Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Mr. Dewan Asim Mushfiq Farooqui Mrs. Sharmin Mushfiq Faruqui vs The Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission of PakistanAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mr. Bilal Vohra vs Mr. Imran Inayat Butt Head of Department (MSRD), SECPAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-09-17Read full judgment →
• Mr. Ayaz Dawood, vs N/ASecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mr. Asim Iftikhar (Partner, Anjum Asim Shahid Rehman CharteredAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mr. Asif Ibrahim a Director of Zillion Capital Securities (Pvt.) Limited vs N/ASecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mr. Asad Feroze Partner Junaidy Shoaib Asad & Co. Chartered AccountantsSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mr. Aqeel Mehmood Khawaja, Member, Islamabad Stock ExchangeAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mr. Amjad Yaqoob, Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") Mr. Fayaz Haider, DirectorAppellate Bench of Securities And Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mr. Amir Rasheed, 503-C, Faisal Town, Lahore Ch. Muhammad Sarwar 174_168a60acAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mr. Amir Rasheed 2. Mr. Ch. Muhammad Sarwar vs Lahore Stock ExchangeAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mr. Altaf Hussain Mr. Asif a Mufti Mr. Adnan-ul-Karim Mr. Nasarullah KoraiAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2009-11-24Read full judgment →
• Mr. Ahmed H. Sheikh, Chief Executive, alongwith six other Directors of Nafees Cotton Mills Limited vs Commissioner (Enforcement & Monitoring), Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, IslamabadAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mr. Ahmed D Patel Mr. Salim Chinoy Mr. Mustafa Khandwala Mr. MajidAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mr. Abdul Razak Diwan, Chief Executive Mr. Shabbir Diwan, Director (iii)Mr.Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• . Mr. Abdul Qadir Tawakkal, Chief Executive, M/s. Tawakkal PolyesterSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 1999-08-20Read full judgment →
• 1. Mr. Abdul Majeed, Chief Executive, 2. Kashif ur- Rehman, Director, Mr.Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mr. Abdul Ghaffar vs N/ASecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mr. Aamir vs Director/Head of Department (MSRD)Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mr, Maqsood Elahi, CEO/Director/Company Secretary Mr. Bilal Maqsood Ms.Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Moulla Bux and 2 others vs The State2016 YLR 1241 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-09
  unlawful assemblyvicarious liabilitycommon objectSection 149 PPCcriminal appealmurder convictionsudden flare-upappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants for murder and causing hurt. The trial court had convicted the appellants under Sections 148, 324, and 302(b) read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the appellants could be held vicariously liable under Section 149 for a murder that occurred before they joined the unlawful assembly or were present at the scene. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the appellants' presence or participation during the initial altercation resulting in the deceased's death. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction under Section 302(b) PPC, finding Section 149 inapplicable to the murder charge. However, the court upheld the convictions under Sections 324 and 148 PPC, as the evidence confirmed the appellants participated in a subsequent unlawful assembly by firing at witnesses from a defensive position. The judgment reinforces that Section 149 liability requires proof of a common object and active participation, and cannot be applied to acts committed before an individual becomes part of an unlawful assembly.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be held vicariously liable under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for an offence committed before they joined the unlawful assembly?
  • Does the mere presence of an accused at a later stage of an incident automatically make them liable for acts committed by others at an earlier stage?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to establish an unlawful assembly under Section 141 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive_MD vs Commissioner Inland Revenue2016 PTD 2831 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-08
  income tax refundstockbrokertax withholdingSection 233Atax creditshare tradingIncome Tax Ordinance 2001
  Summary & questions settled

  This Income Tax Reference Application concerns whether a stockbroker is entitled to claim a refund or adjustment of tax withheld by the Stock Exchange under Section 233A(1)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for transactions executed on behalf of its clients. The core legal question was whether the applicant-stockbroker could claim credit for tax withheld on client transactions. The Court held that the applicant is not entitled to such refund or adjustment. It determined that the tax withheld pertains to the actual clients who are chargeable to tax on the share trading transactions, not the broker, who acts merely as an intermediary. The key principle laid down is that tax credit or refund under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, is available exclusively to the person who is legally chargeable to tax on the specific income. Consequently, a stockbroker cannot claim credit for tax withheld on behalf of its clients, regardless of any internal accounting practices or agreements, as the statutory scheme of the Ordinance governs the chargeability of tax.

  Questions settled

  • Is a stockbroker entitled to claim a refund of tax withheld by a stock exchange on transactions executed on behalf of its clients?
  • Does the tax withheld under Section 233A(1)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, belong to the stockbroker or the client?
  • Can a taxpayer claim a refund of tax for which they are not the person chargeable under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• Mormoo Industries Limited Shahzada A. Monnoo, Chief Executive OfficerAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Moosa, Noor, Muhammad, Shahzada & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd vs Director (MSRD), Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, IslamabadAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Adeel vs StatePLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 957 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-04
  criminal appealmurder convictioneyewitness credibilitydeath penalty confirmationburden of proofcorroborative evidencebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased at a grocery store. The prosecution case relied on the testimony of three eyewitnesses and forensic evidence, including the recovery of a weapon. The appellant pleaded suicide. The Court examined the credibility of the eyewitnesses, noting that two of them were not mentioned in the initial complaint and resided in a distant district, making their presence at the scene during a winter night highly improbable. The Court also noted that CCTV footage from the store did not corroborate the presence of the witnesses or the appellant. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, as the motive was vague and the eyewitness testimony lacked naturalness and credibility. It was further held that corroborative evidence, such as weapon recovery, cannot sustain a conviction when the substantive prosecution case fails. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, the appeal was allowed, and the death sentence was not confirmed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on corroborative evidence if the substantive prosecution case fails?
  • Does the failure of an accused to prove a plea of suicide automatically result in conviction if the prosecution has not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt?
  • Can the testimony of eyewitnesses who were not mentioned in the initial FIR be relied upon when their presence at the scene is unnatural?
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• Mr. Jahangir Elahi Mr. Tanvir Elahi Mr.Ahmed Jahangir Mr.Akhlaq Ali KhanAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Momina Abbasi vs Vice-Chancellor, University of Aj&K, Muzaffarabad2016 C.L.R. 1485 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-04-21Read full judgment →
• Momin Khan vs The State2016 PLD Sindh 378, 2016 NLR Criminal 275 · Sindh High Court · 2015-12-29
  post-arrest bailcontrol of narcotic substancesrecovery of charasprohibitory clauseexclusion of section 103 Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant Momin Khan against the rejection of his bail plea by the Special Court-I (CNS), Karachi, in connection with FIR No. 42 of 2015 registered under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The prosecution alleged that the applicant was apprehended from a street and was found in possession of 990 grams of Charas. The core legal question before the court was whether the applicant was entitled to the concession of post-arrest bail given the quantity of narcotics recovered and the nature of the offence. The Sindh High Court held that the offence was heinous and constituted an offence against society at large, and even though the recovered quantity might fall outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant was not entitled to bail. The court laid down the principle that at the bail stage, courts must consider the quantity of narcotics recovered under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and that Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stands excluded in narcotics cases by virtue of Section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The bail application was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused found in possession of 990 grams of Charas is entitled to post-arrest bail when the offence falls outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does Section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 exclude the application of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in narcotics cases?
  • Whether the quantity of narcotics recovered is a primary consideration for granting bail under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
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• Momin Khan and 3 others vs Umar Wahid and another2016 YLR 658 · Federal Shariat Court · 2015-05-05
  criminal appealbenefit of the doubtrobberyrecovery of case propertymotorway robberyappellants acquittalenhancement of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Section 392, Sections 148/149, Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance, alongside a connected revision petition for enhancement of sentences. The prosecution alleged that the appellants, disguised in police uniforms, intercepted the complainant on the motorway and robbed him of a large cash sum and weapons. The core legal questions revolved around the credibility of the ocular account, the authenticity of recoveries, the unexplained absence of case property, and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Federal Shariat Court held that the prosecution case suffered from material legal infirmities, including suspicious circumstances surrounding the registration of the complainant's vehicle, unsealed and mishandled recoveries, failure to produce the case property, and serious contradictions in the evidence. The court laid down the principle that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitles the accused to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and the revision petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind is sufficient to entitle an accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to keep the case property in safe custody and exhibit it properly vitiate the conviction?
  • Whether the unverified return of alleged looted money to the complainant without maintaining an official record renders the recovery doubtful?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the presence of the complainant at the place of occurrence at the given time is rendered doubtful by official documentary evidence?
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• Molvi Muhammad Naeem vs The State etc2016 LHC 1728 · Lahore High Court · 2016-06-06
  Anti-Terrorism Actsectarian hatredpossession of hate materialcriminal appealburden of proofbenefit of doubtconviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant under Section 9 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 for possessing alleged sectarian hate material. The core legal question was whether mere possession of such material satisfies the requirements of Section 8(d) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, which prohibits acts intended to stir up sectarian hatred. The Lahore High Court held that the conviction was unsustainable because the prosecution failed to establish the essential ingredients of the offense. Specifically, the Court ruled that mere possession of books or CDs is insufficient for conviction; the prosecution must prove that the accused possessed the material with the specific intent to display or publish it to stir up sectarian hatred. Finding major contradictions in the prosecution's evidence and noting the absence of proof regarding such intent, the Court set aside the conviction. The judgment reaffirms the principle that the burden of proof rests squarely on the prosecution and that the benefit of any reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused must be extended to him.

  Questions settled

  • Does mere possession of sectarian material constitute an offense under Section 8(d) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 without proof of intent to display or publish?
  • Is the prosecution required to prove the intent to stir up sectarian hatred to secure a conviction under Section 8(d) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • What is the effect of major contradictions in prosecution witness statements on the validity of a conviction?
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• Moinuddin alias Waseem vs The State2016 YLR 523 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-17
  criminal appealunlicensed pistolbenefit of doubtcontradictions in evidenceofficial witnessesroznamcha entryacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 23(A/(i)) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013, for possession of an unlicensed pistol. The core legal questions involve the appreciation of evidence by official witnesses, the effect of non-production of the departure roznamcha entry, and major contradictions in the testimonies of the complainant and the mashir. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to the omission to produce the departure entry, which cuts at the root of the case, and material contradictions regarding the apprehension of the appellant. The court laid down the principle that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right, and consequently set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-production of the departure roznamcha entry by a police party is fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Does an accused person become entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt?
  • Are material contradictions between the statements of the complainant and the mashir sufficient to discard the prosecution case?
  • Can the conviction of an accused under the Sindh Arms Act be sustained when the foundational arrest and recovery proceedings are shrouded in doubt?
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• Mohsin Gul vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 754 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-09-18
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlrecovery of charasprohibitory clausequantum of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Mohsin Gul, sought post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 21 registered under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of 4.800 kilograms of charas from a truck driven by him. The core legal question was whether an accused involved in the transportation of a huge quantity of narcotics falling under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 is entitled to the concession of bail, particularly concerning the assessment of the quantum of sentence at the bail stage. The Peshawar High Court held that considering the huge quantity of recovered narcotics, the positive FSL report, and the non-bailable nature of the offence falling within the prohibitory clause, the petitioner was not entitled to bail. The court laid down the principle that courts cannot undertake any categorization of sentencing, guess work, or speculative exercise at the bail stage to reduce the potential sentence or pre-empt the trial court's discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when a huge quantity of narcotics is recovered from his possession?
  • Can a court undertake speculative exercises or categorization of sentencing at the bail stage for offences under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Does the recovery of 4.800 kilograms of charas bring the case within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Mohsin Ali vs The State and others2016 SCMR 1529 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-03
  post-arrest bailleave to appealmurderprohibitory clausemedical evidenceinvestigation report
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition seeks leave to appeal against the refusal of post-arrest bail in a murder case. The core legal question revolves around whether reasonable grounds exist to believe the petitioner is connected to the offence, given his specific nomination in the FIR, attribution of firearm injuries, and corroboration by the post-mortem examination report and eye-witness accounts, despite a contrary opinion by the investigating agency. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner remains prima facie implicated by solid material on record, and since the offence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code attracts the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petition must be dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the opinion of the investigating agency regarding the nature of involvement is not binding when the record prima facie discloses sufficient incriminating material linking the accused to the crime, especially where trial has already commenced.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the opinion of the investigating agency regarding the role of an accused is binding on the court during bail adjudication?
  • Does an offence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code attract the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be refused when an accused is specifically nominated in the FIR with a distinct attribution supported by medical and ocular evidence?
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• Mohsin Abbas vs Regional Police Officer and others2016 YLR 877 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-06Read full judgment →
• Mohid and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 306 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-02
  post-arrest bailstatutory bailacid throwingterrorismscheduled offencedelay in trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous petition was filed by the petitioners seeking post-arrest bail in a case involving acid throwing, registered under Sections 336-B, 452/34, 337-A(i), and 337-F(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to statutory bail due to the delay in the conclusion of their trial, despite being accused of an act of terrorism. The Court held that the petitioners were not entitled to bail, noting that they were charged with an offence punishable with imprisonment for life, which constitutes a scheduled offence under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The Court emphasized that the statutory provisions for mandatory bail upon the expiry of a specific period of detention do not apply to individuals accused of acts of terrorism punishable by death or life imprisonment, as explicitly provided in the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the petitioners failed to demonstrate any fresh grounds for relief.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory right to bail upon the expiry of a specific period of detention apply to an accused charged with an act of terrorism punishable by life imprisonment?
  • Can a trial court review its own order dismissing a bail application based solely on the police declaring co-accused persons innocent?
  • Is the police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 binding on the court when considering bail?
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• Mohd Ilyas vs Naeemullah2016 YLR 1822 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-09-16Read full judgment →
• Moharram alias Mar00 vs The State2016 MLD 580 · Sindh High Court · 2014-11-13
  compounding of offencescompromisenon-compoundable offencehurtcompensationDamanmerger of offences
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Sindh High Court arose from applications seeking acquittal based on a compromise under Section 345(2) and Section 345(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, following convictions under various provisions including Section 302(b), Section 459, Section 337-A(i), and Section 337-F(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether a court can permit the compounding of a non-compoundable independent offence such as under Section 459, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether legal heirs can waive compensation awarded under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court held that a non-compoundable offence cannot be compounded as Section 345(7) strictly limits compounding to offences specified in the statute, and independent offences do not merge into the main compoundable offence. Furthermore, while compensation cannot be completely waived by legal heirs, it can be reduced in light of a compromise and circumstances. The court accepted the compromise regarding compoundable offences, declined it for the non-compoundable offence, reduced the compensation amount, and ordered the appellant's release as the already served period exceeded the sentence for the uncompounded offence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the court can permit compounding of a non-compoundable offence?
  • Does an independent offence stand merged into the main compoundable offence upon compromise?
  • Can legal heirs waive the compensation awarded under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can compensation awarded under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be reduced in view of a compromise?
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• Mohan Lal and another vs The State2016 YLR 1354 · Sindh High Court · 2015-07-06
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlheroin recoverycommercial quantitystatutory barfactory ownerstentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail application arising out of a criminal case registered under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, involving the recovery of sixty-eight kilograms of heroin concealed within cotton bales loaded from a factory owned by the applicants. The core legal question before the court was whether the factory owners were entitled to post-arrest bail given that the contraband was not recovered directly from their physical possession, and in light of statements implicating them and the prohibition contained in Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The Sindh High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that prima facie sufficient evidence connected the applicants to the heinous offense, that independent witness statements placed them at the scene during the loading of the narcotics, and that the statutory bar against bail applied given the massive quantity of the recovered narcotic substance. The key principle laid down is that where there is tentative prima facie evidence linking an accused to the concealment and transportation of a massive commercial quantity of narcotics from their premises, the statutory prohibition against bail under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 is fully attracted, disentitling the accused to pre-trial relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person can be granted post-arrest bail under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 when a huge commercial quantity of narcotics is traced back to their premises?
  • Do statements recorded under sections 161 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 provide sufficient prima facie grounds to connect a factory owner with the concealment of narcotics in goods dispatched from the factory?
  • Does the principle of consistency apply to grant bail to factory owners merely because co-accused drivers of a transport vehicle carrying narcotics were admitted to bail?
  • What is the effect of the prohibitory bar contained in section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 upon the consideration for grant of bail in cases involving heinous narcotics offenses?
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• Mohammad Zaman and another vs Mohammad Kareem and 17 others2016 YLR 709 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-09-30
  second appealco-sharerjoint propertyfamily arrangementsale of landconcurrent findingspartition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil second appeal arises from concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the lower courts, which dismissed the plaintiffs' suit for declaration and perpetual injunction regarding joint land. The core legal question concerns the legality of a sale of specific field numbers by a co-sharer in excess of his share within those specific numbers, and the binding nature of concurrent findings of fact. The High Court held that a co-sharer in exclusive possession of specific field numbers under a family arrangement can validly transfer land, provided the alienation does not exceed the vendor's overall share in the joint holding, subject to adjustment at the time of partition. Furthermore, superior courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless misreading, non-reading of evidence, or misconstruction of law is established. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-sharer in possession of specific field numbers validly transfer land exceeding his share in those specific numbers?
  • Under what circumstances can superior courts interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal?
  • Does a family arrangement regarding possession of joint property extinguish the title of other co-sharers?
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• Mohammad Tariq vs Safdar Hussain and another2016 MLD 67 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-24Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Shafa vs Mst. Hasina2016 CLC 339 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-06-30Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Pali vs The State2016 YLR 1986 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-12
  criminal appealmurder convictionocular evidenceamalgamation of casesprivate complaintfalsus in uno falsus in omnibusappreciation of evidencedouble jeopardy
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concern the procedural validity of amalgamating a State case and a private complaint case to use evidence interchangeably, and whether the ocular testimony was sufficient to sustain a conviction. The High Court held that the trial court’s procedure of amalgamating the cases and using evidence from the State case to convict in the complaint case was illegal, as evidence must be recorded independently in each proceeding. The Court further established that the same set of evidence cannot be disbelieved for co-accused—leading to their acquittal—and simultaneously believed for the appellant without clear, distinct reasoning. Finding that the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent, frequently changed their stance regarding the motive and the manner of the incident, and failed to provide a natural account, the Court concluded the evidence was unreliable. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, reinforcing the principle that corroborative evidence cannot sustain a conviction when the direct ocular account is rejected.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court amalgamate a State case and a private complaint case to use evidence interchangeably?
  • Is it legally permissible to convict an accused based on evidence that was disbelieved for co-accused in the same trial?
  • Does the principle of double jeopardy prohibit the simultaneous prosecution of an accused in both a State case and a private complaint case for the same offence?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on ocular testimony that has been found inconsistent and contradictory across multiple statements?
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• Mohammad Naveed vs Mohammad Ismail and 2 others2016 YLR 2728 · Sindh High Court · 2016-02-24Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Naeem vs Director Public Instruction (SE), Punjab Lahore2016 LHC 1776 · Lahore High Court · 2016-06-09
  constitutional petitioncivil servantservice tribunal jurisdictionremoval from servicebar of jurisdictionlachesdepartmental appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by a civil servant seeking to set aside a departmental order dated 27th September 1999 removing him from service, or alternatively, a direction to the respondent to decide his pending departmental appeal. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan to adjudicate a service matter or compel a departmental authority to decide an appeal in light of the constitutional bar under Article 212 and the remedy provided under the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal pursuant to Article 212 of the Constitution, barring the High Court's jurisdiction. The court laid down the principle that a civil servant cannot bypass the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal by filing a constitutional petition, nor can the High Court issue a writ to direct the departmental authority when the statute allows the civil servant to approach the Tribunal after the expiry of the statutory waiting period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan to entertain a petition filed by a civil servant regarding terms and conditions of service in view of the bar contained in Article 212?
  • Can a civil servant approach the Service Tribunal if the departmental authority fails to decide a pending departmental appeal within the statutory period?
  • Whether a constitutional petition challenging a departmental removal order passed over a decade prior is barred by laches?
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• Mohammad Munir vs The State and another2016 YLR 1474 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-26
  narcotics recoverycharassentencing policyreduction of sentencesentence already undergoneControl of Narcotic Substances Actcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Toba Tek Singh, convicting the appellant under Section 9(c) of The Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for the recovery of five kilograms of charas and sentencing him to imprisonment for life with a fine. The core legal question revolves around the quantum of sentence and whether the punishment awarded is in accord with established sentencing guidelines for the recovery of narcotics exceeding four kilograms and up to five kilograms. The Lahore High Court held that the sentence of imprisonment for life was excessive and out of line with the sentencing policy laid down in precedent. Consequently, while maintaining the conviction, the Court reduced the appellant's sentence to the period already undergone and reduced the fine. The key principle laid down is that courts must adhere to established sentencing guidelines and policies regarding the proportionality of sentences in narcotics cases based on the weight of the recovered substance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sentence of imprisonment for life for the recovery of five kilograms of charas is excessive in light of established sentencing guidelines?
  • Can the appellate court reduce a narcotics convict's sentence to the period already undergone while maintaining the conviction?
  • Does the recovery of five kilograms of charas warrant the standard and normal sentence prescribed in judicial policy rather than life imprisonment?
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• Mohammad Liaqat Sulehira vs S.H.O., City Police Station, Muzaffarabad and 6 others2016 P Cr. L J 441 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-12-19
  pre-arrest bailquashment of FIRcognizable offencepublic servantAnti-Corruption EstablishmentEhtesab Bureautransfer of investigationjurisdiction of police
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a public servant, challenged the dismissal of his writ petition and pre-arrest bail application by the High Court. The core legal questions were whether an FIR against a public servant for corruption-related offences could be registered by local police rather than the Anti-Corruption Establishment, and whether the transfer of investigation by the Deputy Inspector General of Police to the Anti-Corruption Establishment was lawful. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the registration of an FIR by local police for a cognizable offence is authorized under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and is not barred by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Anti-Corruption Establishment Rules, 1997. The Court clarified that the Anti-Corruption Establishment Rules, 1997 govern internal departmental inquiries and investigations, not the initial registration of cognizable offences by police. Furthermore, the Court held that the Deputy Inspector General of Police lacked the authority to transfer the investigation, as such power lies with the Chairman of the Ehtesab Bureau under the Ehtesab Bureau Act, 2001. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can local police register an FIR against a public servant for a cognizable offence, or is it exclusively the domain of the Anti-Corruption Establishment?
  • Does the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Anti-Corruption Establishment Rules, 1997 prohibit the registration of criminal cases by local police?
  • Who possesses the legal authority to transfer an investigation of a scheduled offence to the Anti-Corruption Establishment?
  • Is an FIR liable to be quashed solely on the ground that it was registered by the local police rather than the Anti-Corruption Establishment?
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• Mohammad Juman through General Attorney vs Iind Additional District2016 MLD 831 · Sindh High Court · 2015-06-05Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ijaz and another vs Muhammad Shafi (decd.) through L.Rs,2016 PLJ SC 361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-emptionlimitationpresentation of plaintactus curiae neminem gravabitcivil procedureco-ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from two pre-emption suits filed by the respondents on May 30, 1963. Due to the temporary absence of the local Civil Judge at Narowal, the plaints were presented to the local Tehsildar, who subsequently transmitted them to the Civil Judge on June 5, 1963. The appellants contended that the suits were time-barred as they were not presented to a competent court within the limitation period. The trial court decreed the suits, but the appellate court reversed this, holding that the first suit was time-barred and that the appellants had consequently become co-owners, defeating the respondents' superior pre-emption right in the second suit. The High Court restored the trial court's decrees. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the Tehsildar was authorized to receive plaints in the Civil Judge's absence. Invoking the maxim 'Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit', the Court ruled that litigants cannot be penalized for court-related administrative omissions or the absence of presiding officers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the presentation of a plaint to a Tehsildar in the temporary absence of the Civil Judge constitutes valid presentation for the purposes of limitation?
  • Does the legal maxim 'Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit' protect a litigant from being penalized or having their suit barred by limitation due to the absence of a presiding officer?
  • How does Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply when a court is closed or the presiding officer is away on tour on the final day of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Hassan vs The State2016 MLD 1167 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-21
  murderdeath sentenceinterested witnessrelated witnessre-statement under section 342 Cr.P.C.recovery of weaponcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal jail appeal arises from a judgment of the Sessions Court convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased and sentencing him to death, which was referred to the High Court for confirmation. The core legal questions involved whether the ocular testimony of related and allegedly interested witnesses could be safely relied upon, whether the appellant's defence plea of false implication due to political enmity and an alternative theory of the crime was established, and whether the recovery of the weapon of offense was lawful and duly proved. The Sindh High Court held that mere relationship of witnesses to the deceased does not render them interested witnesses in the absence of a motive for false substitution, that the appellant failed to establish his alternative defence pleas, and that the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The court laid down the principle that the inherent worth and consistency of ocular testimony, corroborated by medical evidence and prompt lodging of the FIR, forms a sufficient basis for conviction, and affirmed the death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere relationship of an eyewitness to the deceased render their testimony unreliable or make them an interested witness under Pakistani criminal law?
  • Whether the failure of an accused to substantiate a plea of false implication through evidence leaves the prosecution case intact?
  • Does the strict compliance of search provisions under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply when a recovery is made from the person of the accused rather than through a house search?
  • Whether the non-production of a weapon of offense before the trial court vitiates the conviction when ocular and medical evidence is otherwise consistent and confidence-inspiring?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Farhan Asghar and another vs Mohammad Asghar2016 MLD 671 · Sindh High Court · 2014-12-16Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Dangul and another vs The State2016 MLD 737 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-12-29Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Azam Brohi and others vs The State through Chairman,National Accountability Bureau and others2016 P Cr. L J 1417 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-30
  pre-arrest bailpost-arrest bailbail cancellationwhite collar crimecorruption and corrupt practicescooperative housing societyNational Accountability Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of five petitions for bail arising out of a National Accountability Bureau (NAB) reference pending before an Accountability Court in Karachi, involving allegations of corruption, misuse of authority, embezzlement of society funds, and illegal cancellation and re-allotment of plots within the Central Information Employees Cooperative Society Limited. The core legal questions concern whether sufficient grounds exist to connect the petitioners to the alleged offenses under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and whether the matter falls exclusively within the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, rather than NAB's jurisdiction. The court held that white-collar crimes require a holistic view of the entire transaction chain and found reasonable grounds connecting all five petitioners to the offenses. Consequently, the court recalled the ad interim pre-arrest bail granted to the first four petitioners and dismissed the post-arrest bail petition of the fifth petitioner, while directing the trial court to conclude the proceedings within three months. The key principle laid down is that the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 is a special law with overriding effect over other legislation, and where acts complained of fall under section 9 of the Ordinance, NAB possesses exclusive jurisdiction to inquire into and prosecute them.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the National Accountability Bureau has jurisdiction to investigate matters concerning a cooperative housing society or if such matters fall exclusively within the domain of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925?
  • Are there reasonable grounds to connect the petitioners to offenses of corruption and corrupt practices under section 9 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, to warrant the recall of pre-arrest bail?
  • Whether an accused person charged under section 23 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, who is also implicated in the main reference for major financial corruption, is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Does the abuse of the concession of pre-arrest bail by an absenting petitioner provide an independent ground for the recall of such bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ayub Fazlani vs The Province of Sindh & others2016 SHC 23 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-11Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ameen vs The State2016 YLR 1118 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-30Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ali Yougvi vs Deputy Commissioner/Chairman House2016 PLC (C.S.) 1168 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-10-06
  writ petitiongovernment accommodationallotment cancellationtransfer and postingmala fides
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a writ petition filed before the Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court, whereby the petitioner challenged the cancellation of his allotment of a government quarter at Skardu following his promotion and transfer as Secretary Excise and Taxation stationed at Gilgit. The core legal question revolved around the legality of the petitioner's continued retention of the government accommodation at Skardu after his transfer to another station, and whether the cancellation order issued by the District House Allotment Committee (DHAC) Skardu was lawful. The court held that the petitioner had no legal right or policy justification to retain the government quarter indefinitely after his transfer, that the petition was based on mala fides intended merely to prolong possession, and that the writ petition was not competent. The court dismissed the petition accordingly, establishing that a government servant cannot indefinitely retain official accommodation at a previous station of posting after promotion and transfer without supporting rules or policies.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government employee retain official accommodation at a previous station of posting indefinitely after promotion and transfer?
  • Whether a writ petition is competent against the cancellation of a government quarter allotment by a House Allotment Committee in the absence of supporting rules for retention?
  • Does the continuation of possession of a government quarter without an operative temporary injunction constitute mala fides on the part of the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Abdullah, Chairman and 6 otherss vs Head of Department2016 CLD 1713 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-07-06
  associated companiesinvestment in associated undertakingsstandby letters of creditcompanies ordinancepenaltyratificationsecurities and exchange commission of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under section 33 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 against an order imposing penalties on the directors of Sapphire Fibres Limited for violating section 208 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 by issuing standby letters of credit on behalf of an associated company without prior shareholder approval. The core legal question was whether issuing standby letters of credit and providing financial guarantees constituted investments under section 208 requiring prior member sanction, and whether subsequent shareholder ratification cured the default. The Appellate Bench held that such financial engagements fall within the ambit of investments under section 208 and that secondary legislation cannot override primary provisions. However, considering that the shareholders subsequently ratified the transactions via a special resolution and that no actual financial loss was caused, the Bench adopted a lenient view and set aside the penalty. The key principle laid down is that guarantees and standby letters of credit issued for associated companies require prior statutory compliance under company law, though subsequent ratification and absence of loss are relevant mitigants when determining penalties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the issuance of standby letters of credit and financial guarantees on behalf of an associated company constitutes an investment under section 208 of the Companies Ordinance 1984?
  • Can secondary legislation or regulations expand or contradict the scope of a primary statutory provision?
  • Does subsequent ratification of a transaction by shareholders cure a prior procedural default under section 208 of the Companies Ordinance 1984?
  • Whether penalties imposed for statutory non-compliance can be set aside when subsequent rectification is made and no financial loss is caused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohabti vs Provincial of Punjab, etc.2016 LHC 328 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-11Read full judgment →
• Mohabti vs Province of Punjab, etc.K.L.R. 2016 Civil Cases 185 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-31Read full judgment →
• Mohabti vs Province of Punjab through D.C.O. and 5otherss2016 LHC 328, 2016 MLD 1708 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-11Read full judgment →
• Mohabat Khan vs Muhammad Fareed2016 MLD 1139 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-11-23Read full judgment →
• Mohabat Khan vs Abdul Hameed2016 YLR 1120 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-12-04
  civil revisionrejection of plaintquestion of titleprivate partitionpartition mutationjurisdiction of civil courtrevenue records
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the appellate court's judgment setting aside the rejection of the respondents' plaint and remanding the case for trial on merits. The core legal question was whether a civil suit challenging partition proceedings and mutation is barred under Section 172(2)(xviii) of the Land Revenue Act, 1967, when a question of title is involved. The Peshawar High Court held that where a bona fide question of title is raised—such as a claim of ownership and possession based on an antecedent private partition—the jurisdiction of the civil court is not barred by the exclusionary provisions of the Land Revenue Act, notwithstanding the fact that the private partition was not formally affirmed under Section 147 of the said Act, since seeking such affirmation is discretionary rather than mandatory. The court affirmed that civil courts have the exclusive mandate to resolve questions of title through evidence, thereby dismissing the revision petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil suit challenging partition proceedings is barred under Section 172(2)(xviii) of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 when a question of title is raised?
  • Does the failure to seek formal affirmation of a private partition from a Revenue Officer under Section 147 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 render the private partition legally ineffective?
  • Is seeking affirmation of a private partition under Section 147 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 mandatory or discretionary for co-sharers?
  • When does a question of title arise in the context of partition proceedings and revenue records?
  Read full judgment →
• Moeen-Ud-Din---Applicant vs Ms. Fahmeeda Begum through Legal Heirs2016 YLR 2413 · Sindh High Court · 2015-03-06Read full judgment →
• MN Innovative Investment Bank Limited Formerly Innovative HousingSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• MK Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. Through Chief Executive Director vs Managing2016 YLR 715 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-22Read full judgment →
• Miss Mehwish Asif vs Vice Chancellor Shaheed Benazir Bhutto2016 MLD 95 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-12-16
  contractual employmentregularization of serviceconstitutional petitionmaintainabilityexhaustion of alternate remediestermination of contractservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a contract-based Liaison Officer at Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University, challenged the termination of her services via a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. The core legal questions were whether a contract employee has a vested right to regularization or continuation of service, and whether the petition was maintainable given the existence of alternate departmental remedies. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable as the petitioner failed to exhaust available departmental appellate remedies under the University Statute. Furthermore, the Court ruled that contractual employees, particularly those on fixed-pay and fixed-term appointments, possess no vested right to regularization or continuation of service. The Court emphasized that contractual employment, regardless of duration, does not confer the status of a regular employee. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine, affirming that contract employees cannot seek regularization through constitutional jurisdiction and that termination in accordance with the terms of a contract is legally permissible.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contract employee have a vested right to claim regularization or continuation of service?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable where the petitioner has failed to exhaust available departmental appellate remedies?
  • Can a contract employee seek reinstatement through a writ petition when their services are terminated in accordance with the terms of their contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Hajra Bibi, Karachi vs Oir, Unit-06, Zone-IV, Rto-III, Karachi2016 PTD.(Trib.) 2861 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-06-02Read full judgment →
• Miss Afifa vs MRs, Nusrat Hafeez and others2016 YLR 1193 · Sindh High Court · 2015-08-31Read full judgment →
• Misri Khan vs StatePLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Karachi) 777 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-16
  suspension of sentencepost-conviction bailshort sentenceappellate delaycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking suspension of sentence and grant of bail pending the final adjudication of a criminal appeal. The appellant had been convicted by the trial court for offences under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, and sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment along with a fine. The core legal question was whether the sentence imposed upon the appellant should be suspended during the pendency of the appeal given the short duration of the sentence and the anticipated delay in the appellate process. The Court, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the appeal, held that because the sentence was of a short duration and the preparation of the paper book would require significant time, the sentence should be suspended. The Court granted bail to the appellant subject to the furnishing of solvent surety, establishing the principle that a short sentence coupled with the likelihood of delay in appellate proceedings constitutes valid grounds for suspension of sentence pending appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a short sentence of imprisonment constitute a valid ground for suspension of sentence pending appeal?
  • Can a court suspend a sentence and grant bail pending appeal without examining the merits of the conviction?
  • Is the anticipated delay in the preparation of the paper book a relevant factor for granting bail under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Misri Khan Jatoi vs The State2016 YLR 2600 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-16
  suspension of sentenceshort sentencepost-conviction bailcriminal appealdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the suspension of a sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment imposed upon the appellant following his conviction for an offence under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The core legal question before the court was whether the sentence of the appellant should be suspended pending the final adjudication of the criminal appeal, given the relatively short duration of the sentence and the anticipated delay in the appeal process. The court, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the appeal, held that the sentence should be suspended. The key principle laid down is that where a sentence is of a short duration and the preparation of the paper book and final adjudication of the appeal are not expected in the near future, the court may exercise its discretion to suspend the sentence and grant bail to the appellant pending the final outcome of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence be suspended pending the final adjudication of a criminal appeal if the sentence is of a short duration?
  • Is it appropriate to suspend a sentence without addressing the merits of the appeal?
  • Does the delay in the preparation of the paper book justify the suspension of a sentence during the pendency of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Misbah Karim and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2016 PLD Sindh 462 · Sindh High Court · 2016-04-15Read full judgment →
• Mis. Travel Waliis (Pvt.) Limited vs Commissioner Appeals, Income Tax, Islamabad, EtcNLR 2016 Tax 42 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mis. Sitara Energy Limited vs NotSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2000-05-04Read full judgment →
• Mis. Siemens Aktiengese- vs Pakistan, etc. Ilschaft, Germany. Present:2016 PTD 1158, PTCL 2016 CL. 52 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-12-10Read full judgment →
• Mirza vs Patel2016 SCMR 1637 · Supreme Court of United Kingdom
  illegality defenceex turpi causaunjust enrichmentinsider dealingreliance principlepublic policyrestitutionproportionality
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerned a claim for the recovery of £620,000 paid by Mr. Patel to Mr. Mirza for the purpose of insider dealing, which never occurred. The core legal question was whether the doctrine of illegality (ex turpi causa) precluded the recovery of money paid under an illegal contract, and whether the "reliance principle" established in Tinsley v Milligan remained the correct test. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the reliance test is no longer the appropriate framework for the illegality defence. The Court held that the defence should be applied based on a policy-based assessment rather than rigid procedural rules. The key principle laid down is that when considering the illegality defence, courts must: (a) consider the underlying purpose of the prohibition transgressed; (b) consider any other relevant public policies; and (c) determine whether denying the claim would be a proportionate response. The Court emphasized that punishment is the function of criminal courts, and civil courts should focus on maintaining the integrity of the legal system and avoiding inconsistency.

  Questions settled

  • Does the reliance principle established in Tinsley v Milligan remain the appropriate test for the illegality defence in civil claims?
  • Can a party recover money paid under an illegal contract if the illegal purpose was never executed?
  • Should the illegality defence be applied based on a rigid rule or a policy-based assessment of proportionality?
  • Is the illegality defence intended to be a tool for punishment in civil proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Khan and 3 others vs Mehtar Jan2016 MLD 1075 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-04-27Read full judgment →
• Mirza Jahanzaib Baig Chief Executive Mirza Aurangzeb Baig DirectorAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mirza GULand 2 others vs Muhammad Ayub and 18 others2016 YLR 319 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-10-27Read full judgment →
• Mirza Fazal Ghani vs Bahadar Khan and 2 others2016 PLJ Peshawar 270 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-05-27Read full judgment →
• Mirza Abdul Sattar Baig and others vs Pakistan Railway through Divisional Superintendent, Karachi and others2016 CLC 1931 · Sindh High Court · 2016-04-06Read full judgment →
• Mirbaz Ali Faraz and others vs The State through NAB Gilgit-Baltistan, Secretariat Gilgit and others2016 P Cr. L J 1431 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-05-24
  post-arrest bailNational Accountability Bureauconstitutional jurisdictionfurther inquirymisuse of authorityselective prosecutioncorruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three writ petitions filed by government employees seeking post-arrest bail after being booked by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) for alleged corruption and corrupt practices. The core legal question is whether the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court possesses the jurisdiction to grant bail to accused persons under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, given the statutory bars against bail, and whether the petitioners' cases warrant such relief. The Court held that while the NAB Ordinance contains restrictive provisions, the Superior Courts retain constitutional jurisdiction to grant bail to prevent the abuse of process, particularly when prosecution appears malicious, discriminatory, or lacks evidence of illegal gain. The ratio establishes that where a criminal action is initiated on a "pick and choose" basis, targeting low-level employees while ignoring actual beneficiaries, the Court is duty-bound to intervene. The principle laid down is that the Court may grant bail under its constitutional jurisdiction if the case requires further inquiry or if the prosecution's actions constitute a misuse of authority, regardless of statutory bars in special laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court have the jurisdiction to grant bail to an accused booked under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, despite the statutory bar?
  • Can a court grant bail in a corruption case if the prosecution appears to be malicious or based on selective targeting of low-level employees?
  • Is the absence of evidence regarding illegal gain or pecuniary advantage a ground for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Miran Bukhsh vs Muhammad Ismail and others2016 YLR 420 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-09-10
  civil revisionexecution petitionunregistered documentsecondary evidenceattesting witnessesobjection petitionQanun-e-Shahadat
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts whereby an objection petition filed by the respondents against an execution petition was accepted. The core legal question involved the admissibility, proof, and evidentiary value of unregistered documents relied upon in execution proceedings, particularly regarding the requirement to prove execution when marginal witnesses have passed away. The Peshawar High Court held that when a document containing fiscal matters and future obligations is unregistered and the marginal witnesses are dead, secondary evidence—such as proving the signatures through relatives or comparison—must be legally adduced, and failure to prove the document in the manner provided by law renders it a nullity. The court established that unregistered documents cannot be accepted without proper legal proof of execution in accordance with evidentiary standards, setting aside the orders of both lower courts and remanding the case for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • How must an unregistered document be proved when its marginal witnesses have passed away?
  • Does an unregistered document confer title or hold evidentiary value in execution proceedings?
  • What are the legal consequences of failing to produce secondary evidence to prove the execution of a disputed document?
  • Can an objection petition based on unregistered sale documents be maintained without fulfilling the formal requirements of proof?
  Read full judgment →
• Miraj Khalid vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 1161 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-05
  narcotic substanceschemical analysisrepresentative samplesentencing reductionamalgamated samplecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of 135 kilograms of charas and 10 kilograms of opium. The core legal question concerns the validity of the sentence when the prosecution fails to take separate samples from each individual packet or container of narcotics for chemical analysis, instead amalgamating them into a single consolidated sample. The Court upheld the conviction, finding the evidence of recovery sufficient, but held that in the absence of separate sampling from each container, the quantity of narcotics proved against the accused is limited to the weight of the single sample actually tested. Relying on the principle established in Ameer Zeb v. The State (PLD 2012 SC 380), the Court ruled that only the quantity represented by the tested sample can be attributed to the accused for sentencing purposes. Consequently, the Court reduced the appellant's sentence of life imprisonment to the period already undergone and set aside the fine.

  Questions settled

  • Is a consolidated sample of narcotics sufficient to prove possession of the entire recovered quantity for sentencing purposes?
  • What is the legal consequence of failing to take separate samples from each individual packet of recovered narcotics?
  • Can a sentence be reduced based on the failure of the prosecution to provide representative samples for chemical analysis?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Qad Ayaz vs Sabir Khan and another2016 P Cr. L J 709 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-12-09
  transfer of evidenceabsconding witnessprevious statementsubsequent trialevidentiary valuecross-examinationcriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-III, Bannu, which accepted an application to transfer and use previous statements of prosecution witnesses—including a deceased police officer and a complainant who was an absconder—recorded during the trial of an acquitted co-accused, into the subsequent trial of the petitioner under section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question concerned whether previous statements of witnesses whose attendance cannot be procured can be transposed into a subsequent trial against an accused. The Peshawar High Court held that there is no legal bar against transposing a deposition recorded under section 512, Cr.P.C. to a subsequent trial when the attendance of the witness cannot be procured without unreasonable delay or expense. The Court laid down that while such statements are legally transposable, their ultimate evidentiary value and admissibility must be strictly judged by the trial court under Article 47 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, particularly regarding the right and opportunity of cross-examination.

  Questions settled

  • Can previous statements of witnesses recorded in an earlier trial be transposed into a subsequent trial under section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What are the statutory conditions required under section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for reading a witness's deposition in the absence of an accused?
  • How does Article 47 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 govern the admissibility and relevancy of evidence given by a witness in a previous judicial proceeding?
  • Does the mere transposition of a previous statement to a subsequent trial cause legal prejudice to an accused who lacked a prior opportunity to cross-examine?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Nadir Ali Khan Talpur vs Chief Secretary to Government of Sindh2016 PLC (C.S.) 403 · Sindh High Court · 2015-12-04
  civil servanttransfer and postingconstitutional jurisdictionbar of jurisdictionservice tribunalterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by a civil servant challenging his transfer order on the grounds of mala fides and lack of approval by the Chief Minister under the Sindh Civil Services (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974. During the proceedings, the respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition in view of Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and the Supreme Court judgment in Ali Azhar Khan Baloch v. Province of Sindh, asserting that matters relating to terms and conditions of civil service, including transfers and postings, fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The High Court held that since the petitioner is a civil servant challenging his transfer, the constitutional petition is barred by Article 212 of the Constitution and the settled law, as adequate remedy is available before the Service Tribunal under the Sindh Services Tribunal Act, 1973. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the petition as not maintainable, while granting liberty to the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition filed by a civil servant against an order of transfer and posting is maintainable in view of Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Does the expression 'terms and conditions' of service under the law include matters relating to the transfer and posting of civil servants?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain service matters of civil servants or must such aggrieved persons approach the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Dil Khan son of Moeen Khan vs The State2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mir Abdul Razzaq vs D.C.O., Gujrat2016 PLJ Lahore 985 · Lahore High Court · 2016-06-21
  cancellation of declarationPress Registration OrdinanceDistrict Coordination OfficerPress Registrarjurisdictioncoram non judicefreedom of the pressequality before law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the orders of the District Coordination Officer (DCO), Gujrat, whereby the declaration of the newspaper "Daily Naya Andaz" and Al-mir Printing Press was cancelled following the publication of a news item regarding an incident of desecration. The core legal question was whether the DCO had the lawful jurisdiction and authority to initiate cancellation proceedings suo motu under Section 19 of the Press, Newspapers, News Agencies and Books Registration Ordinance, 2002 without an application from the Press Registrar. The Lahore High Court held that the DCO acted without lawful authority and coram non judice, as proceedings under Section 19 can only be initiated upon an application made by the Press Registrar. The Court also noted that the action violated Article 25 of the Constitution regarding equal treatment since other newspapers publishing the same news were not penalized. The appeal was accepted and the impugned orders were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can a District Coordination Officer initiate proceedings for the cancellation of a newspaper declaration suo motu without an application from the Press Registrar under Section 19 of the Press, Newspapers, News Agencies and Books Registration Ordinance, 2002?
  • Whether the cancellation of a newspaper declaration by a DCO without statutory referral from the Press Registrar is rendered coram non judice?
  • Does initiating punitive action against a single newspaper while ignoring other local newspapers that published the same news violate Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Abdul Razzaq vs D.C.O. Gujrat2016 LHC 2036 · Lahore High Court · 2016-06-21Read full judgment →
• Ministry of Justice vs Cox2016 SCMR 1340 · Supreme Court of United KingdomRead full judgment →
• Mingora Bench]Bakht Zada vs Shah Tamash Khan and 5 others2016 PLJ Peshawar 153 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-11-19Read full judgment →
• Military Accounts Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd. vs Secretary to Government of the Punjab and others2016 PLD Lahore 223 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-28Read full judgment →
• Military Accounts Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd vs Secretary to Government of the Punjab, etc2016 PLD Lahore 223, 2016 PLJ Lahore 671 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-28Read full judgment →
• Military Accounts Co operative Housing Society Ltd. vs Secretary to Government of the Punjab, etc2016 LHC 101 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-11Read full judgment →
• Mian Waseem Rasool vs Ahmad Fareed and others2016 CLC 1077 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-01
  specific performancearbitration awardrule of the courtexecutable decreeobjections to awardremand
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the trial court's order disposing of a suit for specific performance and perpetual injunction on the basis of an arbitration award. The core legal question was whether the trial court could dispose of the suit and implement the arbitration award without inviting objections and making the award a rule of the court. The Lahore High Court held that upon receiving an arbitration award, the trial court is legally bound to invite objections from the parties, decide those objections, and make the award a rule of the court to create an executable decree. Furthermore, the court must implead necessary third parties involved in the arbitration. The court laid down the principle that an arbitration award cannot be implemented or executed without first being made a rule of the court after due consideration of any objections raised by the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can dispose of a suit on the basis of an arbitration award without making the award a rule of the court?
  • Is a trial court bound to invite objections from the parties against an arbitration award before making it an executable decree?
  • Can third parties mentioned in an arbitration award who were not original parties to the suit be impleaded by the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Waqar ud Din & others vs M/s United Industries Limited & others2016 LHC 674 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-02Read full judgment →
• Mian Umer Ikram-Ul-Haq vs Additional District and Sessions Judge, Lahore and 15 others2016 P Cr. LJ 1054 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-04
  registration of criminal caseEx-officio Justice of Peaceprivate complaintalternate remedywrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 seeking the setting aside of an order passed by the Ex-officio Justice of Peace, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioner's application under sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the registration of a criminal case. The core legal question was whether the Ex-officio Justice of Peace was justified in dismissing the application for registration of a criminal case solely on the ground that a private complaint regarding the same occurrence had already been filed by the petitioner and was pending inquiry before a judicial forum. The Lahore High Court held that since the petitioner had already availed an alternate remedy by filing a private complaint regarding the same occurrence, he could not simultaneously invoke the jurisdiction of the Ex-officio Justice of Peace. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the prior invocation of a judicial forum bars the issuance of a direction for registration of a criminal case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the pendency of a private complaint regarding the same occurrence bars the registration of a criminal case through the Ex-officio Justice of Peace?
  • Can a petitioner invoke the jurisdiction of the Ex-officio Justice of Peace after already availing the alternate remedy of filing a private complaint?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Umar Ikram-ul-Haque vs Dr. Shahida Hasnain and another2016 SCP 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-10
  landlord-tenant relationshiprent tribunal jurisdictionjurisdictional facteviction applicationstatutory interpretationagreement to sellinterim rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether a Rent Tribunal can order a respondent to deposit rent under Section 24 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, when the respondent denies the landlord-tenant relationship. The appellant, facing an eviction application, denied being a tenant, asserting possession via an agreement to sell. The High Court had ordered the deposit of rent, ruling that the Act's scheme required such deposits regardless of the denial. The Supreme Court set aside this judgment, holding that the Rent Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 24 until it positively determines the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. The Court emphasized the doctrine of jurisdictional fact, noting that the Tribunal's authority is contingent upon establishing this relationship. It clarified that the term "tenant" in Section 24 is distinct from "respondent," and the legislature’s use of these terms is deliberate. Furthermore, Section 10 of the Act, regarding agreements to sell, applies only where a tenancy already exists, not where the relationship is denied from the outset. Consequently, the Tribunal must first resolve the jurisdictional issue of tenancy before ordering rent deposits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Tribunal pass an order for the deposit of rent under Section 24 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, when the respondent denies the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship?
  • Does the term 'tenant' in Section 24 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, include a respondent who denies the tenancy?
  • Does Section 10 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, apply to cases where the occupant claims possession via an agreement to sell that predates any alleged tenancy?
  • Is the determination of the landlord-tenant relationship a jurisdictional fact that must be established before a Rent Tribunal can order the deposit of rent?
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• Mian Umar Ikram-U1-Haque vs Dr. Shahida Hasnain and another2016 SCP 86, 2016 SCMR 2186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-10
  landlord and tenant relationshipinterim rentjurisdictional facteviction applicationagreement to sellleave to contestPunjab Rented Premises Act 2009
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed a pivotal question of law: whether a Rent Tribunal can pass an order for the deposit of interim rent under Section 24 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, when the respondent denies the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. The appellant claimed possession of the property based on an agreement to sell, denying the tenancy agreement cited by the respondent. The High Court had previously held that Section 24 mandates rent deposits regardless of such denial. However, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that the jurisdiction of the Rent Tribunal is contingent upon the 'jurisdictional fact' of a tenancy relationship. The Court ruled that because Section 24 specifically uses the term 'tenant' rather than 'respondent,' an order for rent deposit cannot be issued against a party whose status as a tenant is yet to be determined. The Court further clarified that Section 10 of the Act, which preserves tenancy despite subsequent agreements to sell, only applies where a valid tenancy existed prior to such agreements.

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• Mian Touseef vs District Police Officer, Gujrat and 2 othersK.L.R. 2016 Criminal Cases 137 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-01Read full judgment →
• Mian Saqib Nisar, Ejaz Afzal Khan, Mushir Alam and Manzoor Ahmad Malik Jjyounas Abbas and others vs Additional Sessions Judge, Chakwal and others2016 PLD Supreme Court 581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Justice of Peace powersSection 22-A Cr.P.C.Vires of lawConstitutional validityQuasi-judicial functionsInterference with investigationSeparation of powersNon-registration of criminal caseTransfer of investigationJudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses appeals and petitions challenging the vires and application of Sections 22-A and 25 of the Criminal Procedure Code, particularly Section 22-A(6), which empowers Ex-officio Justices of Peace to issue directions regarding non-registration of criminal cases, transfer of investigation, and police misconduct. The core legal questions revolved around whether these provisions are ultra vires the Constitution, specifically Article 175(3), by conferring executive powers on judicial officers, and if they interfere with police investigation. The Supreme Court held that the functions performed by an Ex-officio Justice of Peace under Section 22-A(6) Cr.P.C. are quasi-judicial, not executive or administrative. The Court further ruled that these provisions are not ultra vires the Constitution, as they facilitate expeditious and inexpensive justice, empower the public, and do not impinge on judicial independence or separation of powers. The Court affirmed that these functions are complementary to police duties and do not amount to undue interference in investigation, provided they are exercised within established judicial parameters. A concurring note emphasized the need for Ex-officio Justices of Peace to ensure prior recourse to the police hierarchy before issuing directions for case registration or investigation transfer to prevent misuse.

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• Mian Rafat Mehmood and 5 others vs Director General, Lahore2016 CLC 408 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-18Read full judgment →
• Mian Nisar Elahi, Appellant did not appear in person and was representedAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →