Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. through Chief Manager vs The VTH2016 MLD 780 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-02Read full judgment →
• Messrs Munir Foundry vs C.I.R. (Appeals-II), Lahore and others2016 PTD (Trib.) 485 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-12-09
  sales taxnatural justicefair trialsearch and seizureauditshow cause noticejurisdictiontax fraud
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the registered person against the order of the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), which maintained the Order-in-Original upholding a tax demand and dismissing the taxpayer's appeal under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal questions involved whether the adjudication proceedings violated principles of natural justice and the right to a fair trial, whether the tax authorities had territorial jurisdiction, whether search and seizure under section 38 was lawful without invoking section 40, and whether tax assessment and recovery could be sustained on mere presumptions of electricity consumption without corroborating evidence. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue held that the ex parte adjudication order passed without a personal hearing violated natural justice and Article 10-A of the Constitution, that search and seizure under section 38 without complying with section 40 was illegal, and that tax demands cannot be raised on assumptions and presumptions without proof of actual supply. The Tribunal set aside the impugned show cause notice, adjudication order, and appellate order as void ab initio and without jurisdiction, allowing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does passing an ex parte adjudication order without providing an opportunity of personal hearing vitiate the proceedings as violative of natural justice and Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can tax authorities conduct a regular search and seizure under section 38 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 without complying with the mandatory provisions of section 40 of the Act?
  • Whether sales tax liability can be created solely on the basis of electricity consumption units and hypothetical production estimates without tangible evidence of actual physical supply and receipt of monetary consideration?
  • Does section 38 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 empower revenue officers to conduct an audit of a registered person without invoking the provisions of section 25 of the Act?
  • Is an adjudication order sustainable when it imposes a penalty under a statutory provision that was never cited or confronted in the show cause notice?
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• Messrs Multan Electric Power Company, MEPCO Complex, Khanewal2016 PTD (Trib.) 1829 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-12-19Read full judgment →
• Messrs Multan Electric Power Co. Limited (MEPCO) through Chief2016 LHC 2114, PLJ 2016 Tax Cases (Lah.) 80, 2016 PTD 2567 · Lahore High Court · 2016-06-06
  advance income taxelectricity billfiscal interpretationharmonious constructiontaxpayer rightswithholding taxstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application under Section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, concerns the calculation of advance income tax on electricity bills. The central legal question was whether advance tax under Section 235 of the Ordinance is chargeable on the gross amount of an electricity bill, inclusive of sales tax and other duties, or exclusively on the electricity consumption charges. The Court held that Section 235(1) and (2) must be read harmoniously, concluding that advance tax is strictly applicable to electricity consumption charges only, excluding extraneous levies like sales tax and excise duty. The Court affirmed that fiscal statutes must be construed strictly, and in cases of ambiguity or where two interpretations are possible, the view favoring the taxpayer must prevail. Furthermore, the judgment established that statutory provisions must be read as an organic whole to avoid conflict and ensure that no provision is rendered nugatory. Consequently, the Court ruled against the revenue department, affirming that the subject cannot be taxed beyond the clear letter of the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether advance income tax under Section 235 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is chargeable on the gross amount of an electricity bill or only on electricity consumption charges?
  • Does the rule of harmonious construction require that Section 235(1) and Section 235(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 be read together?
  • In the event of ambiguity in a fiscal statute, should the interpretation be resolved in favor of the revenue department or the taxpayer?
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• Messrs Muhammad Muqeem Sohail Builders and Developers through Managing Partner vs Shamsher Ali and 43 others2016 YLR 240 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Muhammad Hassan Wassan, Government Contractor through Proprietor vs Province of Sindh through Secretary and 2 others2016 CLC 633 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Muhammad Ashraf through Nasar Mahmood Gondal, Sargodha vs Commissioner Inland Revenue R.T.O., Sargodha2016 PTD (Trib.) 253 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-10-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mughal Steel Metallurgy Corporation Ltd. Lahore vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV R.T.O.Faisalabad2016 PTD (Trib.) 2069 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-05-20
  tax deductionre-rolling chargesaccrual basisactual paymentincome tax assessmentwithholding tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns tax assessments for the tax years 2009 and 2010, wherein the taxpayer challenged additions made under Section 21(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The assessing authority had made these additions on the basis that the taxpayer failed to deduct tax on payments for re-rolling charges made to suppliers, despite the suppliers holding exemption certificates. The core legal question was whether the taxpayer was required to deduct tax at the time of accrual or at the time of actual payment under Section 158 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Tribunal held that the payments for re-rolling charges fall under Section 158(b), which mandates tax deduction only at the time the amount is actually paid, rather than on an accrual basis. Consequently, the Tribunal vacated the orders of the lower authorities and remanded the matter to the assessing authority to verify the specific timing of the payments and to determine the tax liability accordingly, particularly considering whether the recipient had already discharged its own tax liability for the relevant period.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 158(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 require tax deduction at the time of accrual or at the time of actual payment for re-rolling charges?
  • Is the assessing authority permitted to make additions under Section 21(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 if the taxpayer failed to deduct tax on payments made to suppliers holding exemption certificates?
  • Does Section 158(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 apply to payments other than profit on debts?
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• Messrs Merck (Pvt.) Ltd, Karachi and others vs Commissioner Inland2016 PTD (Trib.) 1356 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-12-08
  unrealized exchange lossencapsulation chargesroyalty claimarm's length priceWorkers' Profit Participation Fundscrap saleFinal Tax Regimeaccrual basis accounting
  Summary & questions settled

  These cross appeals were filed by both the Department and the taxpayer against the order of the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), Karachi, concerning various tax additions and disallowances for Tax Year 2010. The core legal questions involved the allowability of unrealized exchange losses under accrual basis accounting, the apportionment of expenses against insurance commission, the treatment of encapsulation charges for withholding tax purposes under Section 153, the validity of additions under Section 111(1)(c) for unexplained credits, the determination of arm's length price for royalty payments under Section 108, scrap sales, and the apportionment of the Workers' Profit Participation Fund between normal and final tax regimes. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue held that certain issues such as encapsulation charges, unverified credits, and royalty payments required fresh adjudication and were remanded back to the lower authorities, while upholding the disallowance of unrealized exchange losses, the apportionment of expenses and Workers' Profit Participation Fund, and the deletion of scrap sale additions. The key principle laid down is that liabilities in foreign currency must meet the accrual criteria under Section 34(3) to be allowable, and expenses must be properly apportioned across all revenue streams including the Final Tax Regime.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unrealized exchange loss recorded on outstanding foreign currency liabilities is allowable as an expense under section 34(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Are payments made for encapsulation where raw material is provided by the customer classifiable as supplies of goods or services for the purpose of tax deduction under section 153 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Whether the apportionment of Workers' Profit Participation Fund can be restricted solely to the Normal Tax Regime by excluding income covered under the Final Tax Regime?
  • Can an addition under section 108 for royalty payments be sustained without establishing proper comparability under the relevant rules?
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• Messrs Mega Steel Mills Private Limited vs Government of Punjab2016 CLC 1095 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-22
  environmental protectionsealing of premisesjurisdictioncasus omissusaudi alteram partemfreedom of tradenatural justiceenvironmental tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This First Appeal under section 23 of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997 challenges the action of the Environmental Protection Agency in sealing the appellant's factory premises. The core legal question is whether the environmental authorities have the legal power and jurisdiction under the relevant environmental laws to seal a factory premises, and whether such action violates the fundamental right to trade and the principles of natural justice. The Lahore High Court held that neither the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997, nor the Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (Review of IEE and EIA) Regulations, 2000 contain any provision empowering the authorities to seal property, and courts cannot supply such an omission under the doctrine of casus omissus. The Court laid down the key principles that administrative authorities cannot exercise powers not expressly conferred by statute, that the power to seal cannot be implied where omitted by the legislature, that sealing a factory without prior notice violates the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice, and that arbitrary sealing infringes the constitutional freedom of trade and livelihood under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Environmental Protection Agency has the legal power and jurisdiction to seal a factory premises under the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997?
  • Can a court supply missing words or powers in a statute under the doctrine of casus omissus?
  • Does the sealing of a factory premises without prior notice violate the principle of audi alteram partem and natural justice?
  • Whether the unmerited sealing of a commercial establishment infringes the constitutional freedom of trade and livelihood guaranteed under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
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• Messrs Mega Steel Mills Private Limited through Chief Executive/Director2016 CLD 1097 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-22
  environmental protectionsealing of factoryjurisdictioncasus omissusfundamental rightsnatural justiceaudi alteram partemfirst appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This First Appeal under section 23 of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997 challenges the action of the Environmental Protection Agency in sealing the appellant's factory premises and the underlying order. The core legal question is whether the environmental authorities possess the legal power and jurisdiction under the relevant environmental laws and regulations to seal a factory premises. The Lahore High Court held that neither the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997 nor the Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (Review of IEE and EIA) Regulations, 2000 contain any provision empowering the authorities to seal property, and supplying such a power would violate the principle of casus omissus. The Court further ruled that the sealing action violated Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 concerning freedom of trade and livelihood, and breached the principles of natural justice by failing to provide an opportunity of being heard. The appeal was accepted and the impugned sealing order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Environmental Protection Agency has the power to seal a factory under the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997?
  • Does sub-Regulation (3) of Regulation 20 of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (Review of IEE and EIA) Regulations, 2000 authorize the sealing of property?
  • Is the action of sealing a commercial premises without prior notice violative of the principles of natural justice and audi alteram partem?
  • Can a court supply missing words or omitted provisions into a statute under the principle of casus omissus?
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• Messrs Masood and Co., Peshawar vs C.I.R., R.T.O., Peshawar2016 PTD (Trib.) 1377 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-10-01
  sales taxlimitation periodtax fraudcompulsory registrationtax invoiceunregistered persondouble taxation
  Summary & questions settled

  This sales tax appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue arose from an assessment order demanding sales tax, default surcharge, and penalty from an unregistered taxpayer for taxable supplies of sugar. The core legal questions pertained to the applicable period of limitation for issuing a show-cause notice without an allegation of tax fraud, and whether an unregistered person liable to be registered can issue tax invoices or be assessed without compulsory registration. The Tribunal, through a reference to a third member following a difference of opinion on merits, concurred with the initial finding that in the absence of mens rea or tax fraud, the case fell under Section 36(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, rendering the recovery notice issued beyond three years time-barred. The Tribunal established that an unregistered person cannot issue tax invoices under Section 23, and departmental authorities must follow compulsory registration procedures under Rule 6 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 before creating a tax demand.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a show-cause notice for recovery of short-levied sales tax without an allegation of tax fraud is governed by the three-year limitation period under Section 36(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • As to whether the appellant being not registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, was under legal obligation to issue sales tax invoices under section 23 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • As to whether a person liable to be registered can issue invoice prescribed under the law and withhold tax thereon?
  • As to whether the department was legally bound to compulsory register the appellant before creating a tax demand or requiring him to pay sales tax not withheld under Rule 6 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006?
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• Messrs Malik Rubber Sheet Factory vs Deputy Collector and another2016 PTD (Trib.) 1847 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-02-14
  customs adjudicationjurisdictionlimitation periodconfiscationredemption fineimport policy ordergoods of indian origin
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by Messrs Malik Rubber Sheet Factory against the order of the Collector of Customs (Appeals) upholding the outright confiscation and penalty imposed by the Deputy Collector of Customs regarding an imported consignment of printing ink of Indian origin. The core legal questions involved whether the Deputy Collector had the pecuniary jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter, whether the adjudication and appellate orders were rendered void ab initio for being passed beyond the statutory time limits prescribed under the Customs Act, 1969, and whether goods of Indian origin not listed in the positive list could be released on payment of a redemption fine instead of outright confiscation. The Customs Appellate Tribunal held that the Deputy Collector lacked jurisdiction based on the low amount of duty and taxes, that both the original and appellate orders were time-barred and void, and that beneficial trade policies should be applied retrospectively. The Tribunal set aside the lower orders and allowed the appeal, directing the refund of auction proceeds to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an adjudication order passed beyond the statutory time limit under Section 179 of the Customs Act, 1969 is void ab initio?
  • Does a Deputy Collector have jurisdiction to adjudicate a customs case where the involved duty and taxes fall within the pecuniary limits of an Assistant Collector?
  • Whether goods of Indian origin not included in the positive list of the Import Policy Order must be outright confiscated or can be released upon payment of a redemption fine?
  • Can a beneficial trade policy or notification be given retrospective effect for the benefit of the taxpayer?
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• Messrs Majeed and Sons Steel (Pvt.) Ltd vs Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad2016 PTD 2599 · Federal Tax Ombudsman
  maladministrationprovisional assessmentcustoms dutyFederal Tax Ombudsmaninordinate delaylaboratory test report
  Summary & questions settled

  This complaint was filed before the Federal Tax Ombudsman under Section 10(1) of the F.T.O. Ordinance, 2000, against the Model Customs Collectorate (MCC) Appraisement-East, Karachi, alleging maladministration due to the department's failure to finalize provisional assessments of imported goods. The Complainant had imported steel consignments, which were released provisionally under Section 81 of the Customs Act, 1969, pending laboratory test reports from KRL, Islamabad, to determine the nature of the goods. Despite repeated requests, the department failed to pursue these reports for over a year and eight months. The core legal question was whether the department's inaction regarding pending test reports constituted maladministration. The Federal Tax Ombudsman held that the department's failure to pursue the pending laboratory reports caused inordinate delay in finalizing the provisional assessment, which amounted to maladministration under Section 2(3)(ii) of the F.T.O. Ordinance, 2000. The Ombudsman recommended that the Federal Board of Revenue direct the department to expedite the pending reports, finalize the assessment within a specified timeframe, and establish a monitoring mechanism for all provisional assessment cases to prevent future delays.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a customs department to pursue pending laboratory test reports for provisional assessments constitute maladministration?
  • Can the Federal Tax Ombudsman intervene in cases of inordinate delay regarding the finalization of provisional assessments under the Customs Act, 1969?
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• Messrs Magna Textile (Pvt.) Ltd., Faisalabad vs The Commissioner2016 PTD (Trib.) 2248 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-10-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Macca Traders vs Superintendent Special Anti Smuggling2016 PTD (Trib.) 2230 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-07-13Read full judgment →
• Messrs M.Z. International vs The Assistant Commissioner Inland2016 P.C.T.L.R. 199, PTCL 2016 CL. 513, 2016 PTD 358, 2016 PLJ Lahore 29 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-03
  Sales Tax Act 1990show cause noticeOrder-in-Originalstatutory limitationadjudication proceedingsmandatory limitationvoid ab initiowrit petition maintainabilityalternate remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional writ petition before the Lahore High Court challenged a show cause notice (SCN) dated 11.05.2009 issued by the Deputy Collector (Adjudication) and the subsequent Order-in-Original dated 31.05.2010 passed under Sections 11 and 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The main legal question was whether the Order-in-Original was passed beyond the mandatory statutory limitation period prescribed under Section 36(3) of the Act and was thus without jurisdiction, and whether the constitutional petition was maintainable despite alternate remedies. The Lahore High Court allowed the petition, declaring the SCN and Order-in-Original void ab initio and without lawful authority. The Court held that the statutory time limit of 120 days for completing adjudication under Section 36(3) of the Act is mandatory, not directory. An extension granted after the expiry of the statutory period is legally ineffective. Furthermore, where an impugned action or order is void ab initio and passed without jurisdiction, a constitutional writ petition is maintainable despite the existence of alternate statutory remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Is the statutory period prescribed for passing an Order-in-Original under Section 36(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 mandatory or directory?
  • Can an extension of time limitation for adjudication under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 be validly granted after the statutory period has already expired?
  • Is a constitutional writ petition maintainable against an order that is void ab initio and passed without jurisdiction despite the availability of alternate remedies?
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• Messrs M.K. International, Local Agent of Messrs Interman Trading Fze vs Sui Southern Gas Company through M.D. and 2 others2016 CLC 1 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-06
  blacklistingpublic procurementconstitutional jurisdictionalternate remedydisputed factstender processforgeryindenting firm
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a private indenting firm, challenged an order dated 22.09.2014 issued by Sui Southern Gas Company (Respondent No. 1) blacklisting it from future business under Rule 19 of the Public Procurement Rules, 2004. The respondent alleged that the petitioner submitted false authorization from a French manufacturer (M/s EFFBE France) for a tender and had previously supplied Chinese-origin goods instead of the required French-origin materials. The petitioner contended that the blacklisting violated the Procurement Rules as no proper show-cause notice or inquiry was conducted. The respondent challenged the maintainability of the petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, citing the existence of an alternate remedy and the factual nature of the dispute. The High Court held that the controversy regarding the genuineness of the authorization and alleged forgery involved disputed questions of fact that cannot be adjudicated in constitutional jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the Public Procurement Rules, 2004, provide a complete mechanism for grievance redressal which must be exhausted. The petition was dismissed, with the petitioner advised to seek alternate legal remedies.

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• Messrs Long Grain Rice Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive vs Habib2016 CLD 551 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-18
  constitutional petitionstay of criminal proceedingspledged stocksfinancial institutionscivil and criminal liabilityexecution proceedingsmisappropriation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, sought to stay criminal proceedings initiated under Section 20 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, pending the final disposal of execution proceedings. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings regarding the alleged misappropriation of pledged stocks should be stayed while the same issue of misappropriation was actively being adjudicated within pending civil execution proceedings. The High Court held that the petition should be accepted. The Court reasoned that the criminal complaint and the civil execution proceedings were inextricably intertwined, as both hinged on the determination of liability for the pledged stocks. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the Court established that while civil and criminal proceedings can generally run parallel, criminal proceedings must be stayed when the criminal liability is dependent on the outcome of civil litigation to prevent prejudice to the accused. Consequently, the criminal proceedings were ordered stayed until the civil court determines the issue of misappropriation of the pledged stocks.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances should criminal proceedings be stayed pending the outcome of civil litigation?
  • Does a court have the discretion to stay criminal proceedings when the underlying civil liability is currently being adjudicated?
  • Can criminal proceedings under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 be stayed if they depend on the determination of civil liability in execution proceedings?
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• Messrs Leather Cotex vs Collector of Customs (Adjudication-II) and another2016 PTD (Trib.) 2157 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-03-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Lafarge Pakistan Cement Company vs District Collector, Chakwal and others2016 P.S.C. 1322, 2016 PLD Supreme Court 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-05
  stamp dutymortgage deedpossession of propertyimpounding of instrumentsrecovery of penaltiesCollector's powers
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals arose from a judgment dismissing a writ petition and a civil revision concerning the assessment of stamp-duty on a mortgage-deed. The appellant obtained a loan and hypothecated its machinery and mortgaged land. The District Collector issued a notice alleging evasion of stamp-duty and imposed a penalty. The appellant challenged the notice, arguing that possession was not transferred, making Article 40(b) read with Article 15 of the Stamp Act, 1899 applicable rather than Article 40(a), and that the Collector lacked recovery powers under Section 48 unless the instrument was produced or impounded under Section 33. The Supreme Court held that since the mortgage agreement stipulated that the mortgagor retained possession unless a default occurred, the case fell under Article 40(b) (charged as a bond under Article 15). Furthermore, the Court held that the phrase 'comes in the performance of his functions' in Section 33 empowers the Collector to examine and impound instruments coming before him in official functions, thus sustaining the duty assessment. However, the Court found the imposed penalty excessive and modified it to double the deficient duty.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mortgage deed where possession of the property is not immediately transferred fall under Article 40(a) or Article 40(b) of the First Schedule of the Stamp Act, 1899?
  • Can the Collector recover duties and penalties under Section 48 of the Stamp Act, 1899 when an instrument comes before him in the performance of his functions?
  • What is the proper measure of penalty when an instrument is found to be deficiently stamped?
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• Messrs Labbaik (Pvt.) Ltd. through authorized person and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary for Ministry of Interior and others2016 CLC 575 · Sindh High Court · 2015-07-03
  media regulationsecurity clearancepolicy directivePEMRAchange of managementbroadcast licenseforeign fundingconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the withdrawal of security clearance for their media company and a government directive halting their transmission. The core legal questions concerned whether security clearance is mandatory upon a change in company management and whether the Federal Government may issue licensee-specific directives under Section 5 of the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002. The Court held that security clearance is a mandatory, ongoing requirement upon any change in management to ensure compliance with ownership and funding restrictions. Regarding the second petition, the Court ruled that the government’s directive to stop the transmission of a specific channel did not constitute a "policy" directive but rather an unlawful interference in the regulatory functions of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority. The Court established that policy directives must be general principles applicable across the board, not specific instructions targeting individual licensees. Consequently, the first petition was dismissed as premature, while the second petition was allowed, and the impugned directive was quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the change of directors or management in a media company require fresh security clearance from the Ministry of Interior under the PEMRA framework?
  • Can the Federal Government issue licensee-specific directives to the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority under the guise of 'policy advice' pursuant to Section 5 of the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002?
  • Is the requirement of security clearance for media company directors a violation of the freedom of trade and business under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Messrs Kingcrete Builders. vs Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 3PTCL 2016 CL. 779 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Messrs Kingcrete Builders through General Manager vs Central BoardPTCL 2016 CL. 779, 2016 PTD 1142 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-01-19Read full judgment →
• Messrs Kashmir Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Federation through Secretary2016 LHC 86, 2016 PLJ Lahore 627, 2016 PTD 1649 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-13
  Federal Excise DutyFederal Board of Revenueconstitutional petitionquasi-judicial authorityalternative remedyshow cause noticestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged show cause notices and consequential orders-in-original issued under the Federal Excise Act, 2005, following an administrative interpretation provided by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) regarding the levy of Federal Excise Duty on white crystalline sugar. The core legal question was whether quasi-judicial authorities and tax functionaries are bound to follow the administrative interpretations of the FBR, and whether constitutional petitions are maintainable against show-cause notices when an alternative statutory remedy exists. The Lahore High Court held that while constitutional jurisdiction will generally not be invoked against show-cause notices where alternate remedies exist and questions of statutory interpretation are involved, FBR's administrative interpretations cannot interfere with or bind quasi-judicial authorities in their independent adjudicatory functions. The Court laid down the principle that adjudicating authorities must exercise independent judgment uninfluenced by FBR circulars or letters, pursuant to Section 42 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, and set aside the orders-in-original that had slavishly followed the FBR's directive, while declining to interfere with the show-cause notices.

  Questions settled

  • Whether administrative interpretations issued by the Federal Board of Revenue are binding on quasi-judicial authorities acting under the Federal Excise Act, 2005?
  • Can a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be maintained against a show-cause notice where an alternate statutory remedy is available?
  • Does an order-in-original passed by an adjudicating authority following the dictates of an Fbr letter violate Section 42 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005?
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• Messrs Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Limited through Deputy General Manager (Personnel), Karachi vs Talib Hussain2016 PLC 267 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2015-11-02
  date of birth correctionservice recordtime-barred grievancelabour lawindustrial relationsbelated claimestoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Labour Court order directing an employer to change an employee's date of birth from 07.11.1955 to 01.01.1958. The employee, having consistently declared his birth date as 07.11.1955 in service records, identity cards, and provident fund documents for over 30 years, sought the change near the end of his career. The Labour Appellate Tribunal addressed whether an employee can seek a change in their date of birth at any time, particularly when such a request is time-barred and contradicts decades of self-declared records. The Tribunal held that the employee's request was an afterthought, unsupported by authentic evidence, and time-barred under the relevant industrial relations legislation. The Tribunal emphasized that courts must discourage the practice of seeking birth date changes late in a career, noting that even in the absence of specific statutory prohibitions for non-governmental employees, such claims are subject to limitation periods and judicial scrutiny. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the Labour Court's order and dismissed the grievance application.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee seek a change in their date of birth in service records at any time without limitation?
  • Does the absence of specific statutory rules prohibiting birth date changes for non-governmental employees allow for such changes to be made indefinitely?
  • Is a grievance application for the correction of a date of birth maintainable if filed decades after the initial declaration and beyond the statutory limitation period?
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• Messrs Karachi Club Staff Workers' Union through General Secretary vs Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour2016 PLC 160 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2015-10-07
  trade union registrationlabour lawcommercial establishmentindustry definitionbinding precedentnon-profit organizationindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Labour Court order directing the cancellation of the Karachi Club Staff Workers' Union's registration on the premise that the Karachi Club is neither an industry nor a commercial establishment under the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013. The core legal questions were whether the Karachi Club qualifies as an establishment under the Act and whether the absence of profit-making precludes the formation of a trade union. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the Labour Court erred by ignoring binding precedents from the Supreme Court and the Sindh High Court, which classify clubs as commercial establishments. Furthermore, the Tribunal affirmed that profit-making is not a prerequisite for an entity to be considered an 'industry' for trade union purposes, citing established Supreme Court jurisprudence. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order, ruling that the registration of the appellant union must remain intact, noting that the selective attempt to cancel only one union's registration was both illegal and mala fide.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'industry' or 'establishment' under the Sindh Industrial Relations Act 2013 require the entity to be profit-making?
  • Are judgments of the Supreme Court and the High Court of Sindh binding on the Labour Court under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a club be classified as a commercial establishment for the purposes of forming a trade union?
  • Is the cancellation of a trade union's registration permissible solely on the ground that the employer is a non-profit entity?
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• Messrs Kalb-E-Haider & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive. vs National Bank of Pakistan through President and another2016 CLD 183 · Sindh High Court · 2015-07-10
  banking suitletter of creditTT buying rateOD buying rateforeign exchange circularforged demand draftright of set-offpremature encashment of FDRdamages
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an exporter, filed a banking suit against the respondent bank for declaration, permanent injunction, damages, and recovery, which was dismissed by the trial court. The dispute arose from two main issues: first, whether the bank was entitled to apply Over Draft (O.D.) buying rates instead of Telegraphic Transfer (T.T.) buying rates for export proceeds under letters of credit where the negotiating bank's funds were not utilized; and second, whether the bank could debit the appellant's accounts and prematurely encash a Fixed Deposit Receipt (FDR) to recover losses from a forged demand draft deposited for an advance payment shipment. The Sindh High Court held that since the date of negotiation and realization was the same and the negotiating bank's funds were not utilized, T.T. buying rates were applicable under Foreign Exchange Circular No. 83/1993, making the bank's recovery of the rate difference unlawful. The Court further held that the appellant had acted in good faith after the proceeds of the demand draft were credited, was not guilty of collusion, and was not liable for the forged instrument after several months. Finally, the Court ruled that banks cannot exercise unilateral rights of set-off or prematurely encash FDRs without prior adjudication of liability by a competent judicial forum. The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the dismissal and decreeing the suit except for the claim of damages.

  Questions settled

  • Whether T.T. buying rate or O.D. buying rate is applicable when export documents are negotiated under a letter of credit but the negotiating bank's funds are not utilized?
  • Can a bank unilaterally debit a customer's account and prematurely encash a Fixed Deposit Receipt to recover alleged liabilities without prior adjudication by a competent forum?
  • Is an exporter liable for a forged or altered demand draft received as an advance payment after the proceeds have been credited by the bank and goods have been shipped in good faith?
  • What is the standard of proof required for awarding damages against a bank for business losses allegedly caused by the wrongful withholding of a customer's funds?
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• Messrs J.K. Brothers Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director vs The Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue and another2016 PLJ Lahore 35, PTCL 2016 CL. 507, 2016 PTD 461 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-31
  writ petitionshow cause noticelimitation periodSales Tax Act 1990input tax refundmaintainability of writ petitionvoid ab initio
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional writ petition was filed by the petitioner challenging a show-cause notice issued by respondent No. 1 seeking to reject an input tax refund claim and initiate penal action. The main legal question before the High Court was whether the show-cause notice issued beyond the prescribed statutory period of limitation was void ab initio and without jurisdiction. The petitioner argued that the notice pertained to the tax period of April 2005 and was issued in May 2011, well beyond the five-year limitation under Section 11(4) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The respondents contended that the notice was issued pursuant to a remand order by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue. The Lahore High Court allowed the writ petition, holding that the show-cause notice was barred by limitation and thus void ab initio and without legal effect. The Court affirmed that where statutory limitation for recovery or rejection has elapsed, the claim becomes unenforceable, and an ultra vires or time-barred show-cause notice can be set aside in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a show-cause notice issued under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 after the expiration of the statutory limitation period void ab initio?
  • Does the issuance of a fresh show-cause notice following a remand order extend or restart the five-year limitation period prescribed under Section 11(4) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Can a constitutional writ petition be maintained directly against a show-cause notice that is ultra vires or barred by limitation?
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• Messrs Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited vs Deputy2016 PTD 2685 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-06-09
  sales taxexporttaxable suppliessupply of electricityAzad Jammu and Kashmirexemptioncharging section
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated sales tax reference addressed whether the supply of electricity by Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited to Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) is exempt from sales tax or qualifies as a zero-rated export under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal questions involved the interpretation of 'goods exported' under section 4 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and whether an executive agreement could override statutory tax liabilities without an exemption under section 13. The Islamabad High Court held that AJ&K is not a foreign country or a sovereign state for the purpose of international trade, and therefore supplies sent thither do not constitute 'goods exported' from Pakistan. Furthermore, tax exemptions or reliefs cannot be granted through executive agreements contrary to statutory prescription. The court concluded that electricity supplied to AJ&K is a taxable supply under section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and upheld the sales tax demand and orders against the taxpayer.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the supply of electricity to Azad Jammu and Kashmir falls within the scope of 'goods exported' under section 4 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Can an agreement between governments exempt a taxpayer from sales tax without following the statutory modes of exemption under section 13 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Whether Azad Jammu and Kashmir qualifies as a sovereign state or foreign country for the purpose of international trade and export laws?
  • Are supplies of electricity made from Pakistan to Azad Jammu and Kashmir subject to the charge and levy of sales tax under section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Inter Market Knit (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director Admn and Logistics2016 PLC 220 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2015-10-01
  labour lawpayment of wagesgratuitydocumentary evidencerevision petitionburden of proofadmissibility of documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenges a judgment of the Punjab Labour Court, which had set aside an order of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, regarding the payment of employee dues. The core legal question was whether the respondent (employee) had already received his gratuity, annual leave encashment, and bonus payments, or if the employer's documentary evidence of payment was fabricated. The Labour Appellate Tribunal accepted the revision petition, setting aside the Labour Court's judgment. The Tribunal held that the employer successfully proved payment through original documentary evidence, specifically vouchers and receipts, which were exhibited without objection during the trial. The employee's contradictory stance—initially claiming forgery and later admitting the genuineness of signatures while alleging they were obtained on blank stamps—was rejected. The Tribunal affirmed that where an employee fails to challenge the admissibility or genuineness of documentary evidence at the trial stage, they cannot subsequently raise contradictory pleas regarding the validity of their signatures or the authenticity of payment vouchers to defeat established documentary proof of payment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee challenge the genuineness of documentary evidence on appeal if they failed to object to its exhibition during the trial?
  • Does an admission by counsel regarding the genuineness of signatures on payment vouchers negate a previous claim of forgery?
  • Is documentary evidence of payment sufficient to rebut a claim for unpaid wages when the employee's testimony is contradictory?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Insaf Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factory and Oil Mills, Mirpurkhas Road, Sanghar vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division and Ex-Officio Chairman and 2 others2016 PTD 2585 · Sindh High Court · 2016-06-15
  sales tax exemptionultra viressubordinate legislationcottonseedinput tax adjustmentretrospective taxationVAT mode of taxationfiscal notification
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions challenged SRO 188(1)/2015, which introduced Chapter XV to the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007, effectively imposing sales tax on the supply of cottonseed. The core legal question was whether the Federal Government, through subordinate rule-making power, could impose sales tax on goods explicitly exempt under the Sixth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Court held that Chapter XV was ultra vires the 1990 Act, as the Federal Government cannot, via notification, nullify or withdraw a statutory exemption granted by the legislature. The Court further ruled that the retrospective application of the notification was unlawful, as it imposed a new fiscal burden. The judgment establishes the principle that subordinate legislation cannot override or contradict the parent Act. It clarified that the power to regulate the 'manner' of an exemption under Section 13(1) does not authorize the executive to negate the exemption itself. Additionally, the Court affirmed that denying input tax adjustment without specific statutory authority violates the fundamental structure of the VAT mode of taxation.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government, through subordinate rule-making power, impose sales tax on goods that are explicitly exempt under the Sixth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Does the power of the Federal Government to specify conditions for an exemption under Section 13(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 include the power to withdraw or nullify the exemption itself?
  • Can a fiscal notification that imposes a new tax burden be given retrospective effect?
  • Is the denial of input tax adjustment in the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007 consistent with the fundamental principles of the VAT mode of taxation under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Infotech (Private) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and 4 others2016 P.C.T.L.R. 885, 2016 PLJ Islamabad 529, 2016 PTD 2839 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-07-22
  minimum taxincome tax ordinancevires of statuteturnover taxconstitutional petitionlegislative competenceservice sector
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment of the Islamabad High Court addresses a batch of constitutional petitions challenging the vires of Section 153 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, specifically concerning the imposition of minimum tax at the rate of 8% on payments received by companies for rendering or providing services. The core legal questions revolved around whether a tax on gross turnover/receipts constitutes a valid tax on income under Entry 47 of Schedule IV to the Constitution, whether Section 153 is a valid charging section without statutory machinery for calculation, and whether the 8% rate is confiscatory, expropriatory, or discriminatory under Article 25. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that minimum tax is a recognized species of income tax within the legislative competence of Parliament under Entry 47 of Schedule IV, relying on the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 582). The Court established that the legislature has plenary powers to levy minimum tax on gross receipts, that procedural machinery for assessment and collection applies uniformly from the scheme of the Ordinance, and that petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving the tax rate to be confiscatory or violative of equal protection.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minimum tax levied on gross turnover under Section 153 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, falls within the legislative competence of Parliament under Entry 47 of Schedule IV to the Constitution?
  • Does the imposition of minimum tax at the rate of 8% on gross receipts for rendering services amount to a confiscatory or expropriatory tax violating fundamental rights?
  • Whether Section 153 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, lacks necessary procedural machinery for the assessment and levy of minimum tax?
  • Does the differential treatment of minimum tax rates for certain service sectors under the Income Tax (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, violate the principle of equality under Article 25 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Imran Pipe Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore vs Commissioner Inland2016 PTD (Trib.) 286 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-12-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Hudaibya Paper Mills Ltd. and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2016 PLD Lahore 667 · Lahore High Court · 2014-03-11
  quashment of referencere-investigationcorruption and corrupt practicesapprover statementNational Accountability BureauReferee Judgedue processmoney laundering
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference was heard by a Referee Judge of the Lahore High Court following a split decision between two judges of a Division Bench regarding the quashment of NAB Reference No. 5 of 2000 (Hudaibya Paper Mills case). While both judges of the Division Bench agreed that the reference and subsequent proceedings should be quashed, they differed on whether the court could observe that NAB authorities remained competent to re-investigate the matter. The Referee Judge held that the investigation conducted by NAB was illegal and void ab initio because the accused were never joined in the investigation to 'reasonably account for' their assets, which is a condition precedent under Section 9(v) of the NAB Ordinance, 1999. Furthermore, the statement of the approver was recorded by a Magistrate without lawful authority at the time. The court concluded that once a reference is quashed as 'non est', the court cannot grant the prosecution a 'free hand' to re-investigate after a 13-year delay, as this would allow the state to fill lacunas and potentially victimize the petitioners.

  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Huawei Technologies Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Commissioner2016 PTD 1799 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-03Read full judgment →
• Messrs Honda Point (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore vs C.I.R., Audit, R.T.O.-1, Lahore2016 P.C.T.L.R. 149, 2016 PTD (Trib.) 57 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-12-08
  sales taxspecial procedures rulesretailertax fraudburden of proofjurisdictionspeaking orderassessment order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, filed by a private limited company operating under Chapter II of the Sales Tax Special Procedures Rules, 2007, challenged the order of the Commissioner-IR (Appeals) upholding an assessment order issued by the ACIR. The core legal question concerned whether a registered person acting as a dealer of motor vehicles/spare parts and paying sales tax under special procedure rules is liable to sales tax at standard rates on retail sales, and whether the tax authorities acted within their lawful jurisdiction in issuing the assessment and alleging tax fraud. The Tribunal held that the tax authorities misread the law by incorrectly treating the vehicle sales of the manufacturer as the appellant's direct retail sales and improperly importing terms not found in the statute during the relevant tax period. The Tribunal laid down the principle that in fiscal statutes, taxation must strictly fall within the letter of the law, the initial burden to prove tax fraud lies heavily on the department, and authorities cannot exercise unfettered discretion or alter unambiguous statutory provisions through arbitrary interpretations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a motor vehicle dealer operating under Chapter II of the Sales Tax Special Procedures Rules, 2007 can be subjected to standard rate sales tax on vehicle sales made directly by the manufacturer?
  • Where the initial assessment and show cause notice are found to be void ab initio and without lawful jurisdiction, does the entire superstructure built thereon fall to the ground?
  • Does the initial burden of proof to establish the elements of tax fraud under the sales tax law lie on the department or the taxpayer?
  • Is an appellate authority legally obligated to pass a reasoned, speaking order addressing all core contentions raised by the taxpayer?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Honda Point (pvt.) Ltd., Lahore vs C.I.R., Audit, R.T.O-1, Lahore and others2016 P.C.T.L.R. 149 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-12-08
  sales tax auditspecial procedure rulestax fraudspeaking orderstatutory interpretationburden of proofquasi-judicial proceedingsvoid ab initio
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order by the Commissioner-IR (Appeals) upholding an assessment by the ACIR against a private limited company engaged in the sale and service of vehicles and parts. The core legal questions concern the classification of the taxpayer under the Sales Tax Special Procedures Rules, 2007, the validity of the audit proceedings, and the justification for imposing standard sales tax rates and penalties. The Tribunal held that the tax authorities acted beyond their jurisdiction by misinterpreting the law and improperly 'inducting' terms into the Special Procedures Rules to create tax liability. The Tribunal ruled that the assessment and appellate orders were void ab initio, patently illegal, and based on arbitrary, non-speaking reasoning. It emphasized that taxing statutes must be interpreted strictly, and authorities cannot legislate by adding words to rules. Furthermore, the burden of proving 'tax fraud' rests solely with the department, which failed to discharge it. The Tribunal vacated the penalties and remanded the issue of input tax to the Commissioner-IR (Appeals) for a fresh, speaking order.

  Questions settled

  • Can tax authorities unilaterally expand the scope of statutory rules by 'inducting' terms not present in the legislation?
  • Does the burden of proving 'tax fraud' lie with the taxpayer or the tax department?
  • Is an appellate order that fails to address specific arguments raised by the taxpayer a valid 'speaking order'?
  • Can tax authorities impose standard sales tax rates on a taxpayer governed by special procedure rules without legal justification?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Hassan Cotton Ginners through Managing Partner and 4 otherss2016 CLD 1897 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Haroon Oils Ltd. Through General Sales Manager vs Pakistan2016 YLR 1252 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs Haq Bahu Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and others2016 PTD 955 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-01-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs H.H. Misbah Securities vs Director, Market Supervision and Capital Issue Department2016 CLD 1196 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-01-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs H.A.H. Packages, Faisalabad vs Commissioner Inland2016 PTD (Trib.) 2002 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-05-02Read full judgment →
• Messrs Grace Accumulators and 3 others vs Messrs Soneri Bank Limited2016 CLD 892 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Golden Sanitary Ceramics, Gujranwala vs Commissioner2016 PTD (Trib.) 2348 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-06-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Getz Pharma Limited through Authorised Person--Plaintiff vs2016 PLD Sindh 479, 2016 PLJ Karachi 215 · Sindh High Court · 2015-03-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Getz Pharma (Pvt.) Ltd. through Authorised Person vs Federation2016 PLD Sindh 420 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-07
  writ of mandamuspublic procurementmis-procurementalternate remedyconstitutional petitionNational Accountability Ordinancetender dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a pharmaceutical company, filed a constitutional petition seeking a writ of mandamus to direct the National Accountability Bureau to investigate alleged mis-procurement and corruption in the tender for Hepatitis B and C medicines for the year 2014-2015, and to direct disciplinary proceedings against officials responsible for rejecting the petitioner's technical bid. The core legal questions involved whether a constitutional petition is maintainable when alternate statutory remedies exist and when civil suits regarding the same tender disputes are already pending. The Sindh High Court held that the petitioner failed to exhaust alternate and efficacious remedies provided under the Sindh Public Procurement Rules, 2010, and that parallel civil suits on the same subject matter were already pending on the original side of the court. The court established that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued when adequate statutory remedies are available and where collateral proceedings would prejudice pending civil litigation. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner maintain a constitutional petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus without exhausting alternate statutory remedies available under public procurement rules?
  • Whether a constitutional petition is competent when civil suits covering the same subject matter and seeking identical reliefs are already pending before a court of competent jurisdiction?
  • Does the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau have a mandatory duty to initiate an inquiry solely upon a direct writ petition without the aggrieved party approaching the relevant forum first?
  • Is it appropriate for a constitutional court to issue directions amounting to a finding on disputed facts while parallel civil proceedings are sub judice?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Getz Pharma (Pvt.) Limited through Authorised Person vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh and 7 others2016 PLD Sindh 479 · Sindh High Court · 2015-03-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs General Food Corporation, Karachi and another vs Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation-FBR, Karachi and 2 others2016 PTD (Trib.) 2777 · Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal · 2014-12-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Garden Town, Phase-II, Gujranwala vs Commissioner Inland2016 PTD (Trib.) 2362 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-01-18
  Federal Excise Dutyland developmenttime limitationproperty developerschargeability of taxphysical possessionshow cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This federal excise appeal was filed by a registered property developer and construction entity against an Order-in-Appeal upholding a tax demand for Federal Excise Duty, penalties, and default surcharge for the tax periods between July 2008 and June 2011. The core legal questions addressed were whether the show-cause notice was barred by the three-year limitation period under section 14 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, and when Federal Excise Duty becomes chargeable on land development services. The Appellate Tribunal held that the show-cause notice issued on 26 December 2013 was barred by time for the period prior to 25 December 2010 based on the three-year limitation. Furthermore, the Tribunal held that Federal Excise Duty on land development services cannot be levied until development is completed, map approvals are obtained, and the physical possession of developed plots is transferred to the allottees against monetary consideration. The appeal was accordingly accepted and the impugned orders were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a show-cause notice for the recovery of unpaid Federal Excise Duty issued beyond the three-year limitation period under section 14 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 is lawful?
  • At what point in time does Federal Excise Duty become chargeable on land development services rendered by property developers or promoters?
  • Does the issuance of provisional allotment letters or the acquisition of utility connections constitute the rendering of development services for the levy of Federal Excise Duty?
  • Can advance payments deposited by allottees with a developer be subjected to Federal Excise Duty prior to the delivery of physical possession of the developed plots?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs G.A. Polymer (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Collector, Collectorate of Customs2016 PTD (Trib.) 1570 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2016-03-05
  customs appealpecuniary jurisdictionadjudication powersmisdeclarationPCT headingredemption fineshort levy
  Summary & questions settled

  This customs appeal arose from an order passed by the Collector of Customs (Appeals), Karachi, upholding an Order-in-Original that found the appellant guilty of misdeclaring the classification and value of imported goods (Coated Calcium Carbonate), leading to a short-levy of duties and taxes amounting to Rs. 540,084. The core legal question centered on whether the Assistant Collector possessed the pecuniary jurisdiction to adjudicate a case involving duties and taxes exceeding Rs. 500,000 under Section 179 of the Customs Act, 1969, and whether proceedings initiated by an incompetent authority are void ab initio. The Customs Appellate Tribunal held that the Assistant Collector lacked the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction since the involved amount exceeded the statutory limit of Rs. 500,000, rendering the proceedings and subsequent orders without lawful authority. Consequently, while modifying the lower orders, the Tribunal remitted the redemption fine and penalty imposed on the importer.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Assistant Collector of Customs has the pecuniary jurisdiction to adjudicate a case where the amount of duty and taxes involved exceeds five hundred thousand rupees under Section 179 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Do proceedings initiated on the basis of a show-cause notice issued by an authority lacking pecuniary jurisdiction become void ab initio?
  • Whether a difference in the classification or PCT heading of imported goods automatically constitutes misdeclaration under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Miro Khan vs Muhammad Khalil2016 PLJ Peshawar 133 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-08-05Read full judgment →
• Messrs Franklin Credit and Investment Company Ltd. vs Export2016 MLD 952 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-02
  arbitration agreementstay of proceedingsthird party rightsarbitration clauselease cancellationcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed by the defendant under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking to stay legal proceedings and refer the dispute to arbitration. The core legal question was whether a suit involving multiple defendants, one of whom is not a party to the arbitration agreement, can be stayed to allow for arbitration under the agreement between the plaintiff and the other defendant. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that the proceedings could not be stayed. The court established that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, is inapplicable where the legal proceedings involve a third party who is not a signatory to the arbitration agreement and holds independent rights. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the scope of arbitration is limited to the matters explicitly agreed upon by the parties; a dispute involving the rights of a third party cannot be unilaterally referred to arbitration by the original contracting parties, as this would prejudice the third party's legal standing and interests.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court stay legal proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, when the dispute involves a third party who is not a signatory to the arbitration agreement?
  • Does an arbitration clause in an agreement between two parties bind a third party who holds an independent title to the property in dispute?
  • Is a dispute regarding the cancellation of a lease and the rights of a third-party purchaser referable to arbitration if the third party is not a party to the arbitration agreement?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Fort Tiles vs Additional Collector of Customs, MCC of PaCCS2016 PTD (Trib.) 384 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2014-07-02Read full judgment →
• Messrs First National Equities Limited vs Imran Inayat Butt, Director/2016 CLD 1801 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-07-07
  artificial volumesecurities regulationright of hearingpenaltyremandstock exchangeappeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under section 33 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 against an impugned order passed by the respondent imposing a penalty on the appellant under section 22 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 for alleged creation of artificial volume and trading anomalies in the scrip of First National Equities Limited. The core legal question revolved around whether the appellant was afforded a fair opportunity of being heard prior to the passing of the impugned order. The appellate bench held that to ensure the best interests of justice and a fair opportunity of hearing, the impugned order ought to be set aside and the matter remanded. The key principle laid down is that procedural fairness and the right to a meaningful hearing are paramount, warranting a remand of proceedings where effective representation or hearing was curtailed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate bench can set aside an order and remand the matter when a party claims lack of a proper hearing?
  • Does the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan have the power to impose penalties under section 22 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969?
  • Whether repeated extensions for filing a reply and appearing for a hearing satisfy procedural fairness requirements?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs First National Equities Limited vs Director_Hod (MSRD), Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan2016 CLD 1611 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-07-24
  Net Capital BalanceSecurities BrokerRegulatory ComplianceCurrent LiabilitiesInternational Accounting StandardsSecurities and Exchange Commission of PakistanPenalty
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under Section 33 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 against an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) upholding regulatory penalties and conditions imposed on the appellant broker for miscalculating its Net Capital Balance (NCB). The core legal questions involved the correctness of the appellant's NCB calculations, the validity of sampling methods used by SECP, the reliance on Central Depository Company (CDC) account balance reports versus the appellant's share balance reports, and the proper classification of corporate loans as current or non-current liabilities under International Accounting Standard 1 (IAS 1) in light of pending court litigation and lack of an unconditional right to defer settlement. The appellate authority held that the appellant overstated its NCB in violation of Rule 3(b) of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971, failed to justify discrepancies through proper evidence, and improperly classified loans as non-current despite lacking an unconditional right to defer repayment. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the penalty under Section 22 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sampling methods can be utilized by the Commission when calculating and verifying a broker's Net Capital Balance under the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971?
  • Can a broker rely on its internal Share Balance Report instead of CDC Account Balance Reports for valuing securities held for clients without producing proper evidence?
  • How should corporate loans subject to pending recovery suits by banks be classified under IAS 1 regarding the unconditional right to defer settlement of liabilities?
  • Does miscalculation of Net Capital Balance in violation of Rule 3(b) of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971 warrant the imposition of a penalty under Section 22 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs First Dawood Investment Bank Limited through Authorized2016 CLD 920 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-25
  financial institution recoveryleave to defendbanking court jurisdictionarbitration clauseco-extensive liabilityequitable mortgagenegotiable instrumentsummary decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit for recovery of Rs. 65,252,355/- was filed by a financial institution against the principal customer and guarantors under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (FIO, 2001). The defendants sought leave to defend, raising preliminary objections regarding the court's jurisdiction due to an arbitration clause, the validity of the plaint's verification, and the alleged execution of blank documents. The Court held that the FIO, 2001 is a special law that overrides other laws, including the Arbitration Act, 1940, granting the Banking Court exclusive jurisdiction. It further determined that the defendants failed to raise substantial questions of law or fact requiring evidence, as mandated by section 10 of the FIO, 2001. Consequently, the application for leave to defend was rejected for non-compliance with statutory requirements. The Court decreed the suit, affirming that the liability of guarantors is co-extensive with the principal debtor and that the plaintiff is entitled to the recovery of the outstanding amount and the sale of the mortgaged property.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of an arbitration clause in a financial agreement oust the exclusive jurisdiction of a Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Is the liability of a guarantor co-extensive with that of the principal debtor under the Contract Act, 1872?
  • Can a defendant be granted leave to defend a suit if the application fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of section 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the Banking Court have the authority to decree the sale of mortgaged property in a recovery suit filed by a financial institution?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Firdous Cloth Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Company Secretary vs Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance and others2016 PTD 257 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Eni Pakistan Ltd., Karachi vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, Ltu, Karachi2016 PTD (Trib.) 1462 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-12-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Engro Corporation (Formerly Engro Chemical Limited) vs Executive Director (SMD)2016 CLD 1423 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2014-10-03
  beneficial ownershipshort-term tradinginsider tradingtenderable gainlisted securitiesSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under section 33 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 against an order passed by the Respondent regarding transactions of beneficial ownership under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The core legal question was whether the Appellant made a taxable or tenderable gain under section 224 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 through purchase and sale transactions of shares within a period of less than six months. The court held that the transactions did not result in any monetary gain and were done in the ordinary course of business without violating statutory duties, setting aside the impugned order. The key principle laid down is that section 224 requires an actual monetary gain resulting from short-term trading of shares by insiders for a tenderable liability to accrue, and the SECP's recovery powers act as an enforcement mechanism to vest unclaimed gains in the company.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 224 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 apply when no monetary gain is realized from short-term share transactions?
  • What are the prerequisites for the accrual of tenderable gain under section 224 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Whose property do the gains remain if they are not tendered to the company within the prescribed period under section 224?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs English Shoes (Pvt.) Ltd vs The Commissioner of Income2016 PTD 2422 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-23
  tax assessmentmandatory noticenatural justiceprocedural irregularityremandincome taxstatutory requirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax reference application concerns the legality of an assessment order passed without complying with the mandatory notice requirement under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the failure of the assessing officer to issue a notice under the proviso to Section 62(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, before rejecting the taxpayer's declared version, constitutes a curable procedural irregularity or renders the entire proceedings void. The Court held that the requirement of notice under the proviso to Section 62(1) is a mandatory statutory obligation. Relying on established Supreme Court precedents, the Court determined that where a statute mandates notice, its omission is fatal and cannot be cured by subsequent remand to the assessing officer to fill lacunas. Consequently, the Court held that the assessment order was illegal and void ab initio. The key principle laid down is that the failure to comply with a mandatory statutory notice requirement renders the resulting proceedings void, precluding the appellate authorities from remanding the case to rectify the assessing officer's failure.

  Questions settled

  • Is the failure to issue a mandatory notice under the proviso to Section 62(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, a curable defect?
  • Can an appellate authority remand a case to an assessing officer to rectify the failure to issue a mandatory statutory notice?
  • Does the absence of a mandatory statutory notice render the entire assessment proceedings void?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Emco Industries Ltd. through constituted Attorney vs Masood2016 YLR 18 · Sindh High Court · 2015-01-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Emaan Impex (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi vs The Assistant Collector of Customs and another2016 PTD (Trib.) 1767 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-02-25
  duty drawbackshow cause noticenatural justicecustoms adjudicationnon-speaking orderstatutory limitationdiscriminatory treatment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the rejection of a duty drawback claim by customs authorities. The core legal questions concerned whether the adjudicating authority could reject a claim without issuing a mandatory show cause notice under Section 180 of the Customs Act, 1969, whether an appellate order passed beyond the statutory time limit is valid, and whether the authorities acted discriminatorily. The Customs Appellate Tribunal held that the failure to issue a show cause notice rendered the original order void ab initio, as it violated the principles of natural justice and statutory requirements. Furthermore, the appellate order was found to be time-barred under Section 193A of the Customs Act, 1969, and legally deficient for being a non-speaking order in violation of Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Tribunal emphasized that quasi-judicial authorities must provide reasoned orders and adhere to procedural mandates. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside, and the department was directed to process and sanction the appellant's claims, ensuring equal treatment as required by the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Is the issuance of a show cause notice under Section 180 of the Customs Act, 1969, a mandatory prerequisite for the adjudication of a duty drawback claim?
  • Does an appellate order passed beyond the statutory time limit prescribed in Section 193A of the Customs Act, 1969, possess legal validity?
  • Is an administrative order that fails to provide reasons for its decision a violation of Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897?
  • Can an appraising officer unilaterally reject a duty drawback claim without proper adjudicatory authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ehsan Chappal Store (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore vs C.I.R., R.T.O.-II, Lahore2016 P.C.T.L.R. 355, 2016 P.C.T.L.R. 1063, 2016 PT D (Trib.) 342 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-07-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Eac Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive vs The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law and 3 others2016 PTD 1761 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs Dua Traders and 3 others vs Collector of Customs (Appeals), Karachi and another2016 PTD (Trib.) 1294 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2014-11-24Read full judgment →
• Messrs Dua International Trading Systems vs Commissioner Inland2016 PTD (Trib.) 2936 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-04-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Dir Wood Works through Proprietor vs Secretary, Works and Communication Department Government of NWFP and 3 otherss2016 YLR 1687 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-12-08
  regular first appealarbitration awardrecovery suitlimitation periodacknowledgment of liabilitysecondary evidenceevasive denialcontractor claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular first appeal arises from a judgment and decree passed by the Senior Civil Judge dismissing the appellant contractor's suit for recovery of money on account of construction work done for a civil hospital. The core legal questions involved whether the claim was barred by limitation and whether an evasive denial in the written statement coupled with secondary evidence of an arbitration award and official correspondence established the claim. The Peshawar High Court held that the department's evasive denials amounted to admissions, that official correspondence regarding the arrangement of funds constituted an acknowledgment of liability under the Limitation Act giving a fresh starting point of limitation, and that secondary evidence sufficiently proved the arbitration award in the plaintiff's favor. Consequently, the High Court set aside the trial court's judgment, allowed the appeal, and decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff for the claimed amount along with market interest, laying down the principle that continuous departmental correspondence seeking funds for payment operates as an acknowledgment of debt extending limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does an evasive denial in a written statement regarding an arbitration award amount to an admission of the claim?
  • Whether official correspondence requesting the arrangement of funds to clear a contractor's dues constitutes an acknowledgment of liability extending the limitation period under Section 19 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can a plaintiff rely on secondary evidence in the form of a photocopy of an arbitration award when the original departmental record is missing?
  • Whether a claim for recovery of dues for completed construction work can be dismissed on the ground of limitation when continuous departmental correspondence acknowledges the outstanding liability?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Dawlance United Refrigeration Industries Private Ltd. through Branch Coordinator vs Muhammad Asim Chaudhry2016 PLJ Lahore 217, 2016 PLD Lahore 425 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-14
  consumer protectionlimitation periodconsumer complaintdowry articlesdefinition of consumerwarranty period
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the order of the District Consumer Court, Lahore, which granted a claim to the respondent regarding a defective washing machine. The core legal questions involve the limitation period for filing a consumer claim under the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, and whether a husband can maintain a consumer complaint regarding a product that was part of his wife's dowry. The Lahore High Court held that the claim was barred by limitation under Section 28 of the Act, as it was filed beyond the prescribed period and no valid extension was granted by the Consumer Court. Furthermore, the Court held that the husband did not qualify as a 'consumer' under Section 2(c)(1) of the Act because the appliance was purchased by his wife as part of her dowry, making her the absolute owner under Section 5 of The Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 1976. The appeal is allowed, and the consumer complaint stands dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What is the limitation period for filing a claim before the Consumer Court under Section 28 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005?
  • Can a Consumer Court extend the limitation period for filing a claim beyond the statutory maximum limits?
  • Does a husband qualify as a 'consumer' under the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, in respect of a product brought by his wife as dowry?
  • Who is considered the absolute owner of dowry items under The Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 1976?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Daewoo Pakistan Express Bus Service Limited through DeputyPTCL 2016 CL. 490, 2016 PTD 152 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-22Read full judgment →
• Messrs D.S. Textile Mills Limited vs Federation of Pakistan and others2016 C.L.R. 1229, 2016 PLD Lahore 355 · Lahore High Court · 2016-04-20
  license feeregulatory feequid pro quotaxationlocal governmentconstitutional lawtextile industrylegislative competence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, textile manufacturing companies, challenged the constitutionality and legality of license fees imposed by local governments under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001. They contended that the license fee was effectively a tax, which the provincial legislature lacked competence to impose on corporations, and argued that the fee was invalid due to a lack of 'quid pro quo' (services rendered in return). The High Court dismissed the petitions, distinguishing between a 'user fee' and a 'license fee.' The Court held that while a user fee requires specific services to be rendered to the payer, a license fee is a regulatory charge intended to meet the administrative costs of maintaining a regulatory scheme for public welfare. Drawing on Article 73(3)(a) of the Constitution and international jurisprudence, the Court ruled that license fees do not require a quid pro quo and are not taxes. The principle established is that regulatory license fees are valid instruments for governing dangerous or offensive trades and need only be reasonable rather than compensatory.

  Read full judgment →
• Messrs D.J. Builders and Developers through Partner and-Unother vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 6 others2016 PTD 1723 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-17
  tax liabilitynatural justiceaudi alteram partemconstitutional petitionattachment of propertyCommissioner (Appeals)Income Tax Ordinance 2001third party liability
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions challenged an order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) which created tax liabilities against the petitioners—who were not parties to the original assessment proceedings—and directed the attachment of their property based on allegations made by a taxpayer during his appeal. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner (Appeals) possesses the authority to impose tax liabilities on third parties and order property attachment without providing them notice or an opportunity to be heard. The Court held that the impugned order was passed without lawful authority and violated the fundamental principle of audi alteram partem. It ruled that no adverse order can be passed against a person without issuing a proper notice and providing an opportunity to defend, a requirement inherent in the Constitution and natural justice. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 is maintainable when an order is patently illegal or void, particularly when the aggrieved party is denied access to alternate remedies. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and the associated attachment proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Commissioner (Appeals) create tax liability against a third party who was not a party to the original assessment proceedings?
  • Is an order passed by a Commissioner (Appeals) without notice or opportunity of hearing to the affected party sustainable in law?
  • Can the High Court exercise constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 when an order is patently illegal and the petitioner has been denied access to alternate remedies?
  • Does the principle of audi alteram partem apply to proceedings before the Commissioner (Appeals) under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Crystal Textile Processing Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. Gujranwala vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, R.T.O. Gujranwala2016 PTD (Trib.) 2108 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-05-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Coca Cola Beverages Pakistan Limited through Company2016 MLD 1077 · Lahore High Court · 2014-06-30
  arbitration proceedingsres judicatasplitting of claimsterritorial jurisdictionrejection of plaintinterim injunctioncivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an interlocutory order passed by the trial court granting a status quo ante in a subsequent suit for declaration, permanent injunction, and recovery of damages filed by the respondent after an earlier application under the Arbitration Act had been initiated between the same parties. The core legal questions involved whether the second suit was barred under Order II Rule 2 and Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure due to prior pending arbitration proceedings, whether an interim injunction could be sustained where the plaint itself was not maintainable, and whether the Lahore court possessed territorial jurisdiction over property situated in Multan. The Lahore High Court held that proceedings under sections 20 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 are treated as suits, making the subsequent suit barred by the principles of res judicata and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Furthermore, the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction as the suit property was located in Multan. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The key principles laid down are that an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act is treated as a suit for the purposes of barring subsequent duplicate proceedings, and a court lacking territorial jurisdiction cannot issue interim injunctions but must return or reject the plaint.

  Questions settled

  • Whether proceedings under sections 20 and 33 of the Arbitration Act 1940 operate as a bar to a subsequent civil suit involving the same cause of action under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to subsequent proceedings arising from the same facts and between the same parties when earlier arbitration applications have been adjudicated?
  • Can a court lacking territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit grant an interim injunction instead of returning or rejecting the plaint?
  • Whether an appeal against an interim order is maintainable despite alleged non-compliance with the notice requirements under Order XLIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 once the respondents have entered appearance?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Chiltan Ghee Mills, Quetta and others vs Deputy Collector of Sales Tax (Refund), Customs House, Quetta and others2016 SCP 88, 2016 SCMR 2183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-03
  sales tax refundinput tax adjustmentexempt suppliespromissory estoppeltax exemptiontin containersSales Tax Act 1990
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a manufacturer of ghee and its packaging tin containers, sought a refund of sales tax paid on raw materials (tin plates) used for manufacturing containers, arguing that since its finished supplies were exempt from sales tax under a specific notification, the input tax paid should be refunded based on the principle of promissory estoppel. The Sales Tax Department, Appellate Tribunal, and the High Court all rejected the claim. Upon petition before the Supreme Court, the core legal question was whether a registered person making exempt supplies is entitled to a refund or adjustment of input tax paid on raw materials under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that under sections 7, 8(1)(a), and 13 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, input tax adjustment and refund are strictly restricted to 'taxable supplies' and are expressly barred for goods used in making exempt supplies. The Court laid down the principle that tax exemptions do not automatically entail refunds of input tax paid on raw materials unless explicitly provided by statute, and the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot override clear statutory prohibitions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a registered person entitled to claim a refund of input tax paid on raw materials used in the manufacture of supplies that are exempt from sales tax?
  • Whether the principle of promissory estoppel can be invoked to claim a refund of sales tax paid on raw materials when the final supplies are exempt under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Can input tax adjustment be claimed under section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, in respect of goods that do not fall within the definition of taxable supplies?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Chicago Metal Works vs Secretary, Revenue Division2016 PTD 1797 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2015-12-22
  tax refundappellate effectmaladministrationFederal Tax OmbudsmanWorkers Welfare FundIncome Tax Ordinance 2001
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a complaint filed by an association of persons against the tax department's failure to give effect to appellate orders passed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) and the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue for the tax years 2007, 2008, and 2009, and the consequent withholding of tax refunds on the pretext of alleged non-payment of Workers Welfare Fund, without passing any separate or detailed orders. The core legal question was whether the tax department could legally withhold tax refunds and refuse to give effect to final appellate orders pending litigation on similar issues in other cases before higher courts. The Federal Tax Ombudsman held that the department is bound under the law to give effect to appellate decisions and that mere pendency of appeals in other cases before the Supreme Court does not justify withholding refunds or causing inordinate delay. The Ombudsman ruled that such delay and failure to comply amount to maladministration, and recommended that the Federal Board of Revenue direct the Commissioner to implement the appellate orders and issue the due refund.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the tax department can withhold tax refunds due under appellate orders on the ground that similar issues are pending before higher courts in other cases?
  • Does the failure of the tax department to give effect to appellate orders amount to maladministration under the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000?
  • Is the tax department required to pass separate orders when withholding amounts on account of the Workers Welfare Fund?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Chicago Metal Works (Pvt.) Ltd., Multan vs The Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad2016 PTD 2089 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2016-06-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Cherat Packaging Ltd., Staff Providentfund and Gratuity, Peshawar vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and Economic Affairs, Revenue Division, Islamabad and 9 others2016 PTD 2257 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-05-24
  withholding taxexemption certificateIncome Tax Ordinance 2001machinery provisionsprovident fundgratuity fundfiscal regimestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  These writ petitions challenged a Federal Board of Revenue circular requiring recognized provident and gratuity funds to produce exemption certificates to avoid withholding tax on investment profits. The core legal question was whether funds substantively exempt from income tax under Clause 47B, Part-IV, Second Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, are exempt from the procedural requirement of obtaining and producing an exemption certificate under Section 159 of the Ordinance to withholding agents. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the procedural requirement to produce an exemption certificate remains mandatory for all taxpayers, including those substantively exempt. The Court established that while charging provisions of tax law are construed strictly in favor of the subject, machinery or procedural provisions must be construed liberally to ensure the effective realization of tax and prevent the abuse of exemptions. The certificate requirement serves as a necessary check and balance to verify the ongoing entitlement of a fund to its exempt status, ensuring that only validly approved entities access the benefit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a taxpayer exempt from income tax under Clause 47B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is relieved from the procedural requirement of producing an exemption certificate under Section 159?
  • Are machinery provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to be construed strictly or liberally?
  • Does the Federal Board of Revenue have the authority to issue circulars providing guidance on the interpretation of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Cherat Cement Company Ltd*. Nowshera through Manager2016 PLD Peshawar 32 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-11-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Chaudhary Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Chief Commissioner and 2 others2016 PTD 527 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-01
  Writ petitionSales tax refundShow cause noticePast and closed transactionJurisdictionAppellate TribunalRecovery of taxSales Tax Act, 1990Revisional jurisdictionConstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated writ petition challenged a second show cause notice (SCN) issued by the Assistant Commissioner (LTU) proposing recovery of sales tax previously refunded to the petitioner. The refund was sanctioned in compliance with an unchallenged order of the Appellate Tribunal (Inland Revenue), which had set aside lower forum orders rejecting the refund claim for 1% further tax, declared illegal by the Supreme Court. The core legal questions concerned whether the second SCN was lawful, given the Appellate Tribunal's final order, and if a subordinate officer could reopen a "past and closed transaction." The Lahore High Court held the impugned SCN illegal and without lawful authority. The court laid down that a matter finally settled by a competent tribunal and unchallenged attains finality, becoming a past and closed transaction that cannot be reopened by subordinate authorities. Subordinate officers lack jurisdiction to review or reopen such orders, as revisional powers under Section 45A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, are vested in the Board or Commissioner. A writ petition is maintainable against an SCN if it is palpably unlawful or without jurisdiction.

  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Carpet Centre vs Mustafa Farabi Tapu Javeri and others2016 SCMR 1926 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-30
  evictionpersonal needbona fide needlandlord and tenantcommercial premisescross-examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed against an eviction order passed by the High Court on the ground of personal bona fide need of the respondent-landlord. The petitioner argued that the respondent's personal need was not established in evidence, pointing to alleged contradictions where the respondent claimed photography was both a hobby and a profession, and noting that the respondent already ran a photo studio. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the respondent's personal need was categorically explained, as he intended to set up his own photo studio in a commercial premises. The Court noted that no cross-examination suggested the respondent already possessed another commercial premises for his studio. The Court held that in the absence of evidence establishing mala fides on the part of the landlord, the personal need was established. Consequently, the Court found no grounds for interference and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord's statement of running a studio, without proof of owning another commercial premises, defeats a claim of personal bona fide need for commercial premises?
  • Does the failure of a tenant to establish mala fides on the part of the landlord justify an eviction order on the ground of personal need?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Care Impex Lahore vs Deputy Collector of Customs and another2016 PTD (Trib.) 1580 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-03-06
  customs valuationdeclared valuestatutory limitationappellate jurisdictionarbitrary assessmenttransaction valueidentical goods
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order by the Collector of Customs (Appeals) which upheld the reassessment of imported iron and steel grooved wire. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellate authority failed to decide the appeal within the mandatory statutory timeframe and whether the customs authorities could arbitrarily reject the declared transaction value without providing evidence of identical goods. The Tribunal held that the appellate order was void ab initio because it was passed well beyond the statutory limit of 120 days, as prescribed by Section 193A of the Customs Act, 1969, without any recorded extension. Furthermore, the Tribunal ruled that the assessment was arbitrary and illegal because the authorities failed to substantiate the rejection of the declared value with tangible evidence of identical goods, violating the requirements of Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969. The principle laid down is that customs authorities must provide cogent, evidence-based reasons for rejecting declared values, and appellate authorities must adhere strictly to statutory timelines for deciding appeals, failing which their orders are unenforceable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an appellate authority to decide an appeal within the statutory period of 120 days render the resulting order void?
  • Can customs authorities reject a declared transaction value without providing evidence of identical goods?
  • Is an assessment order based on arbitrary valuation without reference to tangible evidence legally sustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Capital Poultry Feed and Dall Mills and others vs Presiding2016 PLJ Islamabad 430, 2016 CLD 1260 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Capital Insurance Company Limited vs Executive Director, (Insurance Division) Karachi, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan2016 CLD 1683 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-07-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Adil vs State, etc.2016 PLJ Sc 390 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-16
  criminal appealcompromisemurdersentence reductionperiod already undergoneparitydamancompoundable offences
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the reduction of sentence for the appellant, Muhammad Adil, who was initially convicted under Sections 302(b), 337-F(vi), and other provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to a reduction of his remaining sentence to the period already undergone, on the principle of parity with his co-accused, given that the primary charge of murder under Section 302(b) had been compounded and the appellant acquitted thereof by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that since the main murder charge stood compounded and co-accused had already been granted reduced sentences to the period undergone, the appellant deserved equal treatment. The Court consequently allowed the appeal, reducing the appellant's sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone while maintaining the financial liability of Daman payable to the injured victim.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellant entitled to a reduction of sentence to the period already undergone on the basis of parity with co-accused when the main murder charge has been compounded?
  • Does the acquittal of an accused under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code pursuant to a compromise affect the remaining sentences for hurt under the same judgment?
  • Can the Supreme Court reduce the substantive imprisonment sentence of a convict while maintaining the payment of Daman to the injured victim?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Burhan Products (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore vs The Secretary, Revenue2016 P.C.T.L.R. 917 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2016-03-18Read full judgment →
• Messrs Brothers Industries through Partner vs Dollars Industries2016 CLD 1103 · Sindh High Court · 2015-07-13Read full judgment →
• Messrs Broadtex (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others vs Messrs Nib Bank Ltd.2016 CLD 217 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-08
  consent ordercorrection of orderclerical errorrecovery suitfinancial institutionrestructuring proposal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an order passed by a Single Judge allowing an application under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to correct an accidental slip or omission in a previous consent order. The underlying matter involved a recovery suit filed by the respondent bank against the appellants under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, which was decreed after the appellants admitted liability. Subsequently, disputes arose regarding restructuring proposals, leading to a consent order that mistakenly directed the bank to honor a proposal marked as Annexure "C" instead of Annexure "B". The core legal question addressed is whether a consent order containing a clerical or accidental error regarding a document reference can be corrected by the court. The Sindh High Court held that while a consent order generally cannot be recalled or reviewed, it remains open to correction if an error, slip, or omission is proven. The court established that courts possess the inherent power to rectify clerical errors in orders to reflect the true intent and record of the proceedings, especially where the erroneously cited document contradicts the record and the parties' pleadings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a consent order passed by a court is open to correction if an error or omission is proved?
  • Can a court modify a consent order to rectify an accidental reference to an incorrect annexure?
  • Does an acceptance of a debtor's subsequent restructuring proposal amount to setting aside a prior decree based on an admission of liability?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bismillah CNG Filling Station, Kot Addu Road, Layyah vs Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad2016 PTD 2681 · Federal Tax OmbudsmanRead full judgment →
• Messrs Bisma Textile Mills Ltd., Lahore through Chief Executive vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division Chairman and 2 others2016 PLJ Lahore 503, 2016 PTD 1790 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bhangoo Farming Services and 2 others vs The Bank of PUNJABthrough Manager2016 CLD 766 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-16
  leave to defendbanking courtspeaking orderrecovery of financesremandsubstantial questions of lawstatement of account
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Banking Court's order and decree in a recovery suit filed by a bank against the appellants. The appellants sought leave to appear and defend the suit, raising objections regarding the lack of authorization of the person filing the suit, the absence of proper certification for the statement of account under the relevant statute, and the unauthorized charging of mark-up. The Banking Court dismissed the leave to defend application and decreed the suit without addressing these substantial objections in a speaking order. The High Court held that a Banking Court is under a mandatory obligation to apply its judicial mind and pass a speaking order when substantial questions of law or fact are raised in an application for leave to defend. The Court emphasized that a decree cannot be passed in a routine manner and that the Banking Court must examine the plaint and supporting documents for compliance with statutory requirements. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned decree, accepted the leave to defend application subject to a 50% deposit of the decretal amount, and remanded the case for fresh adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Banking Court required to pass a speaking order when deciding an application for leave to appear and defend a suit?
  • Does the failure of a Banking Court to address substantial objections raised in a leave to defend application warrant setting aside a decree?
  • Is a Banking Court obligated to examine the plaint and supporting documents for statutory compliance even if the defendant does not file an application for leave to defend?
  • What is the standard for granting leave to appear and defend a suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bhanero Textile Mills Ltd. vs The Federation of Pakistan and 32016 SCMR 1531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-12
  customs dutyexemption notificationimport definitionex-bond bill of entryrural industrial development schemetariff exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the appellant's intra-court appeal and maintained the refusal of duty exemption on imported textile machinery. The appellant imported machinery and filed an ex-bond bill of entry on November 18, 1990, claiming the benefit of an exemption notification (SRO No. 1284(I)/90 dated December 13, 1990) issued under the Rural Industrial Development Scheme. The Central Board of Revenue and the High Courts denied the benefit, holding that the date of import and the date of filing the bill of entry preceded the effective date of the exemption SRO. The core legal question was whether an importer who filed a bill of entry and warehoused goods prior to the issuance of an exemption notification can claim the benefit of duty exemption merely because the goods were ex-bonded after the notification's commencement date. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the crucial date for determining eligibility for an exemption SRO is the date of import or the filing of the bill of entry, not the date of ex-bonding. The Court laid down that exemption notifications must be construed strictly and cannot be applied retrospectively to consignments imported or declared via bills of entry prior to the specified qualifying date.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the date of import for claiming duty exemption under a statutory notification is the date of filing the bill of entry or the date of ex-bonding?
  • Can an exemption notification issued under the Customs Act be applied to goods imported prior to the commencing date specified in the notification?
  • What is the legal definition and connotation of the word 'import' in the context of customs legislation?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Best Oasis Ltd. vs Messrs S.Q. Corporation through Proprietor2016 PLD Balochistan 26 · Balochistan High Court · 2015-12-18Read full judgment →
• Messrs Azhar Brothers vs Assistant Collector (Imports) and 3 others2016 PTD (Trib.) 169 · Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal · 2015-07-27Read full judgment →
• Messrs Atta Cables (PV r.) Ltd., Lahore vs The Commissioner Inland Revenue Ltu, Lahore2016 PTD (Trib.) 792 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2013-07-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Asli Mand Barfi Shop and others vs Messrs Mand Barfi Shop2016 CLD 2167 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-22
  trademark oppositioninheritance of trademarkinterim injunctionbalance of conveniencetrade marks registry backlogfirst come first serve policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two connected First Appeals from Orders (F.A.O. Nos. 418/14 and 474/15) arising from trademark and injunction proceedings. The core legal questions involved the validity of trademark opposition based on inheritance claims and the entitlement to interim injunctive relief. The Lahore High Court held that the appellant, being a maternal grandson, failed to establish his status as a legal heir of the original trademark owner in the presence of a daughter, and therefore had no hereditary right to oppose the trademark registration or use the trademark 'Mand'. Consequently, the Registrar of Trademarks rightly dismissed the opposition, and the trial court correctly granted a temporary injunction in favor of respondent No. 1 as the balance of convenience and a prima facie case lay in his favor. The key principles laid down include that hereditary claims to a trademark must be legally substantiated through proper inheritance status, and that the Trade Marks Registry must strictly adhere to a chronological first-come-first-serve policy in processing applications to ensure transparency and prevent systemic backlog.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a maternal grandson can claim a hereditary right to a trademark in the presence of direct legal heirs like a daughter?
  • Does an unestablished claim of inheritance provide a valid legal basis to oppose a trademark application?
  • What are the mandatory grounds required for the grant of a temporary injunction in trademark infringement suits?
  • Whether the Trade Marks Registry is bound to process trademark applications in chronological order?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Asim Traders through Sole Proprietor and otherss vs National2016 CLD 1654 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-01
  regular first appealbanking courtcontract of guaranteedischarge of suretypledged stockswaiver of rightsco-extensive liabilityfinancial institutions recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular first appeal filed under section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 challenged the judgment and decree passed by the banking court in favor of the respondent bank for the recovery of finance facilities. The core legal question was whether the release of pledged stocks by the creditor bank to the principal debtor discharged the guarantors from their liability under section 141 of the Contract Act, 1872, and whether the rights conferred on a surety under Chapter VIII of the Contract Act can be waived by a specific agreement in the deed of guarantee. The Lahore High Court held that the guarantors were not discharged, ruling that the broad terms of the guarantee authorized the bank to deal with securities without reference to the guarantors, and that statutory rights under Chapter VIII can be validly waived by contract. The key principle laid down is that the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Contract Act, 1872 are interlinked and subject to contract, allowing a surety to lawfully waive rights such as those concerning the release of securities under section 141 through explicit terms in the guarantee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the release of pledged stocks by a creditor bank to the principal debtor discharges the guarantors from their liability under section 141 of the Contract Act, 1872?
  • Can a surety waive the legal rights and protections conferred under Chapter VIII of the Contract Act, 1872 through specific terms in a deed of guarantee?
  • Does section 128 of the Contract Act, 1872 control the operation of other provisions in Chapter VIII regarding the discharge of a surety?
  • Are waiver clauses in a contract of guarantee relating to statutory rights under Chapter VIII of the Contract Act, 1872 considered contrary to public policy?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Asif Textile Trading vs Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation and 2 others2016 PTD (Trib.) 969 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-12-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Asia Poultry Feeds (Pvt.) Ltd vs Federal Board of Revenue and othersPTCL 2016 CL. 521, 2016 PTD 270 · Lahore High Court · 2015-07-14
  withholding taxincome tax ordinanceshow cause noticerectification of mistakesdouble assessmentconstitutional petitiontax recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition filed before the Lahore High Court challenged the issuance of show cause notices under sections 161 and 205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for the Tax Years 2011, 2012, and 2013, despite final orders under the same provisions having already been passed and concluded by tax authorities for those respective years. The core legal question was whether tax authorities could legally re-initiate proceedings and issue fresh notices under sections 161/205 in respect of tax years for which final orders had already been finalized and executed after examining the relevant records. The Court held that once proceedings under sections 161 and 205 have been finalized, initiating fresh proceedings for the same tax years is unsustainable and without lawful authority, noting that any mistake or omission apparent from the record could only be addressed through rectification under section 221 of the Ordinance rather than starting fresh proceedings, which amounts to impermissible double assessment. The petition was consequently allowed and the impugned notices were declared illegal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether tax authorities can re-initiate proceedings under sections 161 and 205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for a tax year for which final orders have already been passed?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against show cause notices issued without lawful authority?
  • Does the initiation of fresh proceedings in the presence of earlier finalized orders under section 161 amount to impermissible double assessment?
  • Can mistakes or omissions in a concluded tax order be corrected by issuing fresh show cause notices instead of invoking the rectification mechanism under section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Asia Motor Company through Proprietor and another vs Messrs2016 CLD 609 · Sindh High Court · 2015-06-29
  recovery of financeleave to defendstatement of accountsBankers Books Evidence Actcertified copybanking courtmarkuprunning finance facility
  Summary & questions settled

  This first appeal challenges the judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court in favor of the respondent bank, as well as the dismissal of the appellants' application for leave to defend a recovery suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question concerns whether a suit for recovery of finance can be validly instituted and decreed on the basis of a statement of accounts that fails to comply with the mandatory certification requirements of section 2(8) of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, and section 9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The court held that the statement of account filed by the respondent bank was incomplete, undated, and not subscribed by the principal accountant or manager with their name and official title, thereby failing to satisfy statutory requirements. The court set aside the judgment and decree, remanded the matter back to the Banking Court to decide the leave to defend application afresh, and granted liberty to the respondent bank to submit a proper, duly certified statement of accounts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a banking suit can be decreed on the basis of a statement of accounts that is not certified in accordance with section 2(8) of the Bankers Books Evidence Act 1891?
  • Does a statement of account subscribed by an authorized officer instead of the principal accountant or manager fulfill the requirements of section 9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
  • Can a financial institution charge markup beyond the period mentioned in the finance agreement?
  • What is the effect of filing a recovery suit without a properly certified statement of accounts?
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