Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Pakistan Petroleum Limited through Authorized Officer vs Pakistan2016 PTD 2664 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-12
  income tax audittax assessmentstatutory interpretationtaxpayer rightsCommissioner of Inland Revenueself-assessment schemejudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit filed by the plaintiff challenging a notice issued by the tax authorities under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, selecting the plaintiff for an audit of its income tax affairs. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner is required to provide reasons for selecting a taxpayer for audit, whether the taxpayer has a right to object to such reasons, and whether the Commissioner must pass a justiciable speaking order on those objections before proceeding with the audit. The Court held that while the Commissioner is statutorily obligated to record and communicate reasons for selecting a case for audit, the law does not grant the taxpayer a right to challenge these reasons through a separate, justiciable proceeding before the audit commences. The Court affirmed that the audit process itself does not create tax liability and that the taxpayer has sufficient remedies to contest findings during the subsequent assessment amendment process. The Court emphasized that it cannot read into the statute a mechanism for challenging audit selection that the legislature did not provide.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 require the Commissioner to pass a justiciable speaking order on a taxpayer's objections to an audit selection notice?
  • Is the Commissioner's power to conduct an audit under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 dependent solely on selection by the Federal Board of Revenue under Section 214C?
  • Does the mere issuance of an audit notice under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 create an adverse tax liability for the taxpayer?
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• Pakistan Petroleum Fund Trust Company (Pvt.) Limited vs Director/HODAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Oilfields Ltd., through General Manager vs Federation of PAKISTANthrough Secretary Revenue, Division and 3 others2016 PLJ Islamabad 185, 2016 PTD 824 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-12-28Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Oilfields Limited through its General Manager vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue, Revenue Division & 3 others2016 PLJ Islamabad 185 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Oil Fields Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and 2 others2016 PLD Islamabad 76, 2016 PLJ Islamabad 367, 2016 PTD 1590, K.L.R. · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-24
  Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenuejudicial independencemeaningful consultationseparation of powersde facto doctrinejudicial functionstax litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the constitution and appointment process of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, asserting that the Tribunal, as a judicial forum, must be independent of the Executive. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal performs judicial functions, thereby necessitating that the appointment of its Chairman and members be made in meaningful consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan. The Court held that the Appellate Tribunal, which resolves disputes regarding tax liabilities and exercises judicial powers, falls within the definition of a 'Court' under Article 175 of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court ruled that meaningful consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan is a mandatory pre-condition for such appointments to ensure judicial independence. Appointments made without this consultation were declared illegal and void, although the Court applied the de facto doctrine to protect past proceedings. The judgment establishes that any forum exercising judicial power must be manned, controlled, and regulated in accordance with judicial principles, ensuring separation from the Executive to uphold the rule of law and due process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue perform judicial functions so as to qualify as a 'Court' under Article 175 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Is meaningful consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan a mandatory pre-condition for the appointment of the Chairman and members of the Appellate Tribunal?
  • Are appointments of the Chairman and members of the Appellate Tribunal made without consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan illegal and void?
  • Does the de facto doctrine protect the orders and judgments passed by the Appellate Tribunal whose members were appointed without the requisite consultation?
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• Pakistan Oil Fields Ltd. through its duly authorized attorney and General2016 PLJ Islamabad 367 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Oil Fields Ltd. through Authorised Attorney and General2016 PLD Islamabad 76 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-24Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Mobile Communications Limited Mr. Rashid Naseer Khan ChiefAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Pathan Khokhar vs The State2016 YLR 359 · Sindh High Court · 2015-06-01
  post-arrest bailnarcoticscharaschemical examination delaypolice witnessesfurther inquiryControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, Pathan Khokhar, challenging the dismissal of his bail plea by the Sessions Judge/Special Judge, CNS, Kamber Shahdadkot, in a case involving the recovery of 2050 grams of charas. The core legal questions were whether the non-association of private witnesses (mashirs) and the delay in sending the narcotic samples for chemical examination entitled the applicant to bail on the grounds of further inquiry. The Court held that under Section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997, the provisions of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are excluded, rendering the absence of private witnesses immaterial as police officials are competent witnesses. Furthermore, the Court held that the rules regarding the 72-hour window for sending samples to the chemical examiner are directory, not mandatory, and a delay does not vitiate the prosecution's case absent evidence of tampering. Consequently, the Court dismissed the bail application, finding no case for further inquiry, while directing the trial court to conclude proceedings within 30 days.

  Questions settled

  • Does the exclusion of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 under Section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 render the non-association of private witnesses at the time of recovery immaterial?
  • Are police officials considered competent witnesses in narcotics cases?
  • Is the requirement to send narcotic samples for chemical examination within 72 hours mandatory or directory under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act (Government Analysts) Rules 2001?
  • Does a delay in sending narcotic samples for chemical examination automatically entitle an accused to bail on the grounds of further inquiry?
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• Pakistan Mobile Communication Ltd. etc. vs Appellate Bench No. III, Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan, etc2016 PLJ Islamabad 304 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Mobile Communication Ltd. and others vs Appellate Bench2016 PLJ Islamabad 304, 2016 CLD 76 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-10-30
  ultra viresmemorandum of associationcompanies ordinanceprize reward schemelotteryillegal actancillary objects
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order passed by the Appellate Bench imposing a fine on the appellants under sections 476 and 496 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, on the ground that the company's 'Prize Reward Scheme' was ultra vires its objects. The core legal question is whether an activity that falls within a company's ancillary objects in its Memorandum of Association but is declared illegal by law can be treated as ultra vires the company under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The Islamabad High Court held that an act which is provided for in a company's objects clause but is rendered unlawful by subsequent rules or regulations is merely an illegal act, not an ultra vires act, and therefore penalties under section 496 of the Ordinance cannot be attracted. The court laid down the principle that the objects of a company should be interpreted flexibly, and an act authorized by the memorandum of association does not become ultra vires merely because it violates a separate law, distinguishing between an act beyond corporate powers and an act that is simply prohibited by law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an act permitted under a company's memorandum of association but prohibited by law constitutes an ultra vires act?
  • Can a penalty under section 496 of the Companies Ordinance 1984 be imposed for an act that is unlawful but falls within the company's objects clause?
  • How should the objects clause in a company's Memorandum of Association be interpreted by courts?
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• Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation. vs Director General Mines and Mineral Punjab Licensing Authority, Lahore, etc2015 LHC 8369 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-23Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation through Project Manager2016 PLJ Lahore 574 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Medical Association through President vs Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of National Health Services Regulation and Coordination, Islamabad and 5 others2016 PLC (C.S.) 676 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-18
  locus standiaggrieved personconstitutional petitiondeputationrepatriationvested rightwrit maintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the Pakistan Medical Association challenging an office memorandum and notification whereby the sixth respondent, serving as a Registrar on deputation, was transferred and repatriated to his parent department. The core legal question addressed by the court was whether the petitioner association possessed the requisite locus standi as an "aggrieved person" under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan to challenge the repatriation of a deputationist officer, and whether a deputationist has a vested right to remain on a post. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner association was not an aggrieved party because its personal, pecuniary, or property rights were not invaded or adversely affected by the repatriation, as the right to challenge such an order vested solely in the affected officer or the autonomous body itself. The court laid down the principle that invoking constitutional jurisdiction requires the infringement of a personal, individual, and justiciable right, and reiterated that a deputationist has no vested right to remain on deputation indefinitely and can be repatriated to their parent department at any time.

  Questions settled

  • Does a representative association have locus standi to challenge the repatriation of a deputationist employee under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What constitutes an "aggrieved person" for the purpose of maintaining a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does a government employee serving on deputation have a vested right to remain on that post for a stipulated period or indefinitely?
  • Can a third-party association maintain a writ petition against the internal transfer and repatriation of an officer from an autonomous body to his parent department?
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• Pakistan Medical Association (Centre) through General Secretary and others vs Chancellor Dow University of Health Sciences and others2016 PLC (C.S.) 1232 · Sindh High Court · 2016-04-26
  Vice-Chancellor appointmentDow University of Health SciencesSearch CommitteeChief Minister adviceGovernor Chancellor powersconstitutional petitionpublic sector university
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment addresses multiple constitutional petitions challenging the appointment process and notification of the Vice-Chancellor of the Dow University of Health Sciences. The core legal questions involve whether the Chancellor has discretion to act contrary to the Chief Minister's advice under Section 12(1) of the Dow University of Health Sciences Act, 2004, read with Article 105 of the Constitution of Pakistan, and whether flaws in the constitution and proceedings of the Search Committee vitiated the selection process. The Sindh High Court held that the Chancellor is bound by valid executive advice and that participation of a search committee member whose name was listed as a referee by a candidate, alongside the unexplained absence of another member, compromised the neutrality and transparency of the selection. Consequently, the court set aside the appointment notification, directed the reconstitution of the Search Committee, and ordered a de novo selection process. The key principle laid down is that statutory search committees for public university leadership must strictly maintain impartiality, full quorum, and transparent evaluation standards to uphold merit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chancellor has the discretion to substitute his own choice or act contrary to the advice of the Government regarding the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor under Section 12(1) of the Dow University of Health Sciences Act, 2004?
  • Does the inclusion of a person in the Search Committee who was cited as a referee by one of the competing candidates vitiate the transparency and neutrality of the selection process?
  • Whether the absence of a member of the Search Committee during interviews and the evaluation process renders the selection of candidates illegal?
  • Can candidates who actively participate in a selection process without immediate objection later challenge the composition of the selection body after being declared unsuccessful?
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• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs Full Bench, NIRC, IslamabadK.L.R. 2016 Labour & Service Cases 75 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-09
  constitutional jurisdictioninterlocutory ordermaintainabilityNIRCwrit petitioninterim suspension
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to challenge an interlocutory order passed by the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission (N.I.R.C.) in an appeal filed under Section 58 of the Industrial Relations Act 2012. The core legal question was whether the High Court can interfere under its writ jurisdiction with an interim order passed by a special tribunal when the petitioner has not raised the issue of maintainability before that forum. The court held that interlocutory orders of a tribunal possessing jurisdiction cannot be challenged directly under Article 199 without first raising objections before the forum itself, and that fragmentary appeals against interim orders should be discouraged. The petition was dismissed in limine as not maintainable, laying down the principle that High Courts will not interfere with interim orders of tribunals acting within jurisdiction unless the order is wholly without jurisdiction, coram non judice, or mala fide.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere in an interim order passed by a special tribunal under Article 199 of the Constitution without the petitioner first raising objections before the said tribunal?
  • Does Section 58 of the Industrial Relations Act 2012 empower the Full Bench of the N.I.R.C. to pass interim orders during the pendency of an appeal?
  • Can proceedings before a Tribunal be challenged directly in the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court when they are not shown to be wholly without jurisdiction, coram non judice, or mala fide?
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• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs Full Bench, National2016 PLJ Islamabad 397 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-09
  writ jurisdictioninterlocutory ordermaintainabilityindustrial relationsexhaustion of remediesconstitutional petitionNIRC
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a writ petition filed by the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation challenging an interlocutory order passed by the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to set aside an interlocutory order of a Tribunal when the petitioner had not first raised the issue of the appeal's maintainability before that Tribunal. The Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that it will not interfere with interlocutory orders of a Special Court or Tribunal unless such orders are wholly without jurisdiction, coram non judice, or mala fide. The Court emphasized that the petitioner must first agitate its grievances, including claims that the appeal had become infructuous due to subsequent events, before the appellate forum itself. The key principle laid down is that the High Court should avoid fragmentary decisions at interlocutory stages, and parties must exhaust remedies before the forum where proceedings are pending, rather than bypassing them through direct constitutional petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with an interlocutory order of a Tribunal under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is it necessary to raise the issue of an appeal's maintainability before the appellate forum before approaching the High Court?
  • Under what circumstances will the High Court interfere with proceedings pending before a Special Court or Tribunal?
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• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs Full Bench, NationalK.L.R. 2016 Labour & Service Cases 75, 2016 PLC 271, PLJ 2016 Islamabad · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-09
  interlocutory orderwrit jurisdictionmaintainability of appealinfructuous appealindustrial relations commissionservice disciplineconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a writ petition filed by Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) challenging an interlocutory order passed by the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC). The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to set aside an interlocutory order of a Tribunal when the petitioner had not yet raised the issue of the appeal's maintainability before that forum. The petitioner argued that the appeal before the Full Bench had become infructuous due to the subsequent dismissal of the respondent from service. The Court held that it would not interfere with interlocutory orders of a Tribunal unless the proceedings were wholly without jurisdiction, coram non judice, or mala fide. The Court emphasized that the petitioner must first agitate the issue of the appeal's maintainability before the Full Bench itself. Consequently, the Court dismissed the writ petition in limine, affirming the principle that High Courts should avoid fragmentary decisions at interlocutory stages to prevent the curtailment of remedies and ensure the orderly administration of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with an interlocutory order of a Tribunal in its writ jurisdiction before the Tribunal has decided the matter?
  • Must a party exhaust remedies regarding the maintainability of an appeal before a Tribunal before approaching the High Court?
  • Under what circumstances will the High Court interfere with the proceedings of a Special Court or Tribunal?
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• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs Aziz-Ur-Rehman2016 SCMR 14, 2016 PLC (C.S.) 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-08-07
  constitutional petitionmaster and servantlachesres judicatapast and closed transactionre-employmentback benefitsservice matterdiscriminationretirement benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that allowed a constitutional petition, directing Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) to treat a re-employed respondent, affected by MLR-52, at par with other employees who received back benefits. The respondent's services were dispensed with under MLR-52 in 1981, and he was re-employed in 1990 on fresh terms, retiring in 2003 after accepting all benefits. He filed a petition in 2009, alleging discrimination for not receiving back benefits like certain other employees. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that a constitutional petition is not maintainable against PIAC for service matters, as the relationship with its employees is that of master and servant, not governed by statutory rules. Furthermore, the petition suffered from laches, as the terms were challenged 19 years after re-employment and after retirement. The claim was also barred by the doctrine of past and closed transaction, having accepted re-employment terms and retirement benefits. Crucially, the principle of res judicata applied, as the respondent's similar claim for back benefits had been previously rejected by the Supreme Court in 2002, a fact concealed from the High Court.

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• Pakistan Industrial Credit & Investment Corporation Ltd State Life BuildingAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2004-12-31Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Industrial Credit & Investment Corporation Limited State LifeAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Pakistan General Insurance Company Limited: In the matter of vs Rahat2016 CLD 1073 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2014-08-20Read full judgment →
• Pakistan General Insurance Company Limited: In the matter of vs Not2016 CLD 1073, 2016 CLD 1021 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2014-08-20Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Football Federation etc. vs Government of Pakistan etc.2016 YLR 916, 2016 PLJ Islamabad 132 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-01-14Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Football Federation and others vs Government of Pakistan2016 YLR 916 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-01-14Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority vs Independent Media2016 SCP 10 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-07-04
  electronic mediaregulatory authoritylive broadcast censorshiptime delaying mechanismshow cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning regulatory actions initiated by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority against a television channel. The core legal questions involve the validity of program suspensions, pending inquiries into remaining charges by the Council of Complaints, and the mandatory installation of censoring and time-delaying mechanisms on live broadcasts. The Court held that the challenge to the three-day suspension had become infructuous due to the passage of time and pending proceedings before the High Court of Sindh, while directing the competent authority to proceed with the remaining charges within a stipulated timeframe after considering a public apology. The key principle laid down is that regulatory bodies must adhere strictly to statutory rules and procedures while ensuring that broadcast licensees implement necessary time-delay mechanisms to censor offending live content.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition challenging a short-term suspension of a television program becomes infructuous due to efflux of time and concurrent proceedings?
  • How should regulatory authorities handle pending charges and inquiries against media channels in light of public apologies?
  • Is it mandatory for television channels to install time-delaying mechanisms to censor live broadcasts under PEMRA regulations?
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• Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority, Karachi through Secretary vs Mrs. Shahida M. Amin and 3 others2016 CLC 624 · Sindh High Court · 2015-10-14Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority vs Creek Marina (Pvt.)2016 CLD 1453 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-04Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority through Administrator/2016 YLR 262 · Sindh High Court · 2014-08-18Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) vs Executive District Officer (Revenue), Lahore and 2 others2016 CLC 1900 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-29
  property tax exemptionurban immovable property taxstadium tax liabilitylease deedconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) challenging the demand for property tax and the dismissal of its revision petition by the Executive District Officer (Revenue), Lahore, regarding Gaddafi Stadium. The core legal question was whether the Gaddafi Stadium property, leased by the Government of Punjab to the PCB, was exempt from property tax under Section 4 of The Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, particularly considering provisions relating to properties leased in perpetuity, public playgrounds, and properties administered by the government. The Lahore High Court held that the PCB is not entitled to property tax exemption post-2002 because the stadium is administered by the PCB and contains commercial units, and differs from leases granted by the Federal Government. However, the Court held that properties administered by the Provincial Government prior to the 2002 amendments enjoyed exemption, and thus tax demands prior to 25.06.2002 were set aside while subsequent tax liability remained intact. The petition was accordingly dismissed with these observations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a stadium leased by the Provincial Government of Punjab to the Pakistan Cricket Board is exempt from property tax under Section 4 of The Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958?
  • Does a sports stadium qualify as a playground for the purpose of tax exemption under Section 4(e) of The Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958?
  • What is the effect of the amendments introduced by the Punjab Finance Ordinance, 2002 regarding the exemption of government-administered properties from property tax?
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• Pakistan Burma Shell Company Now Shell Pakistan Ltd. through Legal2016 MLD 1779 · Lahore High Court · 2013-11-06
  execution petitionlimitation periodrule of mergerstay orderwithdrawal of appealdecree execution
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order dismissing an execution petition as time-barred. The appellant had obtained a decree in 1995, against which the respondents filed an appeal. Although the appeal remained pending for nine years, no stay order was granted, and the respondents eventually withdrew the appeal. The appellant subsequently filed an execution petition, which the executing court rejected as time-barred, prompting this appeal. The core legal question was whether the pendency of an appeal, in the absence of a stay order, extends the limitation period for execution under the rule of merger. The Court held that the rule of merger applies only when an appellate court modifies, reverses, or affirms a decree on merits. Since no stay was granted and the appeal was withdrawn without adjudication on merits, the limitation period for execution commenced from the date of the original decree. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the execution petition was time-barred, establishing that the mere pendency of an appeal without a stay order does not suspend the limitation period for executing a decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rule of merger apply to an appeal that is withdrawn without a decision on merits?
  • Does the pendency of an appeal without a stay order suspend the limitation period for filing an execution petition?
  • When does the limitation period for filing an execution petition commence if an appeal against the decree is withdrawn?
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• Pakistan Broadcasters Association and others vs Pakistan2016 PLD Supreme Court 692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-06-13
  freedom of expressioncommercial speechPEMRA Rulesadvertisement restrictionsconstitutional rightsregulatory powerslachesalternative remedypublic interestviewers' rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed an appeal challenging the vires of Rule 15(3) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Rules, 2009, and clause 10.4 of licenses issued to satellite TV channels, which imposed restrictions on the duration and spacing of advertisement breaks. The appellants contended these restrictions violated their freedom of expression under Article 19 and right to conduct business under Article 18 of the Constitution, arguing they were excessive and arbitrary. The Court held that commercial speech receives a lesser degree of constitutional protection than core free speech and is subject to a higher degree of regulation. It found the quantitative restrictions on advertisements to be reasonable, serving the legitimate state interest of protecting time for core free speech, public discourse, and safeguarding viewers' right to an optimum viewing experience. The Court affirmed that statutory requirements and contractual obligations cannot be made subservient to commercial interests. The petition was also deemed liable for dismissal due to laches and non-exhaustion of statutory remedies.

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• Pakistan Automobile Manufacturers Authorized Dealers Association (Pamada) and Its Member Undertakings: In the matter of vs Not2016 CLD 289 · Competition Commission of Pakistan · 2014-04-10
  competition lawassociation of undertakingsprice fixingcartelizationper se doctrinerelevant marketcollusive decision-makingrestrictive trading conditions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns proceedings initiated by the Competition Commission of Pakistan against the Pakistan Automobile Manufacturers Authorized Dealers Association (PAMADA) and its member undertakings for alleged collusive practices in violation of Section 4 of the Competition Act 2010. The Commission investigated allegations regarding price-fixing of body repairs and paint jobs, fixing prices for genuine spare parts, market division and quota allocation for new automobile sales, and restricting the movement of human resources between dealerships. The Commission held that PAMADA constitutes an 'association of undertakings' under Section 2(1)(q) of the Act, regardless of its informal structure. It determined that PAMADA engaged in per se anti-competitive collusive decision-making by fixing prices for services and spare parts, and restricting labor mobility. Consequently, the Commission imposed a total penalty of PKR 140 million on PAMADA for these violations. However, the Commission found insufficient evidence to hold the individual member undertakings liable for these specific collusive acts, as they demonstrated non-compliance or lack of implementation. The judgment reaffirms that trade associations must avoid discussing commercially sensitive information or coordinating business policies.

  Questions settled

  • Does an informal association of undertakings fall under the definition of an 'undertaking' pursuant to Section 2(1)(q) of the Competition Act 2010?
  • Is the definition of a 'relevant market' a mandatory precondition for establishing a violation of Section 4 of the Competition Act 2010 in cases of collusion?
  • Can an association of undertakings be held liable for anti-competitive decisions even if those decisions are not fully implemented by its members?
  • Does the exchange of information regarding the movement of employees between competing undertakings constitute a violation of Section 4 of the Competition Act 2010?
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• Pakistan Airline Pilots Association and others vs Pakistan International2016 SHC 3 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pak. U.K. Association (Pvt.) Ltd. vs The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan2016 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2016-06-16Read full judgment →
• Pak Oman Investment Company Limited vs Chenab Limited and 9 otherss2016 CLD 1903 · Sindh High Court · 2015-10-29
  Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001Banking suitRejection of plaintLeave to defendCertified statement of accountBankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891Mandatory complianceFair trialDue processTerritorial jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses applications filed under Section 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, seeking rejection of the plaint or leave to defend a suit for recovery of Rs. 191,190,736/-. The core legal questions revolved around the plaintiff financial institution's compliance with mandatory requirements of Section 9(2) and 9(3) of F.I.O., 2001, specifically concerning the filing of a duly certified statement of account and other relevant documents, and whether any deficiencies could be cured at a later stage. The court held that compliance with Section 9 of F.I.O., 2001, including the proper certification of a statement of account under Section 2(8) of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, is mandatory and cannot be rectified subsequently. The court found that both the plaintiff and the defendants failed to fulfill their respective mandatory obligations under Sections 9 and 10 of F.I.O., 2001. Consequently, the court rejected both the defendants' leave-to-defend applications and the plaintiff's plaint, emphasizing that an incompetent suit should not be allowed to continue.

  Questions settled

  • Is compliance with Section 9(2) and 9(3) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, mandatory for a financial institution's suit for recovery?
  • Can non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, be cured at a later stage, such as through replication?
  • What are the essential ingredients for a statement of account to be considered 'duly certified' under Section 2(8) of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891?
  • What are the consequences for a plaintiff financial institution if it fails to strictly comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. preclude a plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint for the same cause of action?
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• Pak Libya Holding Company (Private) Limited vs Maxco (Pvt.) Limited2016 CLD 1147 · Sindh High Court · 2014-04-21Read full judgment →
• Pak Kuwait Takaful Company Limited: In the matter of vs Not2016 CLD 204 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2014-07-21Read full judgment →
• Pak Gulf Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs Commissioner Inland Revenue2016 PLJ Islamabad 310, 2016 PTD 1061, 2016 P.C.T.L.R. 277 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-15
  tax referenceappellate tribunal inland revenuestay of recoveryinterlocutory reliefscope of appealincome tax ordinance 2001assessment order
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax reference application before the Islamabad High Court challenges a consolidated order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), which had dismissed stay applications filed by the applicant company against the recovery of tax demands. The core legal question centered on whether the ATIR has the power to grant a stay against recovery under Section 131 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, when the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) has refused an interlocutory stay while the main assessment appeal is still pending before him. The High Court held that the right of appeal under Section 131(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 lies against 'any order' of the Commissioner (Appeals), including an order refusing interlocutory relief, and is not restricted solely to a final order upholding the assessment. The Court established the principle that Section 131(1) and Section 131(5) must be read harmoniously, and the ATIR possesses the jurisdiction to entertain stay applications against the recovery of tax even if the underlying assessment has not yet been finally adjudicated by the appellate authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue has the power to grant a stay of tax recovery under Section 131 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 against an order of the Commissioner (Appeals) refusing an interlocutory stay?
  • Does the term 'order' in Section 131(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 refer only to a final order upholding the assessment, or does it include separate and independent orders such as the refusal of a stay?
  • Can the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue entertain an appeal against an order of the Commissioner (Appeals) rejecting an application for interlocutory relief while the main appeal against the assessment is pending?
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• Pathan vs The State2016 YLR 1629 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-25
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clauseocular evidencemedical corroborationcriminal liabilitybail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a bail application filed by an accused challenging an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, which dismissed his plea for post-arrest bail in a case involving offences under Sections 302, 324, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail despite being nominated in the FIR, having a specific role attributed to him, and facing incriminating evidence including the recovery of a weapon. The Court held that the applicant was not entitled to bail, noting that the incident occurred in daylight, the parties were known to each other, and the ocular evidence was corroborated by medical reports and the recovery of empty casings from the crime scene. The Court affirmed that the offence fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that where there are reasonable grounds to believe an accused committed an offence punishable by death or life imprisonment, and the prosecution's case is supported by corroborated evidence, bail should be refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of a weapon and empty casings from the crime scene constitute reasonable grounds to deny bail in a murder case?
  • Can bail be granted when the accused is nominated in the FIR and the offence falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a delay in registering an FIR necessarily entitle an accused to bail if the delay is explained by the complainant?
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• Pak Gulf Construction (Pvt.) Ltd, vs Commissioner Inland Revenue2016 PTD 1061 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-15
  Tax ReferenceInterlocutory ReliefStay of RecoveryAppellate Tribunal Inland RevenueIncome Tax Ordinance 2001Right of AppealTax Assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax reference concerns the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) to grant interlocutory relief regarding tax recovery. The core legal question was whether the ATIR could grant a stay against tax recovery when the Commissioner (Appeals) had refused such relief, particularly while the main assessment appeal remained pending. The High Court held that the ATIR possesses the competence to grant such stays. The Court determined that an order by the Commissioner (Appeals) refusing a stay is a separate, independent, and appealable order under Section 131(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The key principle laid down is that the right of appeal under Section 131(1) is not restricted to final assessment orders but extends to any order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals). Furthermore, the refusal of a stay effectively upholds the recovery of tax, thereby invoking the Tribunal's discretionary power to grant injunctive relief to prevent undue hardship, provided the standard legal criteria for such relief are satisfied. The matter was remanded for fresh consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue have the power to grant a stay against tax recovery when the Commissioner (Appeals) has refused such relief?
  • Is an order by the Commissioner (Appeals) refusing a stay of tax recovery an appealable order under Section 131(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Does the scope of the right of appeal under Section 131(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 extend to orders other than final assessment orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Paira and 2 others vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 313 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-30
  dying declarationindivisibility of evidencebenefit of doubtmurder convictionappreciation of evidencechance witnessescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants for the murder of a youth who died from severe burn injuries. The prosecution relied heavily on a dying declaration and the testimony of chance witnesses to establish that the accused lured the deceased to a house and set him ablaze. The trial court convicted the appellants but acquitted a co-accused, Farooq Ahmad, based on the same evidence. The core legal question was whether a dying declaration is divisible, allowing for partial reliance to convict some accused while rejecting it regarding others, and whether the dying declaration in this specific case was credible. The High Court held that a dying declaration is indivisible; if it is found unreliable or false regarding one accused, its evidentiary value is completely vitiated. Consequently, the court rejected the dying declaration, noting the physical impossibility of the deceased communicating while suffering from 90-98% burns. The court established the principle that a dying declaration must be accepted or rejected as a whole, and it cannot be selectively used to secure convictions when its integrity is compromised.

  Questions settled

  • Is a dying declaration divisible, or must it be accepted or rejected in its entirety?
  • Does the acquittal of one co-accused based on a dying declaration vitiate the evidentiary value of that declaration against other co-accused?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on a dying declaration when the medical condition of the deceased makes communication physically impossible?
  Read full judgment →
• Pacific Exim (Pvt.) Ltd. through Company 'Secretary vs Pakistan Steel2016 PLD Sindh 398 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-27Read full judgment →
• P.T.C.L. and others vs Masood Ahmed Bhatti and others2016 SCMR 1362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-19
  civil review petitionsstatutory terms and conditionsmaster and servantwrit jurisdictioncivil servantstransferred employeespensionary benefitsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil review petitions arose from a judgment concerning the employment status and legal remedies available to employees of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL). The core legal question was whether PTCL employees, specifically those transferred from the erstwhile Telegraph and Telephone Department, could invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. The petitioners argued that PTCL is governed by the principle of 'master and servant' and is not a 'person' performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation. The Supreme Court held that while transferred employees are no longer civil servants, their terms and conditions of service are protected by Section 9 of the Act of 1991 and Sections 35 and 36 of the Act of 1996, rendering them statutory in nature. The Court further clarified that since the Federal Government retains majority shares, PTCL remains a 'person' under Article 199(5). Consequently, any violation of statutory terms is amenable to writ jurisdiction, distinguishing these employees from contract workers governed by the master and servant rule.

  Read full judgment →
• Osama Tariq vs Amir Gul and 3 others2016 MLD 946 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-02Read full judgment →
• Order in the matter of M/s. Zahur Cotton Mills Limited vs N/ASecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Order in the matter of M/s. Quice Food Industries Limited vs N/ASecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Order in the matter of M/s. Mubarak Dairies Limited vs N/ASecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Order in the matter of M/s Macdonald Layton Company Limited vs N/ASecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Order in the matter of M/s Hashmi Can Company Limited vs N/ASecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Order in the matter of Babri Cotton Mills Limited vs N/ASecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Olympia Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited vs Olympia Spinning and Weaving Mills LimitedAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Olympia Power Generation (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Sui Southern Gas2016 SHC · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-18Read full judgment →
• Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. through Manager (Pricing) vs Federal Board of Revenue through Chairman and 2 others2016 P.C.T.L.R. 591, 2016 PTD 1675 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-29
  Sales Taxshow cause noticeadjudicationdelegation of powersub-delegationjurisdictionInland Revenue Officerwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Islamabad High Court addresses several writ petitions filed by oil and gas exploration companies challenging show-cause notices issued by 'Inland Revenue Officers' under Section 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The petitioners contended that the issuing officers lacked the legal jurisdiction and specific designation required for adjudication. The core legal question was whether a Commissioner of Inland Revenue could validly delegate the power of adjudication—conferred upon them by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR)—to subordinate Inland Revenue Officers. The Court held that while the FBR had expressly conferred adjudication powers on the Commissioner via an order dated 21-01-2014, the Commissioner lacked statutory authority to further sub-delegate these powers. Applying the principle 'delegatus non potest delegare', the Court ruled that a statutory delegate cannot sub-delegate their powers unless expressly authorized by law. Consequently, the show-cause notices were declared void for want of jurisdiction, though the Court clarified that the competent authority remained free to issue fresh notices in accordance with the law.

  Read full judgment →
• Oil and Gas Development Company Limited through Muhammad Aziz, Manager (Pricing) vs The Federal Board of Revenue through its Chairman and2 others2016 P.C.T.L.R. 591 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Oil and Gas Development Co. Ltd. vs The Sacked Employees Review2016 PLC (C.S.) 1318 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-06-30
  sacked employees review boardouster clausejurisdictionconstitutional petitionbeneficial legislationreinstatementfinality of orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated writ petition challenges the orders passed by the Sacked Employees Review Board constituted under section 12 of the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010. The petitioner, a public limited company, contended that the Review Board lacked jurisdiction, that respondents were not sacked employees under the Act, and that no written termination orders were produced. The core legal questions involved the scope of judicial interference under the ouster clause of section 13(8) of the Act, whether the Review Board possessed jurisdiction without a written termination order, and the finality of factual determinations made by the Board. The court held that while the legislature can oust judicial review, provisions barring jurisdiction must be construed strictly and do not protect orders passed without jurisdiction, coram non judice, or with mala fides. The court ruled that the finality attached under section 13(8) makes the Board's orders final on facts, that written orders are not a mandatory prerequisite under the Act, and that the petitions were without merit. The key principle laid down is that ouster clauses in beneficial legislation must be interpreted narrowly in favor of employees, and factual determinations of special tribunals acting within jurisdiction are not open to judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan is completely barred by the ouster clause contained in section 13(8) of the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010?
  • Can the Sacked Employees Review Board assume jurisdiction under the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 in the absence of a written termination order?
  • What is the scope of judicial review over the factual determinations and final orders passed by the Sacked Employees Review Board?
  • Whether the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 being a beneficial legislation must be construed liberally in favor of sacked employees?
  Read full judgment →
• Oil & Gas Development Company Limited vs The Sacked EmployeesK.L.R. 2016 Civil Cases 233 · Islamabad High Court
  sacked employees review boardouster of jurisdictionconstitutional petitionbeneficial legislationreinstatementfinality of ordersscope of judicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated writ petition challenges the orders passed by the Sacked Employees Review Board established under the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010, which directed reinstatement of employees of the Oil & Gas Development Company Limited. The core legal questions concern the scope of judicial review in light of the ouster clause under Section 13(8) of the Act, whether the Review Board possessed jurisdiction to entertain petitions in the absence of written termination orders, and whether disputed questions of fact regarding employment status are open to scrutiny under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the orders of the Review Board are declared 'final' on questions of fact under Section 13(8) and cannot be interfered with unless shown to be without jurisdiction, coram non judice, or tainted with mala fides. The key legal principles laid down are that beneficial legislation such as the Sacked Employees Act must be construed liberally in favour of employees, that ouster clauses must be interpreted strictly with a presumption against the exclusion of superior court jurisdiction, and that the absence of a written termination order does not bar the Review Board from assuming jurisdiction where termination is otherwise established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the orders passed by the Sacked Employees Review Board are final and immune from challenge under Section 13(8) of the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010?
  • Can the Sacked Employees Review Board assume jurisdiction in the absence of a written order of termination or removal from service?
  • What is the scope of judicial review by the High Court under Article 199 over decisions rendered by a special tribunal protected by a statutory ouster clause?
  • Whether disputed questions of fact regarding the employment status of a claimant can be reopened in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Oil & Gas Company Development Limited vs Agha Muhammad &2016 PLJ Islamabad 6 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Obaidur Rehman vs Messrs Karachi Club, Karachi and another2016 PLC 177 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2015-10-07
  commercial establishmentpermanent workmanwrongful terminationback benefitscontract workerStanding Orders Ordinancereinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the Sindh Labour Court's dismissal of a grievance application regarding the termination of a waiter's service at the Karachi Club. The core legal questions were whether a club constitutes a "commercial establishment" under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and whether the appellant was a permanent workman whose termination was legally deficient. The Tribunal held that a club is explicitly defined as a commercial establishment under the Ordinance, rejecting the Labour Court's reliance on contrary precedents. The Tribunal determined the appellant was a permanent workman, not a contract worker, as his remuneration was not calculated on a "piece-rate basis." Furthermore, the termination was deemed wrongful because the respondent failed to provide explicit reasons as mandated by Standing Order 12(3). The Tribunal set aside the impugned order, directing the appellant's reinstatement with full back benefits. The key principle established is that clubs fall within the scope of the Ordinance, and termination of service requires strict compliance with the statutory requirement of providing explicit, valid reasons for the action taken.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'commercial establishment' under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, include a club?
  • Can a worker be classified as a 'contract worker' under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, if their remuneration is not calculated on a piece-rate basis?
  • Does the termination of a workman's service without providing explicit reasons violate Standing Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  Read full judgment →
• N/A vs N/A2016 P.S.C. 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-03
  access to justicelegal publicationstatutory interpretationrule of lawpublic accountabilitytranslation of lawsregulatory framework
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the systemic failure in the publication and dissemination of accurate, up-to-date, and accessible legal materials in Pakistan. The Supreme Court addressed the proliferation of erroneous law books and the lack of reliable, timely legal databases for citizens and practitioners. The core legal question involved the state's obligation to ensure the availability of verified, authoritative, and accessible versions of laws, both in hard copy and online, and the necessity of establishing a regulatory framework to curb the publication of defective legal materials. The Court held that the Federal and Provincial Governments must implement specific timelines for the recruitment of monitoring and evaluation experts, the establishment of a regulatory framework for law publications, the translation of laws into the national language, and the creation of accessible online repositories. The key principle laid down is that the State has a mandatory duty to ensure that laws are published accurately, verified for correctness, and made easily accessible to the public, and that the government must establish mechanisms to hold publishers accountable for erroneous legal materials.

  Questions settled

  • Does the State have a legal obligation to ensure the accuracy and accessibility of published laws?
  • Can the government be directed to establish a regulatory framework for the publication of law books?
  • Is the government required to provide verified and authoritative online versions of statutes?
  • Does the Court have the authority to mandate timelines for the recruitment of experts and the translation of laws by government departments?
  Read full judgment →
• Novatex Limited vs Executive Director Corporatization and ComplianceAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Noushad Ali vs The State and 2 others2016 YLR 1819 · Sindh High Court · 2015-12-23
  criminal revisionanti-terrorism courtjurisdictionreturn of FIRmurdercommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application was filed by the complainant to assail the order passed by the Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, Shikarpur, whereby the FIR was returned to the police for submission before a court of ordinary jurisdiction after deleting sections relating to terrorism. The core legal question was whether an offense committed inside a bank following a dispute over money between coworkers, resulting in murder without creating public terror or insecurity, falls within the ambit of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Sindh High Court held that since the incident arose from a sudden quarrel over money between bank employees without any design to create terror or public insecurity, the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, were not attracted. The Court laid down the principle that private disputes resulting in violence, absent the specific design or purpose contemplated under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, do not constitute acts of terrorism and are triable by ordinary courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a murder committed during a sudden quarrel between coworkers over a money matter fall within the definition of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can an anti-terrorism court return an FIR to the police for submission to an ordinary court if the offense lacks the elements of terrorism?
  • What constitutes the necessary design or purpose of an offense to attract the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Not vs State2016 SCP 89 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-24
  voluntary returnNAB Ordinancemisconductdisciplinary proceedingspublic officecorruptionaccountability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from the Supreme Court's examination of the vires of Section 25(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, specifically concerning the unbridled discretion of the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) to accept voluntary returns from accused persons. The Court observed that the NAB was misusing this provision to grant 'clean chits' to public servants involved in corruption, allowing them to retain their positions despite admitting to illegal gains. The core legal question concerned whether the NAB's practice of accepting voluntary returns, which effectively shielded accused individuals from departmental disciplinary action, defeated the object of the Ordinance and usurped judicial functions. The Court held that a voluntary return constitutes an admission of misconduct, necessitating immediate departmental disciplinary proceedings. Consequently, the Court restrained the Chairman of the NAB from accepting any further offers of voluntary return under Section 25(a) and mandated that all relevant government authorities initiate disciplinary proceedings against employees who had previously utilized this provision to avoid accountability.

  Questions settled

  • Does the act of offering a voluntary return under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, constitute misconduct sufficient to warrant disciplinary action against a public servant?
  • Can the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau accept offers of voluntary return without subjecting the accused to departmental proceedings?
  • Is the National Accountability Bureau authorized to retain portions of recovered voluntary return amounts for distribution as awards to its officers?
  Read full judgment →
• Not vs Not2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-08-29Read full judgment →
• Not vs Bahadar Sher2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-12-08Read full judgment →
• Not vs Ali Amin Khan Gandapur2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-04-22Read full judgment →
• (1) Nosher Ali (2) Daraz Hussain vs The State and another2016 LHC 2831 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-16
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of the doubtdelayed FIRocular accountmedical evidencerecoveryacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Sahiwal, convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to imprisonment for life, alongside a connected criminal revision seeking enhancement of sentence. The core legal questions involved the credibility of the ocular account, the implications of a twelve-day delay in FIR registration, the reliability of a dying declaration/statement of the injured, and the corroborative value of medical and recovery evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of eyewitnesses, the delay in the FIR suggested deliberation and consultation, and the recoveries and medical evidence could not sustain the conviction in the absence of a reliable ocular account. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted on the benefit of the doubt, while the revision petition for enhancement was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that corroborative evidence such as medical reports and recoveries cannot by themselves sustain a conviction when the primary ocular testimony is unconvincing and riddled with material improvements and unexplained delays.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction for murder be sustained solely on medical and recovery evidence when the ocular account is found to be unreliable and doubtful?
  • Does an unexplained, prolonged delay in the registration of an FIR create serious doubt regarding the authenticity of the prosecution's case?
  • Whether the acquittal of co-accused on the same set of evidence warrants the setting aside of a conviction for the remaining accused when the testimony fails to inspire confidence?
  • Is a statement of an injured person recorded days after the registration of the FIR and without proper corroboration sufficient to ground a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Northern Tourism Development (Pvt) Ltd Executive Business Centre SaudiAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Norinpaco and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2016 PTD 1214 · Sindh High Court · 2015-12-02Read full judgment →
• Noreen Sarwar vs Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir2016 PLC (C.S.) 698 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-06-22
  writ petitionwaiting listpublic service commissionappointmentwithheld postsservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a writ petition filed under Section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, seeking a direction from the High Court for the petitioner's induction into service as a Lecturer, based on her placement on the waiting list. The core legal questions concern whether the department unlawfully withheld vacant posts at the time of requisition and whether a candidate on a waiting list is entitled to appointment after the expiry of the statutory validity period of the list. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's claims were untenable under settled apex court jurisprudence and that a waiting list expires after 180 days under Rule 13 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Public Service Commission (Procedure) Rules, 1994, rendering the petition incompetent. The key principle laid down is that waiting lists remain valid only for the prescribed period of 180 days and cannot be utilized to claim appointments against future or subsequently created vacancies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a candidate placed on a waiting list can be appointed against a post after the expiry of the statutory validity period of the waiting list?
  • Can vacant posts created or occurring after the initial requisition and advertisement be treated as withheld posts at the time of the original requisition?
  • What is the legal lifespan of a waiting list prepared by the Public Service Commission under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Public Service Commission (Procedure) Rules, 1994?
  Read full judgment →
• Noorullah and others vs Additional District and Sessions Judge and others2016 KLR Criminal Cases 52 · Balochistan High Court · 2015-05-25Read full judgment →
• Noorullah & another vs State2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-09-20Read full judgment →
• Noor Rehman and another. vs Akram Khan and others2016 PLJ Peshawar 186 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-02-22
  specific performancelimitation periodunregistered sale deedpart performanceprotection of possessioncivil revisioninheritance mutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts dismissing the petitioners' suit for declaration, permanent injunction, specific performance, and possession based on an unregistered sale deed dated 24.12.1962. The core legal questions addressed the limitation period for specific performance where no date is fixed, the proof of documents predating the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and the availability of protection of possession under the doctrine of part performance. The Peshawar High Court held that while the suit for specific performance and declaration was rightly dismissed as barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the petitioners had successfully proved the execution of the 1962 deed and were entitled to the protection of their possession over part of the property under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, read with Section 50 of the Registration Act, 1908. The key principle laid down is that although an unregistered sale deed cannot confer title or sustain a time-barred suit for specific performance, a transferee who has taken continuous possession in part performance of a written contract is entitled to defend that possession under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unregistered agreement to sell create a right to a declaration of title without first seeking specific performance?
  • When does time begin to run for the specific performance of a contract where no fixed date for performance is provided under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Are documents executed prior to the promulgation of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 governed by its strict witness requirements?
  • Can a transferee who holds continuous possession under an unregistered written contract claim the protection of part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Rehman and another vs Akram Khan and others2016 YLR 1704 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-02-22Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs The State2016 MLD 812 · Lahore High Court · 2014-06-20
  criminal appealmisappropriationbenefit of doubtSection 342 statementsafe administration of criminal justiceacquittalcorruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant by the Special Judge Anti-Corruption, Rawalpindi, for offences under Section 409, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Section 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The appellant, a Head Clerk, was accused of misappropriating funds belonging to teachers. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained when the prosecution failed to prove the original charges, the trial court convicted the appellant for an offence (Section 409, Pakistan Penal Code 1860) for which no charge was framed, and the conviction relied solely on the inculpatory portion of the appellant's statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court ruled that a statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, must be accepted or discarded in its entirety unless supplemented by independent evidence. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the benefit of doubt is a right of the accused, not a concession, and that the prosecution must stand on its own evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted for an offence for which no charge was framed by the trial court?
  • Should a statement of an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be accepted or rejected in its entirety?
  • Can a conviction be based solely on the inculpatory part of an accused's statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Mst. Feroza and another2016 MLD 941 · Sindh High Court · 2014-11-24Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad and others vs Mst. Farzana and othersK.L.R. 2016 Revenue Cases 12 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-14Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad and another vs Mst. Farzana and 3 others2016 CLC 302 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-14Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad and another vs 1ST Additional District Judge, Badin2016 YLR 1270 · Sindh High Court · 2015-08-27Read full judgment →
• Noor Hassan vs Abdullah and 4 others2016 P Cr. L J 166 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-24
  bail cancellationheinous offencefurther inquiryprohibitory clausetransfer of casejudicial biaspolice misconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal miscellaneous applications for the cancellation of bail granted to police officials accused of abduction and rape, alongside a transfer application regarding the trial court's conduct. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion in granting bail based on minor contradictions in witness statements and whether the case warranted transfer due to judicial bias. The High Court cancelled the bail, ruling that the trial court acted illegally by treating minor discrepancies as sufficient grounds for 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, particularly in heinous offences falling under the prohibitory clause. The court established that tentative assessment of evidence for bail purposes does not permit a trial court to fixate on minor contradictions to bypass the prohibitory clause for heinous crimes. Furthermore, the court affirmed that where victims face harassment and the trial judge displays bias—evidenced by unjustified issuance of warrants against victims—transfer of the case is necessary to ensure a fair and impartial trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of minor contradictions between ocular and medical evidence automatically entitle an accused to bail under the 'further inquiry' provision of Section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a trial court's unjustified issuance of bailable warrants against victims and complainants constitute sufficient grounds for the transfer of a criminal case?
  • Is a tentative assessment of evidence in a bail application permitted to focus on minor discrepancies when the offence falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Ellahi through L. Rs, and others vs Muhammad Mehboob and others2016 MLD 840 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-10Read full judgment →
• Noor Daraz Khan through Mpa, PK-40 vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet Division and 7 others2016 PLD Peshawar 114 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-12-23
  constitutional viresprovincial autonomyeighteenth amendmentoccupied fieldanticorruption lawslegislative competencefundamental rightsharmonious interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated batch of writ petitions before the Peshawar High Court challenged the constitutional vires of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Ehtesab Commission Act, 2014, its subsequent amendments, and related notifications on grounds of legislative competence, repugnancy with the federal National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, violation of fundamental rights, and unreasonableness. The core legal questions revolved around whether the provincial legislature possessed the competence to enact anti-corruption legislation following the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, and whether such provincial legislation is void due to an occupied field or conflict with federal laws. The larger bench held that after the omission of the Concurrent Legislative List by the Eighteenth Amendment, residual matters and powers under Article 142(b) of the Constitution enable provincial assemblies to competently enact laws regarding criminal law, criminal procedure, and evidence within their territorial domains. The court ruled that the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Ehtesab Commission Act, 2014, is a special supplemental law that is not inconsistent or in direct conflict with the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, as both enactments can operate simultaneously and complement each other without overlapping. The court laid down the principles that legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality, that courts must strive for harmonious interpretation of seemingly concurrent or parallel statutes, and that provincial anti-corruption laws enacted within constitutional parameters do not violate fundamental rights or the doctrine of occupied field.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Ehtesab Commission Act, 2014 is in conflict with Articles 142 and 143 of the Constitution of Pakistan in the presence of the federal National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does the enactment of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Ehtesab Commission Act, 2014 violate fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 10-A, 12, and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Whether provincial legislatures possess the legislative competence to enact anti-corruption laws concerning criminal law and procedure following the omission of the Concurrent Legislative List by the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment?
  • Does the establishment of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Ehtesab Commission suffer from legal infirmity or lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of a notification published in the official gazette?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Ahmed vs The State2016 YLR 388 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-08
  suspension of sentenceshort sentencebail pending appealnarcotics recoverycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal appeal and an associated application under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 filed by the appellant seeking suspension of sentence and enlargement on bail pending appeal, following his conviction under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 to four years and six months rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question concerns whether a convict serving a short sentence should be granted bail when the appeal is unlikely to be heard promptly due to institutional backlog. The Sindh High Court held that where a short sentence has been awarded and the disposal of the main appeal is likely to take considerable time due to the non-preparation of the paper book and heavy backlog, the sentence ought to be suspended and the appellant released on bail. The key principle laid down is that the existence of a short sentence combined with the improbability of an early hearing of the appeal constitutes sufficient ground for suspending the sentence and granting bail during the pendency of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence be suspended and bail granted during the pendency of an appeal when the appellant has been awarded a short sentence?
  • Whether the likelihood of a delayed hearing due to backlog and absence of a paper book justifies suspension of sentence under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Ahmed through L.Rs, and others vs Province of Punjab and others2016 SCMR 2174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-07
  specific performancerevisional jurisdictionremand orderhierarchy of courtspetitory appealsupervisory jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' revision petition. The petitioners had filed a suit for specific performance that was initially dismissed by the trial court, remanded in appeal by the District Judge, and subsequently dismissed again upon remand. Instead of filing an appeal against the final dismissal decree, the petitioners directly approached the High Court through a revision petition, primarily challenging the earlier remand order and bypassing the appellate hierarchy. The core legal questions involve the maintainability of a revision petition against a final decree when an appellate remedy was available, and the finality of an un-assailed remand order. The Supreme Court held that the revision petition was incompetent because the remand order had attained finality, the appropriate remedy of appeal against the final decree was not availed, and the revision forum, if any, lay before the District Judge based on pecuniary jurisdiction. The Supreme Court laid down that revisional or supervisory jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a substitute for an omitted appeal in inappropriate cases where statutory remedies are bypassed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a revision petition be maintained before the High Court against a trial court decree when the statutory remedy of appeal was not availed?
  • Whether an order of remand that has attained finality can be challenged through a subsequent revision petition?
  • Does a revision petition lie directly before the High Court when pecuniary jurisdiction dictates it should be filed before the District Judge?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor a Qadir and Others vs Executive Director (CLD)Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Noman Ahmed and others vs Mst. Sobia Farooq and others2016 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-21Read full judgment →
• Noman Abid Investment Management Ltd (Now Reliance Investment Ltd)Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Nizamuddin alias Nizam vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 667 · Sindh High Court · 2015-03-05
  Section 540 CrPCrecall of witnesscross-examinationSection 561-A CrPCright of cross-examinationState counselfair trialjust decision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was filed against an order of the Anti-Terrorism Court, Shikarpur, which had dismissed the applicant's application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to recall a key prosecution witness for cross-examination. The trial court had refused to recall the witness after defence counsel initially refused to cross-examine him and state-appointed counsel also failed to cross-examine him. The core legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial court erred in declining to recall a material prosecution witness for cross-examination when no cross-examination had taken place on record. The High Court set aside the trial court's order and allowed the recall of the witness, holding that cross-examination is a fundamental right and the primary vehicle for determining truth, particularly in cases involving severe or capital penalties. The Court established that under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, where evidence is essential for the just decision of a case, it is mandatory for the court to permit its production and examination, and an accused person should not suffer prejudice due to the faults or lapses of defence counsel.

  Questions settled

  • Is it obligatory upon a court under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to recall a prosecution witness for cross-examination when such evidence is essential for a just decision?
  • Should an accused person suffer prejudice or be denied the right of cross-examination due to the default or refusal of defence counsel?
  • Can a court allow an application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to permit cross-examination of a key witness when no cross-examination was conducted by either private counsel or state-appointed counsel?
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• Nizam Ali vs The State2016 P Cr. I, J 1613 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-05-18Read full judgment →
• Nishat Mills Limited vs Director/HOD (Mscid) Securities and ExchangeAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmed vs The State, etc.PL D 2016 Supreme Court 11, 2016 PLJ SC 12, 2016 P.S.C. Crl. 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-09-08
  post-arrest bailsuccessive bail applicationsexpeditious trialdirect complaintfresh groundsqatl-i-amd
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the High Court's dismissal of the petitioner's fourth post-arrest bail application in a murder case. The petitioner, accused of committing qatl-i-amd and causing injuries under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, argued that he was entitled to bail due to the trial court's failure to comply with previous High Court directions for the expeditious disposal of his trial, and because the complainant had filed a direct complaint, which allegedly constituted a fresh ground. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether non-compliance with trial-expediting directions or the filing of a direct complaint could serve as valid grounds for bail. The Court held that non-compliance with directions to conclude a trial expeditiously is alien to the provisions of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and does not constitute a valid ground for bail. Furthermore, the filing of a direct complaint does not affect earlier final bail-refusal orders unless a genuine fresh ground is established. Consequently, the Court refused leave and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of a trial court to comply with directions for the expeditious disposal of a trial constitutes a valid ground for the grant of bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the filing of a direct complaint by a complainant constitute a fresh ground for re-evaluating successive bail applications that have already been dismissed on merits?
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• Nisar Ahmed vs The State and othersPL D 2016 Supreme Court 11 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-09-08
  post-arrest bailexpeditious trialdirect complaintbail refusalqatl-i-amdcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of the petitioner's fourth post-arrest bail application by the Lahore High Court in a criminal case involving charges of murder and causing injuries. The petitioner, accused of qatl-i-amd and other offenses, sought bail primarily on the grounds of the trial court's failure to comply with previous High Court directions for expeditious disposal of the case and the subsequent filing of a direct complaint by the complainant. The core legal question was whether the delay in trial or the filing of a direct complaint constituted sufficient grounds for granting bail after previous bail applications had been dismissed. The Supreme Court held that neither the non-compliance with directions for an expeditious trial nor the filing of a direct complaint provides a valid legal basis for bail under the statutory framework. The Court affirmed that such grounds are alien to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and dismissed the petition, emphasizing that bail cannot be granted absent a fresh, valid ground when previous refusals have attained finality.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a trial court to conclude a trial within a specified timeframe constitute a valid ground for the grant of bail?
  • Can the filing of a direct complaint serve as a fresh ground to reconsider a bail application that has previously been dismissed?
  • Is non-compliance with directions for expeditious trial a recognized ground for bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Nisar Ahmed vs State, etc.2016 PLJ SC 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-09-08
  post-arrest bailbail refusalexpeditious trialdirect complaintfinality of bail ordersqatl-i-amd
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a fourth post-arrest bail application by the High Court in a case involving charges of murder and causing injuries. The petitioner, accused of qatl-i-amd and other offenses, sought bail primarily on the grounds of the trial court's failure to comply with previous directions for expeditious disposal of the case and the subsequent filing of a direct complaint by the complainant. The Supreme Court addressed the core legal question of whether delays in trial or the filing of a direct complaint constitute valid grounds for granting bail when previous bail applications have been dismissed. The Court held that neither the failure to conclude a trial within a specified timeframe nor the filing of a direct complaint provides a valid legal basis for bail under the statutory framework. The ratio established is that bail cannot be granted on such grounds as they are alien to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and previous bail-refusing orders maintain finality unless a genuine fresh ground is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a trial court to conclude a trial within a specified time frame constitute a valid ground for the grant of bail?
  • Does the filing of a direct complaint by a complainant provide a fresh ground for bail after previous bail applications have been dismissed?
  • Can bail be granted on grounds that are not recognized under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Nisar Ahmed Bhatti vs Addl. Sessions Judge etc2016 PLJ Lahore 398 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-05Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmed Ansari through his real son vs Federation of Pakistan2016 P Cr. L J 761 · Sindh High Court · 2015-10-20
  post-arrest bailassets beyond known sources of incomeNational Accountability Ordinancepersonal libertyincomplete investigationsupplementary referenceburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, concerns a request for post-arrest bail by a former government servant facing charges under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, for accumulating assets beyond known sources of income. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to bail when the prosecution admits that the investigation is incomplete, supplementary references are pending, and previous inquiries into the same allegations concluded that no further action was required. The Court held that the prosecution must prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence, specifically the accused's public office, the extent of pecuniary resources, the known sources of income, and that the resources are disproportionate to those sources. Finding that the prosecution had not yet collected sufficient material to connect the petitioner to the offence and that the petitioner could not be held indefinitely pending further investigation, the Court granted bail. The key principle laid down is that mere gravity of an offence does not justify indefinite detention, and personal liberty cannot be curtailed without sufficient prima facie evidence connecting the accused to the crime.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients the prosecution must establish to prove an offence under Section 9(a)(v) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Can an accused be kept in indefinite detention pending the collection of further evidence by the prosecution?
  • Does the mere possession of pecuniary resources or property by a public servant constitute an offence under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
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• Nisar Ahmad vs State through Additional Advocate General, Darul Qaza, Swat and another2016 PHC 1, PLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 78, PLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 784 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmad vs Altaf Hussain & the State2016 PHC 1 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-06-08Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmad and others vs The State and others2016 P Cr. L J 1928 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-18
  Qatl shibh-i-amdQatl-i-amdappreciation of evidencemedical evidenceinterested witnessesmitigating circumstancescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the appellant, Nisar Ahmad, was sentenced for the murder of Mst. Suraya Bibi via a tractor. The core legal question was whether the appellant's act of running over the deceased with a tractor constituted Qatl-i-amd (intentional murder) or a lesser form of homicide, given the absence of evidence of deliberate intent to kill. The court found that the prosecution's ocular account was exaggerated and inconsistent with medical evidence, which showed no external injuries consistent with being deliberately run over. Holding that the element of intent to cause death was missing, the Court set aside the conviction under section 302(b) and converted it to Qatl shibh-i-amd under section 316, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The principle laid down is that where the prosecution's narrative of intentional killing is contradicted by medical evidence and the surrounding circumstances, and the act itself was not inherently likely to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the conviction must be altered from Qatl-i-amd to Qatl shibh-i-amd.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of external injuries consistent with a deliberate run-over negate the charge of Qatl-i-amd?
  • Can a court convert a conviction from Qatl-i-amd to Qatl shibh-i-amd if the element of intent to cause death is missing?
  • Is a complainant's failure to report an occurrence to the police immediately, despite being at the station, a ground to draw an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984?
  • Should a sentence be reduced to the period already undergone if the conviction is altered on appeal?
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• NIRC Muhammad Shoaib vs M/s. Allied Bank Limited through is President2016 PLJ Tr.C. (NIRC) 20 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 2015-07-24
  unfair labour practicedisciplinary proceedingsjurisdiction of NIRCtrade union activitiesdismissal of petitionmisconductinterim stay order
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition filed under Section 54(e) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 read with Regulation 32(2)(c) of the National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 1973, alleging unfair labour practice and victimization on account of trade union activities following the issuance of a charge-sheet and initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner-employee by the respondent bank in connection with fake bank guarantees. The core legal question is whether the National Industrial Relations Commission has jurisdiction to interfere in disciplinary proceedings initiated by an employer where no prima facie case of unfair labour practice connected with trade union activities is made out. The National Industrial Relations Commission held that the jurisdiction of the Commission is strictly confined to cases squarely falling within the scope of unfair labour practice under the statute, and mere bald allegations of victimization without specific nexus to trade union activities do not warrant the interference of the Commission with the employer's right to take disciplinary action against a delinquent employee. The petition and stay application were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the National Industrial Relations Commission has jurisdiction to interfere in disciplinary proceedings initiated by an employer in the absence of a prima facie case of unfair labour practice?
  • Does a general allegation of victimization without specific connection to trade union activities constitute an unfair labour practice under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Is it the right and prerogative of an employer to take disciplinary action and hold an inquiry against a delinquent employee?
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• Nihayat Khan vs Sheheryar Khan Muhammad2016 MLD 776 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-02-26Read full judgment →