Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,828 judgments in total.

• Messrs Waqas Woollen Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Gujranwala vs C . I . R. , R. T.O., Gujranwala2015 PTD (Trib.) 2531 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-06-06
  rectification of orderAppellate Tribunal Inland Revenuefabricated evidencetax appealscope of rectificationcompensatory costs
  Summary & questions settled

  This miscellaneous application was filed by the taxpayer seeking rectification of an Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue order that had previously dismissed the taxpayer's appeal. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal's prior order contained a mistake apparent on the face of the record warranting rectification under the relevant tax laws. The taxpayer contended that the Tribunal erred in its factual premise regarding the non-production of purchase receipts. Upon review, the Tribunal found that the purchase receipts presented during the rectification proceedings appeared fabricated, as they were written in the same handwriting and ink despite purportedly originating from various suppliers. The Tribunal held that the scope of rectification is limited to glaring mistakes floating on the surface of the record and does not extend to entertaining new evidence or arguments not previously furnished. Concluding that no such error existed and that the applicant acted in bad faith by attempting to mislead the Bench with manufactured evidence, the Tribunal dismissed the application with compensatory costs, emphasizing that rectification cannot be used to re-litigate matters or introduce fresh evidence.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of the power of rectification exercised by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue?
  • Can a party introduce new evidence or arguments during rectification proceedings that were not presented during the original appeal?
  • Does the presentation of fabricated documents to a tribunal justify the imposition of compensatory costs?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Wajahat Textiles, Faisalabad vs Commissioner Inland Revenue2015 PTD (Trib.) 360 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-02-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Uzma Construction Co. vs Navid H. Malik2015 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-01-05
  ejectment proceedingsdefault in payment of rentsublettingexpired lease agreementvalid tender of rentcross chequesstatutory tenantCantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963corporate personality
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from ejectment proceedings under Section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, filed by the appellant-landlord against the respondent-tenant on grounds of default in rent payment and unauthorized subletting. Both the Rent Controller and the High Court dismissed the ejectment application. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' findings, holding that after the expiry of a written lease agreement, its mutually agreed terms—such as advancing rent payment dates—continue to bind the tenant. The Court determined that submitting uncashed cross-cheques instead of money orders or court deposits does not constitute a valid tender of rent, thereby establishing default. Additionally, the Court ruled that parting with physical possession of the rented premises to independent corporate entities without prior written consent from the landlord constitutes unlawful subletting under Section 17(2)(ii)(a) of the Act of 1963, even if the tenant is a director or shareholder in those companies. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Do the terms of an expired written lease agreement remain binding on a tenant under rent legislation?
  • Does remitting monthly rent via uncashed cross-cheques constitute a valid tender of rent to defeat a charge of default?
  • Does handing over possession of rented premises to a private limited company constitute subletting if the individual tenant is a director or shareholder of that company?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs United Ethanol Limited and 6 otherss vs Environmental2015 CLD 1079 · Environmental Tribunal · 2015-02-04
  environmental approvalinitial environmental examinationtyre pyrolysis plantwaste-to-energyenvironmental protection agencybasel conventiondiscriminatory treatmentremand
  Summary & questions settled

  The present appeals, filed under Section 22 of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, challenge orders passed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) declining the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) reports submitted by the appellants for setting up tyre pyrolysis plants. The core legal questions involved whether the EPA had the jurisdiction to decline an IEE without requiring an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) or adhering to the statutory procedure, and whether external executive directives could override statutory mandates. The Tribunal held that the EPA acted beyond its jurisdiction by issuing a stereotype order declining the IEEs without recording any finding of adverse environmental impact, without applying an independent mind, and by relying on extraneous grounds rather than evaluating the merits under Section 12 of the Act. The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matters back to the EPA for a fresh review of each case on its own merits. The key principles laid down are that the EPA cannot decline an IEE without following the statutory framework of Section 12, that provincial agencies must exercise independent judgment free from extraneous executive dictation, and that similar projects cannot be subjected to discriminatory treatment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Environmental Protection Agency has the legal authority to decline an Initial Environmental Examination report without requiring the submission of an Environmental Impact Assessment?
  • Can the Environmental Protection Agency reject an environmental approval based on external executive directions without applying an independent mind?
  • Does the failure of the Environmental Protection Agency to communicate its decision within the statutory period amount to an automatic deemed approval under Section 12(4) of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act 1997 regardless of statutory compliance?
  • Whether the Environmental Protection Agency can mete out discriminatory treatment to similarly situated projects seeking environmental approval?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs United Ethanol Industries Ltd. vs Messrs JDW Sugar Mills Ltd2015 YLR 1429 · Lahore High Court · 2013-05-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Unique School vs Messrs Unique Group of Institutions2015 CLD 1297 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-18
  trademark infringementpassing offinterim injunctiondisclaimerprior usergoodwilleducational institutionsTrade Marks Ordinance 2001
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an interim injunction order passed by the Additional District Judge restraining the appellant from using the trademark 'Unique' in relation to its educational system pending the main suit. The core legal questions concern whether the holder of a registered trademark containing a disclaimer can claim infringement based on that disclaimed feature, and whether an interim injunction for passing off can be granted without prima facie proof of prior use and goodwill. The Lahore High Court held that a trademark registration subject to a disclaimer does not grant exclusive rights to the disclaimed feature under the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, precluding an infringement action on that basis, and that an action for passing off or prior user requires prima facie documentary evidence of continuous use and reputation, which the respondent failed to provide. The court laid down the principle that the registration of a school name with the Education Department or Board does not confer trademark rights, that a disclaimer defines the boundaries of statutory trademark rights, and that passing off claims require independent prima facie evidence of prior user and goodwill at the interlocutory stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the proprietor of a registered trademark subject to a disclaimer can allege trademark infringement by the use of the disclaimed part of the mark?
  • Can the registration of a school name with the Education Department or a Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education serve as a valid defense or basis in a trademark infringement or passing off action?
  • What is the legal effect of a disclaimer under Section 21 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 on the scope of rights granted by trademark registration?
  • What evidence is required at the interlocutory stage to establish a prima facie case of prior user and goodwill in a passing off action?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Union National Bank Limited through Attorney---Decree Holder vs Iqbal Ahmed Malik---Judgment Debtor2015 PLJ Karachi 367, 2015 CLD 1524 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs U.K. International, through Sole Proprietor vs Trading2015 CLD 89 · Sindh High Court · 2014-04-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs U.I.G. (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director and 6 otherss vs Bank Al-Falah2015 CLD 452 · Sindh High Court · 2014-07-23
  Running Finance Facilityimplied renewalleave to defendbanking suitBankers' Books Evidence Actrecovery of financesrevolving credit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, challenged a Banking Court's decree against the appellants for recovery of funds under a Running Finance Facility. The appellants contended that the facility agreement had expired, the bank's claim involved manipulated figures, the statement of accounts violated the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, and the trial court improperly requested a breakup of accounts post-dismissal of the leave to defend application. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants’ continued operation of the account after the agreement's expiry constituted an implied renewal of the finance facility. The court rejected the argument regarding manipulated figures, clarifying that revolving credit facilities naturally involve fluctuating balances. Furthermore, the court affirmed that the Banking Court possesses the discretion under Section 10(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to request account breakups to ensure a just decree. The judgment reinforces that borrowers must fulfill statutory disclosure obligations under Section 10(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to successfully defend banking suits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the continued operation of a bank account after the expiry of a finance agreement constitute an implied renewal of the facility?
  • Can a Banking Court request a breakup of accounts after dismissing a defendant's leave to defend application?
  • What are the mandatory disclosure obligations of a defendant under Section 10(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, require specific certification for statements of account filed in banking recovery suits?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Travel Waljis (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Commissioner Appeals, Income Tax, Islamabad andothers2015 P.C.T.L.R. 1, 2015 P.C.T.L.R. 710, PTCL 2015 CL.472, 2015 PTD 550, 2015 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-06
  Tax ReferenceRemedial StatuteFinance LeaseRetrospective OperationPending ProceedingsIncome Tax Ordinance 1979Clarificatory Amendment
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax reference concerns the interpretation of Section 12(12) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, specifically whether the proviso added by the Finance Act, 1998, regarding finance leases, is remedial and applicable to pending appeals. The applicant challenged an assessment addition, arguing that the subsequent amendment was curative and should apply to their pending case. The Court held that the proviso is remedial and clarificatory, designed to rectify defects and align the law with legislative intent regarding finance lease assets. It established that while remedial statutes generally operate prospectively, they apply retrospectively to pending proceedings, as an appeal is a continuation of original proceedings. The Court rejected the Department's contention that the assessment had attained finality, ruling that because the appeal was pending when the amendment came into force, the applicant was entitled to the benefit of the proviso. The principle laid down is that remedial enactments, absent explicit legislative intent to the contrary, apply to pending proceedings, provided they do not reopen past and closed transactions or disturb vested rights.

  Questions settled

  • Is a proviso inserted into a fiscal statute remedial or curative in nature?
  • Does a remedial amendment apply to proceedings that are pending at the time of its enactment?
  • Can the benefit of a remedial statutory amendment be extended to an assessee if the assessment order was passed before the amendment but the appeal was pending?
  • Does an appeal constitute a continuation of the original proceedings for the purpose of applying a remedial amendment?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Travel Waljis (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Commissioner Appeals, Income Tax, Islamabad and others2015 PTD 550 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Trans Tech Pakistan through Authorized Officer vs Alternative2015 PLJ Islamabad 458, 2015 YLR 2528 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs T.U. Plastic Industries Ltd., Lahore vs C.I.R., Zone-VII, R.T.O., Lahore2015 PTD (Trib.) 2241 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-12-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Symphony (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Haji Fazal Karim and others2015 CLC 103 · Sindh High Court · 2013-03-12
  rent proceedingsejectmentlandlord and tenant relationshipregistered sale deedconstitutional petitiontitle disputeconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Court, which ordered the ejectment of the petitioner for default in rent payment. The petitioner, a tenant, contested the landlord's title, arguing that the property was sold by an unauthorized individual following the dissolution of the original owning company, thereby rendering the sale fraudulent and the property bona vacantia. The core legal question was whether a Rent Controller possesses the jurisdiction to adjudicate complex title disputes and allegations of fraud regarding a registered sale deed during summary rent proceedings. The Court held that rent proceedings are not the appropriate forum to resolve title disputes or challenges to registered deeds, which must be determined by a civil court. Until a registered sale deed is set aside by a competent court, the purchaser is entitled to collect rent and is recognized as the landlord. Consequently, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings, ruling that the Rent Controller correctly exercised jurisdiction, and dismissed the petition, granting the tenant sixty days to vacate the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller adjudicate upon the validity of a registered sale deed or allegations of fraud in rent proceedings?
  • Does a registered sale deed entitle a purchaser to collect rent from a tenant until the deed is cancelled by a civil court?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against concurrent findings of rent courts where no illegality or misreading of evidence is demonstrated?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Swera Traders vs Customs Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and 42015 LHC 1476, 2015 P.C.T.L.R. 514, 2015 PTD 2202 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-23
  custom referenceshort levymisdeclarationpast and closed transactionsales tax assessmentcustoms dutylimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This custom reference application challenges an order of the Customs Appellate Tribunal upholding the recovery of short-levied duties and taxes on imported sugar. The applicant-assessee imported sugar from India and declared a lower value, omitting the fixed value prescribed for sales tax assessment under S.R.O. 536(I)/2006. Show-cause notices were subsequently issued under sections 16 and 32(1) and (2) of the Customs Act, 1969, alleging misdeclaration and collusion to evade tax. The core legal questions revolved around whether section 32 could be invoked after goods were cleared ("out of charge"), whether a past and closed transaction was established, and whether short-levied tax could be recovered if passed on to the ultimate consumer. The Lahore High Court held that section 32(2) permits the issuance of show-cause notices within a five-year limitation period, and cleared goods do not automatically constitute a past and closed transaction before the expiry of such limitation. The Court further held that recovery cannot be defeated simply because the incidence of tax was passed on to consumers, and confirmed that misdeclaration and collusion attracted the mischief of section 32(2). The reference application was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969 can be invoked for recovery of short-levied duty and taxes after the imported goods have been cleared and released out of charge?
  • At what point does a customs transaction become a past and closed transaction so as to bar the reopening of assessment?
  • Whether short-levied taxes can be lawfully recovered from an importer under section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969 if the economic burden or incidence of taxation has already been passed on to the ultimate consumer?
  • Whether the intentional omission of a fixed statutory valuation prescribed by a statutory notification on a Goods Declaration constitutes misdeclaration and collusion sufficient to attract section 32(2) of the Customs Act, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Summit Bank Limited through Manager vs Messrs Qasim and Co.through Muhammad Alam and anothers2015 SCMR 1341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-07
  banker's lienright of set-offmutuality of claimbanking court jurisdictionrecovery suitlegal representativesunadjudicated liability
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant-bank challenged a High Court judgment that allowed the respondents' recovery suit against the bank. The dispute arose when the bank unilaterally deducted funds from an account held by the respondents (legal representatives of a deceased debtor) to satisfy an alleged liability of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the bank could exercise a right of lien or set-off against the respondents' account for the deceased's unadjudicated debt, and whether the Banking Court had exclusive jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the bank's action was unlawful. The Court established that a banker’s lien or right of set-off requires strict mutuality of claim; it cannot be exercised against funds belonging to third parties for a deceased's debt without prior judicial determination of the liability and the extent of the inherited estate. Additionally, the Court ruled that the Banking Court lacks jurisdiction where the dispute does not involve a "finance" relationship between the bank and the specific account holders. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the respondents' right to recover the misappropriated funds.

  Questions settled

  • Can a bank exercise a right of lien or set-off against an account held by legal representatives to recover the unadjudicated debt of a deceased person?
  • Does the Banking Court have exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute where the account holders are not the primary borrowers or parties to a finance agreement?
  • Is a banker's right of set-off permissible when the liability of the deceased debtor has not been quantified or judicially determined?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Summit Bank Limited through Manager vs Messrs Qasim and Co2015 PLJ SC 807, 2015 SCMR 1341, 2015 CLD 1377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-07
  banker's lienright of set-offmutuality of claimBanking Court jurisdictionunauthorized deductionlegal heirsrecovery suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment regarding the unauthorized deduction of funds by a bank from a customer's account to satisfy an alleged liability of the account holder's deceased father. The core legal questions were whether a bank can exercise a right of lien or set-off under Section 171 of the Contract Act 1872 against an account held by legal heirs to satisfy an unquantified, unadjudicated liability of a deceased person, and whether such a dispute falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of a Banking Court. The Supreme Court held that the bank's action was unlawful. The Court ruled that a banker's lien requires mutuality of claim; since the account belonged to the respondents and not the deceased, and the alleged liability was neither determined nor quantified by a competent judicial forum, the bank could not unilaterally appropriate the funds. The Court affirmed that a bank cannot exercise judicial powers to determine liability, and the Banking Court lacks jurisdiction over disputes where no 'finance' relationship exists between the bank and the account holders.

  Questions settled

  • Can a bank exercise a right of lien or set-off against an account held by legal heirs to satisfy an unadjudicated liability of a deceased account holder?
  • Is a banker's right of set-off under Section 171 of the Contract Act 1872 available where the debt is not a sum certain and has not been determined by a competent judicial forum?
  • Does a Banking Court have exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute where the account holder is not a party to the finance agreement and no 'finance' relationship exists between the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. through General Manager and anothers vs Arbabnajeebullah2015 PLD Balochistan 110 · Balochistan High Court · 2015-02-27Read full judgment →
• Messrs Stylo Shoes, Lahore vs C.I.R. Zone-X, R.T.0.-II, Lahore2015 PTD (Trib.) 2172 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-12-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Star Impex, Karachi vs Deputy Collector of Customs and another2015 PTD (Trib.) 2584 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-04-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs SRS Impex vs Superintendent Directorate General of Intelligence and 2 others2015 PTD (Trib.) 1469 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2014-11-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Spinzer Travels (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director vs Pakistan2015 YLR 344 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-09-18Read full judgment →
• Messrs Soor Ghar Traders vs Additional Collector (Adjudication-II)2015 PTD (Trib.) 1563 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2014-12-09
  customs valuationmis-declarationunder-invoicingredemption finemens reagoods declarationcustoms appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by Messrs Soor Ghar Traders against an Order-in-Original passed by the Additional Collector of Customs (Adjudication-II), Karachi, which confiscated the appellant's imported consignment of PVC Coated Fabric and imposed a redemption fine and penalty due to alleged misdeclaration of the unit of measurement and value under the Customs Act 1969. The core legal questions involved whether the differential between declared and ascertained values attracted penal action under S.R.O. 499(1)/2009, whether Section 32 of the Customs Act 1969 could be invoked without proving mens rea, and whether the redemption fine was lawfully imposed. The Customs Appellate Tribunal held that the difference between the declared and ascertained value was below the 30% threshold required for penal action under the relevant notification, that mens rea and guilty intention are essential prerequisites for invoking Section 32, and that the adjudicating officer acted without proper application of mind. The Tribunal modified the impugned order, setting aside the redemption fine and penalty while holding the importer liable only for additional duty and taxes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether penal action under Section 32 of the Customs Act 1969 can be invoked without establishing mens rea or a guilty intention on the part of the importer?
  • Does a value difference of less than thirty percent between the declared and ascertained value fall outside the penal purview of S.R.O. 499(1)/2009?
  • Whether the redemption fine under Section 181 of the Customs Act 1969 must be calculated with reference to the duty and taxes evaded rather than the total value of the entire consignment?
  • Can transaction value be routinely discarded or enhanced without supporting evidence and ninety-day computerized clearance data?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Skyword (Pvt.) Ltd. through General Manager vs Salahuddin and 9 others2015 PTD 604 · Sindh High Court · 2014-11-20
  temporary injunctionstolen propertyprima facie caseirreparable lossmining leaseexport of goodsbalance of convenience
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for a temporary injunction filed by the plaintiff, a mining company, seeking to restrain the defendants from exporting marble allegedly stolen from the plaintiff's quarries in District Chagai, Balochistan. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case for an injunction to prevent the export of goods claimed as stolen property, which were the subject of a pending criminal investigation (FIR No. 39/2012). The court held that the plaintiff successfully demonstrated a prima facie case, noting that the marble blocks in question bore the plaintiff's specific identification mark ('SSZ'). The court reasoned that allowing the export of the disputed goods would cause the plaintiff irreparable loss and damage to its reputation, particularly given the plaintiff's exclusive mining rights. Consequently, the court confirmed the interim injunction, restraining the defendants from exporting the containers. The key principle laid down is that where a plaintiff establishes a prima facie claim of ownership over stolen property, the court may grant an injunction to prevent its disposal or export, thereby preserving the status quo pending the final adjudication of title.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant an injunction to restrain the export of goods that are the subject matter of a pending criminal investigation regarding theft?
  • Does a buyer acquire valid title to goods sold by a person who is not the owner and lacks authority to sell?
  • What are the criteria for granting a temporary injunction in a suit involving disputed ownership of movable property?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Singer Pakistan Ltd. through Director Personal and Administration2015 MLD 267 · Balochistan High Court · 2014-06-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Siddiq Traders vs Deputy Collector Customs Appraisement-IV, Customs House, Karachi and 2 others2015 PTD 134 · Sindh High Court · 2014-10-03Read full judgment →
• Messrs Shield Corporation Ltd vs Dalda Foods (Pvt) Ltd2015 CLD 528 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Shell Pakistan Ltd. through Attorney vs Ivth Additional District2015 YLR 647 · Sindh High Court · 2014-01-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Shahid Hanif Poultry through Proprietor vs Messrs K&N's Poultry2015 CLD 1889, 2015 CLC 1766 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-28
  recovery suitlimitation perioddishonoured chequeconcurrent findingssecond appealpartnership firm
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts decreeing the respondent's suit for the recovery of money based on the supply of poultry products on credit. The core legal questions involved whether the suit was barred by limitation and whether the concurrent findings of fact suffered from any misreading, non-reading, or error of law. The Sindh High Court held that the issuance of a cheque and part-payment within the limitation period extended the period of limitation, and the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts were based on sound and cogent evidence without any legal infirmity. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact recorded by courts below in a second appeal will not be interfered with unless shown to be contrary to law, vitiated by misreading or non-reading of evidence, or involving a substantial procedural defect under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the issuance of a cheque as part payment extends the period of limitation for filing a recovery suit?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without showing a substantial error or defect in procedure?
  • Is a board resolution required for a partnership firm to file a suit for recovery?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Shaheen Chemist Shop, Rawalpindi vs C.I.R., R.T.O., Rawalpindi2015 PTD (Trib.) 1425 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2011-06-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Shahbaz Chemicals (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Commissioner Inland Revenue2015 PTD (Trib.) 520 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-03-31
  composite audittax audit selectionex parte assessmentdelegation of powersultra viresincome tax auditsales tax audit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the legality of a composite audit selection process initiated by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). The appellant, a private limited company, challenged the assessment order passed ex parte, arguing that the selection of its case for audit under Section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was illegal because it was part of a 'composite audit'—a combined selection for income tax, sales tax, and federal excise duty under a single ballot. The appellant contended that the law does not authorize such composite audits and that the selection was made by an unauthorized subordinate authority rather than the Board itself. The Appellate Tribunal, relying on precedents from the Sindh and Lahore High Courts, held that the concept of a 'composite audit' is not supported by the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, or the Sales Tax Act, 1990, as each statute operates independently with distinct audit provisions. Consequently, the Tribunal ruled that the combined selection was unlawful and void ab initio, setting aside the orders of the lower authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Is a 'composite audit' involving both income tax and sales tax legally permissible under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Does the Federal Board of Revenue have the legal authority to conduct a combined audit selection for income tax, sales tax, and federal excise duty under a single ballot?
  • Can an assessment order based on an unlawful audit selection be sustained in law?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Shah Nawaz Khan and Sons vs Government of N.-W.F.P. and others2015 KLR Supreme Court Cases 88, 2015 PLJ SC 736, 2015 P.S.C. 1021, 2015 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-17
  remand of caseframing of issuesOrder XIV Rule 1 CPCRegular First Appeallocus standiexpeditious justicetrial court duty
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the High Court's judgment remanding a regular first appeal (R.F.A.) back to the trial court for a third round of litigation. The High Court had remanded the matter on the ground that the trial court failed to frame a specific issue under Order XIV, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding facts denied by the department. The Supreme Court observed that the controversy was sufficiently covered under the existing issue regarding locus standi, both parties fully understood their respective stances as pleaded, and complete evidence had been led on the record. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had all requisite material before it to decide the appeal itself. The Supreme Court set aside the remand order and directed the High Court to decide the R.F.A. on merits, reiterating that remand must only be ordered when strictly necessary, to prevent unnecessary delays and uphold the constitutional mandate for inexpensive and expeditious justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is justified in remanding a case for framing a new issue when the existing issues and evidence adequately encompass the controversy?
  • Under what circumstances should an appellate court resort to remanding a case to the trial court?
  • Does the absence of a specific issue warrant a remand if both parties were fully aware of their respective pleadings and led relevant evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Shafiq Supreme Rice Industries (Pvt.) Limited through Chief2015 CLD 1211 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-10
  banking courtmaintainability of suitrejection of plaintfinancial institutioncustomer suitbreach of contractdamagesstatement of accounts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves multiple suits filed by customers against financial institutions on various grounds such as recovery of damages, cancellation of documents, declaration, rendition of accounts, redemption, and permanent injunction under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The core legal questions relate to the maintainability of such suits, the mandatory requirements of plaints under section 9 of the Ordinance, whether the court can exercise powers under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 at any stage irrespective of proceedings under section 10, and whether remote or indirect damages or tortuous claims can be agitated before a Banking Court. The Lahore High Court held that the power of the court to reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with section 7(2) of the Ordinance precedes and prevails over the obligations under section 10(8) and can be exercised at any stage. The court held that a customer's suit must arise strictly out of a finance facility and a breach of contractual obligation, must contain details of the agreement and the specific default, and must be supported by a statement of accounts. The court further held that tortuous claims and remote or indirect damages cannot be claimed in a Banking Court, and consequently dismissed the suits for failing to meet these statutory requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the power of a Banking Court to reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 precedes and prevails over the procedure under section 10(8) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a customer maintain a suit for damages against a financial institution in a Banking Court based on tortuous claims or remote and indirect losses?
  • Is it mandatory for a customer filing a suit under section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to support the plaint with a statement of accounts or precise breakdown of accounts?
  • Whether a Banking Court can reject a plaint in part by striking out claims that fall outside its jurisdictional ambit?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Saudi Arabian Airlines vs Messrs International Marketing2015 CLC 916 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-22
  execution proceedingsauction salesale proclamationmaterial irregularityreserve pricefraud and misrepresentationjudgment debtorcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns execution proceedings where the judgment debtor challenged an auction sale of property. The core legal question was whether an auction sale conducted during court vacations, without notice to the judgment debtor and without settling the terms of the sale proclamation as required by law, is valid. The Court held that the auction sale was void ab initio, setting it aside due to material irregularities and fraud. The Court established that the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 66, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 are mandatory; failure to issue notice to the judgment debtor for settling the terms of the sale proclamation vitiates the proceedings. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the judiciary must ensure transparency and fair market value in auction sales, noting that the absence of a reserve price allows for predatory practices. It was also clarified that the proviso to Order XXI, Rule 90, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, requiring a deposit, does not prevent the Court from setting aside a sale where fraud and material irregularities are clearly established on the record.

  Questions settled

  • Is the issuance of a notice to the judgment debtor under Order XXI, Rule 66, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mandatory for a valid auction sale?
  • Can an auction sale be set aside on the grounds of material irregularity and fraud even if the judgment debtor did not file objections within the statutory limitation period?
  • Does the failure to fix a reserve price in a court-conducted auction sale render the sale invalid?
  • Does the proviso to Order XXI, Rule 90, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, requiring a deposit, bar the court from setting aside a sale where fraud is apparent?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Saqib Star Quality Printers, Faisalabad vs C.I.R., Zone-III, R.T.O2015 P.C.T.L.R. 788, 2015 PTD (Trib.) 663 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-05-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Saqib Star Quality Printers, Faisalabad vs C.I.R., Zone-III, R.T.O., Faisalabad2015 P.C.T.L.R. 788 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-05-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Safe Life (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary_Chairman and 4 others2015.PTD 1555 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Misal Khan and others vs Azam Khan and others2015 YLR 1224 · Peshawar High Court · 2013-12-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sadiq Vegetable Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore vs C.I.T._R, Ltu., Lahore2015 PTD (Trib.) 1306 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-10-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs S.M. Nisar and Company through Partner and 4 otherss vs Banking Court-III, Multan Camp at Sahiwal and 5 others2015 CLD 1843 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-03
  Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001auction of mortgaged propertysealed tendersexecution proceedingsbanking courtdecree holderobjection petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Banking Court dismissing the appellants' objections to the auction of their mortgaged properties. The respondent bank, having obtained a decree, initiated execution proceedings and sought permission to sell mortgaged assets without court intervention under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether the bank’s auction process, conducted via sealed tenders, complied with statutory requirements and whether the appellants were entitled to notice prior to the sale. The Lahore High Court held that the bank strictly adhered to the procedural requirements of Section 19(3) and (4) of the Ordinance, 2001, including proper advertisement and transparency. The Court ruled that objections based on Order XXI, Rule 66, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, were inapplicable because the bank opted for sealed tenders rather than public auction. The judgment affirms that financial institutions possess the statutory authority to sell mortgaged assets without court intervention provided they follow the specific procedures prescribed by the Ordinance, 2001, and that procedural objections raised after the sale are invalid if the process was fair and transparent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the procedure for public auction under Order XXI, Rule 66, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to the sale of mortgaged property by a financial institution through sealed tenders?
  • Can a financial institution sell mortgaged property without the intervention of the Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • What are the mandatory requirements for a financial institution when selling mortgaged property by inviting sealed tenders under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs S. Z. Securities (Private)Limited: In the matter of vs Not2015 CLD 927 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2014-06-26
  securities brokerunauthorized share transferdisciplinary proceedingsCentral Depositories Actbrokerage chargesinvestor protectionSECPcode of conduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan against a Trading Right Entitlement Certificate holder for alleged unauthorized transfer of a client's shares to its House Account and the imposition of unjustified service charges. The core legal questions were whether the broker violated the Central Depositories Act, 1997, by handling securities without authorization and whether it breached the code of conduct under the Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001. The Commission held that the broker failed to provide valid authority for moving the client's shares, thereby violating Section 24 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997, which prohibits handling book-entry securities without the holder's consent. Furthermore, the broker failed to maintain required standards of integrity and fairness. Consequently, the Commission imposed a penalty of Rs. 25,000 on the respondent. The judgment establishes that brokers are strictly prohibited from transferring or retaining client shares in their House Accounts without explicit prior authorization and must adhere to transparent, documented charging schedules to satisfy professional conduct obligations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a securities broker transfer a client's shares to its House Account without explicit prior authorization?
  • Does the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan have the authority to exercise powers previously delegated to the Corporate Law Authority?
  • Is a broker required to maintain a transparent schedule of charges to justify fees imposed on a client's sub-account?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs S. Z. Securities (Private) Limited: In the matter of vs Not2015 CLD 927 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2014-06-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Rupali Polyster Ltd., through Manager vs The State2015 YLR 1475 · Board of Revenue · 2014-09-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Reckitt Benckiser Pakistan Limited for Deceptive Marketing Practices: In the matter of vs Not2015 CLD 1864 · Competition Commission of Pakistan · 2015-08-11
  deceptive marketing practicesCompetition Act 2010consumer protectioncomparative advertisingreasonable basismisleading informationCompetition Commission of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns proceedings initiated by the Competition Commission of Pakistan against Messrs Reckitt Benckiser Pakistan Limited regarding alleged deceptive marketing practices in its televised marketing campaign and product packaging for 'Dettol Surface Cleaner.' The core legal question was whether the Respondent’s efficacy claims—specifically comparing its product to 'Phenyl' and asserting it kills '99.9% of germs'—violated the prohibition against deceptive marketing practices under the Competition Act, 2010. The Commission held that the claims were misleading and lacked a reasonable basis, thereby violating Section 10 of the Act. It determined that using the term 'germs' was inaccurate because the product was only tested against specific bacteria, not viruses or fungi. Furthermore, the comparative claims against 'Phenyl' were unsubstantiated. The Commission established the principle that for marketing claims to be valid, they must have a 'reasonable basis' substantiated by evidence prior to publication. It further clarified that deceptive marketing practices do not require proof of actual harm to competitors; the potential to harm business interests is sufficient. The Respondent was ordered to rectify its marketing claims and pay a penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Does a claim of deceptive marketing require proof of actual harm to competitors to constitute a violation of the Competition Act, 2010?
  • What constitutes a 'reasonable basis' for efficacy claims made in product advertisements?
  • Is the use of the term 'germs' in marketing materials misleading if the product has only been tested against specific bacteria?
  • Does the distribution of false or misleading information regarding a product's quality violate the Competition Act, 2010?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Rasheed CNG Station through Proprietor vs Federation of Pakistan and 6 othersK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 80, 2015 CLC 945 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-15
  Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Ordinancerepeal of ordinancefunctus officioGas Utility Courtstemporary statuteconstitutional interpretationlegislative power
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions challenged the vires of the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Ordinance, 2014, and the jurisdiction of the Gas Utility Courts established thereunder. The core legal question was whether the Ordinance remained valid law after the expiry of the constitutional period for its promulgation without being enacted as an Act of Parliament. The Court held that the Ordinance, 2014, stood repealed by the efflux of time under Article 89 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, as it was not enacted into an Act of Parliament within the prescribed period. Consequently, the Gas Utility Courts established under the Ordinance became functus officio. The key principle laid down is that an Ordinance is a temporary legislative measure that ceases to operate upon the expiration of the constitutional time limit if not approved or enacted by the legislature. Upon such repeal, the special courts created by the Ordinance lose their legal authority, and pending matters must be transferred to courts of plenary jurisdiction to ensure the continuity of judicial proceedings and prevent a failure of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Ordinance promulgated under Article 89 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, remain valid if not enacted as an Act of Parliament within the prescribed time limit?
  • What is the legal status of special courts established under an Ordinance once that Ordinance has been repealed by the efflux of time?
  • How should pending cases be handled when the special court adjudicating them becomes functus officio due to the repeal of the enabling statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Rafique Enterprises through Proprietor vs Federation of Pakistan2015 PTD 2654 · Lahore High Court · 2013-09-13Read full judgment →
• Messrs Qadir Fabrics through Managing Partner vs The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division_Chairman Federal Board of Revenue and 3 others2015 P Cr. L J 1795 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-06
  post-arrest bailconstitutional jurisdictionsales tax fraudpost-dated chequeswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners approached the High Court through constitutional petitions seeking the return of post-dated cheques submitted by them to secure post-arrest bail before the Special Judge Customs and Taxation in connection with an FIR registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, could order the return of cheques voluntarily submitted by the accused persons for obtaining bail, and whether such recovery was unlawful. The court held that since the cheques were submitted voluntarily to obtain bail without any contemporaneous objection or challenge to the bail-granting order itself, the petitions were misconceived and unjustified. Furthermore, any dispute regarding sales tax liability must be resolved before the forums provided under the relevant statute. The key principle laid down is that an accused who voluntarily furnishes post-dated cheques to secure bail cannot subsequently invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to reclaim those cheques without challenging the underlying bail order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can order the return of post-dated cheques submitted voluntarily by an accused to secure post-arrest bail under its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can an accused challenge the submission of cheques used for obtaining bail without challenging the bail-granting order itself?
  • Whether disputes regarding tax liability and short payment under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 should be determined by forums provided under the statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Punjab Oil Mills Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and others2015 PTD 1219 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-24Read full judgment →
• Messrs PT. Synergy Oil Nusantara through Duly Constituted Attorney, Karachi vs Messrs Evergreen Marine Corporation (Taiwan) Ltd., and 5 others2015 PTD 279 · Sindh High Court · 2014-04-22Read full judgment →
• Messrs Progressive Learning (Pvt.) Ltd., Faisalabad vs C.I.R. (Appeals)2015 PTD (Trib.) 452 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-03-14
  delayed tax refundcompensation receiptrevenue receiptretrospective applicationcharging provisionincome from other sourcestax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the taxability of compensation received by a taxpayer for the delayed issuance of income tax refunds. The core legal question was whether such compensation constitutes a revenue receipt assessable under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and specifically whether the addition of such amounts under Section 39(1)(cc) of the Ordinance could be applied retrospectively to the tax years 2009 and 2010. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue held that while compensation for delayed refunds is generally revenue in nature and akin to interest, the specific charging provision under Section 39(1)(cc) was introduced via the Finance Act, 2012. Consequently, the Tribunal ruled that this provision cannot be applied retrospectively to the tax years 2009 and 2010. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities, concluding that the assessing authority was not justified in charging tax under that specific provision for the years in question.

  Questions settled

  • Is compensation received for the delayed issuance of income tax refunds considered a revenue receipt?
  • Can the charging provision under Section 39(1)(cc) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 be applied retrospectively to tax years prior to its enactment?
  • Does compensation for delayed refunds constitute income from other sources under the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Premier Financial Services (Pvt) Ltd and anothers vs Securities2015 CLD 1852 · Sindh High Court · 2015-07-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Peshawar Electric Supply Company, WAPDA House, Peshawar vs C.I.R., R.T.O., Peshawar2015 PTD (Trib.) 1112 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-06-02
  sales taxinput tax adjustmentlimitation periodpecuniary jurisdictionT&D lossesadjudication proceedingstaxable supplyvoid ab initio
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves five consolidated appeals and a miscellaneous application concerning sales tax disputes between Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO) and the Inland Revenue Department. The core legal questions concern the jurisdiction of tax officers to issue show-cause notices without proper notification under Section 30 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990; the mandatory nature of limitation periods for adjudication; the admissibility of input tax adjustments for Transmission and Distribution (T&D) losses; and the taxability of government subsidies and supplies to PATA. The Appellate Tribunal held that the failure to issue a notification in the official gazette appointing officers under Section 30 rendered the proceedings void. Furthermore, the Tribunal affirmed that limitation periods for tax adjudication are mandatory and cannot be extended after expiry. On merits, the Tribunal ruled that input tax adjustments for T&D losses are admissible, as are adjustments for government-funded projects, as these do not constitute taxable supplies. The Tribunal emphasized that substantive rights of taxpayers cannot be defeated by procedural technicalities or administrative lapses, and that tax liability cannot be created based on conjectures.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period of limitation for adjudication under Sections 11 and 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is mandatory or directory?
  • Can an Inland Revenue officer exercise jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 without a notification published in the official gazette?
  • Is input tax adjustment admissible for Transmission and Distribution (T&D) losses incurred by electric distribution companies?
  • Does the expiry of the statutory limitation period for adjudication create a vested right for the taxpayer that cannot be revived by subsequent extensions?
  • Are government subsidies provided to power distribution companies subject to sales tax?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pervaiz & Co.through Proprietor and otherss vs National Bank of PAKISTANthrough Attorney2015 CLD 972 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-02
  banking appealoffice objectionsdelay in refilingcontumacious conductlimitation periodspecial law
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal assailed the judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court. The primary legal question revolved around the consequences of a highly delayed refiling of an appeal after removing office objections, and whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to banking matters governed by a special law. The Lahore High Court held that although the appeal was originally filed within the period of limitation, the subsequent delay of over three years in removing office objections and refiling the appeal constituted a contumacious act by the appellants, disentitling them to any leniency or condonation of delay. The court laid down the principle that while a litigant may challenge office objections by requesting the court to determine their validity, sitting on the file for years without removing objections or seeking judicial determination is inexcusable. Furthermore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is not applicable to banking matters governed by the special provisions of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is applicable for condonation of delay in banking matters governed by a special law?
  • What are the available options for a litigant when the office raises objections on a filed petition or appeal?
  • Does a delay of over three years in refiling an appeal after removing office objections amount to a contumacious act warranting dismissal?
  • Can a litigant unilaterally decide that office objections are frivolous without seeking a determination from the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pearl Fabrics Corporation through Partner and 3 otherss vs Messrs Kasb Bank Limited and another2015 CLD 243 · Sindh High Court · 2014-10-22
  Banking Court executionFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001Section 12(2) CPCExecution of decreeConsent decreeProcedural technicalities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, filed by judgment debtors challenging orders passed by a Banking Court in execution proceedings. The core legal question was whether the Banking Court, while executing a decree under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, is strictly bound by the procedural constraints of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, specifically regarding the withdrawal of execution applications. The Court held that the Banking Court's authority to execute decrees is derived from Section 19(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, which grants it wide, overriding powers to adopt any appropriate manner for recovery to ensure expeditious results. The Court ruled that the procedural limitations of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 do not curtail the Banking Court's statutory mandate. The key principle laid down is that the Banking Court is not subservient to the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and its execution powers under the special law cannot be defeated by technical procedural objections.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Banking Court's power to execute a decree under Section 19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 override the procedural constraints of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a separate execution application required for the Banking Court to execute its own decree under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
  • Can a Banking Court allow the withdrawal of an execution application and the filing of a fresh one despite the restrictions in Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the filing of an execution application under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 subject the Banking Court's execution proceedings to all procedural limitations of the Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Paul Leather Industries, Lahore vs C.I.R., Zone-X, R.T.G., Lahore2015 PTD (Trib.) 1438 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-11-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pangrio Sugar Mills Ltd vs Bankers Equity Ltd and 5 others2015 CLD 637 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-04
  limitation periodcondonation of delayconsent decreeexecution proceedingssufficient causebanking litigationrecovery of finances
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order dismissing a review application regarding a consent decree in a recovery suit. The appellant, a sugar mill, had defaulted on finance facilities, leading to a consent decree for the settlement of liabilities. Following the appellant's failure to adhere to the payment schedule, the respondent bank initiated execution proceedings. The appellant filed a review application against an order directing the deposit of the decretal amount, which was dismissed. The appellant subsequently filed the instant appeal, claiming the order was not passed on the date stated and seeking condonation of delay under the Limitation Act. The Court held that the date of the order is the date of its announcement in open court, regardless of when the file is processed or when the party obtains a copy. The Court found no "sufficient cause" for the delay, noting that the appellant failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining a certified copy. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and the appeal as time-barred, emphasizing that limitation periods are strict and discretionary relief requires a satisfactory explanation for every day of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for filing an appeal commence from the date of the court's oral announcement of an order or from the date the order is physically available?
  • Is the period of limitation for an appeal dependent on the date a party obtains a certified copy of the order?
  • Can a court exercise discretion to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, without the appellant demonstrating sufficient cause for every day of the delay?
  • Does the mere administrative act of a court reader sending a file to the office indicate the date an order was passed?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority through Director vs The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and 8 others2015 PTD 2561 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. vs C.I.R., L.T.U., Islamabad2015 PTD (Trib.) 1370 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-03-05Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. through duly2015 PTD 2072 · Sindh High Court · 2015-03-11
  constitutional petitionsales tax on servicesinternational incoming callsexhaustion of remediesshow-cause noticetax assessmentmaintainabilitySindh Sales Tax on Services Act 2011
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, various telecommunication companies, challenged the Sindh Revenue Board’s (SRB) move to levy sales tax on revenue generated from international incoming calls following the withdrawal of a prior exemption. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to declare such revenue non-taxable, or to restrain the SRB from proceeding, when only show-cause notices had been issued. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petitions as premature and not maintainable. The Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error or patent illegality that would justify bypassing statutory forums. The ratio established is that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to pre-empt tax authorities from performing their statutory duties of assessment. The Court affirmed that taxpayers must exhaust available statutory remedies—including responding to show-cause notices and pursuing administrative appeals—before seeking judicial intervention. Consequently, the Court declined to adjudicate the taxability of the revenue, leaving the matter to be determined by the relevant tax authorities in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained against a show-cause notice issued by a tax authority where no final adverse order has been passed?
  • Is the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 available to bypass statutory appeal forums in tax matters?
  • Does the issuance of a show-cause notice by a tax authority constitute a cause of action sufficient to invoke the court's writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd., Karachi vs Collector of Customs, Excise and Sales Tax and another2015 PTD (Trib.) 2146 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2014-08-04
  Petroleum Development Levytax evasiontax avoidancecustoms dutywarehousingPakistan Navycolourable deviceCustoms Act 1969
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two customs appeals filed by Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd. challenging the demand for Petroleum Development Levy (PDL) on High Speed Diesel Oil supplied to the Pakistan Navy. The core legal question was whether these supplies qualified for exemption as "exports" or "provisions/stores" under the Customs Act, 1969, or if they constituted local sales subject to PDL. The Tribunal held that the supplies were domestic sales, as the appellant failed to provide evidence of export or compliance with the relevant warehousing provisions. The Tribunal determined that the appellant’s attempt to claim exemption through "colourable devices" and misclassification constituted tax evasion rather than legitimate tax avoidance. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the original order demanding the unpaid levy and the imposition of penalties. The judgment establishes that tax avoidance through deceitful contrivances or illegal manipulation is impermissible, and that the limitation period for recovery in cases of deliberate evasion under Section 32(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, differs from cases of mere inadvertence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the supply of petroleum products to the Pakistan Navy constitute an 'export' or 'provisions/stores' exempt from Petroleum Development Levy under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • What is the legal distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion in the context of customs duty and levy payments?
  • Does the limitation period for recovery of unpaid levies under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969, differ between cases of deliberate evasion and cases of inadvertent error?
  • Can a taxpayer claim exemption from duties based on a 'colourable device' or misclassification of goods?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. through Deputy Chief Commercial vs Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue and 2 others2015 PTD 2168 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-21
  amendment of assessmentincome taxshow-cause noticeconstitutional petitionalternative remedychange of opinionjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Sindh High Court impugning a show-cause notice issued under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for the tax year 2014 by the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and change of opinion. The core legal questions involved were whether a show-cause notice for amendment of assessment under Section 122(5A) amounts to a change of opinion when previous proceedings have been concluded, and whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against a mere show-cause notice bypassing the departmental remedies. The Court held that the impugned notice did not suffer from any jurisdictional defect or mala fide, that fresh legal controversies were raised avoiding any change of opinion, and that bypassing the statutory hierarchy of forums was impermissible. The petition was accordingly dismissed in limine, establishing that taxpayers must exhaust departmental remedies against show-cause notices unless patent illegality or jurisdictional defect is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a show-cause notice under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, after a previous amendment amount to a change of opinion?
  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan maintainable against a mere show-cause notice issued by a tax authority?
  • Must a taxpayer exhaust the departmental hierarchy of forums provided under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, before approaching the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pak Suzuki Motor Company Limited, Karachi vs Collector of Customs, Appraisement Collectorate, Custom House, Karachi2015 PTD 2600 · Sindh High Court · 2014-10-28
  customs dutydeletion programmeCKD kitsreference jurisdictionquestion of law vs factconcurrent findingsimport excess
  Summary & questions settled

  This Special Customs Appeal challenged an order of the Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, which upheld the Collector of Customs' decision to demand additional duty on excess quantities of Conn-Rod and Crankshaft Bearings imported by the appellant. The appellant argued that these bearings, imported as part of CKD kits, were necessary for matching dimensions and tolerances, claiming they formed part of the approved deletion programme. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal's finding, which rejected the appellant's justification for the excess imports and confirmed the liability for additional duty, involved a substantial question of law or merely a dispute of fact. The Court held that the appeal raised no question of law, as the Tribunal's decision was based on concurrent findings of fact regarding the unauthorized excess quantity of imports. The Court affirmed that under its reference jurisdiction, it cannot interfere with factual determinations unless they are perverse or erroneous. The key principle laid down is that the High Court, when exercising jurisdiction under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969, is restricted to examining substantial questions of law and cannot re-examine disputed questions of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court re-examine disputed questions of fact under its reference jurisdiction pursuant to Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does a challenge to the factual findings of the Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal regarding excess imports constitute a substantial question of law?
  • Is an importer entitled to import quantities of components exceeding the approved deletion programme without paying additional customs duty?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs One 2 One Solutionz (Pvt) Ltd vs The Postmaster General2015 CLD 1754 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-05-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs O.S. Corporation through Proprietor vs Federation of PakistanPTCL 2015 CL.510, 2015 PTD 560 · Lahore High Court · 2014-04-03
  Customs dutydetention of goodsimport clearancelaboratory testingclassification disputeSection 186 Customs Actrelease of consignment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the detention of 13 containers of electrical silicon steel sheets by Customs authorities at the exit gate after the goods had been examined, assessed, and cleared for release upon payment of duties and taxes. Despite two independent laboratory reports from the Pakistan Standard and Quality Control Authority and Peoples Steel Mills Ltd confirming the goods matched the declaration, the respondents detained the consignment for a third round of testing based on a 'hunch' and a report concerning a different importer's consignment. The respondents invoked Section 186 of the Customs Act, 1969, to justify the detention. The Court held that detaining goods at the exit gate after formal release and payment of taxes, without any pending adjudicatory process or evidence of fraud, is contrary to the Act. The Court found Section 186 inapplicable as no penalty was under consideration. The petition was allowed, directing the immediate release of the goods while noting that the department could proceed with investigations using already retained samples in accordance with due process.

  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nishat (Chunian) Ltd., Lahore vs C.I.R., Zone-II, Ltu, Lahore2015 PTD (Trib.) 2516 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-05-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nishat (Chunian) Ltd. through Chief Financial Officer vs Federal2015 LHC 1190, 2015 PTD 1385 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-12
  Intra Court Appealmaintainabilityshow-cause noticeoriginal ordertax proceedingsconstitutional petitionstatutory appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This batch of Intra Court Appeals challenges a consolidated order passed by a learned Single Judge regarding constitutional petitions filed against show-cause notices issued under sections 161 and 205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of Intra Court Appeals under section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, where constitutional petitions arise from proceedings in which the underlying law provides for an appeal against the original order. The Lahore High Court held that the Intra Court Appeals are not competent, ruling that the show-cause notices constitute steps in proceedings that ultimately culminate in an appealable original order before the Commissioner (Appeals) under section 127 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Consequently, the bar contained in the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 is attracted, barring intra-court appeals against orders passed in constitutional petitions arising from such proceedings. The key principle laid down is that interlocutory steps or notices initiating tax proceedings cannot be used to circumvent statutory hierarchies and remedies when the eventual original order is appealable under the governing statute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Intra Court Appeal is maintainable against an order passed in a constitutional petition challenging show-cause notices issued under sections 161 and 205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • What is the scope and applicability of the proviso to subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 regarding proceedings that lead to an original order?
  • Do proceedings initiated by show-cause notices qualify as proceedings that attract the bar against Intra Court Appeals under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
  • Does the availability of an appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) under section 127 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 bar an Intra Court Appeal arising from constitutional petitions challenging intermediate notices?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nimir Industrial Chemicals Ltd., Sheikhupura vs Collector of Customs (Appeals), Karachi and 2 others2015 PTD (Trib.) 753 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2014-10-03Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nigar Enterprises, Chaman Chambers vs C.I.R. Zone-VI, R.T.O., Lahore2015 P.C.T.L.R. 926 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-12-01
  sales taxremand powerex parte ordershow-cause noticeappellate jurisdictionde novo proceedingstax fraud
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns an ex parte assessment order passed against a registered person regarding alleged illegal input tax claims. The core legal questions were whether the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) possesses the statutory authority to remand a case for de novo consideration to the adjudicating officer, and whether an assessment order passed without the service of a mandatory show-cause notice is legally sustainable. The Tribunal held that the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) lacks the power to remand cases for de novo proceedings under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Consequently, the Tribunal annulled the original assessment order, finding it invalid due to the failure to serve the show-cause notice, and vacated the remand order. The key principle laid down is that Section 45-B(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, expressly prohibits the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) from remanding cases for de novo consideration, and an assessment order passed without proper service of notice must be annulled rather than remanded to allow the department to cure procedural defects.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) have the legal authority to remand a case for de novo consideration under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Is an assessment order passed without the service of a mandatory show-cause notice legally sustainable?
  • Can an appellate authority remand a matter to the adjudicating officer to cure procedural defects in the original assessment?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Niazi CNG Company vs Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad2015 PTD 2348 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2015-09-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nextek Services, Lahore vs C.I.R, R.T.O., Lahore2015 PTD (Trib.) 1078 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-10-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs New Shalimar Steel Industries (Pvt:) Ltd. vs Secretary, Revenue2015 PTD 1674 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2015-05-08
  sales tax refundcondonation of delayconcealment of factsmanufacturing bondfraudulent refundpost-refund auditFederal Tax Ombudsman
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a complaint filed before the Federal Tax Ombudsman regarding the Federal Board of Revenue's (FBR) failure to decide on an application for condonation of time-bar for a sales tax refund. During the proceedings, the Department alleged that the complainant had concealed the fact that raw materials were imported under a duty-free and tax-free Customs Manufacturing Bond facility, rendering the refund claim fraudulent. The complainant subsequently sought to withdraw the complaint. The Federal Tax Ombudsman rejected the withdrawal request, noting that the entire refund claim was under a post-refund audit due to allegations of abuse of the Expeditious Refund System and concealment of material facts. The holding emphasizes that decisions derived through falsehood, misstatement, or concealment of facts cannot be sustained, and any superstructure built upon an unlawful foundation must fail. The FTO recommended that the FBR expedite the audit, recover any inadmissible refunds, and initiate legal proceedings against those responsible for the fraudulent claims.

  Questions settled

  • Can a complainant withdraw a complaint before the Federal Tax Ombudsman when the matter involves allegations of fraudulent tax refunds?
  • Does a refund claim based on the concealment of duty-free import status remain valid?
  • What is the legal consequence of obtaining a tax refund through misstatement or concealment of facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Transmission and Despatch Company Ltd. through Chief Engineer vs Pub Corporation through Sole Proprietor and 2 others2015 PLD Sindh 397 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-27Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Sana Rizwan vs Mrs. Amna Fahim and 2 others2015 YLR 1834 · Sindh High Court · 2015-03-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Logis'i Ic Cell vs Collector of Customs and others2015 PTD (Trib.) 637 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2014-08-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Gases Ltd. through Company Secretary vs Ministry of Railway through Federal Secretary Railways and 2 others2015 PTD 2552 · Sindh High Court · 2014-02-12
  writ jurisdictioncontractual obligationsconstitutional petitiondisputed questions of factsales taxspecial excise dutycivil suitmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the petitioner seeking the recovery of additional Sales Tax and Special Excise Duty paid on goods supplied to the respondents, invoking Section 64-A of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, could adjudicate upon and enforce contractual obligations involving disputed questions of fact. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that writ jurisdiction is not an appropriate forum for enforcing contractual rights or resolving disputed factual matters, which necessitate the leading of evidence. The Court emphasized that such controversies must be resolved through a civil suit before a court of competent jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court noted that the specific terms of the purchase order, which stipulated that prices were inclusive of all taxes and not subject to variation, appeared to preclude the petitioner's claim under Section 64-A. Consequently, the Court affirmed that constitutional petitions are incompetent for enforcing contractual obligations where facts are controverted.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 maintainable for the enforcement of contractual obligations?
  • Can disputed questions of fact regarding a contract be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does a specific contractual clause stating prices are inclusive of all taxes override the provisions of Section 64-A of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Foods Limited Against Messrs Shangrila (Private)2015 CLD 1737 · Competition Commission of Pakistan · 2015-02-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Multan Textile Allied Industries (Pvt) Limited through Managing2015 CLD 160 · Lahore High Court · 2014-06-19
  Banking CourtFinance Against Facilityburden of proofdecretal amountinternal transfer vouchersobjection petitionfinancial institution
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the order of the Banking Court dismissing the appellants' objection petition regarding the satisfaction of a decretal amount. The core legal question was whether the respondent Bank successfully proved the creation and disbursement of a "Finance Against Facility" (F.A.F.) and the subsequent internal adjustments used to settle the appellants' liability, or whether the appellants had already discharged their debt. The Court held that the Bank failed to discharge its burden of proof. While the appellants produced deposit slips as evidence of payment, the Bank failed to provide internal vouchers or entries in the F.A.F. statement to substantiate its claim of internal transfers. The Court established that under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, a financial institution must prove both the disbursement and utilization of finance facilities through cogent and reliable documentation. Mere assertions in a statement of account, unsupported by vouchers or receipts, are insufficient to establish liability or adjustment, particularly when the borrower has presented prima facie evidence of payment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie on a financial institution to prove the disbursement and utilization of a finance facility?
  • Can a bank recover amounts based solely on statement of account entries without supporting vouchers or receipts?
  • Does the production of deposit slips by a judgment debtor shift the burden to the bank to prove the nature of internal adjustments?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Montgomery Flour and General Mills, Sahiwal through Chief2015 PLJ Lahore 1170, 2015 PLJ Lahore 887, 2015 CLD 1590 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-04
  execution first appealconsent decreenovatesettlement agreementSection 47 CPCextension of timecost of fundsdefault
  Summary & questions settled

  This execution first appeal under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 challenged the order of the Banking Court-II, Multan, which dismissed the appellant's applications under Section 47 and Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, CPC, alongside an application for redemption of mortgaged property. The suit was originally decreed under a consent decree based on a settlement agreement specifying that failure to pay 12 equal quarterly installments would revoke concessions and entitle the bank to recover the full suit amount. Following default, the bank extended the deadline, but default persisted, leading to execution proceedings for the full amount. The core legal questions pertained to whether extending the payment timeline novated the consent decree under Section 62 of the Contract Act, 1872, requiring a separate suit, and whether framing of issues was required under Section 47, CPC. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a mere grant of extended time without material alteration of terms does not novate a consent decree, rendering execution valid.

  Questions settled

  • Does granting an extension of time to pay a decretal amount novate a consent decree under Section 62 of the Contract Act, 1872?
  • Is an executing court required to frame issues and record evidence under Section 47, CPC when the relevant facts and default are admitted?
  • Can a consent decree providing for full recovery upon default in installment payments be directly enforced through execution proceedings without filing a separate suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mima Knit (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi vs Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad2015 PTD 371 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2013-08-05Read full judgment →
• Messrs Millat Tractors Ltd. Through Deputy General Manager vs Muhammad Munir Ahmad and 3 other2015 PLD Lahore 507 · Lahore High Court · 2014-10-01Read full judgment →
• Messrs Millat Tractors Ltd through Deputy General Manager, Administration and Purchases vs Muhammad Munir Ahmad and 3 others2015 CLD 297 · Lahore High Court · 2014-10-01
  constitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionmaintainabilityprivate companyfunction testregulatory controlCompanies OrdinanceService and warranty charges
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an order of a learned Single Bench of the Lahore High Court that allowed a constitutional petition and declared a demand of Rs. 19,000 for service and warranty charges by the appellant company to be without lawful authority. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 is maintainable against a private limited company registered under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 whose management and financial control vest in private individuals, and whose activities are merely regulated by a state agency. The Lahore High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order, holding that a private company with private management is not a "person" performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province, or a local authority under Article 199. The key principle laid down is that the mere statutory registration of a company under the Companies Ordinance and its general regulation by a state regulatory authority do not render a private corporate entity amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 is maintainable against a private limited company?
  • Does the mere fact that a private company is regulated by a state agency bring it within the definition of a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation or a Province?
  • What are the relevant factors for applying the function test to determine if an institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mfmy Industries Ltd. and others vs Federation of Pakistan2015 PLJ SC 976, 2015 SCMR 1550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-21
  delayed judgmentjudicial dispensationremandaudi alteram partemrule of lawconstitutional petitionreasonable timenatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the validity of judgments delivered after inordinate delays following the conclusion of arguments. The appellants challenged a High Court judgment concerning import fees, which was announced approximately fifteen months after being reserved. The core legal question was whether such a significant delay constitutes improper judicial dispensation and violates the principles of natural justice, specifically the right to a meaningful hearing (audi alteram partem). The Supreme Court held that while the Code of Civil Procedure provides specific timelines for trial courts, appellate and constitutional courts must also adhere to a rule of reasonableness. The Court laid down guidelines: trial courts should decide within 30 days, District appellate courts within 45 days, and High Courts within 90 to 120 days. It was determined that excessive delay (exceeding six months) weakens the quality of a judgment as judges may lose track of specific arguments, potentially vitiating the decision. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment due to the fifteen-month delay and remanded the case for a fresh decision.

  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mehran Filling Station through Proprietor vs Oil and Gas2015 LHC 5611, 2015 MLD 1514 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-02Read full judgment →
• Messrs Meezan Bank Limited vs Mrs. Parveen Sabir and another2015 CLD 1806 · Sindh High Court · 2015-01-13
  banking suitclerical mistakearithmetical mistakerectification of decreefinancial institutions recoverymerits of the caseappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant bank challenged an order of the Banking Court, which dismissed its application for the modification of a decree. The bank had previously filed a suit for recovery under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which resulted in a decree for a specific sum. The bank sought to correct the decree, alleging the court made a mistake regarding the sanctioned amount and the exclusion of charity and termination charges. The core legal question was whether such a challenge, which effectively sought to re-litigate the merits of the judgment, could be entertained as a correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or Section 27 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The High Court held that the Banking Court’s refusal to grant specific charges was a reasoned decision on merits, not a clerical error. Consequently, the court ruled that Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 cannot be used to re-agitate the merits of a case once an appeal has been withdrawn.

  Questions settled

  • Can a substantive challenge to a judgment be entertained as a correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the refusal of a court to grant specific charges in a decree constitute a clerical or arithmetical mistake?
  • Can a party re-agitate the merits of a judgment through an application for rectification after withdrawing an appeal against that same judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Master Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd. through Executive Director of Administration vs Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Limited through Managing Director and 2 others2015 PLD Sindh 72 · Sindh High Court · 2014-04-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Maritime Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. through Company Secretary vs Assistant Commissioner-II of SRB and 2 others2015 PTD 160 · Sindh High Court · 2014-04-24
  show-cause noticeconstitutional petitionmaintainabilitySindh Sales Taxshipping agentstatutory remedypremature litigationtax jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a shipping agent company, filed a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan challenging a show-cause notice issued by the Sindh Revenue Board. The petitioner contended that sales tax under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, should only be levied on 'net ocean freight' rather than gross commission income and agency fees. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against a mere show-cause notice when statutory remedies are available. The High Court dismissed the petition as premature, holding that since the respondent had jurisdiction to issue the notice and no final order had been passed, the petitioner was not yet an 'aggrieved person'. The Court laid down the principle that the tendency to bypass statutory forums provided under special taxing statutes must be discouraged. Parties must exhaust remedies such as appeals to the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Appellate Tribunal before invoking constitutional jurisdiction, unless the impugned action suffers from a total lack of jurisdiction or gross illegality.

  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mansoor Aslam Seraj Saleem Shahid, Chartered2015 CLD 822 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2013-10-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs Maniar Tours and Travels (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director2015 YLR 1105 · Sindh High Court · 2014-11-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Madni Packages (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Commissioner (I.R.), Zone-IV, Rto-2015 PTD (Trib.) 1490 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-11-27Read full judgment →
• Messrs Macca Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Limited through General Manager vs District Labour Officer, Kasur and 4 others2015 NLR Labour 111, 2015 PLC 218 · Lahore High Court · 2014-07-24
  labour lawjurisdiction of labour officerwrongful terminationcompetent forumwrit petitionindustrial dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the proceedings initiated by the District Labour Officer and another respondent against the petitioner, a private limited company, following an application filed by a former employee regarding his termination. The core legal question was whether the District Labour Officer possessed the statutory jurisdiction to initiate an inquiry or proceedings concerning the termination of an employee and their subsequent reinstatement. The Court held that the respondents failed to cite any legal provision or authority empowering them to adjudicate upon or inquire into the termination of an employee. The Court observed that grievances regarding termination must be addressed before a court of competent jurisdiction, and the respondents' attempt to exercise authority in this matter was entirely without legal basis. Consequently, the Court declared the inquiry initiated by the respondents to be illegal and contrary to law. The petition was accepted, and the respondents were restrained from initiating any further proceedings against the petitioner regarding the former employee's application for reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Does a District Labour Officer have the statutory jurisdiction to initiate an inquiry into the termination of an employee?
  • Is an inquiry initiated by a labour officer regarding an employee's termination valid in the absence of specific enabling legislation?
  • What is the appropriate forum for an employee to challenge their termination from service?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs M.M. Silk Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Deputy Collector of Customs and another2015 PTD (Trib.) 1817 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2014-09-24
  customs classificationprovisional assessmentstatutory limitationretrospective applicationPCT headingtrade facilitationcustoms duty recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against an Order-in-Appeal confirming the recovery of differential customs duties and taxes from an importer, Messrs M.M. Silk Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., following a reclassification of imported goods. The core legal question was whether the customs authorities could retrospectively apply a PCT classification change and whether the provisional assessment of goods under Section 81 of the Customs Act, 1969, attained finality due to the department's failure to finalize the assessment within the statutory time limit. The Customs Appellate Tribunal held that the department's reliance on a subsequent Public Notice to change the classification retrospectively was legally flawed, particularly as the goods in question were distinct from those referenced in the notice. Furthermore, the Tribunal ruled that the department’s failure to finalize the provisional assessment within the prescribed statutory period rendered the provisional determination final. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders, establishing that statutory obligations regarding assessment timelines are mandatory and that provisional assessments attain finality if not finalized within the stipulated period, precluding subsequent recovery actions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a provisional assessment under Section 81 of the Customs Act, 1969, attain finality if not finalized within the statutory time limit?
  • Can a classification ruling issued by a PCT Committee be applied retrospectively to goods imported prior to the ruling?
  • Is an agreement to pay tax not recoverable under the statute repugnant to Article 77 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the failure of customs authorities to adhere to statutory assessment timelines constitute a legal violation rather than a technical one?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs M. Yasin & Co. vs Federation of Pakistan and others2015 PTD 1607 · Sindh High Court · 2015-01-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Lucky Holding Ltd., Peshawar vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, R.T.O., Peshawar2015 PTD (Trib.) 2427 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-01-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs Lucky Cement Ltd. Karachi vs Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad2015 PTD 289 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2014-09-17
  manufacturing bond licenseinput goodsdue processinterim injunctionFederal Tax Ombudsmancustoms dutynatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The complainant, a manufacturing company, challenged a letter issued by the Deputy Collector (Exports) which amended their manufacturing bond license by deleting 'shredded tyre scrap' as an authorized input material for cement production. The complainant argued that the amendment was made without notice or an opportunity for a hearing, and that the Deputy Collector lacked the authority to amend a license issued by the Collector. Furthermore, the complainant contended that the shredded tyres were essential raw materials for cement manufacturing, not merely fuel, and that the sudden withdrawal of the facility would cause irreparable financial loss due to pending import consignments. The Federal Tax Ombudsman observed that the impugned order was passed without due process and that the complainant provided prima facie evidence that the material was used as an input. Consequently, the Ombudsman granted an interim injunction suspending the operation of the impugned letter for 30 days, directing the Collector of Customs to seek expert advice from the PCSIR and refer the matter to the Federal Board of Revenue for resolution.

  Questions settled

  • Can a licensing authority amend a manufacturing bond license without providing the licensee an opportunity for a hearing?
  • Does a Deputy Collector have the authority to amend a manufacturing bond license issued by a Collector?
  • Can the Federal Tax Ombudsman grant an interim injunction to suspend a customs department order pending final resolution?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Live Securities Limited: In the matter of vs Not2015 CLD 1285 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2013-10-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Lasani Builders through Proprietor and otherss vs Bolan Bank2015 CLD 236 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Koldkraft (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive vs Federal Board of Revenue through Chairman and 2 other2015 PTD (Trib.) 1600 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-02-02
  customs adjudicationincome tax at import stageconcessionary rateraw materialmanufacturerjurisdiction of customs officerdefault surcharge
  Summary & questions settled

  This customs appeal challenged an Order-in-Original passed by the Additional Collector of Customs (Adjudication-II) demanding short-paid income tax and imposing a penalty after disallowing a concessionary income tax rate of 3% on imported raw materials. The core legal questions involved whether a Customs officer possesses the jurisdiction to adjudicate and recover short-paid income tax under the guise of the Customs Act, 1969, and whether the imported components constituted raw materials for an industrial undertaking entitled to the concession under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Customs Appellate Tribunal held that Customs officers have limited powers regarding advance income tax under Section 148 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, strictly confined to collection, and cannot assume general recovery or adjudication powers for income tax, which falls exclusively within the domain of Inland Revenue authorities. Furthermore, on facts, the appellant qualified as a manufacturer entitled to the 3% concessionary rate for raw materials. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order, laying down that jurisdiction regarding income tax at the import stage cannot be stretched by Customs authorities beyond statutory collection limits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Customs officer has the jurisdiction to adjudicate and recover short-paid income tax under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does the power of a Customs officer under Section 148 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 extend beyond the collection of advance tax?
  • Whether imported components used by an industrial undertaking for manufacturing cold equipment qualify as raw material for a concessionary income tax rate?
  • Where the burden of proof lies to establish that an importer is a commercial importer rather than a manufacturer for tax purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Khyber Tea and Food Company and others vs Collector of Customs (Appeals) and 2 others2015 PTD (Trib.) 2480 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2014-12-03Read full judgment →
• Messrs Khan and Co. Manz Kali, Kowar Mang, Bisham vs Deputy2015 PTD 796 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-12-01
  sales tax liabilitycompulsory registrationtaxable suppliesremandwithholding taxSection 65 waiverfiscal statute interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns Sales Tax References filed by suppliers of coal against the Appellate Tribunal, Inland Revenue, regarding the liability to pay sales tax on supplies made to a cement company. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioners were liable for sales tax despite not being registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, the applicability of Section 65 of the Act regarding the waiver of tax, and whether the petitioners could shift the burden of tax deduction to the buyer under the Sales Tax Special Procedure (Withholding) Rules, 2007. The Court held that persons making taxable supplies under Rule 4 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, are liable to registration and tax payment, regardless of their actual registration status. It further held that Section 65 requires a specific notification by the Federal Government, which had not occurred. However, because the lower authorities failed to determine the factual question of whether the petitioners fell within the categories requiring registration under Rule 4, the Court remanded the matter to the Tribunal for a factual determination.

  Questions settled

  • Are persons making taxable supplies liable to pay sales tax even if they are not formally registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Does the failure of a buyer to withhold sales tax under the Sales Tax Special Procedure (Withholding) Rules, 2007, absolve the supplier of their tax liability?
  • Is the Federal Government the sole authority empowered to grant a waiver of tax under Section 65 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Can a High Court determine factual issues regarding registration liability under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, in a reference proceeding?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs J.S. DEVELOPERSthrough Chief Executive and another vs State Bank2015 CLD 173 · Lahore High Court · 2014-04-25
  Credit Information Bureauwritten-off loansState Bank of Pakistanbanking disciplineconstitutional petitionfinancial transparencyexhaustion of remedies
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the inclusion of their names in the Credit Information Bureau (CIB) database maintained by the State Bank of Pakistan, following a settlement with a bank where their loan mark-up was written off. The core legal question was whether the State Bank of Pakistan is legally justified in maintaining and disclosing information regarding written-off loans in the CIB database, and whether the petitioners were entitled to have their names removed despite the waiver. The Court held that the State Bank of Pakistan is empowered under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, to collect and disseminate credit information to ensure financial discipline and protect banking institutions. The Court determined that the inclusion of the petitioners' names was lawful, as the waiver of mark-up constitutes a financial relief that must be reported. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the petitioners failed to exhaust the statutory remedy of representation under Section 41(3) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, rendering the constitutional petition incompetent. The principle established is that the State Bank of Pakistan has the authority to regulate financial transparency by maintaining records of loan write-offs to safeguard the banking system.

  Questions settled

  • Does the State Bank of Pakistan have the legal authority to maintain a database of borrowers whose loans or mark-ups have been written off?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable when a statutory remedy of representation under the Banking Companies Ordinance 1962 has not been exhausted?
  • Does the waiver of a loan mark-up by a bank constitute financial information that must be reported to the Credit Information Bureau?
  • Can a borrower compel the State Bank of Pakistan to remove their name from the Credit Information Bureau list after settling a loan dispute with a bank?
  Read full judgment →