Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,817 judgments in total.

• Mst. Mumtaz Majeed & Others vs Muhammad Inayat2015 LHC 2724 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-21
  specific performanceagreement to sellcivil revisionpartial performancecontractual uncertaintyburden of proofcontract formation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments of the lower courts, which decreed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land. The core legal questions concern whether the courts below erred in granting partial specific performance without adhering to the statutory requirements of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and whether the agreement was void for uncertainty under Section 21(c) of the same Act. The High Court held that the lower courts acted in palpable error by decreeing partial performance without satisfying the conditions stipulated in Sections 14, 15, 16, and 17 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Furthermore, the court determined that the agreement lacked essential particulars regarding the subject matter, rendering it unenforceable for uncertainty under Section 21(c). Additionally, the absence of the vendee's signature on the agreement raised significant doubts regarding the formation of a valid contract under the Contract Act, 1872. Consequently, the court set aside the lower courts' decrees, emphasizing that specific performance cannot be granted where the contract terms are uncertain or where statutory prerequisites for partial performance are not met.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court decree the specific performance of a part of a contract without satisfying the statutory requirements set forth in Sections 14, 15, 16, and 17 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
  • Does an agreement to sell that lacks specific property details, such as killa numbers, violate the requirement of reasonable certainty under Section 21(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
  • Is an agreement to sell legally enforceable if it lacks the signature of the vendee?
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• Mst. Mumtaz Bibi vs Muhammad Sain2015 MLD 1210 · Peshawar High Court · 2013-11-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi, etc. vs Sarfraz Khan, etc.2015 LHC 5495 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Moona W/o Shakeel Asim vs StateSindh High Court · -
  post-arrest bailabductionfurther inquiryprinciple of consistencycriminal procedureFIR delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, Mst. Moona, who was charged under Section 365-B and Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for her alleged involvement in the abduction and sale of the complainant's wife. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail given the circumstances of the case, including the delay in lodging the FIR, the lack of specific evidence regarding the alleged sale, and the principle of consistency regarding co-accused. The Court held that the applicant was entitled to bail, noting that the prosecution failed to provide specific details regarding the time, place, or manner of the alleged sale. Furthermore, the Court observed that the delay in lodging the FIR remained unexplained and that the applicant's case was identical to that of a co-accused who had already been granted bail. The Court established the principle that where ingredients of an offence are not prima facie attracted and there is no reasonable ground to believe the accused committed the offence, the case falls under the scope of further inquiry, warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the lack of specific details regarding the time, place, and manner of an alleged offence justify bail on the grounds of further inquiry?
  • Can bail be granted to an accused when a co-accused in an identical position has already been released on bail?
  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR constitute a valid ground for the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • When does a case qualify for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Mst. Momna Mehmood vs Vice-Chancellor University of Health2015 MLD 1784 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mehrunnisa vs Syed Muhammad Zoha2015 CLC 738 · Sindh High Court · 2015-01-19
  succession certificatedoctrine of returnRaddmental incapacityguardian ad litemmovable propertiessole legal heir
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a Succession Miscellaneous Application filed under Section 372 of the Succession Act, 1925, by the widow seeking a Succession Certificate and Letter of Administration for the movable and immovable properties of her deceased husband, who died issueless leaving no surviving parents. The core legal questions involved whether the sole surviving widow is entitled to the entire estate through the doctrine of return (Radd), and how to protect the interests of the petitioner who was found to be mentally unfit. The Sindh High Court held that the petitioner, as the sole surviving legal heir, inherits one-fourth of the estate as a sharer with the remaining three-fourths reverting to her under the doctrine of return (Radd). Furthermore, recognizing her compromised mental state, the court appointed her nephew and the Nazir of the Court as joint guardians to safeguard her financial interests, ordering the investment of funds in national savings schemes and mandating yearly accounts. The key principle established is that while a sole surviving sharer takes the entire estate via Radd, the court must appoint joint guardians involving an officer of the court to protect the assets of a mentally incapacitated beneficiary.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sole surviving widow inherits the entire estate of her issueless deceased husband through the doctrine of return (Radd)?
  • Can a succession certificate be granted in the exclusive name of a sole legal heir who is mentally incapacitated?
  • Is the appointment of joint guardians including an officer of the court permissible to protect the assets of a mentally unfit petitioner in succession proceedings?
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• Mst. Mehr Afzoon vs T.M.A.2015 CLC 676 · Peshawar High Court · 2013-12-20
  land acquisitioncompensation enhancementmarket value assessmentcompulsory acquisitionpotentiality of landlocal commissioner report
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular first appeal challenges the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Mansehra, which fixed compensation for compulsorily acquired land at Rs. 12,610 per marla. The appellants sought enhancement of compensation, arguing the referee court ignored the Local Commissioner's report and relied on valuation tables meant for stamp duty rather than market value. The core legal question concerned the appropriate criteria for determining the market value of acquired land in light of its potentiality and location. The High Court held that the referee court erred by ignoring the Local Commissioner's report and relying on irrelevant valuation tables. The Court allowed the appeal, fixing compensation at Rs. 2,00,000 per marla, plus 6% simple interest. The key principle laid down is that the 'one-year average' of sales is not an absolute yardstick for compensation. Instead, courts must consider the land's potential, its location, and the 'willing vendor/needy vendee' criteria to ensure the owner is adequately compensated, aiming for 'gold for gold' rather than 'copper for gold'.

  Questions settled

  • Is the one-year average of land sales an absolute yardstick for determining compensation in land acquisition cases?
  • Can valuation tables meant for stamp duty and taxes be used as the sole basis for assessing market value for land acquisition compensation?
  • What factors must be considered when determining the market value of acquired land beyond historical sales data?
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• Mst. Meher Tam and 4 others vs Naseer Muhammad and 2 others2015 CLC 902 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-02-03
  inheritance disputeoral giftIslamic lawrevisional jurisdictionmisreading of evidencedelivery of possessionjoint possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments of the lower courts which decreed a suit for inheritance filed by the respondents against the petitioners. The core legal question concerns the validity of an oral gift of a residential house made by the deceased father to his daughters, the petitioners, in the absence of male issue. The High Court held that the gift was valid, satisfying the requirements of offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession. The court established that under Islamic law, joint possession of the donor and donee following a gift is permissible and does not invalidate the transfer. Furthermore, the court recognized the social reality that a father may validly gift property to his daughters to safeguard them from potential oppression by collaterals. Finding that the lower courts committed significant misreading and non-reading of evidence—specifically by ignoring the plaintiffs' admissions regarding the gift and possession—the High Court set aside the impugned judgments and dismissed the respondents' suit, emphasizing that revisional jurisdiction must be exercised to prevent a miscarriage of justice resulting from such errors.

  Questions settled

  • Is joint possession of a donor and donee permissible under Islamic law after a gift is made?
  • Can a court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in revisional jurisdiction if there is misreading of evidence?
  • Is a formal registered deed mandatory for a valid gift under Islamic law?
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• Mst. Marium Tariq and others vs SHO of Police Station Defence and others2015 PLJ Karachi 241, 2015 PLD Sindh 382 · Sindh High Court · 2015-03-31
  quashing of FIRchild custodyHizanatparental kidnappingguardianshipconstitutional petitionvisitation rightsabuse of process of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment addresses two constitutional petitions arising from a matrimonial dispute: one seeking to quash an FIR registered under Sections 363 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 against a mother and her family members for allegedly kidnapping her minor daughter, and the other seeking Interpol red and yellow notices for the recovery of the minor and extradition of the mother. The core legal question was whether a natural mother holding lawful custody (Hizanat) of her minor child can be prosecuted for kidnapping her own child under Section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Sindh High Court held that a mother exercising her right of Hizanat cannot be held liable for kidnapping her own minor child, and that one natural guardian cannot prosecute the other for such an offence. The court established that criminal proceedings instituted in such circumstances constitute an abuse of the process of law, quashed the FIR and consequential proceedings, and directed the aggrieved father to seek remedies for visitation rights through the family court under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mother be prosecuted for kidnapping her own minor child under Section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 while holding lawful custody?
  • Whether one natural guardian can lodge an FIR for kidnapping against the other natural guardian in respect of their minor child?
  • Does the High Court have the power under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash an FIR involving a domestic custody dispute amounting to an abuse of process?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for the non-implementation of visitation rights granted by a family court under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890?
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• Mst. Marium Tariq & others C.P No.D-1105 of 2012 Syed Asad MustafaSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Manzooran Begum vs Sultan Ahmad2015 LHC 7865 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-29
  acquittal appealdouble presumption of innocenceappreciation of evidencemisreading of evidencecriminal appealmurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the acquittal of respondents Sultan Ahmad and Abdul Ghani by the Additional Sessions Judge, Narowal, in a murder case registered under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the trial court’s acquittal judgment suffered from misreading or non-reading of evidence, thereby warranting appellate interference. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution failed to establish grounds to dislodge the double presumption of innocence enjoyed by the acquitted respondents. The Court noted that investigation reports had exonerated the respondents, identifying the complainant's own son as the perpetrator, a finding supported by forensic evidence linking a recovered weapon to him. Furthermore, the Court observed significant contradictions in prosecution witness testimonies. The Court reaffirmed the principle that an appellate court should not interfere with an acquittal judgment unless there are strong, exceptional circumstances, such as the disregard or illegal reception of material evidence. Finding no such errors in the trial court’s reasoning, the Court upheld the acquittal, emphasizing that the scope of interference in acquittal appeals is narrow and limited.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of appellate interference in a judgment of acquittal?
  • Does an accused person enjoy a double presumption of innocence after being acquitted by a trial court?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment if the trial court has not disregarded or misread material evidence?
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• Mst. Lubna Farah vs Raymond Jal Hap Byramji and another2015.MLD 674 · Sindh High Court · 2014-10-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Lalan, Etc.s vs Mst. Maqsood Mai, Etc.s2015 NLR Revenue 93 · Lahore High Court · 2014-04-11
  civil revisioninheritance rightsfraudulent mutationconcurrent findingsdeclaration suitmis-joinder of causes of action
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from a property dispute where the respondent, Mst. Maqsood Mai, filed a suit for declaration claiming her legal share in the agricultural property of her predecessor, Kaloo. She challenged the legality of Mutations No. 355 and 356, dated 25.03.1992, alleging they were procured through fraud and misrepresentation, asserting that the deceased owner never appeared before the revenue officer. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, a decision subsequently upheld by the Additional District Judge in appeal. The petitioners challenged these concurrent findings in the High Court, primarily arguing that the suit was bad for mis-joinder of causes of action. The High Court reviewed the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the validity of the mutations and the plaintiff's entitlement as a legal heir. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the fraudulent nature of the mutations and the plaintiff's inheritance rights were well-founded and did not warrant interference in revisional jurisdiction, thereby dismissing the civil revision.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the validity of property mutations be challenged in civil revision?
  • Does a suit for declaration regarding inheritance rights and the validity of mutations constitute a mis-joinder of causes of action?
  • Is a mutation valid if the transferor never appeared before the revenue officer?
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• Mst. Laiba Anthony vs The State2015 SHC 17 · Sindh High Court · 2009-08-27
  tender of pardonapproverpublic prosecutor certificatecriminal revisionanti-terrorism courtjoint trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application impugns the order of the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, whereby the trial court evaluated the evidence of the applicant—who had been tendered a pardon under Section 338 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898—and directed her to record a statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without following the statutory procedure for withdrawal of pardon. The core legal question was whether a trial court can bypass the mandatory procedure under Sections 339 and 339-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding an approver who has been granted pardon. The Sindh High Court held that the trial court committed grave illegality by proceeding against the pardoned accused without a certificate from the Public Prosecutor certifying non-compliance with the conditions of the pardon, and without observing the separate trial and plea-recording procedures mandated by law. The court laid down the principle that the trial of a person tendered pardon must strictly follow the exhaustive and mandatory procedures outlined in Sections 339 and 339-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, requiring a certificate of non-compliance from the Public Prosecutor and a separate trial with an opportunity for the accused to plead compliance.

  Questions settled

  • What procedure must a trial court follow when a person granted a tender of pardon is alleged to have breached the conditions of the pardon?
  • Can a trial court on its own initiative declare that an approver has not been finally pardoned and proceed to treat her as a regular accused without a certificate from the Public Prosecutor?
  • Is a separate trial mandatory for an accused whose pardon has been revoked under Section 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • At what stage and in what manner must an accused whose pardon is withdrawn be given the opportunity to plead compliance with the conditions of the tender of pardon?
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• Mst. Kulsoom Bibi vs The state2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-06-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kulsoom Bibi vs Muhammad Waseem and 3 others2015 PLJ Peshawar 392 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-06-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kulsoom Bibi through Attorney vs Muhammad Waseem and 3 others2015 PLJ Peshawar 392, 2015 YLR 2375 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-06-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kiran Nawaz vs State and anotherPLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Lahore) 46 · Lahore High Court · 2014-04-07
  pre-arrest baildishonoured chequeSection 489-F PPCprohibitory clausecriminal liabilitymala fideharassment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by the accused, Mst. Kiran Nawaz, in relation to an FIR registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving an allegedly dishonoured cheque. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the history of litigation between the parties and the nature of the offence. The Court held that the petition should be accepted and the ad-interim pre-arrest bail confirmed. The Court observed that the complainant had failed to disclose previous FIRs involving similar allegations and that the cheque in question was already in the complainant's possession during prior bail proceedings. Furthermore, the Court noted that the offence under Section 489-F does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that dishonest intention is a sine qua non for the offence of dishonouring a cheque, and in the absence of such established intent, coupled with the non-prohibitory nature of the offence, pre-arrest bail is appropriate to prevent harassment and humiliation.

  Questions settled

  • Is the offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 considered to fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is dishonest intention a necessary element for the offence of dishonouring a cheque under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the failure of a complainant to disclose previous related FIRs impact the grant of pre-arrest bail?
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• Mst. KHANZADAand anothers vs Khan Muhammad and another2015 YLR 1893 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-08-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khandana Bibi & others vs Khaista Rehman & others2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-06-02
  inheritancepartitionlimitationacquiescenceancestral propertyrevision petitionShamilat land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a revision petition arising from a dispute over inheritance and property partition among descendants of a common predecessor, Naimatullah Khan. The plaintiffs sought a declaration, possession, and injunction, claiming a share in the ancestral property. The core legal questions were whether the plaintiffs could establish a joint ownership interest in the disputed property and whether their claim was barred by limitation and acquiescence. The Court found that the predecessor had partitioned the land among his four sons during his lifetime, a fact supported by evidence and the long-standing possession and improvements made by the defendants and their successors. The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove joint ownership, as the property had been validly partitioned and subsequently alienated. Furthermore, the Court determined that the suit was time-barred due to the plaintiffs' long silence and acquiescence regarding the defendants' exclusive ownership and improvements. The key principle laid down is that long-standing family partitions, coupled with the conduct of parties who remain silent while others improve and alienate property, preclude claims of joint inheritance, especially when such claims are brought after significant delays.

  Questions settled

  • Can a claim for inheritance be maintained after the plaintiffs have acquiesced to a long-standing partition and the alienation of property by others?
  • Does the failure to implead necessary parties in a suit regarding Shamilat land render the suit defective?
  • Is a claim for inheritance subject to the law of limitation when the plaintiffs have remained silent for decades regarding the property's partition and subsequent improvements?
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• Mst. Khadija Shaheen Ali vs District Coordination Officer, Rajanpur2015 PLJ Lahore 635 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Khadija Shaheen Ali vs District Coordination Officer, Rajan Pur2015 CLC 859 · Lahore High Court · 2014-08-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khadija Qurban vs Federal Government Employees' Housing2015 PLJ Islamabad 285, 2015 MLD 1447 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-03Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khadija Qurban vs Federal Government Employees Housing2015 PLJ Islamabad 285 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Kattu and others vs Eesa2015 LHC 2990 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-07
  civil revisioninheritancelimitationdeclaration suitmutationrevenue recordlegal heirs
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from judgments and decrees of the courts below dismissing a suit for declaration of inheritance filed by the petitioners regarding the estate of their deceased predecessor. The trial court dismissed the suit on merits and limitation, while the appellate court recognized the petitioners as legal heirs but dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation. The core legal question was whether a suit for declaration regarding inheritance and correction of revenue entries is barred by the law of limitation. The Lahore High Court allowed the revision, holding that in matters of inheritance and succession under Sharia law, a wrong mutation confers no right, a suit for declaration to correct revenue entries is not strictly necessary, and the law of limitation does not apply to defeat vested inheritance rights. The key principle laid down is that the right of succession to property under Muslim inheritance law cannot be defeated by the law of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the law of limitation apply to a suit for declaration filed in respect of inheritance rights?
  • Does a wrong revenue mutation confer any right in property or defeat the right of succession?
  • Is a co-sharer obliged to file a declaratory suit to correct a wrong mutation within a specific limitation period?
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• Mst. Kaniz Fatima vs Sessions Judge, Muzaffargarh and 3 others2015 PLJ Lahore 246, 2015 MLD 659 · Lahore High Court · 2014-06-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kaneez Kanwal alias Kaneez Zafar vs Mst. Shehnaz Bibi2015 YLR 1443 · Lahore High Court · 2013-12-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kaneez Fatima vs Sessions Judge, Muzaffargarh and 3 others2015 PLJ Lahore 246 · Lahore High Court · 2014-06-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Jewan Mai vs The State, Etc.s2015 NLR Criminal 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-02-17
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationdouble murderjudicial consistencyChallan caseprivate complaintsuppression of material facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order granting post-arrest bail to an accused in a double murder case. The core legal questions were whether the High Court erred in granting bail despite the existence of reasonable grounds for the accused's involvement, and whether the High Court's reasoning regarding the 'dormancy' of a Challan case due to a parallel private complaint was legally sound. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was unjustified, noting that the accused was implicated by eye-witnesses and medical evidence, and that the High Court had applied inconsistent standards to co-accused persons with identical roles. The Court further rejected the High Court's view that a Challan case becomes dormant due to a parallel private complaint. The key principles laid down are that bail should not be granted when reasonable grounds exist for an accused's involvement in a capital offence, and that courts must maintain consistency in their approach towards co-accused persons facing similar allegations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a private complaint render a Challan case dormant for the purpose of bail adjudication?
  • Is it legally permissible for a court to adopt inconsistent approaches when deciding bail applications for co-accused persons with identical roles?
  • Does the suppression of the fact that bail was refused to a co-accused affect the bona fides of a subsequent bail application?
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• Mst. Jewan Mai vs The State, etc2015 NLR Criminal 565, 2015 PLD Supreme Court 242, 2015 PSC Crl. 469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-02-17
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationdouble murderprohibitory clausediscrepant approachsuppression of material facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court whereby post-arrest bail was granted to a respondent accused of murder. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting post-arrest bail in a double murder case falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, particularly where the High Court adopted discrepant approaches towards similarly placed co-accused and relied on untenable grounds regarding dormant challan cases. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, setting aside the impugned bail order and directing the re-arrest of the respondent. The Court laid down that bail should not be granted on inconsistent reasoning when co-accused with identical roles are denied relief, and reiterated that ongoing private complaints do not render challan cases dormant so as to justify bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted in a murder case falling within the prohibitory clause when reasonable grounds exist to connect the accused with the crime?
  • Does the pendency of a private complaint render a challan case dormant so as to justify the grant of bail to an accused?
  • Is it proper for a court to adopt discrepant approaches in bail matters for co-accused attributed identical roles?
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• Mst. Jewan Mai vs The State and others2015 PLD Supreme Court 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-02-17
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationdouble murderjudicial consistencysuppression of material factsprohibitory clauseChallan case
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order granting post-arrest bail to the respondent in a double murder case. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court exercised its discretion judicially in granting bail despite the respondent's implication in the FIR and the existence of incriminating medical evidence, and whether the High Court erred by adopting inconsistent approaches toward co-accused persons facing identical allegations. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was legally untenable. The Court found that the respondent was implicated by eyewitnesses and medical evidence, and that the offence fell within the prohibitory clause of the relevant bail statute. Furthermore, the Court criticized the High Court for granting bail based on the erroneous premise that the 'Challan' case became dormant due to a parallel private complaint, a view previously rejected by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the bail order, cancelled the respondent's bail, and ordered his re-arrest, emphasizing the necessity of consistency in judicial decision-making regarding co-accused persons with similar roles.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a private complaint render a Challan case dormant for the purpose of bail adjudication?
  • Is a court required to maintain consistency in bail decisions for co-accused persons facing identical allegations?
  • Does the suppression of the fact that a co-accused was previously denied bail affect the bona fides of a subsequent bail application?
  • Can bail be granted in a double murder case where the accused is implicated by eyewitnesses and supporting medical evidence?
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• Mst. Jamila Begum, etc vs Mst. Sheedan Bibi, etc2015 KLR Civil Cases 390 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Jamila Begum (Deceased) through L.Rs. vs Mst. Sheedan Bibi and another2015 P.S.C. 1411 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-09-07
  fraud and misrepresentationconsent decreelimitation periodcondonation of delaywithdrawal of petitionappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil proceedings initiated by the petitioners through an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, challenging a previous consent decree on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. The core legal question concerns whether a decree can be set aside under Section 12(2), CPC without producing supporting evidence, and whether a belated application barred by time can succeed without a valid explanation or condonation of delay. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioners' application was rightly dismissed as it was hopelessly barred by time without any application for condonation of delay, and because the petitioners expressly chose not to lead any evidence at the trial stage to substantiate their allegations of fraud. The key principles laid down are that an applicant under Section 12(2), CPC must substantiate allegations of fraud through proper evidence rather than declining to produce it, and that time-barred applications without grounds for condonation under the Limitation Act 1908 are incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Can an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 succeed when the applicant explicitly declines to produce any evidence at trial?
  • Whether an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 filed beyond the period of limitation without an application for condonation of delay is maintainable?
  • What is the effect of repeated withdrawals of petitions and civil miscellaneous applications before the High Court and the Supreme Court on subsequent legal remedies?
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• Mst. Jameela Bibi vs Ghulam Nabi2015 MLD 1827 · Lahore High Court · 2013-02-13
  condonation of delayex parte decreeLimitation Actpecuniary jurisdictionsufficient causeappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the dismissal of an application to set aside an ex parte decree. The core legal question is whether the delay in filing the appeal can be condoned under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, despite the appellant's failure to explain the delay of each day, particularly the period following a prior High Court decision. The Court held that the appeal is not maintainable as the appellant failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the delay between the High Court's previous order and the filing of the current appeal. The Court emphasized that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, is limited in scope and cannot excuse unexplained laches. The principle laid down is that a party seeking condonation of delay must provide a continuous, day-to-day explanation for the entire period of delay; failing this, the court cannot exercise its discretion to condone the delay, rendering the appeal time-barred and liable for dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a delay in filing an appeal be condoned under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, if the appellant fails to explain the delay of each day?
  • Is an application for condonation of delay maintainable when the appellant fails to account for the period between the conclusion of proceedings in a wrong forum and the filing of the appeal?
  • Does the filing of a revision petition in a court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction constitute sufficient grounds to condone the entire delay in filing an appeal?
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• Mst. Irshad Begum alias Shadan and 8 others Aftab alias Guddu and 32015 LHC 5756 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-17
  control of narcotic substancesheroin smugglingforeign documents admissibilityretrospective operation of criminal lawstatement of accusedburden of proofbenefit of doubtmutual legal assistance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellants handed down by the Special Judge, Control of Narcotics Substances, under Sections 9(c) and 15 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance, 1997, read with Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for alleged drug trafficking and smuggling of heroin to Saudi Arabia. The core legal questions involved the legality of convictions based on foreign documents without compliance with the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, the retrospective application of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, failure to prove exact quantities of the recovered contraband, and omission to put incriminating circumstances to the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to discharge its initial onus of proof, that foreign documents and reports were inadmissible without formal legal proof or compliance with international mutual legal assistance mechanisms, and that retrospective application of penal statutes is impermissible. Consequently, the High Court set aside the trial court's judgment and acquitted the appellants, laying down principles regarding the strict burden of proof in narcotics cases and the mandatory nature of Section 342 Cr.P.C. examinations.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted and sentenced under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for an alleged offence committed prior to its promulgation when the earlier Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance, 1997 was in the field?
  • Whether foreign documents and investigation reports from another country are admissible in evidence without complying with the formal proof requirements under Articles 75 and 89 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Is it fatal to the prosecution case if incriminating evidence, documents, and statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not specifically put to the accused during their examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Does the prosecution retain the initial burden to establish the exact quantity of recovered contraband beyond reasonable doubt under the Control of Narcotic Substances law before shifting the burden under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
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• Mst. Inayat Begum vs State Life Insurance Corporation through Chairman and another2015 P.C.T.L.R. 825, 2015 CLD 595 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-17
  insurance claimlimitation perioddeath claimInsurance Tribunalliquidated damagesInsurance Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal under Section 124(2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 against the dismissal of the appellant's application for recovery of a death claim and liquidated damages by the Insurance Tribunal on the ground of limitation. The core legal questions involved the correct interpretation of Article 86(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908 regarding when time begins to run for filing an insurance claim application, and whether insurance companies can indefinitely withhold claim decisions to defeat limitation periods. The Lahore High Court held that under Article 86(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908, the three-year limitation period begins from the date proof of death is given to or received by the insurer, not merely the date of death, making the appellant's application within time. The Court further found the Tribunal's decision on merits unsustainable due to lack of proper evidence. The appeal was accordingly allowed, and the Court suggested legislative amendments to prescribe time limits for insurance companies to decide claims.

  Questions settled

  • When does the period of limitation under Article 86(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908 begin to run for filing an application before the Insurance Tribunal?
  • Whether an insurance claim application filed within three years from the date of submitting proof of death to the insurer is within time?
  • Can an insurance company withhold the decision on a death claim indefinitely to defeat the claimant's right of action before the Insurance Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Imam Sain and others vs The State2015 YLR 17 · Lahore High Court · 2014-07-15
  capital punishmentchild witnesssolitary witnesspoisoningmurdercompetency of witnesscriminal appealQanun-e-Shahadat Order
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentences imposed on the appellants for the murder of two individuals and the attempted murder of five minors via poisoning. The core legal questions were whether a capital conviction could be sustained on the solitary testimony of a child witness and whether said witness was competent to testify. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the death sentences. The court held that the testimony of the child witness was confidence-inspiring, consistent, and corroborated by medical evidence, including chemical examiner reports confirming insecticide poisoning. The court affirmed that in criminal cases, the quality of evidence is paramount over quantity, and a conviction may be lawfully based on the testimony of a single witness if found reliable. Furthermore, the court established that a child witness is competent to testify under Article 3 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, provided they demonstrate the capacity to understand questions and offer rational answers, irrespective of their specific age.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for a capital offense be based solely on the testimony of a single witness?
  • What criteria determine the competency of a child witness to testify in a criminal trial?
  • Does the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 require a specific number of witnesses to prove a criminal fact?
  • Is the testimony of a child witness reliable if it remains consistent during cross-examination?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Humaira Begum etc. vs Uzma Awan etc.2015 LHC 5913 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hina Rukhsana vs Provincial Police Officer_Inspector General of Police KPK Central Police Office, Peshawar and 10 others2015 PLJ Peshawar 431 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Naseem Sajjad through Legal Heirss vs Mst. Anwar Sultan through Representatives2015.MLD 681 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Hassan Noor through Nazir Muhammad vs Haji Said Hussain Khan2015 MLD 836 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2013-11-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Haslima Tahir & Ors vs Mst. Naheed Ejaz & Ors2015 SHC 23 · Sindh High Court · 2010-01-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Haseena vs SHO Police Station Kotdiji and another2015 P Cr. L J 790 · Sindh High Court · 2015-01-05
  registration of FIRcognizable offenceJustice of Peaceconstitutional petitionSection 22-A Cr.P.C.speaking orderpolice duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order by the Ex-officio Justice of Peace, which dismissed the petitioner's application under Section 22-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the registration of an FIR against police officials for the alleged murder of her son. The core legal question was whether the Justice of Peace acted lawfully by dismissing the application based on a police report detailing the deceased's criminal history, rather than examining whether the complaint disclosed a cognizable offence. The High Court held that the impugned order was not a speaking order and suffered from legal infirmity. The Court established that under Section 22-A(6), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Justice of Peace is duty-bound to determine solely whether the information provided discloses a cognizable offence, without evaluating the credibility of the information or relying on police reports to deny registration. Consequently, the Court set aside the dismissal order and directed the Station House Officer to record the petitioner's statement and register an FIR if a cognizable offence is disclosed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Justice of Peace have the authority to evaluate the credibility of information when deciding an application under Section 22-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a Station House Officer permitted to refuse the registration of an FIR if the information provided discloses a cognizable offence?
  • Can an Ex-officio Justice of Peace rely on police reports regarding the criminal history of a deceased person to dismiss an application for the registration of an FIR?
  • What is the scope of the duty of an Ex-officio Justice of Peace under Section 22-A(6), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Haseena Begum vs (1) Ibrahim and Faheem Lodha (2) Mr. Abrar AliSindh High Court · -
  Illegal Dispossession Actlandlord and tenantcivil disputeabuse of processproperty grabberscriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi Central, which dismissed a complaint filed under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The complainant sought criminal proceedings and recovery of possession of a shop, alleging illegal occupation by the respondents. The core legal question was whether a dispute arising from a landlord-tenant relationship, where no evidence of 'property grabbing' or 'Qabza group' activity exists, falls within the ambit of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Act is intended to curb the activities of land mafias and property grabbers, not to resolve bona fide civil disputes between landlords and tenants. The Court affirmed that attempting to convert a civil tenancy dispute into a criminal case to exert pressure constitutes an abuse of the process of law. The key principle laid down is that the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, cannot be invoked in cases involving legitimate civil disputes, such as those between landlords and tenants, where the respondents do not possess the credentials of property grabbers.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 apply to bona fide civil disputes between a landlord and a tenant?
  • Can the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 be invoked against parties who are not proven to be members of a 'Qabza group' or land mafia?
  • Is the use of criminal proceedings to extract concessions in a civil tenancy dispute considered an abuse of the process of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Halima Tahir & Ors vs Mst. Naheed Ejaz & Ors2015 SHC 45 · Sindh High Court · 2010-01-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Gulalai vs Major Fakhr-I-Jehan and 4 others2015 PLJ Peshawar 182 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-01-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Gohar Fatima and others. vs Farooq Ahmed Lodhi and 3 others2015 MLD 1473 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Sakina vs Province of Punjab through District Officer (Rev.)2015 MLD 188 · Lahore High Court · 2013-04-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Bivi and others vs Muhammad Aslam and others2015 MLD 69 · Lahore High Court · 2013-06-20
  civil revisioninheritance mutationarbitration decreelimitation periodSection 12(2) CPCdeclaration of titlemultiplicity of litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision challenged the appellate court's judgment setting aside a trial court decree that had favored the plaintiffs-petitioners. The plaintiffs sought a declaration of ownership regarding 23 kanals 2 marlas of land, challenging an inheritance mutation of their father, Gul Muhammad, and a subsequent arbitration decree that had transferred the property. The defendants argued the suit was time-barred, having been filed over 22 years after the father's death, and contended that the arbitration decree could only be challenged via an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court rejected the argument that a separate Section 12(2) application was mandatory, noting that the plaintiffs were challenging the underlying inheritance mutation, which necessitated a comprehensive suit for title declaration. However, on the merits, the Court found the plaintiffs failed to prove their case, noting that one of the plaintiffs had originally facilitated the disputed inheritance mutation. Consequently, the Court upheld the appellate court's dismissal of the suit, finding no grounds for interference under its revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a separate application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mandatory to challenge an arbitration decree when the underlying inheritance mutation is also disputed in a suit for declaration?
  • Can a plaintiff challenge an arbitration decree within a broader suit for declaration of title rather than filing an independent application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the High Court have grounds to interfere under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the lower appellate court's findings are based on a proper appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Bibi, etc vs Haji Iftikhar Ahmad, etc2015 LHC 1285, 2015 C.L.R. 677 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-02
  giftinheritancefraudburden of proofdelivery of possessionattesting witnessescivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises out of consolidated suits regarding the inheritance and ownership of a disputed property. The primary legal question involved the validity of a registered gift deed executed by the predecessor-in-interest, which was challenged by the female legal heirs on the grounds of fraud, lack of execution, and absence of essential ingredients of a gift under Muslim law, including delivery of possession. The Lahore High Court held that the mere registration of a gift deed does not prove its execution when challenged, and a heavy onus lies on the beneficiary to prove the transaction through convincing evidence, including examining the required attesting witnesses and proving delivery of possession. The Court further held that gifts designed to arbitrarily deprive female heirs of their inheritance must be strictly scrutinized, and where fraud is alleged, limitation runs from the date of knowledge. Consequently, the appellate court's judgment was set aside and the trial court's judgment decreeing the suit in favor of the petitioners was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere registration of a gift deed suffice to prove its execution when its validity is denied by the contesting parties?
  • What is the extent of the burden of proof placed upon the beneficiary of a gift to establish its genuineness?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to constitute a valid gift under Mohammadan Law?
  • From what point does the period of limitation begin to run when a gift deed is challenged on the ground of fraud?
  • Can the courts scrutinize the reasons and justification for a gift alleged to have been made to bypass the normal course of inheritance and deprive female heirs?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghazala Rehman vs Mst. Najma Sultana and othersSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghazal Rohi & others vs Mst. Saima Tabassum & others2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-01-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Firdous Bakht vs Javaid Khan and 3 others2015 P.S.C. 522 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2014-05-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. Firdous Akhtar and another vs Additional District Judge, Sahiwal2015 PLJ Lahore 213 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Feroza Begum vs Additional District Collector and others2015 PLD Lahore 384 · Lahore High Court · 2013-12-09Read full judgment →
• Mst. Feroz Jan through L.Rs. vs Iind Additional District Judge (South), Karachi and 2 others2015 CLC 293 · Sindh High Court · 2014-02-27
  ejectmentpersonal bona fide requirementlandlord and tenantstatement of attorneyconcurrent findingsburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the concurrent judgments of the lower courts whereby her ejectment from commercial premises was ordered on the ground of personal bona fide requirement of the landlady's sons under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the failure of the landlady and her beneficiaries to personally appear as witnesses and offer themselves for cross-examination is fatal to a plea of personal bona fide need, and whether the testimony of a duly authorized attorney on oath suffices to prove such need. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the testimony of the landlady's attorney on oath, supported by consistent pleadings and remaining unchallenged in cross-examination, is sufficient to prove personal bona fide requirement. The Court laid down the principle that the non-appearance of the landlady or her sons in court to offer themselves for cross-examination is not fatal to the plea of personal need, provided sufficient evidence through an attorney's statement and record is brought forth and left unrebutted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of a landlady or her beneficiaries to personally appear as witnesses and offer themselves for cross-examination is fatal to a plea of personal bona fide requirement?
  • Is the statement on oath of a landlady's attorney sufficient to prove the plea of personal bona fide need when left unchallenged in cross-examination?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact rendered by the lower courts regarding personal bona fide requirement under rent laws in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fatima Bibi through Legal Heirs and others vs Mst. Irshad Begum and others2015 YLR 1352 · Lahore High Court · 2014-07-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fateh Bibi vs Khizar Hayat and others2015 SCMR 907 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-02-13
  bail cancellationimprisonment for lifewithdrawal of petitionmisuse of bailconcession of bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition seeking the cancellation of bail granted to respondent No. 1. The petitioner's counsel pointed out a legal error in the impugned order of the Lahore High Court, wherein the learned Judge-in-Chamber observed that the offence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that this statement of law was incorrect and was likely made inadvertently by the High Court judge. Upon this clarification, the petitioner's counsel sought to withdraw the petition to approach the High Court for cancellation of bail on the grounds of misuse and abuse of the concession of bail by the respondent. Consequently, the Supreme Court disposed of the petition as withdrawn.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an observation that Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment for life is legally correct?
  • Can a petitioner withdraw a bail cancellation petition before the Supreme Court to file a fresh application before the High Court on grounds of misuse of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farzana Siddique vs State through Advocate General, Aj&K & 112015 PLJ Sh.C. (AJ&K) 23 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2014-01-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farzana Shafique, Sahiwal vs C.I.R., Zone, Sahiwal2015 PTD(Trib.) 678 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-04-07
  amended assessmenttime-barred assessmentstatutory limitationdeemed assessmentincome taxnon-prosecutionshow-cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a challenge to an order passed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), which had dismissed the taxpayer's appeal for non-prosecution. The taxpayer challenged the dismissal and further contested the validity of an amended assessment order passed by the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, arguing it was time-barred. The core legal question was whether the amended assessment order, issued under Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was framed within the statutory limitation period. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue held that the deemed assessment was completed on 30-9-2007, and the show-cause notice issued on 5-11-2012 was beyond the statutory time limit for amending such an assessment. Consequently, the Tribunal ruled that the amended assessment order was time-barred and not maintainable in law. The key principle established is that an amended assessment under Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, must strictly adhere to the statutory limitation periods, and proceedings initiated after the expiration of these periods are void ab initio.

  Questions settled

  • Is an amended assessment order valid if the show-cause notice is issued after the statutory limitation period prescribed in Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the failure to amend a deemed assessment within the statutory time limit render the subsequent amended assessment order void?
  • Can an appellate authority dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution when the underlying assessment order is fundamentally time-barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Faryal Gohar vs Ghandra University of Peshawar through Vice2015 YLR 51 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-07-17
  MBBS examinationpromotion to higher classPMDC regulationscivil revisioneducational institutionsfailure in subjects
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges an appellate court order that dismissed the petitioner's application for a direction to respondents to issue an examination form and permit her to appear in the 2nd year MBBS examination. The core legal question is whether an MBBS student who has failed a subject in the 1st professional part-I examination can be promoted to the 2nd year or permitted to appear in 2nd year examinations without first clearing the failed subject. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the petition, holding that under the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PM&DC) Regulations, no student can be promoted to a higher class unless they pass all subjects of the previous class, and there is an absolute bar on promotion and concurrent examination for students who have not cleared all subjects of the 1st professional part-I MBBS examination. The key principle laid down is that courts must enforce statutory regulations governing medical education and prevent unqualified students from using judicial orders to bypass academic prerequisites.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an MBBS student who fails a subject in 1st professional part-I can be promoted to 2nd year without clearing the failed subject?
  • Can a student be permitted to appear in 2nd year MBBS examinations while having backlogs in 1st year examinations?
  • Does the PM&DC Regulation bar the promotion of a student to a higher class unless all subjects of the previous class are passed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farida Bano vs Hazrat Muhammad etc.2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-03-31Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farasa Aijaz vs M/s. Qamaran Construction (Pvt) Ltd and AnotherSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Erum vs Mst. Ameena and 5 othersPIJ 2015 Karachi 177 · Sindh High Court · 2014-12-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Dr. Yousaf Fida and another vs Justice (Retired) Muhammad Azam2015 PLJ Peshawar 444 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Dr. Sabina Imran vs Mst. Zubaida BEGUMand 2 others2015 YLR 887 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-03-05
  gift deedmarginal witnessesQanun-e-Shahadat Ordertransfer of possessioncivil revisionburden of proofattestation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged the concurrent judgments of the lower courts, which declared a gift deed invalid in a suit for declaration and injunction filed by the respondent donor against the petitioner donee. The core legal question was whether the gift deed was validly executed and proved in accordance with the law. The High Court held that the gift deed was legally deficient as it failed to meet the mandatory requirement of two marginal witnesses under Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, as the second witness space remained unsigned and the scribe could not substitute as an attesting witness. Furthermore, the court found that the essential ingredients of a valid gift, particularly the transfer of possession, were not established, as the donor continued to receive rent from the property. The court affirmed the principle that the beneficiary of a disputed document bears the burden of proving its valid execution through cogent evidence, and failure to comply with statutory attestation requirements renders such a document ineffective. The petition was dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Does a gift deed lacking the signature of a second marginal witness satisfy the requirements of Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Can a scribe of a document be considered an attesting witness for the purposes of proving a gift deed?
  • Is the transfer of possession a necessary ingredient for the validity of a gift under Pakistani law?
  • Does the burden of proving the valid execution of a gift deed lie upon the beneficiary when the document is challenged?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Doda Begum vs Israr Hussain Zaidi & others2015 PLJ Karachi 1 · Sindh High Court · 2014-02-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Dilbar Jan (Widow) and 6 others vs Government of KPK (N.W.F.P.)2015 PLJ Peshawar 149 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Dadli vs The Federation of Pakistan and othersSindh High Court · -
  Payment of Wages ActService duesLegal heirsLabour Court jurisdictionIslamic Law of InheritanceGratuity distributionConstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order of the Sindh Labour Court which had overturned a decision by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act 1936. The dispute concerned the distribution of service dues—including gratuity and insurance—of a deceased Pakistan Railways employee among his legal heirs, specifically his mother and widow. The core legal question was whether the Labour Court correctly held that the Authority lacked jurisdiction to determine the distribution of dues among heirs and whether the petitioner, as a legal heir, was entitled to seek relief under the Payment of Wages Act 1936. The High Court held that the Labour Court failed to properly appreciate the scope of Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act 1936, which expressly permits legal heirs to file applications for non-payment of dues. The Court ruled that the Labour Court’s appellate decision was deficient for failing to provide rational findings on the merits of the claim and the propriety of payments made during pending litigation. Consequently, the matter was remanded for a fresh decision, emphasizing that statutory authorities must adjudicate claims rather than summarily relegating parties to civil courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act 1936 have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims regarding the distribution of a deceased employee's dues among legal heirs?
  • Are legal heirs of a deceased employee entitled to file an application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act 1936 for the recovery of unpaid service dues?
  • Can an appellate Labour Court set aside an order of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act 1936 without providing cogent reasons regarding the merits of the claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bushra Bibi and others vs Mst. Nasim Bibi and others2015 MLD 335 · Lahore High Court · 2013-06-03
  specific performanceoral agreementrevision petitionconcurrent findingscontradictory evidenceagreement to sell
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts whereby a suit for specific performance of an oral agreement to sell was decreed in favour of the plaintiff. The core legal question revolved around whether a suit for specific performance based on an unwritten, oral agreement can be decreed in the presence of vague pleadings, lack of witness details, and material contradictions in oral evidence regarding the payment of consideration. The Lahore High Court accepted the revision petition and set aside the lower courts' judgments, holding that while a suit for specific performance is maintainable on an oral agreement, it requires clear, specific, and convincing pleadings, including exact dates, times, and witness names, as well as consistent, unimpeachable evidence. The Court laid down the principle that where concurrent findings of lower courts ignore vital material contradictions on core issues like the payment of consideration and fail to apply settled legal standards for proving oral agreements, such findings are perverse and liable to be set aside in revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit for specific performance be maintained on the basis of an oral agreement to sell?
  • Whether specific details such as date, time, and names of witnesses must be pleaded in the plaint for an oral agreement to sell?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact immune from interference in revisional jurisdiction when lower courts ignore material contradictions in evidence?
  • What degree of proof is required to establish the payment of consideration in a suit for specific performance based on an oral contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bharyan and others vs Hassan Muhammad and others2015 PLD Lahore 421 · Lahore High Court · 2014-08-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bhagul (deceased) through L.Rs, and 8 others vs Abdullah and 72015 PLJ Karachi 185 · Sindh High Court · 2014-11-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Baswara vs Hafizullah Khan and others2015 PLJ Peshawar 14, 2015 PLD Peshawar 30 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-05-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Baswara and others vs Hafiz Ullh Khan and others2015 PLJ Peshawar 14 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-05-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bashiran Bibi vs Bashir Ahmad and 3 others2015 MLD 1131 · Lahore High Court · 2013-06-18
  transfer of trialbias of judicial officerpre-arrest bailapprehension of injusticejudicial independencecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under the inherent powers of the High Court seeking the transfer of a criminal trial, 'The State v. Bashir Ahmad', from the court of an Additional Sessions Judge in Mailsi to another jurisdiction. The petitioner alleged a loss of confidence in the trial court, claiming that the presiding judge had confirmed the respondent's pre-arrest bail through the influence of a police tout. The core legal question was whether a trial should be transferred based on mere apprehension of bias without substantiated proof of misconduct. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to provide any evidence to support the allegation of bias or to identify the alleged tout. Furthermore, the Court noted that the bail confirmation order itself appeared justified based on the facts. The Court emphasized that judicial officers are presumed to perform their duties with honesty and dedication. It laid down the principle that transfer of a trial cannot be granted on bald, unsubstantiated allegations, as doing so would undermine the independence and security of judicial officers and encourage parties to make motivated, false accusations for personal gain.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal trial be transferred to another court based solely on a party's bald allegation of bias without supporting evidence?
  • Does the confirmation of a bail order by a trial court, without more, constitute sufficient grounds to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias?
  • What is the standard for transferring a trial when a party alleges that a judicial officer has been influenced by external factors?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Basharat Jehan vs Director-General, Federal Government2015 PLC (C.S.) 1519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-07-11
  service lawage relaxationvested rightlocus poenitentiaeappointment cancellationmisconductcivil servantrecruitment rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from the termination of the appellant's service as an Assistant Librarian (BPS-09) by the respondent department on the ground that she was over-age at the time of appointment. The core legal question was whether the department could unilaterally cancel an appointment, citing an alleged error in the advertised age limit, after the appellant had been selected on merit and joined service. The Supreme Court held that the department could not benefit from its own oversight or error in the advertisement, especially where the appellant had fulfilled all requirements as advertised. The Court ruled that the appointment created a vested right in the appellant that could not be arbitrarily withdrawn. The key principle laid down is the doctrine of locus poenitentiae, which prevents an authority from withdrawing a validly issued appointment order once a right has vested in the appointee, particularly when the alleged error in the recruitment process was attributable to the department itself rather than the candidate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government department cancel an appointment on the ground of age-limit error when the candidate met the criteria specified in the advertisement?
  • Does an appointment letter issued after fulfilling codal formalities create a vested right that cannot be unilaterally withdrawn?
  • Is a government department bound by its own advertisement regarding age limits, or can it later claim the advertisement contained a typographical error?
  • Does the doctrine of locus poenitentiae prevent the withdrawal of an appointment order once a candidate has joined service?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Basharat Jehan vs Director General, Federal Government Education, Fgei (C_Q), Rawalpindi and others2015 KLR S.C. 164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service lawage relaxationvested rightlocus poenitentiaetermination of serviceappointment validitydiscrimination in service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the termination of the appellant from her position as an Assistant Librarian (BPS-09) on the grounds of being over-age at the time of appointment. The core legal question was whether the appellant, who was 37 years old at the time of application, was ineligible for the post despite the advertisement specifying a maximum age of 35 years, and whether the department could retrospectively cancel her appointment based on an alleged error in the advertisement or a failure to obtain specific age relaxation. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was not over-age, as the government had issued a general policy notification granting a five-year age relaxation for initial appointments. The Court found that the department could not benefit from its own oversight or claim the advertisement was erroneous after the appellant had already been selected and joined service. The Court held that once an appointment is made following codal formalities, a vested right is created, and the doctrine of locus poenitentiae prevents the arbitrary withdrawal of such an appointment. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was reinstated with seniority preserved.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer unilaterally withdraw an appointment letter after the employee has joined service based on an alleged error in the advertisement?
  • Does the doctrine of locus poenitentiae prevent the withdrawal of an appointment once a vested right has been created?
  • Are departments under the Federal Government bound by general policy directives regarding age relaxation issued by the Federal Government?
  • Can a department claim an advertisement contained a typographical error regarding age limits to justify the termination of an employee?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Basharat Jehan vs Director General, Federal Government2015 PLJ SC 1002 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  age relaxationvested rightlocus poenitentiaeservice tribunalremoval from servicemisconductappointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges the Federal Service Tribunal's judgment dismissing the appellant's service appeal regarding her removal from the position of Assistant Librarian (BPS-09) on the ground of being over-aged. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant was entitled to general age relaxation as per government policy and whether an appointment duly made and acted upon can be arbitrarily withdrawn after vesting rights in the appointee. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the advertised age limit of 35 years coupled with the general five-year age relaxation policy of the Federal Government rendered the appellant eligible, and that the department could not take advantage of its own alleged oversight or typo regarding recruitment rules. The Court laid down the principle that once an appointment is made after fulfilling codal formalities and the appointee joins service, a vested right is created, and the authority cannot unilaterally withdraw it under the doctrine of locus poenitentiae.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee can be removed from service on the ground of being over-aged when the advertisement specified an age limit consistent with a general governmental age relaxation policy?
  • Does an appointment letter issued after fulfilling codal formalities create a vested right that cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn?
  • Can the executive authority take advantage of its own oversight or alleged typographical error in an employment advertisement to the detriment of an employee?
  • Whether the doctrine of locus poenitentiae bars the withdrawal of an appointment after the appointee has assumed office?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Balqees Begum etc vs Arbab Hidayatullah Khan etc.2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-04-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bakhtan Mai and 14 others vs Mst. Anwar MM and 49 others2015 PLJ Lahore 1142 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bachho vs Abdul Qayyum Khan alias Habib Ullah and 14 others2015 CLC 805 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-06-17
  revision petitiondismissal in liminefirst appealcontinuation of suitjoint khataalienationremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a revision petition challenging the dismissal of her first appeal by the Additional District Judge against the trial court's judgment, which had dismissed her suit for declaration regarding joint khata property and mutations. The core legal question was whether the appellate court could dismiss a first appeal in limine without issuing notice to the respondents or examining the entire evidence as required by law. The Peshawar High Court held that the appellate court failed in its legal duty by dismissing the first appeal in limine without calling for the record or hearing the respondents, thereby violating the mandatory provisions of Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The court established that an appeal is a continuation of the suit, and the first appellate court—being the final court of facts—must re-evaluate the entire evidence, frame points for determination, and provide reasoned conclusions. Consequently, the revision petition was accepted, the appellate judgment was set aside, and the case was remanded for a decision afresh on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a first appellate court dismiss an appeal in limine without calling for the record or hearing the respondents?
  • Is a first appellate court legally obliged to comply with the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether an appeal is considered a continuation of the suit requiring the appellate court to review the entire evidence?
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• Mst. Azra Parvez and 3 otherss vs Sheikh Ashfaq Hussain and 7 others2015 CLC 1695 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-09
  administrative suitinterim injunctionappointment of receiverattachment before judgmentbalance of convenienceirreparable lossinheritance claimpreliminary decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This order of the Sindh High Court disposed of multiple interlocutory applications in an administrative suit filed by plaintiffs claiming inheritance rights through their deceased mother. The plaintiffs sought interim injunctions (Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2, C.P.C.), attachment before judgment (Order XXXVIII, Rule 8, C.P.C.), and the appointment of a Receiver (Order XL, Rule 1, C.P.C.), while defendants sought vacation of an interim stay. The Court held that an applicant for an injunction must satisfy all three mandatory conditions: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss. Although a prima facie case existed due to undisputed legal heirship, the plaintiffs failed on balance of convenience and irreparable loss owing to delay and the ongoing management of properties/companies by defendants. Appointment of a Receiver was denied as no wastage or dissipation was shown, and attachment before judgment was inapplicable without prior attachment or proof of intent to obstruct execution. Ultimately, all interlocutory applications were dismissed, and the Nazir was appointed as Commissioner under Order XX, Rule 13, C.P.C. to conduct an inquiry into the estate's liabilities and properties.

  Questions settled

  • Can an interim injunction be granted if one of the three essential requirements—prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss—is missing?
  • Does establishing a prima facie right as a legal heir automatically entitle a plaintiff to the appointment of a Receiver under Order XL, Rule 1, C.P.C.?
  • Can an application for investigation of claims under Order XXXVIII, Rule 8, C.P.C. be maintained without an existing order of attachment before judgment?
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• Mst. Azeeman Mai vs The State and 8 others2015 P Cr. L J 410 · Lahore High Court · 2014-04-07
  private complaintpolice challanconsolidation of trialsmurderrevision petitionprotest petitioninnocent by police
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged a judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge dismissing her private complaint under sections 302/460/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in limine. The core legal question was whether a private complaint must be given preference and tried separately from a police challan case when the versions are similar but the police report declared certain nominated accused innocent. The Lahore High Court held that where the version and the accused are practically the same in both the complaint and the challan cases, separate trials or invariable preference for the complaint are not mandatory; instead, both cases should be consolidated and tried together through a unified procedure to avoid prejudice to the complainant and ensure a fair opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The court laid down the principle that consolidation of the challan case and private complaint is appropriate when the prosecution story and parties are essentially overlapping, thus safeguarding the complainant's rights without necessitating redundant parallel proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a private complaint must invariably be given preference and tried separately from a police challan case when both arise from the same occurrence?
  • Can a trial court dismiss a private complaint in limine merely because a police challan concerning the same incident is already proceeding?
  • What is the proper procedure to be adopted by a trial court when both a police report case and a private complaint are pending for the same offence with overlapping accused and versions?
  • Whether consolidation of a challan case and a private complaint safeguards the rights of a complainant against adverse police investigation findings?
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• Mst. Ayyan Ali vs The State, etc2015 KLR Criminal Cases 190 · Lahore High Court · 2015-07-14
  post-arrest bailcustoms smugglingforeign currencyabductionrapegood faith marriageacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The first matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail in a case involving alleged smuggling of foreign currency. The court held that because the petitioner was apprehended before reaching the customs declaration counter, the stage for declaring baggage contents had not yet arrived, necessitating further probe into the intent to smuggle. Citing the principle that taking foreign currency out of Pakistan beyond permissible limits is technical rather than anti-social, and noting the petitioner's gender and lack of criminal record, the court granted bail. The second matter is a criminal appeal against a conviction for abduction and rape. The court held that the prosecution failed to prove the appellant had conscious knowledge of the prosecutrix's existing marriage. Finding the prosecutrix's testimony regarding abduction and intoxication implausible, the court ruled that an individual who enters a marriage in good faith, unaware of the partner's prior marital status, cannot be penalized for the invalidity of that marriage. The conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the apprehension of a passenger before the customs declaration counter negate the immediate intent to smuggle foreign currency?
  • Is a person who enters into a marriage in good faith, unaware of the partner's existing prior marriage, criminally liable for the invalidity of the second marriage?
  • Can a conviction for abduction and rape be sustained solely on the testimony of a prosecutrix whose account of events is inherently implausible and contradicted by the circumstances?
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• Mst. Ayesha Malik. vs Station House Officer, etc.2015 LHC 1101 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ayesha Malik vs Station House Officer, P.S. City Jampur District2015 LHC 1101, 2015 PLJ Lahore 1065 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ashram Bibi vs Musa Khan, etc.2015 PLJ Islamabad 103 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ashram Bibi vs Musa Khan and others2015 PLJ Islamabad 103, 2015 CLC 973 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-11
  benami transactionburden of prooftitle declarationproperty ownershipcivil appealsource of funds
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a trial court judgment and decree dated 14-3-1987, which declared the plaintiff (predecessor-in-interest of respondents) the owner of a plot in Islamabad, effectively declaring the appellant's title as benami. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff successfully established the benami nature of the property transaction. The Islamabad High Court held that the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proof required to establish a benami transaction. The Court emphasized that a transaction cannot be characterized as benami merely because one person provided the funds for the purchase. The key principle laid down is that a party alleging a benami transaction must provide cogent, unimpeachable evidence regarding four essential elements: the source of funds, the custody of original title documents, the possession of the property, and the motive behind the benami arrangement. As the plaintiff failed to address or prove these elements, the Court set aside the trial court's judgment and dismissed the suit, noting that challenging a transaction only after strained relations between spouses lacks bona fide intent.

  Questions settled

  • What are the four essential elements required to prove a benami transaction?
  • Does the mere provision of funds for a property purchase by one person in the name of another automatically render the transaction benami?
  • Is a transaction considered benami if the plaintiff fails to establish the custody of title documents and possession of the property?
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• Mst. Arooj Malik vs Addl. District Judge, etc2015 KLR Civil Cases 353 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Arooj Malik etc. vs Addl District Judge etc.2015 PLJ Lahore 946 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Arooj Malik -- Muhammad Sadiq vs Addl. District Judge, Etc.s2015 KLR Civil Cases 353, 2015 PLJ Lahore 946, 2015 NLR Civil 372 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Anwar Sultana (Deceased) through L.Rs. vs Bank Alfalah Ltd. and others2015 NLR Civil 191, 2015 P.S.C 1494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  court auctionexecution of decreesetting aside salecondition precedentlimitation periodcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellants' execution first appeal regarding an auction-sold property. The core legal question was whether an application under Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for setting aside a court auction sale can be entertained without the simultaneous deposit of the required amounts, and whether the executing court has the power to extend the limitation period for making such deposits. The Supreme Court held that the deposit of 5% of the purchase money and the proclaimed amount of sale is a condition precedent to the entertainment of an application under Order XXI, Rule 89, CPC, and that both the application and the deposit must be made within thirty days pursuant to Article 166 of the Limitation Act 1908. The court further held that the executing court lacks jurisdiction to extend time for these deposits. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the deposit of the specified amounts is a condition precedent to the entertainment of an application under Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can the executing court extend the time for depositing the amounts required under Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What is the limitation period for filing an application under Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 along with the requisite deposit?
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• Mst. Anwar Sultana (Decd.) THR. L.R. vs Bank Alfalah Ltd. and Others2015 NLR Civil 191 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-03-13
  execution of decreeauction salesetting aside salecondition precedentextension of timelimitation periodexecuting court powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing an execution first appeal concerning auction proceedings. The core legal questions were whether an application under Order XXI Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside an execution sale can be entertained without the mandatory deposits, and whether an executing court has jurisdiction to extend time for such deposits beyond the statutory limit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision and held that depositing 5% of the purchase money for the auction purchaser and the proclaimed amount for the decree-holder are mandatory conditions precedent to entertaining an application under Order XXI Rule 89 CPC. The Court ruled that Article 166 of the Limitation Act 1908 imposes a strict 30-day period from the date of sale for making both the application and the required deposits. Furthermore, executing courts lack jurisdiction under Section 148 CPC to extend the time for deposit beyond this statutory timeframe.

  Questions settled

  • Is the deposit of required amounts under Order XXI Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 a mandatory condition precedent for entertaining an application to set aside an auction sale?
  • Does an executing court have jurisdiction under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to extend time for making deposits under Order XXI Rule 89 CPC?
  • What is the limitation period under Article 166 of the Limitation Act 1908 for making an application and deposit to set aside an execution sale?
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• Mst. Amreen ,Asifa Kanwal and another ,Nazam Hussain,Zobila Kousar ,Ashfaq Hussain vs Muhammad Kabir,Raja Waleed Asad,Zobila Kousar and 2 others, Nazam Hussain,Sajda Kousar and 4 others2015 P.S.C. 803 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Mst. Ammara Tasnim Bhutta vs Mst. Khalida Munir and another2015 PLJ Lahore 674 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ameeran Mai vs Inspector General of Police Punjab and 2 others2015 PLJ Lahore 342 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-09Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ameeran Mai vs I.-G. Punjab Police, Lahore and 2 others2015 PLJ Lahore 342, 2015 PLC (C.S.) 289 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-09
  constitutional petitionpolice recruitmentshaheed and family claim basisvested rightsretrospective operation of notificationeducational standarddriver constable
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed by Mst. Ameeran Mai seeking the recruitment of her son, Muhammad Imran, as a driver constable in the police department on a family claim basis following the death of her husband in harness on May 10, 2011. The core legal question was whether a subsequent notification or standing order changing the educational qualification requirement from Middle to Matric could retrospectively take away the right to be considered for recruitment that had already accrued under the existing policy at the time of the death. The Lahore High Court allowed the petition, holding that vested rights cannot be impaired by subsequent executive notifications operating retrospectively, and that notifications altering educational standards apply prospectively rather than retrospectively. The key principle laid down is that executive notifications and standing orders cannot take away accrued or vested rights and operate prospectively unless expressly sanctioned otherwise.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent notification changing educational qualifications can take away a right to recruitment that has already accrued?
  • Do executive notifications impairing existing rights apply retrospectively in the absence of explicit legal sanction?
  • Is the requirement of a Middle standard applicable to the son of a deceased police employee under Standing Order No. 1 of 2008 as amended in June 2011?
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• Mst. Ameer Khatoon vs Mst. Pathani and others2015 LHC 2984 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ambreen Khanam vs Government of Sindh and othersSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Alia Riaz vs Covernment of Punjab and others2015 CLC 1640 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-10Read full judgment →