Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Imtiaz Ahmed Lali vs Ghulam Muhammad Lali2008 PLJ SC 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2006-10-31
  election petitiondisqualification from electiondismissal from servicemisconductmoral turpituderetrospective legislationpolice servicerepresentation of the people
  Summary & questions settled

  These cross-appeals arise under Section 67(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 against an Election Tribunal judgment declaring the election of the appellant (Imtiaz Ahmed Lali) to the Provincial Assembly of Punjab as void due to his disqualification stemming from his past dismissal from police service. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant's dismissal for unauthorized absence constituted misconduct involving moral turpitude under Article 8D(2)(i) of the Conduct of General Elections Order, 2002, and whether the subsequent retrospective amendment substituting 'or' for 'and' in that provision applied to him, rendering him permanently disqualified. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that unauthorized absence from the police force constitutes misconduct under the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, and that the legislature possesses the competence to enact retrospective amendments to bring election laws into harmony with Article 63 of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The Court laid down that a candidate dismissed from public service for misconduct suffers a permanent statutory disqualification from contesting elections, which cannot be cured by the mere efflux of time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unauthorized absence from police service amounts to misconduct under the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975?
  • Can the legislature enact amendments to election laws with retrospective effect to align them with the Constitution?
  • Does a dismissal from public service on the grounds of misconduct create a permanent disqualification from contesting elections that is unaffected by the efflux of time?
  • Whether a candidate's disqualification based on a statutory amendment becomes notorious when conflicting judicial interpretations previously existed.
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• iMst. Surrya Bibi vs Muhammad Mansha and another2008 SCMR 558 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-10-19
  bail suspensionsubsequent bail applicationconcealment of factscriminal appealpre-judging merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the High Court's order suspending the sentence and granting bail to a respondent convicted under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerned the propriety of granting bail through a subsequent petition filed shortly after the unconditional withdrawal of an earlier bail petition without disclosing the prior attempt or presenting any fresh grounds, alongside the premature evaluation of evidence on merits by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the concealment of the prior withdrawn bail petition and the pre-judging of evidentiary matters vitiated the impugned bail order. The Court laid down the principle that a subsequent bail application following the withdrawal of an earlier one must disclose the prior proceedings, and suppression of such material facts disentitles the accused to discretionary relief of bail suspension.

  Questions settled

  • Does the concealment of a previously withdrawn bail petition disentitle an accused to relief in a subsequent bail application?
  • Can the High Court evaluate the admissibility of police statements and pre-judge evidence while deciding a bail suspension matter?
  • Whether an order granting bail obtained without disclosing material facts regarding prior withdrawn petitions is sustainable?
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• Imran Nawaz and another vs Rashid Mahmood and others2008 SCMR 508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-08-15
  election disqualificationlocal government electionbanned organizationAnti-Terrorism Act4th Scheduleleave to appealNazim election
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that disqualified the petitioner from contesting the election for Nazim of Union Council No. 119, Pasrur-I, Sialkot. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was ineligible to participate in the election due to his affiliation with a banned organization, specifically under the provisions of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001. The High Court had relied on official records, including a notification from the Election Commission of Pakistan and documentation from the Home Department, confirming the petitioner's name appeared in the 4th Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, as an active member and office-bearer of a banned organization. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no grounds to interfere with the factual findings regarding the petitioner's disqualification. The Court affirmed that inclusion in the 4th Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, constitutes a valid basis for disqualification under the relevant local government laws, thereby dismissing the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does inclusion in the 4th Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, render a candidate ineligible to contest local government elections?
  • Can the High Court rely on official records from the Home Department and the Election Commission to disqualify a candidate for election?
  • Is the disqualification of a candidate under Section 152(1)(r) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001, based on membership in a banned organization, legally sustainable?
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• Ibrar Khan and others vs Sanaullah Khan and others2008 SCMR 454 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-07-14
  adverse possessionsuit for possessioncivil revisionappellate interferenceland ownershipdemarcation reportcontradictory pleas
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a civil suit for possession of land, which was initially decreed by the Trial Court in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents. The Appellate Court subsequently set aside these decrees and dismissed the suits. Upon revision, the High Court restored the Trial Court's decrees, prompting the defendants to file petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerned the validity of the defendants' contradictory pleas of ownership and adverse possession, and whether the plaintiffs had sufficiently established their title. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the defendants failed to satisfy the legal requirements for adverse possession under the Limitation Act. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the plaintiffs had successfully proven their ownership through credible documentary evidence, including demarcation reports and official testimony from revenue officials. The Supreme Court concluded that the Appellate Court's judgment suffered from significant factual and legal infirmities, thereby justifying the High Court's intervention. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, affirming the plaintiffs' right to possession based on established title and the failure of the defendants' adverse possession claim.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant simultaneously claim ownership and adverse possession over the same land?
  • Does the failure to satisfy the conditions of Section 28 of the Limitation Act 1908 invalidate a claim of adverse possession?
  • Is a High Court justified in setting aside an appellate judgment that suffers from factual and legal infirmities?
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• Ijaz Mehmood Chaudhry vs Lahore High Court, Lahore through Registrar2008 SCMR 927 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-01-04
  Annual Confidential ReportAdverse remarksExpunctionReview petitionService lawJudicial officerInspection Judge
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought a review of a Supreme Court judgment that had dismissed his appeal against adverse remarks in his Annual Confidential Report (ACR). The core legal questions concerned whether the adverse remarks were validly recorded by a reporting officer who was not the designated Inspection Judge, and whether the petitioner's overall service record warranted the expunction of these remarks. The Court held that the previous judgment was based on a factual error regarding the reporting officer's authority as an Inspection Judge. Furthermore, the Court determined that in the absence of adverse reports before or after the impugned period, and given the petitioner's subsequent promotion, the adverse remarks were ineffective. The Court established that adverse remarks recorded by an unauthorized officer, or those that remain uncommunicated, are legally flawed and liable to be expunged. Consequently, the review petition was accepted, the previous judgment was set aside, and the adverse remarks were ordered to be expunged.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be maintained when a judgment was based on a factual error regarding the authority of the reporting officer?
  • Are adverse remarks in an Annual Confidential Report (ACR) liable to be expunged if recorded by an officer who was not the designated Inspection Judge?
  • Does the promotion of a civil servant during the pendency of an appeal against adverse remarks imply that the record was otherwise satisfactory?
  • Is an uncommunicated adverse remark in an Annual Confidential Report (ACR) legally effective?
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• Husnain Haider Sial vs Tayyab alias Ashraf and 2 others2008 SCMR 803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-06-14
  acquittalcriminal appealleave to appealdismissal in limineprosecution failureinvestigation report
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed in limine the petitioner's criminal appeal against the acquittal of the respondents. The petitioner had alleged that the respondents fired shots at his house door, leading to the registration of a case under sections 337-H(ii) and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. During the investigation, the police found the respondents innocent. Subsequently, the trial Magistrate acquitted the respondents after the petitioner failed to appear despite multiple notices. The core legal question was whether the acquittal was justified given the evidence and the petitioner's failure to prosecute. The Supreme Court held that the acquittal was proper, noting that the petitioner failed to provide a plausible explanation for his absence. Furthermore, the Court observed that the alleged offences were not applicable to the facts, as the firing was directed at a door rather than a human body, and no physical evidence, such as empty casings, was recovered. The petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can an acquittal order be upheld when the complainant fails to appear before the trial court despite receiving multiple notices?
  • Does the firing at a door without causing injury or recovering physical evidence constitute an offence under section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when the petitioner fails to provide a plausible explanation for their absence during the trial proceedings?
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• Human Right Case No. 5818 of 2006 vs N/A2008 PLJ SC 262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-12-27Read full judgment →
• Hassan Din vs Sanaullah2008 SCMR 737 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-04-19
  registered sale-deedconveyance of propertyendorsementsignature comparisonleave to appealSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the judgment of the High Court regarding a dispute over suit-land. The original owner, Noor Hussain, sold the land to Sana Ullah via a registered sale-deed in 1970. The petitioner, Hassan Din, claimed that Sana Ullah resold the land back to Noor Hussain in 1973 through an endorsement on the back of the original sale-deed, after which Noor Hussain sold it to the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the endorsement constituted a valid conveyance of property. The High Court found that the endorsement did not operate as a valid conveyance in law and that the trial court's finding on the comparison of signatures was erroneous. The Supreme Court examined the record and found no factual or legal infirmity, misreading, or non-reading of evidence in the impugned judgment. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the endorsement was legally ineffective to convey title, dismissed the petition, and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an endorsement on the back of a registered sale-deed can operate as a valid conveyance of land in the eyes of law?
  • Can an appellate or revisional court substitute its own view on the comparison of signatures when the trial court's observation is found to be incorrect?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the petitioner fails to point out any misreading or non-reading of evidence in the impugned judgment?
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• Hassan and others vs The State and others2008 SCMR 1461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-02-06
  leave to appealreappraisal of evidencemurderacquittalweapon recoverybenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal petitions for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a murder case involving multiple casualties and injuries resulting from a firing and attack incident in District Vehari. The trial court had convicted several accused persons under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing some to death and others to life imprisonment or lesser terms, while acquitting others. The High Court maintained certain convictions while acquitting others on benefit of doubt. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction and sentence of the petitioners, as well as the acquittal of certain respondents, warranted a reappraisal of evidence and a detailed examination in the interest of safe administration of justice. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners had made out a case for grant of leave to appeal for reappraisal of evidence, particularly noting doubtful weapon recoveries and lack of corroboration, and similarly granted leave to appeal in the petitions against acquittals to examine the matters in depth. The key principle laid down is that leave to appeal will be granted for reappraisal of evidence in criminal cases where weapon recoveries are doubtful or lack expert corroboration, or where co-accused have been acquitted under similar circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a case for grant of leave to appeal is made out for the reappraisal of evidence when the crime weapon recovery lacks a positive expert report?
  • Does the delayed recovery of an incriminating weapon beyond the period of police remand render the involvement of an accused prima facie doubtful?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the acquittal of respondents when co-accused similarly situated were apprehended at the spot with crime weapons?
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• Hashwani Hotels Limited vs Government of Pakistan and othersPTCL 2008 CL. 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales tax exemptioncustoms dutyimport of motorboatlocal manufacturabilitytax concessionbill of entryconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the Sindh High Court's dismissal of a constitutional petition regarding the denial of sales tax exemption and customs duty concessions on an imported motorboat. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant was entitled to sales tax exemption under Notification S.R.O. 212(1)/91 despite the withdrawal of the exemption notification and failure to fulfill mandatory pre-conditions before the withdrawal. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to establish that the motorboat could not be manufactured locally while the exemption notification was in force, as the initial 'no objection' was based on mere conjectures and presumption rather than a valid certificate, and subsequent information confirmed local manufacturability. Consequently, the appellant was not entitled to the exemption and became liable to pay sales tax under the amending withdrawal notification. The key principles laid down are that tax exemptions must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and in favour of the taxing power, and mandatory conditions for claiming a tax concession must be fully satisfied while the exemption notification remains operative.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an importer is entitled to a tax exemption when the mandatory conditions of the exemption notification are not fulfilled before its withdrawal?
  • Can a presumption of non-local manufacturability based on the silence of a local manufacturer substitute for a formal certificate required for a tax exemption?
  • How should tax exemptions and fiscal concessions be interpreted under Pakistani law?
  • Whether the date of filing the Bill of Entry determines the rate of sales tax and customs duty under the applicable fiscal statutes?
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• Hashmatullah vs The State2008 SCMR 1533 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-11-24
  narcotic controlchemical examiner reportprocedural irregularityleave to appealcriminal evidencesafe administration of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction and sentence under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The petitioner was convicted by an Additional Sessions Judge for an offense under Section 9(c) of the Act, resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment and a fine. The core legal question raised by the petitioner involves the procedural validity of the chemical analysis evidence. Specifically, the petitioner contends that while samples were purportedly separated from the seized narcotics, they were not sent to the laboratory for examination as required. Furthermore, the petitioner challenges the authenticity of the Chemical Examiner's report, alleging it was not prepared on the prescribed pro forma and was signed by an Excise Inspector rather than the Chemical Examiner. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these procedural irregularities, emphasizing the necessity of ensuring the safe administration of criminal justice regarding the handling and verification of narcotic evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a chemical analysis report signed by an Excise Inspector instead of a Chemical Examiner meet the legal requirements for evidence in a narcotics case?
  • What is the legal consequence if samples separated for chemical analysis are not sent to the laboratory for examination?
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• Hameedullah Khan and others vs Mst. Zeenat Khatoon2008 SCMR 1444 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-02-16
  pre-emptionTalb-e-Ishhadadmissibility of evidencesecondary evidenceleave to appealcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained an appellate court's decision in a suit for possession through pre-emption. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court and subsequent appellate courts erred in admitting a photostat copy of a notice regarding Talb-e-Ishhad as evidence, given that the original had been sent to the petitioners. The petitioners contended that the notice was not duly proved and that the photostat copy was inadmissible under the law. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the respondent, having sent the original notice to the petitioners, was entitled to tender the copy in her possession as evidence. The Court found the trial court's acceptance of this secondary evidence legally sound and distinguished the case from the precedent cited by the petitioners. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and declined to grant leave to appeal, affirming that no valid point of law was raised to warrant further interference.

  Questions settled

  • Is a photostat copy of a notice of Talb-e-Ishhad admissible as evidence when the original has been sent to the opposing party?
  • Does the acceptance of a copy of a notice as evidence constitute a valid ground for granting leave to appeal in a pre-emption suit?
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• Hameed-Ur-Rehman through L.Rs, vs Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Religious Affairs and another2008 SCMR 668 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-12-22
  Evacuee Trust PropertyProvisional Transfer OrderTarget DateEvictionProperty TransferConcession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the status of property declared as evacuee trust property by the Evacuee Trust Property Board. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to retain the disputed property based on a concession granted for transfers made before the target date of June 30, 1968. The petitioners claimed a provisional transfer order (P.T.O.) was issued in 1960, asserting that this qualified them for the concession. The Supreme Court held that while prior case law establishes that a P.T.O. holder who has paid the total price before the target date is entitled to the concession, the petitioners failed to provide evidence of full payment by the deadline. Evidence indicated that dues remained unpaid after the target date. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, upholding the High Court's decision that the petitioners were not valid transferees and thus lacked standing to seek eviction of the respondent. The key principle laid down is that the benefit of a concession for evacuee trust property transfers is contingent upon the full payment of the property price before the specified cut-off date.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a provisional transfer order alone entitle a person to the concession for evacuee trust property if the full price was not paid before the target date?
  • Is a person who has not been declared a valid transferee of evacuee trust property entitled to seek the eviction of an occupant from that property?
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• Hameed-Ur-Rehman through L.Rs, and others vs Chief Secretary, Government of Pakistan and others2008 SCMR 721 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-05-17
  review petitionAdvocate Supreme CourtAdvocate-on-Recordprofessional conductduty to assist courtnon-prosecutiongrounds for review
  Summary & questions settled

  These review petitions were filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the petitioners, where the learned Advocate Supreme Court who drew and signed the review petitions failed to appear to prosecute them, and the Advocate-on-Record expressed inability to assist the Court. The primary issues concerned the professional duties of counsel towards the Court upon drawing and signing a petition, and whether any valid ground for review was established. The Supreme Court disapproved of the conduct of the counsel, holding that having drawn and signed a petition, an Advocate Supreme Court incurs an obligation to appear and assist the Court. Although the petitions could ordinarily have been dismissed on the sole ground of non-prosecution and counsel's default, the Court heard the petitioners in person to prevent injustice. Upon examining the entire matter, the Court held that no ground for review was made out and consequently dismissed the review petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Advocate Supreme Court incur a legal obligation to appear and assist the Supreme Court after drawing and signing a petition?
  • Can a review petition be dismissed on the sole ground that the counsel who drew and signed it failed or refused to appear to prosecute it?
  • Whether the Supreme Court may hear petitioners in person to ensure justice when their counsel fails to appear and prosecute a review petition?
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• Haji Tahir Hussain vs Sqlain and others2008 SCMR 817 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-02-01
  criminal appealenhancement of sentencelife imprisonmentinfructuous appealdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Court was directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court passed in a criminal appeal and murder reference. The core legal question for determination was whether an appeal for the enhancement of a sentence to death becomes infructuous when the convict has already served out the term of life imprisonment awarded by the High Court during the pendency of the appeal. The Supreme Court held that once a convict has served out the legal sentence of life imprisonment, the appeal for enhancement becomes infructuous as the convict cannot be subjected to another sentence such as death. The key principle laid down is that a criminal appeal seeking enhancement of sentence cannot proceed to convert a served term of imprisonment into a death sentence after the original sentence has been fully executed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal for the enhancement of a sentence become infructuous if the respondent has already served out the sentence of life imprisonment?
  • Can a convict be sentenced to death after having already served out the legal sentence of life imprisonment awarded during the pendency of an appeal for enhancement?
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• Haji Peer Bakhsh vs Union Council Bolhari and others2008 SCMR 552 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-09-29
  service appealtime-barred appealtemporary employeepensionary benefitsleave to appealsuperannuation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from a service matter concerning the entitlement of a temporary employee of a Union Council to pensionary benefits. The core legal question is whether a temporary employee who has completed ten years of service and superannuated is entitled to pensionary benefits under the applicable pension rules, notwithstanding that the departmental appeal before the Tribunal was time-barred. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the contention regarding entitlement to pensionary benefits upon completion of ten years of service requires deeper consideration by the court. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a temporary employee of a local body is entitled to pensionary benefits upon completing ten years of service and superannuating?
  • Does the dismissal of a service appeal on the ground of being time-barred preclude the Supreme Court from granting leave to consider substantial questions of law regarding pensionary rights?
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• Haji Muhammad Latif vs Muhammad Waheed alias Yasir and another2008 SCMR 300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-10-17
  leave to appealmitigating circumstancessentencing policyfirearm violencejudicial leniencycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a conviction for murder. The respondent-convict had killed the deceased after the deceased and his father intervened to stop the respondent from beating a beggar. The respondent, armed with a firearm, shot the deceased in the chest following a verbal confrontation regarding the earlier intervention. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the respondent's conduct, characterized by unprovoked violence and the use of firearms for trivial reasons, warrants leniency. The Court specifically framed the legal inquiry around whether traditional mitigating factors, such as the 'non-repetition of the blow'—historically applicable to blunt weapons like sticks—remain valid considerations in cases involving modern automatic or semi-automatic firearms. Furthermore, the Court seeks to determine whether a 'desperado' who carries firearms in public and commits homicide over petty grievances is entitled to judicial mercy. The appeal was ordered to be heard within six months to ensure timely disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'non-repetition of the blow' remain a valid mitigating circumstance in cases involving the use of automatic or semi-automatic firearms?
  • Does a person who commits homicide over trivial matters while carrying firearms in public deserve judicial leniency?
  • Can the conduct of a perpetrator who kills in response to a victim's intervention on behalf of a third party justify a lenient sentence?
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• Haji Muhammad Afzal vs Muhammad Zahid2008 PLJ SC 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-03-26
  pre-emption suitTalb-e-MuwathibatTalb-e-Ashhadplaint requirementsstatutory limitationpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from concurrent findings of lower courts dismissing a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether it is mandatory to mention the date, time, and place of the performance of Talb-e-Muwathibat in the plaint for a pre-emption suit under the relevant pre-emption statute, and whether failure to do so is fatal to the suit. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that mentioning the date, time, and place of Talb-e-Muwathibat in the plaint is mandatory to enable computation of the statutory period for subsequent demands and to ensure the demand was made immediately upon knowledge of the sale. The key principle laid down is that pleading the exact date, time, and place of Talb-e-Muwathibat, alongside the date of issuing notice for Talb-e-Ashhad, is a sine qua non for maintaining a successful pre-emption suit, and omission thereof is fatal.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory to mention the date, time, and place of performance of Talb-e-Muwathibat in the plaint in a pre-emption suit?
  • Does failure to plead the date, time, and place of Talb-e-Muwathibat render a pre-emption suit liable to be dismissed?
  • Whether inconsistencies in the testimony of the pre-emptor and the informer regarding the time of Talb-e-Muwathibat are fatal to the pre-emption claim?
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• Haji Mian Abdul Rafique vs Riaz-Ud-Din and another2008 SCMR 1206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-03-28
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationmurdertentative assessmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant against the order of the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to respondent No. 1, who was accused of murdering his wife. The core legal question concerns the propriety of interfering with a bail order granted by the High Court on the basis of further inquiry and delay in recording witness statements, particularly when the trial has already substantially progressed. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that interference with the bail grant was unwarranted at this advanced stage of the trial, especially given that the accused had not misused the concession of bail and the majority of prosecution witnesses had already been examined. The Court laid down the principle that observations made by a High Court while deciding a bail matter on merits are strictly tentative in nature and shall not prejudice or influence the final outcome of the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a bail grant by the High Court when the trial has already substantially progressed?
  • Are observations made by a court in a bail order binding on the trial court at the conclusion of the case?
  • Does delay in recording witness statements constitute a ground for further inquiry under bail jurisprudence?
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• Haji Malik Amanullah Khan vs Khyber Khan and others2008 SCMR 1723 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-08-13
  review petitionlegal representationSupreme Court RulesTalb-e-Muwathibatplaint requirementspre-emption law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a Civil Miscellaneous Application filed in a review petition, wherein the petitioner sought permission for a specific Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court to appear and argue the case. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the maintainability of the review petition and the competence of the designated counsel to represent the petitioner, citing established precedents. The Court, upon reviewing Rule 6 of Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, and the relevant case law, declined to permit the requested counsel to argue the matter. Furthermore, the Court exercised its discretion to examine the merits of the impugned judgment sought to be reviewed. It held that the judgment adhered to the legal requirement established in Mian Pir Muhammad and another v. Faqir Muhammad through L.Rs, and others PLD 2007 SC 302, which mandates that a plaintiff must specify the date, time, and place of making Talb-e-Muwathibat in the plaint. Finding no apparent error, the Court dismissed the review petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does Rule 6 of Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, restrict the authority of a Senior Advocate to argue a review petition?
  • Is a plaintiff required to specify the date, time, and place of making Talb-e-Muwathibat in the plaint?
  • Can a review petition be dismissed if the impugned judgment contains no apparent error?
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• Haji Inayat Ali vs Shahzada and others2008 SCMR 1565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-07-08
  self-defensesuppression of injuriestwo versionscriminal appealacquittalburden of proofmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of murder and assault charges by accepting their plea of self-defense. The core legal question was whether the appellate court correctly upheld the acquittal despite the prosecution's claim of unprovoked aggression by the respondents. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the acquittal. The Court held that the prosecution had suppressed significant injuries sustained by the accused party, undermining the credibility of the complainant's version. The Court reaffirmed the principle that when the prosecution suppresses injuries on the accused, and the defense version is supported by the circumstances—specifically that the complainant party initiated the confrontation at the accused's residence—the defense plea must be accepted. Even if the accused fails to fully prove their plea, if there exists a reasonable possibility of the defense version being true, the court must grant the benefit of that doubt to the accused. The Court concluded that the appellate judgment was well-founded and free from perversity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused by the prosecution entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • When two conflicting versions of an occurrence exist, how should a court determine which version is true?
  • Is an accused required to produce defense witnesses to successfully establish a plea of self-defense?
  • Can a court accept a plea of self-defense if the accused fails to prove it to the satisfaction of the court but the plea remains reasonably possible?
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• Khan alias Khani and others vs The State2008 SCMR 880 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-09-10
  review petitionerror apparent on the face of the recordcriminal reviewappellate jurisdictiondeath sentencejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had previously upheld the petitioners' death sentences. The petitioners challenged the judgment on several grounds, including the credibility of eye-witnesses, the suddenness of the incident, the lack of corroborating evidence, the failure to prove motive, and the severity of the sentence. The core legal question was whether the grounds raised by the petitioners constituted an 'error apparent on the face of the record' sufficient to warrant a review under the Supreme Court Rules. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the remedy of review is not a rehearing of the case or an appeal, and cannot be sought as a matter of right. The Court affirmed that review jurisdiction is discretionary and limited to correcting manifest errors that are evident on the face of the record without requiring elaborate discussion. As the petitioners merely reiterated arguments previously considered and rejected, and failed to demonstrate any such patent error, the Court found no justification to interfere with the impugned judgment or the sentence imposed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a review petition in a criminal proceeding a rehearing of the case or an appeal against the judgment?
  • What constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of a review petition?
  • Can a review petition be granted as a matter of right?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the discretion to interfere with the quantum of sentence in a review proceeding?
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• Haji Faqir Hussain and 7 others vs Secretary, Provincial Board of Revenue, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar and 15 others2008 SCMR 219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-09-04
  property taxurban immovable property taxmunicipal limitsnotificationrating arealocal government
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' revision upholding the imposition of property tax by the Excise and Taxation Authorities of Kohat. The core legal question was whether properties included within municipal limits via a notification under the local government law could be subjected to property tax without a specific notification under the fiscal statute. The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of an area within municipal limits via a notification under the local government law operates only to extend those limits and does not automatically authorize the imposition of property tax. The ratio laid down is that property tax cannot be levied in any urban area unless that specific area is notified for taxation under section 3 of the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958.

  Questions settled

  • Can property tax be levied on an area merely because it has been included within municipal limits?
  • Is a separate notification under section 3 of the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958 mandatory for the levy of property tax in an urban area?
  • Does a notification issued under the Local Government Ordinance for extending municipal limits suffice for the imposition of property tax?
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• Haji Faqir Hussain & 7 others--Petitioners vs Secretary Provincial2008 PLJ SC 472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  property taxmunicipal limitsstatutory notificationtaxation powersurban areaslevy of tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the imposition of property tax on residents of a town planned by the Kohat Development Authority. The core legal question was whether the inclusion of an area within Municipal Limits via a notification under the NWFP Local Government Ordinance, 1979, automatically subjects properties therein to the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958. The Supreme Court held that the mere inclusion of an area within Municipal Limits is insufficient to levy property tax. The Court set aside the lower courts' judgments, ruling that the imposition of property tax is strictly contingent upon the issuance of a specific, independent notification by the Provincial Government under Section 3 of the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, which must explicitly specify the urban areas where the tax is to be levied. The key principle established is that the power to tax is not automatic upon municipal incorporation; it requires a distinct statutory notification under the governing tax legislation to become operative.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inclusion of an area within Municipal Limits automatically authorize the imposition of property tax under the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958?
  • Is a specific notification under Section 3 of the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, a mandatory prerequisite for the levy of property tax in an urban area?
  • Can property tax be imposed based solely on a notification issued under the NWFP Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
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• Haji Dildar Khan, (since died) and another vs State2008 PLJ SC 867 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-05-05
  contempt of courtcriminal contemptunconditional apologysuspension of advocate licenceabatement of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court convicting the appellants of contempt of court for shouting, using contemptuous language, and interfering with judicial proceedings during the framing of a charge in an Ehtesab reference. The larger Bench of the High Court had found them guilty under Article 204 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1976, sentencing them to imprisonment, fines, and suspending their legal practice licences pending Bar Council proceedings. During the pendency of the appeal, the first appellant passed away, causing the appeal to abate to his extent. The remaining appellant appeared in person, raised legal grounds regarding the procedure adopted, and subsequently tendered an unconditional apology, expressing deep regret and stating he held the highest regard for the judiciary. Accepting the apology and considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and restored the appellant's licence to practice as an advocate. The court established that an unconditional apology coupled with expressions of genuine remorse in contempt proceedings can lead to the setting aside of conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • What is the effect of an unconditional apology tendered by an appellant on a conviction for contempt of court?
  • Does an appeal against a criminal conviction abate upon the death of the appellant during the pendency of the proceedings?
  • Whether the High Court can suspend an advocate's licence to practice pending disciplinary proceedings by the Bar Council under the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Dildar Khan and another vs The State2008 SCMR 1541 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-05-05
  contempt of courtadvocate misconductunconditional apologycontempt convictionlegal practice licensejudicial proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of a Larger Bench of the Lahore High Court, which convicted the appellants of contempt of court for their conduct during proceedings in an Ehtesab Reference. The appellants, who were advocates, had disrupted court proceedings by shouting, attributing mala fides to the bench, and using contemptuous language. The High Court had convicted them under Article 204 of the Constitution and the Contempt of Court Act, 1976, imposing imprisonment, fines, and suspending their legal practice licenses. During the pendency of the appeal, one appellant passed away, causing the appeal to abate regarding him. The remaining appellant argued that the proceedings violated the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 1998, and that the show-cause notice was vague and lacked a formal charge. However, the appellant ultimately tendered an unconditional apology, expressing deep respect for the superior judiciary. In light of this apology and the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court accepted the apology, set aside the conviction and sentence, and restored the appellant's license to practice law.

  Questions settled

  • Can an unconditional apology tendered by an advocate in contempt proceedings lead to the setting aside of a conviction and sentence?
  • Does the death of an appellant during the pendency of an appeal against a contempt conviction cause the appeal to abate?
  • Is a conviction for contempt of court sustainable if the court fails to frame a formal charge as required by the Contempt of Court Act, 1976?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Amin vs Navaid Hussain and others2008 SCMR 133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-09-03
  temporary injunctioncommercialization of landbuilding controlstay of constructioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed an appeal against the refusal to vacate a temporary injunction restraining construction on a plot in Karachi. The core legal question concerned whether a commercial building could be raised on a plot originally designated as residential, given subsequent commercialization of the surrounding roads and approval of building plans by authorities. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where the plot was auctioned as commercial by the Official Assignee, the surrounding roads were officially declared commercial, conversion charges were paid, and building plans were approved, the balance of convenience favored the petitioner. The court set aside the prohibitory injunctions, allowing the petitioner to recommence construction strictly in accordance with the approved building plan, subject to the final adjudication of the substantive suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a temporary injunction restraining construction can be sustained when the surrounding area has been officially declared commercial and building plans have been approved?
  • Can a purchaser in a court-auction raise construction in accordance with an approved plan pending the final adjudication of a civil suit regarding land use?
  • Whether the lack of initial objection to a public auction notice precludes plaintiffs from challenging land conversion in a subsequent suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafeez Ahmed vs Civil Judge, Lahore and others2008 SCMR 107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2006-12-13
  leave to appealrevision petitioncondonation of delaylimitation periodappellate procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging proceedings related to the filing of a revision petition. The core legal question presented for the Court's consideration was whether the delay in filing a revision petition beyond the prescribed period of 90 days is absolutely barred from condonation, or if there exists judicial discretion to condone such delay under specific circumstances. Upon hearing the petitioner's counsel at length, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the legal parameters surrounding the condonation of delay in revision proceedings. The Court did not issue a final adjudication on the merits of the underlying dispute at this stage. Instead, the Court directed the office to fix the main appeal for a final hearing based on the existing record within a period of six months, thereby deferring the final determination of the legal question regarding the condonability of the delay to the final hearing stage of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is the delay in filing a revision petition beyond 90 days absolutely non-condonable?
  • Does the court have the discretion to condone a delay in filing a revision petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Limited vs Ghulam Mustafa Khairati2008 SCMR 1516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-10-10
  service tribunal jurisdictiontermination of servicenatural justicecondonation of delaymaster and servantpresumption of innocencedepartmental inquiryprivatization of nationalized institution
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that reinstated a bank employee whose services were terminated following criminal charges. The core legal questions concerned the Tribunal's jurisdiction post-privatization, the validity of termination without inquiry based on pending criminal allegations, and the propriety of condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the privatization of a nationalized institution does not oust the Service Tribunal's jurisdiction if the employee held civil servant status at the time of filing. The Court affirmed that termination based solely on an FIR, without departmental inquiry, violates natural justice, as the presumption of innocence persists until conviction. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Service Tribunal possesses exclusive, discretionary jurisdiction to condone delays, and such findings, when exercised judiciously, are not subject to interference. The principle established is that departmental proceedings are distinct from criminal trials, and an employer cannot bypass due process by labeling a punitive termination as termination simpliciter. The petition was dismissed, upholding the reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the privatization of a nationalized institution divest the Service Tribunal of jurisdiction over a pending appeal filed by an employee?
  • Can an employer terminate an employee's services solely on the basis of a registered FIR without conducting a departmental inquiry?
  • Is the Service Tribunal's exercise of discretion in condoning a delay in filing an appeal subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the principle of master and servant permit the termination of an employee of a nationalized bank without providing an opportunity for a hearing?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Ahmed alias Gullu vs The State2008 SCMR 1365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-05-25
  criminal appealsentence enhancementdeath penaltylife imprisonmentleave to appealmitigating circumstancesshow cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal petition filed by the petitioner, Gulzar Ahmed alias Gullu, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by the High Court, which had reduced his original death sentence. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in commuting the death penalty to life imprisonment given the circumstances of the case, specifically that the convict had murdered the deceased after being restrained from teasing the womenfolk of the deceased's family. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to reappraise the evidence. Crucially, the Court issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner to explain why, in the event the petition fails, his sentence should not be enhanced back to the death penalty. The Court established the principle that the appellate court has the authority to review the appropriateness of a sentence reduction and may consider enhancing a sentence if the initial mitigation by the lower court appears unjustified based on the proven facts of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court issue a show-cause notice to a petitioner regarding the enhancement of a sentence from life imprisonment to death?
  • Does the appellate court have the authority to reappraise evidence to determine if a reduction in sentence from death to life imprisonment was justified?
  • Is the teasing of womenfolk a relevant factor in determining the appropriateness of a death sentence versus life imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Raeef Khan vs The State2008 SCMR 865 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-08-23
  narcoticsreduction of sentencemitigating circumstancescriminal petitionleave to appealcontrol of narcotic substances
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the petitioner's conviction under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The petitioner faced trial before the Additional Sessions Judge, Mianwali, and was sentenced to fourteen years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine. The High Court maintained the conviction while slightly modifying the default sentence for non-payment of fine. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner's counsel did not press the petition on merits but sought leniency regarding the quantum of sentence, citing mitigating circumstances such as the petitioner being a first-time offender, a young man, and the sole breadwinner. The State raised no objection to a reduction in sentence given the circumstances. The Supreme Court held that while the prosecution successfully established the charge through overwhelming incriminating evidence, the sentence of fourteen years' rigorous imprisonment could be appropriately reduced. The Court ruled that considering the mitigating circumstances and the State's concession, the sentence under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 is reduced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment, maintaining the fine and the benefit of section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can reduce the quantum of sentence under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 when the conviction itself is not challenged on merits?
  • Can mitigating circumstances such as being a first offender and sole breadwinner justify a reduction in sentence for a narcotics offense?
  • Whether the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applies when the sentence is modified by the appellate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Akbar vs State2008 PLJ SC 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-07-25
  bailleave to appealSupreme Court interferencetrial commencementappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for leave to appeal against an order concerning bail. The core legal question involves the circumstances under which the Supreme Court should intervene in bail matters handled by lower courts where the trial has already commenced and challan submitted. The Supreme Court held that it is not the practice of the Court to unduly intervene in bail matters, which should ordinarily be left to the discretion of the courts inquiring into the guilt of the accused, provided such discretion is exercised on sound judicial principles. Leave to appeal is not granted merely because the High Court appreciated and assessed evidence in a manner with which one might disagree. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave refused.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere in bail matters where the trial has commenced and the challan has been submitted?
  • Should the discretion in granting or refusing bail be left to the courts inquiring into the guilt of the accused?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal merely because the High Court appreciated evidence in a debatable manner?
  Read full judgment →
• Govt. of Balochistan through Secretary Board of Revenue, Quetta and others vs Muhammad Ali and 11 others2008 PLJ SC 3 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  public propertylimitationcondonation of delaycivil revisionfirst appealdisciplinary action
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Government of Balochistan arose from a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, which had dismissed a civil revision petition and maintained the appellate dismissal of the state's first appeal on the ground of limitation, while also erroneously discussing the merits. The core legal question concerned whether public property should be lost to private claimants due to severe procedural lapses, inaction, and time-bar defaults by public functionaries in pursuing legal remedies. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the failure of state functionaries to file appeals within limitation periods jeopardized valuable public property and constituted gross inaction, but in order to do complete justice and protect public interest, the delays in filing both the first appeal and the petition for leave to appeal must be condoned. The Court laid down the principle that the state and its functionaries are custodians of public property, and while delinquent officials must face disciplinary action for procedural defaults, valuable public land ought not to be sacrificed due to bureaucratic negligence; consequently, the judgments dismissing the appeal on limitation were set aside and the matter remanded to the first appellate forum for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in filing an appeal by public functionaries can be condoned when valuable public property is at stake?
  • Can a revisional court decide a matter on merits when the first appellate court dismissed the appeal solely on the ground of limitation without addressing the merits?
  • What is the duty of public functionaries as custodians of public property regarding prompt legal action and defense of suits?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab, Food Department through Secretary Food2008 SCMR 1148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2006-09-21
  notified orderofficial gazettesugar millsrefundPunjab Foodstuffs (Control) Actstatutory interpretationcivil appeals
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court allowing writ petitions filed by respondent sugar mills for the refund of amounts deposited pursuant to government directives concerning sugar sales and contributions during the 1982-83 crushing season. The core legal question was whether a notification issued under Section 3 of the Punjab Foodstuffs (Control) Act, 1958, which was never published in the official Gazette, could be validly acted upon. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where a statute requires an act to be done in a particular manner—specifically, by 'notified order' defined as a notification published under proper authority in the official Gazette—it must be done in that manner or not at all. The Court ruled that an unpublished notification has no legal effect and cannot be acted upon from a prior date. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, affirming the respondents' entitlement to a refund.

  Questions settled

  • Can a notification issued under Section 3 of the Punjab Foodstuffs (Control) Act, 1958, be validly acted upon without being published in the official Gazette?
  • Does the requirement for a 'notified order' necessitate publication in the official Gazette?
  • What is the legal effect of failing to publish a statutory notification in the official Gazette when the enabling law mandates a notified order?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab vs Muhammad Munir Akhtar and others2008 SCMR 1452 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-02-10
  service lawde novo inquiryservice tribunalreinstatementremand of casedepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a judgment by the Chairman of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had set aside orders imposing penalties on the respondents and directed their reinstatement. The Tribunal had further ordered a de novo inquiry to be conducted by two independent Chief Engineers to re-examine the entire record and the defense of the appellants. The petitioner contended that because a report dated 4-10-2003 was already available before the Tribunal, the remand for a fresh inquiry was unnecessary. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, finding that the Tribunal had exercised its discretion appropriately after examining the controversy in depth. The Court held that the Tribunal’s decision to order an independent inquiry to ensure a fair and comprehensive adjudication was just and proper. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, declining to interfere under its constitutional jurisdiction, while directing the department to complete the mandated inquiry expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a Service Tribunal's decision to order a de novo inquiry when the Tribunal has examined the controversy in depth?
  • Is a Service Tribunal empowered to order a fresh inquiry by an independent committee after setting aside departmental penalties?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Sindh through Secretary, Cooperative Department, Karachi and another vs Ataullah Anjum2008 PLC (C.S.) 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2006-10-20
  civil serviceretirementpublic interestshow-cause noticedisciplinary inquiryterms and conditions of serviceSindh Civil Servants Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal, which had reinstated a civil servant who was retired under Section 13(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973. The core legal question was whether the procedure for retirement under Section 13(1) requires a formal disciplinary inquiry akin to compulsory retirement, given that the department had issued a show-cause notice listing specific allegations of misconduct. The Supreme Court held that retirement under Section 13(1) is distinct from compulsory retirement and does not necessitate a regular disciplinary inquiry. The Court clarified that Section 13(1) empowers the competent authority to retire a civil servant after 25 years of service in the public interest, provided the civil servant is informed of the grounds and given an opportunity to show cause as per Section 13(2). The ratio established is that the exercise of power under Section 13(1) is a matter of administrative discretion regarding the retention of a civil servant, and once correctly exercised, it remains within the domain of terms and conditions of service, precluding the Tribunal from interfering.

  Questions settled

  • Does retirement under Section 13(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants Act 1973 require a formal disciplinary inquiry?
  • Is the retirement of a civil servant after 25 years of service under Section 13(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants Act 1973 equivalent to compulsory retirement?
  • What is the scope of the requirement to provide a show-cause notice under Section 13(2) of the Sindh Civil Servants Act 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab, Secretary Education, Civil Secretariat, Lahore and others vs Sameena Parveen & others2008 PLJ SC 1022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-04-29
  civil servantterms and conditions of servicetermination of serviceequal protection of lawbogus appointmentjudicial consistencygood governance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed by the Government of Punjab challenging a High Court judgment that set aside the termination orders of several PTC teachers. The core legal question was whether the respondents' appointments were bogus, thereby justifying their dismissal, and whether the High Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate these service matters. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the respondents' appointments were genuine and that the department's repeated attempts to terminate them were unlawful. The Court held that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of previous judicial decisions regarding their service status, noting that compelling similarly situated civil servants to litigate identical issues is contrary to the principles of good governance. The key principle laid down is that when a court or tribunal decides a point of law regarding the terms and conditions of a civil servant, the benefit of that decision should be extended to other similarly situated civil servants who were not parties to the original litigation, ensuring equal protection under the law as mandated by the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Should the benefit of a judicial decision regarding the terms and conditions of a civil servant be extended to other non-litigating civil servants in similar positions?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate service matters when the appointments are alleged to be bogus?
  • Can a department repeatedly terminate the services of employees after a court has declared their appointments to be genuine and lawful?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab through Secretary Schools Education2008 SCMR 1362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-06-04
  service lawmajor penaltyremoval from serviceregular inquiryproportionality of punishmentservice tribunalburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment by the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had modified a major penalty of removal from service to a reduction in pay by three stages. The petitioner, the Government of Punjab, argued that the Tribunal lacked justification for altering the penalty and ignored the gravity of the situation. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan found that the charges against the respondent were vague and unsubstantiated by concrete evidence. Specifically, there was no proof of cheating, copying, or specific interference by the respondent, and no answer sheets were seized. The Court noted that the department failed to conduct a regular inquiry under the relevant Efficiency and Discipline Rules, despite the nature of the allegations warranting one. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, affirming that the penalty of removal from service was disproportionately harsh given the lack of evidence. Finding no question of law of public importance, the Court dismissed the petition, concluding that the Tribunal's judgment was well-reasoned and free from legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Is a major penalty of removal from service sustainable when charges are vague and unsupported by concrete evidence?
  • Does the failure to conduct a regular inquiry under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules justify the mitigation of a major penalty by a Service Tribunal?
  • Can a Service Tribunal modify a disciplinary penalty imposed by a department if the penalty is found to be disproportionate to the established guilt?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of N.-W.F.P. and others vs Qazi Moghal Baz2008 SCMR 883 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-03-24
  civil revisioncondonation of delaylimitationleave to appealrecovery suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government of N.-W.F.P. against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's Civil Revision as time-barred. The respondent had originally instituted a suit for the recovery of Rs. 2,08,000 along with interest and escalation charges. While the trial court initially dismissed the suit, the Additional District Judge subsequently allowed the respondent's appeal. The petitioner challenged this appellate decision in the High Court, but that court dismissed the revision petition due to the delay in filing. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the High Court failed to properly consider their application for condonation of delay and that such delay should have been excused in the interest of justice. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the delay was not satisfactorily explained and that the reasons provided in the application for condonation were insufficient. Consequently, the Court held that the High Court's dismissal of the revision petition was legally sound, and therefore, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an application for condonation of delay require a satisfactory explanation to be granted?
  • Is a High Court's dismissal of a civil revision petition as time-barred sustainable if the reasons for delay are inadequate?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool through L.rs, and others, vs Haji Muhammad Sharif2008 SCMR 296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-08-02
  pre-emptionco-sharerwaiver of pre-emptionestoppelleave to appealadmission of evidencesuperior right of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that affirmed a decree in a pre-emption suit. The respondent had successfully claimed a superior right of pre-emption based on being a co-sharer in the estate, supported by mutation records. The petitioners argued that the respondent had waived his right of pre-emption and that the lower courts erred in allowing the respondent to produce evidence regarding his ownership status at a late stage. The Supreme Court examined the evidence regarding the alleged waiver, specifically the claim that the respondent's presence during the sale constituted estoppel. Relying on the principle established in Baqri v. Salehon (PLD 1972 SC 133), the Court held that a pre-emptor's mere presence at a sale or failure to outbid a purchaser does not constitute a waiver of the right of pre-emption. Furthermore, the Court rejected the procedural objection regarding the late admission of evidence, noting that the petitioners failed to object at the trial stage and did not raise the issue in their appeal before the High Court. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere presence of a potential pre-emptor at the time of a sale constitute a waiver of the right of pre-emption?
  • Does the failure of a person entitled to pre-empt to outbid a purchaser amount to a waiver of the right of pre-emption?
  • Can a party challenge the admission of evidence at the appellate stage if no objection was raised when the evidence was produced at the trial stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool Ranjha vs Government of the Punjab through Chief2008 PLC (C.S.) 1212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-01-08
  judicial misconductcorruptiondismissal from servicedisciplinary proceedingsservice appealcompulsory retirementPunjab Civil Servants (E&D) Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against an order of the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, which upheld the dismissal of the petitioner, a judicial officer, from service and maintained adverse Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) for the years 1997, 1998, and 1999. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, having been found guilty of corruption and misconduct, was entitled to a conversion of the penalty of dismissal from service to compulsory retirement on compassionate grounds, given his long service record. The Supreme Court held that the charges of corruption were proven beyond reasonable doubt based on overwhelming evidence. The Court affirmed that corruption constitutes the highest degree of disqualification for a judicial officer and warrants no leniency. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, holding that no legal or factual infirmity existed in the Tribunal's judgment and that the petitioner could not be granted any premium for proven misconduct. The key principle established is that corruption by a judicial officer is a grave disqualification that precludes leniency in disciplinary penalties, regardless of the length of service.

  Questions settled

  • Is a judicial officer found guilty of corruption entitled to a conversion of the penalty of dismissal to compulsory retirement on compassionate grounds?
  • Does a long service record with an allegedly unblemished history mitigate the penalty for proven corruption by a judicial officer?
  • Can a court interfere with a disciplinary order where the charges of corruption are proven beyond reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir and 2 others vs The State2008 SCMR 1221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-04-04
  Criminal appealDacoity with murderIdentification paradeBenefit of doubtAcquittalHearsay evidenceWithheld evidenceEvidentiary valueRecovery of weapons
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's judgment upholding convictions and death sentences against Ghulam Qadir, Rab Nawaz, and Ali Hassan under sections 148, 149, 324, 396, and 449 PPC, stemming from a dacoity with murder at a sugar mill. The Supreme Court examined the reliability of the prosecution's evidence, including ocular accounts, identification parades, and recoveries. The Court held that the first informant's testimony was hearsay, a key injured witness was not produced, and the identification parade suffered from infirmities as specific roles were not attributed. Furthermore, the belated recording of a witness's statement and the recovery of weapons after six months without proper procedure were deemed unreliable. The Court emphasized that a single infirmity creating reasonable doubt is sufficient for acquittal and that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a shadow of doubt. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, and the appellants were acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can hearsay evidence be relied upon for conviction?
  • Whether an identification parade is reliable if specific roles are not attributed to the accused by the identifying witness?
  • Does an unexplained delay in recording a witness statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. adversely affect the prosecution case?
  • Can recovery of crime weapons after a significant delay without proper sealing and analysis be considered reliable evidence?
  • Is a single infirmity creating reasonable doubt sufficient for an accused to be granted the benefit of doubt and acquitted?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir and 2 others vs State2008 PLJ SC 747 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-04-04
  criminal appealidentification paradereasonable doubtburden of proofdacoitymurderevidentiary valueacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants for dacoity and murder, which had been affirmed by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained based on an identification parade where no specific roles were attributed to the accused, alongside evidence involving unexplained delays and unreliable recoveries. The Supreme Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants. The Court held that an identification parade lacks evidentiary value if it fails to attribute specific roles to the accused, as mere identification does not prove participation in the crime. Furthermore, the prosecution's failure to produce injured witnesses, the unexplained delay in recording statements, and the lack of credible recovery evidence created reasonable doubt. The Court reiterated that a single infirmity creating reasonable doubt is sufficient to entitle an accused to acquittal, as the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond any shadow of doubt; convictions cannot be based on mere conjecture, probability, or weak evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does an identification parade have evidentiary value if the identifying witnesses fail to attribute specific roles to the accused?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution fails to produce injured witnesses without justifiable reason?
  • What is the legal effect of an unexplained delay in recording the statements of prosecution witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is medical evidence sufficient to connect an accused to the commission of an offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa vs Senior Member, Board of Revenue, Sindh and another2008 PLC (C.S.) 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-08-31
  service appealdismissal from serviceembezzlementadmission of liabilitynatural justiceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his appeal against dismissal from service and the recovery of a defalcated amount. The petitioner, a junior clerk, was issued a show-cause notice regarding forgery and embezzlement of government funds. The core legal question was whether the failure to hold a regular departmental enquiry vitiated the penalty of dismissal where the employee had admitted liability. The Supreme Court held that in the face of an admission of liability by the petitioner, facts admitted need not be proved, and thus a regular enquiry was unnecessary. Furthermore, the Court found that the rules of natural justice were fully complied with before imposing the penalty. The petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Is a regular departmental enquiry required when an employee admits liability for forgery and embezzlement?
  • Whether the failure to hold a regular enquiry vitiates dismissal from service where facts are admitted?
  • Does an admission of guilt obviate the need for formal proof in disciplinary proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa Shehzad vs Lahore High Court through Registrar &2008 PLJ SC 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  judicial officerremoval from servicereputation of being corruptregular inquiryAnnual Confidential Reportsservice tribunaldispensing with inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Additional District and Sessions Judge, challenged the dismissal of his service appeal by the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, which had upheld his removal from service for having a reputation of being corrupt. He contended that a regular inquiry should have been held and that adverse remarks covering a short period could not justify his dismissal. The core legal question was whether a major penalty of removal from service could be imposed on a judicial officer on the ground of corrupt reputation without holding a regular departmental inquiry, and whether the dispensing of such inquiry vitiated the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the competent authority is fully empowered to dispense with a regular inquiry depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, provided the accused is informed of the grounds and given a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The Court concluded that the petitioner was afforded due process, including a personal hearing by a High Court judge, and dismissed the petition, affirming the high standards of integrity expected of judicial officers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a major penalty can be imposed on a civil servant or judicial officer without holding a regular departmental inquiry?
  • Can adverse Annual Confidential Reports reflecting a reputation for corruption form the basis of disciplinary action under the efficiency and discipline rules?
  • Whether the composition of the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal is rendered invalid because its member judges are junior to the members of the High Court Administration Committee?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa Channa vs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and others2008 SCMR 909 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-03-03
  dismissal from servicemisappropriationbank employeepublic trustback-benefitspetitions for leave to appealreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Sindh High Court which had set aside the reinstatement of the petitioner employee by the Labour Court and restored his dismissal from service for misappropriation of bank funds. The core legal question involved whether an employee of a banking institution found guilty of misappropriation could be reinstated on the ground that the amount was subsequently deposited and no pecuniary loss was suffered by the bank. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that banking business is based entirely on public trust and confidence, and once misappropriation is proved, subsequent deposit of the amount does not constitute a mitigating circumstance; thus, the High Court rightly restored the order of dismissal. The key principle laid down is that acts of dishonesty or misappropriation by bank employees strike at the root of public trust and warrant the penalty of dismissal regardless of the quantum of the amount or its subsequent restitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether subsequent deposit of a misappropriated amount by a bank employee constitutes a mitigating circumstance for reinstatement?
  • Does the dismissal of a bank employee for misappropriation depend upon the quantum of the amount involved?
  • Are petitions for leave to appeal maintainable against a High Court judgment in a labor dispute concerning a bank employee?
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• Ghulam Murtaza and another vs Muhammad Akram and another2008 PLJ SC 209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-04-25
  criminal appealacquittalenhancement of sentencemedical evidencepresumption of innocencemiscarriage of justicecommon intentionsuppression of injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals arising from a High Court judgment regarding convictions for murder and murderous assault. The core legal questions were whether the High Court erred in acquitting a co-accused and whether the sentence of the primary convict should be enhanced to capital punishment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, maintaining the acquittal of the co-accused and the life imprisonment sentence of the convict. The Court held that interference with an acquittal requires overwhelming proof of a miscarriage of justice, as the presumption of innocence is doubled upon acquittal. It emphasized that medical evidence is merely corroborative and cannot independently identify the perpetrator. Furthermore, the Court established that the power to enhance sentences should be exercised sparingly, reserved only for cases where failure to do so would result in a serious miscarriage of justice. Additionally, the Court noted that the prosecution's suppression of injuries sustained by the accused is a critical factor that undermines the credibility of the prosecution's case, justifying the lower court's findings.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment?
  • Is medical evidence sufficient to identify an accused in a criminal case?
  • What is the standard for enhancing a sentence from life imprisonment to capital punishment?
  • Does the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused in the FIR affect the credibility of the prosecution's case?
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• Ghulam Hussain and others vs Nadir Ali and others2008 SCMR 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2006-10-18
  civil revisionwritten statementpenal consequencesleave to appealprocedural lawconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Sindh High Court judgment that dismissed a civil revision application, thereby upholding concurrent findings of lower courts which had decreed a suit against the petitioners under Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioners, as defendants, had failed to file a written statement despite being granted opportunities by the trial court, leading to the suit being decreed against them. The core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in invoking the penal consequences of Order VIII, Rule 10, C.P.C., when no specific, speaking order had been passed directing the petitioners to file a parawise written statement. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners' failure to file the written statement was due to professional fee disputes and that the trial court's order lacked the necessary specificity to trigger the penal provisions. Relying on established precedents, the Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the strict application of Order VIII, Rule 10, C.P.C. requires a clear, positive, and speaking order from the court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court invoke the penal consequences of Order VIII, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, without first passing a specific, speaking order directing the defendant to file a written statement?
  • Is the failure to file a written statement due to a dispute over professional fees sufficient grounds to justify a decree under Order VIII, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Ghulam Hussain and others Criminal Appeal No,243 of 2003 Criminal Appeal No,244 of 2003 Khalid Rashid vs The State the State2008 SCMR 866 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-01-31
  murderdeath penaltyquantum of sentencebenefit of doubtjuvenile offenderanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants for murder and related offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act. Leave to appeal was granted to examine the quantum of sentence and the specific role attributed to certain appellants. The core legal question concerned whether mitigating circumstances existed to warrant a lesser penalty than death for the capital offences, and whether the conviction of an appellant attributed a non-fatal injury was sustainable given his age and circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the gruesome murder of three persons by Ghulam Hussain and Muhammad Ramzan justified the death penalty, and the sentence of Nazir Ahmed was upheld, leaving no room for extenuation. However, regarding Khalid Rashid, who was a juvenile at the time and attributed a single non-fatal wrist injury while co-accused were acquitted, the Court held that his complicity was doubtful and extended him the benefit of doubt. The appeals of Ghulam Hussain, Muhammad Ramzan, and Nazir Ahmed were dismissed, while Khalid Rashid's appeal was allowed and his conviction set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the death penalty is justified for the commission of multiple murders without mitigating circumstances?
  • Can an appellant attributed a single non-fatal injury be given the benefit of doubt when co-accused are acquitted?
  • Does a plea of alibi warrant rejection when ocular and medical evidence consistently support the prosecution's case?
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• Ghulam Haider and others vs Wali Muhammad and others2008 SCMR 1425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-05-24
  civil revisionlimitation periodmutation challengerevenue record presumptionconcurrent findingssuit for declarationsuit for possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, which dismissed the petitioners' civil revision and confirmed the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts dismissing the petitioners' suit for declaration and possession regarding a property mutation. The core legal question concerned whether the suit challenging a property mutation executed several decades prior was maintainable and within time, and whether the mutation was collusive or without consideration. The Supreme Court held that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 142 of the Limitation Act 1908, having been filed nineteen years after the mutation, and that the petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of regularity attached to the revenue records where the respondents remained in continuous possession. The court laid down the principle that a suit for possession and declaration challenging a mutation is subject to the twelve-year limitation period, and revenue entries carrying a presumption of regularity cannot be set aside without credible rebutting material, particularly when the original vendor survived for years without challenging them.

  Questions settled

  • What is the period of limitation for filing a suit for declaration and possession challenging a property mutation?
  • Whether a presumption of regularity is attached to entries in the revenue record?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding limitation and merits be interfered with without credible rebutting material?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Habib vs Muhammad Suleman and 2 others2008 SCMR 1607 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-07-24
  leave to appealacquittalappreciation of evidencecriminal appealdouble presumption of innocenceocular accountperversity of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the convictions and sentences of the respondents, Muhammad Suleman and Mst. Zeenat Bibi, for the murder of Abdul Aziz. The respondents were initially convicted by the trial court under sections 302(b), 201, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court's acquittal of the respondents was based on a misreading or non-appraisal of evidence warranting interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court had properly appreciated the material on record and that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any perversity in the acquittal judgment. The Court reaffirmed the principle that it will not interfere with an acquittal judgment unless there are very strong reasons regarding its perversity. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the mere fact of natural witnesses or daylight occurrence is insufficient for conviction; the real test remains whether the witnesses are truthful and confidence-inspiring in the specific facts of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal?
  • Is the mere fact that an occurrence took place in daylight sufficient to sustain a conviction?
  • Does the Supreme Court require proof of perversity to overturn an acquittal judgment?
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• Ghulam Farooq Tarar vs Rizwan Ahmad and others,2008 SCMR 383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-07-18
  acquittalprivate complaintcopyright infringementpreliminary evidenceunauthorized publicationremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment affirming the trial court's order under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which acquitted the respondents of offences under Section 66-A of the Copyright Ordinance 1962 and various provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner had filed a private complaint alleging unauthorized publication of his books. The trial court summoned the respondents based on preliminary evidence but subsequently acquitted them upon their application, citing a lack of trademark registration and absence of proof regarding the installation of a printing press. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether the trial court was justified in invoking Section 249-A without recording prosecution evidence or framing charges. The Court held that since the allegations in the complaint were supported by preliminary evidence and not specifically denied, it could not be concluded that there was no probability of conviction. The Court ruled that the trial court acted in haste, set aside the acquittal orders, and remanded the case for trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court acquit an accused under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the allegations in the complaint, supported by preliminary evidence, are not specifically denied?
  • Whether an order of acquittal under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is sustainable when passed in haste without recording prosecution evidence or framing charges, despite a prior finding of a prima facie case?
  • Is the registration of a trademark a mandatory prerequisite for initiating criminal proceedings for copyright infringement under Section 66-A of the Copyright Ordinance 1962?
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• Ghulam Farid and others vs Muhammad Bakhsh and another2008 SCMR 1201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-06-25
  specific performanceagreement to sellpardanashin ladyconcurrent findingscivil revisionbona fide purchaserleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had allowed a civil revision and decreed the respondents' suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The respondents had instituted the suit claiming that petitioner No.8 executed an agreement to sell land in their favour, but subsequently sold the same land to petitioners Nos. 1 to 7 via a registered sale deed. The trial court and the first appellate court dismissed the suit, but the High Court reversed those concurrent findings, holding that the agreement was duly proved and that subsequent purchasers had notice of it through the husband of petitioner No.8. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court was justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact and whether the agreement was void due to lack of independent advice for a pardanashin lady or non-compliance with the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts' judgments suffered from misreading and non-reading of evidence, and that the High Court rightly decreed the suit. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact recorded by courts below based on misreading and non-reading of evidence?
  • Whether an agreement to sell executed by a pardanashin lady in the presence of her husband lacks independent advice?
  • Whether subsequent purchasers having knowledge of a prior agreement to sell can claim the status of bona fide purchasers without notice?
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• Ghulam Akbar and another vs The State2008 SCMR 1064 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-04-09
  murderdacoityjoint pointationrecovery of weaponforensic delaycircumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtidentification parade
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction and death sentences of the appellants for offences under Sections 302/34 and 392 (altered to 394) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The High Court of Sindh had previously acquitted a co-accused but maintained the appellants' convictions based on circumstantial evidence, despite discarding the ocular testimony and identification parade. The Supreme Court examined the remaining circumstantial evidence, namely the recovery of a jeep, a stolen motorcycle, and a pistol matching a crime-empty. The Court held that the joint recovery of the motorcycle from an open place at the pointing of two accused lacked evidentiary value, and the recovery of the pistol was highly doubtful due to an unexplained three-month delay in sending the empty and weapon to the Forensic Science Laboratory. Reaffirming that guilt cannot be based on high probabilities or conjectures, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a recovery made at the joint pointation of multiple accused persons from an open place has any evidentiary value against them?
  • Does an unexplained delay in sending a recovered weapon and crime-empty to the Forensic Science Laboratory destroy its incriminatory value?
  • Can a criminal conviction be sustained on high probabilities and conjectures in the absence of reliable direct or circumstantial evidence?
  • Is a recovery under Section 103 of the Cr.P.C. valid if the police failed to secure local public witnesses without showing it was impossible to do so?
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• Ghulam Akbar and another vs State2008 PLJ SC 700 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-04-09
  circumstantial evidencecriminal appealrecovery evidencebenefit of doubtforensic delayjoint pointingburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentences of the appellants for murder and robbery. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution successfully proved the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt based solely on circumstantial evidence, specifically the recovery of a jeep, a motorcycle, and a weapon, after the trial court discarded the ocular testimony. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient and riddled with doubts. The Court found the identification of the jeep unreliable, the recovery of the motorcycle from an open field at the joint pointing of the accused legally deficient, and the forensic evidence regarding the weapon compromised by an unexplained three-month delay in submission to the laboratory. Furthermore, the recovery witnesses were not from the locality, violating mandatory procedural requirements. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants. The judgment reaffirms the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution, and convictions cannot be sustained on mere probabilities, conjectures, or weak circumstantial evidence, as the benefit of the doubt must always accrue to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be sustained solely on the basis of high probabilities and conjectures?
  • Does a joint recovery at the pointing of multiple accused persons hold evidentiary value?
  • What is the legal consequence of an unexplained delay in sending crime empties and a recovered weapon to a forensic laboratory?
  • Is the recovery of stolen property from an open, accessible place sufficient to establish exclusive possession by the accused?
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• Ghulam Abbas vs The State2008 SCMR 1352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-06-16
  murdercapital punishmentdeath sentenceeyewitness testimonymedical evidencemitigating circumstancesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his step-mother. The prosecution case was established through natural eyewitnesses whose presence at the scene was deemed credible and corroborated by medical evidence regarding the nature and seat of injuries. The core legal question pertained to the reliability of eyewitness testimony, the corroborative value of medical evidence, and the existence of mitigating circumstances to warrant a lesser sentence. The Supreme Court held that unimpeachable ocular testimony coupled with supporting medical evidence is sufficient to sustain a capital sentence, and that the alternate sentence of life imprisonment is not a matter of mere discretion but requires strong mitigating circumstances. Leave to appeal was refused and the petition dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the number of injuries affect the truthfulness of eyewitnesses?
  • Is motive an essential component of a crime whose weakness or absence necessitates an acquittal or lesser punishment?
  • Whether the alternate sentence of life imprisonment under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is a matter of pure judicial discretion or requires strong mitigating circumstances?
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• Ghulam Abbas and another vs Manzoor Ahmad and another2008 SCMR 1366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-12-24
  pre-emptionTalb-i-Ishhadregistered postpresumption of deliverycivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions directed against a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing civil revisions relating to suits for possession of land through pre-emption. The core legal questions involve whether the requirements of law as to Talb-i-Ishhad were properly fulfilled, specifically concerning the proof of sending the notice and the necessity of a registered post acknowledgment due receipt. The trial court had dismissed the suits holding that Talb-i-Ishhad requirements were not met, but the appellate court and the High Court reversed this finding and decreed the suits. The Supreme Court held that the sending and delivery of the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad were duly proved through unimpeachable oral and documentary evidence, including postal receipts and testimony of postal officials, and that sending via registered post without acknowledgment due substantially complies with the law when delivery is otherwise established, attracting the presumption of delivery under the General Clauses Act. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sending a notice of Talb-i-Ishhad through registered post without an acknowledgment due receipt satisfies the requirements of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1991?
  • Can the delivery of a notice of Talb-i-Ishhad be proved through secondary or other unimpeachable oral and documentary evidence when the original postal acknowledgment receipt is absent?
  • Does a presumption of delivery arise under section 26 of the General Clauses Act when a notice of Talb-i-Ishhad is sent by registered post to the correct address?
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• Ghazi Khan vs The State2008 SCMR 741 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-02-01
  transfer of casejudicial biasadjournmentcounsel diligenceSessions Courtleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order passed by the Sukkur Bench of the Sindh High Court, which declined the petitioner's request to transfer a Sessions Case from the file of the Sessions Judge, Khairpur, to an Additional Sessions Judge within the same district. The core legal question was whether sufficient grounds existed to warrant the transfer of the case based on allegations of bias or pressure exerted by the presiding Sessions Judge. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the Sessions Judge had denied the allegations of pressuring parties into a compromise. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner's counsel had been absent during the High Court proceedings, erroneously assuming an adjournment would be granted. The Supreme Court held that a counsel cannot claim an adjournment as a matter of right due to their own lack of diligence. Finding no valid grounds for interference and determining that no question of law of public importance was presented, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that transfer of cases requires substantive justification rather than mere allegations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a counsel claim an adjournment as a matter of right due to their own lack of diligence?
  • Is a transfer of a Sessions Case warranted based on unsubstantiated allegations of pressure by the presiding judge?
  • Does a petition for transfer of a case require a question of law of public importance to be entertained by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Feroze vs The State2008 SCMR 696 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-05-26
  grave and sudden provocationburden of proofcriminal appealmurdergeneral exceptionsappreciation of evidencedeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that affirmed the petitioner's conviction and death sentence for the murder of the deceased under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner admitted to the killing but raised a plea of grave and sudden provocation, alleging he found the deceased in a compromising position with his sister. The core legal question was whether the petitioner successfully discharged the burden of proof to bring his case within the exceptions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that when an accused admits the occurrence but claims an exception, the burden of proof shifts to the accused under Article 121 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. The Court found the petitioner failed to prove his plea, noting the deceased was fully clothed and the nature of the injuries indicated he was asleep when attacked, contradicting the defence version. The principle laid down is that the burden of proving circumstances bringing a case within general or special exceptions lies squarely upon the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused when they admit to an occurrence but claim it falls within a legal exception?
  • Can a plea of grave and sudden provocation be sustained if the physical evidence, such as the state of the deceased's clothing and the nature of injuries, contradicts the claim?
  • Is the failure to produce witnesses to support a defence plea of grave and sudden provocation fatal to that defence?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Govt. of Pakistan2008 PLJ SC 901 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-12-04
  service tribunaltermination of serviceres judicatavested rightslocus poenitentiaequota policycivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal whereby the respondent's termination from service as Assistant Superintendent of Police was set aside and he was reinstated with consequential benefits. The core legal question revolves around whether the respondent's appointment, made following an earlier court judgment and subsequent adjustment of another candidate, could be lawfully terminated on the grounds of res judicata and binding precedent under the Constitution, and whether a vested right had been created in his favour. The Supreme Court held that the matter was not barred by res judicata as the specific controversy regarding the misallocation of quotas had not been previously settled, and that the respondent's appointment had created a valid vested right protected under the principle of locus poenitentiae. The Court laid down the principle that an order taking legal effect and creating rights in favour of an individual cannot be unilaterally withdrawn or rescinded to their detriment, especially where the appointment was valid on merits and supported by equitable considerations and official legal opinions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the principle of res judicata applies when the specific controversy regarding quota misallocation has not been previously adjudicated upon?
  • Can an order that has taken legal effect and created vested rights in favour of an individual be subsequently withdrawn or rescinded to their detriment?
  • Whether a civil servant whose appointment was validly made and acted upon is entitled to protection under the principle of locus poenitentiae?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution to determine matters pertaining to the terms and conditions of service?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Government of Pakistan2008 SCMR 544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-12-04
  locus poenitentiaecivil serviceres judicatavested rightsquota policylegitimate expectationtermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment by the Federal Service Tribunal, which reinstated a civil servant whose services were terminated following a Supreme Court directive regarding the induction of Armed Forces officers into the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP). The core legal question was whether the respondent’s termination was lawful, given that he had already been appointed and completed training, and whether the matter was barred by res judicata due to previous litigation. The Supreme Court held that the respondent’s appointment had created a vested right, and the principle of locus poenitentiae precluded the government from unilaterally rescinding an order that had already taken legal effect. The Court observed that the specific issue of quota misallocation had not been previously adjudicated. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, ruling that the respondent was entitled to reinstatement based on legitimate expectation and the principle of equality. The petition was dismissed, upholding the respondent's right to continue in service as a nominee of the Pakistan Air Force.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae prevent the government from rescinding an appointment order that has already taken legal effect?
  • Can a matter be considered res judicata if the specific controversy regarding quota misallocation was not settled in previous litigation?
  • Does the termination of a civil servant's appointment, after the completion of training and assumption of duty, violate the principle of legitimate expectation?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Finance Division, Islamabad and others vs Messrs Zaman Cotton Mills Ltd.2008 SCMR 602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2006-04-26
  minimum taxfiscal incentivestax exemptionprotection of economic reformsindustrial establishmentremand
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals by leave of the Supreme Court challenged the judgments of the Peshawar High Court regarding whether industrial establishments were entitled to exemption from minimum tax under section 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and whether Workers' Welfare Fund was leviable. The principal controversy centered on the protection of fiscal incentives granted via notifications under the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992. The core legal question was whether tax exemptions enjoyed by the respondent assessees under prior notifications were protected under section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 against subsequently introduced provisions like minimum tax. Relying on precedent, the Supreme Court held that the special provisions of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 prevail over the earlier general provisions of section 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, provided the assessees fulfill the conditions of the relevant notifications. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgments and remanded the cases to the competent authority to determine as a question of fact whether the assessees satisfied the conditions for exemption.

  Questions settled

  • Whether fiscal incentives and tax exemptions granted through notifications are protected under section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 against minimum tax under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Do the provisions of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 prevail over section 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 being a subsequent special statute?
  • Is the determination of whether an assessee fulfills the conditions of tax exemption notifications a question of fact to be decided by the departmental hierarchy?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and others vs Raja Muhammad Ishaque Qamar2008 PLJ SC 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constitutional jurisdictionouster of jurisdictionarmed forces personnelmala fideadministrative dischargeservice lawwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the dismissal of two Pakistan Air Force (PAF) personnel following their acquittal in a criminal case. The core legal question was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition against the dismissal of Armed Forces personnel, given the bar under Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court held that the bar in Article 199(3) is not absolute. It affirmed that the High Court retains jurisdiction to review actions taken against Armed Forces personnel if the impugned action is found to be mala fide, corum non judice, or without jurisdiction. In this case, the Court found that the authorities failed to adhere to their own established policy (Air Headquarters circular dated 13.12.1992) regarding the administrative discharge of personnel acquitted of criminal charges. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the failure to follow the notified policy rendered the dismissal unfair and mala fide, thus justifying the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. The principle established is that constitutional ouster clauses must be strictly construed and do not protect actions that are mala fide or without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar on jurisdiction contained in Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 prevent the High Court from reviewing actions against Armed Forces personnel that are mala fide or without jurisdiction?
  • Can an action taken against a member of the Armed Forces be challenged in the High Court if no efficacious alternate remedy is provided under the relevant service statute?
  • Is a failure by the competent authority to follow its own notified policy regarding the discharge of personnel considered an act of mala fides?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and others vs Muhammad Ashraf and others2008 SCMR 415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-12-05
  civil servantcompulsory retirementpublic interestservice tribunalreview committeeterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Federation of Pakistan challenged the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which had reinstated the respondent civil servants into service with back-benefits following their retirement under section 13(1)(i) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The core legal question revolved around whether retirement under section 13(1)(i) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 constitutes a non-appealable order or an unchallengeable administrative exercise of determining suitability, and whether guidelines issued by the Establishment Division were applied properly. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the Federal Service Tribunal rightly interfered as the authorities mechanically followed the guidelines without evaluating the overall performance and service record of the civil servants. The key principle laid down is that retirement under section 13(1)(i) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 must be based on a holistic assessment of a civil servant's total performance rather than a mechanical application of guidelines, and isolated human errors cannot outweigh an otherwise satisfactory service record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether retirement under section 13(1)(i) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 can be equated with a penalty under the Government Servants (E&D) Rules?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against an order of retirement passed under section 13(1)(i) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Can guidelines issued by the Establishment Division for the retirement of civil servants be applied in a mechanical manner?
  • What is the primary object of section 13 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 regarding the efficiency and discipline of civil servants?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and others vs Attock Pedtroleum LtdPTCL 2008 CL. 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2006-10-19
  Alternate Dispute Resolutiontax evasioncriminal liabilitycivil liabilitycustoms dutysales taxjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a Lahore High Court judgment directing an Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) Committee to entertain a tax dispute involving a company facing pending criminal investigations for alleged fake duty drawback claims. The core legal question was whether the ADR mechanism under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, the Customs Act, 1969, and the Central Excises Act, 1944, could be invoked when a taxpayer is simultaneously facing criminal charges for the same transaction. The Supreme Court held that the ADR scheme is exclusively designed for resolving civil tax liabilities and does not extend to cases involving criminal liability. The Court reasoned that the ADR Committee lacks jurisdiction over matters where criminal proceedings are pending, as these fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of Special Courts. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, declaring the reference to the ADR Committee void ab initio. The principle established is that ADR provisions in these tax statutes cannot be bifurcated to isolate civil liability from criminal charges, rendering the ADR forum incompetent in such mixed-character cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Alternate Dispute Resolution mechanism under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, apply to cases where the taxpayer is facing pending criminal charges?
  • Can a tax dispute involving both civil liability and criminal charges be bifurcated to allow for Alternate Dispute Resolution regarding the civil portion?
  • Does an Alternate Dispute Resolution Committee have jurisdiction to entertain a tax dispute where criminal proceedings are pending under the Customs Act, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and others vs Amir Zaman Shinwari, Superintending Engineer2008 PLC (C.S.) 1143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-01-01
  civil service promotionCentral Selection BoardFederal Service Tribunalback-benefitsadverse remarkswrit jurisdictionsuperannuation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order directing the promotion of a civil servant to the next grade with back-benefits. The core legal question was whether the High Court could issue a mandamus directing promotion when the departmental authority had repeatedly failed to implement the Federal Service Tribunal's orders and had unfairly deferred the respondent's promotion based on unsubstantiated grounds. The Supreme Court dismissed the Federation's petition, holding that the departmental authority acted with hostility and failed to implement the tribunal's directions. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision to grant the promotion, noting that the respondent's deferment was based on non-existent disciplinary proceedings and uncommunicated adverse remarks. The judgment reinforces the principle that departmental authorities cannot arbitrarily withhold promotion or ignore tribunal orders, especially when the civil servant has an unblemished record and the grounds for deferment are found to be baseless or procedurally flawed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court issue a directive for promotion when departmental authorities have failed to implement the orders of the Federal Service Tribunal?
  • Does the failure to communicate adverse remarks in an Annual Confidential Report render them invalid for consideration by the Central Selection Board?
  • Is a civil servant entitled to promotion with back-benefits if their deferment was based on contemplated disciplinary proceedings that were subsequently found to be without merit?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazali Rehmani vs Chief Minister, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar and others2008 PLD Supreme Court 769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-06-19
  service lawpromotionselection postseligibility versus fitnessjurisdiction of Service Tribunalseniority-cum-fitnesstraining course exemptionESTACODE
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal dismissing an appeal against the promotion of respondent No. 5 to BPS-21 for lack of jurisdiction under Section 4(b)(i) of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunals Act, 1974. The appellant argued that respondent No. 5 was ineligible due to non-completion of mandatory training and that promotion should follow seniority-cum-fitness. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision and dismissed the appeal. The Court held that eligibility for promotion relates to terms and conditions of service and is subject to judicial review, whereas determination of fitness for promotion is a subjective evaluation barred from the Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 4(b)(i). The Court ruled that posts in BPS-19 and above are selection posts made on a fitness-cum-seniority basis via Selection Board evaluation rather than strict seniority-cum-fitness. Furthermore, serving for one year as head of a specialized training institution validly exempted the respondent from the regular training course requirement under applicable guidelines.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to evaluate a civil servant's fitness for promotion under Section 4(b)(i) of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunals Act, 1974?
  • How does the legal standard for promotion to selection posts in BPS-19 and above differ from non-selection posts in BPS-18 or below?
  • Is a civil servant who has served for one year as the head of a specialized training institution exempted from attending mandatory training courses for promotion to BPS-21?
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• Fazal-Ur-Rehman Hanif vs Station House Officer, Taluka Police2008 PTD 2003 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-04-16
  customs seizureconfiscation of goodsmandatory noticeadjudication proceedingspowers of police officersmugglingleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding the confiscation of gold seized by traffic police. The core legal questions involve the authority of police officers to seize goods under customs law without being notified as customs officers, and the mandatory procedural requirements for issuing notices under the Customs Act, 1969. Specifically, the petitioner challenged whether the failure to issue notices under sections 171, 180, and 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969 rendered the subsequent adjudication proceedings and confiscation order illegal. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner's contentions regarding the lack of authority of the seizing officer and the failure to adhere to mandatory notice provisions raised substantial legal issues requiring authoritative determination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider these questions, directing that the appeals be fixed for hearing within six months, while allowing parties to submit additional documentation if necessary.

  Questions settled

  • Does a traffic police officer possess the authority to search a vehicle and seize goods under the Customs Act, 1969, if not specifically notified as a customs officer under Section 6?
  • Is the issuance of notices under Sections 171, 180, and 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969 a mandatory requirement for the validity of confiscation proceedings?
  • Must seized goods be returned to the owner if the prescribed notice period under Section 168 of the Customs Act, 1969 expires without proper notice being served?
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• Fazal Ahmad Naseem Gondal vs Registrar, Lahore High Court2008 PLC (C.S.) 1156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-04-29
  misconductcorruptiondisciplinary proceedingsjudicial officerservice appealdismissal from servicefair inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal filed by a former Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate challenging his dismissal from service due to charges of misconduct and corruption. The core legal question was whether the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant were conducted in accordance with the law and whether the appellant was denied a fair opportunity to defend himself. The Supreme Court held that the disciplinary inquiry was conducted fairly, noting that the appellant had been afforded full opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and participate in the proceedings. The Court observed that the charges were substantiated by substantial evidence, including numerous transfer applications containing allegations of corruption and complaints from the local Bar regarding the appellant's integrity and judicial conduct. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the appellant's contention that he was condemned unheard or that the evidence was misappreciated. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, ruling that the disciplinary authority had acted properly within the scope of the relevant service rules, and dismissed the appeals accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can a judicial officer be dismissed for misconduct based on findings of a regular inquiry?
  • Does the presence of numerous transfer applications containing allegations of corruption constitute sufficient material to support disciplinary action?
  • Is a disciplinary inquiry considered fair if the accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses?
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• Fazal Ahmad Naseem Gondal vs Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore2008 PLJ SC 759 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Dismissal from serviceMisconductCorruptionJudicial officerService appealInquiry proceedingsAdverse remarksPunjab Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involved appeals filed by a Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate challenging his dismissal from service for 'misconduct' and 'corruption' under Rule 3(b) and (c) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1999, as well as the expunction of adverse remarks in his annual confidential reports. The appellant contended that the major penalty was imposed in disregard of his unblemished service and that evidence was not properly appreciated. The Supreme Court found that a fair and proper inquiry had been conducted, during which the appellant was afforded full opportunity of personal hearing and cross-examination. The Inquiry Officer had considered various materials, including transfer applications with serious allegations of corruption and complaints from the District Bar. The Court found no illegality or irregularity in the inquiry proceedings and concluded that the appellant had not been condemned unheard. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, upholding the dismissal from service, while appeals concerning adverse remarks were deemed infructuous.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be dismissed from service for misconduct and corruption following a fair and proper inquiry?
  • Is an inquiry considered fair if the accused is given full opportunity of personal hearing and to cross-examine witnesses?
  • Do appeals for expunction of adverse remarks become infructuous if the appellant's dismissal from service is upheld?
  • Can allegations of corruption and misconduct from multiple sources, including bar associations and transfer applications, be considered in an inquiry against a judicial officer?
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• Fauji Foundation (Headquarters) through its Manager Administration2008 PLJ SC 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  workmanestablishmentgrievance petitionsupervisory capacitycharitable organizationmaster and servantremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave arose out of grievance petitions filed under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 by an employee (Superintendent E&M) challenging his removal from Fauji Foundation. The Labour Court dismissed the petitions holding that the employee was not a workman. The Labour Appellate Tribunal reversed this decision, and the High Court affirmed the Tribunal's view in writ proceedings. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that Fauji Foundation is a charitable organization governed by master-servant rules rather than an 'establishment' under labour laws, and that the respondent performed supervisory duties rather than manual or clerical work. The Supreme Court held that the legal status of Fauji Foundation as an establishment and the respondent's status as a workman had not been properly examined. Reaffirming the pith-and-substance test, the Court observed that incidental manual work does not transform supervisory employment into that of a workman. The appeal was allowed, and the case was remanded to the Labour Appellate Tribunal for fresh determination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the performance of incidental or ancillary manual work by an employee in a supervisory capacity brings them within the definition of a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 and the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Whether Fauji Foundation, as a charitable organization registered under the Charitable Endowments Act 1890, qualifies as an 'establishment' under Section 2(ix) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 and the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • What is the determinative legal test for deciding whether an employee qualifies as a workman or is engaged in a supervisory/managerial capacity?
  Read full judgment →
• Faryad Ali vs The State2008 SCMR 1086 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-04-09
  criminal appealqatl-i-amdmedical evidenceocular accountconflict of medical and ocular evidenceexhumationbenefit of the doubtcommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court partly allowing the appellant's appeal, maintaining his conviction under section 302(b)/34 of the P.P.C. while altering the sentence of death to imprisonment for life for the Qatl-i-Amd of the deceased. The core legal question revolved around a conflict between the ocular account and the medical evidence, specifically whether the fatal head injury sustained by the deceased was caused by a blunt weapon attributed to the appellant or by a firearm used by an absconding co-accused, as opined by a Special Medical Board upon exhumation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where medical evidence establishes that the injuries were caused by a firearm rather than a blunt weapon, the appellant cannot be held responsible for the fatal blow, and the benefit of the doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. The Court laid down the principle that while ocular evidence generally prevails over medical conflict, the nature and weapon causing specific injuries are relevant to ascertain individual culpability and common intention, and any reasonable doubt created by medical experts regarding the fatal injury entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the opinion of a Special Medical Board following exhumation prevail over initial post-mortem reports regarding the weapon used in causing a fatal injury?
  • How does a conflict between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the nature of an injury impact the specific culpability of an accused?
  • Can an accused be convicted under section 302(b)/34 P.P.C. when medical evidence establishes that the fatal injury was inflicted by a co-accused using a different weapon than that attributed to the appellant?
  • What is the effect of medical evidence making a dent in the prosecution story regarding the weapon of offense on the accused's liability?
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• Faryad Ali vs State2008 PLJ SC 694 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-04-09
  Qatl-i-amdmedical evidenceocular accountbenefit of doubtexhumationcommon intentioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant for the murder of the deceased, where the prosecution alleged the appellant caused a fatal head injury using a blunt weapon (Wahola). The core legal question was whether the conviction for murder could be sustained when medical evidence, specifically a report from a Special Medical Board following exhumation, indicated the fatal injury was caused by a firearm rather than the blunt weapon attributed to the appellant. The Supreme Court held that the medical evidence created a reasonable doubt regarding the appellant's role in the fatal injury. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as the prosecution failed to prove the intention to kill beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Court maintained the convictions for assault under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The judgment reaffirms that while ocular evidence is significant, medical evidence acts as a crucial confirmatory tool, and any conflict therein, when creating doubt, must be resolved in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a conflict between ocular evidence and medical evidence regarding the nature of an injury entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Is the re-examination of a dead body by a medical board permissible after a significant period following burial?
  • Can an accused be convicted for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the fatal injury is attributed to a weapon other than the one used by the accused?
  • What factors determine the existence of common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Farooq Khan vs The State2008 SCMR 917 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-02-20
  murdersolitary witnessinjured witnessinterested witnessquality of evidencemedical evidencecorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Court was directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed the appellant's conviction under Section 302(b), PPC, and sentence of death passed by the trial court for committing murder. The legal issue was whether a conviction for murder can be legally sustained based on the solitary, uncorroborated testimony of a single injured witness who is a close relative of the deceased. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction. The Court held that the testimony of an injured eyewitness, who is a natural witness, carries great weight and credibility when supported by medical evidence and chemical examiner reports. The Court reaffirmed the principle that law emphasizes the quality rather than the quantity of evidence; a conviction in a murder case can be based on the statement of a single, trustworthy, and reliable witness. Mere relationship with the deceased does not render a witness 'interested' absent evidence of motive or enmity to falsely implicate the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be legally based on the solitary testimony of a single witness?
  • Does mere relationship with the deceased render an eyewitness an interested witness whose testimony must be discarded?
  • What constitutes an 'interested witness' in criminal jurisprudence?
  Read full judgment →
• Farooq Khan vs State2008 PLJ SC 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murder convictionsolitary witnessinterested witnessocular evidencedeath sentenceinjured witnesscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's dismissal of the appellant's appeal against his conviction and death sentence for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a conviction for murder could be sustained based solely on the ocular testimony of a single injured witness, and whether such a witness, being a relative of the deceased, should be deemed an "interested witness." The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the conviction was sound. The Court affirmed that a conviction in a murder case can be based on the testimony of a single witness, provided the court is satisfied that the witness is reliable, emphasizing that the quality of evidence is paramount over its quantity. Furthermore, the Court clarified that mere relationship with the deceased does not render a witness "interested"; an interested witness is defined as one possessing a motive to falsely implicate the accused. Finding the witness consistent and corroborated by medical evidence, the Court upheld the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on the solitary testimony of a single witness?
  • Does the mere relationship of a witness to the deceased render them an 'interested witness'?
  • What is the legal definition of an 'interested witness' in criminal proceedings?
  • Is the quality of evidence more significant than the quantity of witnesses in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Farooq Hamid and others vs L.D.A. and others2008 SCMR 446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-05-11
  high-rise constructionpublic safetyjudicial interventionbuilding control authoritystructural stabilitystay ordercommission of inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the unchecked proliferation of high-rise buildings in Lahore, which the Supreme Court identified as a grave threat to public safety due to the absence of structural stability assessments, soil bearing capacity checks, and regulatory oversight by the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) and local Town Administrations. The core legal question addressed was whether the Court should intervene to halt construction activities to protect public life and property in the face of administrative failure and jurisdictional confusion among government agencies. The Court held that the situation necessitated extraordinary judicial intervention to prevent potential disasters. Consequently, the Court ordered an immediate stay on the construction of all high-rise buildings exceeding three storeys in Lahore. Furthermore, it appointed a Commission to inspect all such buildings, whether under construction or completed, to verify compliance with building plans, structural safety standards, and legal requirements. The principle laid down is that the rights and safety of the public-at-large take precedence over the commercial interests of builders, justifying judicial intervention when regulatory bodies fail to perform their statutory duties.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court order a stay on the construction of high-rise buildings to protect public safety when regulatory authorities fail to enforce building laws?
  • Does the court have the authority to appoint a commission to inspect the structural stability and legal compliance of buildings?
  • Can the court mandate that the government bear the costs of a commission appointed to investigate regulatory failures in building construction?
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• Farooq Hamid and others vs L. D. a . and others2008 SCMR 483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-07-26
  building regulationsenvironmental protection agencylahore development authorityfloor area ratiostructural stabilityurban planningnoc delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves various petitions and proceedings before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning building regulations, environmental clearances, and compliance with zoning laws in Lahore, overseen by the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The core legal questions address the arbitrary delays by regulatory bodies in issuing NOCs for building projects, the qualifications and suitability of administrative heads such as the Director-General of the EPA, structural stability and floor area ratio compliance of specific commercial buildings, and the enforcement of attendance regarding absconding accused persons in related matters. The Court held that regulatory authorities must discharge their statutory duties transparently and without extraneous considerations like pending litigation if irrelevant to environmental impact, expressed grave concern over improper bureaucratic appointments, directed expert commissions to inspect structural conformity, and granted conditional relief to secure the appearance of an absconding accused. The key principles laid down emphasize that administrative agencies cannot withhold statutory approvals on extraneous grounds, and courts will strictly monitor public interest matters concerning urban planning and environmental safety.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pending litigation with respect to a project is a relevant factor for the Environmental Protection Agency to determine the environmental impact of a building?
  • Can regulatory authorities withhold the issuance of a No Objection Certificate for extraneous reasons and ulterior motives?
  • What procedure is to be followed by expert commissions when examining the structural stability and conformity of buildings with building regulations?
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• Farooq Ahmad vs Fazal-Ur-Rehman and another2008 SCMR 1197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-07-12
  pre-emptionTalb-i-MuwathibatTalb-i-Ishhadstatutory interpretationright of pre-emptionPunjab Pre-emption Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a pre-emption suit concerning land in Arifwala Town. The petitioner, claiming a superior right of pre-emption as a Shafi Khalit and Shafi Jar, challenged a sale made by the original owners to the respondent. The petitioner asserted compliance with the requirements of Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad. While the trial court dismissed the suit, the appellate court decreed it in the petitioner's favor. However, the Lahore High Court subsequently set aside the appellate decree, ruling that the petitioner failed to satisfy the requirement of making Talb-i-Ishhad 'as soon as possible' under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, because he delayed the notice until three days after the Talb-i-Muwathibat without providing sufficient justification for the delay. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the High Court correctly interpreted the statutory requirement of 'as soon as possible' under Section 13(3) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, and whether a three-day delay in sending the Talb-i-Ishhad notice constitutes a failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these contentions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the phrase 'as soon as possible' in Section 13(3) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 require a pre-emptor to justify a delay of three days between Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad?
  • Is a delay of three days in making Talb-i-Ishhad fatal to a suit for pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991?
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• Farhat Azeem vs Asmat Ullah and 6 others2008 SCMR 1285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-06-15
  criminal petition for leave to appealdouble presumption of innocencemurdercommutation of death sentencere-appraisal of evidenceunseen occurrenceocular testimonyacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal petitions for leave to appeal were filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted five co-accused, maintained the conviction and death sentence of one convict (since deceased), and commuted the death sentence of convict Shehbaz Masih to life imprisonment under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The complainant and the State sought leave to appeal against the acquittals and the commutation of sentence, while Shehbaz Masih challenged his conviction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to Shehbaz Masih to re-appraise the evidence, noting that the ocular witnesses were not named in the initial FIR, failed to immediately inform the complainant, and only attributed the role of pointing out the victim's cot to him. However, the Court dismissed the petitions filed by the complainant and the State, holding that the acquittal of the co-accused was neither arbitrary nor perverse. The Court reaffirmed that an acquitted accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence requiring a heavy burden to rebut.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acquittal by the High Court can be interfered with if the judgment is neither arbitrary nor perverse and not against the weight of evidence?
  • What standard of proof and burden rests on the prosecution to overturn the double presumption of innocence earned by an acquitted accused?
  • Whether a specific finding on an ancillary charge under Section 449 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is necessary when the accused is acquitted on the primary charge due to discredited evidence?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted to reappraise ocular evidence where eyewitnesses were not named in the initial FIR and only attributed an instigatory role to the convict?
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• Faqir Sain alias Muhammad Sain and another vs Ahmad Din and others2008 SCMR 1062 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-06-29
  leave to appealregistered sale-deedburden of proofcivil revisionexecution of documentsuspicious circumstancesconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed a civil revision, set aside the judgment of the First Appellate Court, and restored the trial court's decree declaring a registered sale-deed invalid. The predecessor-in-interest of the respondents had challenged the sale-deed executed by his late brother concerning the suit property. The core legal question involved the validity of the registered sale-deed and the sufficiency of evidence regarding the execution and payment of consideration by an infirm vendor. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in setting aside the appellate court's judgment, noting that the petitioners failed to produce key marginal witnesses, that the vendor was an old and infirm person, and that suspicious circumstances surrounded the execution and registration of the sale-deed at a distant location. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether presumption of correctness attached to a registered sale-deed can be displaced by suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution?
  • Is the non-production of a material marginal witness fatal to the proof of a disputed transaction?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent or appellate findings regarding the factual validity of a sale-deed where no legal infirmity is shown?
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• Faiz Ahmed vs The State2008 SCMR 1559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-06-06
  murdercapital punishmentcommutation of sentencerelated witnessesocular testimonybenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant, Faiz Ahmed, under section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of a young woman, while commuting his death sentence to imprisonment for life. The core legal questions involved the reliability of related eye-witnesses, the prompt lodging of the First Information Report, and whether the acquittal of a co-accused on medical grounds warranted the acquittal of the appellant on identical evidence. The Supreme Court held that the ocular testimony of related witnesses, corroborated by prompt reporting and medical evidence consistent with the specific role attributed to the appellant, was sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, distinguishing his case from the acquitted co-accused. However, considering mitigating circumstances such as the passage of fourteen years in the death cell and the appellant's lack of a direct motive, the Court partly allowed the appeal by converting the death sentence to life imprisonment while maintaining the conviction and compensation orders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the mere relationship of eye-witnesses with the deceased is sufficient to render them interested witnesses in a criminal trial?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused on the ground of conflict with medical evidence automatically entitle another co-accused to an acquittal when their cases are distinguishable?
  • Can delay in the execution of a death sentence and the absence of a direct motive serve as mitigating circumstances to convert a death sentence into imprisonment for life?
  Read full judgment →
• Faiz Ahmed vs State2008 PLJ SC 1129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-06-06
  murder convictionocular testimonyinterested witnessesdeath sentence commutationcriminal appealappellate delaySection 302 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular testimony provided by witnesses related to the deceased and the appropriateness of the death sentence following the acquittal of a co-accused on appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the appellant's conviction, finding that the prosecution successfully proved the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that the mere relationship of witnesses to the deceased does not automatically render them 'interested' or unreliable, provided their testimony remains consistent and free from evidence of prior enmity or motive to falsely implicate. While maintaining the conviction, the Court exercised its discretion to commute the death sentence to life imprisonment. The key principle laid down is that sentencing may be mitigated based on mitigating factors such as the significant passage of time—specifically fourteen years spent on death row—and the acquittal of a co-accused, even when the appellant’s direct involvement in the crime is established by consistent evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere relationship of eye-witnesses to the deceased render them 'interested' witnesses whose testimony must be discarded?
  • Can a death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment based on the significant passage of time spent on death row?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when a co-accused, charged on similar evidence, has been acquitted?
  Read full judgment →
• Faisal Basheer Memon vs Government of Pakistan through Secy.2008 PLJ SC 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  CSS examinationdomicile certificatepast and closed transactionservice group allocationultra viresadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition regarding the allocation of a CSS group. The petitioner, an Assistant Collector, sought to have his domicile recognized as Sindh (Urban) rather than Sindh (Rural) to secure a different service group, relying on the fact that the rule governing domicile allocation (Rule 6(iii)(a) of the Federal Public Service (Rules of Competitive Examination) Rules, 1997) had been declared ultra vires by the High Court. The High Court had dismissed the petition, treating the matter as a 'past and closed' transaction based on Supreme Court precedents regarding candidates who had already completed training. The Supreme Court held that the 'past and closed' doctrine applies only to candidates who had completed training or had their groups allocated before the rule was struck down. Since the petitioner's group allocation occurred after the rule was invalidated and his training was completed later, his case was distinguishable. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the respondents to consider the petitioner's case under the amended rule.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'past and closed' transaction doctrine apply to a candidate whose CSS group allocation occurred after the relevant domicile rule was declared ultra vires?
  • Can a candidate seek re-allocation of a CSS service group based on an amended rule if their initial allocation occurred under a rule subsequently declared unconstitutional?
  • At what point in the CSS recruitment process does a candidate's case become a 'past and closed' transaction regarding rule changes?
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• Faisal Basheer Memon vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and others2008 SCMR 623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-01-16
  CSS examinationgroup allocationdomicile certificatepast and closed transactioncivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court of Sindh, which had refused to alter the service group allocation of the petitioner, an Assistant Collector in the Customs and Excise Department. The petitioner had challenged his group allocation, arguing that following the judicial striking down of Rule 6(iii)(a) of the Federal Public Service (Rules of Competitive Examination) Rules, 1997 as unconstitutional, his domicile ought to have been accepted as urban rather than rural based on his father's birthplace, entitling him to the Police Service of Pakistan. The High Court had treated his matter as a past and closed transaction relying on Supreme Court precedents regarding candidates who had completed training. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the petitioner's group allocation occurred after the rule was struck down and that his case was distinguishable from past and closed transactions. The impugned judgment was set aside with directions to reconsider the petitioner's case on merits under the amended rule.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the case of a civil servant whose group allocation was made after the unamendend rule was struck down constitutes a past and closed transaction?
  • Does an amendment to the Federal Public Service (Rules of Competitive Examination) Rules, 1997 apply to candidates awaiting group allocation at the time of the rule change?
  • Can domicile determination for CSS examination quotas rely on the birthplace of a candidate's father rather than the certificate issued by the competent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Faheem Ahmed Farooqui vs The State2008 SCMR 1572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-04-23
  abduction for ransomillegal gratificationidentification paradebenefit of doubtanti-terrorismcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had maintained the conviction and life imprisonment sentence of the appellant under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.) read with Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, posing as a police officer, abducted the complainant's son and demanded ransom. The Supreme Court of Pakistan re-examined the evidence and found that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court observed that the abductee was not recovered from the appellant's custody, nor was there evidence of ransom money passing to him. Furthermore, the detention appeared to be for extorting illegal gratification rather than ransom, thereby failing to attract the ingredients of Section 365-A P.P.C. and Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The identification parade was also held after a delay of six days without satisfying legal requirements. Consequently, the Court accepted the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the detention of a person to extort illegal gratification, rather than ransom, attracts the provisions of Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code and Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an identification parade conducted six days after the arrest of the accused without satisfying the requirements of law?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on the same set of evidence that was disbelieved and led to the acquittal of a co-accused in the same trial?
  • Does a single infirmity in the prosecution's case suffice to extend the benefit of doubt to an accused person?
  Read full judgment →
• Faheem Ahmed Farooqui vs State2008 PLJ SC 859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-04-23
  criminal appealabduction for ransomAnti-Terrorism Actbenefit of doubtidentification paradeacquittalPakistan Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the appellant's appeal and maintaining his conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, as passed by the Anti-Terrorism Court. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, a police official, abducted the victim for ransom. The Supreme Court re-examined the evidence and found that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt, noting serious discrepancies, lack of recovery of the abductee from the appellant, absence of proof regarding ransom, and flawed identification parade. The Court held that the ingredients of kidnapping for ransom were not attracted, and the detention, if any, was merely for illegal gratification. Emphasizing that a single infirmity creating reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal, the Court accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned judgments, and acquitted the appellant of the charge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the ingredients of kidnapping or abduction for ransom under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 are attracted when the detention is shown to be for illegal gratification rather than ransom?
  • Does a single infirmity creating a reasonable doubt in the mind of a prudent person suffice to extend the benefit of doubt and acquit an accused?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on the same set of evidence that led to the acquittal of a co-accused without independent corroboration connecting the appellant to the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Factor Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Secretary Food and others2008 SCMR 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2006-04-06
  sugarcane development cessprovincial tax jurisdictionestoppel against statutediscrimination in taxationremand of casecess penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions challenging a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning show cause notices issued to the petitioner sugar mill for short payment of the sugarcane development cess and associated penalties under the Punjab Sugar Cane (Development) Cess Rules, 1964. The petitioner contended it had mistakenly paid the cess to the N.-W.F.P. Government due to its geographical location on the provincial border and a longstanding practice. The core legal question addressed whether administrative practice or estoppel could override explicit statutory tax liability, and whether the petitioner faced discrimination regarding penalties and adjustments compared to other mills like Koh-i-Noor Sugar Mills Ltd. The Supreme Court held that practice cannot override statutory provisions and there is no estoppel against a statute, but upon the agreement of the parties and the State counsel conceding on the issue of disparate treatment, the Court set aside the lower judgments and remanded the case to the Cane Commissioner for redetermination of the cess, penalties, and potential adjustments for payments made to the N.-W.F.P. Government.

  Questions settled

  • Can a longstanding administrative practice override explicit statutory provisions regarding tax payment?
  • Whether there is any estoppel in law against a statute?
  • Does differential treatment in the imposition of penalties and cess adjustments among similarly situated taxpayers amount to unlawful discrimination requiring a remand?
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• Executive Engineer, Qadirabad Barrage Division, Qadirabad, etc. vs Ejaz Ahmad2008 PLJ SC 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service tribunaldismissal from servicedisciplinary proceedingsshow-cause noticeprinciples of natural justiceprocedural lapsesremoval from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal whereby the respondent, an employee dismissed from service following disciplinary proceedings for inefficiency and misconduct, was reinstated. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the Tribunal erred in setting aside the dismissal despite findings regarding the employee's absence and misbehavior. The Supreme Court observed that the disciplinary proceedings, initiated under the Punjab Removal From Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, suffered from glaring illegalities, notably the failure to issue a mandatory show-cause notice under Section 3(2) of the Ordinance and the denial of a fair opportunity of hearing. The Court held that such omissions amount to flagrant violations of statutory provisions and principles of natural justice, vitiating the entire proceedings, and cannot be dismissed as mere procedural lapses. Upholding the Tribunal's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed that mandatory prescribed procedures must be strictly followed regardless of the severity of the charges, and dismissed the appeal as devoid of merit while allowing fresh proceedings in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to issue a show-cause notice under Section 3(2) of the Punjab Removal From Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 vitiate disciplinary proceedings?
  • Can mandatory statutory procedures in disciplinary actions against government employees be flouted on the ground that the alleged charges are serious in nature?
  • Whether the omission to afford a fair opportunity of hearing constitutes a violation of natural justice sufficient to set aside a departmental dismissal?
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• Engineer-in-Chief, G.H.Q. and another vs Abdul Khaliq Siddiqui2008 PLC (C.S.) 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2006-07-05
  condonation of delaylimitationtime-barred petitionservice tribunalsufficient cause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which was barred by 52 days. The core legal question is whether sufficient cause has been shown for the condonation of delay in filing the petition when the petitioners claimed they did not receive a timely copy of the impugned judgment. The Supreme Court held that the explanation offered for the inordinate delay was unsatisfactory, noting that the copy of the judgment had been duly endorsed to the petitioners and that petitioner No. 1 was negligent and lacked diligence in pursuing the remedy. The petition was accordingly dismissed as time-barred. The key principle laid down is that departments or petitioners must show active diligence and sufficient cause, and cannot rely on vague assertions of non-receipt of copies to justify prolonged delays.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in filing a petition can be condoned without showing sufficient cause?
  • Does failure to exercise diligence in obtaining a copy of the judgment justify an inordinate delay?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will exercise discretion in favor of a negligent petitioner?
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• Elahi Bakhsh and others, vs Muhammad Siddique and others,2008 SCMR 312 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-06-14
  evacuee propertypublic auctionP.T.D.jurisdiction of civil courtconcurrent findingssecond appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common judgment of the Lahore High Court, which reversed the concurrent findings of the lower courts and decreed the suit of the respondent while dismissing that of the petitioners. The core legal question concerned the jurisdiction of the civil court to determine whether a property was non-evacuee and whether the High Court was justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the question of a property being declared non-evacuee could not be examined by a civil court in the absence of exceptional circumstances, as such power was exclusively exercisable by the Custodian or Deputy Custodian under the relevant evacuee property legislation. The Court concluded that the High Court rightly interfered with the concurrent findings, finding no legal infirmity in the impugned judgment. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused and the petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil court determine whether a property is non-evacuee in the absence of exceptional circumstances?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the power to declare a property as evacuee or non-evacuee vest exclusively in the Custodian or Deputy Custodian under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957?
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• Ejaz Ali Bughti vs P.T.C.L, And Other(K.L.R. 2008 Supreme Court 76) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-02-12
  civil servantmaster and servantPTCLstatutory rulesservice tribunaltransfer of employmentreversion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a judgment concerning the employment status of individuals transferred from the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation to the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL). The core legal question was whether these transferred employees retained their status as 'civil servants' or if their employment relationship was governed by the principle of master and servant. The Supreme Court held that while transferred employees may retain civil servant status, this is subject to statutory provisions to the contrary. The Court found that Section 36(3) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996, provided the mechanism for reversion, and since the petitioners had not been reverted, they remained employees of the PTCL. Furthermore, because the PTCL lacked statutory service rules, the relationship was governed by the principle of master and servant, not civil service law. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Federal Service Tribunal's decision to decline relief, establishing that in the absence of statutory rules or reversion, PTCL employees do not enjoy civil servant status and cannot seek remedies under service tribunal jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee transferred to the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited retain the status of a civil servant?
  • Is the relationship between the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited and its employees governed by the principle of master and servant?
  • Can an employee of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited seek relief under service laws if the company lacks statutory service rules?
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• Ehsanullah Khan, Exassistant Director, F.I.A. vs Federation of Pakistan2008 PLD Supreme Court 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-02-06
  review petitiondisciplinary proceedingscompulsory retirementgovernment servantsshow-cause noticenatural justiceaudi alteram partem
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition seeking the recall of an earlier order passed by this Court in a civil petition for leave to appeal concerning a disciplinary proceeding against a government servant. The core legal question was whether the competent authority, when disagreeing with the recommendations of the authorized officer to exonerate the employee, was bound to issue a show-cause notice under Rule 6-A of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, rather than acting under Rule 5(1)(iv). The Supreme Court held that the proceedings against the petitioner were in fact conducted and finalized under Rule 6-A rather than Rule 5(1)(iv), and that where the authority intends to pass an adverse order differing from the exoneration recommended by the authorized officer, affording an opportunity of hearing and issuing a show-cause notice is mandatory pursuant to the principles of natural justice and the statutory requirements of Rule 6-A. The review petition was consequently allowed, the previous order recalled, and the penalty set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the authority is bound to issue a notice under Rule 6-A of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 when differing from the recommendations of the authorized officer?
  • Does a recommendation of exoneration by the authorized officer create a vested right that deprives the authority of its revisional powers?
  • Whether an initial charge sheet loses its efficacy once the authorized officer exonerates the accused employee in disciplinary proceedings?
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• Ehsanullah Khan, Ex-Assistant Director, FIA vs Federation of Pakistan2008 PLJ SC 1065 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  disciplinary proceedingsgovernment servantscompulsory retirementaudi alteram partemshow-cause noticereview petitionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenged an earlier Supreme Court order dismissing a petition for leave to appeal regarding disciplinary proceedings against a government servant. The core legal question was whether the Authority, upon disagreeing with an Authorized Officer's exoneration of the petitioner, could impose a major penalty without issuing a fresh show-cause notice under Rule 6-A of the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1973. The Court held that the proceedings were conducted under Rule 6-A rather than Rule 5(1)(iv), and because the Authorized Officer had already exonerated the petitioner, the original charge sheet had lost its efficacy. Consequently, the Authority was legally obligated to provide a fresh show-cause notice and an opportunity for a personal hearing before imposing an adverse order. The Court reaffirmed the principle of audi alteram partem, ruling that no adverse order can be passed against a government servant under Rule 6-A without affording them an opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, the Court allowed the review petition and set aside the penalty of compulsory retirement.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Authority acting under Rule 6-A of the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1973, have the power to impose a major penalty without issuing a fresh show-cause notice after an Authorized Officer has exonerated the accused?
  • Does a charge sheet served during initial disciplinary proceedings retain its efficacy after an Authorized Officer has exonerated the accused?
  • Is the principle of audi alteram partem applicable when an Authority reviews and reverses an exoneration order passed by an Authorized Officer?
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• Ehsanullah Khan, Ex-Assistant Director, F.I.a vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment and another2008 PLC (C.S.) 910 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-02-06
  disciplinary proceedingscompulsory retirementnatural justiceaudi alteram partemservice lawreview jurisdictionshow-cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenges a Supreme Court order that upheld the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal. The petitioner, an Assistant Director in the F.I.A., faced disciplinary proceedings where the Inquiry Officer found him guilty, but the Authorized Officer exonerated him. The Authority subsequently imposed a major penalty of compulsory retirement. The core legal question was whether the Authority could impose a major penalty under Rule 6-A of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, without issuing a fresh show-cause notice after the Authorized Officer had recommended exoneration. The Court held that the proceedings were conducted under Rule 6-A, not Rule 5(1)(iv) as previously presumed. It established that when the Authority intends to revise an exoneration order by the Authorized Officer, it must comply with the principles of natural justice, specifically the maxim 'audi alteram partem'. Consequently, the Court ruled that the failure to issue a fresh notice and provide an opportunity for a hearing rendered the penalty invalid. The impugned judgment and the notification of compulsory retirement were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Authority have the power to impose a major penalty under Rule 6-A of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, without issuing a fresh show-cause notice after the Authorized Officer has recommended exoneration?
  • Is a previous charge sheet sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 6-A of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, when the Authorized Officer has already exonerated the accused?
  • Does the principle of 'audi alteram partem' require an opportunity of hearing when the Authority intends to pass an order adverse to the interest of an accused government servant under Rule 6-A?
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• Dr. Zahoor Mehdi vs Chief Election Commissioner, Islmabad and others2008 PLD Supreme Court 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-11-22
  presidential electionnomination papersproposer and seconderconstitutional petitionmaintainabilitypublic importancefundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed by Dr. Zahoor Mehdi, challenging the order of the Chief Election Commissioner dated 29-9-2007 rejecting his nomination papers for the election of the President, and further praying for a caretaker charge of the Government under the doctrine of necessity. The core legal questions involved whether the requirement of a proposer and seconder for a presidential candidate under subordinate legislation and the Second Schedule to the Constitution was mandatory, and whether the petition was maintainable under Article 184(3). The Supreme Court held that the rejection of the nomination papers was unexceptionable as the statutory and constitutional requirements of a proposer and seconder are mandatory, and further held that petitions challenging matters relating to the election of the President do not involve a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the requirement of a proposer and seconder for a presidential candidate is mandatory under the Constitution and the Presidential Election Rules, 1988?
  • Is a constitutional petition challenging the rejection of nomination papers for the election of the President maintainable under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
  • Do matters relating to the election of the President involve a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights?
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• Dr. Zahoor Mehdi vs Chief Election Commissioner Islamabad & others2008 PLJ SC 289 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-11-22
  presidential electionnomination papersproposer and seconderdoctrine of necessitymaintainabilityconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a Constitution Petition filed by Dr. Zahoor Mehdi challenging the order of the Chief Election Commissioner dated 29.9.2007 rejecting his nomination papers for the election of the President of Pakistan, and further praying for caretaker charge of the Government under the doctrine of necessity. The core legal questions involved whether the requirement of a proposer and seconder for a presidential candidate under subordinate legislation and the Second Schedule to the Constitution is mandatory, and whether a petition challenging presidential election matters is maintainable under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that deviation from constitutional and statutory provisions regarding proposer and seconder is not permissible, affirming that nomination papers lacking them are rightly rejected, and further ruled that petitions challenging matters relating to the election of the President are not maintainable under Article 184(3) as they do not involve a question of public importance concerning the enforcement of fundamental rights. The key principles laid down include the mandatory nature of nomination requirements for the presidential election and the non-maintainability of election-related challenges under Article 184(3) of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the requirement of a proposer and seconder for a presidential candidate under the Constitution and the Presidential Election Rules, 1988 is mandatory?
  • Is a petition challenging matters relating to the election of the President maintainable under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
  • Does a challenge to the rejection of presidential nomination papers involve a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of fundamental rights?
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• Dr. Syed Sabir Ali vs Government of the Punjab through Secretary, Health Punjab and others2008 SCMR 1535 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-10-25
  service lawpro forma promotiondepartmental promotion committeeinjunctionlimitationpensionary benefitsmisconstruction of orderservice tribunal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan was directed against the judgment dated 4-11-2002 passed by the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the appellant's appeal regarding the non-consideration of his case for promotion according to his entitlement. The primary legal issue was whether the department was justified in withholding the consideration of the appellant for promotion due to a stay order issued by the Service Tribunal in another civil servant's appeal, which merely ordered that no adverse action be taken to the extent of that specific appellant. The Supreme Court observed that the department misconstrued the injunctive order, which did not restrain the consideration of the present appellant's case for promotion against an existing vacancy. The Court also held that the plea of limitation, having not been raised before the Service Tribunal, could not be agitated for the first time before the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was wrongly deprived of his legitimate right to promotion and pensionary benefits, and directed the departmental authorities to consider his case for pro forma promotion in accordance with the law within three months.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of limitation be raised for the first time in an appeal before the Supreme Court if it was not taken before the Service Tribunal?
  • Does a protective injunctive order directing no adverse action against a specific civil servant justify the department in withholding the promotion consideration of another eligible civil servant?
  • Whether a retired civil servant wrongfully deprived of timely consideration for promotion due to departmental misconstruction of a court order is entitled to be considered for pro forma promotion?
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• Dr. Shireen Qasim Khan vs Dr. Ashfaque Ahmed Sharif2008 SCMR 1514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2005-07-14
  child custodyvisitation rightsinterim custody orderminorfamily lawexpeditious disposal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the High Court of Sindh, which modified a custody arrangement for a minor child during summer vacations. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court’s modification of the custody order, allowing the father visitation and temporary custody of the minor during summer vacations and fortnightly Sundays, was just and equitable given the pending appeal before the Additional District Judge. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s arrangement was appropriate, just, and equitable. The Court rejected the petitioner’s concerns regarding the potential removal of the child from the jurisdiction, noting the respondent’s denial and willingness to surrender his passport. The Court emphasized that custody matters require speedy resolution and directed the trial court to expedite the pending appeal. The key principle laid down is that in matters of child custody, the court’s primary objective is to ensure an equitable arrangement that respects the rights of both parents while prioritizing the welfare of the minor, and that such interim arrangements should be implemented promptly to ensure the child benefits from the ordered visitation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court modify an interim custody order to allow visitation rights during school vacations?
  • Is a parent's undertaking to surrender their passport sufficient to address concerns regarding the potential removal of a minor from the court's jurisdiction?
  • Should appellate courts direct trial courts to expedite the disposal of pending custody appeals?
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• Dr. Muhammad Sharif vs Secretary to Government of Punjab and others2008 PLC (C.S.) 315 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2006-10-02
  service tribunaldisciplinary proceedingsdelay in departmental proceedingswithholding of incrementpensionary benefitsmisconductad hoc appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the appellant's service appeal regarding a penalty imposed by the Competent Authority. The core legal question concerned the validity and consequential permanent impact of a disciplinary penalty of withholding of one increment for one year, initiated nine years after the alleged misconduct of making an unauthorized ad hoc appointment in January 1996. The Supreme Court of Pakistan converted the petition into an appeal and partly allowed it by setting aside the penalty of withholding an increment and substituting it with 'Censure'. The Court held that an inordinate delay of nine years by the authorities in initiating disciplinary proceedings, which ultimately caused a permanent reduction in the retiring employee's pensionary benefits due to timing of retirement, warrants rectification in the interest of justice. The key principle laid down is that disciplinary proceedings must be initiated promptly, and punishments whose temporal effects outlast an employee's service due to administrative delays resulting in permanent pensionary loss require judicial intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inordinate delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings can cause a minor penalty to result in permanent loss of pensionary benefits?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal?
  • Whether the penalty of withholding an increment can be substituted with censure under the circumstances of undue administrative delay?
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• Dr. Muhammad Naeem Aslam vs Province of Punjab through Chief2008 PLC (C.S.) 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2007-09-04
  service matterappointment challengeacademic exerciselachesconstitutional petitionintra-court appealsenior registrar
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's intra-court appeal regarding the appointment of respondents as Senior Registrars in Cardiology. The petitioner contended that the High Court misread his constitutional petition by incorrectly stating that the issue of the respondents' lack of requisite specialization qualifications had not been raised. The petitioner argued that under a 1995 notification, specialized qualifications were mandatory, and alternative criteria were only applicable if no specialized candidates were available. The Supreme Court observed that the initial appointments occurred in 1998, and over ten years had elapsed since the respondents were appointed. Furthermore, the petitioner had since been promoted to the position of Senior Registrar Cardiology in the same institute. Consequently, the Court held that the validity of the initial appointments was no longer a live issue. Declining to engage in an academic exercise that would disturb rights accrued over a decade, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no substantial cause to warrant interference with the impugned judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the court interfere with initial appointments after a significant lapse of time when the issue is no longer a live controversy?
  • Can a court decline to adjudicate a matter if it constitutes an academic exercise?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to challenge the selection process of colleagues after being promoted to the same position?
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