioner constituted a matter of 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the prosecution presented two conflicting versions of events—one from the complainant and one from the investigation. The Court emphasized that vicarious liability and common intention are matters for the trial court to determine after recording evidence. Furthermore, the Court established that the heinousness of an offense or mere absconsion does not automatically preclude bail if the accused is otherwise entitled to it, particularly when the investigation is complete and the accused is a previous non-convict.

  Questions settled

  • Does a finding of innocence by the investigating officer render a case one of further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  • Can bail be refused solely on the grounds of the heinous nature of the alleged offense?
  • Is the determination of vicarious liability and common intention a matter to be decided at the bail stage or during the trial?
  • Does the existence of two conflicting versions of the prosecution's case entitle an accused to the grant of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Rashid Bhatti (Fca) vs Head of Department (Enforcement), SecuritiesAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Tariq Muhammad vs The State, etc.2016 KLR Criminal Cases 261 · Lahore High Court · 2013-03-07
  post-arrest bailcross-versioncommon objectnon-fatal injuryfurther inquirycriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 302, 337-F5, 337-L2, 337-A1, 337-F1, 147, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involves determining whether the petitioner is entitled to bail where the injury attributed to him was on a non-vital part of the body, categorized as a minor abrasion, and where a cross-version of the incident exists involving injuries sustained by the accused party. The Lahore High Court held that since the injury attributed to the petitioner was not reported to be fatal and his precise criminal liability in the context of the cross-version and common object requires further probing at trial, the petitioner has made out a case for further inquiry. Consequently, the court allowed the petition and admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail, establishing that tentative assessment of non-fatal injuries and cross-versions warrants the grant of bail pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the injury attributed to him is on a non-vital part of the body and declared as an abrasion?
  • Does the existence of a cross-version where the accused also sustained injuries justify the grant of bail for further inquiry?
  • Whether tentative assessment of a role involving common object warrants bail when the guilt requires probing at trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Meiimood vs Naseer Ahmed, etc.2016 PLJ SC 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-26
  compounding of offencescompromise at bail stageresiling from compromisemurderqatl-i-amdpermission of the courtacquittalcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether a criminal offence compounded at the bail stage can be given effect to at the trial stage when one party subsequently resiles from the compromise. The appellant was booked under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. During pre-arrest bail proceedings, a compromise deed was executed by the complainant and heirs, stating they had no objection to the appellant's acquittal. However, when the appellant sought acquittal before the trial court under Section 345(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the heirs resiled from the compromise, and the trial court and High Court dismissed the application. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that for offences falling under Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a private compromise at the bail stage has no legal validity unless formally permitted by the trial court where the prosecution is pending. The key principle laid down is that compounding of offences requiring court permission cannot take place outside the trial court, and a party may resile prior to formal acceptance by the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a private compromise entered into between parties at the stage of bail be given effect to at the stage of trial for offences falling under Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether a party can resile from a compromise deed entered into during pre-arrest bail proceedings before the matter reaches the trial court?
  • Is a formal permission from the trial court mandatory for the valid compounding of offences specified under Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood vs Naseer Ahmed, etc.2016 P.S.C. Crl. 877 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-26
  compounding of offencesSection 345 CrPCcompromise at bail stageresiling from compromisepre-arrest bailacquittal on compromisemurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a criminal case under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, wherein the accused sought acquittal based on a compromise entered into with the victim's legal heirs at the pre-arrest bail stage. Before the trial court, the legal heirs resiled from the compromise. The trial court dismissed the acquittal application under Section 345(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the Peshawar High Court affirmed that decision. The core legal question was whether a private compromise entered into at the bail stage can be given effect for acquittal at the trial stage when a party resiles from it. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that for offences falling under Section 345(2) Cr.P.C., a private compromise has no legal validity unless formally permitted by the court where the prosecution is pending. As provided under Section 345(7) Cr.P.C., no composition is valid unless made in strict accordance with the section. Consequently, a compromise resiled from before trial court permission cannot support acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an offence governed by Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be validly compounded based on a private compromise entered into at the bail stage if a party resiles from it before the trial court?
  • Does a compromise executed prior to the submission of the challan automatically entitle the accused to an acquittal under Section 345(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is formal permission from the court where the prosecution is pending required under Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to give legal effect to a private compromise?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood vs Naseer Ahmed, etc2016 P.S.C. Crl. 441 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-26
  compounding of offencescompromisepre-arrest bailresiling from compromiseacquittalmurderQisasTazir
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a murder case registered under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. During pre-arrest bail proceedings, a compromise deed was executed by the deceased's heirs, which was subsequently recorded by a local commission, leading to the confirmation of the appellant's bail. However, at the trial stage, the heirs resiled from the compromise, and the Trial Court rejected the appellant's acquittal application under Section 345(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The High Court upheld this rejection. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, clarifying the distinction between offences compoundable without court permission under Section 345(1) and those requiring court permission under Section 345(2). The Court held that for offences falling under Section 345(2), a private compromise reached at the bail stage has no legal sanctity for acquittal unless the Trial Court, where the prosecution is pending, formally grants permission. Since the heirs resiled before the Trial Court, no valid or subsisting compromise existed to satisfy the statutory requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Can a private compromise entered into at the stage of bail be given effect for acquittal at the stage of trial if one of the parties resiles from it before the Trial Court?
  • What is the legal distinction between compounding under Section 345(1) and Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a Trial Court have the jurisdiction to allow compounding of an offence under Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without its formal permission?
  • Are the provisions of waiver and compounding under Sections 309 and 310 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 applicable to stages prior to the case reaching the Trial Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood vs Naseer Ahmed and others2016 PLD Supreme Court 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-26
  compounding of offencescompromise deedpre-arrest bailresiling from compromiseacquittalmurdercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a criminal case where the appellant, accused of murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought acquittal during trial based on a compromise deed executed earlier at the pre-arrest bail stage. The heirs of the deceased had subsequently resiled from the compromise before the trial court. The core legal question was whether a private compounding of a criminal offence at the bail stage remains binding and effective at the trial stage if one party resiles from it before the trial court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, offences requiring court permission can only be validly compounded with the express permission of the court before which the prosecution is pending. The Court laid down the principle that any private compromise entered into prior to the submission of the challan has no legal sanctity for compounding unless formally presented to and approved by the trial court, and a party cannot be prevented from resiling from such an agreement before such judicial permission is granted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a private compromise entered into at the stage of bail is binding at the trial stage if a party resiles from it before the trial court?
  • Does a trial court have the jurisdiction to reject a compromise under Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the heirs of the deceased refuse to support it during trial?
  • What is the legal effect of a private compounding of an offence under Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without the formal permission of the court where prosecution is pending?
  • Are the provisions of waiver (afw) and compounding (sulh) under Sections 309 and 310 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 applicable at any stage before the case reaches the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood vs Ministry of Interor, Government of Pakistan, etc.2016 PLJ Islamabad 66 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-11-11Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood vs Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan and others2016 PLJ Islamabad 66, 2016 PLD Islamabad 32 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-11-11Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood and otherss vs Additional District Judge and otherss2016 MLD 1767 · Lahore High Court · 2014-03-17
  guardian and wardcustody of minormother as natural guardianwelfare of the minorconstitutional petitionstatement of minor
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed to challenge the appellate judgment whereby the custody of a minor female was handed over to her real mother, reversing the Guardian Judge's order. The core legal question revolved around whether the custody of a minor should be given to the real mother or the paternal uncle and aunt, keeping in view the welfare of the minor and the statement of the minor preferring to stay with the relatives. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that in the absence of the father, the real mother is the natural guardian and her love and affection are irreplaceable, especially when a female child approaches the age of puberty. The Court laid down that a mother cannot be deprived of custody merely due to lack of independent financial resources, and while a minor's preference can be considered, it is not the sole determining factor when the welfare of the minor dictates custody with the mother.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a real mother can be deprived of the custody of her minor child solely on the ground of lacking an independent source of income?
  • Is the statement of a minor expressing a preference to live with relatives a conclusive factor in determining custody against the real mother?
  • Does a real mother take precedence over paternal uncle and aunt regarding the custody of a female minor nearing the age of puberty?
  • Whether the absence of financial self-sufficiency disqualifies a natural mother from securing the custody of her children under family law?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Khan Mazari and 3 otherss vs Government of Punjab through Secretary Industries and 3 others2016 PLD Supreme Court 778 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-07-25
  sugar industry banestablishment and enlargement of industriesnational interestfreedom of tradeexecutive policy decisionpublic interest restrictionwrit of mandamus
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arose from the dismissal of writ petitions by the Lahore High Court challenging a Notification dated 6th December 2006 issued by the Punjab Industries Department. The Notification imposed a province-wide complete ban on establishing new sugar mills and expanding existing ones under the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Act, 1963. The core legal question was whether the Provincial Government possessed the authority under Sections 3 and 11 of the 1963 Act to impose a general ban on an industrial sector, and whether such a restriction infringed upon the fundamental right to freedom of trade and business under Article 18 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the ban. The Court held that the policy decision was backed by expert inquiries and extensive data showing that sugarcane expansion depleted scarce groundwater, threatened food security, displaced vital wheat and cotton crops, and harmed the national economy. The Court ruled that under Section 3 of the Act, the Government is fully authorized to prohibit industrial undertakings when satisfied that their establishment or expansion would be prejudicial to the national interest. Furthermore, fundamental rights under Article 18 are subject to lawful statutory qualifications and regulations made in the public interest.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Government possess the authority under Section 3 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Act, 1963 to impose a complete ban on setting up or expanding a specific class of industrial undertakings in the national interest?
  • Does a policy ban imposed on setting up or enlarging sugar mills violate the fundamental right to freedom of trade, business, or profession under Article 18 of the Constitution?
  • Is the Government required to give individualized reasons or show-cause notices when rejecting an application for setting up an industrial undertaking if a general policy notification banning such industry is already in force?
  • Can executive policy decisions made in the public interest and based on expert data be interfered with by courts under Article 199 of the Constitution in the absence of mala fide or ulterior motives?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Khan Mazari (in C.A. No. 1242/2013) M/s Punjnad Sugar Mills Limited2016 SCP 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sugar mills banindustrial establishment and enlargementfreedom of trade and businessnational interestexecutive policywater-intensive cropscotton sector protectionconstitutional writ
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing writ petitions challenging the Notification dated 6th December 2006, which imposed a complete ban on setting up new sugar mills and enlarging the capacity of existing sugar mills in the Punjab. The core legal questions involved the scope of Sections 3 and 11 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Act 1963, whether the government possesses the power to impose a blanket ban through notification, and whether such restrictions violate fundamental freedoms under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the government's policy decision to restrict sugar mills was taken in the public and national interest following extensive expert consultations regarding water scarcity, ecological impact, and the protection of essential crops like cotton. The Court affirmed that the executive possesses the authority to regulate industries in the national interest, and fundamental rights relating to trade and business under Article 18 are subject to lawful qualifications and regulatory frameworks.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the government has the power under the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Act 1963 to impose a complete ban on the establishment of new sugar mills and the enlargement of existing ones?
  • Does the imposition of a regulatory ban on a specific industry violate the fundamental right to freedom of trade and business guaranteed under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is maintainable against a policy decision of the government enacted in the public and national interest?
  • Does section 11 read with section 3 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Act 1963 permit the issuance of a notification restricting a class of industrial undertakings?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Khan Mazari & others vs Government of Punjab through Secretary2016 PLD Supreme Court 778, 2016 SCP 20, 2016 PLJ SC 741 · Appellate Jurisdiction · 2016-07-25Read full judgment →
• Tariq Irshad and anothers vs Chairman National Accountability2016 MLD 1902 · Sindh High Court · 2014-02-18Read full judgment →
• Tariq Ahmed vs The State.2016 LHC 651 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-10
  narcotic substanceschemical examiner reportforensic analysisburden of proofcase propertytamperingcriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, facing trial for possession of Acetic Anhydride under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, challenged the Special Court's refusal to order a fresh chemical analysis of the seized contraband. The appellant argued that the substance was harmless and requested testing at a laboratory other than the Punjab Forensic Science Agency. The core legal question was whether an accused has the right to demand a re-analysis of prosecution evidence based on claims of discrepancies, particularly when the accused denies the recovery entirely. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that prosecution is a state function with a presumption of genuineness. The Court emphasized that an accused cannot dictate the investigative process or demand re-analysis to establish innocence, as the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution. Furthermore, the Court expressed concern regarding potential tampering with case property, noting that such requests often arise from manipulation. It held that courts must be cautious and require disclosure of the source of knowledge prompting such requests, especially when the accused denies the charge, thereby negating any onus to prove innocence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused person demand a fresh chemical analysis of contraband by a private laboratory during a criminal trial?
  • Does an accused person have the burden to prove their innocence through forensic re-analysis when they have denied the charge?
  • Should courts entertain requests for re-analysis of case property without the disclosure of the source of knowledge prompting such requests?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanzeem Corporation Gupis/Yasin through Representative and another2016 CLC 1490 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-04-18
  Civil ProcedureOrder XVII Rule 3Production of EvidenceDismissal of SuitRemandRecovery Suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil First Appeal challenged the trial court's order dismissing a recovery suit under Rule 3 of Order XVII, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, due to the plaintiffs' failure to produce evidence. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion under this rule to dismiss the suit summarily. The Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court held that the trial court erred by treating Rule 3 as a penal provision requiring dismissal. The Court clarified that Rule 3, Order XVII, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 does not authorize the summary dismissal of a suit for non-production of evidence. Instead, the rule mandates that the court must proceed to decide the suit based on the available record, including pleadings and documents, rather than dismissing it. The Court emphasized that the trial judge should have recorded statements or heard arguments to reach a decision on merits. Consequently, the appellate court set aside the dismissal order and remanded the case for trial, directing that the plaintiffs be granted limited opportunities to produce evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does Rule 3, Order XVII, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 empower a court to summarily dismiss a suit for non-production of evidence?
  • What is the correct procedure for a court to follow under Rule 3, Order XVII, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a party fails to produce evidence?
  • Is the dismissal of a suit under Rule 3, Order XVII, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 equivalent to a dismissal under Rule 8, Order IX, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Hussain Manji and 3 otherss vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Interior and 3 otherss2016 CLC 1534 · Lahore High Court · 2014-07-21
  Exit Control List (ECL)Constitutional PetitionFundamental RightsFreedom of MovementPlea BargainTerritorial JurisdictionConcurrent JurisdictionNatural JusticeCollateral SecurityRecovery of Dues
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the placement of the petitioners' names on the Exit Control List (ECL) by the Ministry of Interior, seeking their removal and a declaration that the relevant memorandums were without lawful authority. The core legal questions addressed included the lawfulness of placing names on the ECL without prior notice, hearing, or stated reasons, particularly after a plea bargain where a substantial amount was paid and the remaining liability was secured by collateral properties. The Court also examined its territorial jurisdiction and the adequacy of the alternative remedy of review. The Lahore High Court accepted the petition, setting aside the impugned orders. It held that placing names on the ECL without notice, hearing, or specific reasons violates fundamental rights under Articles 4 and 9 of the Constitution. The Court affirmed its concurrent territorial jurisdiction, noting that federal institutions operate nationwide and a partial cause of action arose in Lahore. It further ruled that retaining names on the ECL for recovery purposes, when the liability is secured and the authorities are inactive in pursuing recovery through agreed means, is unjustified.

  Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Aslam Dar and others vs Mst. Rashida and others2016 PLJ Sc (AJ&K) 177 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Tanveer Ahmad vs The State and another2016 MLD 1219 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-04Read full judgment →
• Tamil Than Mumtaz and otherss vs Province of Punjab through Chief2016 C.L.R. 1252, 2016 PLD Lahore 699 · Lahore High Court · 2016-07-14
  constitutional petitionheritage preservationprotected antiquityspecial premisesenvironmental impact assessmentjudicial reviewsustainable developmentvisual impairmentOrange Line Metro Train
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the legality of the Lahore Orange Line Metro Train Project, specifically focusing on its impact on 26 heritage sites and environmental approvals. The petitioners argued that construction within the 200-foot prohibitory zone of protected antiquities and special premises violated the Antiquity Act, 1975 and the Punjab Special Premises (Preservation) Ordinance, 1985. The Court held that the initial and revised No Objection Certificates (NOCs) were issued without independent expert assessment, lacked reasoned justification, and failed to consider the 'visual impairment' of monuments. Consequently, the Court set aside the NOCs and restrained construction within 200 feet of the sites. It directed the government to engage independent international consultants, preferably via UNESCO, for a fresh study. Regarding environmental approvals, the Court dismissed the challenge, noting that statutory remedies via the Environmental Tribunal had not been exhausted. The key principle established is that the right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution includes the preservation of heritage, and discretionary powers to permit development near protected sites must be structured, rational, and based on independent expert findings.

  Read full judgment →
• Talpur Road, Karachi vs Executive Director (Specialized Companies), Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Nic Building, Jinnah Avenue, IslamabadAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Talha Baig and others vs Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad and others2016 MLD 1648 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-02-09Read full judgment →
• Talha Asif Taufiq vs VTH Additional District Judge and 3 others2016 MLD 742 · Sindh High Court · 2015-07-04Read full judgment →
• Takaful Pakistan Ltd vs Commissioner (Insurance) Securities and ExchangeAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Takaful Pakistan Limited: In the matter of vs Not2016 CLD 840 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2014-09-04
  Takaful Rulessolvency requirementsregulatory complianceParticipants' Takaful Fundstatus quo orderfiduciary dutiesSECP
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns regulatory proceedings initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan against Takaful Pakistan Limited for failing to comply with the solvency requirements mandated by the Takaful Rules, 2012. The core legal question was whether the company violated Rule 10(1)(k) by failing to maintain admissible assets in excess of liabilities within its Participants' Takaful Fund, and whether a pending High Court order to maintain status quo rendered the 2012 Rules inoperative. The Commission held that the company had indeed contravened the solvency requirements, as the High Court's status quo order did not suspend the operation of the Rules. While the Commission affirmed that the violation attracted penal action under Rule 12(1)(d), it adopted a lenient approach, noting the company's commitment to future compliance and the increased stringency of the new regulatory framework compared to the repealed 2005 Rules. Consequently, the Commission condoned the default, provided the company achieved full compliance by the specified deadline, emphasizing that directors bear fiduciary duties requiring strict adherence to statutory obligations.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court order to maintain status quo automatically render statutory rules inoperative?
  • What are the fiduciary duties of directors regarding statutory compliance in a Takaful company?
  • Can the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan impose penalties for failure to maintain excess admissible assets over liabilities in a Participants' Takaful Fund?
  Read full judgment →
• Takaful Pakistan Limited vs Executive Director (Insurance)Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Takaful Pakistan Limited vs Commissioner (Insurance), Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan2016 CLD 2312 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-02-17Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad vs The State2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-11-18Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad vs The State and anothers2016 MLD 1825 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-10
  narcotics possessionchain of custodysafe custodyreasonable doubtchemical examiner reportMalkhanacriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the alleged possession of narcotics. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution successfully established the chain of custody for the recovered contraband, thereby proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Lahore High Court held that the conviction could not be sustained because the prosecution failed to establish the safe custody of the recovered substance. Specifically, the evidence was silent regarding the handling of the case property between the time of recovery and its transmission to the chemical examiner. The court emphasized that in the absence of testimony from the Malkhana Moharrar confirming the receipt and intact storage of the samples, the chemical examiner's report could not be connected to the seized material. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction, ruling that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and ordered the acquittal of the appellant, discharging his surety.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to establish the safe custody of recovered narcotics entitle an accused to acquittal?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution fails to prove the chain of custody of the recovered substance from the time of seizure to the chemical examiner?
  • Can a chemical examiner's report be relied upon if the prosecution fails to prove that the sample remained intact in the Malkhana?
  Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad etc. vs Government of the Punjab, etc.2016 PLJ Lahore 290 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-16Read full judgment →
• Taimur Asad Khan vs Higher Education Commission and others2016 YLR 363 · Lahore High Court · 2014-01-06Read full judgment →
• Taimoor Khan vs The State2016 P.S.C. Crl. 239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-02-04
  control of narcotic substancespoppy strawopiumchemical examiner reportmorphine percentagecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of a large quantity of ground poppy. The core legal question concerns the definition of opium and poppy straw under the Act, the evidentiary value and requirements of a Chemical Examiner's report, and whether the ascertainment of the exact percentage of alkaloids is mandatory in cases involving poppy straw (Poast or Doda). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that poppy straw in its natural or crushed form constitutes a narcotic substance and that the ascertainment of morphine percentage is not required for such substances under Section 2(t)(i) of the Act. The key principle laid down is that mowed poppy plant parts, excluding seeds, fall within the definition of opium and are treated as narcotic drugs without needing chemical breakdown of alkaloids.

  Questions settled

  • Whether poppy straw or crushed poppy heads (Poast/Doda) fall within the definition of opium under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Is it mandatory for a Chemical Examiner to specify the exact percentage of morphine and other alkaloids in cases involving the recovery of poppy straw?
  • Does a report signed by a Government Analyst serve as conclusive evidence under Section 36 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 when left unrebutted?
  Read full judgment →
• Taimoor Khan and another vs State and another2016 PLJ SC 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-02-04
  narcoticspoppy strawopiumchemical examiner reportalkaloidscriminal appealnarcotic testing laboratory
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellants under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of 8,000 kilograms of crushed poppy heads from a truck. The core legal questions centered on the adequacy and conclusiveness of the Chemical Examiner's report, which lacked specific percentages of alkaloids, and whether 'poppy straw' or 'Poast' falls within the definition of 'opium' under Section 2(t) of the Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, maintaining the convictions. The Court, through a majority and minority split on the reasoning, affirmed that under established precedent, poppy straw (excluding seeds) in natural or crushed form constitutes a narcotic drug. The minority opinion, which formed the consensus on the legal holding, clarified that the percentage of morphine or other alkaloids is only relevant to mixtures or liquid preparations, and is not required for raw poppy straw or poppy heads. Consequently, a simple qualitative report confirming the substance as poppy heads is legally sufficient for conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether poppy straw or 'Poast' in its natural or crushed form falls within the definition of 'opium' under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • Is the Chemical Examiner required to ascertain the exact percentage of morphine or other alkaloids in cases involving the recovery of raw poppy straw or poppy heads?
  • Does a Chemical Examiner's report require formal proof if it is not rebutted by the defense under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Taimoor Khan (In Crl.A.163/2013 Taj Muhammad (In Crl.A.164/2013 vs The2015-SCP-52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  narcotics traffickingchemical examiner reportstatutory interpretationcriminal evidencenarcotic testing laboratoriespoppy strawpossession of narcotics
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against convictions for possession of narcotics under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question addressed is the evidentiary validity of a Chemical Examiner's report that lacks detailed analysis, specific alkaloid percentages, and adherence to mandatory testing protocols. The Court held that while the specific report in this case was cryptic and absurd, the appeals were dismissed because the appellants had abandoned their request for re-examination, creating a presumption of guilt. The Court established that Chemical Examiner reports must be reasoned, authoritative, and include full protocols and percentages of alkaloids to be admissible for conviction. It emphasized that the Executive has a mandatory statutory obligation to establish properly equipped laboratories and appoint qualified experts. Furthermore, the Court noted the vagueness in the statutory definitions of opium and poppy straw, directing the Government to amend these provisions to ensure clarity and effective enforcement against drug trafficking.

  Questions settled

  • What are the mandatory requirements for a Chemical Examiner's report to be admissible in narcotics cases?
  • Does the failure of a defendant to pursue an application for re-examination of narcotics samples create a presumption of guilt?
  • Are the definitions of 'opium' and 'poppy straw' under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, considered legally sufficient?
  • What are the statutory obligations of the Federal and Provincial Governments regarding the establishment of narcotics testing laboratories?
  Read full judgment →
• Taimoor Alam Satti vs Mst. Aalia Bibi and others2016 YLR 765 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-11Read full judgment →
• Taimoor Ahmad and another vs Addl. Sessions Judge and 9 others2016 LHC 189, 2016 PLJ Lahore 715, K.L.R. 2016 Criminal Cases 75 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-25Read full judgment →
• Taimoor Ahmad and another vs Additional Sessions Judge and 9 others2016 PLJ Lahore 715 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-25Read full judgment →
• Taimoor Ahmad & another vs Addl. Sessions Judge & 9-others2016 LHC 189 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-25Read full judgment →
• Tahira Zaib vs Ghaffar Ahmed and others2016 PLJ Sh.C. (AJ&K) 12 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-06-26Read full judgment →
• Tahira Zaib vs Ghaffar Ahmed & others2016 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 239 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-05-25Read full judgment →
• Tahira Parveen vs Station House Officer, Police Station Mansoor2016 P Cr. L J 44 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-22
  habeas corpuschild custodyminor custodyguardians and wardshazanatillegal custodyimproper custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a habeas corpus petition filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by the petitioner, Mst. Tahira Parveen, seeking the recovery and custody of a minor child, Kashaf, allegedly removed by respondent No.2. The core legal question centered on whether the custody of the father was illegal or improper and whether habeas corpus proceedings under Section 491, Cr.P.C. are the appropriate forum to resolve complex questions of child welfare and guardianship normally determined under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The Lahore High Court held that while the father's custody may not be strictly illegal as an adopted parent, it was improper given that the mother enjoys the right of Hazanat, the child expressed a clear preference to remain with the petitioner, and the father had contracted a second marriage. The court ruled that inquiries regarding financial status, residential environment, and general welfare are matters for the Guardian Court under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, rather than a habeas corpus petition. The petition was allowed and custody of the minor was handed over to the petitioner with police protection.

  Questions settled

  • Whether habeas corpus proceedings under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be used to determine the detailed welfare of a minor instead of proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890?
  • Does a father's custody become improper when the mother enjoys the right of Hazanat and the minor expresses a clear preference to live with the mother?
  • Can a habeas corpus petition for the recovery of a minor be entertained when the child has been recently removed from the custody of the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahira Batool vs Provincial Government through Chief Secretary and 3 others2016 PLC (C.S.) 712 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-04-07
  recruitment ruleseducational qualificationwrit petitionwildlife managementforest departmenteligibility criteriaadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by the petitioner seeking to be declared eligible for the posts of Range Forest Officer (RFO), Sub-Divisional Forest Officer (SDFO), and Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) in the Forest Department of Gilgit-Baltistan, despite the existing recruitment rules not explicitly listing her degree, M.Sc. Wildlife Management, as a qualifying academic credential. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's specialized degree in Wildlife Management should be recognized as a valid qualification for these posts, given that other provinces in Pakistan recognize such degrees and the Forest Department maintains a sub-department for wildlife. The Court held that since the respondents admitted the relevance of the degree and its recognition in other provinces, the petitioner's qualification was both relevant and necessary. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, directing the respondents to amend the 1998 recruitment rules to include M.Sc. or B.Sc. Wildlife Management as a required educational qualification for the relevant posts. The Court further validated the petitioner's participation in the recruitment process, establishing that recruitment rules should reflect contemporary academic standards relevant to the department's functional requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the court can direct the amendment of recruitment rules to include specific academic qualifications?
  • Is a degree in Wildlife Management a relevant qualification for the post of Range Forest Officer?
  • Can a candidate be declared eligible for a government post if their specific degree is not currently listed in the existing recruitment rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Taj Abbasi vs Fop, through Secretary M_o Housing and Works and others2016 C.L.R. 609, 2016 MLD 867, 2016 PLJ Islamabad 292, 2016 PLC (C.S.) 831 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-02
  civil revisionrejection of plaintgovernment accommodationfederal government servantaccommodation allocation rulesregularization of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from concurrent orders of the lower courts rejecting the petitioner's plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The petitioner sought a declaration and mandatory injunction to retain government accommodation originally allotted to his retired father, relying on Rule 15(2) of the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002. The core legal question was whether an employee serving on a contingency basis at the time of their father's retirement qualifies as a Federal Government Servant entitled to retain government accommodation under the proviso to Rule 15(2). The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that persons hired on contingencies, daily wages, or ad-hoc bases are excluded from the definition of Federal Government Servant under Rule 2(g) of the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002. Since the petitioner's services were not regularized within the mandatory six-month window following his father's retirement, he was ineligible for the benefit of the rule and became an unauthorized occupant. The court affirmed that the rejection of the plaint was legally sound and that the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, does not warrant interference with correct concurrent findings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee working on a contingency basis is a Federal Government Servant under the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002?
  • Is the child of a retired Federal Government Servant entitled to retain government accommodation if their own service is not regularized within six months of the retirement?
  • Can a court look into the documents annexed with the plaint and written statement when deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Taj Abbasi vs Fop, through Secretary M_o Housing and -Works and others2016 MLD 867 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-02Read full judgment →
• Tahir Taj Abbasi vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Housing2016 C.L.R. 609 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-02Read full judgment →
• Tahir Mehmood vs Additional Sessions Judge, Vehari2016 LHC 3218 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-16Read full judgment →
• Tahir Mahmood, Commissioner CLD and Fida Hussain Samoo, Commissioner InsuranceAXIS Global Limited vs Director_Hod (Msci) Securities Market Division, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan2016 CLD 1179 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-01-22Read full judgment →
• Tahir Mahmood vs Abdul Salam and 6 others2016 PLJ AJ&K 17 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-01-27Read full judgment →
• Tahir Khan vs The State and others2016 P Cr. LJ 924 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-11-05
  criminal appealhostile witnessmurderqatl-i-amdbenefit of the doubtcorroborationmedical evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant for qatl-i-amd under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to life imprisonment. The core legal question revolved around whether a conviction can be sustained based on the testimony of the complainant who was declared hostile, in the absence of reliable corroborating evidence. The Peshawar High Court held that while the testimony of a hostile witness remains admissible, it requires strong, independent corroboration from surrounding circumstances for a safe administration of criminal justice. Finding that material contradictions existed between the medical evidence, site plan, and the ocular account, and that necessary corroboration was lacking, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant on the benefit of doubt. The key principle laid down is that a conviction cannot be recorded on the uncorroborated testimony of a hostile witness when the surrounding circumstances and medical evidence negate the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be based on the testimony of a hostile witness without independent corroboration?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a hostile witness in a criminal trial?
  • Does a contradiction between medical evidence and ocular testimony warrant the acquittal of the accused?
  • What is the effect of the failure of the prosecution to prove recoveries and site plans in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Javed vs Superintendent District Jail, Bahawalpur and another2016 MLD 777 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-26Read full judgment →
• Tahir Javed Khan vs The State2016 MLD 1840 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-05-13Read full judgment →
• Tahir Humayun and others vs High Court of Balochistan through Registrar and others2016 PLD Balochistan 56 · Balochistan High Court · 2016-04-25
  service appealseniorityadhoc appointmentretrospective regularizationjudicial servicelimitationvoid order
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal concerns the seniority of judicial officers in the Balochistan judiciary. The core legal question was whether the services of ad-hoc appointees could be regularized with retrospective effect, thereby counting their ad-hoc tenure for seniority purposes to the detriment of officers appointed regularly via the Balochistan Public Service Commission (BPSC). The Court held that the retrospective regularization of ad-hoc services was illegal and arbitrary. It determined that ad-hoc service, being a stopgap arrangement, cannot be counted for seniority, which must be reckoned from the date of substantive appointment. Consequently, the Court declared the appellants, who were appointed regularly via the BPSC prior to the respondents' regularization, to be senior to the private respondents. The judgment establishes that executive or administrative authorities cannot exercise discretionary powers in a manner that violates established legal canons or prejudices vested rights. Furthermore, it affirms that illegal administrative orders do not become valid through the efflux of time, and thus, the principles of limitation and estoppel do not apply to void notifications.

  Questions settled

  • Can ad-hoc service be counted for the purpose of determining seniority in government service?
  • Does the principle of limitation apply to a void notification or illegal administrative order?
  • Can an administrative authority regularize the services of an ad-hoc employee with retrospective effect to the detriment of regularly appointed employees?
  • Is an appointment on probation synonymous with an ad-hoc appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Hasan vs Commissioner (Non-Banking Finance Companies) SECP.Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Tahir Hasan vs Commissioner (Non-Banking Finance Companies) SECPAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Tahir Hanif vs Saira Kosar2016 PLJ Sh.C. (AJ&K) 14 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-10-15Read full judgment →
• Tahir Azam vs The State2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-08-25Read full judgment →