Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and another vs Javaid2011 SCMR 1013 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-02-14
  life insuranceuberrima fidesliquidated damagesInsurance Tribunaladditional evidenceconcealment of factsrecovery suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for recovery of insurance amounts and liquidated damages filed by the respondent following the death of his wife, who held two life insurance policies. The Insurance Tribunal and the Lahore High Court concurrently decreed the suit, finding the policies valid and revived through premium payments. The petitioners contended that the policies were void due to a breach of the principle of 'uberrima fides' (utmost good faith), alleging the deceased concealed a pre-existing medical condition. They also challenged the rejection of an application to examine a doctor as an additional witness. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to produce evidence establishing any concealment or fraud. It further ruled that the request to examine the doctor was rightly dismissed as the underlying medical certificate was not properly filed or relied upon in accordance with Order XIII, Rule 1 and Order VII, Rule 14 of the C.P.C. Finally, the Court upheld the award of liquidated damages under Section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, as the claim was withheld without reasonable cause. Leave to appeal was declined.

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• Sohail Khan and another vs Afzal Hussain and others2011 SCMR 1532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-30
  leave to appealqatl-e-amdself-defencesuppression of injuriesreappraisal of evidencecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the impugned judgment of the High Court whereby the death sentence of the respondent-convict was commuted to life imprisonment. The core legal questions pertained to the appreciation of evidence regarding the exact place of occurrence, the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused party, and whether the convict was liable for qatl-e-amd or had exceeded the right of private defence. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the rival versions of the incident and the plea of self-defence warranted a thorough examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in both criminal petitions to enable a reappraisal of the entire evidence on record. The key principle laid down is that where cross-versions involving a plea of self-defence and suppression of injuries are presented, leave to appeal may be granted for a comprehensive reappraisal of the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the convict can be held liable for qatl-e-amd or if he exceeded the right of claimed self-defence?
  • Does the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused party warrant a reappraisal of evidence?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted for the reappraisal of evidence in a criminal case involving rival versions of an incident?
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• Sohail Butt vs Deputy Inspector-General of Police (North) National2011 PLC (C.S.) 846 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-05-20
  service tribunaldepartmental appeallimitationunauthorized absenceremoval from servicesubstantial question of law of public importanceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the petitioner's service appeal as time-barred and on merits. The petitioner, a Senior Patrol Officer in the National Highways and Motorway Police, had been dismissed from service for prolonged unauthorized absence from duty after disciplinary proceedings under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted that the petitioner's departmental appeal was barred by limitation for over two years, rendering both the departmental appeal and the subsequent tribunal appeal incompetent. The Court affirmed that where a departmental appeal is time-barred, an appeal before the Service Tribunal is likewise incompetent. Furthermore, the Court held that findings of fact by the Service Tribunal do not warrant interference under Article 212(3) of the Constitution unless the case involves a substantial question of law of public importance. Finding no such question of law of public importance or any misreading of evidence, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal is competent when the departmental appeal is filed beyond the period of limitation?
  • Does a finding of fact recorded by the Service Tribunal warrant interference by the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What constitutes a substantial question of law of public importance for the grant of leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Sindh High Court Bar Association through Secretary and another vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad and others2011 PLD Supreme Court 671 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-07-22
  natural justiceaudi alteram partemnoticeemergency of 3rd November 2007constitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from constitutional petitions concerning the events of 3rd November 2007, involving the Federation of Pakistan and General (Rtd.) Pervez Musharraf. During the hearings, the core legal question arose as to whether notice should be issued to General (Rtd.) Pervez Musharraf before proceeding, given potential adverse observations or actions against him, and whether exceptions to the principle of natural justice applied based on historical precedents. The Court held that it is a cardinal and universal principle of natural justice that no one should be condemned unheard, and courts must invariably provide an opportunity of being heard when an adverse decision or action is likely against an individual, notwithstanding the silence of relevant statutes. The Court distinguished prior case law where notice was omitted or where superior courts refrained from making binding observations against absent parties, and ordered that formal notice be issued to General (Rtd.) Pervez Musharraf pursuant to the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. The key principle laid down is the strict adherence to the audi alteram partem rule, requiring personal notice to affected individuals despite widespread public awareness of proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether notice of proceedings must be issued to a person against whom adverse observations or actions are likely to be taken?
  • Does widespread media publicity of court proceedings satisfy the legal requirement of the principle of audi alteram partem?
  • Whether the failure of the government to defend an individual's actions dispenses with the requirement of issuing a notice to that individual?
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• Silk Bank Limited vs Qazi Ehtishamul Haq and others2011 CLD 1569 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-02-23
  judgment and decreeforum to assail decreedoctrine of mergerBanking CourtFirst Appealexecution proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a technical controversy regarding the proper forum to approach for setting aside a judgment and decree. The core legal question is whether an application to set aside a judgment and decree passed by an appellate court should be filed before that appellate court or the original trial court. The Supreme Court held that under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 or general law, a judgment and decree of a court can only be assailed before that very court, especially where the lower court's judgment has merged into the appellate court's judgment. The Court laid down the principle that the proper forum for assailing a decree that has been varied or finalized in appeal is the appellate court itself and not the lower court, and execution proceedings are to be suspended pending the disposal of such an application.

  Questions settled

  • Which court is the proper forum to approach for setting aside a judgment and decree that has been varied in appeal?
  • Does the judgment and decree of a lower court merge into the judgment and decree of the appellate court?
  • Can a Banking Court entertain an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 against a decree passed by the High Court in appeal?
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• Sikandar Zaman vs The State and others2011 SCMR 870 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-09-18
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequematrimonial disputeprohibitory clausedelay in trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal converted into an appeal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, wherein the appellant sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the dishonour of a cheque amounting to Rs. 100,000 issued in favour of his wife. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to post-arrest bail considering the matrimonial nature of the dispute, the allegation of forged signatures, and the fact that the offense did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and granted bail to the appellant, holding that since the offense did not fall within the prohibitory clause, trial was not concluded within the timeframe directed by the High Court, and the dispute essentially stemmed from strained matrimonial relations, further incarceration was not warranted. The key principle laid down is that bail is to be liberally granted in offenses falling outside the prohibitory clause, particularly when trial delays occur and the dispute arises from matrimonial discord.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to bail as a matter of right when the alleged offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a matrimonial dispute involving a financial transaction under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 warrant post-arrest bail when the trial is not concluded expeditiously?
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• Shoukat Ali vs The State2011 PSC (Crl.) 419 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Qatl-e-Amdcapital punishmentinjured eyewitnessmedical corroborationabsconsioncriminal appealrejection of plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant for Qatl-e-Amd under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with convictions for attempted murder and hurt, resulting in a sentence of death and terms of imprisonment. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular testimony, the corroborative value of medical evidence, delayed recovery of the weapon, and the credibility of injured eyewitnesses. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the lower courts were based on a proper appraisal of evidence, noting that the testimony of the injured eyewitnesses remained consistent, unshattered, and fully corroborated by medical evidence and circumstantial proofs. The appeal was consequently dismissed, affirming the convictions and sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of injured eyewitnesses can form the basis of a conviction for murder and attempted murder when corroborated by medical evidence?
  • Does a delay in the recovery of the weapon of offense inherently discredit the prosecution's case?
  • Whether failure of an accused to depose on oath under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 impacts the assessment of a Section 342 defense plea?
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• Shoukar Ilahi vs Javed Iqbal etc.2011 PLJ SC 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-03-01
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationplea of alibipolice investigation reportrule of consistencymurderdeeper appreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the cancellation of post-arrest bail granted to the petitioner, who was accused of murder under Sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner sought bail primarily on the grounds that the police had declared him innocent during the investigation and that he was entitled to the rule of consistency following the bail granted to a co-accused. The core legal question was whether a police finding of innocence or a plea of alibi, unsupported by evidence at the time of the initial bail application, constitutes sufficient grounds for bail in a non-bailable offence. The Supreme Court held that the opinion of the police is not binding on the court, which must independently assess the material on record. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a plea of alibi requiring deeper appreciation of evidence cannot be evaluated at the bail stage. Consequently, the Court upheld the cancellation of bail, affirming that there were reasonable grounds to believe the petitioner was involved in the offence.

  Questions settled

  • Is the opinion of the police declaring an accused innocent binding upon the court during bail proceedings?
  • Can a plea of alibi be evaluated at the bail stage if it requires deeper appreciation of evidence?
  • Does the rule of consistency apply to bail matters where the co-accused was granted bail based on a police report of innocence?
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• Sheraz Khan vs The State2011 PSC (Crl.) 78 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-04-29
  murderdeath sentencerelated witnessesocular testimonymedical corroborationmitigating circumstancescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the dismissal of the appellant's appeal against his conviction and death sentence under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Aqal Shah. The core legal questions revolved around the credibility of related and chance eye-witnesses, the presence of contradictions in the prosecution's case, and whether a single fire and trivial motive constitute mitigating circumstances for commuting the death sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt through consistent, confidence-inspiring testimony of the complainant and an eye-witness, which was duly corroborated by medical evidence and motive. The Court laid down the principle that the testimony of related or natural witnesses cannot be discredited solely on the ground of inter se relationship in the absence of a motive to falsely implicate, and that minor contradictions naturally occurring with the passage of time do not undermine an otherwise reliable ocular account.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of related eye-witnesses be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship with the deceased?
  • Does a single fire attributed to the accused constitute a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Do minor contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses warrant the rejection of their otherwise consistent testimony?
  • Can a suggestion put to a witness during cross-examination take the place of substantive proof?
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• Shehri-Cbe and others vs City District Government, Karachi and others2011 SCMR 287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-08-19
  Constitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionfactual controversyland utilizationpublic interest litigationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing their Constitutional petition concerning the utilization of land known as Gutter Baghaicha, Karachi. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly declined to exercise its Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, given that the petitioners sought to re-agitate matters involving complex factual controversies and alleged violations of a previous Supreme Court order in a Human Rights case. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision was correct and dismissed the petition. The Court reasoned that the matter involved disputed facts and required detailed factual inquiries based on evidence, which are unsuitable for resolution within the summary framework of Constitutional jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 cannot be invoked to resolve factual controversies that require the recording of evidence; such matters must be pursued through appropriate civil proceedings where evidence can be properly examined and findings of fact can be established.

  Questions settled

  • Can Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 be invoked to resolve complex factual controversies requiring evidence?
  • Are proceedings in a Constitutional petition equivalent to proceedings in a civil suit for the purpose of recording evidence?
  • Does a previous order in a Human Rights case regarding a proposed settlement create a fresh cause of action for a Constitutional petition?
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• Shamshad Ali vs The State2011 SCMR 1394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-05-13
  murderdeath sentencefilicideTazirQisasnatural witnessmedical evidencemotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave was directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which confirmed the death sentence awarded to the appellant for the murder of his thirteen-year-old daughter. The prosecution's case rested on the ocular testimony of the appellant's wife, who witnessed the appellant repeatedly attacking the deceased with a hatchet inside their home. The appellant contended that he was falsely implicated due to his wife's alleged immoral character and that the prosecution failed to prove a motive. The Supreme Court observed that the ocular account was provided by a natural witness and was corroborated by medical evidence. The Court rejected the appellant's defense regarding the character of the deceased, noting that medical reports confirmed her hymen was intact. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the prohibition of Qisas under Section 306(b) PPC does not bar a sentence of death as Tazir under Section 302(b) PPC. Finding no mitigating circumstances in the brutal nature of the attack, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a father who commits the qatl-e-amd of his child can be sentenced to death as Tazir under Section 302(b) PPC despite the provisions of Section 306 PPC?
  • Is the failure of the prosecution to prove a specific motive fatal to a conviction if the ocular and medical evidence is otherwise reliable?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on the solitary statement of a natural witness if it is found to be confidence-inspiring and corroborated by medical evidence?
  • Does the prohibition of Qisas under Section 306(b) PPC provide immunity from capital punishment under Tazir?
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• Shakeel & others vs State2011 PLJ SC 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-09-17
  Zina-bil-Jabrcommon intentioncorroborationcriminal appealrape convictionsentencingOffence of Zina Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the convictions and sentences for Zina-bil-Jabr under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, upheld by the Lahore High Court. The primary legal questions concerned the sufficiency of the prosecutrix's solitary testimony, the necessity of corroboration, the applicability of common intention for capital sentencing, and the jurisdiction of the Special Court. The Supreme Court held that while the prosecutrix's testimony was credible and sufficient to sustain a conviction, the prosecution failed to establish a pre-arranged plan or common intention among the accused to justify the death penalty under Section 10(4). Consequently, the Court set aside the death sentences, convicting the appellants under Section 10(3) instead, and reduced the sentences for the offence under Section 11. The Court affirmed the principle that corroboration is a rule of prudence, not law, and that common intention requires a distinct meeting of minds, differentiating it from merely similar intentions. Furthermore, the Court declined to address the belated jurisdictional challenge, noting it was not raised during trial or in the leave petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for Zina-bil-Jabr be based on the solitary statement of the prosecutrix?
  • Does the omission of semen grouping in a rape case materially affect the prosecution's evidence?
  • What is the legal distinction between 'same or similar intention' and 'common intention' in criminal liability?
  • Can a jurisdictional objection not raised at the trial or appellate stage be entertained by the Supreme Court if not part of the leave grant?
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• Shahzada and another vs State2011 PLJ SC 472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-01-18
  narcotics possessionconscious possessionburden of proofcriminal liabilityrecovery of contrabandjoint possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellants for an offence under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of 180 kilograms of charas and one kilogram of opium from the trunk of a car in which they were passengers. The core legal question was whether passengers in a vehicle can be held liable for the possession of contraband found in the vehicle's trunk when the driver, who fled the scene, had exclusive control of the vehicle. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish that the appellants had conscious possession of the narcotics. The Court reasoned that mere presence in a vehicle does not equate to possession of items concealed in a trunk, absent evidence of knowledge, conspiracy, or abetment. The key principle laid down is that for passengers to be held liable for contraband found in a vehicle, the prosecution must prove they had knowledge of the illicit items or that the items were in plain view; otherwise, the burden of proof regarding conscious possession remains with the prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Can passengers in a vehicle be held liable for narcotics found in the trunk if they had no knowledge of the contraband?
  • Does the mere presence of a passenger in a vehicle containing narcotics establish joint possession with the driver?
  • What is the evidentiary requirement for the prosecution to establish conscious possession of narcotics against vehicle passengers?
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• Shahzad Ahmed vs State through FIA Islamabad2011 PLJ SC 55 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-04-13
  post-arrest bailcorruptionmisappropriation of public fundsdiscretionary jurisdictiontender fraudbail cancellationFIA investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a post-arrest bail application in a corruption case involving the Federal Investigation Agency. The petitioner was accused of misappropriating public funds through fraudulent billing and the unauthorized installation of a computer system for issuing arms licenses. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the allegations and the material on record. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing to grant bail. The Court held that bail is a privilege, not a right, and must be exercised based on sound judicial principles. In corruption cases, courts must adopt a pragmatic approach to investigation and bail, as excessive leniency hinders the eradication of systemic corruption. The Court emphasized that it will not interfere with the discretion exercised by lower courts unless it violates established legal principles. Furthermore, the Court noted that while bail decisions are tentative, the material on record sufficiently connected the petitioner to the alleged offenses, thereby justifying the denial of bail despite the principle of consistency, as each case must be decided on its own peculiar facts.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of bail a matter of right or a privilege to be exercised at the court's discretion?
  • Should courts adopt a more pragmatic approach in corruption cases when considering bail applications?
  • Does the principle of consistency apply when subsequent investigation reports provide new material connecting an accused to an offense?
  • What factors must a court consider when deciding a bail application?
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• Shahnaz Parveen vs PTCL through President and others2011 SCMR 1924 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-11-20
  Voluntary Separation Schemelabour lawcoercionquestion of factleave to appealservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a grievance petition by the Punjab Labour Court and the subsequent dismissal of a labour appeal by the Lahore High Court. The petitioner, an employee of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL), had opted for a Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS), which was accepted by the management. Subsequently, the petitioner challenged the validity of her option, alleging that it was exercised under coercion and fear of termination rather than voluntarily. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner's exercise of the option for the VSS was voluntary or coerced. The Supreme Court held that the determination of whether an option was exercised voluntarily or under duress constitutes a pure question of fact. Consequently, the Court refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, as no question of law of public importance was presented. The Court affirmed that it would not adjudicate upon factual controversies already settled by lower forums without substantive evidence to support the petitioner's claims.

  Questions settled

  • Is the question of whether an employee's option for a voluntary separation scheme was exercised voluntarily a question of fact or law?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by a Labour Court and the High Court in the absence of a question of law of public importance?
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• Shahid Orakzai Ch. Nisar Ali Khan vs Pakistan Through Secretary Law,_b77b34f6K.L.R. 2011 Supreme Court 59 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Chairman National Accountability Bureauappointment validityconsultation with Leader of the Oppositionnon-extendable periodquo warrantopublic importancefundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions challenged the appointment of Mr. Justice (Retired) Syed Deedar Hussain Shah as the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau. The core legal questions involved whether the appointment complied with the mandatory consultative requirements under Section 6(b)(i) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, whether the President was bound by the advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan, and whether a fresh appointment after the withdrawal of an earlier notification violated the statutory bar against a non-extendable tenure. The Supreme Court held that the respondent's second appointment was made without consulting the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly as mandated by law, and that a fresh appointment following a premature discontinuation of an earlier term circumvented the statutory embargo of a non-extendable four-year period. Consequently, the court declared the appointment illegal and ultra vires, directing the respondent to cease holding office forthwith. The key legal principles laid down include that mandatory statutory consultation processes must be strictly followed, that appointments for a non-extendable period cannot be manipulated through successive re-appointments, and that such high-profile anti-corruption appointments directly implicate fundamental rights and access to justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointment of the Chairman, National Accountability Bureau is subject to mandatory consultation with the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly under Section 6(b)(i) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does the statutory provision of a 'non-extendable period' for the tenure of the Chairman, National Accountability Bureau prohibit a fresh appointment of the same person following the withdrawal or cancellation of an initial appointment?
  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan is maintainable to challenge the appointment of the head of a premier anti-corruption institution on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights?
  • Whether the President of Pakistan is bound to act upon the advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(1) of the Constitution when appointing the Chairman, National Accountability Bureau?
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• Shahid Orakzai & another vs Pakistan through Secretary Law, Ministry of Law, Islamabad and others2011 PLJ SC 798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Chairman NABconsultation with Leader of the Oppositionnon-extendable periodpublic importancefundamental rightsquo warrantoconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions challenged the appointment of Mr. Justice (Retired) Syed Deedar Hussain Shah as Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) under Section 6(b)(i) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal questions revolved around whether the mandatory statutory requirement of consulting the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly was fulfilled, whether the appointment violated constitutional provisions regarding the Prime Minister's advice, and whether a fresh appointment after the withdrawal of a prior notification circumvented the statutory embargo against re-appointment for a 'non-extendable period'. The Supreme Court held that the second appointment made on February 9, 2011, was distinct, and since it was executed without any consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, it was patently illegal and ultra vires. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the statutory term of a 'non-extendable period of four years' bars any re-appointment of the same incumbent. The petitions were accepted, declaring the appointment illegal and directing the respondent to cease holding office forthwith.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointment of the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau without consulting the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly violates Section 6(b)(i) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does the statutory term 'non-extendable period' under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 prohibit the re-appointment of an incumbent to the office of Chairman, National Accountability Bureau?
  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan is maintainable to challenge the appointment of the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau?
  • Can a defective initial appointment to a public office be legally cured by a subsequent appointment made without fulfilling mandatory statutory consultative requirements?
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• Shahid Orakazi and another vs Pakistan through Secretary Law, Ministry2011 PLD Supreme Court 365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-03-10
  Chairman NABconsultationnon-extendable periodconstitutional petitionseparation of powersLeader of the Oppositionpublic importancequo warrantotenure limit
  Summary & questions settled

  These Constitution Petitions filed under Article 184(3) challenged the appointment of Mr. Justice (Retired) Syed Deedar Hussain Shah as Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The petitioners asserted that the appointment violated Section 6(b)(i) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and constitutional mandates regarding executive advice and meaningful consultation. The core legal questions involved whether the President's second appointment of the respondent (after withdrawing the first) constituted a fresh appointment requiring new consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, and whether the 'non-extendable' tenure bar applied. The Supreme Court held the appointment illegal and ultra vires, ruling that the second appointment was a distinct legal act that lacked the mandatory consultation required by statute. The Court laid down that 'consultation' must be meaningful, purposive, and consensus-oriented. Furthermore, it established that the statutory 'non-extendable period' prevents the reappointment of a person to the same office once the initial appointment process has been triggered and acted upon, regardless of whether the full term was completed, to prevent circumvention of tenure limits.

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• Shahid Imran vs The State, etc.2011 PSC (Crl.) 883 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-07-08
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationcriminal breach of trustinvestment versus entrustmentmala fide implication
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner against the order of the Lahore High Court cancelling his pre-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 406 and 506 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the ingredients of criminal breach of trust were met where money was given as an investment rather than by way of entrustment, and whether bail was rightly cancelled by the High Court. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, restoring the pre-arrest bail of the petitioner. The Court held that a mere breach of promise, agreement, or contract does not amount to criminal breach of trust without a clear element of entrustment, and that considerations for the grant of bail and its cancellation are distinct, with bail not to be cancelled merely for wreaking vengeance or where there is no misuse of the concession.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mere breach of a promise, agreement or contract attract the definition of criminal breach of trust under Section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Are the considerations for the grant of bail and those for its cancellation entirely different?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be cancelled merely for wreaking vengeance of the complainant party or in the absence of misuse of the concession of bail?
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• Shahid Imran vs The State and others2011 SCMR 1614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-07-08
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationcriminal breach of trustinvestment vs entrustmentfurther inquirymala fidecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court order cancelling the pre-arrest bail previously granted to the petitioner in a case involving Sections 406 and 506 of the PPC. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner fraudulently obtained Rs. 3,000,000 from the complainant for a school investment but failed to establish the venture or return the funds. The Supreme Court observed a critical legal distinction between investment in a business venture and entrustment of property; for an offence under Section 406 PPC to be made out, there must be clear evidence of entrustment rather than a mere breach of contract or investment agreement. The Court noted that the complainant failed to provide evidence of payment or join the investigation, suggesting mala fide intent. Furthermore, the Court held that considerations for granting bail differ from those for cancellation, and bail should not be revoked for vengeance when no misuse of the concession is alleged and the investigation is complete. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and restored the petitioner's pre-arrest bail.

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• Shahid Hussain alias Multani vs The State and others2011 SCMR 1673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-17
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirydelayed supplementary statementjoint confessionjoint recoveryrule of consistencymurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition, later converted into an appeal, was filed by Shahid Hussain alias Multani challenging an order of the Lahore High Court whereby post-arrest bail was refused to him in a case registered under sections 302, 392, 411, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail in light of the delayed supplementary statement, absence of test identification parade, questionable evidentiary value of joint extra-judicial confessions and joint recoveries, and the principle of consistency arising from bail granted to a similarly placed co-accused. The Supreme Court held that the case against the petitioner called for further inquiry into his guilt under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court laid down the principle that delayed nomination without disclosure of source, weak evidentiary value of joint confessions and recoveries, and parity of treatment with a co-accused who has already been admitted to bail constitute grounds for granting post-arrest bail under the purview of further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the accused is not nominated in the FIR and is named belatedly through a supplementary statement without disclosing the source of information?
  • What is the evidentiary worth of joint extra-judicial confessions and joint recoveries at the bail stage?
  • Does the grant of bail to a co-accused with a similar role entitle another accused to bail on the ground of consistency?
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• Shahid Farooq vs The State and others2011 SCMR 1619 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-06
  post-arrest bailmurderrule of consistencysupplementary statementdelay in trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from an order refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioner, who was implicated in a case registered under sections 302, 364, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station City Toba, District Toba Tek Singh, involving a murderous assault resulting in multiple fatalities. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the grounds of not being named in the initial first information report, the rule of consistency vis-a-vis co-accused, and delay in the conclusion of the trial. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner's case was distinguishable from co-accused who were granted bail, as he was specifically named in the supplementary statement of an injured victim who later succumbed to his injuries, attributing a specific role of firing. The Court also noted that the trial had commenced and multiple witnesses had been examined, rendering it an unfit case for bail. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing principles regarding the evidentiary value of supplementary statements by deceased victims and the applicability of the rule of consistency in bail matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused not named in the initial first information report is entitled to bail when subsequently named in a supplementary statement by an injured victim?
  • Does the rule of consistency apply when the role attributed to the petitioner is distinguishable from co-accused who were granted bail?
  • Is delay in the conclusion of the trial sufficient ground for bail when the trial has commenced and witnesses have been examined?
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• Shah Hussain vs State2011 PLJ SC 210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-sentence custodySection 382-B Cr.P.C.remission of sentenceconsecutive sentencesright to lifejudicial discretioncriminal sentencing
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the conviction and sentencing of the petitioner for murder and robbery. The Supreme Court addressed the interpretation of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the consideration of pre-sentence custody. The Court re-visited the precedent in Haji Abdul Ali v. Haji Bismillah, which had previously denied remissions for pre-sentence detention. The Court held that Section 382-B is a mandatory, beneficial provision requiring courts to consider pre-sentence custody. It ruled that when a convict is granted the benefit of Section 382-B, they are entitled to remissions granted by the government during their pre-sentence detention, as denying such remissions violates the right to life and liberty under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court further clarified that consecutive sentences must comply with the limits set in Section 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, ordered the petitioner's sentences to run concurrently, and granted the benefit of Section 382-B and applicable remissions.

  Questions settled

  • Is the trial court mandatorily required to consider the pre-sentence custody period under Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the grant of the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 entitle a convict to remissions granted by the government during the pre-sentence period?
  • Can consecutive sentences imposed in a single trial exceed the limits prescribed by Section 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the denial of remissions for pre-sentence custody, after the benefit of Section 382-B has been granted, violate the fundamental rights of a prisoner?
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• Shafqat Mehmood and others vs The State2011 SCMR 537 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-10-27
  Criminal appealConvictionAcquittalIdentification paradeMisreading of evidenceCircumstantial evidenceDacoity with murderAnti-Terrorism ActEyewitness testimonyEvidentiary value
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned an appeal against the dismissal of a criminal appeal by the Lahore High Court, upholding the appellants' conviction by the trial court for offences including dacoity with murder under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Act. The core legal questions revolved around the validity and evidentiary value of identification parades, the consistency of eyewitness testimony with medical evidence, and the reliability of circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal, setting aside the convictions and acquitting the appellants. The Court held that identification parades must be conducted strictly according to High Court Rules, ensuring witnesses do not see the accused beforehand, and that such precautions must be recorded and proved. It further emphasized that identification parades are corroborative, not substantive evidence, and their value is diminished if the accused's role is not described by witnesses or if there is undue delay. The Court also reiterated that circumstantial evidence requires an unbroken chain of interconnected circumstances to sustain a conviction.

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• Shafi Muhammad Saand vs Government of Sindh and another2011 SCMR 276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-06-14
  service lawminor penaltyreinstatementdepartmental inquirynatural justiceservice tribunalrecovery of loss
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a former Superintendent in the Irrigation Department, challenged a Sindh Service Tribunal judgment that upheld a minor penalty of recovery of Rs. 1,131,916 imposed upon him. The appellant contended that the penalty was imposed without a charge-sheet, inquiry, or show-cause notice, violating principles of natural justice. The respondents argued that the penalty was not the result of a fresh disciplinary proceeding but was a condition of the appellant's reinstatement, as approved by the Governor in a summary, which explicitly proposed reinstatement subject to a minor penalty. The Supreme Court examined the record and found that the penalty was indeed part and parcel of the reinstatement order approved by the competent authority, rather than a separate disciplinary action requiring a new inquiry. Consequently, the Court held that the Service Tribunal correctly evaluated the matter and found no illegality in the impugned order. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that where a penalty is a specific condition of a reinstatement order approved by the competent authority, separate disciplinary proceedings are not required.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a minor penalty imposed as a condition of reinstatement requires a separate departmental inquiry or charge-sheet?
  • Does the failure to issue a show-cause notice invalidate a penalty that was explicitly approved as part of a reinstatement order by the competent authority?
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• Shabir Ahmed Bhurgri and others vs Muhammad Hussain and others2011 SCMR 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-07-01
  withdrawal of petitionstatement at barrecall of ordercivil petitionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking to challenge an order of the High Court of Sindh, whereby a civil petition was dismissed as not pressed after being argued at some length by the petitioner's counsel, and a subsequent application for the recall of that order was also dismissed. The core legal question concerns whether an order dismissing a petition as not pressed upon a conscious statement made by counsel after arguing the case can be recalled or set aside on the ground of mistake. The Supreme Court held that the statement made by the counsel was conscious and deliberate after arguing the merits, and it cannot be equated with a mistake or unauthorized withdrawal of proceedings. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a deliberate statement made by a counsel not to press a matter after arguing it on merits binds the client and cannot be subsequently recalled in the absence of a genuine procedural mistake.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order dismissing a petition as not pressed after arguments can be recalled?
  • Does a statement made consciously by a counsel not to press a petition bind the petitioner?
  • Can a deliberate statement by counsel during proceedings be equated with a procedural mistake?
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• Sh. Muhammad Abid vs The State2011 SCMR 1148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-05
  Criminal AppealMurderConvictionDeath SentenceCommon IntentionVicarious LiabilityOcular EvidenceForensic EvidenceSection 302 PPCSection 34 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, by leave of the Court, challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that confirmed the appellant's conviction and death sentence under Section 302(b) PPC for the murders of Adeel Ahmed and Haider Ali. The core legal question revolved around the sufficiency of evidence, particularly the inability of eyewitnesses to specify which assailant's fire hit which victim during indiscriminate firing, and the application of common intention. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence. The Court held that when accused persons act with a common intention to commit a crime, it is immaterial what specific part each played, as per the principle of vicarious liability under Section 34 PPC. The Court found the ocular evidence credible, corroborated by medical and forensic evidence, including matching empties from the scene with the appellant's recovered pistol. The difficulty for eyewitnesses to attribute specific injuries during indiscriminate firing does not negate the common intention or liability.

  Read full judgment →
• SH. Muhammad Abid vs State2011 PLJ SC 941 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-05
  criminal appealqatl-i-amdcommon intentionvicarious liabilityocular testimonymedical evidenceforensic science laboratorycapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, by leave of the court, challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b), PPC for the qatl-i-amd of two deceased victims arising from an armed attack. The core legal question concerned whether the appellant was entitled to acquittal or a lesser sentence given that eye-witnesses did not specify which particular firearm shot from the multiple assailants hit which specific part of the victims' bodies. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that where multiple accused commit an offense with a common intention through indiscriminate firing, the specific attribution of individual injuries is immaterial under the principle of vicarious liability. The key legal principle laid down is that persons who act together in furtherance of a common intention are collectively liable for the resulting acts, and the exact role or specific injury inflicted by each participant ceases to be material.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of eye-witnesses to specify which individual firearm shot hit which part of the victims' bodies entitles an accused to acquittal or a lesser sentence in an indiscriminate firing case?
  • Is the specific attribution of an injury material when multiple accused act in furtherance of a common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the principle of vicarious liability apply when co-accused engage in a joint murderous attack?
  Read full judgment →
• Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan through Commissioner vs First Capital Securities Corporation Limited and anothers2011 CLD 907 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-02
  Companies Ordinancebeneficial ownerinsider tradingtenderable gainvesting of propertystatutory interpretationSECPconstitutional validity
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed under Article 185(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the interpretation and application of section 224 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The core legal question revolves around whether trading gains made by a beneficial owner within a period of less than six months vest absolutely in the SECP upon failure of the issuer company to recover them within the statutory timeframe, or whether the SECP's right is merely an enforcement mechanism to ensure the gains are restored to the company. The Supreme Court held that the word 'vest' in section 224 is context-dependent and does not confer absolute title or ownership upon the SECP. The Court ruled that the statutory provision must be interpreted in a restrictive manner to preserve its constitutional validity under Articles 4, 23, and 24, concluding that trading gains under section 224 always remain the property of the issuer company, while the SECP acts merely as a regulatory enforcement agency without any right to appropriate such gains for itself. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the word 'vest' in section 224 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 confer absolute title or ownership of trading gains upon the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan?
  • Whether trading gains made by a beneficial owner within a period of less than six months belong to the SECP or to the issuer company when recovery is delayed?
  • Is the SECP entitled to retain or confiscate tenderable gains under section 224 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 as an owner, or does it act merely as an enforcement mechanism?
  • How should section 224 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 be interpreted to ensure it remains consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan through Commissioner vs First Capital Securities Corporation Limited and another2011 PLD Supreme Court 778 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-02
  beneficial ownertenderable gainshort-swing tradinginsider tradingstatutory interpretationvesting of propertycompany lawSECP enforcement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerned the interpretation of Section 224 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, regarding the recovery of 'tenderable gains' made by beneficial owners through short-swing trading. The respondent, a beneficial owner of over 10% shares in a listed company, made a gain of Rs. 7.715 million through sale and purchase transactions within six months. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) sought to recover this gain, arguing that because the issuer failed to recover it within the statutory period, the amount 'vested' absolutely in the Commission. The Supreme Court held that the word 'vest' does not confer absolute title or ownership upon the SECP. Instead, the court ruled that the legislative intent of Section 224 is to protect innocent shareholders by ensuring wrongful gains are returned to the company, not the State. The SECP acts merely as an enforcement mechanism. The Court further held that the State cannot confiscate private property without constitutional justification, and any penal action for contravention must follow Section 224(4). The appeal was dismissed.

  Read full judgment →
• Secretary, Ministary of Law, Parliamentary Affairs and Human Rights, Government of Punjab and others vs Muhammad Ashraf Khan and others2011 PLD Supreme Court 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-11-05
  Advocate-GeneralAdditional Advocate-GeneralAssistant Advocate-GeneralAppointment of Law OfficersConstitutional OfficeConsultation with High CourtGovernor's DiscretionLaw Department ManualWrit PetitionInterpretation of Constitution
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that allowed a writ petition concerning the appointments of Additional Advocates-General and Assistant Advocates-General, Punjab. The core legal question revolved around whether the appointments of the Advocate-General, Additional Advocates-General, and Assistant Advocates-General required prior consultation with the Chief Justice/High Court, and the interpretation of Article 140 of the Constitution regarding the Governor's discretion. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and dismissing the writ petition. The Court held that Article 140 of the Constitution does not mandate consultation by the Governor with the Chief Justice/High Court for the appointment of an Advocate-General. It further clarified that while an earlier notification (1993) required consultation for Additional and Assistant Advocates-General, a subsequent notification (1994) explicitly removed this requirement, a fact the High Court failed to consider. The Court affirmed that the qualifications for an Advocate-General (qualified to be a High Court Judge) do not extend to the disabilities or tenure provisions applicable to High Court Judges.

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• Secretary to Government of Punjab, Agriculture Department Lahore2011 SCMR 1722 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pro forma promotioncivil servicevested rightdepartmental promotion committeeretrospective promotionsupersessionservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had granted the respondent pro forma promotion to the post of Horticultural Officer with retrospective effect. The core legal question was whether a civil servant is entitled to pro forma promotion as a matter of right, particularly when no junior officer was promoted in their stead, and whether such promotion can be granted retrospectively. The Supreme Court held that pro forma promotion is not a vested right and is generally contingent upon the supersession of a civil servant by a junior officer. Since the respondent failed to demonstrate that any junior officer had been promoted, the conditions for pro forma promotion were not met. The Court further held that while Departmental Promotion Committees should meet within a reasonable time, there is no fixed time limit for convening such meetings, as promotion involves assessing competency and official records rather than mere seniority. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, affirming that the respondent's promotion date was the date of the actual promotion order.

  Questions settled

  • Is pro forma promotion a vested right for a civil servant?
  • Can a civil servant claim pro forma promotion if no junior officer has been promoted in their stead?
  • Does the law impose a mandatory time limit for convening a Departmental Promotion Committee meeting?
  • Can promotion be granted with retrospective effect in the absence of supersession?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of Punjab, Agriculture Department Lahore2011 PLC (C.S.) 1575 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-11-26
  pro forma promotioncivil servantdepartmental promotion committeevested rightservice tribunalretrospective promotionsupersession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which had granted the respondent pro forma promotion. The core legal question was whether a civil servant is entitled to pro forma promotion as a matter of right, particularly when no junior officer has been promoted in their stead, and whether such promotion can be granted with retrospective effect. The Supreme Court held that pro forma promotion is not a vested right and is governed by specific policy guidelines, which require that a civil servant must have been superseded by a junior officer to qualify. In this instance, the respondent failed to demonstrate that any junior officer was promoted, rendering the claim for pro forma promotion untenable under the relevant policy and Rule 9(2) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974. The Court further clarified that while departmental promotion committees should convene within a reasonable time, there is no absolute right to promotion or to have a post filled by a specific date. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, affirming that the respondent's promotion date was the date of the actual promotion order.

  Questions settled

  • Is pro forma promotion a vested right for a civil servant?
  • Can a civil servant claim pro forma promotion if no junior officer has been promoted in their stead?
  • Does a civil servant have a right to demand that a promotional post be filled by a specific date?
  • Is there a fixed time limit for convening a Departmental Promotion Committee?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary Revenue Division, CBR/Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad vs Gul Muhammad and others2011 PLC (C.S.) 651 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-07-15
  promotion policybest of bestsupersessiondefermentcivil serviceFederal Service Tribunalobjective criteriadiscretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from petitions filed for leave to appeal against judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad. The petitioner department sought to deny promotions to the respondents based on an uncodified 'best of best' policy or criteria of excellence. The central legal question was whether civil servants could be denied promotion or superseded based on an undefined 'best of best' criteria without objective guidelines. The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the Federal Service Tribunal, dismissing the petitions with costs. The Court reaffirmed its previous jurisprudence holding that promotion decisions cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a Selection Board. The Court laid down the principle that in the absence of defined, objective criteria for assessing comparative merit or excellence, supersession or denial of promotion based on vague standards like 'best of best' is arbitrary and invalid under service laws.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be denied promotion based on an undefined 'best of best' criteria?
  • Is a Selection Board authorized to exercise unguided discretion in denying promotions without objective standards?
  • Can supersession of a civil servant meet the test of judicial scrutiny when the criteria of excellence has not been defined by the department?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary M/O Law, Parliamentary Affairs & Human Rights,2011 PLJ SC 502 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Advocate GeneralAdditional Advocate GeneralAssistant Advocate Generalconstitutional appointmentconsultation with High CourtLaw Department Manualquo warranto
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court that allowed a writ petition against the appointment of Additional and Assistant Advocates General, Punjab, and issued directions requiring prior consultation with the High Court/Chief Justice for appointing the Advocate General, Additional Advocates General, and Assistant Advocates General. The core legal question was whether Article 140 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and the relevant rules require consultation with the High Court for appointing the Advocate General and other law officers. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that Article 140 does not envisage consultation with the Chief Justice or High Court for the appointment of the Advocate General, and that statutory rules governing Additional and Assistant Advocates General had expressly removed the consultation requirement via subsequent notifications. The Court laid down the principle that prescribing a qualification for a constitutional office does not import other constitutional disabilities or requirements, such as judicial consultation, unless explicitly provided by the text of the Constitution or applicable rules.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 140 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 require the Governor to consult the Chief Justice or the High Court when appointing the Advocate General?
  • Can the requirement of consultation with the High Court for appointing Additional and Assistant Advocates General be read into the rules when the applicable notifications have expressly omitted it?
  • Does prescribing a qualification for appointment as Advocate General or Attorney-General subject the appointee to the same disabilities and restrictions applicable to a High Court or Supreme Court Judge?
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• Secretary (Schools), Government of Punjab, Education Department2011 PLC (C.S.) 825 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-08-28
  contract educatorsregularization of servicead hocismjob securityconstitutional guaranteesservice rulesseniority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from petitions challenging the precarious nature of contract-based employment for educators in the Punjab Education Department, which raised concerns regarding the lack of job security and potential violation of constitutional guarantees. The core legal question concerned whether the government's policy of persistent ad hocism and contract-based recruitment for teachers was constitutionally permissible and whether it undermined the rights of educators. During the proceedings, the Government of Punjab issued a notification regularizing the services of approximately 125,000 contract educators into regular posts, subject to specific conditions, including seniority placement at the bottom of the cadre and the exclusion of previous contract service for pensionary benefits. The Court accepted this policy shift as a resolution to the grievances of the petitioners, noting the government's commitment to regularize even those exceeding the upper age limit. Consequently, the Court discharged the notices issued to the Chief Secretary, holding that the regularization policy effectively addressed the constitutional concerns regarding job security for the teaching cadre.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government regularize contract employees by relaxing existing service rules through a notification?
  • Does the regularization of contract employees entitle them to count their previous contract service period for pension and gratuity purposes?
  • Is it permissible for the government to place newly regularized employees at the bottom of the seniority list of their respective cadres?
  • Can the government withdraw specific posts from the purview of the Public Service Commission to facilitate the regularization of contract staff?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Muhammad Ashraf (deceased) through LRs,. and others vs Government of N.-W.F.P. (now KPK) through. Collector and others2011 SCMR 1244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-03-02
  land acquisitionmarket value determinationcompensation enhancementpotential value of landcompulsory acquisitionrevenue recordindustrial estate
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple civil appeals arising from a land acquisition dispute in Village Dingi, District Haripur, where the government acquired land for an industrial estate. The core legal question was whether the compensation determined by the Land Acquisition Collector and upheld by the Land Acquisition Judge was adequate, considering the market value, potentiality, and classification of the land. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had enhanced the compensation. The Court held that the determination of market value must account for factors beyond mere geographical boundaries or selective mutations, including the potential for commercial or industrial use, proximity to developed areas, and the actual state of irrigation at the time of acquisition. The Court affirmed that while revenue records provide a baseline, they are not conclusive, and courts must apply the principles of sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 to ensure fair compensation, balancing plus and minus factors to reflect the true market value at the time of the notification under section 4.

  Questions settled

  • Is an entry in the revenue record regarding the nature of land conclusive for determining compensation in acquisition proceedings?
  • Should the potential for industrial or commercial use be considered when determining the market value of acquired land?
  • Does the determination of market value for acquired land require consideration of factors beyond the geographical boundaries and selective sale mutations?
  • Are the principles laid down in sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 mandatory for assessing compensation?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Asmatullah Khan vs Moulvi Muhammad Sarwar and others2011 SCMR 107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-09-14
  Election PetitionEducational QualificationBachelor's Degree EquivalenceShahadatul AlmiyaHigher Education CommissionUniversity Grants CommissionReturned Candidate DisqualificationProvincial Assembly ElectionBye-election
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from the judgment of the Election Tribunal, Baluchistan, dismissing an election petition filed by the appellant under the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The appellant had challenged the election of respondent No. 1 as a returned candidate to the Provincial Assembly (PB-15, Musa Khail) on the ground that the respondent lacked the requisite educational qualification of graduation. The primary legal question was whether the Sanad 'Shahadatul Almiya Fil Uloomal Arabia Wal Islamia' held by the returned candidate was equivalent to a Bachelor's degree for the purpose of contesting elections. The Supreme Court observed that the appellate court is the final court of facts and examined reports from the Higher Education Commission. The Court found that under relevant regulations, saved by Section 22(2) and administered under Section 10(o) of the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002, such a Sanad is recognized only for teaching and higher education, unless accompanied by passing required additional subjects at the B.A. level from a recognized university. Holding that the respondent lacked the requisite qualification, the Supreme Court set aside his election notification and directed the Election Commission of Pakistan to conduct a bye-election.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Sanad 'Shahadatul Almiya Fil Uloom Al-Arabia Wal Islamia' is equivalent to a Bachelor's degree for contesting elections without passing additional elective and compulsory subjects at the B.A. level?
  • Whether the Supreme Court acting as an appellate court in election matters can examine original records and act as the final court of facts?
  • What is the legal effect on an election if a returned candidate does not possess the requisite educational qualification on nomination day?
  • Whether actions and notifications regarding degree equivalence issued under the repealed University Grants Commission Act, 1974 are saved under Section 22(2) of the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002?
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• Sanobar Khan vs Government of NWFP through the Chief Secretary, Peshawar and another2011 PLJ SC 680 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service appealminor penaltyquantum of punishmentdisciplinary proceedingsservice tribunal jurisdictioncensurecivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a civil servant, challenged a disciplinary penalty of censure imposed for negligence leading to the loss of government property. The Service Tribunal dismissed his appeal, ruling it incompetent under Section 4(b)(ii) of the North West Frontier Province Service Tribunal Act, 1974, which bars appeals against minor punishments. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the statutory bar on appeals against minor penalties extends to the entire disciplinary proceedings or is limited strictly to the quantum of punishment. The Supreme Court held that the bar under Section 4(b)(ii) applies exclusively to the quantum of punishment. It affirmed that the Service Tribunal retains jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying determination of guilt or innocence, as well as ancillary matters such as procedural flaws or the competency of the disciplinary authority. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's dismissal and remanded the case for a decision on the merits. The principle established is that while a Service Tribunal cannot alter or modify minor penalties, it has full jurisdiction to review the findings of guilt or innocence and procedural legality of the disciplinary process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar on appeals against minor punishments under Section 4(b)(ii) of the North West Frontier Province Service Tribunal Act, 1974, preclude a Service Tribunal from reviewing the finding of guilt or innocence?
  • Can a Service Tribunal examine procedural flaws in disciplinary proceedings if the penalty imposed is a minor one?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to modify or alter the quantum of a minor punishment imposed on a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Sanobar Khan vs Government of N.-W.F.P. through the Chief Secretary, and another2011 SCMR 546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-12-29
  service appealminor penaltycensurequantum of punishmentjurisdiction of service tribunaldepartmental inquirycivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a departmental disciplinary action taken against the appellant, a Deputy District Officer, who was imposed a minor penalty of censure following an inquiry into missing water supply pipes. The appellant's service appeal before the Service Tribunal was dismissed on the ground of non-maintainability under section 4(b)(ii) of the North-West Frontier Province Service Tribunals Act, 1974, which bars appeals against minor punishments. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the bar under section 4(b)(ii) extends to an appeal challenging the finding of guilt itself or is strictly limited to the quantum of a minor departmental punishment. The Supreme Court held that the bar under the statute applies exclusively to the quantum of minor punishments, whereas the Service Tribunal retains full jurisdiction to examine the guilt or innocence of a civil servant, along with procedural flaws or the competency of the authority. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and remanded the matter for a decision on merits, establishing that an appeal against a minor penalty is maintainable to challenge the underlying determination of guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar on filing a service appeal against minor punishments under section 4(b)(ii) of the North-West Frontier Province Service Tribunals Act, 1974, preclude a civil servant from challenging the determination of guilt?
  • Whether the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to examine the guilt or innocence of an aggrieved civil servant when a minor penalty has been imposed?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to alter or modify the quantum of a minor punishment?
  Read full judgment →
• Sanobar Khan vs Government of N.-W.F.P. through the Chief Secretary2011 PLC (C.S.) 713 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-12-29
  service appealminor penaltycensureservice tribunal jurisdictionquantum of punishmentdisciplinary proceedingscivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the maintainability of a service appeal filed by a civil servant against a minor penalty of censure. The appellant, a Deputy District Officer, challenged a departmental penalty of censure imposed following an inquiry into alleged negligence causing financial loss. The Service Tribunal dismissed the appeal, citing Section 4(b)(ii) of the North-West Frontier Province Service Tribunals Act, 1974, which bars appeals against minor punishments. The core legal question was whether this statutory bar precludes the Service Tribunal from examining the merits of the guilt or innocence of a civil servant, or if it only restricts review of the quantum of punishment. The Supreme Court held that the bar under Section 4(b)(ii) applies exclusively to the quantum of minor punishments. It affirmed that the Service Tribunal retains jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the determination of guilt, procedural flaws, and the competency of the disciplinary authority. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's dismissal and remanded the case for a decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar on appeals against minor punishments under the North-West Frontier Province Service Tribunals Act, 1974, preclude a Service Tribunal from reviewing the finding of guilt or innocence of a civil servant?
  • Can a Service Tribunal examine procedural flaws or the competency of the authority in disciplinary proceedings despite the statutory bar on appeals against minor penalties?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to modify the quantum of a minor punishment imposed on a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Sanjha vs The State2011 SCMR 1034 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-01-14
  narcoticsrecovery of charasreduction of sentencemitigating circumstancesadvanced agecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant criminal appeal was filed by the appellant, who was convicted under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for the recovery of 10 kilograms of Charas and sentenced to life imprisonment with a fine, which conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction of the appellant was sustainable based on the evidence, and whether any leniency was warranted given the advanced age of the appellant. The Supreme Court maintained the conviction of the appellant upon considering the record and arguments, but partially allowed the appeal by reducing the substantive sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone, keeping in view the appellant's advanced age of over 80 years, and also reduced the fine amount. The key principle laid down is that while a conviction for a major narcotics offence may be maintained on sufficient evidence, mitigating circumstances such as advanced age of the convict can form a valid basis for a discretionary reduction of the sentence of imprisonment and fine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sentence of life imprisonment under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act can be reduced to the period already undergone on the ground of the convict's advanced age?
  • Is a convict entitled to the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 as a matter of law?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can reduce a sentence of fine imposed along with imprisonment upon reviewing the facts and circumstances of a narcotics case?
  Read full judgment →
• Sameen Jan (Naib Tehsildar) and another vs The State and another2011 PSC (Crl.) 488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-03-04
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycriminal intentforgerymutation attestationanticorruptionprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioners, who were charged under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 in connection with the attestation of a mutation based on a fake Permanent Transfer Deed. The core legal question is whether the petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail when the prosecution failed to show prima facie criminal intent, knowledge of the forgery, or benefit from the transaction, and where the offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the case called for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and converted the petition into an appeal, granting bail to the petitioners. The key principle laid down is that bail should not be withheld by way of premature punishment, that considerations for granting bail differ from those for its cancellation, and that absence of prima facie criminal intent or benefit in non-prohibitory offences warrants the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the prosecution fails to prima facie establish criminal intent or knowledge of forgery in a non-prohibitory offence?
  • Are the considerations for the cancellation of bail different from those for the initial grant of bail?
  • Does the absence of physical custody requirement for investigation justify granting bail to public servants who are not likely to abscond?
  • When does a criminal case call for further inquiry into the guilt of accused persons under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Sameen Jan (Naib Tehsildar) and another vs State and another2011 PLJ SC 745 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-03-04
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryprohibitory clausecancellation of bailpublic servantsattestation of mutationcriminal intent
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioners, a Naib Tehsildar and a Girdawar, in a case involving offences under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 relating to the attestation of a mutation based on a fake Permanent Transfer Deed. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail where the record lacked prima facie evidence of criminal intent, knowledge of the forgery, or benefit from the transaction. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the case called for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause, the petitioners were not beneficiaries, and bail should not be withheld as a form of premature punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether public servants attesting a mutation based on a fake document are entitled to post-arrest bail in the absence of prima facie criminal intent or knowledge of forgery?
  • Are the considerations for the cancellation of bail the same as those for the initial grant of bail?
  • Does an offence falling outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 warrant the grant of bail when further inquiry into guilt is called for under Section 497(2)?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be cancelled without establishing any misuse or abuse of the concession of bail by the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Sameen Ian (Naib Tehsildar) and another vs The State and another2011 PLD Supreme Court 509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-03-04
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryprohibitory clausecancellation of bailpublic servantsmutation attestationpremature punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a Lahore High Court order refusing post-arrest bail to public servants (a Naib Tehsildar and a Girdawar) charged under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, for attesting a mutation based on a fake Permanent Transfer Deed. The core legal questions were whether the petitioners were entitled to bail where no prima facie criminal intent, bribery, or benefit was established, and whether bail should be granted when offences fall outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and granted bail, holding that the trial court erred in cancelling pre-arrest bail without misuse of the concession, noting that considerations for granting and cancelling bail differ. The Court laid down that without evidence of criminal intent or knowledge of forgery, the case called for further inquiry under Section 497(2), Cr.P.C., and bail should not be withheld as premature punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Are the considerations for the grant of bail distinct from those applicable to the cancellation of bail?
  • Whether post-arrest bail can be withheld as a measure of premature punishment when investigation is complete and physical custody is no longer required?
  • Does a case fall under further inquiry under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. when public servants attest a mutation without any evidence of criminal intent, benefit, or knowledge of forgery?
  • Whether bail ought to be granted when the alleged offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) Cr.P.C.?
  Read full judgment →
• Salim Khan vs Secretary, Government of N.W.F.P. Higher Education2011 PLJ SC 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-01-08
  service matterconstitutional jurisdictionfinding of factleave to appealburden of proofdiscretionary jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a service matter concerning the selection process for a government post. The petitioner challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed his constitutional petition against the selection of a respondent, alleging that he possessed the requisite 15 years of experience and was wrongly ignored. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the petition after the petitioner failed to substantiate his claim of experience despite being granted opportunities to do so. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the petitioner failed to produce any evidence of the required experience and that the High Court had recorded a finding of fact against him. The Supreme Court held that it lacks jurisdiction to substitute its own findings for those of the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with factual findings recorded by the High Court in the absence of illegality or infirmity, particularly when the petitioner fails to support their claims with evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court substitute its own findings of fact for those recorded by the High Court under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court discretionary in nature?
  • Does the failure to produce evidence of required experience justify the dismissal of a constitutional petition challenging a selection process?
  Read full judgment →
• Saleemuddin and others vs The State2011 SCMR 1171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-03-22
  kidnapping for ransomsentencing discretiondeath penalty commutationbenefit of doubtcriminal appealquantum of sentenceta'zirevidence evaluation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against a High Court judgment that confirmed death sentences for appellants convicted of kidnapping for ransom under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). The core legal question addressed was whether the death penalty was the mandatory or appropriate sentence given the circumstances and the statutory discretion available. The Supreme Court maintained the appellants' convictions but commuted their death sentences to life imprisonment. The Court held that while Section 365-A PPC prescribes death or life imprisonment, the legislature intended to vest discretion in the courts to determine the appropriate punishment based on case-specific facts. The Court emphasized that sentencing is not a mechanical process and must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence. Crucially, the Court established that accused persons are entitled to the benefit of doubt regarding the quantum of sentence, particularly where the prosecution's case contains unexplained weaknesses or procedural defects. Consequently, the Court ruled that in cases of ta'zir, courts must exercise judicial discretion to ensure sentences align with the surrounding circumstances and the principles of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code mandate the death penalty, or does it grant the court discretion to impose life imprisonment?
  • Can a court consider evidentiary weaknesses and procedural defects when determining the quantum of sentence, even if the conviction is maintained?
  • Are accused persons entitled to the benefit of doubt regarding the quantum of sentence in criminal cases?
  • Is the death penalty the only permissible punishment for ta'zir offences where the statute provides for alternative sentencing options?
  Read full judgment →
• Saleem Ullah Khan vs Shahid Hamid and another2011 SCMR 788 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-04-29
  civil service promotionsupersessionCentral Selection Boardvested rightequal treatmentdiscrimination in promotionrecusal of biased officersArticle 190 Constitution
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns Criminal Original Petitions filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by a senior Police Service of Pakistan officer, alleging non-compliance with court directives and discriminatory treatment regarding his promotion and repeated supersession. The core legal questions pertained to whether promotion is a vested right of a civil servant, whether the decisions of selection boards regarding promotion can be subjected to judicial scrutiny when allegations of discrimination and improper board composition exist, and the duty of executive authorities to execute court directions pursuant to Article 190 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that while promotion is not a vested right and rests within the domain of the competent departmental authority based on merit, competence, and suitability rather than seniority alone, the selection process must be conducted fairly, without discrimination, and without participation of biased officers. Finding that the Central Selection Board recommended supersession without comparative assessment and with interested officers present, the Court directed the respondents to reconsider the petitioner's case in a just and fair manner.

  Questions settled

  • Is promotion a vested right that a civil servant can claim or enforce through a court as a fundamental right?
  • Does seniority alone determine suitability for selection post promotion under Section 9 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Can a Central Selection Board recommendation be challenged if officers with interest or prior litigation involvement participated in the decision-making process?
  • What is the obligation of executive authorities under Article 190 of the Constitution regarding the implementation of Supreme Court directions?
  Read full judgment →
• Saleem and another vs The State2011 SCMR 1349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-09
  Leave to appealCircumstantial evidenceIdentification paradeTest Identification ParadeFIRSecondary evidenceEvidence reappraisalCriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal in a criminal case where the petitioners challenged the sufficiency and admissibility of evidence. The core legal questions revolved around the absence of an ocular account, the sole reliance on circumstantial evidence primarily an identification parade, the non-production of the supervising Magistrate for the Test Identification Parade, the lack of in-court identification of the accused, the absence of assailant descriptions in the First Information Report, and the non-proof of investigation documents through secondary evidence due to the death of the investigating officer. The Supreme Court considered these submissions substantial and granted leave to appeal for a comprehensive reappraisal of the entire evidence presented in the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can leave to appeal be granted for reappraisal of evidence when there is no ocular account and only circumstantial evidence?
  • Does the non-production of a Magistrate who supervised a Test Identification Parade constitute a valid ground for appeal?
  • Is the absence of assailant description in the FIR and lack of in-court identification a significant factor in reappraising evidence?
  • Can the death of an investigating officer and the non-proof of documents through secondary evidence be a ground for granting leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Saleem Akhtar Siddiqui vs Shujah Ahmed and others2011 PLC (C.S.) 1119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-10-14
  contempt petitionpromotion to BPS-20Central Selection BoardsupersessiondefermentPerformance Evaluation ReportOfficer on Special Duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This order arises from a contempt petition filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the non-consideration and deferment of the petitioner's promotion to BPS-20. The Federal Service Tribunal had previously observed that the petitioner met the 70% mark promotion threshold, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court in Civil Petition No. 200 of 2006. Following earlier contempt proceedings where the Establishment Division promised consideration, the Central Selection Board (CSB) superseded the petitioner in February 2008 and deferred his case in July 2008 for lacking a full year's Performance Evaluation Report (PER). The petitioner contended that as an Officer on Special Duty (OSD), a PER was not required under Para 2.87 of the Guide to Performance Evaluation Report. The Supreme Court disposed of the contempt petition by directing the CSB to consider the petitioner's case for promotion in its upcoming meeting scheduled for November 2008.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Central Selection Board can defer a civil servant's promotion for lack of a PER when the civil servant is posted as an Officer on Special Duty?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct the Central Selection Board to consider a civil servant for promotion in a specific upcoming meeting to ensure compliance with its previous orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Salah-Ud-Din vs State2011 PLJ SC 396 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-05-11
  narcotic possessionofficial witnessesappreciation of evidenceleave to appealrecovery of hashishSection 103 Cr.P.C. exclusion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that upheld the petitioner's conviction for drug trafficking. The petitioner was convicted by a Special Judge under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of 20 kilograms of hashish recovered during a vehicle search. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution sufficiently proved the recovery of narcotics based solely on the testimony of official witnesses, and whether the absence of private witnesses or non-compliance with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiated the conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the prosecution's evidence was consistent, forthright, and unshattered during cross-examination. The Court affirmed that police officials are competent witnesses whose testimony can sustain a conviction if credible. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, expressly excludes the application of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in such cases. Consequently, the conviction was upheld as legally sound.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for narcotics possession be sustained solely on the testimony of official witnesses?
  • Does Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 exclude the application of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the reluctance of the public to serve as witnesses in narcotics cases a judicially recognized fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Sajjad Ahmed vs The State, etc2011 PSC (Crl.) 799 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-07-21
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirypolice investigationmedical variancetelecom recordmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the refusal of post-arrest bail in case F.I.R. No. 523/2010 registered under Sections 302, 148, 149, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Saddar, Kasur. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, granting bail to the petitioner. The court held that the guilt of the petitioner fell within the scope of further inquiry based on tentative assessments, noting that the police investigation presented a different version of events placing the petitioner away from the scene, the medical report prima facie conflicted with the ocular account, and telecom records indicated the petitioner's presence at a distant location. The key principle laid down is that at the bail stage, where police investigation, medical variance, and corroborative material like telecom records tentatively cast doubt on the accused's presence at the crime scene, the case warrants the grant of bail pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether tentative discrepancies between the ocular account and the medical report warrant the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Can police investigation findings placing the accused away from the scene of occurrence form a valid basis for further inquiry under bail adjudication?
  • Is telecom record indicating the presence of an accused at a place far from the crime scene relevant for considering bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Saeed Khan vs The State and others2011 SCMR 1392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-13
  pre-arrest bailbelated nominationsupplementary statementmala fidemedico-legal certificate contradictionfirearm injury
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal, converted into an appeal and allowed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenges the refusal of pre-arrest bail by the Lahore High Court in a case registered under sections 324 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the circumstances of his belated nomination, previous business relationship with the complainant, and glaring contradictions between the first information report and the medico-legal certificate. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's belated implication by the complainant smacked of mala fide, and the discrepancy regarding the number of firearm injuries cast serious doubt on the veracity of the allegations. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that unexplained delays in naming a known associate in a supplementary statement, coupled with medical contradictions, constitute sufficient grounds for granting pre-arrest bail to an accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner is entitled to pre-arrest bail when not nominated in the initial first information report and implicated only through a belated supplementary statement?
  • Does a glaring contradiction between the number of injuries reported in the first information report and the medico-legal certificate warrant the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  • Whether previous business relations between the complainant and an unnamed accused render the subsequent belated nomination prima facie doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• Saeed Ahmad vs The State and others2011 SCMR 1686 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-09
  post-arrest bailpolice confessioninadmissible evidencefurther inquirycriminal conspiracyabetment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a criminal case involving murder and related offences. The core legal question is whether the petitioner, who was abroad at the time of the crime and implicated through an alleged extra-judicial police confession and a cash recovery, is entitled to post-arrest bail. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the petitioner's case falls within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given that police confessions are legally inadmissible and the investigation has already been finalized. The key principle laid down is that a confession made by an accused person while in police custody is inadmissible in evidence, and where the primary incriminating material against an accused consists of such an inadmissible confession and unnecessary continued custody is not required, bail ought to be granted as a matter of further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Is a confession made by an accused person before the police in its custody admissible in evidence?
  • Whether an accused person is entitled to post-arrest bail when the primary evidence against him consists of an inadmissible police confession and the investigation is complete?
  • When does a criminal case fall within the purview of further inquiry into guilt under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Sabir Hussain alias Sabri vs The State2011 SCMR 1003 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-05-28
  criminal leave to appealmurderdeath sentenceappreciation of evidencemotiveforensic evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court affirming the petitioner's conviction and sentence of death for the murder of Salah-ud-Din and for causing injuries to a prosecution witness under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with a related firearm charge. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the sentence of death is too harsh and inappropriate given the facts and circumstances of the case, including the night-time occurrence, negative Forensic Science Laboratory reports regarding recovered empties, and the alleged weak motive. The Court granted leave to appeal specifically to examine the appropriateness of the death sentence. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will examine mitigating circumstances and the proportionality of capital punishment in criminal matters where ocular account and material corroboration present arguable points.

  Questions settled

  • Whether in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence of death is too harsh and inappropriate?
  • Does a weak motive and negative forensic report regarding recovered empties warrant a reduction of sentence in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Sabir Ali vs The State2011 SCMR 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-06-15
  murderdeath sentencelife imprisonmentfamily honourgrave and sudden provocationself-defenceevidence reappraisalmitigating circumstances
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard an appeal against the death sentence of Sabir Ali, convicted of murdering four individuals in 1995. The prosecution alleged that the appellant and an acquitted co-accused attacked the victims following a dispute over illicit relations between the complainant's brother and the co-accused's daughter. Upon reappraisal of the evidence, the Court identified significant contradictions between the ocular testimony, the First Information Report (FIR), and the site plan, particularly regarding the venue of the occurrence and the behavior of the witnesses. The appellant pleaded self-defence and grave provocation, asserting the incident arose from a family honour conflict. The Court held that while the appellant was not entitled to acquittal due to his admitted role, the prosecution's version was fraught with doubt. Applying the principle that the benefit of reasonable doubt must favor the accused, and recognizing family honour as a mitigating factor in sentencing under Section 302(b) PPC, the Court converted the death sentence to life imprisonment.

  Read full judgment →
• Sabir Ali alias Fauji vs The State2011 SCMR 563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-10-08
  Criminal AppealMurderAttempted MurderIdentification ParadeCircumstantial EvidenceFIRConfessionAcquittalMisreading of EvidenceBenefit of Doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a judgment dismissing the appellant's appeal against his conviction for qatl-e-amd under Section 302(b) PPC and attempted murder under Section 324 PPC. The core legal questions revolved around the validity of the identification parade, the reliability of circumstantial evidence, and the lower courts' appreciation of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the identification parade was not conducted in accordance with the law, citing delays, joint identification of multiple accused, and prior exposure of the accused to witnesses at the police station. The Court also found the confessional statement and recovery of the rifle doubtful, noting inconsistencies in witness statements and material improvements. The Court's decision was to accept the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquit the appellant. Key principles laid down include the necessity of strict adherence to rules for identification parades, the requirement for precautionary measures to conceal accused identity, the corroborative nature of identification evidence, and the need for an unbroken chain in circumstantial evidence.

  Read full judgment →
• Sabir Ali @ Fauji vs State2011 PLJ SC 401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-10-08
  identification paradeqatl-e-amdcircumstantial evidencecriminal appealappreciation of evidencebenefit of doubtconviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for qatl-e-amd, which was upheld by the High Court. The core legal question concerns the validity of the identification parade and the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction when the accused were strangers to the witnesses, not named in the FIR, and where the identification parade was conducted after significant delay and potential exposure of the accused to witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was unsustainable due to the failure of the prosecution to prove the identification parade was conducted in accordance with the law, specifically noting the lack of precautionary measures to prevent witnesses from seeing the accused before the parade, the joint nature of the parade, and the absence of physical descriptions in the FIR. The Court emphasized that an identification parade is merely corroborative evidence and loses its value if not conducted strictly according to established rules. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, and ordered his immediate release, finding the prosecution's case riddled with doubt and procedural irregularities.

  Questions settled

  • Is an identification parade valid if the accused were shown to the witnesses prior to the parade?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of an identification parade where the accused were not named in the FIR and no physical description was provided?
  • Does the failure to conduct an identification parade separately for each accused invalidate the identification process?
  • Is a conviction based on circumstantial evidence sustainable if the chain of circumstances is broken or not properly established?
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• Rohtas Khan vs State2011 PLJ SC 468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-10-09
  interested witnesscorroborationabscondencecriminal appealmurder trialbeneficial doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Rohtas Khan, was convicted under Section 302(b)/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and sentenced to death by the trial court, which sentence was modified to life imprisonment by the High Court. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court evaluated the evidence, focusing on the testimony of related and inimical eyewitnesses, the absence of corroborative physical evidence such as bullet empties and marks, and the legal weight of the appellant's abscondence. The core legal question centered on whether a conviction can be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of interested witnesses and weak circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court held that the ocular account was unnatural, lacked corroboration, and that abscondence alone cannot remedy inherent defects in the prosecution case or sustain a conviction. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitting the appellant of the charge. The key principle laid down is that the testimony of an interested witness requires careful scrutiny and strong corroboration unless found inherently truthful and plausible, and that abscondence is merely a corroborative circumstance which cannot substitute for substantive evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of related and inimical witnesses can form the basis of a murder conviction without strict scrutiny?
  • Can the abscondence of an accused remedy inherent defects and gaps in the substantive prosecution evidence?
  • What is the evidentiary value of abscondence in criminal cases when the primary ocular account is disbelieved?
  Read full judgment →
• Riaz Jafar Natiq vs Muhammad Nadeem Dar and others2011 SCMR 1708 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-08
  Post-arrest bailDishonour of chequeSection 489-F PPCNon-prohibitory clauseMedical groundsBail bondCriminal law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a petition for bail filed by an accused arrested under Section 489-F, P.P.C., for the dishonour of a cheque amounting to Rs. 2,00,00,000. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who had been incarcerated for eight months, was no longer required by the police for investigation, and suffered from diabetes and ulcer, should be granted bail, particularly as the maximum sentence for the offence was three years, placing it outside the prohibitory clause. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, admitting the petitioner to bail. The Court reiterated the principle that where a case falls within the non-prohibitory clause, the concession of granting bail must be favourably considered and should only be declined in exceptional cases, a situation not found to exist in the present matter.

  Read full judgment →
• Riaz Hanif Rahi vs Saeed-Uz-Zaman Siddiqui, and 4 others2011 SCMR 948 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-05-10
  contempt of courtfair commentfreedom of expressiontalk showsPCO oathcriminal original petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Original Petition was filed by an advocate seeking the initiation of contempt proceedings against a former Chief Justice of Pakistan and others on the basis of a published newspaper report concerning remarks made in a television talk show. The petitioner contended that the respondent had maligned the judiciary, cast doubt on the legality of a seven-member Supreme Court bench order, and undermined the court's authority by comparing judges who took oath under the 2000 and 2007 Provisional Constitutional Orders (PCO). The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, observing that in talk shows involving question-and-answer formats, no conclusive opinion could be formed without the complete context of both the questions and answers. The Court held that making fair, bona fide comments about a judge or a judgment is a protected right of every citizen based on their viewpoint. Expressing an opinion that is not derogatory and does not ridicule the judiciary is a healthy sign of public trust rather than contempt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether making fair comments on a judge or a judgment with bona fide intention constitutes contempt of court?
  • Can contempt proceedings be initiated based on isolated extracts of a television interview without the complete context of the questions asked and answers given?
  • Does expressing an opinion comparing two sets of judges who took oath under different Provisional Constitutional Orders amount to lowering the authority of the judiciary?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmatullah vs The State and another2011 SCMR 1332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-04-17
  bail cancellationmurdertrial in progressleave to appealexpeditious trialcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court which cancelled the bail previously granted to the petitioner by the Additional Sessions Judge in a murder case registered under Sections 302/34 PPC. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in cancelling bail at a stage when the trial was nearing conclusion. The Supreme Court observed that the trial was at the verge of completion, with only one or two witnesses remaining to be examined. The Court held that, as a matter of settled law, courts should generally refrain from granting or cancelling bail when a trial is in progress. Instead, the appropriate course of action is to direct the trial court to conclude the proceedings within a specified timeframe. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, converted the petition into an appeal, and confirmed the bail while directing the trial court to conclude the case within two months.

  Read full judgment →
• Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore vs Muhammad Naveed Hashmi2011 PLJ SC 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service tribunaldismissal from servicejudicial officercorruptionillegal gratificationpersistent reputationinquiry proceedingsAnnual Confidential Reports
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal with leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, Lahore, whereby the service appeal of the respondent, a civil judge dismissed from service on charges of corruption and accepting illegal gratification, was accepted. The core legal question centered on whether the allegations of corruption and a persistent reputation of being corrupt were sufficiently substantiated by cogent and concrete evidence during the disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the charges through reliable, confidence-inspiring evidence, and that a finding of a persistent reputation of being corrupt cannot be sustained in a vacuum without supporting adverse entries in Annual Confidential Reports. The Court laid down the principle that disciplinary charges, particularly those involving corruption against judicial officers, must be proven through solid and admissible evidence rather than vague assertions, hearsay, or extraneous considerations, and that Annual Confidential Reports serve as the primary device to assess a persistent reputation of being corrupt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a judicial officer be held to have a persistent reputation of being corrupt without supporting adverse entries in Annual Confidential Reports?
  • Is hearsay evidence admissible to substantiate allegations of corruption in disciplinary proceedings against a civil servant?
  • Whether the findings of an inquiry officer exonerating an accused can be disregarded by an authorized officer without cogent and concrete proof?
  Read full judgment →
• Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore vs Malik Riaz Ahmad Khokhar2011 PLC (C.S.) 681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-12-21
  adverse remarksACRService Tribunalfindings of factleave to appealpublic importanceexoneration
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order passed by the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, which had expunged adverse remarks from the respondent's Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs). The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal erred in expunging these remarks, given the petitioner's argument that the Countersigning Officer's opinion should prevail over the Reporting Officer's opinion. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the adverse remarks were inextricably linked to charges in an inquiry from which the respondent had been exonerated. Consequently, the factual basis for the remarks no longer existed. The Court affirmed that it lacks jurisdiction to substitute its own findings of fact for those of the Service Tribunal when exercising powers under Article 212(3) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that a petitioner must raise a substantial question of law of public importance to invoke its jurisdiction under this provision. The judgment reinforces the principle that findings of fact by a Service Tribunal are generally final and not subject to re-evaluation by the Supreme Court absent a substantial legal question.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court substitute its own findings of fact for those of a Service Tribunal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable if it fails to raise a substantial question of law of public importance?
  • Should adverse remarks in an ACR be expunged if the underlying charges leading to those remarks were dismissed in an inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Regarding Corruption in Hajj Arrangements in 2010: In the matter of vs Not2011 PLC (C.S.) 1489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-07-29
  Hajj scamjudicial reviewOfficer on Special DutyOSDcivil servant transferArticle 184(3)Article 190fair investigationcontempt of courtcorruption probe
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding widespread corruption, malpractices, and mismanagement in Hajj arrangements for 2010. The core legal questions involved the court's power of judicial review under Article 184(3) of the Constitution over executive administrative transfers and postings, specifically when executive actions hamper fair criminal investigations or penalize civil servants for complying with binding court orders. The Supreme Court held that executive transfer decisions made contrary to rules, against public interest, or to frustrate judicial orders are subject to judicial review. The Court ruled that placing a civil servant as an Officer on Special Duty (OSD) without valid justification amounts to an illegal penalty, as all executive and judicial authorities are constitutionally bound under Articles 5 and 190 to implement judicial orders. Consequently, the Court directed the immediate implementation of the transfer notification for the lead investigating officer to resume the Hajj scam probe and ordered the posting of the former Secretary Establishment to an appropriate post commensurate with his status.

  Questions settled

  • Is an executive decision regarding the transfer or posting of a civil servant subject to judicial review under Article 184(3) or Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can a civil servant be lawfully placed as an Officer on Special Duty (OSD) as a penal measure for complying with a binding court order?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to monitor and direct executive agencies to ensure an independent and transparent criminal investigation?
  • What is the legal effect of executive actions taken to frustrate or delay the implementation of judicial orders under Article 190 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Reference No. 1 of 2011 In re vs Not2011 SCMR 962 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-04-21
  Presidential Referencefundamental rightsdue processbinding precedentIslamic lawamicus curiaeconstitutional reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a Presidential Reference forwarded to the Supreme Court of Pakistan under Article 186 of the Constitution regarding the murder trial and execution of Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The core legal questions formulated in the reference concern whether the judicial decisions of the Lahore High Court and the Supreme Court met the requirements of fundamental rights, due process, constitutional binding precedents under Article 189, Islamic law and the Quranic doctrine of repentance, and whether the death sentence was justified. The Supreme Court ordered the requisitioning of the original trial record from the Lahore High Court, appointed prominent senior advocates and jurists as amicus curiae alongside the Attorney General and Advocates General to assist the court, and directed the constitution of a larger bench for the hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the decision of the Lahore High Court and Supreme Court in the murder trial of Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto meets the requirements of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution?
  • Whether the conviction leading to the execution of Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto constitutes a binding precedent upon other courts under Article 189 of the Constitution?
  • Whether the awarding and maintaining of the death sentence in the case was justified or fulfilled the requirements of Islamic laws and the doctrine of repentance?
  Read full judgment →
• Rasool Bakhsh Naich (decd.) through L.Rs, and others vs Syed RasoolPLJ-2011 SC 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  specific performancebona fide purchaserconstructive noticepossessionburden of proofagreement to selltransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns competing claims for specific performance of agreements to sell land. The core legal question is whether a subsequent vendee can claim the protection of Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1877 as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, particularly when the prior purchaser is in physical possession of the property. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the respondent/plaintiffs proved the prior agreement and their possession. The Court held that the appellants failed to establish their status as bona fide purchasers without notice. The key principle laid down is that while the initial burden to prove a prior contract lies on the plaintiff, once discharged, the burden shifts to the subsequent transferee to affirmatively prove they are a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Furthermore, physical possession of property by a person other than the vendor constitutes constructive notice of their title or lien, effectively putting subsequent purchasers on inquiry regarding the nature of that possession.

  Questions settled

  • Does physical possession of property by a person other than the vendor constitute constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie to establish the status of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice under Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Is a subsequent vendee required to affirmatively prove the absence of notice of a prior agreement to claim protection under the Specific Relief Act 1877?
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• Rashid Ali vs The State2011 SCMR 1037 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-10-27
  quantum of punishmentdeath sentencedisciplined forcemurderjudicial confessioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellant, a member of the Rangers, under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a co-employee using an official G-3 rifle. The conviction was based on eyewitness testimony and a judicial confession. Leave to appeal was granted solely to consider the quantum of sentence. The core legal question was whether the appellant's act of shooting the deceased following a minor altercation and a time lapse of approximately 45 minutes warranted a reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appellant, belonging to a disciplined force and acting with recklessness after sufficient time to cool down, was not entitled to any leniency. The appeal was consequently dismissed, and the death sentence was upheld. The key principle laid down is that members of disciplined forces who commit premeditated murders with state-issued weapons after adequate time for reflection cannot invoke sympathy to mitigate the death penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the death sentence should be commuted to life imprisonment when the murder is committed by a member of a disciplined force after a lapse of time following a minor complaint?
  • Does a judicial confession detailing the motive for a murder preclude the reduction of a death sentence?
  • Is a member of a disciplined force who uses an official weapon to kill a colleague entitled to leniency on the ground of provocation after a cooling-off period?
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• Rashid Ahmed vs Chief Executive Officer, GEPCO and others2011 SCMR 1451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-26
  service tribunal jurisdictionlabor court jurisdictionremoval from servicestatutory rulesleave to appealcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment whereby the Service Tribunal dismissed the petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the employer, GEPCO, is not governed by statutory rules, notwithstanding that a penalty was imposed under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000. Previously, the Labour Court had allowed the petitioner's claim, but the High Court set it aside, holding that the Federal Service Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction because the company was a statutory body owned by the Federal Government. The core legal question concerns the conflicting views on forum jurisdiction between the Labour Court and the Service Tribunal, and whether the resulting confusion entitles the litigant to condonation of delay. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the High Court erred in holding that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction, and whether the jurisdictional confusion warrants condonation of delay for the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that contradictory judicial determinations regarding the appropriate forum for redress should not prejudice a litigant's right to pursue remedies on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction over employees of GEPCO?
  • Whether the High Court correctly held that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the service dispute of a corporate entity owned by the Federal Government?
  • Does confusion over the appropriate judicial forum entitle an aggrieved employee to condonation of delay in pursuing legal remedies?
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• Rasa Khan vs Manager (Operation) Faisalabad Electric Supply2011 SCMR 676 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-05-21
  Leave to appealService matterCompulsory retirementMisconductUnauthorized absenceTime-barred appealLimitationEstoppelConstitutional jurisdictionService Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that dismissed the petitioner's appeal on merits and as time-barred. The petitioner, a Chowkidar, was compulsorily retired from service for misconduct and unauthorized absence under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2002. He contended that the retirement order was void, thus not subject to limitation, and that the Service Tribunal failed to address this. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no infirmity or illegality in the Service Tribunal's judgment. The Court held that the initial departmental appeal was time-barred, and no provision existed for a second departmental appeal. It affirmed that an appeal to the Service Tribunal is incompetent if the preceding departmental appeal was time-barred. Furthermore, the Court noted the petitioner's acceptance of pensionary benefits, applying the principles of "approbate and reprobate" and estoppel, and declined to exercise its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 212(3) due to the petitioner's conduct and failure to raise a question of public importance.

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• Rao Zahid Tasawar and another vs Secretary M/O Interior and others2011 SCMR 1947 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-05-26
  civil serviceback benefitsresignationservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, directed against an order regarding the service rights of a civil servant, Rao Zahid Tasawar. The core legal questions involve whether an employee is entitled to back benefits up to the date of resignation after a dismissal order is set aside, whether a civil servant may remain absent after submitting a resignation, the legal effect of a resignation prior to its acceptance by the competent authority, and whether a service tribunal possesses the competence to accept a resignation that falls within the domain of the competent authority. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions concerning civil service law, resignation procedures, and the jurisdiction of service tribunals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether after the setting aside of dismissal order, Rao Zahid Tasawar was entitled to back benefits upto the date of resignation?
  • Whether after submission of resignation a civil servant is entitled to remain absent?
  • Whether the resignation has any effect until it is accepted by the competent authority?
  • Whether the learned Tribunal, as such, can accept the resignation of an official which otherwise is the competence of the competent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Rana Shahid Ahmad Khan vs Tanveer Ahmed and others2011 SCMR 1937 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-08-05
  quashment of FIRconstitutional jurisdictioninherent powers of High Courtdishonored chequemala fidespolice investigationcriminal proceedingsextraordinary remedycivil nature of disputescope of jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave challenged a High Court judgment that quashed an FIR registered under Section 489-F PPC. The High Court had quashed the FIR, citing the complainant's concealment of facts regarding partial payment and the matter being civil in nature, indicating mala fides. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution and Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to quash criminal proceedings, particularly at the investigation stage, when factual disputes existed. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment. It held that quashment of an FIR in constitutional or inherent jurisdiction is an extraordinary remedy, permissible only in exceptional circumstances. The High Court cannot ordinarily interfere with police investigation in cognizable offenses, act as an investigating agency, or determine guilt/innocence at the initial stage. Mala fides, being a question of fact, requires proper inquiry by the investigating officer. The Court reiterated that if allegations ex facie make out a criminal offence, investigation should proceed on merits.

  Read full judgment →
• Rana Shahid Ahmad Khan vs Tanveer Ahmed & others2011 PLJ SC 932 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-08-05
  quashment of FIRinherent powers of High Courtdishonoured chequepolice investigationconstitutional jurisdictioncriminal breachquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the High Court whereby an FIR registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was quashed at the investigation stage based on disputed questions of fact and pleas raised by the accused. The core legal question was whether the High Court could competently quash an FIR in the exercise of its inherent or constitutional jurisdiction while an investigation by the police was still underway and where the allegations on their face disclosed a cognizable offence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment, holding that the High Court erred by stepping into the shoes of the investigating agency and deciding disputed questions of fact at the initial stage. The Court laid down the principle that quashment of criminal proceedings or an FIR under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 or Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances, and the High Court must not interfere with police investigation or resolve questions of guilt or innocence before the completion of the investigation and trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court quash an FIR under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 while the police investigation is still in progress?
  • Whether disputed questions of fact regarding financial transactions can be resolved by the High Court in proceedings for the quashment of a criminal case?
  • Is the quashment of a criminal case under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 or Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 an ordinary or an extraordinary remedy?
  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction to take over the role of an investigating agency in determining the guilt or innocence of an accused person?
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• Rana Muhammad Khalil vs Regional Audit Chief and others2011 SCMR 1500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-27
  master and servantjurisdiction of civil courtFederal Service Tribunalrejection of plaintservice dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the concurrent orders of lower forums rejecting his plaint on the ground that the relationship between the parties was that of master and servant and the appropriate forum was the Federal Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the trial court's order was self-contradictory, as a finding of master and servant relationship did not mean the Federal Service Tribunal had jurisdiction over claims not based on terms and conditions of service. Furthermore, the respondent-bank's counsel was unable to defend the impugned order. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of the lower forums, converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and directed the parties to appear before the trial court for the resurrection and continuation of the civil suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court lack jurisdiction in every master and servant dispute involving a statutory body?
  • Can a plaint be rejected solely on the ground that the Federal Service Tribunal is the appropriate forum when the claim is not based on terms and conditions of service?
  • Whether the finding of a master and servant relationship automatically bars a civil suit.
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• Rana Muhammad Aslam Badar Munir vs Azmat Bashir and others2011 SCMR 1420 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-03-30
  habeas corpusillegal detentionpolice torturespecial costsdetenu recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal petitions seeking leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which set a detenu at liberty upon a habeas corpus petition and imposed special costs on two police officials, Badar Munir, S.I., and Rana Muhammad Aslam, Inspector, for keeping the detenu in illegal confinement and subjecting him to physical torture. The core legal question was whether the High Court could validly impose costs and direct departmental proceedings against police officers found involved in illegal detention during habeas corpus proceedings under section 491, Cr.P.C., without a separate show-cause notice, when the officers were present and heard. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court's order finding illegal detention and directing disciplinary action was fully justified given the bailiff's report, medical evidence, and the officers' failure to justify the detention, though it exercised leniency to reduce the quantum of costs imposed. The key principle laid down is that where police officers are present during habeas corpus proceedings and fail to justify illegal custody established by a bailiff's report and medical evidence, the High Court may competently award compensation costs and recommend departmental action without requiring formal separate show-cause notices.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can impose special costs upon police officials for illegal detention during habeas corpus proceedings under section 491, Cr.P.C.?
  • Is a separate show-cause notice mandatory before imposing costs on police officers who are personally present and heard during habeas corpus proceedings?
  • Can the Supreme Court reduce the amount of special costs imposed on police officials while maintaining the finding of illegal detention?
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• Raja Khan vs Manager (Operation) Faisalabad Electric Supply2011 PLC (C.S.) 856 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-05-21
  compulsory retirementlimitationdepartmental appealapprobate and reprobateestoppelservice lawvoid orderpensionary benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a service appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal on grounds of limitation and merit. The petitioner, a Chowkidar at PESCO, was awarded the major penalty of compulsory retirement following a show-cause notice under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2002, for unauthorized absence and misconduct. The petitioner filed a departmental appeal which was dismissed as time-barred, followed by an unauthorized second appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the Tribunal's decision, ruling that an appeal before the Tribunal is incompetent if the preceding departmental appeal was time-barred. The Court further held that the petitioner was estopped by his conduct from challenging the retirement order as he had already applied for and received his pensionary benefits, invoking the principle of 'approbate and reprobate'. The Court reaffirmed that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 212(3) is discretionary and will not be exercised to circumvent limitation laws or assist a party who does not come with clean hands.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal is competent if the underlying departmental appeal was dismissed as time-barred?
  • Can a civil servant challenge a retirement order after having applied for and accepted pensionary benefits under the principle of 'approbate and reprobate'?
  • Does the filing of a second or 'further' departmental appeal, where not provided for by rules, extend the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • Can a void order be challenged at any time if the petitioner's conduct suggests estoppel or an attempt to circumvent limitation laws?
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• Raja Fazal-ur-Rehman vs Muhammad Afzal and another2011 PSC (Crl.) 670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-09-24
  bail cancellationabductionabsconsionlast seen evidencecriminal procedurereasonable grounds
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought the cancellation of bail granted by the High Court to the respondent-accused, who was implicated in an abduction case under Section 364/109 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The complainant alleged that the respondent took the abductee away on the pretext of currency exchange, following which the abductee remained untraced for years, and the respondent remained a fugitive from law before seeking bail. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in granting bail based on last-seen evidence and whether reasonable grounds existed to believe the accused was guilty under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the specific circumstances—including the last-seen evidence corroborated by a telephonic contact and the accused's prolonged absconsion—constituted reasonable grounds to believe the accused was connected to the crime. The court laid down the principle that the criteria for bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is distinct from the standard of proof required for conviction, and absconsion is a highly relevant factor weighing against the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether absconsion of an accused for a prolonged period is a relevant factor to be considered at the bail stage?
  • Does last-seen evidence coupled with telephonic communication and the continued disappearance of the abductee constitute reasonable grounds to believe the accused is guilty under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Whether the criteria for granting bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is different from the standard applied for conviction or acquittal?
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• Rahat Ali vs State2011 PLJ SC 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-10-19
  abductiondelayed statement of witnesssole eyewitnessinadmissible confessionpointing outbenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal appeal arising from a jail petition filed by the appellant against his conviction and sentence under Section 364 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for abduction. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular testimony, specifically the credibility of a delayed sole eyewitness, and the admissibility of confessional statements and pointings-out under Articles 38 and 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the uncorroborated statement of an eyewitness who observed the incident but remained silent for a month without a plausible explanation is untrustworthy, and that police disclosures and pointings-out leading to no recoveries or already known facts are inadmissible. The Court set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitting the appellant. The key principle laid down is that an inordinate and unexplained delay in a witness reporting a crime, coupled with unnatural subsequent conduct, renders their testimony unreliable for sustaining a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inordinate and unexplained delay in recording the statement of a sole eyewitness renders their testimony unreliable?
  • Is a confessional statement made to the police regarding the commission of a murder admissible under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Can the pointing out of a place of incident by an accused be used as incriminating evidence under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 when no discovery is made and the place is already known?
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• Raees-Ud-Din vs Nasreen Anwar and others2011 SCMR 998 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-06-30
  review jurisdictionex parte orderdemarcation reportservice of noticefraud and misrepresentationexecution of decreeencroachment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed his applications to set aside an ex parte review order. The underlying dispute involved a suit for possession of land based on a demarcation report. Initially, the trial court decreed possession of 4 marlas against the petitioner. Following a revision, the High Court restored the trial court's decree. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a review petition, which was allowed, granting an additional 2 marlas of land. The petitioner challenged this, alleging he was not served notice and that the plaintiff committed fraud by providing a wrong address. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner had failed to challenge the initial revision judgment and the subsequent review judgment in a timely manner. Furthermore, the court found no merit in the allegation of fraud, noting that the address used in the review was consistent with previous proceedings and that the petitioner had knowledge of the execution proceedings. The Court held that the review jurisdiction was correctly exercised to correct an error apparent on the face of the record and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a review judgment on the grounds of non-service when the address provided was consistent with previous proceedings?
  • Is a demarcation report divisible such that a party can accept a portion of the findings while rejecting the remainder?
  • Does the exercise of review jurisdiction to correct an error apparent on the face of the record constitute a valid legal action?
  • Can a petition under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be sustained when the petitioner had prior knowledge of the proceedings?
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• Raees Khan vs The State2011 SCMR 1055 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-01-08
  quantum of sentencesudden provocationmurder convictionmitigating circumstanceslethal weaponcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction for murder, wherein the appellant sought to challenge the quantum of sentence imposed by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the occurrence, involving a dispute over a thorny hedge, constituted a sudden flare-up or provocation sufficient to warrant the application of Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, rather than Section 302(b). The Supreme Court examined the circumstances, noting that the appellant arrived at the scene armed with a lethal firearm while the complainant party was unarmed. The Court observed that the injuries sustained by the accused occurred only after the appellant had already fired the fatal shot at the deceased. Consequently, the Court held that the appellant failed to establish that the act was committed under sudden provocation or in a manner justifying a reduction in sentence. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the presence of a lethal weapon and the sequence of events did not mitigate the offense to the category of Section 302(c), thereby maintaining the original sentence of imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Does the act of arriving at a dispute scene armed with a firearm preclude a claim of sudden provocation under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a sentence be reduced from Section 302(b) to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the accused fired the fatal shot before sustaining injuries from the complainant party?
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• Rab Nawaz vs The State2011 SCMR 1485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-21
  criminal appealjustice of the peacejudicial proceedingscontemptillegal convictionpolice official
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, challenged his conviction and sentence under Section 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which had been recorded by the Additional Sessions Judge/Justice of the Peace, Sargodha, for allegedly disobeying an administrative order, and subsequently upheld by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether proceedings conducted by an ex-officio Justice of the Peace constitute 'judicial proceedings' for the purposes of Section 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether the said section is attracted in cases of non-compliance with an order rather than intentional insult or interruption during a judicial proceeding. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that proceedings conducted by an ex-officio Justice of the Peace are not judicial proceedings, and that Section 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 applies exclusively to insults or interruptions occurring during actual judicial proceedings. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentence were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether proceedings conducted by an ex-officio Justice of the Peace qualify as judicial proceedings under the law?
  • Does the disobedience of an administrative order passed by a Justice of the Peace attract penal consequences under Section 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to constitute an offence under Section 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Rab Nawaz Ahmed vs Mst. Hasina Iqbal and another2011 SCMR 972 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-07-01
  dowerrecovery of dowerfamily court decreewrit jurisdictiondocumentary evidenceexecution proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment which had restored a Family Court decree in favor of the respondent-wife for the recovery of Rs. 500,000 as dower. The core legal question was whether the petitioner-husband had satisfied his dower obligation through the alleged transfer of a one-half share in a house to the respondent. The Appellate Court had initially set aside the Family Court's decree, believing the property transfer satisfied the dower claim. However, the High Court, exercising writ jurisdiction, reversed this, finding no documentary evidence of the property transfer and noting the petitioner remained in occupation of the house. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the petitioner failed to produce any registered deed or documentary proof of the alleged property transfer before the trial, appellate, or supreme courts. The Court held that in the absence of evidence establishing the transfer of property in lieu of dower, the monetary decree for dower remains enforceable. The petition was dismissed, and the executing court was directed to expedite recovery proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to produce documentary evidence of a property transfer in lieu of dower render a monetary dower decree enforceable?
  • Can a High Court in writ jurisdiction restore a Family Court decree when the Appellate Court's finding lacks evidentiary support?
  • Is a claim of dower satisfaction valid if the husband fails to prove the transfer of the agreed-upon property?
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• Qeemat Gul vs The State2011 SCMR 954 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-02-24
  post-arrest bailnarcotics traffickingpolice encounterrecovery of firearmsstatutory detention period
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner, Qeemat Gul, seeking post-arrest bail after being denied the same by lower courts in a case registered under sections 324, 353, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with section 9 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the circumstances of his apprehension during a narcotics trafficking interception involving a vehicle accident and police encounter. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, noting that three co-accused received firearm injuries and one was killed while the police party remained unhurt, that the petitioner sustained no injuries despite a severe vehicle accident, that no firearm was recovered from him, and that he had been in detention since July 2009. The appeal was consequently allowed and the petitioner granted bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when co-accused sustained injuries in a police encounter but the petitioner remained uninjured despite a serious vehicle accident?
  • Does the absence of any firearm recovery from an accused person support the grant of bail in a case involving cross-firing and narcotics recovery?
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• Qasim Wasti and others vs Secretary to Government of Punjab, Revenue Department, Board of Revenue, Lahore and others2011 PLC (C.S.) 997 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-05-26
  civil service seniorityappointment datepre-service trainingstatutory interpretationTehsildar recruitmentservice rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a long-standing seniority dispute between two groups of civil servants in Punjab: direct recruits (E.A.C. group) and promotees (Tehsildar group). The central legal question was determining the precise date of appointment for Tehsildars to calculate seniority, specifically whether the mandatory two-year training period constitutes pre-service or in-service training. The Supreme Court held that selection for a post does not equate to appointment. Relying on the West Pakistan Tehsildari and Naib-Tehsildari Service Rules, 1962, the Court determined that a person selected for the post of Tehsildar is merely a candidate until they successfully complete the prescribed training and pass the required departmental examinations. Consequently, the Court ruled that the training period is pre-service in nature and cannot be counted towards seniority. The Court further affirmed that the 1962 and 1969 Rules remain valid and consistent with the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The key principle established is that appointment to service is contingent upon satisfying all statutory prerequisites, including training and examination, and seniority commences only from the date of actual posting following such completion.

  Questions settled

  • Does the selection of a candidate for the post of Tehsildar constitute an appointment to the service?
  • Is the training period for Tehsildars considered in-service or pre-service training for the purpose of seniority?
  • Can the period spent in mandatory training and departmental examination be counted towards seniority for civil servants?
  • Are the West Pakistan Tehsildari and Naib-Tehsildari Service Rules, 1962, inconsistent with the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
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• Qamar-Uz-Zaman alias Kala vs The State2011 SCMR 856 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-06-03
  Qatl-e-amdocular evidenceinterested witnessesmotivedeath sentencecriminal appealforensic evidencereasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arose from the conviction of the petitioner for the murder of Muhammad Iqbal under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioner challenged the High Court's judgment, which had upheld his death sentence while acquitting his co-accused. The core legal questions concerned whether the ocular testimony of interested witnesses, specifically the deceased's family, was sufficient for conviction, the impact of a failed motive, and the effect of a negative Forensic Science Laboratory report regarding the weapon of offence. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound, noting that the ocular account was natural, straightforward, and corroborated by medical evidence. The Court affirmed that motive is not an essential ingredient of the offence of Qatl-e-amd; thus, its disbelief by the High Court did not invalidate the conviction. Furthermore, the Court held that a negative FSL report regarding a recovered weapon does not automatically discredit consistent ocular testimony. The petition was dismissed, confirming that the prosecution had established the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Is motive an essential ingredient to constitute the offence of Qatl-e-amd?
  • Does a negative Forensic Science Laboratory report regarding the recovery of a weapon automatically invalidate a conviction based on ocular testimony?
  • Can the testimony of interested witnesses be relied upon if it is natural, consistent, and corroborated by medical evidence?
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• Qamar Abbas vs The State2011 SCMR 1335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-05-15
  murderdeath sentencegrave and sudden provocationocular evidencemedical evidenceSection 540 CrPCappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased, maintained by the High Court. The appellant contended that the eye-witnesses were chance witnesses whose presence was improbable and that the courts below failed to exercise powers under Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon material witnesses. The appellant further pleaded grave and sudden provocation, alleging the deceased attempted to molest his wife. The Supreme Court held that the presence of the eye-witnesses was natural as they were relatives attending a pre-wedding ceremony. The court rejected the appellant's plea of grave and sudden provocation as an absurd fabrication, noting that the appellant failed to produce any corroborating evidence from the household members. The court affirmed that the ocular account, corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of the weapon, was reliable. The principle laid down is that the court acts as an impartial arbiter and is not required to create evidence for a party; the burden remains on the accused to substantiate a special plea, such as grave and sudden provocation.

  Questions settled

  • Is the court required to exercise its powers under Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon witnesses to support a defense plea when the accused has failed to produce them?
  • Can a plea of grave and sudden provocation be accepted when the accused fails to provide any corroborating evidence from the inmates of the house where the incident occurred?
  • Does the presence of relatives at a family function, such as a nikah ceremony, render their testimony as eye-witnesses to a crime committed at that location reliable?
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• Qaiser Masud vs Secretary Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Punjab and another2011 SCMR 1181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-04-08
  permanent absorptiondeputationlien in servicerepatriationlimitation periodservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed the appellant's service appeal concerning his repatriation from the Federal Investigation Agency to his parent department, the Law Department, Government of Punjab. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant was permanently absorbed into the Federal Investigation Agency, whether he lost his lien in the provincial government upon such absorption, and whether his service appeal before the Tribunal was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appellant's appointment in the Federal Investigation Agency was permanent and confirmed against a clear vacancy, meaning he had lost his provincial service lien and was not entitled to repatriation, and further that his service appeal was time-barred. The key principles laid down are that a government servant permanently absorbed into another department ceases to maintain a lien in their parent department, and limitation for challenging an adverse departmental decision runs from the initial communication of the refusal rather than subsequent administrative reminders or correspondence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a government servant permanently absorbed in another department retains a lien in their parent provincial department?
  • Does a government servant automatically stand confirmed after the expiry of the maximum extended probationary period under the civil servants appointment rules?
  • From which date is the period of limitation computed for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal when a request for repatriation has been formally declined?
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• Qaisar Mushtaq Ahmad vs Controller of Examinations and others2011 PLD Supreme Court 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-12-13
  Condonation of delayDirect appealCivil petition for leave to appealLimitationSupreme Court RulesConstitutional jurisdictionPecuniary jurisdictionTime-barred appealSufficient cause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned an application for condonation of delay in filing a direct appeal before the Supreme Court, following the Lahore High Court's acceptance of a Regular First Appeal. The applicant had initially filed a civil petition for leave to appeal (CPLA) instead of a direct appeal, despite admitting its competency under Article 185(2)(d)(e) of the Constitution due to the suit's pecuniary value exceeding Rs. 50,000. An earlier request to convert the CPLA into an appeal was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court, which noted that any subsequent direct appeal would be "subject to all just exceptions." The core legal question was whether the delay of 142 days in filing the direct appeal should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the application, holding that no specific or sufficient cause for the delay was provided, nor was an explanation offered for each day's delay. The Court emphasized that the applicant's deliberate choice to pursue an incorrect remedy and the prior rejection of the conversion request did not constitute grounds for condonation, leading to the dismissal of the civil appeal as time-barred.

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• Qadir Baksh (Deceased) through L.Rs, vs Allah Dewaya and another2011 SCMR 1162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-04-27
  specific performancesale agreementattesting witnessesspecial oathCode of Civil ProcedureQanun-e-Shahadatappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld a decree for specific performance of a sale agreement. The core legal questions were whether the lower courts violated Order XX, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by failing to record findings on every issue, and whether the non-examination of both attesting witnesses to the sale agreement rendered the document unproved under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. The Supreme Court held that the judgments were legally sufficient, noting that Order XX, Rule 5 does not mandate separate findings on every issue if the judgment is reasoned and addresses the core points. Furthermore, the Court held that where a document is exhibited without objection and one attesting witness is examined, the requirements of proof are satisfied, and the document cannot be challenged subsequently. The Court also emphasized the petitioner's inconsistent conduct, specifically the predecessor's prior offer to accept a special oath on the Holy Quran to resolve the dispute. Leave to appeal was refused, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a trial court to record a separate finding on every single issue violate Order XX, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a document be challenged in appeal if it was produced and exhibited in the trial court without any objection?
  • Is the examination of only one attesting witness sufficient to prove a document if the document itself is not disputed and was exhibited without objection?
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• Punjab Public Service Commission and anothers vs Mst. Aisha Nawaz2011 SCMR 1602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-23
  civil servicedisabled quotamerit listconstitutional jurisdictionintra-court appealpublic service commissionappointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which directed the Punjab Public Service Commission to appoint respondent No. 1, a blind candidate, as a Subject Specialist (BS-17) despite her merit position being outside the 2% quota reserved for disabled persons. The respondent was placed at Serial No. 11 on the merit list, while only five seats were available. The High Court had influenced its decision based on the degree of the respondent's disability compared to other successful candidates. The Supreme Court, in setting aside the High Court's judgment, held that the degree of disability was not a criterion for appointment under the existing policy or advertisement. The Court ruled that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be used to substitute government policy or introduce new formulas that disadvantage other successful candidates who secured higher marks. It was further held that merit lists prepared in accordance with established rules cannot be bypassed on humanitarian grounds or presumptions of potential performance, and government policy remains immune from interference unless it violates fundamental rights.

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• Punjab Public Service Commission and another vs Mst. Aisha Nawaz2011 PLC (C.S.) 1284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-23
  public service commissionmerit listdisabled quotaconstitutional jurisdictionappointmentjudicial reviewrecruitment policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court directing the appointment of the respondent, a visually impaired candidate, to the post of Subject Specialist (BS-17) despite her ranking at serial number 11 on the merit list, which exceeded the 2% quota of five reserved seats. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise constitutional jurisdiction to direct an appointment over and above the established quota and merit list. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s direction was legally unsustainable. The Court found that the respondent failed to demonstrate that her merit position was superior to the candidates appointed or those ranked between 6 and 10. Furthermore, the Court rejected the respondent's late-stage claims regarding the lack of an amanuensis and extra time, noting these were not raised in the original pleadings. The key principle laid down is that courts cannot substitute government recruitment policy or interfere with merit-based selections absent a violation of fundamental rights, nor can they entertain hypothetical claims not raised in the initial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court in constitutional jurisdiction direct the appointment of a candidate over and above the reserved quota?
  • Is a court permitted to interfere with government recruitment policy in the absence of a violation of fundamental rights?
  • Can a candidate raise new pleas regarding examination conditions, such as the need for an amanuensis, for the first time during an appeal?
  • Does a candidate have a right to be appointed to a reserved post if they do not rank within the available number of vacancies based on merit?
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• Punjab Public Service Commission and another vs Mst. Aisha Nawaz2011 PLJ SC 867 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  disabled quotapublic service commissionconstitutional jurisdictionmerit listappointmentintra court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby an Intra Court Appeal filed by a blind candidate (Respondent No. 1) was allowed, directing her appointment as a Subject Specialist (Female) BS-17 under the 2% quota for disabled persons. The core legal questions involved whether the merit list prepared by the Punjab Public Service Commission was violative of rules and whether the High Court could issue a direction in constitutional jurisdiction for the appointment of a candidate over and above the established merit and quota limits. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in directing the appointment of Respondent No. 1, who was placed at Serial No. 11 on the merit list, overlooking other candidates with higher merit who were also disabled. The Court laid down that appointments against reserved quotas must strictly follow inter se merit, that courts cannot substitute government policy or grant relief on mere presumptions regarding examination accommodations not raised in pleadings, and that government policies cannot be interfered with unless shown to violate fundamental rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the merit list prepared on the basis of which respondents have been appointed and a candidate ignored is violative of relevant instructions and rules?
  • Whether the High Court could in constitutional jurisdiction issue a direction for the appointment of a candidate over and above the quota reserved for the disabled while ignoring inter se merit?
  • Can a plea regarding the non-provision of an amanuensis and extra time be raised for the same time before the Supreme Court when it was not pleaded in the writ petition or intra court appeal?
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• Provincial Police Officer, N.-W.F.P. and others vs Muhammad Nawaz2011 SCMR 689 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-04-22
  promotion listvested rightaudi alteram partemnatural justiceshow cause noticecivil servicepolice department
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Provincial Police Officer, N.-W.F.P., against the judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which had set aside an order transferring the respondent and removing his name from promotion list 'D'. The petitioners contended that the removal of the respondent's name from the promotion list was within the competent authority's domain of managing a disciplined force and did not constitute a punishment. The respondent argued that his name was removed without any show-cause notice or opportunity of being heard, violating the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition and declined to grant leave. The Court held that the inclusion of an employee's name in a promotion list creates a vested right in their favour for promotion to a higher rank, which cannot be withdrawn without adopting proper legal procedures. The Court further ruled that removing a name based on oral complaints without a show-cause notice violates the principle of audi alteram partem.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inclusion of a civil servant's name in a promotion list create a vested right that cannot be withdrawn without proper legal procedure?
  • Can a competent authority remove an employee's name from a promotion list based on oral complaints without issuing a show-cause notice?
  • Does the removal of an employee's name from a promotion list without an opportunity of being heard violate the principle of audi alteram partem?
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• Province of Sindh and others vs Saeed-Ur-Rehman2011 SCMR 833 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-06-26
  pensionary benefitsdepartmental inquiryreinstatementcompetent authorityadministrative orderlook after chargeservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which directed the petitioners to finalize and release the respondent's pensionary benefits following his retirement. The respondent had previously faced departmental proceedings for alleged forgery of his date of birth, resulting in a removal from service. Following a remand by the Sindh Service Tribunal, a fresh inquiry recommended reinstatement with back-benefits. Subsequently, an order was passed by the Administrator Auqaf reinstating the respondent and treating the intervening period as duty, effectively retiring him. The petitioners challenged this, arguing that the officer who passed the reinstatement order held only a 'look after' charge and lacked the competency under the relevant statute to exercise the powers of the Administrator Auqaf. The Supreme Court observed that the reinstatement order remained in the field and had not been challenged or recalled by the petitioners. Finding no legal or factual error in the High Court's decision to enforce the existing order, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that an administrative order that has not been recalled or set aside remains binding and enforceable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an administrative order that has not been formally recalled or set aside remains binding and enforceable?
  • Can a petitioner challenge the competency of an officer to pass an order when that order has not been challenged or recalled by the department?
  • Is a respondent entitled to pensionary benefits if a departmental inquiry recommends reinstatement and the order treating the intervening period as duty remains in the field?
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• Province of Punjab through District Officer (Revenue), District Collector, Kasur vs Border Area Committee through Chairman and others2011 PLD Supreme Court 550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-03-17
  land allotmentBorder Area CommitteeWest Pakistan Border Area Regulationjurisdictionvoid allotmentmunicipal limitsadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the legality of a land allotment made by the Border Area Committee to the respondent on 10-5-1971 within the municipal limits of Kasur. The core legal question was whether the Committee had the lawful authority to allot this land given the Provincial Government's prior prohibition on such allotments within those specific limits. The Supreme Court examined the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation, 1959 (MLR No. 9), noting that while the Committee was empowered to allot land, it was bound by the terms and conditions prescribed by the Provincial Government. The Court found that the Government had explicitly prohibited allotments within the Kasur municipal limits as of 28-9-1970, and the stay order issued in November 1970 only applied to existing allotments, not future ones. Consequently, the Court held that the 1971 allotment was made without jurisdiction and was void ab initio. The Court further clarified that the failure to pursue an Intra-Court Appeal does not necessarily bar the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's judgment upholding the allotment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Border Area Committee had the legal authority to allot land within the municipal limits of Kasur after the Provincial Government's prohibition of 28-9-1970?
  • Does the failure to file an Intra-Court Appeal before a High Court absolutely bar the Supreme Court from exercising its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Did the stay order issued by the Colonies Department in November 1970 suspend the prohibition against future land allotments within the municipal limits of Kasur?
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• Province of Punjab through District Coordination Officer, Okara and others vs Market Committee, Okara through Chairman_Secretary2011 SCMR 1856 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-07-21
  market committeelocal authorityproperty tax exemptiongeneral clauses actstatutory corporationtax and fee distinctionlocal fund
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a demand for urban immovable property tax raised by the Punjab provincial authorities against a market committee constituted under the Punjab Agriculture Produce Market Ordinance, 1978. The market committee claimed exemption under section 4(b)(ii) of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, as a 'local authority'. The Lahore High Court ruled in favor of the market committee for the period prior to 2002, holding it to be a local authority under section 3(28) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, but held that the exemption was removed by an amendment in 2002. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the legal attributes of a 'local authority', including juristic personality, local self-government, power to make bye-laws, and control over a local fund sustained by fees or taxes. The Court held that a market committee possesses all essential characteristics of a local authority under the General Clauses Act, 1897, and is thus entitled to the property tax exemption under the Act of 1958. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a market committee constituted under the Punjab Agriculture Produce Market Ordinance, 1978 qualifies as a 'local authority' under section 3(28) of the General Clauses Act, 1897?
  • Is a market committee entitled to an exemption from property tax under section 4(b)(ii) of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958?
  • What are the essential legal attributes and characteristics required for a statutory body to be classified as a 'local authority'?
  • Does the power of a market committee to expend funds on property tax liabilities strip it of its status as a local authority entitled to tax exemptions?
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• Province of Punjab through Collector, T.T. Singh and others vs Muhammad Farooq & others2011 PLJ SC 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil revisionlimitation periodsuo motu jurisdictionexclusion of timestatutory interpretationprocedural technicalities
  Summary & questions settled

  The Province of Punjab appealed against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed its Civil Revision as time-barred. The High Court had ruled that the 90-day limitation period for revisions was absolute, that Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 was inapplicable, and that time spent obtaining copies could not be excluded under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 because 'Revision' was not explicitly mentioned. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the omission of 'Revision' in Section 12(2) was due to the historical absence of a limitation period for revisions, and that such time should be excluded when computing the limitation period. Furthermore, the Court clarified that while a 90-day limitation applies to parties filing a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, this limitation does not restrict the High Court's inherent power to exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction under Section 115(1). The Court emphasized that technicalities should not defeat the ends of justice and remanded the case for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the exclusion of time for obtaining copies under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to revision petitions?
  • Does the 90-day limitation period for filing a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 restrict the High Court's power to exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction?
  • Can a High Court entertain a time-barred revision petition if the merits of the case demand it?
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• Province of Punjab and others vs Messrs Akhtar and Co.2011 SCMR 1516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-16
  pecuniary jurisdictionleave to appealsuspension of judgmentcoram non judicecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Province of Punjab against Messrs Akhtar and Co., challenging the judgment of the High Court in an FAO. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court's judgment was rendered without pecuniary jurisdiction, given that the pecuniary jurisdiction was amended in 2002 while the FAO was decided in 2008, rendering the judgment allegedly coram non judice. The Supreme Court held that the absence of pecuniary jurisdiction appeared to be patent and was not considered by the High Court. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider the question of pecuniary jurisdiction and suspended the operation of the impugned judgment, noting that the decretal amount had been deposited and placed in a profit-bearing security scheme. The key principle laid down is that where a patent defect of pecuniary jurisdiction exists and was overlooked by the appellate court, the operation of such judgment may be suspended pending appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate judgment is coram non judice when rendered without pecuniary jurisdiction due to subsequent amendments?
  • Can the operation of a High Court judgment be suspended when a patent defect of pecuniary jurisdiction is established?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the lower court fails to consider the issue of pecuniary jurisdiction?
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• Prof. Dr. Shamim Hassan, University of Health Sciences and another vs Dr. Waseem Abbas Zaidi and others2011 SCMR 1426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-26
  locus standiservice lawmaintainability of appealaggrieved persondepartmental penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions were filed by Professor Dr. Shamim Hassan and the University of Health Sciences to challenge the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated 13-5-2010. The Service Tribunal had allowed an appeal filed by the private respondents against a departmental order and referred the matter to the Chief Minister. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether the private respondents had the locus standi to file an appeal before the Service Tribunal under the Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, when they were not directly aggrieved by the departmental order passed under Section 9(1) of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that under Sections 9 and 10 of the Ordinance, only a person who has been awarded a penalty or is directly aggrieved by a final order has the standing to file an appeal. Since the private respondents were not aggrieved by any final order under Section 9(1), their appeal before the Service Tribunal was not maintainable. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals, allowed them, and set aside the Service Tribunal's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person who has not been awarded a penalty or is not directly aggrieved by a final order under Section 9 of the Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance 2000 has the locus standi to file an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • Can the Punjab Service Tribunal entertain an appeal under Section 10 of the Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance 2000 from a party who is not an aggrieved person under Section 9 of the said Ordinance?
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• Proceedings Against: Justices (R) Iftikhar Hussain Chaudhry, Khurshid2011 PLD Supreme Court 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-02-02
  contempt of courtPCO judgesjudicial immunityextra-constitutional stepsdisobedience of court ordercontempt proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from contempt proceedings initiated against certain retired judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts who took oath under the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) of 3 November 2007, in disobedience of the restraining order passed by a seven-member bench of the Supreme Court on the same date. The core legal questions involved whether the Constitution permits contempt proceedings against judges of superior courts, whether judicial propriety bars such proceedings, and whether sufficient material exists to frame charges. The Supreme Court held that superior court judges do not enjoy immunity from contempt proceedings under Article 204 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and the Contempt of Court Ordinance 2003, and that judicial propriety demands they be put to trial. The Court further held that sufficient material existed to frame charges against the contesting respondents, except for two individuals who were not judges at the relevant time, whose conduct was merely deprecated. The key principle laid down is that judges who violate orders restraining extra-constitutional steps and take oaths under unconstitutional decrees are liable to contempt proceedings without immunity.

  Questions settled

  • Is it constitutionally permissible for the Supreme Court to proceed under Article 204 of the Constitution against judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts for committing contempt?
  • Does judicial propriety require the Supreme Court to discontinue contempt proceedings against superior court judges bearing in mind their status?
  • Is there sufficient material available to charge judges for committing contempt of the Supreme Court on account of disobedience of the order dated 3 November 2007?
  • Can individuals who took oath under the PCO but were not judges at the time of the restraining order be charged with contempt for violating the letter of the order?
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