Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Nasir Javaid Maqsood Imran, Chartered Accountants vs Hasnat Ahmed-Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Nasir Javaid and another vs The State2016 P.S.C. 400, 2016 SCMR 1144, 2016 SCP 44, 2016 P.S.C. Crl. 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-15
  circumstantial evidencemurderlast seen evidenceextra-judicial confessionrecoverycapital sentenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which confirmed the death sentences of the appellants for the kidnapping and murder of a four-year-old child. The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, including motive, 'last seen' testimony, extra-judicial confessions, and recoveries. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the motive unproven and insufficient to drive such a crime. The 'last seen' evidence was deemed concocted due to the witnesses' unexplained three-day silence and inconsistencies regarding their presence at the scene. The extra-judicial confessions were rejected as they were allegedly made to persons closely related to the complainant who held no authority. Furthermore, the Court noted that recoveries made during a second raid of the appellants' house appeared contrived. Applying the principle that circumstantial evidence must form an unbreakable chain incompatible with any hypothesis of innocence, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants.

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• Nasir Iqbal vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 1906 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-08-02
  post-arrest bailsuccessive bail applicationfresh groundjudicial proprietymurderhostile witnessconflicting judgments
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal bail petition filed by an accused charged with murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the accused could maintain a third successive bail application in the High Court based on the alleged 'fresh ground' of a recovery witness turning hostile, and whether the procedural practice of assigning successive bail applications to different judges was permissible. The Court dismissed the petition, finding it meritless. It held that the petitioner failed to establish a valid fresh ground, as the witness's testimony did not constitute a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant re-adjudication. The Court reaffirmed the principle that subsequent bail applications must be placed before the same judge who decided the initial application to prevent conflicting orders and judicial malpractice. Furthermore, it established that grounds available during the first application but not raised cannot be invoked as 'fresh grounds' in subsequent petitions, and that the flagrant misuse of bail provisions through frivolous successive applications is strictly prohibited.

  Questions settled

  • Can a subsequent bail application be filed before a different judge than the one who decided the first application?
  • Does a recovery witness turning hostile constitute a sufficient fresh ground for a successive bail application?
  • Can grounds that were available but not raised during the first bail application be used as fresh grounds in a subsequent application?
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• Nasir Iqbal @ Nasra and anothers vs The State2016 SCMR 2152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-14
  murdercommon intentioneye-witness credibilitymitigating circumstancesdeath sentencelife imprisonmentanti-terrorismproclaimed offender
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals arose from a daylight attack where five individuals were killed by indiscriminate firing while traveling to a court hearing. The prosecution alleged the motive was to coerce a compromise in a separate pending murder case. The Supreme Court re-evaluated the ocular testimony of two eye-witnesses, finding their presence at the scene natural and their testimony credible despite their relationship to the deceased. The court held that in a high-stress, rapid occurrence, the inability to assign specific roles to each assailant does not invalidate the testimony but rather reflects human limitations, ruling out false implication. Regarding Muhammad Ashraf, his conviction and death sentence were upheld due to established direct motive and participation. However, for Nasir Iqbal, the court found mitigating circumstances: he was not a nominated accused in the previous murder case, the trial court found no direct motive against him, and the recovery of the weapon was deemed doubtful. Consequently, while maintaining his conviction, the court converted Nasir Iqbal's death sentence to life imprisonment.

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• Nasir alias Imran Nasir vs State2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-04-22Read full judgment →
• Nasir Ali vs The State and others2016 SCMR 1283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-23
  suspension of sentencepost-conviction bailocular evidenceFIR discrepanciesappellate reviewcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of an application for suspension of sentence by the High Court during the pendency of the petitioner's criminal appeal against his conviction. The petitioner was convicted by the trial court under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, among other sections, for the murder of Iftikhar Ahmad. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the suspension of his sentence pending appeal, given significant discrepancies between the FIR and the ocular evidence presented at trial. Specifically, the FIR alleged the petitioner used a Kalashnikov to inflict blunt force injuries on an injured witness, whereas trial testimony claimed he fired a pistol at the deceased. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner was not attributed a firearm injury in the FIR, and the medical evidence required careful reappraisal by the Appellate Court. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner had established a prima facie case for suspension of sentence, emphasizing that when the final adjudication of an appeal is not in sight and evidence is contradictory, suspension of sentence is appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence be suspended pending appeal when there are material contradictions between the FIR and the ocular evidence presented at trial?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to suspension of sentence if the final adjudication of their criminal appeal is not in immediate sight?
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• Nasir Ali Shah Bukhari and 2 others vs Federation of Pakistan and 7 othersK.L.R 2016 Civil Cases 404 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-05
  banking moratoriumamalgamation of banking companiesregulatory powernon-obstante clauseexcessive delegationconstitutional petitionpremature petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the State Bank of Pakistan's (SBP) regulatory actions regarding the moratorium and proposed amalgamation of KASB Bank Limited under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962. The petitioners contended that the SBP's powers under Section 47 constituted excessive delegation of judicial functions and violated their property rights, further arguing that Section 48, which requires shareholder approval for amalgamations, should apply. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the SBP's actions under Section 47 are regulatory and executive, not judicial. The Court affirmed that Section 47 contains a non-obstante clause, which excludes the application of Section 48 regarding shareholder approval for amalgamations. The judgment established that regulatory powers exercised by the SBP to manage banking crises are administrative in nature. Furthermore, the Court held that a non-obstante clause in a statute overrides inconsistent provisions within the same legislative part. Finally, the Court ruled that constitutional petitions based on mere apprehension of future harm, where administrative remedies are still pending, are premature and not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power of the State Bank of Pakistan to apply for a moratorium and prepare an amalgamation scheme under Section 47 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, constitute an exercise of judicial power?
  • Does the non-obstante clause in Section 47 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, exclude the application of Section 48 regarding shareholder approval for bank amalgamations?
  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained based on the mere apprehension of future adverse action by a regulatory authority?
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• Nasir Ali and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 906 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-14
  pre-arrest baildelayed FIRsupplementary statementcar theftmala fidecivil dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by Nasir Ali and Muhammad Iqbal in case FIR No. 541 dated 11.06.2016 under Sections 381-A and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, registered at Police Station Civil Line, Faisalabad, concerning the alleged theft of a car. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioners are entitled to pre-arrest bail given the unexplained delay in FIR registration, unnamed status in the initial report, subsequent implication via supplementary statement without disclosure of source, documentary evidence of ownership, and a pending civil suit regarding vehicle documents. The Lahore High Court held that the petition should be allowed and confirmed the ad-interim pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioners. The key principle laid down is that where an FIR is registered after an inordinate delay, the accused are not nominated therein, their subsequent implication lacks a disclosed source, and a civil dispute regarding ownership is pending between the parties, mala fide in the prosecution can be inferred, warranting the confirmation of pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be confirmed when the FIR is lodged with an unexplainable delay and the accused are not nominated therein?
  • Does the lack of a disclosed source in a supplementary statement implicating the accused justify granting pre-arrest bail?
  • Can mala fide of the complainant be inferred when a civil suit regarding the ownership of the disputed property is already pending between the parties?
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• Nasir Abbas vs Muhammad Afzal2021[M] C L R 681, 2016 LHC 4057 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-06
  civil revisionpre-emptionTalb-i-Ishhadnotice of demandburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts which dismissed the petitioner's suit and appeal regarding a right of pre-emption. The core legal question concerns whether the failure to produce the Postman to prove the service of notice of Talb-i-Ishhad, after the vendee specifically denied receiving it in the written statement, extinguishes the right of pre-emption. The Lahore High Court held that where the vendee denies receipt of the notice, the presumption of service under Article 129 of the Qanoon-e-Shahdat Order, 1984 and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 stands rebutted, requiring the production of the Postman to prove service. Since the pre-emptor failed to produce the Postman, the factum of Talb-i-Ishhad was unproven. The key principle laid down is that failure to prove Talb-i-Ishhad through requisite evidence when the notice is specifically denied extinguishes the superior right of pre-emption.

  Questions settled

  • Does the denial of receipt of notice in a written statement rebut the presumption of service under Article 129 of the Qanoon-e-Shahdat Order, 1984?
  • Is the production of the Postman mandatory to prove Talb-i-Ishhad when the service of notice is specifically denied by the vendee?
  • What is the legal effect on a pre-emption suit when the pre-emptor fails to prove the factum of Talb-i-Ishhad?
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• Nasim Beg vs Director/HOD (MSRD) Securities and Exchange CommissionAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Naseer Ahmad vs The State2016 MLD 1352 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-23
  attempt to commit rapebenefit of doubtdelayed FIRimprovements in testimonycredibility of witnesscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 376 and 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for attempting to commit rape. The core legal questions involve evaluating the credibility of prosecution witnesses, the implications of an inordinate delay in lodging the First Information Report, and the effect of dishonest improvements made during testimony. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to an unexplained seven-day delay in reporting the incident, unreliable testimonies tainted by material improvements, doubtful presence of eyewitnesses, and delayed recovery of evidence. The court established that deliberate and material improvements in witness testimonies to strengthen the prosecution case render them unreliable, entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report renders the prosecution case doubtful?
  • What is the legal effect of material and dishonest improvements made by a witness during trial testimony?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right when the prosecution fails to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Does the absence of medical examination of an allegedly assaulted eyewitness affect the reliability of her testimony?
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• Naseer Ahmad vs State2016 MLD 1352, PLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 939 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-23
  attempt to commit rapebenefit of doubtdelay in FIRimprovements in testimonycriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 376 and 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for attempting to commit rape. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, specifically evaluating the implications of an inordinate delay in lodging the First Information Report, material improvements in the victim's testimony, doubtful presence of an eyewitness, and delayed production of evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the charge conclusively due to multiple serious flaws and discrepancies in the evidence, thereby entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt. The court laid down the key principle that an inordinate delay in reporting the crime without plausible explanation, coupled with dishonest improvements by witnesses and lack of corroborative physical evidence, renders the prosecution's case doubtful, requiring the extension of the benefit of the doubt to the accused as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inordinate delay of seven days in lodging the FIR, without a satisfactory and proven explanation, renders the prosecution case doubtful?
  • Does the making of dishonest and material improvements by a victim in her statement during trial render her testimony unreliable?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right when the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt?
  • What is the evidentiary value of last worn clothes of a victim produced before the investigating officer days after the incident without plausible justification?
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• Naseer Ahmad and others vs Yousaf Murtaza Mirza and others2016 CLC 160 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-12Read full judgment →
• Naseem Saigol , Chief Executive Saeed Ansari Athar Rafiq Shahid SethiAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Naseem Iqbal vs Federation of Pakistan and others2016 PLC (C.S.) 1305 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-06-07
  Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistanconstitutional petitionappointment of Commissionerre-appointmenttenure limittransparent competitive processstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves constitutional petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the appointment of respondent No. 2 as a Commissioner and subsequently as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. The core legal question revolves around whether a person who has already completed two terms as a Commissioner can be re-appointed or appointed for a third term under the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997. The Islamabad High Court held that while the Act bars the 're-appointment' of a Commissioner for a third consecutive term after completing the cumulative period of two terms, it does not place any statutory bar or disqualification on such a person being newly 'appointed' through a fresh, transparent, and competitive selection process. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed as meritless, establishing that previous tenure does not permanently disqualify an individual from competing in an open, transparent process for a fresh appointment as Commissioner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person who has completed two terms as a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan is barred from being appointed for a third term?
  • Is there a distinction between 'appointment' and 're-appointment' under Section 7 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997?
  • Does the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 disqualify a former Commissioner from participating in a fresh transparent selection process after completing their cumulative terms?
  • Can a Commissioner who has held office for two consecutive terms be subsequently appointed as the Chairman of the Commission?
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• Naseem Abbas vs The State and another2016 LHC 2432 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-22
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirytwo versionsrule of consistencyheinousness of offensecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Lahore High Court through a petition filed under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, whereby the petitioner Naseem Abbas sought post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 581/15 registered under Sections 302, 397, 148, 149, 427, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner is entitled to bail after arrest when investigation reveals his non-presence at the scene, establishing a case of further inquiry under Section 497(2). The court held that the divergence between the FIR allegations and investigation findings created a case of two versions, making the matter one of further inquiry. Furthermore, consistency with co-accused whose pre-arrest bail was confirmed, lack of previous convictions, and completion of the investigation justified granting bail. The court laid down the principle that mere heinousness of an offense does not warrant refusing bail when an accused otherwise establishes a case for it, and police investigation findings can be considered tentatively during bail adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail when investigation reveals his absence from the crime scene?
  • Does a contradiction between the FIR and the outcome of the police investigation bring a case within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be refused solely on the ground of the heinousness of the offense when the accused otherwise qualifies for the concession?
  • Does the principle of consistency apply when co-accused facing similar allegations have been granted pre-arrest bail?
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• Naseem A. Sattar and 6 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Federal Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 3 others2016 PLD Sindh 311, 2016 CLD 906 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-16Read full judgment →
• Nano Ram through Legal Heirs and others vs Javed and others2016 PLD Peshawar 254 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-10-26Read full judgment →
• Nanik Ram vs Ghulam Akbar and 9 others2016 MLD 52 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-08
  rejection of plaintinterlocutory applicationtemporary injunctionaudi alteram partemmaintainability of suitcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision application challenges the concurrent orders of the lower courts whereby the applicant's plaint for declaration and permanent injunction was rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 while hearing an interlocutory application for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether a trial court can summarily reject a plaint at the stage of deciding an interim injunction application after summons have already been issued, without providing the plaintiff prior notice or an opportunity to be heard on maintainability. The Sindh High Court held that once a suit has passed initial scrutiny and summons have been issued, a plaint cannot be summarily rejected behind the plaintiff's back while hearing an interlocutory matter, as this violates the principle of audi alteram partem. The court laid down the principle that courts must afford a fair opportunity of hearing on maintainability and allow for curative amendments rather than resorting to a summary technical knock-out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can reject a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 while hearing an application for temporary injunction without issuing prior notice to the plaintiff?
  • Can a plaint be summarily rejected after summons have been issued and the defendant has filed a written statement without affording the plaintiff an opportunity of hearing on the question of maintainability?
  • Does the rejection of a suit for declaration automatically bar the separate and independent relief of permanent injunction?
  • Is it mandatory for an appellate court under Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to formulate points for determination while deciding a civil appeal?
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• Najm Koreshi vs Chase Manhattan Bank Now Muslim Commercial2016 PLJ SC 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  execution proceedingsdecretal amountappropriation of paymentssimple interestcompound interestexecuting courtcivil decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns execution proceedings arising from a civil decree for the recovery of money. The core legal question was whether the judgment-debtor's liability for interest should be calculated on the principal amount alone or on the aggregate of the principal and accrued interest, and consequently, whether the interest is simple or compound. The Court held that as the decree did not expressly order compound interest, the interest must be calculated on the principal amount (simple interest). The Court further clarified that when a decree is silent on the method of adjusting payments, the general rule of appropriation applies: payments must be applied first toward the satisfaction of accrued interest and costs, and only thereafter toward the principal amount. The Court emphasized that an executing court must implement a decree strictly according to its terms, and that under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the award of interest is discretionary. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for recalculation of the liability based on these principles of appropriation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a decree silent on the method of interest calculation authorize the charging of compound interest?
  • How should payments be appropriated when a decree is silent on the order of adjustment between principal, interest, and costs?
  • Does the failure to specify the method of interest calculation in a decree imply a refusal of further interest under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Najeem Khan vs The State and 5 others2016 P Cr. L J 418 · Sindh High Court · 2014-12-31
  criminal revisionpolice investigationB-class reportfalse FIRfurther investigationCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenges an order passed by the III Judicial Magistrate, Sehwan at Thana Bula Khan, which accepted a police report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in 'B' class and authorized proceedings against the complainant under section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the Investigating Officer conducted a proper investigation before concluding the FIR was false and initiating proceedings against the complainant. The Court held that the investigation was deficient, noting that the Investigating Officer failed to obtain crucial evidence, such as tracking data for the allegedly snatched vehicle, and relied on statements from local witnesses while ignoring the fact that the complainant was a transient passerby. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and directed further investigation, emphasizing that while an Investigating Officer is empowered to conclude an investigation as false, they must first collect tangible, systematic evidence to support such a conclusion before initiating penal proceedings against a complainant, as failure to do so violates the basic scheme of investigation and norms of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate accept a police report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without ensuring the investigation was conducted systematically?
  • Is an Investigating Officer required to collect tangible evidence before concluding an FIR is false and initiating proceedings under section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the failure to obtain tracking data for a vehicle in a theft case constitute a deficient investigation?
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• Najeebullah and others vs Director NADRA, Balochistan, Quetta and others2016 C.L.R. 511 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• Najeeb Ullah vs Superintendent Central Jail, Peshawar. and 2 otherssPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 836 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-03-21Read full judgment →
• Najeeb Ullah Khan and another vs Mst. Hameeda Chaudhry and others2016 YLR 1538 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-21Read full judgment →
• Najeeb Ullah Khan and another vs Mst Hameeda Chaudhry and others2016 PLJ Islamabad 264, 2016 YLR 1538, 2016 C.L.R. 551 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-21Read full judgment →
• Najamuddin Samejo and 2 others vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 1616 · Sindh High Court · 2015-08-19
  quashment of proceedingsdishonour of chequecivil disputepremature acquittalinherent powerscognizance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of criminal proceedings arising out of an FIR registered under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the dishonour of cheques. The applicants contended that the dispute was civil in nature, that a civil suit was pending between the parties, and that there was no probability of conviction. The State opposed the application, arguing that the ingredients of the offence were made out and that the applicants had bypassed the remedy of seeking premature acquittal before the trial court under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Sindh High Court held that the pendency of a civil suit does not bar criminal proceedings and that the extraordinary jurisdiction under section 561-A cannot be invoked to bypass the alternative remedy available under section 249-A before the trial court, particularly when cognizance has already been taken and sufficient material exists. The application was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be quashed merely on the ground that a civil suit is pending between the parties?
  • Whether the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when an adequate remedy of seeking premature acquittal under section 249-A is available before the trial court?
  • Can an FIR or criminal proceedings be quashed after the trial court has already taken cognizance of the case and a challan has been submitted?
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• Najaf Khan and others vs The State and others2016 P Cr. L J 380 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-09
  benefit of doubtsolitary witnesschance witnessunexplained delaymurder referencecriminal appealmedical evidenceabscondanceweapon recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the convictions and sentences of the appellant, Najaf Khan, who was convicted under sections 302(b), 302(b)/34, and 449 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and sentenced to death and imprisonment for life, alongside a connected murder reference and a criminal revision for enhancement of compensation. The core legal questions involved the credibility of a solitary chance witness, the reliability of uncorroborated ocular and medical evidence, the effect of unexplained delays in lodging the FIR and conducting post-mortem examinations, and the evidentiary value of alleged weapon recoveries and abscondance. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to tangible flaws, including the doubtful presence of the eyewitness, inconsistencies between ocular and medical evidence, and the withholding of natural witnesses. The court laid down that unexplained delays in police reports and post-mortems cast serious doubt on prosecution veracity, that an uncorroborated chance witness of doubtful credibility cannot sustain a capital conviction, and that an accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when the prosecution case suffers from multiple reasonable doubts. Consequently, the court acquitted the appellant, answered the murder reference in the negative, and dismissed the revision petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained inordinate delay in lodging the FIR and conducting post-mortem examinations casts a reasonable doubt on the presence of eyewitnesses and the veracity of the prosecution case?
  • Can a conviction for capital murder be sustained solely on the testimony of an interested and chance witness without strong and independent corroboration?
  • Does the absence of ballistic matching for a recovered weapon render the recovery inconsequential to the prosecution case?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an accused person's abscondance when independent connecting evidence is lacking?
  • When is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right under criminal jurisprudence?
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• Najab Nawaz Khan vs The State2016 MLD 1461 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-12-01Read full judgment →
• Naimatullah and others vs Haji Muhammad MAHMOODand others2016 YLR 263 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-05-07
  inheritance mutationcustomary lawlimited ownerMuslim Personal Lawlimitation and co-sharersrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenges the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Tank, which accepted the plaintiff's appeal regarding an inheritance dispute dating back to 1905 under customary law. The core legal questions involve the applicability of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act to successions occurring prior to its enactment, the extent of a mother's share as a limited owner under custom versus Shariat, and the applicability of the law of limitation to co-sharers in inheritance matters. The Peshawar High Court held that the inheritance of a Muslim prior to the Shariat enactment is to be dealt with according to Muslim Personal Law, that a mother is entitled to a 1/3rd share in the absence of children, and that no limitation runs against a co-sharer. The court modified the lower appellate court's judgment regarding the specific shares of the parties and disposed of the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the rule of decision for Muslim successions occurring prior to the 1935 Act shall be Muslim Personal Law?
  • Does the law of limitation run against a co-sharer in matters of inheritance?
  • What is the share of a mother in the legacy of her deceased issueless son under Muslim Personal Law?
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• (1) Naimat Ullah Khan (2) Parvaiz Akhtar (3) Parvaiz Akhtar vs (1) The State2016 LHC 2294 · Lahore High Court · 2016-04-17
  abductionrapesolitary testimonyfalsus in uno falsus in omnibussifting grain from chaffsentence enhancementacquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Sections 365-B and 376(1) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside a revision petition for sentence enhancement and a petition against the acquittal of co-accused. The core legal questions concern the sufficiency of the victim's solitary testimony for conviction, the applicability of the doctrine of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, and the validity of the trial court's acquittal of co-accused. The Court held that the conviction was sound, as the victim's testimony was credible and corroborated by medical evidence, while the appellant's inconsistent defense regarding marriage failed. The Court affirmed the acquittal of the co-accused, noting that the doctrine of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is inapplicable in Pakistan, requiring courts to sift the grain from the chaff. Furthermore, the Court exercised its power to correct an illegal sentence of 25 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 376(1) PPC, converting it to life imprisonment. The principle established is that a victim's solitary statement can sustain a conviction if reliable, and appellate courts may rectify sentencing discrepancies while maintaining the separation of individual culpability.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the solitary statement of the victim?
  • Is the doctrine of 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' applicable in the Pakistani criminal justice system?
  • Does a delay in reporting an abduction case automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can an appellate court correct a sentence that is not provided for in the statute?
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• Naik Amal vs The State and another2016 YLR 865 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-07-13
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryattempt to commit qatl-i-amdfalse implicationnon-vital partscrime emptiesvicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Naik Amal, sought post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under Sections 324 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following the rejection of his bail application by the Additional Sessions Judge. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner and his co-accused, armed with firearms, opened fire on the complainant and his brother, resulting in injuries to the complainant. The court observed that despite the allegation of indiscriminate firing by five individuals, no crime empties were recovered from the scene. Furthermore, the court noted that the complainant sustained injuries only on non-vital parts of his body, despite the assailants allegedly having the opportunity to cause greater harm. Given the charge against five brothers and the lack of physical evidence, the court found a high probability of false implication and a tendency to rope in family members. Consequently, the court held that the case required further inquiry and granted the petitioner bail, emphasizing that the circumstances raised reasonable doubt regarding the intent to commit murder.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of recovered crime empties from the crime scene constitute grounds for further inquiry in a bail application?
  • Can the fact that injuries were sustained only on non-vital parts of the body raise doubt regarding the intent to commit murder?
  • Is the probability of false implication of multiple family members a valid consideration for granting bail?
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• Naheed Azhar vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and 2 others2016 PLC (C.S.) 879 · Sindh High Court · 2016-04-01
  deputationrepatriationcivil serviceadministrative controlcompetent authorityconstitutional petitionSindh Revenue Boardacting charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a notification issued by the Acting Chairman of the Sindh Revenue Board (SRB) repatriating the petitioner, a deputationist officer, to her parent department. The core legal question was whether the Acting Chairman possessed the authority to issue such a repatriation order and whether the Chief Secretary of Sindh had the power to cancel it. The court held that the Acting Chairman acted without lawful authority in issuing the repatriation order. It determined that the SRB operates under the administrative control of the Chief Minister’s Secretariat through the office of the Chief Secretary, making the Chief Secretary the competent authority to recall or cancel the unauthorized repatriation order. The court further ruled that post-facto ratification by the Board could not validate an action initially taken without legal authority. Consequently, the court directed the SRB to allow the petitioner to resume her duties. The judgment underscores that repatriation of a deputationist is a matter between the borrowing and lending governments, and subordinate officials cannot unilaterally interfere with such arrangements without proper authorization.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Acting Chairman of the Sindh Revenue Board have the authority to unilaterally repatriate a deputationist officer to her parent department?
  • Is the Sindh Revenue Board under the administrative control of the Chief Minister's Secretariat through the office of the Chief Secretary?
  • Can post-facto approval by a Board validate an order issued by an official who lacked the initial lawful authority to pass it?
  • Does the Chief Secretary of Sindh have the authority to cancel a repatriation order issued by the Acting Chairman of the Sindh Revenue Board?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadir Khan and 5 others vs Muqadar Khan and 13 otherss2016 PLJ Peshawar 215 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-02-22Read full judgment →
• Nadir Hussain vs Yar Muhammad and 10 others2016 MLD 873 · Lahore High Court · 2014-05-26Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Younas vs Additional District Judge and 3 others2016 KLR Civil Cases 9, 2016 PLJ Islamabad 58, 2016 CLC 474 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-09-25
  landlord and tenant relationshipeviction petitiondefault in payment of rentchange of ownership noticenecessary party impleadmentconstitutional jurisdictionIslamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance 2001
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated writ petition arises from eviction proceedings initiated by respondents against the tenant, Nadeem Younas, regarding commercial premises in Islamabad, on the grounds of expiry of lease, default in rent, and personal need. The core legal questions involved the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, the necessity of a change of ownership notice, and the impleadment of the tenant's son as a necessary party. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the conduct of the petitioners was dubious and aimed at protracting litigation through a collusive impleadment application by the tenant's son. The court ruled that where a person occupies premises without setting up an adverse title, a tenancy is presumed by law, and the tenant cannot challenge the landlord's title or withhold rent. Furthermore, the court held that filing an eviction petition serves as sufficient notice of change of ownership, and failure to pay rent during the pendency of proceedings constitutes willful default. The key principle laid down is that a tenant cannot evade rent obligations or deny the landlord-tenant relationship without an adverse title, and procedural delays engineered through fictitious third-party claims will be firmly rejected.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the filing of an eviction petition can be treated as a sufficient notice for change of ownership?
  • Can a tenant refuse to pay rent or deny the landlord-tenant relationship without setting up a title adverse to the owner?
  • Whether a third-party claimant who is a family member and business associate is a necessary party to eviction proceedings under the circumstances of a collusive defense?
  • Does the failure of a tenant to tender rent during the pendency of eviction proceedings render them a willful defaulter?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Younas vs Additional District Judge & 3 others2016 KLR Civil Cases 9 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-11-25Read full judgment →
• Nadeem vs The State and another2016 SCMR 1619 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-18
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationmurderous assaultmedical board opinioncross-versiontampering with evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition seeking pre-arrest bail arising out of FIR No. 127 of 2015 registered under sections 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Gogera, District Okara. The core legal question concerns the propriety of recalling pre-arrest bail already granted, and whether grounds for the grant of bail and its cancellation are distinct. The Supreme Court held that the grounds for granting bail and those for its cancellation are altogether different, and in the absence of any evidence that the accused misused the concession of bail or tampered with prosecution evidence, recalling pre-arrest bail was unjustified. The Court laid down the principle that once pre-arrest bail is granted, it cannot be arbitrarily recalled without proof of misuse of the concession or tampering with evidence, and noted that cross-versions and conflicting medical board opinions warrant the continuation of protective pre-arrest relief.

  Questions settled

  • Are the grounds for the grant of bail and the cancellation of bail different?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be recalled in the absence of evidence that the accused misused the concession of bail or tampered with prosecution evidence?
  • Does a conflicting medical board opinion regarding an injury justify the cancellation of pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Siddiqui vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad2016 PLD Federal Shariat Court 1 · Federal Shariat Court · 2015-04-16Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Shaikh vs Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi and another2016 PLJ Karachi 1, 2016 PLC (C.S.) 772 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-12
  repatriation of civil servantcivil servantsubordinate judiciaryservice tribunal jurisdictionmisconductconstitutional petitionimplementation of supreme court judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns the repatriation of a civil servant to his parent department, the Court of Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (Provincial), Karachi, following government orders. The core legal questions were whether the respondent department could lawfully decline the petitioner's joining based on alleged misconduct or lack of vacancies, and which forum possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. The Court held that the petitioner must be allowed to join his parent department immediately, as repatriation orders issued to implement Supreme Court judgments are binding and must be executed. Allegations of misconduct do not justify preventing a civil servant from joining their parent department, though the authority remains free to initiate disciplinary proceedings separately. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the petitioner, as a civil servant, does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted for the subordinate judiciary. The key principle laid down is that administrative repatriation orders must be implemented without delay, and a civil servant cannot be denied their right to join their parent department based on unverified allegations of misconduct or purported lack of vacancies.

  Questions settled

  • Can a department refuse to allow a civil servant to join their parent department based on alleged misconduct without prior disciplinary proceedings?
  • Does the Tribunal constituted for the members of the subordinate judiciary have jurisdiction over employees of the Anti-Corruption Department?
  • Is an order of repatriation issued to implement a Supreme Court judgment binding on the respondent department regardless of vacancy availability?
  • Can a Service Tribunal direct the Registrar of the High Court to fix a case before a specific tribunal without the High Court's authorization?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Shafi vs Tariq Shuja Butt, Etc.2016 NLR Civil 524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-10-29
  nomination paperselection lawproposer and secondersubstantial defectPunjab Local Government Act 2013electoral qualificationrectification of nomination papers
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that rejected the petitioner's nomination papers for election as a general councilor for a Union Council. The core legal questions were whether the requirement under the Punjab Local Governments (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013, for a proposer and seconder to be from the same constituency is mandatory, and whether a defect involving an unqualified proposer is rectifiable. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the provisions of Rule 12(2) of the 2013 Rules are mandatory. The Court ruled that a proposer and seconder must be voters of the specific constituency (ward) from which the candidate is nominated. Consequently, the absence of this qualification constitutes a defect of a "substantial nature" that cannot be remedied by substituting a new proposer or seconder under Rule 14(7). The Court affirmed that the Returning Officer lacks the authority to permit such substitution, as the defect goes to the heart of the proposer's qualification. The judgment reinforces strict compliance with electoral nomination requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Is the requirement under Rule 12(2) of the Punjab Local Governments (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013, for a proposer and seconder to be from the same constituency mandatory?
  • Does the failure of a proposer or seconder to be a voter of the constituency constitute a defect of a substantial nature?
  • Can a Returning Officer allow the substitution of a proposer or seconder under Rule 14(7) of the Punjab Local Governments (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013, if the original proposer or seconder is unqualified?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Shafi vs Tariq Shuja Butt and others-2016 PLD Supreme Court 944 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-02
  Nomination papersLocal government electionsProposer qualificationSeconder qualificationSubstantial defectRectification of defectSubstitution of proposerMandatory provisionConstituencyWrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that accepted a writ petition, leading to the rejection of the petitioner's nomination papers for election as a general councilor. The petitioner's nomination papers were initially rejected because his proposer was not from the correct constituency. The appellate authority had allowed substitution of the proposer, but the High Court, relying on a Full Bench judgment, set aside this order. The Supreme Court considered whether Rule 12(2) of the Punjab Local Governments (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013, is mandatory, requiring a proposer/seconder to be a voter of the same constituency, and if a defect in this regard is substantial or remediable. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that Rule 12(2) is mandatory, requiring proposers/seconders to be voters of the candidate's constituency (ward). A defect in this qualification is substantial, rendering the nomination liable for rejection under Rule 14(3)(b), and is not amenable to rectification or substitution under Rule 14(7).

  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Raza Abbasi vs Sardar Abu.Bakar and 2 others2016 CLC 1051, 2016 C.L.R. 533 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-01Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Raza Abbasi vs Sardar Abu Bakar and 2 others2016 CLC 1051 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-01Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Raja vs Additional Sessions Judge and otherss2016 MLD 1810 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-03Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Khan and others vs Noureen .Sultan and others2016 MLD 1267 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-10-30Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Farooq and others vs Newze Land Electronic Trading Co. Lee2016 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-11-30
  foreign decreeexecutabilityreciprocating territorysuperior courtcivil procedureUAE law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the executability of a foreign decree in Pakistan under Section 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether a decree passed by a Federal Court of First Instance in the United Arab Emirates qualifies as a decree from a 'superior Court' under the relevant reciprocating territory notification, thereby allowing for direct execution in Pakistan. The Supreme Court examined the statutory framework, specifically Section 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the notification SRO No. 208(I)/2007, and Article 9 of the Federal Law No. 03 of 1983 (UAE). The Court held that the decree in question, having been passed by a Court of First Instance, did not meet the criteria of a 'superior Court' as defined by the notification, which specifically designates the Federal Courts of Appeal as superior courts. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment. The principle laid down is that for a foreign decree to be directly executable under Section 44-A, it must originate from a court explicitly designated as a 'superior Court' in the relevant government notification.

  Questions settled

  • Does a decree passed by a Federal Court of First Instance in the United Arab Emirates qualify as a decree from a superior court for the purposes of Section 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a foreign decree not originating from a superior court be executed in Pakistan without recourse to Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What is the status of the Federal Court of Appeal in the United Arab Emirates regarding the execution of foreign decrees in Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Elahi, CEO Ali Asghar Textile Mills Ltd. vs Director (MSRD), Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan2016 CLD 1549 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-01-22Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Elahi, CEO Ali Asghar Textile Mills Ltd vs Director (MSRD) SecuritiesAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Bhatti alias Sanni vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 558 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-30
  benefit of doubtabductionrapetheftfabrication of evidenceadverse inferencecriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentences imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Shakargarh, for offenses under sections 365-B, 376, and 380 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant was convicted of abducting, raping, and committing theft against the complainant's daughter. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, given inconsistencies in the FIR, the absence of key witnesses, and the lack of corroborative evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution's case was riddled with doubts, noting the unexplained delay in reporting, the complainant's lack of personal knowledge, the failure to produce material witnesses, and the Investigating Officer's admission of fabricating evidence regarding the victim's recovery. Furthermore, the medical evidence failed to support the allegations of rape. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellant. The key principle laid down is that the prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and where the prosecution's case is doubtful, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right, not grace.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to produce key witnesses mentioned in the FIR warrant an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt when the prosecution fails to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the Investigating Officer admits to fabricating evidence regarding the recovery of the victim?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Asghar Nadeem and others vs Province of the Punjab and others2016 PLC (C.S.) 155 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-06
  probationer terminationdue processfair trialcivil servantreading downtermination simpliciterfundamental rightsjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Section 10(1)(i) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, which allows for the termination of a probationer's service without notice, arguing it violates the right to due process and fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The core legal question was whether this provision, by denying notice and reasons for termination, infringes upon fundamental rights. The Court held that while the provision is not entirely unconstitutional, it must be 'read down' to align with constitutional mandates. The ratio establishes that where termination is punitive—based on allegations of misconduct, inefficiency, or corruption—prior notice and a fair hearing are mandatory under Article 10A. Conversely, where termination is 'simpliciter' (e.g., failure to pass departmental exams), notice is not required, but the order must explicitly state the reasons for termination. The judgment emphasizes that public authorities cannot bypass due process by opting for termination simpliciter when the underlying cause is actually punitive, as this violates the dignity and rights of the civil servant.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 10(1)(i) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, violate Article 10A of the Constitution when used to terminate a probationer for punitive reasons without notice?
  • Is a public authority required to provide reasons for the termination of a probationer even in cases of termination simpliciter?
  • Can a court employ the doctrine of 'reading down' to save a statutory provision from being declared unconstitutional?
  • Does a probationer have a right to notice and hearing when termination is based on allegations of misconduct or inefficiency?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Ahmed and others vs State and others2016 PLJ FSC 11 · Federal Shariat Court
  dacoity with murderretracted confessionjudicial confessioncircumstantial evidenceenhancement of sentencejoint trial confessionpointation recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from appeals against the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Lasbela at Hub, convicting the appellants under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for dacoity with murder, alongside a criminal revision for enhancement of sentences. The core legal questions involve the reliability of a retracted judicial confession, the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct eyewitnesses, and the extent of corroboration required to sustain a conviction under Section 396 PPC. The Federal Shariat Court held that a retracted judicial confession, when found to be voluntary and true, is sufficient for conviction if corroborated on material particulars by strong circumstantial evidence such as recoveries of crime weapons, stolen property, and matching medical evidence. The court dismissed the appeals, upheld the convictions, and partly accepted the revision petition to enhance the sentence of one of the appellants. The key principle laid down is that retracted judicial confessions, fortified by trustworthy circumstantial evidence and recoveries, can legally form the sole basis of a conviction in heinous criminal cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession be the basis for a criminal conviction without independent corroboration?
  • Whether a confession made by one co-accused during a joint trial can be taken into consideration against other co-accused under the law?
  • Does a delay of three days in recording a judicial confession render it suspicious or inadmissible?
  • Whether circumstantial evidence consisting of weapon recovery and medical corroboration is sufficient to prove an offence under Section 396 PPC?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Ahmad Khan and Others vs Government of Balochistan2016 NLR Civil 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-30
  local council propertypublic purposelease of public propertycompetitive biddingenhancement of rentreview applicationSection 12(2) CPCpublic interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from an order of the High Court of Balochistan enhancing the monthly rent of 'Cafe Baldia' payable by the petitioners to the Metropolitan Corporation Quetta. During proceedings before the Supreme Court, the parties presented an unapproved and unregistered agreement proposing to demolish the cafe and replace it with a commercial multi-storied plaza, requesting the Court to dispose of the petition accordingly. The core legal questions involved whether local council property could be converted or alienated through a private agreement contrary to public interest and statutory mandates, and whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to approve such an agreement. The Supreme Court rejected the agreement, holding that local council property can only be used for public purposes, cannot be alienated without competitive public bidding, and that local authorities are personally liable for financial losses caused by unauthorized acts. Addressing the petitioners' factual grievance regarding the rent increase, the Supreme Court transmitted the petition to the High Court to be treated as an application for review or under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Can local council property be converted or leased without public auction or competitive bidding under the Balochistan Local Government Act, 2010?
  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to accord approval to a private compromise agreement concerning municipal property that falls outside the purview of the pending litigation?
  • Are local council officials personally liable for loss or waste resulting from property disposal decisions made in violation of statutory provisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Ahmad Khan and others vs Government of Balochistan2016 SCMR 1543, 2016 PLJ SC 801 · Appellate Jurisdiction · 2016-06-01Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Abbas vs District Coordination Officer and 3 others2016 P Cr. L J 590 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-25
  locus standiaggrieved personconstitutional jurisdictioncancellation reportdisputed questions of factwrit petitionalternative remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a Magistrate's order accepting a police cancellation report in a criminal case involving allegations of domicile fraud. The petitioner, who was neither the complainant nor a witness in the FIR, sought to set aside the Magistrate's order, claiming the investigation was flawed and that the accused had obtained employment through deceit. The Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the petitioner lacked the necessary locus standi to challenge the order as an 'aggrieved person' under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any violation of a vested legal or fundamental right. Furthermore, the Court held that disputed questions of fact regarding the authenticity of documents cannot be resolved through constitutional jurisdiction, which requires the recording of evidence. The Court affirmed that the petitioner had alternative, efficacious remedies available, such as filing a private complaint, approaching the police hierarchy under the Police Order, 2002, or initiating civil proceedings to challenge the validity of the documents.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person who is neither a complainant nor a witness in an FIR have the locus standi to challenge a Magistrate's order accepting a police cancellation report?
  • Can the High Court resolve disputed questions of fact regarding the authenticity of documents while exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable when the petitioner has alternative, efficacious remedies available such as filing a private complaint or a civil suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadar Shah and 9 others vs Province of Sindh through Secretary and another2016 PLD Sindh 586 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-31Read full judgment →
• Nabid Baig vs Chairman, PPSC Lahore, etcK.L.R. 2016 Labour and Service 103, 2016 LHC 1670, 2016 PLJ Lahore 903, 2016 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-24
  service rulesage relaxationPunjab Public Service Commissionfundamental rightsjudicial review of policydiscriminationcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the age limit condition prescribed for the post of Deputy Director Technical (BPS-18) in the Anti-Corruption Establishment Department, seeking a direction for age relaxation and an amendment to the service rules to lower the minimum age requirement. The petitioner contended that the age limit was discriminatory and infringed upon his fundamental rights. The Court held that the fixation of age limits for government posts is a policy matter within the domain of the competent authority, and courts should not interfere unless there is a gross violation of fundamental rights. The Court determined that the age condition applied uniformly to all candidates and thus did not constitute discrimination. Furthermore, the Court ruled that age relaxation is a prerogative of the competent authority and cannot be claimed as a vested right. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition, observing that the petitioner could compete when he met the prescribed age criteria, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court direct the government to amend service rules to lower the minimum age requirement for a government post?
  • Does the fixation of a minimum age limit for a public service post constitute a violation of fundamental rights?
  • Is age relaxation for a government post a vested right that a candidate can claim?
  • Does an age limit condition applied uniformly to all candidates in a public advertisement constitute discrimination?
  Read full judgment →
• Nabid Baig vs Chairman, PPSC Lahore etc.2016 PLJ Lahore 903 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-24
  constitutional petitionage relaxationservice rulesfundamental rightsdiscriminationpublic service commissionpolicy matters
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 was filed seeking directions to the respondents to grant age relaxation in the lower age limit for the post of Deputy Director Technical in the Anti-Corruption Establishment Department, and to amend the relevant service rules. The core legal questions involved whether the prescription of a minimum age limit in service rules violates fundamental rights or constitutes discrimination, and whether the court can interfere in policy matters regarding service rules and age qualifications. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the fixation of age limits is a policy matter falling within the domain of the executive and rule-making authorities, and that age criteria applicable uniformly across the board to all prospective candidates do not violate fundamental rights or amount to discrimination. Furthermore, the court held that age relaxation is a prerogative of the competent authority and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The key principle laid down is that courts should not ordinarily interfere with government policy or service rules unless a gross violation of fundamental rights is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prescription of a minimum age limit in service rules for a public post constitutes discrimination against an underage candidate?
  • Can age relaxation be claimed as a matter of vested right by a candidate?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere with the policy matters and service rules framed by the executive or competent authority?
  • Does the fixation of different age limits for different posts in the same grade violate fundamental rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Nabid Baig vs Chairman, PPSC Lahore etc2016 LHC 1670 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-24
  constitutional petitionage relaxationservice rulespublic service commissiondiscriminationfundamental rightspolicy matters
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed seeking directions against the respondents to grant age relaxation in the lower age limit for the post of Deputy Director Technical (BPS-18) in the Anti-Corruption Establishment Department, and to amend the relevant service rules. The core legal questions involved whether the prescribed minimum age limit of 35 years was discriminatory against the petitioner and whether the court could interfere in policy matters and rule-making regarding age qualifications. The Lahore High Court held that the age limit applied uniformly to all prospective candidates and did not constitute discrimination, that age relaxation is a prerogative of the competent authority rather than a vested right, and that courts should not ordinarily interfere in government policy or service rules unless fundamental rights are violated. The petition was accordingly dismissed as meritless.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prescription of a minimum age limit for a public post applies uniformly and constitutes discrimination?
  • Can age relaxation be claimed as a matter of vested right by a candidate?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere in service rules and policy matters regarding age requirements for government posts?
  • Does the fixation of minimum age limits for specialized government posts infringe upon fundamental rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Nabi Gul vs The State and another2016 YLR 1013 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-06-11Read full judgment →
• Nabeel vs State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 737 · Lahore High Court · 2016-06-27
  post-arrest baildelay in F.I.R.unlawful assemblyfurther probefirst offender
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in case F.I.R. No. 975 of 2015 registered under Sections 337-A(iii), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Cantt. Multan, on allegations of being part of an unlawful assembly and inflicting injuries. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Lahore High Court accepted the bail application, holding that the unexplained delay of fourteen days in lodging the F.I.R. and six days in the medical examination, the tentative assessment of applicability of Tazir under Section 337-N(2), the completion of recovery with the petitioner no longer required for investigation, and his status as a first offender constituted sufficient grounds for further probe. The key principle laid down is that delayed reporting, coupled with the debatable applicability of penal enhancements and completed recoveries, brings a case within the scope of further inquiry warranting post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging the F.I.R. and medical examination constitute grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the accused is no longer required for investigation and has no previous criminal record?
  • Does the tentative assessment of the applicability of Tazir punishments under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 justify the grant of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Nabeel Ahmed vs StatePLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Karachi) 330 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-10
  post-arrest bailunlicensed pistolrecoverymushirfurther inquiryrule of consistency
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal bail application has been filed by the applicant seeking post-arrest bail in Crime No. 320 of 2014 registered under Section 23-1(A) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 at Police Station Sir Syed Karachi, following the dismissal of his earlier bail plea by the trial court. The core legal question concerns whether the applicant is entitled to post-arrest bail in light of alleged procedural defects in the recovery and the principle of consistency. The Sindh High Court held that the failure of the police to associate independent local witnesses as mushirs for the arrest and recovery created reasonable doubt regarding the recovery proceedings, bringing the case within the scope of further inquiry. The Court further noted that a co-accused had already been granted bail, making the rule of consistency applicable, and that the applicant had been detained without the need for further investigation. Consequently, the Court admitted the applicant to post-arrest bail, establishing that lack of independent verification in recovery proceedings and the rule of consistency constitute valid grounds for granting bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to associate independent local witnesses as mushirs for an arrest and recovery creates reasonable doubt warranting post-arrest bail?
  • Does the rule of consistency apply when a co-accused has already been granted bail in the same case?
  • Can an accused be granted bail when the case falls within the purview of further inquiry based on tentative assessment?
  Read full judgment →
• NAB through D.G. NAB Lahore vs Judge Accountability Court, etc.2016 LHC 3608 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-16Read full judgment →
• M/s.J.K. Brothers Pakistan Pvt. Ltd. vs Additional Commissioner Inland2016 PLJ Lahore 35 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s.HH Misbah Securities vs The Director, Market Supervision and CapitalAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• M/s. Zainab Textile Mills Limited. vs NotSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 1970-01-01Read full judgment →
• M/s. Zahid Packages vs The Additional (Pvt) Limited. Collector of CustomsPTCL 2016 CL. 708 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-09-03Read full judgment →
• M/s. X.E.N. Shahpur Division (LJC) Quarry Sub-Division, Sargodha. vs ThePTCL 2016 CL. 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constitutional immunityprovincial government propertysales tax exemptionestoppel against the ConstitutionArticle 165federal taxationquarrying operations
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the imposition of sales tax on the petitioner, an Executive Engineer (XEN) of the Punjab Irrigation Department, regarding quarrying operations. The core legal questions were whether the XEN constitutes the Provincial Government under Article 165(1) of the Constitution, whether quarried stones qualify as property under that Article, and whether prior payment of tax creates an estoppel against claiming constitutional exemption. The Supreme Court held that the XEN acts on behalf of the Provincial Government and is not a separate entity; thus, the quarrying operations are protected under Article 165(1), which prohibits Federal taxation of Provincial Government property. The Court further ruled that stones constitute property under the broad definition in Article 260. Crucially, the Court established that there is no estoppel against the Constitution; therefore, the appellant’s previous payment of sales tax did not preclude it from asserting its constitutional immunity. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's decision and affirming that the Federal Government cannot tax the property of a Provincial Government.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Executive Engineer of a provincial department constitute the Provincial Government for the purposes of Article 165(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Do quarried stones and spawl constitute property within the meaning of Article 165(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a party be estopped from claiming constitutional exemption from taxation due to the prior payment of such taxes?
  • Does Article 165A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 override the tax immunity granted to a Provincial Government under Article 165(1)?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. X.E.N. Shahpur Division (LJC) Quarry Sub-Division, Sargodha vs2016 PLJ SC 606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constitutional immunityprovincial governmentsales taxestoppel against the constitutionfederal taxationproperty of provincial governmentstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the imposition of sales tax by the Federal Government on the Irrigation Department of the Government of Punjab, specifically the Executive Engineer (XEN) of the Shahpur Division. The core legal questions were whether the XEN constitutes the Provincial Government, whether quarried stones qualify as property under the Constitution, and whether prior payment of sales tax estops the appellant from claiming constitutional exemption. The Supreme Court held that the XEN is an integral part of the Provincial Government and that stones/spawl constitute property under Article 260 of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court ruled that the Provincial Government is immune from Federal taxation under Article 165(1) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The Court further held that there is no estoppel against the Constitution; thus, the appellant’s previous payment of tax did not preclude it from asserting its constitutional immunity. The judgment clarifies that Article 165A, which pertains to corporations and institutions, does not override the fundamental immunity granted to Provincial Governments under Article 165(1).

  Questions settled

  • Is the Executive Engineer of a Provincial Government department considered part of the Provincial Government for the purposes of Article 165(1) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Do stones and spawl constitute property within the meaning of Article 165(1) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can a party be estopped from claiming constitutional exemption from taxation due to having previously paid such tax?
  • Does Article 165A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, override the exemption from Federal taxation granted to Provincial Governments under Article 165(1)?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. World Trans Logistics etc. vs Silk Bank Limited and others2016 PLJ SC 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-29
  banking recoverypledge of goodsconstructive possessionfinancial institutionsduty of carecontractual liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed an appeal against a banking recovery decree. The core legal question was whether a bank, as a pledgee, is liable for the loss or misappropriation of pledged goods when the pledgor retained actual physical possession under a "constructive possession" arrangement. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the bank was not liable. The Court reasoned that in commercial pledges involving raw materials or stocks-in-trade, the pledgor often retains actual possession to utilize goods in the ordinary course of business. Under the specific terms of the "letter of pledge" and the nature of such transactions, the pledgor acts as a trustee for the pledgee and bears the duty of care. Consequently, where the bank holds only constructive possession, it cannot be held accountable for the theft or misappropriation of the goods. The judgment clarifies that the character of a pledge remains valid despite the absence of physical delivery, and the pledgor remains responsible for the security of the inventory.

  Questions settled

  • Can a valid pledge be created through constructive possession without actual physical delivery of the goods?
  • Is a pledgee bank liable for the loss or misappropriation of pledged goods if the pledgor retained actual physical possession?
  • Does the standard of care under the Contract Act shift to the pledgor when the pledgor retains physical possession of pledged goods for business use?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. Wbrld Trans Logistics, etc. vs Silk Bank Limited and others2016 P.S.C. 426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-29
  pledgeconstructive possessionbanking recoverypledgor liabilityfinancial institutionsbailment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed an appeal against a banking recovery decree. The petitioner, a borrower, argued that the respondent bank was liable for the alleged misappropriation of pledged goods, claiming the bank held responsibility as the pledgee. The core legal question was whether a bank is liable for the loss of pledged goods when the pledge agreement grants the borrower constructive possession and the liberty to utilize the goods in the ordinary course of business. The Supreme Court held that where a pledge agreement allows the pledgor to retain actual possession and use the goods, the pledgor acts as a trustee for the pledgee and bears the responsibility for the goods' safety. The Court ruled that the bank, holding only constructive possession, was not liable for the loss. The principle laid down is that in mercantile pledges involving stocks-in-trade, the standard of care under the Contract Act falls on the pledgor, and the pledgee is not accountable for loss or theft of goods retained in the pledgor's actual possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can a valid pledge be created through constructive possession without the actual physical delivery of goods?
  • Does a pledgee bank bear liability for the loss of pledged goods if the pledgor retains actual physical possession and the right to use the goods?
  • Does the standard of care for pledged goods under the Contract Act 1872 shift to the pledgor when the pledgor retains actual possession for business purposes?
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• M/s. United Foam Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., etc. vs M/s. Joy Foam (Pvt.) Ltd., etc.2016 P C T L R 807 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-09Read full judgment →
• M/s. Umer Fabrics Limited vs Commissioner (Enforcement) Securities andAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• M/s. Trade Link Corporation and Others vs Federation of Pakistan andPTCL 2016 CL. 735 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Time Trading Co. vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2016 P.C.T.L.R. 648 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-16Read full judgment →
• M/s. Time Trading Co. vs Federation of Pakistan etc.2016 P.C.T.L.R. 648, 2016 PTD 2227, 2016 PLJ Lahore 914 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-16Read full judgment →
• M/s. Taj Packages Company (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan and 62016 PTD 203, PTCL 2016 CL. 402 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-04-30Read full judgment →
• M/s. Summit Bank Limited vs Muhammad Ramzan2016 PLJ Islamabad 49 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-09-29
  damagestortmalicious prosecutiondishonored chequegeneral damagesfinance facilityrecovery suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular first appeal challenges the trial court's judgment and decree whereby a suit for damages filed by Respondent No. 1 against the appellant bank was decreed for Rs. 1,000,000/-. The core legal question revolves around whether filing a police complaint based on a dishonored cheque and an outstanding finance facility constitutes a wrongful act or malicious prosecution entitling the plaintiff to general damages. The Islamabad High Court held that the mere filing of a police complaint upon the dishonor of a cheque does not amount to a legal wrong or malicious prosecution, especially where the matter was amicably resolved and withdrawn, and where the plaintiff failed to prove any direct loss or injury. The court set aside the trial court's decree and dismissed the suit, establishing that general or special damages cannot be awarded in the absence of a proven wrongful act and direct proximate loss.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of a police complaint based on a dishonored cheque constitute a wrongful act or malicious prosecution?
  • Can general damages be awarded in a suit for damages without proof of a wrongful act and direct loss?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to establish a case of malicious prosecution?
  • Is a bank liable for damages for invoking police assistance over an outstanding finance default subsequently settled amicably?
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• M/s. Summit Bank Limited through Its Manager vs Mis. Qasim & Co.2016 NLR Civil 223 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Naeem Khan vs State through Aag at Bannu and another2016 P Cr. L J 1378 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-04-22
  murderbenefit of doubtsolitary eyewitnessmedical evidence contradictionabscondencecorroborative evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Trial Court convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to life imprisonment, along with a connected revision petition for enhancement of the sentence. The core legal question revolves around whether the ocular account of a solitary, related eyewitness—contradicted by medical evidence regarding firing distance and victim injuries, showing unnatural conduct, and marred by delayed reporting and material improvements—can form the basis of a conviction, and whether circumstantial evidence and abscondence can substitute for substantive proof. The Peshawar High Court held that the testimony of the solitary eyewitness was untrustworthy and in gross conflict with the medical evidence, meaning corroborative pieces of evidence like recoveries and abscondence could not sustain a conviction in the absence of reliable substantive evidence. The court laid down the principle that corroborative evidence only tests the veracity of ocular testimony and cannot independently establish guilt when the primary eyewitness account is disbelieved, and that any reasonable doubt arising in the prosecution case must be resolved in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder under Section 302 be sustained solely on the testimony of a solitary eyewitness whose presence and conduct are unnatural and whose account contradicts medical evidence?
  • Whether corroborative evidence such as weapon recovery, bloodstained articles, and crime empties can independently sustain a conviction when the primary ocular testimony is disbelieved?
  • Does abscondence of an accused serve as a substitute for substantive evidence of guilt in the absence of reliable eyewitness testimony?
  • What is the effect of material contradictions and unexplained delay in lodging the FIR on the credibility of a complainant witness in a criminal trial?
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• M/s. State Corporation Customs Clearing Agents, Lahore. vsPTCL 2016 CL. 643 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-04-25Read full judgment →
• M/s. SMS Courier (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Collector (Appeals) Customs and another.PTCL 2016 CL. 375 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-28Read full judgment →
• M/s. Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan through Chairman2016 CLD 1164, 2016 PLJ Peshawar 174 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-02-04Read full judgment →
• M/s. Sarwar Brothers vs Habib Bank Limited, etc.2016 PLJ Lahore 103 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-04Read full judgment →
• M/s. Sarwar & Company (Pvt.) Limited vs The Appellate Tribunal Inland2016 P.C.T.L.R. 921 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Sarhad Restaurant, Lahore vs C.I.R. (Appeals-Ill), Lahore2016 P.C.T.L.R. 184 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-06-03Read full judgment →
• M/s. Samar & Company (Pvt.) Limited vs The Appellate Tribunal Inland2016 LHC 2782, 2016 P.C.T.L.R. 921, 2016 P.C.T.L.R. 1028 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Rahman Cotton Mills Ltd., Malakand Road, Takht Bhai, Mardan vs2016 PLJ Peshawar 98 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Raas System Enterprises through Authorize Representative vs2016 PLJ Karachi 207 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-14Read full judgment →
• M/s. Qadir Fabrics. vs Federation of Pakistan and 3 others.PTCL 2016 CL. 48 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-06Read full judgment →
• M/s. Power Construction Corporation of China Limited (previously2016 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil petition for leave to appealpre-qualification of biddersworld bank guidelinesinternational financial institutionsjudicial reviewpublic policyjudicial restraintconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from judgments of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner company's writ petition and intra-court appeal against its disqualification from pre-qualification for the Dasu Hydropower Project's main works. The petitioner, a Chinese construction company, was initially included in the list of pre-qualified bidders by WAPDA, but was subsequently disqualified after the International Development Association (IDA), a World Bank group member funding the project, requested its deletion pursuant to World Bank procurement guidelines. The core legal question concerns whether WAPDA's acceptance of the IDA's request and the consequent disqualification of the petitioner are justiciable in the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, and whether such policy decisions involving international financing agreements warrant judicial interference. The Supreme Court held that the IDA's decision was not challenged nor was the IDA a party, and WAPDA's pragmatic commercial decision not to jeopardize vital foreign funding fell within the realm of public policy, necessitating judicial restraint. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a decision by a national procuring agency to comply with an international funding institution's request to delete a bidder from a pre-qualification list is subject to judicial review?
  • Can an international financial institution like the International Development Association be subjected to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does a pragmatic commercial decision by the executive regarding the protection of foreign funding for a vital public infrastructure project fall within the domain of non-justiciable policy matters?
  • Whether the failure to challenge the foundational decision of an international funding body and to implead it as a party renders a constitutional petition against a local procuring agency's consequential action unmaintainable?
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• M/s. Popular International Limited, Karachi through Authorized Officer2016 PLD Sindh 19, 2016 PLJ Karachi 109 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-04Read full judgment →
• M/s. Pharmawise Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., Lahore through Chief Executive2016 PLJ Lahore 442 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Peshawar Electric Supply Co., Peshawar. vs The Cir, Rto, Peshawar.PTCL 2016 CL. 689 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-06-09Read full judgment →
• M/s. Paktel Limited,Islamabad. vs Collector of Central Excise & Sales Tax,PTCL 2016 CL. 296 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Pak Fibre Industries, Limited vs NotSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 1970-01-01Read full judgment →
• M/s. Pak Arab Pipeline Company Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and 2 othersPTCL 2016 CL. 362 · Sindh High Court · 2015-10-08Read full judgment →
• M/s. North West Corporation, Karachi. vs Superintendent, DirectoratePTCL 2016 CL. 116 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-05-08
  customs adjudicationpost-importation seizurejurisdiction of customs authoritiessales tax recoverylimitation periodmis-declarationredemption fine
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-appeals against an adjudication order regarding the seizure of a container by the Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation after its clearance by Customs authorities. The core legal questions were whether the Directorate possessed the jurisdiction to adjudicate and recover short-paid Sales Tax and Income Tax post-importation, and whether the adjudication proceedings were barred by the limitation period prescribed under the Customs Act, 1969. The Tribunal held that while Customs authorities may collect taxes at the import stage, they lack jurisdiction to adjudicate or recover Sales Tax and Income Tax post-clearance, as such authority vests in Inland Revenue officers. Furthermore, the Tribunal found the adjudication order time-barred under Section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969. The key principle laid down is that Customs authorities act merely as collecting agents for other taxes at the import stage and cannot initiate recovery proceedings for those taxes post-importation without proper authorization from the relevant Inland Revenue authorities. Consequently, the Tribunal remitted the personal penalty and reduced the redemption fine.

  Questions settled

  • Do Customs authorities have the jurisdiction to adjudicate and recover short-paid Sales Tax and Income Tax post-importation?
  • Are adjudication proceedings under the Customs Act, 1969, subject to a strict limitation period for the issuance of an order?
  • Can the Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation initiate recovery proceedings for Sales Tax and Income Tax without a notice from the Commissioner of Inland Revenue?
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• M/s. Nishat Chunian Ltd. And others vs Securities and ExchangeSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• M/s. Nazir Cotton Mills Limited. vs NotSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• M/s. Mustafa Impox, Karachi and others vs The Government of Pakistan2016 P C T L R 721 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Federal GovernmentRules of Businesssales tax exemptionsubordinate legislationcollective responsibilityexecutive authorityCabinet approval
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter entails appeals filed by importers of cellular phones and textile goods challenging the withdrawal and modification of sales tax exemptions through notifications issued under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal question revolves around whether the statutory power of the Federal Government to grant or modify tax exemptions can be exercised by individual functionaries like a Secretary or the Prime Minister without the prior approval of the Cabinet, and the proper construction of 'Federal Government' under Article 90 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Government consists collectively of the Prime Minister and Federal Ministers (the Cabinet), and statutory powers vested in the Federal Government cannot be exercised unilaterally by the Prime Minister, a single Minister, or a Secretary. The Court ruled that mandatory provisions of the Rules of Business, 1973, requiring Cabinet approval for fiscal measures must be strictly followed, and struck down the impugned notifications as well as Rule 16(2) of the Rules of Business to the extent it enabled bypassing the Cabinet. The key principles laid down include the supremacy of collective Cabinet responsibility in executive governance and the mandatory nature of the Rules of Business in the exercise of delegated fiscal powers.

  Questions settled

  • Who constitutes the Federal Government under Article 90 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Whether the Prime Minister alone can exercise powers statutorily conferred upon the Federal Government without the approval of the Cabinet?
  • Are the provisions of the Rules of Business, 1973, mandatory for the valid exercise of executive and legislative powers by the Government?
  • Does the Chairman of the Federal Board of Revenue or the Secretary of the Revenue Division possess the independent authority to issue fiscal notifications modifying tax rates without Cabinet sanction?
  • Whether fiscal notifications issued in violation of Rule 16 of the Rules of Business are ultra vires and void?
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