Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Sufiyan Akram and another vs Appellate Authority Additional District2016 YLR 2276, 2016 C.L.R. 217 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-15
  local government electionsnomination papersdisqualificationZakat and Ushr Committeestatutory bodypublic servantelection law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged an order of the Appellate Authority which set aside the acceptance of the petitioners' nomination papers for local government elections. The core legal question was whether a member of a local Zakat and Ushr Committee is disqualified from contesting local government elections under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013. The court held that a member of a Zakat and Ushr Committee is in the service of a statutory body controlled by the government, thereby attracting the disqualification under Section 27(2)(e) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013. The court emphasized that the expression 'in the service' should be construed in a broad, liberal sense, encompassing any position where there is a master-servant relationship or subordination to the government, rather than a narrow technical definition. Furthermore, the court noted that the legislative intent behind the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980, is to keep committee members aloof from political activity. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition, affirming that the petitioner's candidature was legally invalid due to the statutory disqualification.

  Questions settled

  • Is a member of a local Zakat and Ushr Committee considered to be in the service of a statutory body under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
  • Does the disqualification for being 'in the service' of a statutory body apply to members of Zakat and Ushr Committees?
  • Should the expression 'in the service' be construed in a narrow technical sense or a broad liberal sense when determining election disqualification?
  • Does a member of a Zakat and Ushr Committee hold the status of a public servant under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
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• Sufi Muhammad Farrukh Amin vs Federation of Pakistan & others2016 LHC 1862 · Lahore High Court · 2016-06-17Read full judgment →
• Sue Evenwel, Et Al vs Greg Abbott, Governor of Texas, Et Al2016 SCMR 1152 · Supreme Court of United StatesRead full judgment →
• Success Industries (Pvt) Ltd vs The Registrar (SECP)Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2013-02-22Read full judgment →
• Suba Khan and 2 others vs Malik Falak Sher2016 PLJ Peshawar 1 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-07-27Read full judgment →
• Suba and 2 others vs Malik Falaksher2016 PLJ Peshawar 1, 2016 YLR 1202 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-07-27
  revision petitionpre-emption suitTalb-e-MuwathibatTalb-e-IshhadMajlissuperior right of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts whereby a pre-emption suit filed by the respondent was decreed and partially upheld on appeal. The core legal question revolves around the proper proof and legal requirements for the essential pre-requisites of pre-emption, specifically Talb-e-Muwathibat (jumping demand) and Talb-e-Ishhad (demand with attestation/notice). The Peshawar High Court held that Talb-e-Muwathibat must be announced in a Majlis (assembly) upon receiving information, and in the absence of proof regarding the constitution of a Majlis and the information given, the demand stands unproven. Furthermore, defects in the attestation and evidence regarding notices of Talb-e-Ishhad vitiate the claim. Consequently, the court set aside the lower courts' judgments, allowed the revision petition, and dismissed the pre-emption suit. The key principle laid down is that failure to legally prove both Talb-e-Muwathibat in a valid Majlis and Talb-e-Ishhad through competent witness testimony is fatal to a pre-emption suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the performance of Talb-e-Muwathibat requires the constitution of a Majlis upon receiving information of a sale transaction?
  • What are the legal consequences when both Talb-e-Muwathibat and Talb-e-Ishhad are not proved in accordance with law in a pre-emption suit?
  • Does the death of an attesting witness of Talb-e-Ishhad notices require strict compliance regarding the testimony of the surviving witness to prove the notices?
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• Sub-Divisional Officer (Operation), FESCO vs Muhammad Illyas2016 CLC 1417 · Lahore High Court · 2014-04-22
  District Consumer Courtelectricity theftdetection billjurisdictionPunjab Consumer Protection ActElectricity Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an order passed by the District Consumer Court, Sargodha, which entertained a complaint regarding a disputed electricity detection bill and directed the issuance of an amended bill. The core legal question was whether the District Consumer Court had the jurisdiction to entertain a consumer complaint regarding the correction of a detection bill issued for electricity theft. The Lahore High Court held that the Consumer Court lacked jurisdiction, as the dispute did not relate to defective products or faulty services under the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, but rather involved electricity theft and a detection bill. The Court affirmed that disputes regarding detection bills fall outside the purview of Consumer Courts, and that orders passed without jurisdiction are void, meaning no period of limitation runs against them. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the consumer's complaint was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a District Consumer Court have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint regarding the correction of an electricity detection bill?
  • Whether limitation runs against an order passed without jurisdiction by a court or tribunal?
  • Does a dispute involving the theft of electricity fall within the cognizance of a Consumer Court?
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• State vs Syed Aamir ShabbirPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 222 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-06
  acquittalhostile witnesscorruptionspecial judgecriminal appealprocedural irregularityprevention of corruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the State against an order of acquittal passed by the Special Judge Central, Lahore, in a corruption case involving charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in acquitting the respondent under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, after the complainant turned hostile and exonerated the accused, and whether the court possessed the requisite jurisdiction to pass such an order. The Court held that the acquittal was justified because the complainant, the material witness, denied the occurrence and the prosecution's case, rendering further trial a futile exercise. The Court clarified that while the Special Judge functions as a Court of Session, the powers to acquit at any stage under Section 249-A and Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, are substantively similar. It was established that where the primary witness exonerates the accused, continuing the trial serves no objective, and procedural technicalities regarding the specific section cited for acquittal do not warrant remand when the court possesses inherent powers to prevent abuse of process.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, have the power to acquit an accused at any stage of the trial?
  • Is an acquittal order invalid if the trial court cites Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, instead of Section 249-A?
  • Can a trial court be compelled to continue a trial when the material witness has turned hostile and exonerated the accused?
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• State vs Muhammad Abbasi, etc.PLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 442 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-18
  murder referencecapital punishmentplea of self-defenseburden of proofcircumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Islamabad High Court addresses a murder reference, criminal appeals, and a criminal revision arising from a trial court judgment dated 10-12-2011 concerning the murder of one Naseer Ahmed. The core legal questions involved the evaluation of eyewitness testimony, circumstantial evidence, the burden of proof regarding the plea of self-defense, and the quantum of sentence in a murder trial. The court held that the prosecution successfully established its case beyond a reasonable doubt through consistent and credible ocular testimony, medical evidence, and corroborating circumstances, while the accused failed to substantiate his plea of self-defense. The conviction and death sentence of the main accused were confirmed, and the appeals seeking to overturn the acquittal of another co-accused or enhance compensation were dismissed. The key principles laid down include the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the evaluation of circumstantial evidence, the burden on an accused pleading self-defense under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and the principles governing the choice between the alternative sentences of death and imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused to establish the plea of self-defense when such a defense is raised?
  • Can capital punishment be awarded on the basis of circumstantial evidence when it is clear, cogent, and convincing?
  • What is the correct interpretation and standard of proof regarding 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal trials?
  • Are two alternative sentences of death or imprisonment for life provided under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and what factors govern their award?
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• State vs Maqsood Ahmed alias MudiPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 848 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-16Read full judgment →
• State vs Anwar Saif Ullah Khan2016 PSC CRI 90, 2016 PLJ SC 622, 2016 PLD Supreme Court 276, PLJ 2016 · Appellate Jurisdiction · 2016-01-20
  misuse of authorityNational Accountability Ordinancepolitical patronagepublic appointmentsburden of proofmens reaactus reusacquittal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the acquittal of a former Federal Minister by the Lahore High Court regarding charges of corruption and misuse of authority. The respondent had forced the appointment of 145 individuals to a public sector corporation to appease political allies, despite resistance from the corporation's management. The Supreme Court examined whether this constituted an offence under Section 9(a)(vi) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The Court held that the respondent’s actions went beyond mere procedural irregularity, constituting a willful misuse of authority to gain political favor at the cost of institutional integrity. The Court emphasized that while the prosecution bears the initial burden of establishing a reasonable case, the presumption of guilt under Section 14(d) of the Ordinance shifts the burden to the accused once a prima facie case is made. The Court set aside the acquittal, restoring the conviction, while remitting the fine due to the case's age. The judgment reaffirms that public appointments must adhere to merit, transparency, and constitutional mandates under Article 18, rejecting political patronage in public service.

  Questions settled

  • Does the misuse of authority under Section 9(a)(vi) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 require proof of both actus reus and mens rea?
  • When does the burden of proof shift to the accused under Section 14(d) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Can a Federal Minister legally direct appointments in a public sector corporation to accommodate political recommendations?
  • Does a procedural irregularity in public appointments constitute a criminal offence under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
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• State vs Ali Asghar2016 LHC 1, 2017 P Cr. L J 349, PLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 591 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-12
  appeal against acquittalsafe custody of case propertychemical examiner reportbenefit of doubtnarcotic substancetampering of samples
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by the State under Section 48 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, challenging the judgment of the Special Court CNS, Faisalabad, whereby the respondent was acquitted of a charge under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question revolved around whether the prosecution successfully established the safe custody and safe transmission of the recovered narcotic substance and samples to the Chemical Examiner without tampering. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove safe custody and safe transmission, noting material illegalities in how a second sample was drawn and handled without proper judicial supervision under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court reaffirmed that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt, and interference in an acquittal judgment requires proof of perversity or arbitrariness, which was absent here. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the acquittal upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the safe custody and safe transmission of narcotic samples vitiate the trial?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal that enjoys a double presumption of innocence without showing it to be perverse or arbitrary?
  • What are the legal requirements for drawing and handling samples of narcotic substances under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt sufficient to grant the benefit of doubt to an accused in a criminal case?
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• State through Advocate-General Sindh vs Elahi Bux2016 P Cr. L J 332 · Sindh High Court · 2015-03-12
  acquittal appealdouble presumption of innocencemisappropriationanti-corruptionappellate interferenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two criminal acquittal appeals filed by the State and the District Agricultural Supply Officer against the acquittal of the respondent, Illahi Bux Ansari, by the Special Judge Anti-Corruption, Sukkur. The respondent was charged with misappropriation of fertilizer stocks and forgery of documents. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt to warrant setting aside the acquittal. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the charges, noting that the respondent produced documentary evidence demonstrating that the stocks were already damaged or short upon receipt, and that he had been exonerated by departmental inquiries. The Court affirmed the acquittal, emphasizing the principle of 'double presumption of innocence' attached to an acquitted accused. It held that an appellate court should only interfere with an acquittal if the trial court's judgment is perverse, illegal, based on misreading of evidence, or reflects a miscarriage of justice. Finding the trial court's reasoning balanced and plausible, the appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal?
  • Does an accused person enjoy a double presumption of innocence after being acquitted by a trial court?
  • Is an acquittal order liable to be set aside if the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt?
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• State through Advocate-General Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar vs Nazakat2016 YLR 2352 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-05-17Read full judgment →
• State of Rajasthan vs Daud Khan2016 P.S.C. 337, 2016 P.S.C. Crl. 337 · Supreme Court of India · 2015-11-04
  culpable homicideFIR delaySection 157 CrPCeyewitness testimonyforensic evidenceballistics reportcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-appeals arising from a High Court judgment that modified the conviction of Daud Khan from murder under Section 302 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. The core legal questions involved the impact of a delay in forwarding the First Information Report (FIR) to the Magistrate under Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, the evidentiary value of inconclusive forensic ballistics reports, and the significance of the absence of a blood trail at the crime scene. The Supreme Court dismissed both appeals, affirming the High Court’s decision. The Court held that a delay in transmitting the FIR to the Magistrate does not automatically vitiate the prosecution’s case unless the accused demonstrates prejudice. Furthermore, the Court established that minor discrepancies, such as the absence of skin blackening or blood spillage, do not override consistent and trustworthy eyewitness testimony. The judgment emphasizes that evidence must be evaluated collectively rather than in isolation to determine the truth.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in forwarding the First Information Report to the Magistrate under Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 automatically vitiate the prosecution case?
  • Is the absence of skin blackening in a gunshot wound sufficient to reject eyewitness testimony regarding the distance of the shot?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the forensic ballistics report is inconclusive regarding the specific weapon used?
  • Does the absence of a blood trail at the scene of the crime necessarily disprove the prosecution's version of the occurrence?
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• State of M.P. vs Madanlal2016 P.S.C. Crl. 65 · Supreme Court of India · 2015-07-01
  appellate jurisdictionre-appreciation of evidencerapenon-compoundable offencevictim dignitysentencingcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The State of Madhya Pradesh appealed against a High Court judgment that converted the respondent's conviction from Section 376(2)(f) read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (attempted rape) to Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (outraging modesty) and reduced the sentence to time served. The core legal questions concerned the scope of appellate jurisdiction and the validity of considering a compromise between parties in rape cases for sentencing. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to fulfill its mandatory duty to re-appreciate evidence, rendering the judgment perverse and laconic. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication. The Court established that appellate courts must provide comprehensive, reasoned analysis of evidence. Crucially, it laid down that rape is a non-compoundable offence against society; therefore, any compromise between parties is legally irrelevant and cannot be used as a mitigating factor to reduce sentences, as such an approach violates the dignity of the victim and the principles of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellate court have a mandatory duty to re-appreciate evidence in a criminal appeal?
  • Can a compromise between the accused and the victim's family be a valid ground for reducing a sentence in a rape case?
  • Is an appellate judgment that fails to analyze evidence and provides only cryptic reasoning legally sustainable?
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• State Life Insurance Corporation vs Messrs Asiatic Enterprises and 22016 YLR 2457 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-05Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation vs Co-operative Insurance Society of Pakistan2016 KLR Civil Cases 360 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-12Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation through Attorney vs Province of Punjab through Secretary Local Government and Community Development Department and 3 others2016 CLD 2219 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-04Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan vs Qazi Majid Ali and 22016 CLC 765 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-26Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan vs Additional District2016 CLD 410 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-12Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan vs National Industrial Relations Commission, Islamabad and others2016 PLC 185 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-11-30
  Trade Union registrationLocus standiFederation of Trade UnionsIndustrial Relations ActEmployer standingConstitutional petitionAggrieved person
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the registration of a Federation of Trade Unions by the National Industrial Relations Commission, with the State Bank of Pakistan contending that the registration violated the Industrial Relations Act, 2008, specifically regarding the requirement for constituent unions to be nation-wise. The core legal questions concerned whether an employer possesses the locus standi to challenge the registration of a trade union or federation, and whether such an employer qualifies as an aggrieved person under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Court held that the registration of a trade union is a matter strictly between the Registrar and the union, and an employer lacks the legal standing to challenge this process. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Section 22(1) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 does not mandate that constituent unions must have multi-provincial membership to form a federation. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed. The key principle laid down is that employers have no locus standi to interfere in the registration process of trade unions or federations, as they are not aggrieved persons entitled to challenge such administrative decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employer have the locus standi to challenge the registration of a Trade Union or a Federation of Trade Unions?
  • Is an employer an aggrieved person under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 regarding the registration of a Trade Union?
  • Does Section 22(1) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 require that both constituent Trade Unions must have membership in more than one province to form a Federation?
  • Can a Registrar of Trade Unions cancel a registration certificate directly, or must they approach a Labour Court?
  Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan vs Learned Full Bench, National Industrial Relations2016 NLR Labour 30, 2016 PLC 185, 2016 PLJ Islamabad 152, KLR 2016 Labour · Islamabad High Court · 2015-11-30
  locus standitrade union registrationindustrial relationsemployer rightsconstitutional petitionfederation of trade unionslabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  The State Bank of Pakistan filed petitions challenging the registration of a Federation of Trade Unions, arguing that the registration failed to meet statutory requirements under the Industrial Relations Act, 2008. The core legal question was whether an employer possesses the locus standi to challenge the registration of a Trade Union or a Federation of Trade Unions, and whether such an employer qualifies as an "aggrieved person" under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the registration of trade unions is a matter strictly between the Registrar and the unions involved. The Court affirmed that an employer has no legal standing to object to the registration process or to appeal such decisions. Furthermore, the Court established that once a trade union is registered, the Registrar lacks the power to unilaterally recall the certificate; any challenge regarding the validity of registration must be pursued through a complaint before the Labour Court under Section 12 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employer have locus standi to challenge the registration of a Trade Union or a Federation of Trade Unions?
  • Is an employer an "aggrieved person" under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, in matters of trade union registration?
  • Can a Registrar of Trade Unions unilaterally recall a certificate of registration once it has been issued?
  • What is the proper procedure for challenging the registration of a Trade Union under the Industrial Relations Act, 2008?
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• State Bank of Pakistan vs Learned Full Bench, National Industrial2016 PLJ Islamabad 152 · Islamabad High Court
  locus standitrade union registrationfederation of trade unionsemployer rightsIndustrial Relations Act 2008writ jurisdictionaggrieved person
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns writ petitions filed by the State Bank of Pakistan challenging the registration of a Federation of Trade Unions. The core legal question was whether an employer possesses the locus standi to challenge the registration of a trade union or a federation of trade unions, and whether the registration process followed the Industrial Relations Act, 2008. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the registration of a trade union or federation is a matter strictly between the applicant unions and the Registrar. Consequently, an employer is not an aggrieved person under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and lacks the standing to challenge such registration or file an appeal against it. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the Registrar lacks the power to unilaterally cancel a registration; such cancellation must be directed by a Labour Court upon a formal complaint under Section 12 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008. The principle established is that the employer has no say in the registration process of trade unions.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employer have the locus standi to challenge the registration of a trade union or a federation of trade unions?
  • Is an employer considered an aggrieved person under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, in matters of trade union registration?
  • Can the Registrar of Trade Unions unilaterally cancel the registration of a trade union or federation?
  • What is the procedure for the cancellation of a trade union registration under the Industrial Relations Act, 2008?
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• State Bank of Pakistan vs Learned Full Bench, National Industrial2016 NLR Labour 30 · Islamabad High Court
  locus standitrade union registrationindustrial relationsemployer rightsfederation of trade unionsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition concerns the registration of a Federation of Trade Unions by the National Industrial Relations Commission. The petitioner, State Bank of Pakistan, challenged the registration, contending that the constituent unions failed to meet the statutory requirements for a "Nation-wise Trade Union" under the Industrial Relations Act, 2008. The core legal question was whether an employer possesses the locus standi to challenge the registration of a trade union or federation. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the registration process is a matter strictly between the trade union and the Registrar. The Court affirmed that an employer is not an "aggrieved person" under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, in matters of union registration. The ratio established that an employer lacks the standing to object to such registration. Furthermore, the Court clarified that if a registration is allegedly made in contravention of the law, the appropriate remedy is for the Registrar to file a complaint before a Labour Court for cancellation under Section 12 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008, rather than an appeal by the employer.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employer have the locus standi to challenge the registration of a trade union or a federation of trade unions?
  • Is an employer an 'aggrieved person' under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, in proceedings regarding the registration of a trade union?
  • What is the appropriate legal mechanism for challenging the registration of a trade union that has been registered in contravention of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008?
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• State (NAB) vs Muhammad Aslam Bajwa and others2016 P Cr. L J 1189 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-14
  limitation periodcondonation of delayspecial lawNational Accountability Ordinancetime-barred appealstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal filed by the National Accountability Bureau, which was submitted beyond the statutory limitation period. The applicant sought condonation of the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, citing administrative vacancies within the Bureau as the cause. The core legal question was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, regarding the condonation of delay, are applicable to appeals filed under Section 32 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The Court held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, are not applicable to appeals filed under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The ratio of the decision is that where a special law, such as the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, prescribes a specific limitation period for appeals, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908, operates to exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, unless the special law explicitly provides otherwise. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal in limine as time-barred, affirming that limitation is a substantive legal requirement, not a mere technicality.

  Questions settled

  • Can the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 be applied to condone a delay in filing an appeal under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 exclude the application of Section 5 of the same Act when a special law prescribes a different period of limitation?
  • Is the question of limitation considered a mere technicality that can be overlooked in the interest of justice?
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• State & others vs Jehangir & othersPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 466 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-01
  criminal appealmurder referencebenefit of doubteye-witness testimonyidentification of accusedadverse presumptionmedical evidencenight-time occurrence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against the conviction and sentence of the appellants for murder and attempted murder, alongside a murder reference and a revision petition for sentence enhancement. The core legal question was whether the prosecution established the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the identification challenges in a night-time occurrence. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case, citing the absence of a verified source of light, material contradictions in eye-witness testimony, and the failure to identify co-accused relatives. Consequently, the Court acquitted the appellants, set aside their convictions, and dismissed the revision petition. The judgment reaffirms the principle that the prosecution must stand on its own evidence; that withholding a pivotal witness warrants an adverse presumption under Article 129, Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984; and that medical evidence, while confirming injuries, cannot independently identify assailants. Emphasizing that the benefit of doubt is a right, not a grace, the Court ruled that any reasonable doubt regarding the identity of the accused necessitates acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to explain the source of light in a night-time occurrence create a reasonable doubt regarding the identity of the accused?
  • Can medical evidence alone be used to identify the assailants in a criminal case?
  • What is the legal consequence of the prosecution withholding a pivotal eye-witness from the court?
  • Is the benefit of doubt a matter of grace or a right of the accused when the prosecution fails to prove its case?
  Read full judgment →
• Standard Cotton Oil Mills and 3 others vs Allied Bank of Pakistan and 2 others2016 CLD 93 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-18Read full judgment →
• Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Ltd.and others vs Additional2016 YLR 1750 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-27Read full judgment →
• Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Ltd. through Authorized Attorney2016 CLD 2066 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-04Read full judgment →
• Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Limited through Manager vs Shafqat Ullah Tahir2016 CLD 1546 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-14
  consumer court jurisdictionbanking courtfinancial institutionfederal and provincial legislationconstitutional precedenceinterlocutory orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses three First Appeal Against Orders (F.A.O.s) involving the jurisdiction of consumer courts over disputes between banks and their customers. The core legal question was whether a Consumer Court has jurisdiction to entertain a consumer complaint and claim for damages filed by a customer against a financial institution, or if such matters exclusively fall within the jurisdiction of a Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The Lahore High Court held that the Consumer Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain complaints between financial institutions and their customers, noting that the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, being a federal statute, has precedence over the provincial Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 pursuant to Article 143 of the Constitution of Pakistan. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders of the Consumer Court and dismissed the respondents' complaints.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a consumer court has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint regarding defective services between a bank and its customer?
  • Does the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 take precedence over the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 in case of a conflict?
  • Are orders dismissing an application for rejection of a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction considered final orders or interlocutory orders?
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• Standard Capital Securities (Pvt) Limited vs Director/HOD (MSRD)Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• ST. Patrick's High School and College through Rector_Principal and another vs Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour2016 PLC 358 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2014-11-19
  labour lawworkmanindustrial establishmentillegal terminationburden of proofback benefitsdue processeducational institution
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order by the Labour Court, which had directed the reinstatement of the respondent with back benefits after finding his termination illegal. The core legal questions were whether the appellant educational institution qualified as an 'industry' or 'commercial establishment' under the relevant labour laws, and whether the respondent, an Assistant to the Principal, qualified as a 'workman' entitled to protection against summary dismissal. The Labour Appellate Tribunal upheld the Labour Court's decision, noting that the appellant failed to produce documentary evidence to prove its non-commercial or charitable status or to substantiate the respondent's alleged managerial capacity. Crucially, the appellant admitted that hundreds of employees were registered with Social Security and EOBI, supporting the classification of the institution as an industry. The Tribunal held that the termination was illegal because it was effected without issuing a show-cause notice, charge sheet, or conducting an inquiry, violating the mandatory procedural requirements. The key principle laid down is that an employer bears the burden of proving that an establishment is not an industry and that an employee is not a workman, particularly when the employer possesses all relevant employment records.

  Questions settled

  • Does an educational institution employing a large number of staff registered with Social Security and EOBI qualify as an industry under labour laws?
  • Is an employer required to produce documentary evidence to prove an employee is not a 'workman' when the employer has custody of all employment records?
  • Can a permanent employee be terminated without the issuance of a show-cause notice or the conduct of a formal inquiry?
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• Speaker Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly vs Sardar Mir2016 C.L.R. 1569 · Chief Election Commissioner · 2016-05-18Read full judgment →
• Soofia Munir & another vs Judge, Family Court (West), Islamabad &2016 LHC · Islamabad High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Soobo vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 290 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-11
  criminal procedureanti-terrorismfair trialnon-supply of documentsprocedural irregularityprejudiceSection 265-CSection 537
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants challenged their convictions under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, primarily on the ground that the trial court failed to provide copies of police statements recorded under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as mandated by Section 265-C, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether this omission vitiated the entire trial. The Court held that while the right to receive such copies is a mandatory procedural requirement, the failure to supply them does not automatically vitiate the proceedings. Applying Section 537, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Court determined that an irregularity only warrants reversal if it causes a failure of justice or prejudice to the accused. Finding that the appellants had vigorously cross-examined prosecution witnesses and failed to raise any objection regarding the missing documents during the trial, the Court concluded that no prejudice occurred. The key principle laid down is that procedural irregularities, including the non-supply of documents, are curable under Section 537, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, provided the accused was not deprived of a fair trial or prejudiced in their defense.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to supply copies of statements under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to the accused automatically vitiate the trial?
  • Are the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to proceedings under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can a procedural irregularity regarding the non-supply of documents be cured under Section 537, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if no prejudice is shown to the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Soneri Bank Ltd. vs Messrs Punjab Engineering Services (Pvt.) Ltd. and 32016 CLD 440 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-17Read full judgment →
• Soneri Bank Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law and others2016 SCMR 2168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-11
  constitutional petitionalternative remedycommercial establishmentworkmanjurisdictional factpayment of wages
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner bank challenged an order passed by the authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, along with the vires of Section 17 of the Act, through a constitution petition rather than filing an statutory appeal. The High Court dismissed the petition regarding the order due to failure to avail the appellate remedy while retaining it for the constitutional challenge to the section's vires. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the order was void and thus a constitution petition was maintainable without exhausting alternative remedies. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner fell within the definition of a 'commercial establishment' under the Act and the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and that the determination of whether a respondent was a 'workman' was a jurisdictional fact that ought to be challenged in an appeal rather than through constitutional jurisdiction on the plea of a void determination. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the availability of an adequate statutory appeal bars the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitution petition is maintainable against an order of the authority under the Payment of Wages Act without exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal?
  • Does a bank fall within the definition of a commercial establishment under the Payment of Wages Act 1936 and the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Can a determination of a jurisdictional fact regarding whether a person is a workman be challenged in constitutional jurisdiction as a void order?
  Read full judgment →
• SOHRAffiLHAN and 17 others vs Noor Muhammad and others2016 PLJ Peshawar 77 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-01-19Read full judgment →
• Sohnda Khan vs Muhammad Ali etc2021 [M] C L R 351, 2016 LHC 4053 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-06Read full judgment →
• Sohail Tufail vs Secretary Health, Government of the Punjab, Lahore2016 PLC (C.S.) 766 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-10
  ad hoc appointmentcontractual employmentvested righttermination of serviceregularizationPunjab Public Service Commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two writ petitions filed by ad hoc Hospital Pharmacists challenging the termination of their services and the refusal to extend their contracts. The core legal questions relate to whether ad hoc or contractual appointees possess a vested right to continuous employment, regularization, or extension of their tenure, and whether termination upon the availability of regular incumbents recommended by the public service commission constitutes unlawful discrimination. The Lahore High Court dismissed both petitions, holding that ad hoc and contractual appointments do not confer any vested right to continuous employment, seniority, or regularization, and such services can be dispensed with upon the expiry of the term or the arrival of regular selectees. The court laid down the principle that an ad hoc appointee is bound by the terms of appointment, has no right to challenge termination upon the availability of regular selectees, and cannot claim discrimination when failing to qualify through regular competitive examination processes while others succeed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ad hoc or contractual appointee acquires a vested right to continuous employment or regularization of service?
  • Can the services of an ad hoc employee be lawfully terminated upon the availability of regular candidates recommended by the Public Service Commission?
  • Does termination of ad hoc employment in accordance with the stipulated terms and conditions amount to unlawful discrimination?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Jiwani vs Ghulam Qadir Thebo, Additional Inspector-General2016 P Cr. L J 107 · Sindh High Court · 2015-08-19
  reinvestigationfurther investigationchallancognizancecriminal procedurepolice powersinvestigation transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged an order issued by the Additional Inspector-General of Police transferring the investigation of an FIR to another officer after the challan had been submitted to the Magistrate and cognizance taken. The core legal question was whether the police are legally barred from conducting further investigation or reinvestigation of a criminal case once the challan has been submitted and the court has taken cognizance. The Court held that there is no absolute legal bar under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 or the Police Rules, 1934, prohibiting further investigation or reinvestigation of a criminal case after the submission of a final report. The key principle laid down is that while the police may conduct further investigation in appropriate cases, any subsequent report submitted is merely an opinion of the investigating officer. Such reports are not binding upon the Magistrate, who retains the ultimate authority to accept or discard the findings and decide the case on its merits based on the evidence available on record.

  Questions settled

  • Is there a legal bar on further investigation or reinvestigation of a criminal case after the submission of a challan under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Are reports submitted by the police after further investigation or reinvestigation binding upon the Magistrate who has taken cognizance of the matter?
  • Does the police have the authority to transfer the investigation of a case to another officer after the challan has been submitted to the competent court?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Aslam vs The State etc2016 LHC 4195 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-01
  murderbenefit of doubtdying declarationmedical evidence contradictionabsconsionplea of alibicriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant, Sohail Aslam, under Sections 302(b)/34, 324/34, and 337-F(iii)/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the ocular account, the evidentiary value of an unverified dying declaration, contradictions between medical and oral evidence, and the legal weight of absconsion. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to material contradictions between the testimony of the eyewitnesses and the medical evidence regarding the distance of firing and weapon types, the lack of corroboration for the dying declaration, and the fact that co-accused had already been acquitted on the same set of evidence. The court established the principle that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right, and absconsion alone cannot form the basis of a conviction when substantive evidence fails.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unverified dying declaration can be accepted as a basis for conviction without strong and independent corroborative evidence?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of absconsion when the substantive ocular and medical evidence has been disbelieved?
  • Does a contradiction between the medical evidence regarding the distance of firing and the oral testimony of eyewitnesses demolish the prosecution's case?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed and another vs Justice of Peace/ASJ and 2 others2016 LHC 2821, 2016 KLR Criminal Cases 288 · Lahore High Court · 2016-07-21
  Justice of PeaceSection 22-A CrPCregistration of FIRcivil disputebreach of contractcriminal vs civil jurisdictionmisrepresentationabuse of process of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order dated 11.4.2016 passed by a Justice of Peace at Rawalpindi directing the Station House Officer, Police Station Airport Rawalpindi, to proceed in accordance with law on an application seeking registration of a criminal case. The dispute arose out of a sale transaction of a plot where earnest money was paid, but the buyer alleged misrepresentation regarding the commercial status of the property. Civil suits between the parties were already pending. The core legal issue was whether a dispute arising out of a contractual breach or misrepresentation in a civil transaction justifies recourse to criminal proceedings under the direction of a Justice of Peace. The Lahore High Court set aside the impugned order, holding that while civil and criminal pursuits may proceed simultaneously, criminal law must not be invoked to settle purely civil disputes or subdue adversaries where damages and rights can be adequately adjudicated by civil courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Justice of Peace can direct the registration of a criminal case in a matter that essentially constitutes a civil dispute arising out of a commercial transaction?
  • Does a breach of promise or alleged misrepresentation in a property transaction automatically justify recourse to criminal prosecution?
  • Under what circumstances does invoking criminal jurisdiction for a dispute justiciable in civil jurisdiction amount to an abuse of the process of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed & others vs Province of Sindh & others2016 SHC 39 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-01
  judicial serviceretrospective effectofficial gazettenotificationadditional district and sessions judgeeligibility criteriaconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was brought to challenge the rejection of the candidature of serving judicial officers seeking to participate in the competitive selection process for appointment as Additional District and Sessions Judges. The core legal question was whether an amendment to the Sindh Judicial Service Rules, 1994, which excluded serving judicial officers from direct recruitment, could be applied retrospectively to invalidate applications submitted prior to the notification and official gazette publication of the amendment. The Sindh High Court held that a notification curtailing rights cannot operate retrospectively or take effect prior to its publication in the official gazette, and since the petitioners had applied before the cutoff date and prior to the notification of the amendment, their applications were wrongly rejected. The court laid down the principle that subordinate legislation and statutory notifications take effect from the date of their publication in the official gazette and cannot impair existing rights retrospectively, and directed that the petitioners and similarly placed applicants be included in the ongoing selection process.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amendment to service rules excluding judicial officers from direct recruitment can be applied retrospectively to reject applications submitted before its notification?
  • From which date does a statutory notification curtailing rights take legal effect?
  • Does a writ lie against an administrative or consultative order passed by the Chief Justice or Administration Committee involving a violation of rules framed under Article 208 of the Constitution?
  • Whether the submission of an application before the cutoff date creates a right to participate in a selection process when rules are unamended at the time of application?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed & another vs Justice of Peace/ASJ & 22016 LHC 2821 · Lahore High Court · 2016-07-21
  criminal revisionjustice of peacecivil disputeabuse of processcognizable offencecontractual obligationmisrepresentation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges an order passed by a Justice of Peace directing the Station House Officer to proceed in accordance with law regarding a property transaction dispute. The petitioners allegedly induced the respondent to purchase a plot by misrepresenting its commercial status, leading to a dispute over earnest money. The core legal question was whether a dispute essentially civil in nature, involving a breach of contract or misrepresentation, warrants the intervention of criminal jurisdiction via the Justice of Peace. The Court held that while civil and criminal proceedings can theoretically coexist, criminal jurisdiction should not be invoked to settle civil scores or resolve contractual disputes. The Court emphasized that not every broken promise or civil wrong constitutes a crime. Because the dispute involved verifiable claims regarding property character and contractual obligations, it was deemed exclusively within the domain of civil courts. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order, ruling that using criminal process to coerce an adversary in a civil dispute constitutes an abuse of the process of law, which must be discouraged.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal jurisdiction be invoked to resolve a dispute that is essentially civil in nature?
  • Does the mere existence of a civil remedy bar the registration of a criminal case?
  • Is it an abuse of process to use criminal proceedings to settle civil scores between parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Afsar vs Abdul Rehman2016 CLC 1277 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-05-18
  civil revisionpre-emptionTalb-i-MuwathibatTalb-i-Ishhadnotice of Talbacknowledgment due cardconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was filed against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's suit for possession through pre-emption. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had validly fulfilled the mandatory requirements of 'Talbs' (specifically Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad) under the law of pre-emption. The Peshawar High Court held that the petitioner failed to prove the delivery of the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad through an acknowledgment due card or postman, and suffered from material contradictions and inconsistencies in the statements of his witnesses regarding the dispatch and attestation of the notice, violating the requirements of Section 13 of the NWFP Pre-emption Act, 1987. The Court laid down the principle that failure to produce the AD card, non-examination of the postman, and contradictory testimonies of attesting witnesses who fail the threshold of truthfulness render the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad defective, thereby disentitling the plaintiff to a pre-emption decree. Consequently, the concurrent findings of the lower courts were upheld and the revision petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to produce an acknowledgment due card or examine the postman renders the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad defective in a pre-emption suit?
  • Do material contradictions and inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses regarding the dispatch of Talb-i-Ishhad invalidate the pre-emption claim?
  • Can concurrent findings of lower courts on the non-fulfillment of Talbs be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Sofia Noorbakhshia, Skardu through Representatives vs Sofia Imamia2016 MLD 1151 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-01-07Read full judgment →
• Sofi Mureed Hussain Alfuqrah and another vs The State and another2016 PLD Sindh 300 · Sindh High Court · 2014-07-25
  cognizancepolice reportadministrative orderjudicial orderinherent jurisdictionrevisional jurisdictionspeaking orderSection 561-A Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicants challenged an order by a Magistrate who, while disagreeing with a police report recommending disposal of a criminal case under 'B' class, took cognizance and directed the submission of a challan to the Sessions Court. The core legal question was whether an order passed by a Magistrate under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, regarding a police report, is administrative or judicial in nature, and consequently, whether it is subject to revisional jurisdiction. The Court held that a Magistrate, when concurring or disagreeing with a police report under Section 190, acts in an administrative capacity, not a judicial one. Consequently, such orders are not amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, but are challengeable under the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction pursuant to Section 561-A. The Court further established that while such orders are administrative, they must still be 'speaking orders' that demonstrate the application of judicial mind to the available material. Finding the impugned order silent on material facts, the Court set it aside.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order passed by a Magistrate under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, regarding a police report, administrative or judicial in nature?
  • Are orders passed by a Magistrate under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an order passed by a Magistrate under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be challenged under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court pursuant to Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a Magistrate required to pass a 'speaking order' when disagreeing with a police report under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Sobia Mahmood d/o Raja Mahmood Khan, r/o Dhirkot, Tehsil Dhirkot,2016-SC-AJK-126 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-02-29Read full judgment →
• Soba Khan vs The State and another2016 P.S.C. Crl. 316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-04
  post-conviction bailsuspension of sentencevicarious liabilitytentative assessment of evidencepari materiaappellate court powersacquittal of co-accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's refusal to suspend the sentence and grant bail to the petitioner, who was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail pending appeal when similarly charged co-accused had been acquitted on the same evidence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, suspended the sentence, and granted bail. The Court held that Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which governs bail pending appeal, is pari materia with Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. It established that appellate courts must perform a tentative assessment of evidence to prevent injustice, particularly where a convict might be acquitted later without any reparatory mechanism for incarceration. The Court laid down the principle that where co-accused with similar roles are acquitted on the same evidence, the remaining convict is ordinarily entitled to bail unless there is strong, independent, and convincing corroborative evidence to sustain the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 considered pari materia with Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the criteria for bail?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused with similar roles on the same evidence entitle the remaining convict to bail pending appeal?
  • Is a tentative assessment of evidence permissible for an appellate court when considering a petition for suspension of sentence pending appeal?
  • Can an appellate court grant bail to a convict if the prosecution evidence is indivisible and co-accused have been acquitted?
  Read full judgment →
• Soba Khan vs State and another2016 PLJ SC 515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-04
  post-conviction bailsuspension of sentencevicarious liabilityrule of consistencytentative assessment of evidenceappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Soba Khan against the Lahore High Court's dismissal of his application for suspension of sentence and grant of post-conviction bail during the pendency of his appeal against a conviction and life imprisonment. The core legal question centered on the principles governing the suspension of sentence and grant of bail under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, particularly where similarly charged co-accused had already been acquitted on the same set of evidence. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the provisions of Section 426 are in pari materia with Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that a tentative assessment of evidence is permissible to avoid leaving an innocent convict to rot in jail. The key principle laid down is that where co-accused assigned the same role are acquitted on the same evidence, the remaining convict ordinarily becomes entitled to bail through tentative assessment pending appeal, absent strong independent corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are in pari materia with Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the grant of bail at the post-conviction stage?
  • Can an appellate court make a tentative assessment of evidence while considering an application for suspension of sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the acquittal of similarly charged co-accused on the same set of evidence entitle a convicted person to the concession of bail during the pendency of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Smithkline Beecham P.L.C. through Authorized Signatory vs The Registrar2016 CLD 1647 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-04Read full judgment →
• Smander Habib vs Shaista Jabeen and 3 others2016 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 93 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-01-30Read full judgment →
• Siranjam Khan and 4 others vs Chairman National Highway Authority, Islamabad and 7 others2016 CLC 216 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-02-18Read full judgment →
• Sirajuddin vs Allah Bux and 2 others2016 P Cr. L J 726 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-10
  acquittal appealbenefit of doubtabductionmaterial contradictionsdouble presumption of innocenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kashmore, whereby respondents Allah Bux and Atta Muhammad were acquitted under Section 265-H(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case arising out of FIR registered under Section 365-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the trial court's acquittal of the respondents was based on a misreading or non-reading of evidence, and whether the prosecution successfully proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt despite material contradictions in the testimony of eyewitnesses and an inordinate delay in lodging the FIR. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution's evidence contained major material contradictions regarding the presence and positioning of eyewitnesses at the crime scene, and that an accused person after acquittal enjoys a double presumption of innocence which cannot be interfered with lightly. The court affirmed that the benefit of any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, and accordingly dismissed the appeal in limine, upholding the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with an acquittal judgment in the absence of strong and compelling grounds indicating misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • What evidentiary value does a document carry when produced merely through a statement without being formally tendered through a witness?
  • Does a contradiction between the statements of the complainant and an eyewitness regarding the material particulars of the incident create sufficient doubt to warrant the acquittal of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraj Muhammad vs The State2016 SHC 25 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-14Read full judgment →
• Sip, Adam Abro and 13 others vs Syed Muhammad Amin Shah and 2 others2016 P Cr. LJ 883 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-14
  acquittal applicationSection 265-K Cr.P.C.groundless chargeabductiondirect complaintcriminal procedureanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal application challenged the dismissal of an acquittal application filed under Section 265-K, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by the Anti-Terrorism Court. The applicants, accused of abduction, sought acquittal based on alleged contradictions in witness statements and delay in filing the direct complaint. The core legal question was whether such grounds warrant acquittal under Section 265-K, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before the commencement of trial evidence. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that the provision for acquittal under Section 265-K, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applies only when a charge is 'groundless,' meaning there is no probability of conviction even if the allegations are accepted as true. The Court clarified that claims of a 'false' charge, based on witness contradictions or procedural delays, are factual disputes that must be determined through the recording of evidence at trial. Consequently, the Court affirmed that neither alleged contradictions nor delay in filing a complaint constitute sufficient grounds for pre-trial acquittal, as these matters require judicial appreciation of evidence during the trial process.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be acquitted under Section 265-K, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 based solely on alleged contradictions in witness statements?
  • Does a delay in filing a direct complaint constitute a valid ground for acquittal under Section 265-K, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the legal distinction between a 'groundless' charge and a 'false' charge in the context of an acquittal application under Section 265-K, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Singer Pakistan Limited The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. vs NotAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Sindh Board of Revenue Employees Co-Operative Housing Society2016 YLR 1699 · Sindh High Court · 2016-02-09Read full judgment →
• Sindh Ali Gul vs The State2016 PCRLJ 1997 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-05-01
  criminal revisionsummoning witnessesadditional evidencefair trialpolice challaninvestigationconfession
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenges the order of the Additional Sessions Judge dismissing the applicant's application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for summoning two additional witnesses whose names were neither in the FIR nor in the challan. The core legal question was whether the trial court was bound to summon witnesses introduced by the complainant to prove an alleged confession of guilt when their names were absent from the police report and their statements had not been recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Peshawar High Court held that the trial court rightly dismissed the application under Section 265-F(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to prevent vexation, delay, or the defeating of justice, and emphasized that examining strangers whose Section 161 statements were not provided to the defense would violate the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The court laid down the principle that the trial court cannot assume the role of an investigator to improve the complainant's case by summoning unlisted witnesses without compelling necessity for a just decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court summon unlisted witnesses under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 at the instance of a complainant to improve their case?
  • Whether examining witnesses whose statements were not recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 violates Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Under what circumstances can a court refuse to summon a witness under Section 265-F(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Sind Fine Textile Mills Limited Chief Executive Officer and Directors of SindAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Sikander Teghani alias Muhammad Bux Teghani vs The State2016 YLR 1098 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-29
  AppealMurderQatl-e-amdOcular evidenceCircumstantial evidenceMotivePrompt FIRBallistic reportSection 342 Cr.P.C.Benefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment dated August 5, 2010, passed by the Sessions Judge, Jacobabad, convicting the appellant for qatl-e-amd of a post office clerk by fire shot injuries. The core legal questions addressed the credibility of ocular and circumstantial evidence, the impact of a prompt FIR, the relevance of motive, the absence of a ballistic expert report, and the non-examination of a passerby injured during the appellant's apprehension. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant, along with an absconding accused, committed the murder. Key principles affirmed include that a chance witness's testimony is credible if their presence is reasonably explained and narration inspires confidence; prompt FIR and immediate apprehension lessen chances of false implication; motive is immaterial in the presence of ocular evidence; non-production of a ballistic report is not fatal if other direct evidence is strong and a genuine reason for its absence exists; and an accused's mere denial under Section 342 Cr.P.C. is insufficient when the prosecution has discharged its burden.

  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Zulqarnain vs Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. and 9 others2016 PLD Sindh 139 · Sindh High Court · 2014-12-04
  investigation powersbank account detailssimultaneous civil and criminal proceedingsembezzlementcriminal breach of trustquashment of criminal proceedingspending civil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed by the State through the Investigating Officer under section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking directions against several respondent banks and tax authorities to provide complete account details and tax deductions pertaining to the accused persons in a pending criminal case registered for embezzlement, cheating, and criminal breach of trust. The core legal question was whether investigative powers to collect evidence and bank details under section 94 Cr.P.C. can be exercised while civil proceedings and arbitration regarding the business accounts are already pending between the parties. The Sindh High Court held that the pendency of civil proceedings or arbitration places no restriction or embargo upon the lodging of an FIR or the continuation of criminal investigation, and that both civil and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. The court allowed the application, granting permission under section 94(b) Cr.P.C. for the police to obtain the required bank account details to complete the investigation. The key principle laid down is that the existence of a civil dispute or pending civil suit does not bar criminal investigation or prosecution for fraud and misappropriation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the pendency of a civil suit or arbitration proceedings bars the continuation of a criminal investigation for embezzlement and fraud?
  • Can the High Court grant permission under section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to direct banks to provide account details during an ongoing criminal investigation?
  • Does the filing of an interim challan and framing of a charge restrict the Investigating Officer from collecting further evidence?
  • Can civil and criminal proceedings pertaining to the same subject matter continue simultaneously?
  Read full judgment →
• (1) Sikandar Khan etc (2) Muhammad Ziaullah Khan vs (1) The State etc (2)2016 LHC 3331 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-28
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtante-timed FIRocular evidencemedical evidenceabscondenceQanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellants for murder and rioting under Sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt, given the alleged inconsistencies in the FIR, ocular testimony, and medical evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution case was fundamentally flawed. The Court found the FIR was ante-timed, as evidenced by discrepancies in the inquest report and the timing of the autopsy. Furthermore, the ocular account contradicted the medical evidence regarding the position of the deceased and the nature of the injuries. The Court also noted that the motive was unproven and the recovery of weapons was procedurally defective. Relying on the principle that abscondence is merely corroborative and not substantive evidence, and applying an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 for withholding material witnesses, the Court acquitted the appellants, granting them the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does an ante-timed FIR render the entire prosecution case doubtful?
  • Can conviction be sustained when ocular testimony contradicts medical evidence?
  • Is abscondence considered substantive evidence of guilt in a criminal trial?
  • What is the legal consequence of withholding a material witness under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Ali Lashari vs The State and another2016 YLR 62 · Sindh High Court · 2015-06-22
  fair trialdue processdocumentary evidenceelectronic evidencesupply of documentscriminal revisionanti-terrorismdigital data
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged an Anti-Terrorism Court order that refused to supply the applicant with copies of USB and CD data before the framing of charges. The core legal question was whether digital data stored on such devices constitutes a "document" under Section 265-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, thereby entitling the accused to receive copies as part of the right to a fair trial. The Sindh High Court held that USBs and CDs containing audio and visual data fall within the broad definition of "document" under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 and the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Consequently, the court set aside the impugned order, directing the trial court to provide the requested copies. The ratio established is that the constitutional right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 mandates that an accused must be provided with all evidentiary material, including digital records, to effectively prepare a defense and confront the prosecution's case, regardless of potential concerns regarding data manipulation.

  Questions settled

  • Does audio and video data stored on a USB or CD constitute a 'document' under Section 265-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to receive copies of electronic evidence, such as USBs and CDs, before the commencement of the trial?
  • Does the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 require the prosecution to provide the accused with copies of digital evidence?
  • Can a trial court refuse to supply copies of digital evidence to an accused based on the apprehension of potential manipulation?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Ali and another---Applicants vs The State and another-2016 YLR 2697 · Balochistan High Court · 2014-11-28
  quashment of FIRprivate complaintcognizance of offencecriminal breach of trustabuse of process of lawYouth Business Loans Schemeinquiry by magistrate
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal quashment petition was filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking to quash an FIR registered against the petitioners under sections 161, 409, and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 pursuant to a magistrate's order on a private complaint. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate could direct the registration of an FIR without following the mandatory procedure for entertaining and inquiring into private complaints under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether criminal liability could be fastened on bank officials acting in accordance with loan scheme regulations. The Balochistan High Court held that the trial court erred by bypassing mandatory procedures such as examining the complainant on oath or ordering a formal inquiry under section 200, and instead abruptly ordering the registration of an FIR. Furthermore, the court held that no ingredients of criminal breach of trust or bribery were established on the record as the delay in loan processing was due to unverified guarantor details under the Prime Minister's Youth Business Loans Scheme. Consequently, the High Court accepted the petition and quashed the FIR to prevent the abuse of the process of law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate can direct the registration of an FIR on a private complaint without examining the complainant upon oath or ordering a preliminary inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the allegations lack supporting evidence and fail to satisfy the legal requirements of criminal breach of trust?
  • Does the failure of bank officials to disburse a loan due to unverified guarantor credentials under an official scheme constitute a criminal offence?
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• Sikandar (Pvt.) Limited Sikandar Dad vs Executive, Director Securiti_0e1af248Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-01-15Read full judgment →
• Sidra Idrees vs Punjab Public Service Commission through Chairman2016 PLC (C.S.) 1142 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-06
  Constitutional petitionPublic Service Commissiontechnicalitiesmerit-based appointmentprocedural justiceservice matterslegitimate expectation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the Punjab Public Service Commission's (PPSC) decision to reject the petitioner's candidature for the post of Educator (BS-16) due to the non-submission of an original bank challan, despite the petitioner having deposited the requisite fee and provided the challan number. The core legal question was whether the PPSC could lawfully exclude a qualified candidate based on a minor technical omission when the underlying requirement had been satisfied. The Court held that the PPSC’s decision was illegal and without lawful authority. It emphasized that the Commission, as a public body, possesses the resources to verify payment details and should not prioritize rigid technicalities over the legitimate expectations of meritorious candidates. The Court ruled that procedural rules exist to facilitate justice, not to impede it. Consequently, the Court directed the PPSC to reconsider the petitioner's case, noting that the Special Education Department had no objection to her appointment. The judgment affirms that public institutions must act with parental responsibility, ensuring that technical omissions do not unjustly deprive qualified individuals of employment opportunities.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public service commission reject a qualified candidate's application solely on the basis of a minor technical omission?
  • Is a public authority required to verify payment details before rejecting a candidate for non-submission of a bank challan?
  • Should procedural technicalities be allowed to override the merit-based selection of candidates for public employment?
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• Siddiq Moti vs Director (SMD), Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Mr. Naeem HussainAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Siddiq Moti vs Director (SMD), Securities and Exchange Commission2016 CLD 1719 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-05-22
  Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistanstockbrokercentral depositoryunauthorized transfer of sharesburden of proofinvestor complaintjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under section 33 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 against an order passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan in favour of the respondent, who alleged that his shares held in a Central Depository Company account with the appellant stockbroker were unauthorizedly transferred and disposed of. The core legal questions involved whether the Commission had jurisdiction to entertain the investor complaint despite arbitration provisions in stock exchange regulations, whether a broker can handle client securities without express authority, and upon whom the burden of proof lies regarding an alleged debit balance. The appellate bench held that stock exchange arbitration rules do not oust the statutory jurisdiction of the Commission to protect investors, that brokers cannot move client securities without explicit client authority pursuant to section 24(2) of the Central Depository Act, 1997, and that the burden of proving an alleged debit balance rests on the broker asserting it under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the arbitration provisions in stock exchange regulations bar the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan from entertaining investor complaints?
  • Can a stockbroker handle or transfer book-entry securities of a client without the client's express authority?
  • Upon whom lies the burden of proof to establish the existence of a debit balance claimed against a client's account?
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• Sialkot International Container Terminal Limited through CompanyAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Shuja Nawaz and otherss vs Gulzar Khan and others2016 YLR 2026 · Board of Revenue · 2015-05-27Read full judgment →
• Shrimati Ghori vs 9TH Civil Judge/Judicial Magistrate, Hyderabad and2016 MLD 1155 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-11Read full judgment →
• Shoukat Alt vs Election Commissioner, District Kasur and others2016 PLJ Lahore 115 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-07Read full judgment →
• Shoaib-Ur-Rehman and others vs Abdul Hadi and others2016 MLD 1950 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-01-04Read full judgment →
• Shoaib Khan vs Messrs Karachi Water and Sewerage Board through Managing Director and 5 others2016 YLR 2471 · Sindh High Court · 2016-02-10Read full judgment →
• Shoaib Khan and others vs The State and others2016 YLR 2385 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-08
  narcotic possessiondeath sentence commutationfirst offenderpolice witness credibilityControl of Narcotic Substances Actcriminal appealsentencing discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentences imposed under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, regarding the recovery of a large quantity of charas. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution successfully established the recovery of narcotics through police witnesses and whether the death sentence awarded to the appellant was legally justified. The Court held that the prosecution’s case was substantiated by consistent, unbiased police testimony, and the appellants failed to provide evidence of enmity or planting of evidence. Consequently, the conviction was maintained. However, regarding the sentence, the Court applied the principle that the death penalty should be reserved for hardened criminals or drug barons. Noting that the appellant was a first-time offender and the substance involved (charas) was less lethal than heroin, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. This judgment reinforces that sentencing discretion must consider the nature of the narcotic, the offender's criminal history, and the proportionality of the punishment to the offense.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of police officials alone be sufficient to sustain a conviction for narcotic possession?
  • Is the death penalty mandatory for offenses involving large quantities of narcotics under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Should the death sentence be commuted for a first-time offender involved in the possession of charas?
  • Does the failure of an accused to produce defense evidence under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 impact the court's assessment of the prosecution's case?
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• Shoaib Ahmed Shaikh and 2 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and others2016 PLD Sindh 607 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-04Read full judgment →
• Shin Satellite Public Company Limited through Attorney---Plaintiff vs2016 YLR 2322 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-04Read full judgment →
• Shifa International Hospitals Limited vs The Commissioner Company LawAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Limited vs Joint Director (SMD) Securities and Exchange Commission of PakistanAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Sherin vs The State etc2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-11-18Read full judgment →
• Sher Zad Khan and another vs Mst. Zulekha and another2016 P Cr. LJ 541 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-03-26
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtocular evidencemedical evidenceabscondenceadverse inferenceacquittalcontradictory testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for murder and causing injuries, imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Bannu. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, given the alleged contradictions in the ocular account, the delay in reporting, and the absence of corroborating evidence. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case, as the complainant's testimony was riddled with material contradictions, improvements, and inconsistencies regarding the timing and circumstances of the incident. The medical evidence contradicted the ocular account, and the prosecution withheld a key injured witness without justification. The Court emphasized that in criminal jurisprudence, the prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and any reasonable doubt arising from the evidence must be resolved in favor of the accused. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, establishing that abscondence alone cannot substitute for substantive evidence of guilt when the primary ocular testimony is unreliable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the unexplained delay in lodging an FIR create a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution's case?
  • Can an adverse inference be drawn against the prosecution for failing to produce a material witness?
  • Is the fact of abscondence sufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of reliable substantive evidence?
  • Does the absence of blackening or charring marks on wounds invalidate an ocular account claiming a close-range shooting?
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• Sher Wali vs Haji Said Mahmood Khan2016 YLR 1349 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-03-05Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad, U.D.C. Office of Post Master General, Federal Capital, AJK & GB Circle, G-9 Markaz, Islamabad vs Postmaster General, Federal Capital, AJK and Gilgit Baltistan, G-9 Markaz, Islamabad . and 17 others2016 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 22 · Federal Service Tribunal
  seniority listcivil servantservice appealprovisional senioritydepartmental representationfixity of seniority
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an Upper Division Clerk, challenged a seniority list circulated on July 23, 2012, alleging he was incorrectly placed junior to private respondents following the abolition of a Circle Office and subsequent absorption of posts. The core legal question was whether a seniority list attains permanent finality, thereby precluding future challenges or corrections, and whether the department was obligated to address the appellant's pending representations regarding his placement. The Federal Service Tribunal held that seniority lists are not static documents and are subject to change over time due to new inductions and administrative adjustments. Consequently, the Tribunal rejected the department's argument that the list had attained finality from 2001. The Tribunal directed the competent authority to consider the appellant's objections and representations and to issue a final seniority list in accordance with applicable law and rules within three months. The key principle laid down is that seniority lists are provisional and liable to change; they possess no inherent fixity and must be maintained and revised according to the rules applicable at the time of their preparation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a seniority list attain permanent finality such that it cannot be challenged or corrected in subsequent years?
  • Is an appointing authority obligated to consider objections raised against a provisional seniority list?
  • Can a seniority list be revised to account for changes such as new inductions into service?
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• Sher Muhammad vs State etc.PLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 540 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-09
  illegal confinementpolice tortureofficial recordpresumption of truthbenefit of doubtcriminal revisionacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges the conviction and sentence of the petitioner, an Assistant Sub-Inspector, for the alleged illegal confinement and torture of a detainee. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the charges of illegal confinement and physical abuse beyond a reasonable doubt, given the conflicting official police records and medical evidence. The High Court held that the trial and appellate courts erred by relying on a High Court bailiff's report while ignoring unchallenged official police records (rapats) that established the detainee's lawful arrest in connection with a separate murder case. Furthermore, the medical evidence regarding the duration of the detainee's injuries failed to corroborate the prosecution's timeline. The Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the petitioner was acquitted. The key principle laid down is that official police records enjoy a presumption of truth and must be considered alongside other evidence; where such records contradict the prosecution's narrative and medical evidence is inconclusive, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether official police records (rapats) enjoy a presumption of truth in criminal proceedings?
  • Does medical evidence regarding injury duration override official police records regarding the time of arrest?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution fails to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt due to conflicting evidence?
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• Sher Muhammad vs Postmaster General, Federal Capital, AJK and Gilgit Baltistan, G-9 Markaz, Islamabad and 17 others2016 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 105 · Federal Service Tribunal
  service appealseniority listprovisional senioritycivil servantdepartmental representationabsorption of posts
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a service appeal filed under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, challenging a seniority list circulated on 23.07.2012, wherein the appellant alleged he was wrongly placed junior to private respondents following the abolition of a circle office and the absorption of posts. The core legal question was whether a seniority list attains permanent finality and whether the appellant's representation against a provisional seniority list required consideration by the departmental authority. The Federal Service Tribunal held that seniority lists are not immutable and are liable to change over time with new inductions, meaning they do not possess permanent finality. The Tribunal laid down the principle that a seniority list inviting objections is provisional in nature, and the competent authority is statutorily and legally bound to consider pending representations or objections and issue a final seniority list in accordance with the applicable rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a seniority list possesses permanent finality and is immune to future changes?
  • Is an appointing authority obliged under Section 8 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 to prepare and finalize seniority lists in accordance with law and rules?
  • Does a seniority list circulated for inviting objections constitute a provisional list requiring the consideration of representations?
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• Sher Muhammad through Legal Heirs and 9 others vs Messrs Sui Southern2016 YLR 1321 · Sindh High Court · 2015-03-10Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad through L.Rs. and others vs Abdul Latif alias Abdur Rauf2016 YLR 987 · Lahore High Court · 2014-04-17
  civil revisionmutation of giftlimitationfraudperverse findingscross-objectionsCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged the concurrent judgments of the lower courts which dismissed a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction regarding a disputed mutation of gift. The core legal questions concerned whether an appellate court could reverse a trial court's finding on limitation in the absence of cross-objections, and whether the suit was barred by time. The Court held that while a respondent may support a decree on grounds decided against them without filing formal cross-objections under Order XLI Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, they cannot assail the decree without an appeal. Regarding limitation, the Court found that the petitioners failed to prove the date of knowledge regarding the alleged fraud, rendering the suit time-barred. Furthermore, the Court determined that the lower courts' findings on ownership were perverse due to misreading of evidence. However, because the suit was barred by limitation, the dismissal of the suit was upheld. The principle established is that while revisional jurisdiction allows interference with perverse findings, a suit remains unsustainable if it is barred by limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court reverse a trial court's finding on limitation if the respondent has not filed cross-objections?
  • Does the mere signature or thumb mark of a person on an instrument constitute sufficient proof of execution in cases of alleged fraud?
  • Is a suit for declaration challenging a mutation barred by time if the plaintiff fails to establish the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in revisional jurisdiction if the findings are perverse or result from misreading of evidence?
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• Sher Muhammad and others vs Mst. Fatima and others2016 MLD 185 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-16
  civil revisioninheritance mutationlimitation periodshia faithsunni faithburden of proofrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts whereby a suit for declaration filed by the respondent-plaintiff regarding inheritance and ownership of property was decreed. The core legal questions involved whether a suit challenging an inheritance mutation after thirty-four years was barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and whether the plaintiff successfully proved that the deceased propositus professed the Shia faith as opposed to the general presumption that Muslims in Pakistan are Sunni. The Lahore High Court held that the suit was manifestly barred by time, as the right to sue accrued upon the attestation of the mutation and incorporation in the revenue record decades prior, and that the plaintiff failed to establish the deceased's faith through admissible evidence of conduct rather than mere opinion or funeral rites. The court laid down the principles that Janazah prayers are not a determining factor of a deceased's religious faith, that Muslims are presumed to be governed by Hanafi law unless proved otherwise, and that courts are mandatorily bound under Section 3 of the Limitation Act to dismiss time-barred suits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for declaration challenging an inheritance mutation filed after thirty-four years is barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Is the manner in which a funeral prayer is offered a determining factor of the religious faith professed by the deceased during his lifetime?
  • What is the legal presumption regarding the religious faith and applicable personal law of Muslims living in Pakistan?
  • Can a plaintiff succeed in a declaratory suit regarding personal law and inheritance without proving the pleadings through cogent evidence of conduct?
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• Sher Khan through Legal Heirs vs Gul Zar Khan2016 CLC 663 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-06-05
  specific performancerejection of plaintlimitation acttime-barred suitabatement of suitcivil revisionOrder VII Rule 11
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenged concurrent judgments rejecting a plaint in a suit for specific performance of an oral agreement to sell agricultural land. The core legal questions were whether the suit, filed twenty years after the alleged agreement, was time-barred, and whether a judgment announced after the plaintiff's death—but following the conclusion of arguments—was legally valid. The Court held that the suit was clearly time-barred under Article 113 of the Limitation Act 1908, as the limitation period for specific performance is three years from the date of the agreement or notice of refusal. Regarding the procedural objection, the Court ruled that the death of a party after the completion of arguments does not cause the suit to abate, and the subsequent judgment remains valid and effective. The Court affirmed that the primary objective of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is to prevent frivolous litigation at the inception of proceedings. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, confirming that the lower courts correctly exercised their authority to reject the time-barred plaint.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 preclude a plaintiff from filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action?
  • Is a judgment valid if it is announced after the death of a party but after the conclusion of arguments?
  • What is the limitation period for a suit for specific performance of a contract under the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can a court reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the suit is clearly time-barred?
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• Sher Dil vs Mst. Sharifa and 2 others2016 CLC 1747 · Balochistan High Court · 2014-06-05
  restoration of appealnon-prosecutionlimitation periodcondonation of delayexecution of decreedismissal in defaultprocedural negligence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for the re-admission of a Regular First Appeal that was previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The appellant sought restoration under Order XLI, Rule 19, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, claiming that the dismissal resulted from a lack of notice regarding the transfer of the case to the Sibi Circuit Bench. The respondents opposed the application, arguing it was time-barred by approximately fourteen months and that the decree had already been executed. The Court held that the application for re-admission was governed by the thirty-day limitation period prescribed under Article 168 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Finding that the appellant had obtained a copy of the dismissal order in 2012 but failed to file the restoration application until December 2013, the Court determined the appellant was negligent and failed to pursue the remedy diligently. The Court affirmed that the law favors the vigilant, not the negligent, and dismissed the application as time-barred and lacking sufficient cause for condonation of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 allow for the re-admission of an appeal if the application is time-barred under Article 168 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • What is the limitation period for filing an application for the re-admission of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Can an application for re-admission of an appeal be granted where the applicant fails to explain the delay of each day and demonstrates negligence in pursuing the remedy?
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• Sher Dil Khan vs Baby Maimoona and others2016 CLC 256 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-02-06Read full judgment →
• Sher Baz Khan and others vs Additional District Judge and 3 others2016 YLR 452 · Lahore High Court · 2015-07-29Read full judgment →
• Sher Bahadur and 10 otherss vs Ghulam Qamar Din and 3 otherss2016 MLD 1749 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-12-09Read full judgment →
• Sher Badshah etc vs Government of Pakistan, etc.2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-10-27Read full judgment →
• Sher Azam Khan vs The State and 2 others2016 YLR 1166 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-04-01
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtocular evidencedishonest improvementwitness credibilityacquittalcircumstantial evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the reliability of the ocular account and the alleged recovery of the crime weapon. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The Court found that the eye-witnesses made significant, dishonest improvements to their statements, departing from the initial FIR to align with other evidence, which rendered their testimony unreliable. Furthermore, the Court determined that the recovery of the crime weapon was doubtful due to the lack of independent witnesses and procedural irregularities. Applying the principle that dishonest improvements cast doubt on the veracity of witnesses and that conviction cannot rest on corroborative evidence alone when direct evidence is discredited, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, emphasizing that the benefit of any reasonable doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a witness making dishonest improvements to their statement render their testimony unreliable for maintaining a conviction?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on corroborative evidence alone when the direct ocular evidence has been disbelieved?
  • Is the benefit of reasonable doubt a right of the accused in criminal proceedings?
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• Sher Ali and anothers vs Dr. Sikandar Hayat and another2016 MLD 2027 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-05-18Read full judgment →
• Sher Afzal Khan vs The State2016 P Cr. LJ 67 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-07-03
  superdariinherent jurisdictionquashment of FIRcriminal investigationArms Actvehicle custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging an order by the Additional Sessions Judge, D.I. Khan, which dismissed the petitioner's application for the superdari (custody) of a motorcar involved in a criminal case. The vehicle was seized in connection with FIR No. 194, registered under Section 15 of the Arms Act, following the recovery of arms and ammunition from secret cavities within the vehicle. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to interfere with the investigation or grant superdari when the petitioner failed to establish lawful ownership and the vehicle was used for criminal activity. The Court held that the petitioner failed to produce proof of ownership and that the circumstances of the recovery suggested active involvement. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that it should not interfere with ongoing police investigations or assume the role of an investigating agency under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., absent exceptional circumstances. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. to interfere with an ongoing police investigation?
  • Is the High Court empowered to grant superdari of a vehicle involved in a criminal case when the applicant fails to prove ownership?
  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction to quash an FIR under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. when alternative remedies are available under Sections 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C.?
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