Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Muhammad Yousaf vs State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 481 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-20
  post-arrest bailemigration offencefurther inquirydelay in FIRprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was filed by the petitioner seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 17/22 of the Emigration Ordinance 1979. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner fraudulently received Rs. 5,20,000/- from the complainant to send three relatives abroad, but failed to do so or return the money. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given a two-year delay in lodging the FIR and the absence of any recovery during investigation. The Lahore High Court held that because the petitioner had been in custody since August 2015, was not a previous convict, and was no longer required for investigation, further detention served no purpose. Additionally, since the alternative sentences of imprisonment or fine under the statute would be determined at trial, the case fell within the ambit of further inquiry. Consequently, the Court accepted the bail application, establishing that unexplained delay in FIR registration combined with a lack of criminal history can render a case fit for further inquiry under bail provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained delay of two years in lodging an FIR for emigration fraud can make the prosecution's case one of further inquiry for the purposes of granting bail?
  • Does the absence of criminal history and lack of any recovery during investigation support the grant of post-arrest bail in offences under the Emigration Ordinance 1979?
  • Can post-arrest bail be granted where the statutory sentence provides alternative punishments of imprisonment or fine, leaving the final sentence to be determined only at trial?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs Abdul Qayyum2016 PLD Supreme Court 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-12-08
  malicious prosecutiondamagesreasonable and probable causemalicetort lawfalse FIRconcurrent findingscivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for damages for malicious prosecution. The petitioner had initially lodged an FIR for vehicle theft and subsequently implicated the respondent via a supplementary statement based on alleged hearsay from a third party. The respondent was arrested and detained for seven days before being discharged when the vehicle was recovered from another individual. The trial court, appellate court, and High Court concurrently decreed the suit in favor of the respondent. The Supreme Court, in dismissing the petition, examined the essential ingredients of the tort of malicious prosecution: the initiation of proceedings without reasonable and probable cause, motivated by malice, resulting in the plaintiff's favor, and causing damage. The Court held that while 'absence of reasonable and probable cause' and 'malice' are distinct, malice can be inferred from circumstantial evidence and the lack of an honest belief in the accused's guilt. The failure of the petitioner to produce the informant as a witness indicated a lack of reasonable basis for the accusation, justifying the inference of malice. The Court emphasized that civil suits for malicious prosecution are vital to curbing the societal propensity for false criminal accusations.

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• Muhammad Yousaf etc. vs State etc.PLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 542 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-03
  pre-arrest bailbail confirmationdelay in FIRtentative assessmentovert actcriminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners Muhammad Yousaf, Ghulam Murtaza, and Imran Abbas sought pre-arrest bail in case F.I.R. No. 495 of 2015 registered under Sections 337-A(iii), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Yousafwala, District Sahiwal. The core legal question concerned the entitlement of the petitioners to pre-arrest bail in light of the roles attributed to them and the delay in lodging the F.I.R. The Lahore High Court held that petitioner Muhammad Yousaf, being specifically nominated with a role corroborated by the medical certificate and witness statements, was not entitled to pre-arrest bail, resulting in the dismissal of his petition. However, the court confirmed the pre-arrest bail of petitioners Ghulam Murtaza and Imran Abbas, noting that no specific injury or overt act was attributed to them, that they had joined the investigation, and that the investigation was complete. The key legal principle laid down is that pre-arrest bail may be denied to an accused with a specific, corroborated role involving grievous hurt, while it may be confirmed for co-accused lacking specific overt acts who have fully participated in completed investigations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused specifically nominated in the FIR with a corroborated role of causing a fracture is entitled to pre-arrest bail?
  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR affect the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be confirmed for co-accused who are not attributed any specific overt acts and have joined the investigation?
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• Muhammad Yousaf and another vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 373 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-04-10
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtocular testimonycontradictionsabscondencemedical evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing them to life imprisonment for murder. The core legal questions involved the credibility of the ocular account furnished by closely related and interested witnesses, the corroborative value of medical evidence and abscondence, and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Peshawar High Court held that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses suffered from material contradictions, were inconsistent with medical evidence and natural human conduct, and that the abandonment of a cited witness warranted an adverse inference. Emphasizing that the prosecution must establish guilt through cogent evidence and that a single reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right, the court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of closely related eyewitnesses be relied upon without confidence-inspiring corroboration?
  • What is the legal effect of the prosecution abandoning a material eyewitness named in the FIR?
  • Can the factum of abscondence alone sustain a conviction when direct evidence fails to establish guilt?
  • What is the standard of proof required regarding reasonable doubt in criminal cases?
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• Muhammad Younus Chief Executive Haji Abdul Ghani Director MehmoodAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younus and another vs Director General FIA and othersK.L.R. 2016 Labour & Service C · Federal Service Tribunal · 2015-09-11
  adverse remarksAnnual Confidential Reportcountersigning officerreporting officerservice tribunalpromotioncivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from consolidated appeals filed by two Assistant Sub-Inspectors of the Federal Investigation Agency challenging the recording of adverse remarks in their Annual Confidential Reports by the countersigning officer. The core legal question concerns the validity of adverse remarks recorded by a countersigning officer which disagree with the reporting officer's positive assessment without cogent reasoning or sufficient observation period. The Federal Service Tribunal held that the countersigning officer's remarks lacked strong and cogent reasoning to displace the reporting officer's 'very good' assessment, especially given the short duration of subordination and subsequent promotion of the appellants. The Tribunal laid down the principle that strong and cogent reasoning is required to brush aside the remarks of a reporting officer, and that adverse remarks become toothless upon the subsequent promotion of the civil servant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether strong and cogent reasoning is required for a countersigning officer to disagree with a reporting officer's ACR remarks?
  • Do adverse remarks in an ACR become ineffective or toothless upon the subsequent promotion of a civil servant?
  • Can adverse remarks be sustained when the period of observation by the countersigning officer is too short to make such an assessment?
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• Muhammad Younis vs Taluka Municipal Administration, Taluka2016 MLD 916 · Sindh High Court · 2015-10-07Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younas vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 593 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-12-04
  post-arrest bailHundi HawalaForeign Exchange Regulation Actbail as rulecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition concerns an application for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, Muhammad Younas, who was charged under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, for allegedly engaging in the illegal business of Hundi Hawala without a valid license or permit. The core legal question before the Peshawar High Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to the grant of bail given the nature of the offenses charged. The Court, without delving into the merits of the case, observed that the punishments prescribed for the offenses charged against the petitioner do not fall within the restrictive limb of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Emphasizing the established legal principle that in such cases, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, the Court found no exceptional circumstances warranting the denial of bail. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the petitioner was admitted to bail subject to furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned Judicial Magistrate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the offense of engaging in illegal Hundi Hawala business fall within the restrictive limb of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the grant of bail the rule and refusal the exception in cases where the offense does not fall within the restrictive limb of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Younas Gujjar and 2 others vs District Police Officer and others2016 YLR 307 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younas and another vs Ghazanfar Abbas and 12 otherss2016 PLJ Lahore 1069 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-02
  civil revisiongift deedfraud and misrepresentationinheritancelis pendensburden of proofregistered instrumentQanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arose from a suit for declaration and cancellation of a gift deed and subsequent revenue mutations, filed by the legal heirs of a deceased woman against her brothers. The plaintiffs alleged the defendants fraudulently procured a gift deed from their father after his death to deprive their sister of her inheritance. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court decreed it. The High Court upheld the appellate decision, finding that the defendants failed to prove the genuineness of the gift deed. The Court held that a registered document, when challenged, loses its presumption of truth, requiring independent proof of execution. Furthermore, the Court ruled that documents created during the pendency of litigation are hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, and that a 30-year-old document under Article 100 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984 is admissible but does not create a presumption of the truth of its contents. Ultimately, the Court affirmed that fraud vitiates all proceedings and that inheritance claims involving fraud are not barred by limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the registration of a gift deed create an irrebuttable presumption of the validity of the transaction?
  • Does a document that is more than 30 years old under Article 100 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984 create a presumption regarding the truth of its contents?
  • Can a document created during the pendency of a suit be relied upon in evidence?
  • Does the limitation period bar a suit for inheritance where the underlying transaction is alleged to be fraudulent?
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• Muhammad You nis Khan and 5 others vs Inhabitants_Public at large, through Subidar Akhtar Hussain2016 P.S.C. 807 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2014-08-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasir Khan vs State2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-09-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasin etc. vs The State etc.2016 LHC 3272 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-19
  benefit of doubtmurder trialcriminal appealocular accountmedical evidence contradictiondelayed FIR nominationsafe custody of recoveries
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and sentencing them to life imprisonment. The core legal question involves determining whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically regarding delayed naming of the accused, discrepancies in the time of occurrence, medical and ocular inconsistencies, and doubtful weapon recoveries. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution evidence suffered from serious infirmities, including delayed nomination of appellants, contradictions between oral testimony and medical evidence regarding the time of death, and failure to establish safe custody of alleged weapon recoveries. The court laid down the principle that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right, leading to the acceptance of the appeal and the acquittal of the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contradictions between oral testimony and medical evidence regarding the time of death are sufficient to create reasonable doubt in a criminal case?
  • Does a supplementary statement recording the delayed nomination of accused persons carry the same evidentiary value as a prompt First Information Report?
  • What is the legal effect of the prosecution's failure to prove the safe custody and proper handling of alleged weapon recoveries?
  • Whether the benefit of doubt must be extended to an accused as a matter of right when the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt?
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• Muhammad Yaseen vs The State2016 PLD Sindh 521 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-03
  qatl-i-khatarash and negligent drivingdiyyatenhancement of sentencecompetence of witnessestraffic accidentcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the appellant's conviction under Sections 320, 337, and 427 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for rash and negligent driving resulting in the death of six persons and injuries to several others. The core legal questions involve the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, whether the trial court's sentence of imprisonment without the mandatory payment of diyyat was legally correct, and the appellate court's power to enhance the sentence to include diyyat. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, upheld the conviction based on unimpeachable eyewitness testimony which went uncrossed and unrefuted by the appellant on oath, and modified the sentence to include the mandatory payment of diyyat to the legal heirs of the deceased victims alongside the five-year rigorous imprisonment. The key principle laid down is that under Section 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, the punishment of diyyat is mandatory and must be awarded in addition to imprisonment upon conviction for qatl-i-khata by rash or negligent driving.

  Questions settled

  • Is the payment of diyyat mandatory upon conviction for qatl-i-khata through rash or negligent driving under Section 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the testimony of female witnesses alone or alongside other evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction in matters outside the scope of Hudood laws under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Can an appellate court issue a notice to enhance a sentence to include mandatory statutory compensation such as diyyat?
  • What is the effect of an accused failing to depose on oath under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to rebut specific allegations of rash and negligent driving?
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• Muhammad Yaseen vs State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 720 · Lahore High Court · 2016-04-25Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaseen vs Nizamuddin through L.Rs. and 6 others2016 MLD 358 · Sindh High Court · 2014-11-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaseen vs Election Commission and others2016 CLC 1280 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaseen Kalwar vs Alamzeb and others2016 MLD 1058 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-10-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaseen and another vs Commissioner, Income Tax, Aj&KPLJ 2016 Tax Cases (AJ&K) 19 · High Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Yar alias Mami vs The State2016 MLD 261 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-25
  criminal appealSection 322 PPCexculpatory statementSection 342 CrPCburden of proofacquittalroad accident
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 322, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following his trial for murder. The trial court had acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, after rejecting the prosecution's ocular evidence as unreliable. However, the trial court convicted the appellant under Section 322, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, relying solely on the appellant's statement recorded under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, wherein he characterized the incident as a road accident. The core legal question was whether an accused can be convicted based on a statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, after the prosecution's case has been disbelieved. The Court held that the appellant's statement was exculpatory, not a confession of guilt, and that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Establishing that an accused's statement must be considered as a whole and not piecemeal, the Court ruled that the conviction was unsustainable. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted under Section 322, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, solely based on their statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, after the prosecution's evidence has been disbelieved?
  • Should an accused's statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, be read as a whole or in part when determining criminal liability?
  • Does an exculpatory statement by an accused constitute an admission of guilt sufficient to sustain a conviction?
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• Muhammad Yaqub Brohi vs Ministry of Housing & Works and others2016 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2016-10-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob, Exfield Market Officer vs Bayer Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.2016 PLC 54, 2016 PLJ Tr.C. (NIRC) 16 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 2015-08-18
  workmanindustrial relationstermination of servicemanagement cadrejurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 was filed by the petitioner challenging his termination from service and the rejection of his departmental appeal, alleging unfair labor practice and seeking reinstatement with back benefits. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who served as a Senior Field Marketing Officer and was part of the management cadre drawing substantial salary and allowances, qualified as a 'workman' or 'worker' under the statute to invoke the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Relations Commission. The Commission held that based on the documentary evidence, appointment terms, and management cadre responsibilities, the petitioner did not fall within the definition of a workman and therefore the petition was not maintainable. The key principle laid down is that an employee whose duties, designation, and remuneration place them within the management cadre, enjoying special allowances and benefits incompatible with those of a workman, cannot invoke labor legislation designed exclusively for workmen.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee appointed in the management cadre and drawing substantial allowances qualifies as a workman under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have jurisdiction to entertain a grievance petition filed by an employee who is not a workman?
  • What is the effect of accepting terms of employment indicating management duties on an employee's status as a worker?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob vs Bayer Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and another2016 PLC 54 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 2015-08-18
  workmanmanagement cadreunfair labour practicetermination of serviceIndustrial Relations Commissionjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 was filed by the petitioner challenging his termination from service and seeking reinstatement with back benefits, alleging unfair labour practice. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who served as a Senior Field Marketing Officer, fell within the definition of a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, so as to invoke the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Relations Commission. The Commission held that based on the documentary evidence, including appointment and promotion letters showing the petitioner belonged to the management cadre and received allowances and benefits not available to ordinary workers, the petitioner was not a 'workman'. The petition was accordingly dismissed for lack of status and applicability. The key principle laid down is that an employee whose duties, designation, and remuneration package place them within the management cadre, enjoying special allowances and terms inconsistent with those of a manual or clerical worker, does not qualify as a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee designated in the management cadre and receiving special allowances qualifies as a workman under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have jurisdiction to entertain a termination grievance petition filed by an employee who is not a workman?
  • Can an employee challenge their termination under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 without establishing their status as a worker?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob Nadeem Sethi vs Versus Muhammad Ilyas Khan etc2016 SCP 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-30
  election petitionreturned candidatecounterfoilselection irregularitiesnullification of electionbogus votingburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an election petition challenging the results of the 2013 General Elections for Provincial Assembly constituency PP-175 Kasur-I, where the appellant was declared the returned candidate. The respondent alleged illegal practices and bogus voting. An Election Tribunal, relying on a Commission's report regarding irregularities in counterfoils (missing signatures, stamps, and thumb impressions), declared the entire election void. The core legal question was whether the absence of certain procedural formalities on counterfoils, absent evidence of bogus voting or impact on the final result, justified nullifying the election. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Tribunal's judgment. The Court held that the irregularities identified in the counterfoils did not establish that the election was not held in a fair and transparent manner, particularly as all valid ballot papers contained the necessary signatures and stamps of the Presiding Officers. The key principle laid down is that minor procedural irregularities in counterfoils, which do not affect the integrity of the ballot papers or the final election result, are insufficient to invalidate an election under the Representation of the People Act, 1976.

  Questions settled

  • Can an election be declared void solely on the basis of procedural irregularities in counterfoils when the ballot papers themselves are valid?
  • Does the absence of signatures or stamps on election counterfoils automatically invalidate the election result?
  • Is the nullification of an election justified if the alleged irregularities do not impact the final vote count or the winning margin?
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• Muhammad Yaqob Nadeem Sethi vs Muhammad Ilyas Khan and others2016 SCMR 1632 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yahya, Member (Technical-I)Messrs Patanwala and Sons, Karachi and 3 others vs Collector MCC of Appraisement-Westcustoms House, Karachi2016 PTD (Trib.) 1266 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-12-15Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yahya vs StatePLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Karachi) 262 · Sindh High Court · 2015-10-06
  pre-arrest bailfirearm injuryplea of alibimala fidesprohibitory clausetentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant sought pre-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under Sections 324, 337-H(ii), and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning a firearm attack resulting in injury. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to pre-arrest bail given his specific attribution in the FIR, the plea of alibi, and the alleged land dispute. The Sindh High Court held that the applicant was named in the FIR with a specific role, that the plea of alibi cannot be considered at the pre-arrest bail stage, and that the applicant failed to establish mala fides or make out a case for extraordinary relief. Consequently, the court dismissed the bail application and recalled the interim pre-arrest bail granted earlier. The key principles laid down include that a plea of alibi is a matter for the trial court and cannot be appreciated at the bail stage, and that an accused seeking pre-arrest bail must establish mala fides and reasonable grounds for further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of alibi be considered at the pre-arrest bail stage?
  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted when the accused is specifically nominated in the FIR with a role of causing firearm injury?
  • Does an accused failing to establish mala fides or grounds for further inquiry remain entitled to pre-arrest bail?
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• Muhammad Ya Sin through L.Rs. and others vs Muhammad Latif and others2016 CLC 553 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-23
  specific performanceagreement to sellproof of documentattesting witnessevidence beyond pleadingssecond appealoral gift
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Burewala, which set aside the trial court's decision and decreed the respondents' suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell and for a declaration regarding mutation of properties. The core legal question involved the determination of the valid execution of the agreement to sell dated 7.3.1982, the applicability of the Evidence Act, 1872 regarding proof of attested documents executed prior to the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and whether parties can lead evidence beyond their pleadings. The Lahore High Court held that the execution of the agreement and receipt was duly proved by the testimony of an attesting witness and the scribe under Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872, and that defendants are strictly bound by their pleadings and cannot set up a new case in evidence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the lower appellate court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement to sell executed prior to the promulgation of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is governed by Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872?
  • Can a party be permitted to lead evidence on facts that have not been specifically pleaded in the written statement?
  • Whether the High Court in second appeal should give preference to the findings of the lower appellate court when there is variance in the findings of the two courts below?
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• Muhammad Waseem Ullah Awan vs Chairman Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2016 PLC (C.S.) 322 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-04-21
  constitutional petitioncivil judge appointmentzonal allocation formulapublic service commissionregularization of servicesquota allocationmerit list
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 by Muhammad Waseem Ullah Awan seeking a direction to the respondents to appoint him as a Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate/Alaqa Qazi. The petitioner, who belonged to Zone-IV, qualified the examination and interview conducted by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission but was initially placed at serial No. 63 on the combined merit list. A vacancy in Zone-IV arose due to the regularization of a previously selected candidate under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2009. The respondents contended that the petitioner was low on merit and that another candidate had been adjusted pursuant to a previous judgment. The core legal question was whether a vacant post allocated to a specific zone under the zonal allocation formula could be reallocated or filled by a candidate from another zone when a qualified and eligible candidate from the same zone was available. The Peshawar High Court held that zonal quotas cannot be altered or reallocated without government approval and in the absence of a deficiency of qualified candidates from that zone, pursuant to Regulation 34(2) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission Regulations, 2003. The Court allowed the petition, directing the respondents to recommend and appoint the petitioner against the available fourth seat of Zone-IV.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vacant post allocated to a specific zone under the zonal allocation formula be reallocated to another zone in the presence of a qualified candidate from the same zone?
  • Whether the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission can alter zonal allocation without the prior approval of the government and in the absence of a deficiency of qualified candidates?
  • Does a candidate next in merit within a specific zone have a preferential right to appointment when a seat in that zone falls vacant due to the regularization of a prior candidate?
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• Muhammad Waseem Khan vs The State2016 MLD 730 · Lahore High Court · 2014-06-19
  qatl-i-amdsolitary eye-witnessmurder referencemitigating circumstancesreduction of sentencedeath sentence commutedmotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from a judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the qatl-i-amd of the deceased and sentenced to death, along with compensation. The core legal questions involved the credibility of a solitary eye-witness, the sufficiency of motive, and whether mitigating circumstances warranted the reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case through the consistent and confidence-inspiring testimony of the sole eye-witness and a strong established motive stemming from family animosity, and that relationship to the deceased alone does not discredit a witness. However, considering the appellant's young age of 19 years at the time of the occurrence and the background circumstances of family disgrace, the court maintained the conviction but altered the sentence from death to imprisonment for life, with the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principles laid down are that a conviction can be validly based on the solitary testimony of a truthful and natural eye-witness, and that youth combined with background emotional triggers can serve as a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a solitary eye-witness?
  • Whether the mere relationship of an eye-witness to the deceased is sufficient to discard their testimony?
  • Does the young age of an offender coupled with emotional family background constitute a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • What is the effect of the prosecution giving up a natural witness who is closely related to both the accused and the deceased?
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• Muhammad Waseem Ghori and another vs Altaf Hussain Tunio and 62016 YLR 157 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-27
  territorial jurisdictionoriginal civil jurisdictionimmovable propertyreturn of plaintcause of actionagreement to sell
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiffs filed a civil suit before the Sindh High Court seeking a declaration, cancellation of an agreement to sell, restoration of vacant possession, and a permanent injunction regarding agricultural land located in District Jamshoro, outside the territorial jurisdiction of Karachi. Defendant No. 6 raised an objection regarding the maintainability of the suit based on territorial jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the Sindh High Court, in its original civil jurisdiction, can entertain a suit concerning immovable property situated outside Karachi merely because the agreement to sell was executed in Karachi. The court held that the original civil jurisdiction of the Sindh High Court is confined to the civil district of Karachi under Section 7 of the Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance 1962, and Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 does not make Sections 16, 17, and 20 of the Code inapplicable to properties situated outside Karachi. The court concluded that since the subject property is located in Jamshoro, Section 16 of the Code applies mandatorily, rendering the suit not maintainable at Karachi. Consequently, the plaint was ordered to be returned for presentation to the court of competent jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Sindh High Court possess original civil jurisdiction to entertain suits regarding immovable properties situated outside the civil district of Karachi?
  • What is the true scope and effect of Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the inapplicability of Sections 16, 17, and 20 to the High Court?
  • Does the mere execution of an agreement to sell within Karachi confer territorial jurisdiction on the Sindh High Court over a suit for property located outside Karachi?
  • Are the provisions of Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mandatory for suits relating to the recovery and determination of rights in immovable property?
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• Muhammad Waris and 3 otherss vs Malik Abdul Ghaffar2016 CLC 1651 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-04-14Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Waqas s/o Muhammad Bashir Caste Sohlen r/o Nalah2016 SC AJK 19 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Naeem-Ul-Arfeen vs StatePLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Karachi) 740 · Sindh High Court · 2015-12-08
  post-arrest bailrecovery of weaponfurther inquirySindh Arms Actmashirprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, Naeem-ul-Arfeen, following the rejection of his bail plea by the trial court in a case involving the alleged recovery of a .30 bore pistol and ammunition. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail given the circumstances of the recovery and the nature of the alleged offence under the Sindh Arms Act, 2013. The High Court held that the applicant was entitled to bail, finding the case to be one of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court reasoned that the recovery was suspicious, noting the absence of private mashirs, the failure to seal the weapon on the spot, and the lack of clarity regarding the place of arrest. Furthermore, the Court observed that the specific statutory provision cited did not explicitly include the term 'pistol'. Consequently, the Court granted bail, emphasizing that bail should not be withheld solely based on the prohibitory clause when there are grounds for further inquiry and the investigation is complete.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of private mashirs in a recovery case constitute grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be withheld solely because an offence falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when there are reasons for further inquiry?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the investigation is complete and the challan has been submitted?
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• Muhammad Zubair vs Karachi Stock Exchange (G) Limited M.a LodhiAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Waqas Anwar vs Muhammad Nawaz Sharif University of Agriculture,2016 KLR Civil Cases 43 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-28
  recruitment processconstitutional petitionretrospective applicationpublic functionariesselection criteriaadministrative discretionUniversity recruitment
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the recruitment process for Admin Officer (BS-16) posts conducted by the Muhammad Nawaz Sharif University of Agriculture, Multan. The petitioner alleged that the University arbitrarily altered the selection criteria and procedure—specifically by allowing candidates to rectify application deficiencies post-deadline and introducing a written test—after the initial advertisement. The core legal question was whether the University could retrospectively modify recruitment criteria to the prejudice of applicants. The Court held that the recruitment process was illegal, noting that while the Syndicate possesses the authority to frame rules, such rules cannot be applied retrospectively to an ongoing selection process initiated under a specific advertisement. The Court emphasized that public functionaries must exercise discretion within the framework of law, fairness, and procedural propriety. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned recruitment process and directed the University to fill the posts strictly in accordance with the eligibility criteria stipulated in the original advertisement, ensuring the process is conducted without nepotism or favoritism.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public university retrospectively alter recruitment criteria after the issuance of an advertisement?
  • Does the introduction of a written test after the submission of applications constitute a valid exercise of administrative discretion?
  • Are public functionaries required to adhere strictly to the eligibility conditions stipulated in an initial employment advertisement?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Waqas Anwar vs Muhammad Nawaz Sharif University of Agricultural Multan, etc2016 PLJ Lahore 663 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-01
  recruitment processconstitutional petitionpublic functionariesretrospective application of rulescolorable exercise of poweruniversity recruitmentadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the recruitment process for Admin Officer (BS-16) positions at the Muhammad Nawaz Sharif University of Agriculture, Multan. The petitioner alleged that the university acted arbitrarily and with mala fide intent by altering the recruitment criteria—specifically by allowing candidates to cure application deficiencies after the deadline and introducing a written test—after the initial advertisement. The core legal question was whether the university could retrospectively apply new criteria to an ongoing recruitment process. The Court held that the university's actions constituted a colorable exercise of power designed to accommodate favored individuals. It affirmed that public functionaries must exercise discretion within the framework of law, fairness, and transparency. The Court ruled that rules framed by the university could not be applied retrospectively to a process initiated under different advertised criteria. Consequently, the petition was allowed, the impugned recruitment process was set aside, and the university was directed to fill the posts strictly according to the criteria originally advertised.

  Questions settled

  • Can a university retrospectively apply new recruitment criteria to a selection process initiated under a previously advertised set of rules?
  • Does the introduction of a written test after the publication of an advertisement for a post constitute a valid exercise of administrative discretion?
  • Are public functionaries required to adhere strictly to the eligibility criteria specified in an initial recruitment advertisement?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Waqas alias Vicky vs State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 152 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-23
  post-arrest bailsodomyfurther probemedicolegal certificatecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was filed by Muhammad Waqas alias Vicky seeking post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 463/2014 registered under Sections 367-A and 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station City Layyah, involving allegations of sodomy. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was connected to the crime so as to warrant his continued incarceration pending trial, given the nature of the medical evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail as the medicolegal certificate did not show any marks of violence on the victim's body, and the petitioner's actual involvement required further probe to be determined at trial. Consequently, the court accepted the petition and admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail subject to furnishing appropriate security bonds. The key principle laid down is that where the medical evidence does not corroborate the visible marks of violence and the petitioner's complicity requires further inquiry, the case falls within the scope of further probe under the criminal procedure, justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the petitioner's involvement in the offence requires further probe?
  • Does the absence of marks of violence on the victim's body in the medicolegal certificate constitute a ground for further inquiry into the guilt of the accused?
  • Whether the question of complicity in offences under Sections 367-A and 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is to be determined at trial upon recording of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Wajid Khan vs Attock Cement Factory Pakistan Ltd. and 32016 CLC 1063 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-11
  composite negligenceworkplace accidenttortious liabilityres ipsa loquiturdamages for permanent disabilitylimitation periodjoint and several liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil suit concerns a claim for damages arising from a workplace accident where the Plaintiff, a project engineer, suffered severe injuries after falling from a height due to inadequate safety measures at a construction site. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of the suit, the limitation period for tortious claims, the liability of multiple contractors under the doctrine of composite negligence, and the quantum of damages for permanent disability and mental agony. The Court held that the suit was maintainable and not time-barred, as the liability for the tortious conduct was continuous and the cause of action subsisted. Applying the principle of composite negligence, the Court found all defendants jointly and severally liable for the accident, noting the failure to provide mandatory safety measures like scaffolding. The judgment affirms that where a right exists, there must be a remedy, and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies when defendants fail to rebut evidence of negligence in maintaining a safe working environment. The Court awarded damages for medical expenses, loss of earnings, and permanent disability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for damages for personal injury is time-barred if filed after one year of the incident?
  • Does the doctrine of composite negligence apply to hold multiple contractors jointly and severally liable for workplace injuries?
  • Is a medical certificate issued by an orthopedic surgeon admissible as evidence of permanent disability if not challenged by the defendants?
  • Can a plaintiff seek damages for mental agony and nervous shock in addition to special damages for medical expenses?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Wahid vs NasrullahPLJ 2016.SC 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-08-12
  specific performancefunctus officioconditional decreecivil appealextension of timeex-parte decreejurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed a suit for specific performance and terminated execution proceedings. The trial court had initially passed an ex-parte decree requiring the plaintiffs to deposit the balance sale consideration within 40 days, stipulating that failure to do so would result in the suit's dismissal. The plaintiffs failed to deposit the amount within the prescribed period but subsequently obtained an extension from the trial court under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether a trial court retains jurisdiction to extend a time limit for payment once the conditional period specified in its own decree has expired. The Supreme Court held that upon the expiry of the 40-day period, the trial court became functus officio and lacked the jurisdiction to grant an extension. Consequently, the Court ruled that the trial court's subsequent final decree was a nullity in the eyes of the law. The principle established is that a court cannot extend a time limit fixed in its own conditional decree once that period has lapsed, as it loses jurisdiction over the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial court retain jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of sale consideration after the expiry of the period specified in its own conditional decree?
  • Can a trial court exercise powers under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to extend time once it has become functus officio?
  • Is a final decree passed by a trial court after the expiry of a conditional time limit for payment of consideration considered a nullity?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Wahid and another vs Nasrullah and another2016 SCMR 179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-08-12
  specific performanceex-parte decreeextension of timefunctus officioself-executing decreedeposit of sale considerationnullity of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The trial court had passed an ex-parte decree in favor of the appellants, directing them to deposit the remaining sale consideration within forty days, failing which the suit would stand dismissed. The appellants failed to deposit the amount within the stipulated period and subsequently applied for an extension of time under Section 148 C.P.C., which the trial court granted. The High Court later set aside these orders, dismissing the suit. The Supreme Court, while upholding the High Court's decision, held that once a decree contains a self-executing default clause (stating the suit shall stand dismissed upon non-compliance), the trial court becomes functus officio after the expiry of the specified period. The Court clarified that Section 148 C.P.C. cannot be invoked to extend time after the period has lapsed and the suit has effectively stood dismissed. Any subsequent final decree passed after such an unauthorized extension is a nullity in the eyes of law.

  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Waheed vs Customs Appellate Tribunal and anotherPTCL 2016 CL. 476 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Waheed through attorney vs Customs Appellate Tribunal2016 PT D 35 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Usman vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 54 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-09-21
  post-arrest bailforeign currency recoveryproceeds of crimeanti-money launderingfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail petition filed by Muhammad Usman, who was arrested in connection with FIR No. 72/2015 registered under sections 409/109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sections 4 and 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947, and sections 3 and 4 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2010. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the recovery of foreign currency and the applicability of the invoked statutory provisions. The Peshawar High Court held that section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code was inapplicable, that the prosecution had not yet established that the recovered currency constituted proceeds of crime under section 3 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2010, and that the case warranted further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the bail petition was allowed. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution fails to investigate or establish the essential ingredients constituting 'proceeds of crime' under the Anti-Money Laundering Act at the interim stage, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry, entitling the accused to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether mere recovery of foreign currency without establishing proceeds of crime attracts the prohibitory clause of the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2010 for the purpose of bail?
  • Does the applicability of section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 arise in a case involving the mere transport of foreign currency purchased from an exchange company?
  • Can an accused be granted post-arrest bail when the investigation agency fails to satisfy the requirements of the defining clause of the crime under section 3 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2010?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Usman and another vs State etc.PLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 158 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-23
  criminal appealmurder referencebenefit of doubtdelayed FIRocular testimonymedical evidenceacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside a murder reference for confirmation of the sentence. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of the ocular testimony, the impact of a five-day delay in lodging the FIR, and the sufficiency of evidence regarding the motive and recovery of weapons. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to significant unexplained delays in reporting, material contradictions between the ocular account and medical evidence, and the absence of crime empties to link the recovered weapons to the crime. The court emphasized that the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right, not grace, even if based on a single circumstance. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, and answered the murder reference in the negative, finding the prosecution's narrative unreliable and potentially fabricated.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR create sufficient doubt to warrant the acquittal of the accused?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when there are material contradictions between the ocular account and the medical evidence?
  • Is the recovery of weapons sufficient to prove guilt if no crime empties are recovered from the scene?
  • Must the benefit of doubt be extended to an accused if only a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ummar and others vs The State2016 PLJ FSC 1, 2016 YLR 1181 · Federal Shariat Court · 2015-10-14
  dacoitymurderidentification paradedelayed FIRbenefit of doubtacquittalcriminal appealhudood ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, subsequently converted to Section 17(4) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, arising from a dacoity and murder incident at a petrol pump. The core legal questions involve the reliability of an identification parade conducted by police officers rather than a Magistrate, the evidentiary value of delayed FIRs, and the sufficiency of circumstantial and recovery evidence. The Federal Shariat Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to a delayed FIR, defective identification parades conducted without a Magistrate and lacking physical descriptions in the initial report, uncorroborated recoveries, and the non-examination of material witnesses. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellants, and dismissed the complainant's revision petition for enhancement of sentence. The key principle laid down is that identification parades conducted in non-compliance with superior court instructions and without a judicial magistrate are defective and insufficient for conviction, and procedural lapses coupled with missing material witnesses render the prosecution case inherently doubtful.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an identification parade conducted under the supervision of police officers rather than a judicial magistrate is legally sustainable?
  • Does a significant and unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report make the prosecution case doubtful?
  • Can a conviction for dacoity and murder rest solely on a doubtful identification parade and uncorroborated weapon recoveries?
  • What is the legal effect of the prosecution's failure to examine key eyewitnesses and material witnesses during trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ummar & others vs State2016 PLJ FSC 1 · Federal Shariat Court · 2015-10-14
  dacoityharrabahidentification paradedelay in FIRbenefit of doubtcriminal appealpolice disclosure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellants under Section 17(4) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, arising from a dacoity and murder incident at a petrol pump. The core legal questions involved the reliability of unnominated accused identification through defective identification parades, delayed FIR lodging, inadmissible police disclosures, and doubtful weapon recoveries. The Federal Shariat Court held that unexplained delays in lodging the FIR, flawed identification parades conducted without a magistrate and without proper matching features or recorded descriptions, and major discrepancies in material recoveries rendered the prosecution's case doubtful. Consequently, the court allowed the appeals, set aside the trial court's judgment, acquitted the appellants of the charges, and dismissed the complainant's revision petition for enhancement of sentence. The key principles laid down include that failure to properly conduct identification parades in accordance with established rules and superior court instructions, coupled with delays in reporting and weak circumstantial links, creates insurmountable doubts requiring the acquittal of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an identification parade conducted without a magistrate and lacking proper physical descriptions of the accused in the FIR is legally reliable?
  • Does an unexplained delay of several hours in lodging the FIR render the prosecution case doubtful?
  • Are disclosures made to the police during investigation regarding the commission of an offense admissible without the discovery of a new fact?
  • Whether material contradictions and the non-examination of key eyewitnesses entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Umer and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 687 · Lahore High Court · 2016-04-13
  post-arrest bailrapeblackmailprohibitory clausetentative assessmentheinous offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by Muhammad Umer and Qamar Abbas, who were accused in an FIR registered under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the alleged rape of the complainant's niece. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the evidence presented. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners had been sexually assaulting the victim for several months, had taken nude photographs, and had blackmailed her. The victim's statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 corroborated these allegations. The Court observed that sufficient incriminating material existed to connect the petitioners to the crime, which fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Holding that the offence was heinous and sensational, the Court dismissed the bail petition, emphasizing that such crimes are offences against society and the State. The Court reiterated the principle that bail proceedings require only a tentative assessment of evidence and that deeper appreciation is impermissible at this stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the allegation of committing rape and blackmailing the victim constitutes sufficient grounds to deny post-arrest bail?
  • Does an offence falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 preclude the grant of bail?
  • Is a deeper appreciation of evidence permissible during the consideration of a post-arrest bail petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Umar Qureshi vs Government of Sindh through Vice-2016 YLR 2439 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Umar Mir and others vs Dr. Muhammad Afzal Hussain and others2016 PLJ SC 120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-10-27
  Undesirable Cooperative Societiesnullity of decreelocus standieviction proceedingscooperative societies dissolutionstatutory interpretationrental assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside eviction orders obtained by the petitioners against the respondents. The core legal question was whether a decree obtained against an Undesirable Cooperative Society after July 1, 1990, remains valid and enforceable without confirmation by the Co-operatives Judge as required by statute. The Supreme Court held that the decree in favor of the petitioners' predecessor was a nullity because it was passed after the statutory cutoff date of July 1, 1990, and was never confirmed by the Co-operatives Judge. Consequently, the petitioners lacked locus standi to initiate eviction proceedings. The Court upheld the High Court’s decision to set aside the lower fora's orders. The Court affirmed that under Section 16 of the Punjab Undesirable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Ordinance, 1992, any decree passed against such a society after July 1, 1990, is legally ineffective unless confirmed by the designated Co-operatives Judge, rendering any subsequent claims based on such a decree void.

  Questions settled

  • Does a decree passed against an Undesirable Cooperative Society after July 1, 1990, remain valid without confirmation by the Co-operatives Judge?
  • Does a person relying on a nullified decree possess the locus standi to initiate eviction proceedings against tenants?
  • What is the legal effect of a failure to obtain confirmation of a decree under Section 16 of the Punjab Undesirable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Ordinance, 1992?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Umar Khan vs Khan Baha..Dur2016 NLR Civil 405, 2016 CLC 1616 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-12-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Umar Gull vs Nasir Javed2016 YLR 1350 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ubaidullah vs The State and others2016 MLD 414 · Lahore High Court · 2015-07-08
  suspension of sentencestatutory bailcriminal appealdelay in disposal of appeallife imprisonmentpost-conviction bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was filed by the petitioner seeking suspension of his sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the Additional Sessions Judge, Multan, in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the suspension of his sentence and release on bail due to the statutory delay in the disposal of his appeal. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner was entitled to the relief sought. The Court observed that the petitioner had been incarcerated for over two years and eight months following his conviction, and the appeal remained undecided through no fault of his own. Consequently, the Court suspended the sentence and granted bail, finding that the petitioner had fulfilled the statutory requirements under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The key principle laid down is that under Section 426(1-A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a convict sentenced to life imprisonment or imprisonment exceeding seven years is entitled to the suspension of sentence and release on bail if their appeal is not decided within a period of two years, provided they are not a hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a convict entitled to suspension of sentence if their appeal remains undecided for more than two years?
  • Does the statutory right to bail under Section 426(1-A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to convicts sentenced to life imprisonment?
  • Can a sentence be suspended on statutory grounds without addressing the merits of the criminal appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tufail and 3 others vs Muhammad Idrees and 2 others2016 MLD 407, K.L.R. 2016 S.C. 85 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-05-07
  shamilat dehconsent decreelegal heirsabatement of appealadditional evidencedead persondeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises out of a judgment and decree of the High Court dismissing the appellants' second appeal regarding a suit for cancellation of a consent decree and mutation concerning shamilat deh land. The core legal questions involved whether an application for bringing on record the legal representatives of deceased respondents filed years out of time is maintainable, whether an appeal filed against dead persons can proceed, and whether additional evidence can be permitted at a belated stage under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the application for substitution of legal heirs was hopelessly time-barred and that an appeal or suit filed against a dead person is not maintainable. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts that declaratory decrees for ownership in respect of shamilat deh land cannot be passed and that the appellants failed to establish ownership in the village. The key principle laid down is that proceedings initiated against deceased persons without timely substitution of legal heirs abate, and a civil court cannot pass declaratory decrees regarding shamilat deh land in favor of non-owners.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal filed against a deceased respondent is maintainable?
  • Can an application for bringing on record the legal representatives of a deceased party be entertained after the expiry of the period of limitation without showing sufficient cause?
  • Whether a Civil Court can pass a declaratory decree of ownership in respect of shamilat deh land?
  • At what stage can additional evidence be allowed under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Taufique Khan vs Multan Electric Power Company Limited, MULTANthrough Chief Executive Officer and 3 others2016 PLC 465 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2016-04-15
  back benefitscompulsory retirementreinstatementgainful employmentburden of prooflabour lawwrongful termination
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the quantum of back benefits granted to an employee following his reinstatement into service. The appellant challenged the trial court's decision to limit his back benefits to 50% for the period he remained out of service following an illegal compulsory retirement order. The core legal question was whether the employee was entitled to full back benefits or if the trial court correctly limited the award based on the employer's assertion of gainful employment elsewhere. The Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside the trial court's order limiting back benefits to 50%, holding that the appellant was entitled to full back benefits for the entire period he remained out of job. The Tribunal affirmed the principle that the burden of proving that an employee was gainfully employed elsewhere during the period of dismissal rests on the employer, not the employee. Furthermore, once an employee is exonerated and reinstated, the period of forced absence cannot be attributed to the employee's fault, and they are entitled to full benefits as if they had never been out of service.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proving gainful employment during the period of dismissal lie on the employee or the employer?
  • Is an employee entitled to full back benefits upon reinstatement if the employer fails to prove the employee was gainfully employed elsewhere?
  • Can an employer deny back benefits to an employee who was compulsorily retired without cogent evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tariq vs The State2016 LHC 531 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tariq vs The Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad2016 PTD 2104 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2016-06-23
  tax refundmaladministrationprovisional assessmentfederal tax ombudsmanwithholding refundincome taxcompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This complaint was filed under Section 10(1) of the FTO Ordinance, 2000 against the non-payment of a tax refund along with compensation for tax year 2011 after a provisional assessment made under Section 122C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was declared void ab initio by the Commissioner. The core legal question was whether the tax department could lawfully withhold a tax refund and deny compensation based on anticipated or prospective amendment proceedings under Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Federal Tax Ombudsman held that the department's failure to process the refund constituted maladministration under Section 2(3)(ii) of the FTO Ordinance, 2000, and ruled that a tax refund cannot be withheld on the basis of prospective proceedings or anticipated liability without a substantiated flaw in the claim. The key principle laid down is that tax authorities cannot delay or withhold undisputed refunds on the pretext of anticipated future assessments.

  Questions settled

  • Can the tax department withhold a tax refund on the basis of anticipated liability or prospective amendment proceedings?
  • Whether the failure of tax authorities to process a refund claim amounts to maladministration under the FTO Ordinance, 2000?
  • Does a provisional assessment made under Section 122C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 survive when a valid deemed assessment already exists in the field?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tariq vs StatePLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 896 (DB) · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tariq Rasheed vs State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 150 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tanveer Mughal and 2 others vs Managing Director Teachers2016 C.L.R. 1517 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-05-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tahir vs Additional Sessions Judge, (Justice of Peace), Faisalabad and 3 others2016 PLJ Lahore 587 · Lahore High Court · 2014-05-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Suleman vs Dy. Inspector General, Pakistan Railway Police, Lahore and others2016 P.S.C. 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-07-28
  departmental inquiryservice lawmisconductshow-cause noticefactual disputesdisciplinary proceedingsPakistan Railway Police
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service dispute involving a petitioner, an Assistant Sub-Inspector in the Pakistan Railway Police, who faced departmental proceedings for alleged misconduct, specifically using abusive language and violating the chain of command. The departmental authority dispensed with a regular inquiry and imposed a minor penalty of withholding one year's increment based on the charges. The petitioner challenged this action, arguing that because the charges were strictly factual and were denied in his reply to the show-cause notice, a regular inquiry was mandatory to establish the allegations. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the legal necessity of conducting a regular inquiry when the underlying charges are factual in nature and contested by the accused. The court's decision focuses on the procedural requirement of departmental inquiries in service matters where factual disputes exist, emphasizing that dispensing with such inquiries may be improper when the charges are not admitted and require evidentiary proof to substantiate the alleged misconduct.

  Questions settled

  • Is a regular departmental inquiry mandatory when the charges against a civil servant are factual in nature and denied in the reply to a show-cause notice?
  • Can a disciplinary authority dispense with a regular inquiry in service matters involving disputed factual allegations?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Suleman vs Deputy Inspector General, Pakistan Railway2016 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 282 · Federal Service Tribunal
  service appealremoval from servicedefective investigationmandatory inquirycensureappellate orderreasons
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal was filed before the Federal Service Tribunal by an Assistant Sub-Inspector challenging the appellate order modifying a penalty of reduction in pay to "censure" arising from allegations of gross misconduct and defective investigation under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000. The core legal question was whether a departmental penalty could be imposed without holding a formal inquiry despite the accused denying the charges, and whether an appellate order must assign reasons. The Tribunal held that where an accused denies the charges in response to a show-cause notice, conducting a formal inquiry is mandatory, and dispensing with it without recording witness statements and providing an opportunity for cross-examination renders the proceedings flawed. Furthermore, the Tribunal held that an appellate order modifying a penalty must assign reasons pursuant to the General Clauses Act, 1897, failing which it is a nullity. The impugned appellate order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether holding a formal inquiry is mandatory when an employee denies the allegations in a show-cause notice under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000?
  • Does an appellate authority need to assign reasons when modifying a penalty under the General Clauses Act, 1897?
  • Can a penalty of reduction in pay or censure be sustained when an inquiry is dispensed with despite conflicting factual assertions?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sohail Tabba vs Director Enforcement, SECP2016 CLD 1697 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-04-24
  associated companiesequity investmentshareholders approvalstatutory disclosurewillful defaultSecurities and Exchange Commission of PakistanCompanies Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under section 33 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 against an order passed by the Respondent for non-compliance with sections 160 and 208 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The core legal question was whether the appellant company committed a default by failing to make the approved equity investment in an associated company and by not updating shareholders regarding the status of implementation in subsequent general meetings as required by law. The court held that the appellant willfully defaulted by advancing funds contrary to the special resolution and failing to seek proper statutory modifications or provide required disclosures to shareholders. The ratio laid down is that companies must strictly comply with mandatory statutory disclosure requirements and shareholder resolution mandates regarding investments in associated companies, and administrative penalties are justified upon proof of willful non-compliance regardless of the business group's standing or reputation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a company can alter the nature of an approved investment in an associated company without obtaining a fresh special resolution under section 208 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Is a company required under section 160 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 to update its shareholders on the status of implementation of a previously approved investment project in subsequent general meetings?
  • Does advancing mobilization funds instead of making the approved equity investment constitute non-compliance with the shareholders' resolution?
  • Whether penalties imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan for non-compliance with statutory disclosure provisions are lawful upon proof of willful default?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sohail Butt vs Chief (MGT Customs) Revenue Division2016 PLC (C.S.) 454 · Federal Service Tribunal · 2015-10-06
  service appealenhancement of penaltyappellate authorityrevisional powersmisconductshow-cause noticereinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal challenges the enhancement of a minor penalty (withholding of four annual increments) to a major penalty (removal from service) by the respondent, who acted in the capacity of an Appellate Authority. The core legal questions were whether the respondent possessed the legal competence to enhance the penalty using revisional powers under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and whether the enhancement was adequately reasoned. The Federal Service Tribunal held that the respondent, acting as an Appellate Authority, could not invoke revisional powers reserved for an 'Authority' to enhance the penalty. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the enhancement was based on vague and insufficient reasons, failing to meet the legal standard requiring specific justification for increasing a penalty. Additionally, the Tribunal noted that the underlying inquiry report was based on conjecture and failed to establish the charges of corruption or negligence against the appellant. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside both the initial minor penalty and the subsequent major penalty, ordering the appellant's reinstatement with full back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Appellate Authority invoke revisional powers under Rule 6-A of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 to enhance a penalty?
  • Is an authority required to provide specific reasons when enhancing a minor penalty to a major penalty?
  • Does the withdrawal of a departmental representation by a civil servant preclude them from challenging the underlying penalty before the Service Tribunal?
  • Can an Appellate Authority act as both the 'Authority' and the 'Appellate Authority' in the same disciplinary matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sikannd Ar vs District Collector/DCO Rajanpur and 22016 PLC (C.S.) 306 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-16
  civil servantwrit jurisdictionterms and conditions of servicetransfer orderservice tribunalconstitutional bar
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by a civil servant challenging his frequent transfers within the Revenue Department, alleging that the impugned transfer order was issued by an incompetent authority and was arbitrary. The core legal question was whether the High Court possesses jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, to adjudicate a dispute concerning the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant, specifically regarding transfer orders. The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition, citing the bar created by Article 212(2) of the Constitution. Relying on the principle established by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in National Assembly Secretariat through Secretary v. Manzoor Ahmed and others (2015 SCMR 253), the Court determined that grievances of a civil servant regarding terms and conditions of service fall exclusively within the domain of the relevant Service Tribunal. Consequently, the Court disposed of the petition by directing the respondent authority to treat the petition as a departmental representation and decide it in accordance with law, while granting temporary relief to the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to adjudicate a dispute regarding the transfer of a civil servant?
  • Does the bar under Article 212(2) of the Constitution preclude a civil servant from challenging service-related grievances in the High Court?
  • Is a dispute concerning the transfer of a civil servant within the exclusive domain of a Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique vs The State and 4 others2016 P Cr. LJ 635 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-05
  criminal revisionAnti-Terrorism Actmaintainability of revisionSpecial Court jurisdictiontime-barred applicationinherent jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged an order passed by the Anti-Terrorism Court, Sukkur, which returned a case to the Investigating Officer for submission before a court of competent jurisdiction, effectively declining to try the matter as an anti-terrorism case. The core legal questions were whether a criminal revision application is maintainable against an order passed by a Special Court under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and whether the offence described in the FIR fell within the ambit of the Act. The Court held that the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, does not provide for revision against orders passed by a Special Court, as sections 25, 31, and 32 of the Act, when read together, preclude such challenges. Furthermore, the Court found the revision application time-barred due to a significant delay in filing. The principle laid down is that the revisional or inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, cannot be invoked to challenge orders of a Special Court under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, though constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 may be available in cases of patent illegality.

  Questions settled

  • Is a criminal revision application maintainable against an order passed by a Special Court under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Can the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be invoked to challenge orders passed by a Special Court under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Does the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, permit the challenging of a Special Court's order through revision?
  • In what circumstances can the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court be invoked to challenge an order of an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique through Legal Representatives vs Mst. Noor Bibi2016 PLD Lahore 140 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-17
  oral salepower of attorneyburden of proofmutationcivil revisionadverse inferenceinheritanceevidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged an appellate court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's suit for declaration of title over land. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner had successfully proved an alleged oral sale of land by his sisters and the evidentiary admissibility of testimony provided by an attorney-holder in lieu of the principal. The Court held that the petitioner failed to prove the oral sale, citing material inconsistencies in the witnesses' depositions regarding the payment of sale consideration. Crucially, the Court affirmed that an attorney-holder cannot depose for a principal regarding facts within the principal's exclusive personal knowledge; the plaintiff's failure to testify created an adverse inference. The Court emphasized that mutations do not confer title, and when challenged, the beneficiary must prove the underlying transaction. Furthermore, courts must rigorously scrutinize transactions where illiterate women are divested of inheritance. Finding the appellate court’s reasoning sound and the trial court’s judgment flawed for ignoring evidentiary inconsistencies, the High Court dismissed the revision petition, upholding the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can an attorney-holder depose on behalf of a principal regarding facts exclusively within the principal's personal knowledge?
  • Does a mutation entry in revenue records confer title to land?
  • What is the evidentiary consequence of a party failing to appear in the witness box to testify on facts within their personal knowledge?
  • Is an appellate court, upon remand of a case, bound by its previous decision?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique through Legal Heirs and others vs Hadayat Ali2016 YLR 668 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-15
  specific performanceagreement to sellconcurrent findingsParda Nasheen ladyburden of proofcivil revisionmarginal witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 31.01.1963, filed by the petitioners against the respondents. The trial court and the appellate court concurrently dismissed the suit, finding that the petitioners failed to prove the execution of the agreement. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had sufficiently established the validity of the agreement, particularly given that the alleged executant was an illiterate lady and the petitioners failed to produce the requisite number of marginal witnesses. The Lahore High Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, noting that the petitioners failed to prove that the contents of the agreement were explained to the illiterate executant or that she executed it in the presence of witnesses. The Court reaffirmed the principle that in cases involving illiterate or 'Parda Nasheen' ladies, specific evidentiary standards must be met, including identification by family members. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts should not be interfered with in civil revision unless there is a jurisdictional defect or serious misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is it necessary for an agreement to sell to be attested by two marginal witnesses to be considered legally proved?
  • What is the evidentiary requirement for proving an agreement to sell executed by an illiterate or Parda Nasheen lady?
  • Under what circumstances will the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in a civil revision?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique Baloch vs Jehangir Khan Tareen & others2016 PLJ Sc 276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-10-28
  election petitionbogus votingelection voiddisqualificationRepresentation of the People Actburden of proofNADRA verificationcorrupt practices
  Summary & questions settled

  This election appeal challenges the Election Tribunal's judgment declaring the appellant's election as Member National Assembly for constituency NA-154 Lodhran-I void. The Tribunal had unseated the appellant based on findings of a false educational qualification declaration and widespread corrupt practices by election staff. The Supreme Court held that the finding of disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 was unsustainable, as it relied on presumptions rather than affirmative evidence. Regarding the election's validity, the Court found that widespread non-compliance with mandatory voting procedures under Section 33 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, including the issuance of ballot papers without proper identification or stamping, materially affected the election result. Consequently, the Court upheld the declaration that the election was void under Section 70(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, but set aside the finding that the appellant had procured such illegalities. The principle established is that an election can be declared void due to pervasive statutory violations materially affecting the result, while disqualification requires strict, affirmative proof.

  Questions settled

  • Can an election be declared void under Section 70(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, without proof of corrupt practices by the candidate?
  • What is the standard of proof required to establish disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the failure of election staff to comply with mandatory voting procedures under Section 33 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, constitute sufficient grounds to declare an election void?
  • Can a court rely on presumptions or inferences to disqualify a candidate for a false declaration of educational qualifications?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique and others vs Mst. Ayesha Bibi and others2016 YLR 383 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique and another vs Abdul NAB! and 11 others2016 PLC 383 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2015-10-30
  trade union membershipCBA unionunfair labour practicemonthly subscriptionRegistrar Trade UnionLabour CourtBalochistan Industrial Relations Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal is directed against the judgment of the 1st Labour Court Quetta, which allowed the petition filed by the respondents under sections 18, 32, and 52 of the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010. The core legal question involved whether the appellants (representing the CBA trade union) lawfully cancelled or refused the membership of the respondent workers and withheld the deduction of their monthly subscriptions from their salaries. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the refusal of the appellants to accept the workers' membership and subscriptions—despite orders of the Registrar Trade Union and the Labour Court—was unjustified and exhibited mala fides. The Tribunal upheld the trial court's decision, modifying it slightly to set strict timelines for the deposit of outstanding subscription fees and the subsequent restoration of union membership and salary deductions, laying down the principle that arbitrary denial of trade union membership and non-compliance with statutory subscription mechanisms by a CBA union constitutes an unfair labor practice and is legally unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a collective bargaining agent (CBA) union can arbitrarily refuse membership and cancel the registration of workers who have fulfilled statutory requirements?
  • Does the refusal to deduct monthly trade union subscriptions from workers' salaries through the check-off system violate the provisions of the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010?
  • Can the Registrar Trade Union intervene and establish a committee to resolve disputes regarding union membership and voting rights?
  • Whether an appellate tribunal can uphold a trial court's judgment while issuing modified directions for the deposit of outstanding subscription fees and restoration of membership?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique and 6 others vs Abdul Aziz Ratalvi and 7 others2016 YLR 612 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-04-23
  specific performanceagreement to sellearnest moneybreach of contractcause of actioncontractual interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land. The respondent-plaintiff sought a decree for specific performance based on an agreement executed by the predecessor of the appellants. The trial court and the High Court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent. The core legal question was whether the respondent was entitled to a decree for specific performance given the specific terms of the agreement, which provided a remedy of double the earnest money in case of the vendor's failure to execute the sale deed. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the suit for specific performance was not maintainable. The Court reasoned that the agreement explicitly stipulated that the vendee's remedy for the vendor's failure was limited to receiving double the earnest money, rather than compelling the transfer of property. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower courts' judgments and dismissed the suit, establishing the principle that where an agreement to sell limits the remedy for breach to monetary damages, a suit for specific performance is not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for specific performance maintainable when an agreement to sell explicitly provides for a specific monetary penalty in case of the vendor's failure to execute the sale deed?
  • Does an agreement to sell that limits the remedy for breach to the return of double the earnest money preclude a claim for specific performance?
  • Can a party maintain a suit for specific performance if the underlying agreement to sell does not contain a condition entitling the vendee to such relief upon the vendor's default?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique and 3 others vs Babar Hussain and 3 others2016 PLJ AJ&K 6 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-02-25Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shoaib Shaheen, Etc. vs Pakistan Bar Council, Etc.2016 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2016-10-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shoaib and another vs Messrs M. Kamil Builders and Developers' through Partner and others2016 MLD 1359 · Sindh High Court · 2015-12-22
  ad-interim injunctioneasement rightsprivacy rightsbuilding planbalance of conveniencecivil proceduremodification of injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter before the Sindh High Court involved cross-applications under Order XXXIX Rules 1, 2, and 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 concerning a proposed multi-storey building constructed without an initially approved building plan, which allegedly infringed the plaintiffs' easement and privacy rights and caused damage to their property. The core legal question was whether an ad-interim injunction should continue to restrain construction based on alleged violations of easement and privacy rights when the building plan was subsequently approved by the competent authority. The Court held that claims of nuisance, infringement of easement, and privacy rights are factual in nature and must be established through evidence during trial, and mere assertions are insufficient to restrain construction being carried out in accordance with an approved plan. The key principle laid down is that without proving the actual infringement of easement or privacy rights at trial, a defendant cannot be restrained from raising construction in accordance with an approved building plan, and the balance of convenience lies in favor of allowing construction once the plan is duly approved.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant be restrained from raising construction on the basis of alleged infringement of easement and privacy rights without proof at the interim stage?
  • Whether mere general assertions of blocked light, air, and privacy are sufficient to grant an injunction against construction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the subsequent approval of a building plan by the competent authority entitle a builder to seek modification of an existing restraining order under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sher vs Additional Sessions Judge_Justice of Peace, District Khushab and 6 others2016 CLC 717 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-11
  constitutional petitionjustice of peaceregistration of FIRperiod of iddatirregular marriagedivorcesui juris
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged an order of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace dismissing the petitioner's application under Sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for registration of a criminal case regarding alleged abduction and unlawful marriage during the period of Iddat. The core legal question was whether a second marriage contracted by a divorced sui juris female before the expiration of the customary ninety days, but after completing three menstrual periods, constitutes a void marriage or Zina, and whether the Justice of Peace erred in refusing to direct the registration of a First Information Report. The Lahore High Court held that a marriage contracted before the completion of the Iddat period is merely irregular rather than void, that the divorced woman herself is the best judge regarding the completion of her menstrual periods, and that the Justice of Peace committed no illegality in dismissing the application. The court laid down the principle that Islamic injunctions regarding Iddat—requiring three menstrual periods—prevail, and that an irregular marriage does not amount to Zina or justify criminal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a marriage contracted by a divorced woman before the expiration of ninety days but after completing three menstrual periods considered void or irregular?
  • Can a writ petition under Article 199 challenge the refusal of an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to direct the registration of a criminal case?
  • Who is the best judge to determine the completion of the period of Iddat based on menstruation?
  • Does an irregular marriage contracted during the period of Iddat constitute Zina or warrant the registration of a criminal case for abduction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif, etc. vs Member, Board of Revenue, etc.2017 CLC 1452, 2016 LHC 117, 2016 PLJ Lahore 640, K.L.R. 2016 Revenue Cases · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-20
  constitutional petitionlis pendensbinding precedentrevenue mutationboard of revenuespecific performancereview power
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged the orders passed by the Member, Board of Revenue and the Executive District Officer (Revenue), whereby mutations sanctioned in favour of the petitioners were cancelled. The core legal question revolved around whether revenue authorities could ignore or reopen matters settled by judgments of the High Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan upholding the petitioners' title, and whether a transaction pendente lite could override final judicial determinations. The Lahore High Court held that the orders passed by the revenue authorities were without lawful authority, being in direct violation of superior court judgments and the doctrine of binding judicial precedent under Article 189 of the Constitution. The Court reiterated that transactions entered into during the pendency of litigation are hit by the principle of lis pendens and remain inconsequential, and that subordinate executive authorities possess no power to review or bypass decisions affirmed up to the apex court. The petition was consequently accepted and the impugned orders were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether revenue authorities can review or set aside mutations that have been attested pursuant to the final judgments and decrees of the High Court and the Supreme Court?
  • Does the principle of lis pendens render a subsequent sale or court decree obtained during the pendency of litigation inconsequential?
  • Can an appellate or administrative revenue authority exercise powers of review to rehear a matter that has already attained finality through superior court adjudication?
  • Whether the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked against illegal orders passed by administrative authorities in defiance of binding judicial precedents?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Managing Director Carriage Factory, Pakistan2016 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 9 · Federal Service Tribunal
  pension increaseservice lawbinding precedentequal treatmentservice tribunalimplementation of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under Section 4 of the Service Tribunal Act, 1973 by a retired Pakistan Railways employee seeking a 10% increase in pension, citing previous judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal and the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the appellant, despite not being a party to previous litigation, was entitled to the same pension benefits granted to other employees under the same policy, given that the department had already implemented these benefits for others following Supreme Court directives. The Tribunal held that the matter had attained finality through consistent judicial precedents and that the department was bound to extend the same treatment to the appellant. Relying on the principle established in State Bank of Pakistan vs. Mst. Mumtaz Sultana, the Tribunal ruled that the legal position declared by the Supreme Court regarding a scheme applies to all eligible employees, not just those who were parties to the specific litigation. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, and the respondents were directed to extend the pension benefits to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a government department is bound to extend the benefits of a judgment to non-parties when the legal position declared by the Supreme Court applies to the entire class of employees?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have the authority to reopen or reconsider a matter that has already attained finality through consistent judgments of the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Are the respondents obligated to implement pension increases based on a policy that has been judicially affirmed in previous litigation involving the same department?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and another2016 PLC (C.S.) 1083 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 2015-12-21
  compulsory retirementregular inquirygross misconductillegal gratificationservice appealPunjab Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant appeal was preferred against the order of compulsory retirement from service passed against the appellant on allegations of gross misconduct and corruption without holding a regular inquiry. The core legal question was whether a major penalty of compulsory retirement could be legally imposed on the basis of disputed factual allegations of bribery without conducting a regular inquiry and affording an opportunity of cross-examination. The Punjab Service Tribunal held that where a case involves material controversy of facts and factual disputes, holding a regular inquiry with independent evidence and the right of cross-examination is mandatory, and dispensing with an inquiry without recording proper reasons renders the penalty order illegal. The Tribunal laid down the principle that disputed allegations of corruption and bribery entailing factual controversy cannot be resolved through a summary procedure without a regular departmental inquiry and evaluation of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is a regular inquiry mandatory when a public servant denies allegations of corruption and bribery involving disputed questions of fact?
  • Can a major penalty of compulsory retirement be sustained when the disciplinary authority dispenses with a regular inquiry without recording mandatory reasons?
  • Does previous bad service record justify the imposition of a major penalty in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding without establishing current charges through proper inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif etc. vs Member, Board of Revenue, etc.2016 PLJ Lahore 640 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif etc vs Member, Board of Revenue etc.2016 LHC 117 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and others vs Hussnain Abbas alias Nasir and others2016 YLR 1128 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-12-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shareef vs The State and 6 others2016 P Cr. LJ 216 · Sindh High Court · 2015-06-02
  transfer of criminal caseanti-terrorism courtsecurity of witnessesconvenience of partiesapprehension of threat
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal transfer application was filed under section 28 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 read with sections 526 and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, seeking the transfer of a Special Case from the Anti-Terrorism Court at Khairpur to an Anti-Terrorism Court at Karachi on the ground of life threats to the applicant-complainant. The core legal question was whether a case pending before an Anti-Terrorism Court should be transferred to another city merely on the apprehension of threats to the complainant when the previous transfer orders had attained finality and no bias was attributed to the trial judge. The Sindh High Court held that general apprehensions of danger do not warrant a case transfer, as the state machinery is constitutionally bound to provide adequate security and protection to citizens, and transferring the case to Karachi would cause grave inconvenience to the numerous accused persons and witnesses residing near Sukkur. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the transfer application while directing local law enforcement authorities to ensure comprehensive legal protection and security to both parties during court appearances.

  Questions settled

  • Can a case be transferred from one Anti-Terrorism Court to another on the ground of threats to the complainant?
  • Whether general apprehension of danger to the complainant's life is a sufficient ground for transferring a trial to another city?
  • Does the High Court have the power under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 to transfer cases between Anti-Terrorism Courts in the interest of justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shakil vs Chanzeb and 2 others-2016 YLR 2391 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-05-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shakeel Khan vs Ali Raza and others2016 P Cr. L J 1578 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-05
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailprohibitory clausepolice investigation reportmurderFIR sanctityperverse bail order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the cancellation of post-arrest bail granted to respondent No. 1 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jaranwala. The respondent was accused of murder and other offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with a specific role of firing two fatal shots attributed to him in a promptly lodged FIR. The core legal question was whether the bail granted to the respondent was perverse and legally unsustainable given the evidence and the nature of the offence. The Court held that the bail order was patently illegal, noting that the respondent was charged with an offence falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that the police's finding of innocence was not binding on the court. The Court emphasized that bail should not be granted in such cases without cogent material indicating further inquiry into guilt. Consequently, the Court cancelled the bail, reiterating that it will interfere when a bail order is perverse or violates settled legal principles.

  Questions settled

  • Is the opinion of the police declaring an accused innocent binding upon the court during bail proceedings?
  • Can bail be cancelled if the order granting it is found to be perverse or patently illegal?
  • Does an offence falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, generally preclude the grant of bail unless the case falls under subsection (2)?
  • What weight should be attached to a promptly lodged FIR in bail matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahid vs The State, Etc.2016 NLR Criminal 153 · Lahore High Court · 2014-06-17
  criminal appealmurdercircumstantial evidencelast-seen evidencedelay in FIRbenefit of doubtacquittalrecovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased, handed down by the trial court. The core legal questions involve the reliability of an inordinately delayed First Information Report, the evidentiary value of last-seen evidence, the credibility of alleged recoveries, and whether a conviction can be sustained on tainted and uncorroborated circumstantial evidence when co-accused have already been acquitted on the same evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the 15-day unexplainable delay in lodging the FIR, the lack of corroboration for the weak last-seen testimony, the doubtful recoveries, and the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus rendered the prosecution case untrustworthy. The court established the key principles that last-seen evidence is the weakest form of testimony requiring strong independent corroboration, inordinate unexplained delay in reporting a crime creates fatal doubt, medical evidence only corroborates the cause and nature of injuries but cannot connect an accused to a crime, and tainted evidence disbelieved against co-accused cannot form the sole basis of conviction for the remaining accused without independent corroboration. The appeal was accepted and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inordinate and unexplained delay of fifteen days in lodging the First Information Report creates fatal doubt regarding the veracity of the prosecution case?
  • Is last-seen evidence considered a weak type of testimony that requires strong, independent corroboration to sustain a conviction?
  • Can medical evidence alone connect an accused person to the commission of a crime in the absence of reliable ocular or circumstantial evidence?
  • Whether the testimony of interested witnesses disbelieved with regard to acquitted co-accused can be relied upon to convict another co-accused without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahid vs The State and others2016 YLR 616 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-09
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtadverse inferenceanti-terrorismacquittalwitness credibilitywithholding of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence imposed by the Anti-Terrorism Court, where the appellant was convicted for murder and related offenses. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's participation in the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, given conflicting witness testimonies and the withholding of a key witness. The Court found significant discrepancies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses regarding the appellant's specific role, noting that the Investigating Officer admitted the appellant possessed no weapon and did not fire. Furthermore, the Court drew an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 against the prosecution for withholding a material witness. Holding that the prosecution failed to establish guilt, the Court emphasized the principle that the benefit of doubt is a right, not a concession, and must be extended to the accused if any reasonable doubt exists in a prudent mind. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withholding of a material witness by the prosecution warrant an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Is the benefit of doubt a matter of grace or a legal right of the accused?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when there are major discrepancies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses regarding the accused's specific role?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahid vs Rasool Khan s/o Abdul Rasool Khan Pattoki DistrictPTCL 2016 CL. 649 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-01-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahid Murtaza---Applicant vs The State and another2016 YLR 2571 · Sindh High Court · 2016-04-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahid Khan vs Faysal Bank Ltd. etc2016 LHC 2129 · Lahore High Court · 2016-06-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahid Fahim vs Abdullah Tayyab and 2 others2016 MLD 1121, K.L.R. 2016 Civil Cases 208 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-29Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahid Fahim vs Abdullah Tayyab and 2 other2016 MLD 1121 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-29Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahid Akram vs Government of the Punjab through Chief2016 PLJ Lahore 42, 2016 PLC (C.S.) 1335 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-31
  writ of quo-warrantopublic appointmentDirector GeneralPunjab Emergency Service 1122lachesmala fide intentconstitutional petitionjudicial reviewstatutory compliancetenure extension
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment concerns a writ petition challenging the appointment and subsequent extensions of the Director General, Punjab Emergency Service 1122, alleging non-transparency and violation of Section 9 of The Punjab Emergency Service Act, 2006. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of the petition on grounds of laches and mala fide intent, and the legality of the appointment itself. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition. While holding that laches does not bar a quo-warranto petition where disqualification persists, the Court found the petition non-maintainable due to the petitioner's mala fide intent and personal vengeance, noting the petitioner was an ex-employee removed from service by the respondent. On merits, the Court ruled that the respondent's appointment and tenure extensions were fully compliant with Section 9 of The Punjab Emergency Service Act, 2006, as he met all eligibility criteria. The judgment reiterated that constitutional jurisdiction is not for settling personal disputes and emphasized that statutory provisions governing appointments must be followed, with judicial review available for illegality.

  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahid Akram vs Government of Punjab through Chief2016 PLJ Lahore 42 · Lahore High Court
  quo-warrantopublic appointmentemergency servicestatutory interpretationmala fidelachesconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 challenged the appointment and successive tenure extensions of Respondent No. 3 as the Director General of the Punjab Emergency Service (Rescue 1122) on grounds of non-transparency, lack of advertisement, and violation of Section 9 of The Punjab Emergency Service Act, 2006. The respondents raised preliminary objections regarding maintainability due to laches and mala fide intent, noting that one of the petitioners was an ex-employee dismissed by Respondent No. 3. The core legal question revolved around the validity of the appointment and whether it contravened statutory provisions and principles of transparency. The Lahore High Court held that the appointment strictly fulfilled the criteria laid down in Section 9 of The Punjab Emergency Service Act, 2006, and that the petition was also not maintainable as it stemmed from personal vengeance and mala fide conduct. The court laid down the principle that where appointments are governed by specific statutory provisions, those provisions must be followed, and courts will not interfere when the executive acts within its legal limits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ of quo-warranto be entertained if the petition is filed with mala fide intent and personal vengeance?
  • Does the appointment of the Director General of the Punjab Emergency Service comply with Section 9 of The Punjab Emergency Service Act, 2006?
  • Whether the question of laches bars a petition seeking a writ of quo-warranto against a subsisting public appointment?
  • Are specific statutory provisions governing high-level appointments in autonomous bodies subject to judicial substitution by general policy recommendations?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shah vs Muhammad Zaigham and 5 others2016 PLD Lahore 495 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafique vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 1315 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-14
  post-arrest bailnarcotic substanceschemical analysisprocedural delayborderline casefurther inquiryControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail concerns a charge under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, involving the recovery of 1150 grams of charas and 250 grams of heroin. The core legal questions were whether a seven-day delay in sending samples for chemical analysis, in violation of the 72-hour requirement under the Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, constitutes grounds for bail, and whether the quantity recovered qualifies as a borderline case between Section 9(b) and 9(c) of the Act. The Court held that the failure to adhere to the mandatory timeline for chemical analysis rendered the prosecution's case one of further inquiry. Furthermore, the Court determined that the recovered quantity marginally exceeded the threshold, classifying it as a borderline case. Consequently, the Court granted post-arrest bail, emphasizing that the procedural lapse and the nature of the evidence—being exclusively police witnesses—warranted the concession. The principle established is that procedural non-compliance regarding sample dispatch timelines in narcotics cases entitles an accused to further inquiry and potential bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in sending narcotic samples for chemical analysis beyond the 72-hour period prescribed by the Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, entitle an accused to bail?
  • Is the recovery of a quantity of narcotics marginally exceeding the threshold between Section 9(b) and Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, considered a borderline case for the purpose of bail?
  • Does the fact that all prosecution witnesses are police officials reduce the risk of evidence tampering in a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafique vs The State and another2016 KLR Criminal Cases 27 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-21
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtcontradictions in ocular and medical evidenceappreciation of evidenceacquittalQatl-e-Amd
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for committing Qatl-e-Amd and sentencing him to life imprisonment. The core legal question involves determining whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt through consistent ocular and medical evidence. The Lahore High Court held that numerous glaring contradictions existed between the ocular account and medical evidence, regarding the place of occurrence, the entry and exit wounds, the firing distance, and the time of death, alongside an unproven source of light for a night-time incident and delayed reporting. The court established the principle that even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contradiction between the ocular account regarding the seat of injury and the medical report warrant the acquittal of the accused?
  • Whether an accused is entitled to an acquittal when the prosecution fails to establish a reliable source of light in a dark-time occurrence?
  • Is a single circumstance creating a reasonable doubt in a prudent mind sufficient to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when material discrepancies exist regarding the exact place of occurrence and the timing of the FIR?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafique vs State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 358 · Lahore High Court · 2010-09-21
  qatl-e-amdbenefit of doubtcontradiction between medical and ocular accountblind murdercriminal appealacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for committing the qatl-e-amd of the deceased and sentencing him to life imprisonment. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the ocular account, glaring contradictions between the medical evidence and eyewitness testimonies, the lack of a source of light in a dark-time occurrence, and delayed police reporting. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to material discrepancies regarding the place of occurrence, contradictions between the medical evidence and oral testimony, related and interested witnesses, and unexplained delay, making the occurrence an unseen, blind murder. The court laid down the principle that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right, leading to the setting aside of the conviction and the acquittal of the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contradictions between ocular account and medical evidence are sufficient to create reasonable doubt warranting the acquittal of an accused?
  • Does the presence of discrepancies regarding the actual place of occurrence in a criminal trial render the prosecution story untrustworthy?
  • Whether a single circumstance creating a reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitles an accused to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right?
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• Muhammad Shafique Shahid vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Rto, Faisalabad2016 PTD (Trib.) 2905 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-12-10Read full judgment →