Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Zeba Khan vs Station House Officer, Police Station Gulberg, Lahore2004 SCMR 375 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-05-28
  petition for leave to appealintra-court appealprivate complainttentative observationswithdrawal of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's Intra-Court Appeal. During the hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that she intended to file a private complaint before a competent court of jurisdiction but expressed apprehension that certain observations made by the High Court in the impugned judgment might prejudice her case. The counsel submitted that she would not press the petition if this Court clarified that any such complaint would be considered independently and strictly in accordance with the law, without being influenced by the High Court's observations. The Supreme Court heard the counsel and held that the observations made in the impugned judgment were merely of a tentative nature. The Court directed that if the petitioner files a complaint for the redressal of her grievance, it must be dealt with independently and in accordance with the law, uninfluenced by the High Court's prior observations. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn.

  Questions settled

  • Whether observations made in an impugned judgment of the High Court are of a tentative nature?
  • Can a petitioner withdraw a petition for leave to appeal upon receiving clarification that future legal proceedings will be decided independently of prior tentative observations?
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• Zaman Khan alias Zama Khan through Legal Heirs vs Mst. Sardaran Mai2004 SCMR 1387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-04-27
  leave to appealburden of proofinheritance disputemisreading of evidencecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order passed by the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' civil revision against the appellate judgment that set aside the trial court's decree in a property dispute. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners successfully proved their ownership of the disputed property as legal heirs of the deceased Khuda Yar through documentary evidence, specifically Exhibit P-1. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners miserably failed to prove Exhibit P-1, as the witness who produced it had no official connection to the issuing committee at the relevant time, and the crucial stamp vendor was neither summoned nor produced. Consequently, the petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was declined, affirming the concurrent findings against the petitioners regarding the failure to discharge the burden of proof.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to produce the original record keeper or the author of a document renders the document unproved?
  • Does the non-production of a material witness, such as a stamp vendor, weaken a party's claim of property ownership?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere in concurrent findings of fact when the lower courts have properly appreciated the evidence?
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• Zaman Khan alias Zama Khan and other vs Mst. Sardaran Mai alias2004 PLJ SC 549 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  inheritance disputeburden of proofFiqa Jafriaappreciation of evidencecivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil dispute regarding the inheritance of property belonging to the deceased, Khuda Yar. The petitioners, claiming to be legal heirs, sought a declaration of ownership, asserting that the respondent, Mst. Sardaran Mai, was not entitled to inherit under the Fiqa Jafria. The trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the petitioners, but this was reversed by the Additional District Judge, whose decision was subsequently upheld by the Lahore High Court in civil revision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the lower appellate court and the High Court erred in their assessment of evidence, specifically regarding the proof of a document (Ex. P-1) and the failure of the petitioners to discharge the burden of proof. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to prove the document in question, noting that the witness produced lacked the authority to present the record and that the stamp vendor was not examined. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the lower courts' findings were based on a correct appreciation of evidence and facts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to produce a stamp vendor as a witness constitute a failure to discharge the burden of proof regarding the execution of a document?
  • Can a witness who lacks official custody of a record properly authenticate a document purportedly from that record?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts when the evidence has been properly appreciated?
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• Zakauddin vs Dastgir Investment and Management Limited (in Liquidation), through The Official Assignee_Liquidator, Sindh High Court, Karachi and 2 others2004 CLD 1037 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-03-15
  Intra-Court Appealwinding-up proceedingsCompany Judgemaintainability of appealleave to appealOfficial Assignee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed an Intra-Court Appeal (ICA) filed by the petitioner. The underlying dispute arose from the winding-up proceedings of Dastgir Investment and Management Limited, where the petitioner failed to make timely payments for a property purchase offered by the Official Assignee/Liquidator. Following multiple orders by a Company Judge regarding payment deadlines and subsequent litigation, the petitioner challenged the Single Judge's order before a Division Bench. The High Court dismissed the ICA, ruling that such an appeal was not maintainable and that the proper forum for challenging the Company Judge's order was the Supreme Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an Intra-Court Appeal is competent against an order passed by a Company Judge in winding-up proceedings. Finding that the issue was identical to matters already pending in other civil appeals, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, directing that the current petition be heard alongside those existing appeals to resolve the maintainability of the ICA.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Intra-Court Appeal is maintainable against an order passed by a Company Judge in winding-up proceedings?
  • Does an appeal against the order of a Company Judge lie before the Supreme Court rather than a Division Bench of the High Court?
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• Zakaria H.A. Sattar Bilwani and another vs Inspecting Additional2003 PTD 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-07-01
  Wealth Tax Actretrospective operationprocedural lawsubstantive lawleave to appealstatutory interpretationassessment orders
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal were filed against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the petitioners' tax appeals regarding the cancellation of assessment orders under section 17-B of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether section 17-B of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963, inserted via the Finance Act, 1992, operates retrospectively as a procedural or machinery provision, or prospectively as a substantive law affecting vested rights. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the High Court had erroneously concluded that the question of retrospective application had not been raised before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, and that the matter requires detailed examination in light of established principles of statutory interpretation regarding procedural versus substantive laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 17-B of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 is a procedural provision operating retrospectively or a substantive law operating prospectively?
  • Does a taxpayer acquire a vested right against the correction of erroneous assessment orders prejudicial to the revenue?
  • Can the time limit prescribed under section 25 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 be read into section 17-B of the said Act?
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• Zaka Ullah Bajwa vs Chief Secretary, Punjab and others2004 PLC (C.S.) 556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-06-11
  service tribunalmajor penaltyquantum of punishmentjudicial minddepartmental inquiryremandservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which upheld the petitioner's removal from service despite finding that only one of seven original charges was proven. The departmental authority had initially imposed the major penalty of removal based on the finding that all seven charges were substantiated. Upon review, the Tribunal concluded that six charges were unfounded but maintained the penalty of removal without reconsidering whether such a severe punishment remained appropriate given that only a single charge of willful absence and failure to report for duty was proven. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal, acting as the first appellate forum, failed to apply its judicial mind to the quantum of punishment in light of the reduced number of proven charges. The Court emphasized that the Tribunal was obligated to evaluate whether the major penalty was commensurate with the remaining proven charge. Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the Tribunal for a fresh determination on whether the major penalty of removal from service was legally justified under the altered circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Service Tribunal required to reconsider the quantum of punishment when it finds that only some of the charges against a civil servant are proven?
  • Does the failure of a Service Tribunal to apply its judicial mind regarding the proportionality of a penalty constitute a valid ground for remand?
  • Can a major penalty of removal from service be maintained if the appellate authority finds that the majority of charges against the employee were not proven?
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• Zahoor Hussain vs Principal of G1C. Sahiwal and others2004 PLC (C.S.) 1393 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-04-17
  adverse remarksexpunction of adverse remarksservice lawcounselingreporting officersubjective assessmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which rejected the petitioner's appeal for the expunction of adverse remarks recorded in his performance evaluation. The petitioner contended that the adverse remarks were recorded due to bias, were inconsistent with his overall service record, and were invalid because no counseling was provided prior to their recording. The Supreme Court evaluated the record and determined that counseling had indeed been provided both verbally and in writing. Furthermore, the Court observed that the petitioner received favorable ratings in several other categories from the same reporting officer, which disproved the allegation of personal bias. The Court held that subjective assessment in performance evaluations falls within the supervisory domain of the reporting officer and cannot be interfered with in the absence of cogent reasoning or proof of malice. Finding no question of law of public importance, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can adverse remarks in a civil servant's performance evaluation be expunged without proof of bias or malice by the reporting officer?
  • Whether subjective assessment of a civil servant falls within the supervisory domain of the reporting officer?
  • Does failure to establish lack of counseling preclude the expunction of adverse remarks in service matters?
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• Zahoor Hussain vs Principal Of G.C. Sahiwal, Etc.K.L.R. 2004 S.C. 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-04-17
  adverse remarksexpungementservice lawcivil serviceperformance evaluationbiascounseling
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from the rejection of the petitioner's appeal by the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had declined to expunge adverse remarks from his performance evaluation report. The petitioner contended that the adverse remarks were conjectural, biased, and recorded without any prior counseling, thereby causing grave prejudice. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the reporting officer's assessment was biased and whether prior counseling had been provided. The Court found that the petitioner had indeed received written and verbal counseling from the Principal. It held that the reporting officer's appreciation of the petitioner's positive traits disproved any allegations of malice or bias. The Court laid down the principle that the subjective assessment of a civil servant's performance falls within the exclusive supervisory domain of the reporting officer and cannot be interfered with by courts unless convincing and cogent evidence of bias or illegality is produced. Consequently, the petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the subjective assessment of a civil servant's performance by a reporting officer can be interfered with by courts in the absence of convincing and cogent evidence of bias?
  • Does the appreciation of certain positive traits of an employee by a reporting officer negate the allegation of personal bias or malice in recording adverse remarks?
  • Can adverse remarks in a performance evaluation report be expunged on the ground of lack of counseling if written and verbal advice was actually administered?
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• Zahid Munir vs Malik Muhammad Aslam and another2004 SCMR 855 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-04-02
  habeas corpusexecution of sentenceprocedural relaxationwakalatnamacriminal appealdetentionQazf
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a habeas corpus petition filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner challenged the arrest of his father, who had been convicted of Qazf under the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance 1979, arguing that his detention was unlawful because a Judge of the Supreme Court had previously relaxed rules regarding the attestation of a Wakalatnama for the convict. The core legal question was whether the relaxation of procedural rules for filing an appeal by a Supreme Court Judge operated as a stay or prohibition against the execution of a sentence by law enforcement agencies. The Supreme Court held that the procedural relaxation regarding the Wakalatnama did not constitute a stay of execution or a prohibition against arrest in implementation of the Federal Shariat Court's judgment. Consequently, the detention was deemed lawful. The Court affirmed that procedural orders in chambers do not automatically suspend the execution of a criminal sentence unless explicitly ordered.

  Questions settled

  • Does the relaxation of procedural rules for filing an appeal by a Supreme Court Judge operate as a stay of execution of a criminal sentence?
  • Can a petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used to challenge an arrest made in implementation of a valid conviction?
  • Is a convict entitled to release if they have completed their sentence through remissions, regardless of the pendency of an appeal?
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• Zaheer-Ud-Din Babar and another vs Allah Lubhaiya2004 SCMR 1338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-06-19
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptiontarget daterepealed Actpre-emption decreepending proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a pre-emption decree could be passed in favour of a pre-emptor after the target date of 31-7-1986, following the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Malik Said Kamal Shah. The petitioners had filed a suit for pre-emption in 1982, which was initially decreed in their favour by the trial court in 1987. The High Court, relying on established precedents, set aside the decree, reasoning that no decree could be passed in pre-emption suits after 31-7-1986. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the law established in Said Kamal Shah and subsequent cases dictates that pending pre-emption proceedings could not continue under the repealed Act if a decree had not been passed before the target date of 31-7-1986. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, confirming that the impugned judgment was consistent with the settled legal position regarding the limitation on pre-emption decrees post-31-7-1986.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decree in a pre-emption suit be passed after the target date of 31-7-1986?
  • Do pending pre-emption proceedings survive if no decree was passed before 31-7-1986?
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• Zafar Muhammad vs Mst. Anwar Bibi2004 SCMR 559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-05-14
  Hiba Namavalidity of giftdelivery of possessionmutationfraud and misrepresentationconcurrent findingsproperty ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court which affirmed the decision of the First Appellate Court in a property dispute. The respondent, Mst. Anwar Bibi, filed a suit claiming ownership of 1/3rd of the suit-land, alleging that her husband, the petitioner, had fabricated a Hiba Nama (gift deed) to transfer her land to himself through fraud and misrepresentation. The Trial Court initially dismissed the suit, but the First Appellate Court reversed this, finding the gift invalid due to the absence of proof regarding the delivery of possession, the offer, and the acceptance of the gift. Additionally, the identification of the donor during the mutation process was found to be suspicious. The High Court upheld this reversal, finding no illegality or misappreciation of evidence. The Supreme Court, upon review, held that the petitioner failed to prove the essential elements of a valid gift and failed to demonstrate any legal error in the lower courts' concurrent findings. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the respondent's ownership rights.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential elements required to prove a valid Hiba (gift) of land?
  • Can a mutation based on a disputed gift be upheld if the donor's identification is proven to be doubtful?
  • Does the failure to prove the delivery of possession invalidate an alleged gift of land?
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• Zafar Iqbal Khan vs Pakistan Agricultural Research Council, Islamabad and others2003 PLC (C.S.) 1175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-04-07
  service tribunallimitationcondonation of delayabatement of proceedingswrong forumseniority disputecivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Zafar Iqbal Khan, an Accounts Officer, challenging the dismissal of his service appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal on the ground of limitation. The petitioner had initially challenged his supersession in seniority before the Lahore High Court via a constitutional petition. During its pendency, section 2-A was inserted into the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, bringing his post within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner's continued litigation before the High Court constituted bona fide conduct justifying the condonation of delay in approaching the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that upon the creation of the forum via section 2-A, pending proceedings automatically abated under section 6 of the Act, and parties were required to approach the Tribunal within ninety days without waiting for the High Court's decision. The Court established that litigating before a wrong forum due to lack of due diligence does not constitute a bona fide act, and delay caused thereby is uncondonable. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pending proceedings in a civil court or high court automatically abate upon the insertion of section 2-A into the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Is a litigant justified in waiting for the final decision of a wrong forum before approaching the newly created Service Tribunal?
  • Does litigating before a wrong forum amount to a bona fide act sufficient to warrant the condonation of delay under limitation laws?
  • What is the prescribed limitation period for approaching the Service Tribunal following the extension of its jurisdiction to a class of employees?
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• Zafar Iqbal alias Shahid vs The State2004 PLD Supreme Court 367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-01-23
  Dying declarationCriminal appealMurderSepticemiaOcular evidenceMedical evidenceAppreciation of evidenceDeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the petitioner's conviction and death sentence for murder. The core legal question was whether the statement recorded from the victim, who succumbed to injuries 47 days later, constituted a valid dying declaration under Article 46 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the statement was admissible and reliable. The Court reasoned that the victim was in full possession of his senses when the statement was recorded shortly after the incident, and the apprehension of death at that time satisfied the legal requirements for a dying declaration. Furthermore, the Court found that the dying declaration was sufficiently corroborated by ocular testimony and medical evidence, establishing the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed that the conviction was based on a correct appreciation of evidence and consistent with established principles of criminal justice, finding no grounds for interference with the lower courts' concurrent findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statement be treated as a dying declaration if the deceased survives for a significant period after making it?
  • Does the onset of septicemia due to medical treatment absolve the accused of liability for the murder?
  • Is a dying declaration admissible if it is corroborated by ocular testimony and medical evidence?
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• Zafar Iqbal alias Babu vs The State2004 SCMR 716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-12-09
  criminal convictionnarcotic substancestechnical objectionprejudice to accusedjudgment requirementsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The petitioner, convicted by the trial court and sentenced to fourteen years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine, challenged the High Court's dismissal of his appeal. The core legal question was whether the trial court's failure to explicitly cite the specific section of the law under which the petitioner was convicted in its judgment rendered the conviction illegal and void under Section 367(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the omission was a mere technicality that did not prejudice the petitioner, as he was fully aware of the charge framed against him throughout the trial. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the conviction. The key principle laid down is that a technical omission in a judgment, such as failing to cite the specific section of law, does not invalidate a conviction if the accused was aware of the charges and suffered no prejudice to their defense.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a trial court to explicitly cite the section of law in a judgment render the conviction illegal?
  • Can a conviction be set aside on technical grounds if the accused was aware of the charges framed against them?
  • Does the omission of a section number in a judgment necessarily cause prejudice to the accused?
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• Younas Khan and otherss vs Haji Ajab Khan and others2004 PLD Supreme Court 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-10-22
  fraud and misrepresentationconcurrent findings of factcompromise decreebelated challengepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition and maintained the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The core controversy involved a dispute over a parcel of land originally transferred by a registered sale-deed in 1978, which was later made the subject of a compromise decree in 1982. Years later, the petitioners filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alleging that the decree was obtained through fraud and that the original sale-deed was forged. The trial court dismissed the application as frivolous, a decision upheld by the District Judge and subsequently affirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts were based on proper appreciation of evidence without any misreading or non-reading, noting that the original transferor never challenged the transaction during his lifetime and the petitioners delayed approaching the court. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be interfered with in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Whether an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is maintainable when filed years after the death of the predecessor-in-interest who never challenged the transaction during his lifetime?
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• Younas Khan and others vs Haji Ajab Khan etc.2004 PLJ SC 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-10-22
  Section 12(2)fraudcompromise decreeconcurrent findingslimitationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of an application filed under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioners challenged a 1982 compromise judgment and decree, alleging that it was obtained through fraud and that the underlying 1978 sale deed executed by their predecessor-in-interest was forged. The trial court, appellate court, and High Court concurrently dismissed the application as frivolous. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld these decisions, noting that the predecessor-in-interest never challenged the sale deed during his lifetime, and the petitioners delayed taking action for two years after his death. The Court reiterated that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts, when cogent and convincing, cannot be interfered with unless there is a demonstrable misreading or non-reading of material evidence, or a grave legal infirmity, which was absent in this case. Consequently, the petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts be interfered with in the absence of misreading or non-reading of material evidence?
  • Whether an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be sustained where the predecessor-in-interest never challenged the disputed transaction during his lifetime?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court of Pakistan disturb concurrent findings of fact in a civil matter?
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• Yaroo vs The State2004 SCMR 864 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-12-16
  post-arrest bailmurder casegeneral allegationsno injury to deceasedprolonged incarcerationsoticross version
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which had dismissed the petitioner's post-arrest bail application in a case registered under Sections 302, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether an accused is entitled to the concession of post-arrest bail when only general allegations of causing injuries to witnesses are attributed to him, without any specific fatal injury being assigned to the deceased, alongside a prolonged period of incarceration. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner was armed only with a Soti, faced purely general allegations regarding injuries caused to witnesses, was attributed no injury whatsoever to the deceased, and had been in jail for over a year. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal and granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner subject to furnishing surety bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused facing general allegations of causing injuries to witnesses, with no fatal injury attributed to the deceased, is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Whether prolonged custody exceeding one year without specific attribution of fatal injury justifies the grant of post-arrest bail in a murder trial?
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• Yara and others vs The State2004 SCMR 969 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-01-07
  reduction of sentencemitigating circumstancesold agemurdercriminal petitionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal seeking the reduction of sentences for certain petitioners convicted of murder. The core legal question concerns the propriety of reducing the sentences of elderly convicts taking into consideration mitigating circumstances such as age, duration of incarceration, and the underlying motive of the crime. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where the petitioners were over sixty years of age at the time of the occurrence and had already served a substantial period in prison, their sentences of imprisonment under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code could be reduced to the period already undergone. The key principle laid down is that advanced age and prolonged pre-conviction and post-conviction incarceration serve as valid mitigating factors for reducing a sentence of imprisonment in murder cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court reduce the sentence of imprisonment for elderly convicts based on their age and period already undergone?
  • Whether old age and prolonged incarceration are valid mitigating factors for reducing a sentence under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code?
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• Wilayat Ali vs The State and another2004 SCMR 477 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-10-31
  capital punishmentretracted confessioneyewitness testimonychance witnesscorroborationabsconsionmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the double murder of two deceased persons, along with compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal questions involved whether the conviction could be sustained on the basis of eyewitness testimony from related and alleged chance witnesses, and whether a retracted confessional statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without a formal appended certificate is admissible and sufficient for conviction when corroborated. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that minor contradictions do not discredit otherwise reliable eyewitness testimony, that a real father is an inherently credible witness unlikely to substitute a real culprit, and that a voluntary retracted confession is legally admissible and acts as a valid basis for conviction when supported by adequate corroborative evidence such as medical testimony, recovery, and absconsion.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the basis of a retracted confession?
  • Whether minor contradictions and improvements in eyewitness testimony are sufficient to discard their evidence entirely?
  • Is a confessional statement rendered inadmissible solely due to the absence of a formal attached certificate under Section 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the testimony of a real father who witnessed the murder of his sons require independent corroboration?
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• Wilayat Ali vs State and another2004 PLJ SC 624 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-10-31
  murderdeath sentenceretracted confessioneye-witness testimonyabsconsioncriminal petitioncorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the double murder of Jehanzeb and Khanzeb and his sentence of death. The core legal questions involved the credibility of eye-witnesses, the admissibility and voluntariness of a retracted confessional statement, the effect of minor procedural irregularities under Section 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the requirement of independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case through consistent and coherent eye-account testimony supported by medical evidence, absconsion, and recovery of the weapon. The Court ruled that a retracted confession, when voluntary and corroborated by sufficient connecting evidence, forms a valid basis for conviction, and that minor irregularities in recording a confession do not render it inadmissible if core statutory safeguards are met. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be based on a retracted confession if it is supported by sufficient independent corroboration?
  • Does the absence of a formal certificate attached to a confessional statement render it inadmissible under Sections 164 and 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether the recording of two separate confessional statements in different cases on the same day by the same Magistrate affects the admissibility of the confession?
  • Can minor contradictions and improvements in the statements of prosecution witnesses justify the total rejection of their testimony?
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• Water and Power Development Authority through its Chairman, WAPDA House, Lahore vs Abbas Ali Malano and another2004 PLC (C.S.) 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-04-02
  ad hoc appointmentregularization of servicePlacement Bureautermination of servicewaiver by employervested rightFederal Service Tribunalback-benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had allowed the service appeals of the respondents and reinstated them in service with full back-benefits. The respondents had initially been appointed in 1989 on an ad hoc basis in the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) on the recommendation of the Placement Bureau, subject to passing a competitive examination. Their services were subsequently terminated multiple times following changes in government policies regarding Placement Bureau appointees, but earlier termination orders were set aside by the High Court. WAPDA terminated them again in 1998, citing non-compliance with recruitment criteria established in the Human Rights Case (1996 SCMR 1349). The Supreme Court held that the employer could not terminate the employees for lack of regular selection when the authority itself failed to conduct the required competitive examinations over several years. Non-holding of the prescribed examination amounted to waiver by the employer. Having continuously served for approximately 11 years with requisite qualifications, the employees accrued a vested right to regularization. The petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employer's prolonged failure to conduct a scheduled qualifying examination amount to a waiver of the condition precedent for confirming an ad hoc employee?
  • Can an authority terminate employees on the ground of irregular appointment when the authority itself was responsible for the procedural irregularity and the employees possessed the requisite qualifications?
  • Does long and continuous ad hoc service create a vested right in favor of qualified employees to have their services regularized?
  • Can employees appointed through the Placement Bureau be subjected to discriminatory termination when similarly situated employees have been retained and regularized?
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• Water and Power Development Authority through its Chairman and others vs Muhammad Naveed Iqbal and others2003 PLC (C.S.) 1270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-11-18
  compulsory retirementnatural justicearbitrary exercise of powerservice lawWAPDAmala fideright of hearing
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns four civil petitions filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) challenging judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the compulsory retirement of several employees. The employees were retired under Section 17(1-A)(a) of the Pakistan WAPDA Act, 1958, without prior notice or hearing. The core legal question was whether the Authority could exercise its power to retire an employee without assigning reasons or providing an opportunity of hearing, particularly in light of the principles of natural justice and the 1994 amendment to the Act. The Supreme Court held that while the Authority retains the discretion to retire employees under Section 17(1-A)(a) without assigning reasons, such power must not be exercised arbitrarily or with mala fide intent. The Court affirmed that where an order of retirement lacks bona fides, the principles of natural justice, including the right to a hearing, must be observed. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, finding the Tribunal's decision to reinstate the employees justified due to the arbitrary nature of the original retirement orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power of the Authority to retire an employee under Section 17(1-A)(a) of the Pakistan WAPDA Act 1958 exclude the application of the principles of natural justice?
  • Is an order of retirement passed under Section 17(1-A)(a) of the Pakistan WAPDA Act 1958 immune from judicial review if it is alleged to be arbitrary or mala fide?
  • Does the 1994 amendment to Section 17(1-A) of the Pakistan WAPDA Act 1958 entirely remove the discretion of the Authority to retire employees without assigning reasons?
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• Waseem Ullah vs The State2004 SCMR 860 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-01-22
  post-arrest bailmurderjuvenile offenderrule of consistencyfire-arm injurysupreme court of pakistanbail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court whereby the petitioner's second application for post-arrest bail in a murder case registered under sections 148, 302, 324, 149, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code was dismissed. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail on the grounds of statutory delay in submission of the challan, juvenility under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, or the rule of consistency based on the release of co-accused. The Supreme Court held that the Lahore High Court was fully justified in refusing bail, noting that the occurrence took place in daylight, the F.I.R. was prompt, specific fire-arm injuries were attributed to the petitioner, a serious motive existed regarding the murder of an advocate, and the co-accused had been released because they were found innocent during investigation. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, laying down that heinous offences involving direct attribution of fatal injuries and strong prima facie evidence do not warrant bail merely on grounds of juvenility or the release of co-accused found innocent during investigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to bail merely on the ground of being a minor under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 when directly charged with a capital crime involving firearm injuries?
  • Does the release of co-accused who were found innocent during police investigation entitle another accused to bail under the rule of consistency?
  • Is delay in the submission of the challan sufficient ground for the grant of post-arrest bail in heinous offences?
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• WAPDA vs Messrs Dada Bhoy Cement Industries Ltd.2004 SCMR 1481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-05-21
  restoration of appealcondonation of delaynon-prosecutionsufficient causeSupreme Court Ruleslachesdilatory conduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil miscellaneous application seeking the restoration of a dismissed appeal after an inordinate and unexplained delay of 731 days under Order XV, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. The core legal question was whether sufficient cause had been shown for the condonation of delay and restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution, where notice was duly communicated via the cause list to the Advocate-on-Record. The Supreme Court dismissed the application, holding that publication on the court's cause list constitutes sufficient and adequate notice, and that litigants cannot display gross negligence, indifference, and a lack of diligence while expecting discretionary relief from the court. The Court laid down the principle that law and equity favor the diligent and vigilant rather than the indolent, and that finality attached to judicial determinations should not be lightly unsettled after long lapses of time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether publication of a case on the court cause list constitutes sufficient notice to an Advocate-on-Record?
  • Can an application for restoration of an appeal filed after an inordinate delay of 731 days be condoned without showing sufficient cause?
  • Whether equity assists litigants who demonstrate gross negligence and indifference in prosecuting their legal remedies?
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• WAPDA vs Fida Hussain2004 PLJ SC 849 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-06-01
  compulsory retirementnatural justiceaudi alteram partemservice tribunaldepartmental remedyWAPDA Actshow cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a civil petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the compulsory retirement of the respondent, an employee of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The core legal questions were whether an employee retired under Section 17(1-A)(a) of the WAPDA Act, 1958, is entitled to a show-cause notice and a hearing, and whether the failure to exhaust departmental remedies bars an appeal before the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the right to a hearing is inalienable based on the principle of natural justice (audi alteram partem), regardless of whether the statute explicitly mandates assigning reasons for retirement. Furthermore, the Court held that where no departmental appeal mechanism is provided under the specific statute governing the action, the failure to file a departmental appeal does not preclude an appeal before the Service Tribunal. The key principle established is that statutory provisions allowing for removal without a hearing are subject to the overriding requirements of natural justice and fairness.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee retired under Section 17(1-A)(a) of the WAPDA Act 1958 entitled to a show-cause notice and an opportunity of hearing?
  • Does the absence of a provision for departmental appeal in a statute bar an aggrieved employee from approaching the Service Tribunal?
  • Can an order of compulsory retirement be sustained if passed without assigning reasons or providing a hearing?
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• WAPDA through Project Director vs Azam Khan and others2004 PLJ SC 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-12-15
  land acquisitioncompensationinterest ratelimitationcondonation of delayaccidental slipexecution proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment awarding interest on land acquisition compensation from the date of the Section 4 notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and at the profit rate of the National Bank of Pakistan. The appellant argued the appeal was time-barred by 842 days, contending the interest should accrue from the date of possession and be capped at 8% compound interest under Section 34 of the Act. The Supreme Court found the appeal time-barred, noting that the appellant failed to provide sufficient grounds for condonation of delay. Regarding the interest rate, the Court observed that the High Court's application of the National Bank profit rate appeared to be an accidental slip. With the respondents' consent, the Supreme Court modified the judgment to specify that compound interest at the rate of 8% per annum should be paid, directing the Executing Court to calculate the amount accordingly. The appeal was disposed of with this modification, while the limitation plea remained effective against the appellant's broader challenge.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal be entertained when it is barred by a significant period of delay without sufficient grounds for condonation?
  • Is a judgment awarding interest from the date of a Section 4 notification void ab initio if possession was taken simultaneously?
  • Can an appellate court modify a judgment to correct an accidental slip regarding interest rates with the consent of the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA through Chairman vs Muhammad Ijaz Rabbani and 2 others2004 PLC (C.S.) 750 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-03-03
  dismissal from servicemisconductreinstatementservice tribunalleave to appealdepartmental inquiryWAPDA
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 arose from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the dismissal of two WAPDA employees and ordered their reinstatement with back-benefits. The employees had been deputed to China for prototype testing and inspection of energy meters. They were subsequently dismissed on charges of misconduct, specifically for issuing an inspection certificate for the entire consignment in advance, allegedly transgressing their mandate and protecting the manufacturer from liquidated damages. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the department failed to substantiate any charge of misconduct, corruption, or bad faith through direct or circumstantial evidence. Furthermore, the meters were delivered within the specified timeframe, conformed to specifications, and functioned satisfactorily. The Court held that any subsequent negligence by the verifying authorities at the time of delivery could not be shifted to the respondents. Finding no merit in the petitions, the Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee be dismissed for misconduct based on procedural transgression where no bad faith, corruption, or financial loss to the department is established?
  • Whether the negligence of verifying authorities at the time of delivery of goods can be shifted to the officers who conducted the initial prototype testing and inspection?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a finding of fact by the Service Tribunal when the department fails to produce direct or circumstantial evidence of misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA through Chairman and others vs M.M. Chandio, Ex-Chief2004 SCMR 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-05-27
  service lawpersonal hearingmajor penaltyshow-cause noticeexonerationrevisional authorityWAPDA employees
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment by the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the removal of the respondent, a former Chief Engineer of WAPDA, from service. The respondent had been previously exonerated of charges, but the petitioners subsequently reopened the case and imposed a major penalty of removal from service under Rule 12 of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978. The core legal question was whether the respondent was denied the right to a personal hearing and whether the show-cause notice was legally sufficient before the imposition of the major penalty. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the respondent was not provided a personal hearing on the date the decision to impose the penalty was finalized, nor were the grounds for reversing the previous exoneration communicated to him. The Court affirmed the principle that a personal hearing is essential before the imposition of a major penalty, particularly when reversing a prior order of exoneration, and that a show-cause notice must explicitly disclose the grounds for the proposed action.

  Questions settled

  • Is a personal hearing mandatory before the imposition of a major penalty under the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978?
  • Can an authority impose a major penalty after reversing a prior order of exoneration without providing the employee an opportunity to be heard on the specific grounds for reversal?
  • Does a show-cause notice issued under Rule 12 of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978, require the disclosure of specific grounds for the proposed major penalty?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA House, Lahore vs Abbas Ali Malano and another2004 SCMR 630 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-04-02
  ad hoc appointmentregularization of servicevested righttermination of serviceservice tribunalwaiver
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from consolidated civil petitions filed by WAPDA against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which allowed the respondents' appeals and reinstated them with back-benefits. The respondents were initially appointed on an ad hoc basis as Assistant Directors in 1989 on the recommendations of the Prime Minister's Secretariat Placement Bureau. Their services were subjected to various terminations and reinstatements due to changing government policies and political shifts, and they were eventually terminated in 1998 on the ground that their appointments violated rules laid down in a human rights case. The core legal question was whether the termination of ad hoc employees was justified when the authority itself failed to conduct the required competitive examination for their regularization and when similarly situated employees had been regularized. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner authority's failure to organize the required examination amounted to a waiver, and since the respondents had served for eleven years and were fully qualified, they had accrued a vested right to regularization. The Court concluded that the Tribunal committed no error, dismissed the petitions, and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ad hoc employee acquires a vested right to regularization after serving for a long duration when the employer authority fails to conduct the prescribed competitive examination?
  • Does the failure of an authority to hold a required departmental examination for regularization amount to a waiver of that condition?
  • Can the services of employees appointed through a placement bureau be terminated on political grounds following a change of government?
  Read full judgment →
• Walayat Khan and 3 others vs Khyzer Hayat Khan and 6 others2004 SCMR 1558 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-09-27
  pre-emptioncollusive suitsuperior right of pre-emptionmarket value of landleave to appealmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over pre-emption rights concerning a land sale. The petitioners, claiming superior pre-emption rights as collaterals and co-sharers, challenged a decree granted to the respondents (the vendor's family), who had filed a competing pre-emption suit. The trial court had issued a conditional decree favoring the respondents, which was later reversed by the Additional District Judge on the grounds that the respondents' suit was collusive and intended to defeat the petitioners' superior rights. The High Court subsequently set aside the appellate court's judgment and restored the trial court's decree. The petitioners contended that the High Court failed to address the pivotal issue of collusion and the improper determination of the land's market value, alleging misreading and non-reading of evidence. The Supreme Court, finding merit in the contentions regarding the legality of the High Court's judgment, granted leave to appeal to examine whether the lower court properly adjudicated the issues of collusion and valuation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit for pre-emption filed by the family members of a vendor be dismissed on the grounds of collusion?
  • Does a trial court have the authority to fix different sale prices for rival pre-emptors in a consolidated suit?
  • Is a High Court required to address the issue of collusiveness in a pre-emption suit when reversing an appellate court's finding?
  Read full judgment →
• Waheed Ullah vs Mst. Rehana Nasim and others2004 C.L.R. 342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-06-04
  ejectment petitionstriking off defencerelationship of landlord and tenantoral agreement of salerent depositsummary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment petition where the Rent Controller ordered the petitioner to deposit arrears and future monthly rent under Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance. Upon the petitioner's failure to comply, his defence was struck off, and eviction was ordered. The petitioner challenged the eviction, arguing that because he denied the landlord-tenant relationship based on an alleged oral agreement of sale, the Rent Controller was required to frame an issue and record findings on that relationship before ordering rent deposit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's dismissal of the petitioner's constitutional petition. The Court held that a mere plea of an oral agreement of sale, without a decree from a competent civil court, does not oust the landlord-tenant relationship or exempt a tenant from complying with a rent deposit order. The Court established that rent deposit orders must be complied with to safeguard the landlord's interest against frivolous litigation, and a tenant cannot rely on an unproven oral sale agreement to avoid paying rent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant's plea of an oral agreement of sale with the landlord is sufficient to deny the relationship of landlord and tenant in rent proceedings?
  • Must a Rent Controller frame a formal issue and record findings on the relationship of landlord and tenant before passing a rent deposit order when the tenant's denial is based solely on an unproven oral sale agreement?
  • Does the failure of a tenant to comply with a rent deposit order under Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance justify striking off their defence despite an outstanding plea of an oral sale agreement?
  Read full judgment →
• United Liner Agencies of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi and 4 others vs Miss Mahenau Agha and 8 others2003 CLD 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-07-10
  private limited companytransfer of sharespre-emptive rightfirst right of refusalArticles of Associationspecific performanceshareholders' agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh, which had reversed the Single Judge's dismissal and decreed the plaintiff's suit for declaration, specific performance, and permanent injunction regarding the transfer of shares in a private limited company. The core legal questions involved whether the transfer of shares to a third party was valid and whether the existing shareholders possessed a pre-emptive right or first right of refusal under the company's Articles of Association. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the transfer of shares in a private company must strictly adhere to the procedure and restrictive covenants outlined in its Articles of Association, and that private negotiations bypassing the mandatory notice and right of first refusal to existing members render the transaction invalid. The court reaffirmed the principle that Articles of Association constitute a binding contract among shareholders inter se, and that pre-emptive rights to protect against unwanted outsiders must be strictly enforced.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the transfer of shares in a private limited company made in violation of the procedure prescribed in its Articles of Association is valid?
  • Do existing shareholders have a pre-emptive right or first right of refusal to purchase shares proposed to be transferred by other members?
  • Whether obtaining permission from the State Bank of Pakistan can validate a share transfer that is otherwise contrary to the Articles of Association of a company?
  Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited vs C.M. Sarwar, Advocate and others2004 PLJ SC 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-12-02
  court auctioneercommissionexecution of decreesale proceedstime-barred executionauction confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court directing the payment of commission to court auctioneers on the sale proceeds of attached property in execution of a money decree. The core legal question was whether court auctioneers are entitled to a commission when the execution petition and auction sale are annulled before confirmation due to the execution being held time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the auction could not be considered completed before its confirmation by the executing court, and since the execution petition was dismissed as barred by time prior to confirmation, the commission had not become due under the applicable rules. The Court laid down the principle that under Rules 21 and 22 of the Lahore High Court Rules and Orders (Chapter 12-L, Volume-1), court auctioneers are only entitled to actual expenses and not a commission when an auction sale is not completed or finalized, as commission is deductible and payable strictly out of completed sale proceeds upon confirmation.

  Questions settled

  • Are court auctioneers entitled to a commission when an execution petition is dismissed as time-barred before the auction sale is confirmed?
  • When does a commission become due to a court auctioneer under the Lahore High Court Rules and Orders?
  • What remuneration is payable to a court auctioneer in cases where auction sales are ordered but not completed or do not take place?
  Read full judgment →
• Umer Bukhsh vs Nikku and others2004 SCMR 1555 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-07-04
  allotted landdisplaced personinheritanceremandburden of proofrevenue recordcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a civil revision regarding the inheritance of land allotted to a displaced person, Mst. Kaily, in lieu of her verified claim. The respondents claimed inheritance rights to the allotted land, asserting Mst. Kaily held only a life estate. The core legal question was whether the entire suit land was allotted against Mst. Kaily’s claim or if a portion was independently owned by the petitioner. The lower courts failed to address whether the suit land comprised solely the allotted land or included land owned by the petitioner in his own right, despite revenue records suggesting multiple mutations. The Supreme Court held that to ensure complete justice, the matter required further investigation. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower courts' judgments, and remanded the case to the trial court. The trial court was directed to record evidence to determine the exact extent of the land allotted against the claim versus the land independently owned by the petitioner, placing the burden of proof on the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court have the authority to remand a case for further evidence when the lower courts failed to determine whether the suit land was entirely allotted or partially owned by the petitioner?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie when a party claims that a portion of the disputed land was owned in their own right rather than being part of an allotted claim?
  • Is a trial court required to determine with exactitude the portion of land allotted against a claim versus land independently owned by a petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Hayat vs Additional District Judge and others2004 SCMR 1367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-05-14
  summoning of witnesseslist of witnessesdiscretionary jurisdictioncivil procedureleave to appealproof of minority
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding orders of the lower courts that permitted the plaintiffs in a suit for cancellation of documents to summon additional witnesses to prove their minority at the time of executing a general power of attorney. The core legal question was whether the trial court lawfully exercised its discretion under Order XVI Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to allow the summoning of witnesses not initially included in the list of witnesses within the prescribed timeline, due to an unintentional omission and good cause shown. The Supreme Court held that the trial court, revisional court, and High Court concurrent decisions were based on sound discretionary powers to advance the cause of justice and that technicalities should not obstruct the dispensation of justice. The key principle laid down is that under Order XVI Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, a court is competent to grant permission to call witnesses at any stage if good cause for the omission is shown, and such discretionary orders will not be interfered with lightly.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court permit a party to summon witnesses not included in the original list of witnesses?
  • Whether the High Court's interference in discretionary orders of subordinate courts regarding witness summoning is warranted under technical grounds?
  • Does Order XVI Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 empower the court to allow the summoning of additional witnesses at any stage upon showing good cause?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Draz vs The State2004 SCMR 275 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-06-04
  leave to appealreappraisal of evidenceimpersonationland mutationPatwariforgerycorruptionsuspension of sentencebail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by a Patwari challenging the dismissal of his criminal appeal by the High Court, which upheld his conviction under Sections 419, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner connived with co-accused persons to enter a land mutation through the impersonation of the actual land owner. The petitioner contended that no incriminating material or forged document existed against him, that a Patwari cannot physically identify every landowner, and that a compromise had been executed. The State argued that the Supreme Court could not reappraise evidence under Article 185(3) of the Constitution. Rejection the State's contention, the Supreme Court held that as the court of ultimate jurisdiction, it possesses the power to reappraise evidence to prevent miscarriage of justice and ensure correct legal principles were applied. Leave to appeal was accordingly granted, and sentence suspension with bail was ordered.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the jurisdiction to reappraise evidence while exercising powers under Article 185(3) of the Constitution?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted to examine if lower courts applied the correct principles of justice regarding appreciation of evidence?
  • Whether a Patwari can be held criminally liable for forgery and impersonation in the absence of evidence showing active connivance?
  Read full judgment →
• The State through Prosecutor-General, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad vs Nasim-Ur-Rehman and others2004 SCMR 1943 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-09-16
  National Accountability Bureauacquittalpublic office holderassets beyond meansleave to appealcorruptionAccountability Court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, the National Accountability Bureau, sought leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment that upheld the acquittal of the respondents by the Accountability Court. The respondents were charged with accumulating assets disproportionate to their known sources of income under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance. The trial court acquitted the respondents under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, primarily on the grounds that non-public office holders could not be tried under the Ordinance and that the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie case. The petitioner contended that the trial court prematurely terminated proceedings, denying the prosecution a fair opportunity to present incriminating evidence, and argued that beneficiaries of corruption, even if not public office holders, are liable under the Ordinance. The Supreme Court, noting conflicting judicial precedents regarding the liability of non-public office holders and the scope of the Accountability Court's powers to acquit at an early stage, granted leave to appeal. The Court identified the need to reconcile divergent views on the applicability of the Ordinance to non-public office holders and to examine the sufficiency of evidence against the principal accused.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance 1999 regarding an accused who is not a holder of public office but is a beneficiary of a public office holder?
  • Can an Accountability Court acquit an accused under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without affording the prosecution sufficient opportunity to lead evidence?
  • Whether a person other than a public office holder, who is a beneficiary of a public office holder, can be tried under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance 1999?
  Read full judgment →
• The State through Prosecutor-General, National Accountability Bureau vs Agha Wazir Abbas and another2004 SCMR 1824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-04-13
  NAB Ordinancecorruption and corrupt practicesforgeryhandwriting expertacquittalremand of casepublic exchequer
  Summary & questions settled

  The State through the Prosecutor-General of the National Accountability Bureau impugned a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, whereby respondents were acquitted of charges under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, for forging import and transport permits, evading vend and cess fees, and causing a massive loss to the public exchequer. The trial court had convicted the respondents under section 10 of the NAB Ordinance, 1999, but the High Court set aside their convictions and sentences. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in discarding crucial prosecution evidence regarding forged signatures without examining a handwriting expert. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court to record the evidence of a handwriting expert and deliver a fresh judgment. The key principle laid down is that while expert evidence on handwriting is opinion evidence, courts should not base definitive findings on visual comparisons alone without concrete expert testimony where scientific and specialized knowledge is required.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court discard prosecution evidence regarding forged signatures without examining a Handwriting Expert?
  • Whether the testimony of a Handwriting Expert is necessary when determining the authenticity of disputed signatures involving scientific knowledge?
  • Is a court permitted to decide the issue of forged signatures solely on personal inspection and presumption without concrete expert evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• The State through Deputy Prosecutor-General, NAB vs Tariq Mohsin and others2004 SCMR 1892 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  quashment of FIRinherent jurisdictionSection 561-A Cr.P.C.Section 265-K Cr.P.C.excise duty evasioncriminal proceedingsprima facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that quashed criminal proceedings against the respondents regarding the alleged evasion of Central Excise duty. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash an FIR while an application for acquittal under Section 265-K, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was still pending before the Trial Court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s intervention was premature and improper. It ruled that inherent powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 should not be invoked when an alternative statutory remedy is available and pending. Furthermore, the Court established that criminal proceedings should not be quashed at the initial stage if a prima facie case exists, as it would stifle the trial process. The Trial Court must be permitted to record evidence and adjudicate the matter on merits. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case for the Trial Court to decide the pending application.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise inherent powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash criminal proceedings while an application under Section 265-K, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is pending before the Trial Court?
  • Does the mere delay in the disposal of an application pending before a Trial Court justify the High Court's interference through its inherent jurisdiction?
  • Is it appropriate for the High Court to quash criminal proceedings at an initial stage when a prima facie case is disclosed in the complaint?
  Read full judgment →
• The Secretary, LG and RD and others vs Dr. Amjad Ali Khan2004 PLC (C.S.) 1201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-12-24
  civil servicedisciplinary proceedingsdepartmental inquiryreduction in rankexonerationleave to appealPunjab Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Department against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which set aside a major penalty of reduction in rank imposed on the respondent. The core legal questions involved whether a Medical Officer holding additional charge as Officer of Health could be held responsible for a fatal cholera outbreak caused by contaminated water supplied by the Public Health Engineering Department, and whether the impugned penalty was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court observed that the joint inquiry report of the Commissioner exonerated the Health Department and explicitly held officials of the Public Health Engineering Department responsible for the water supply scheme. Finding that the respondent had been completely exonerated on facts and that no legal infirmity was pointed out in the Tribunal's decision, the Supreme Court held that no ground for interference was made out. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can be penalized for negligence regarding a matter managed exclusively by another public department?
  • Can a disciplinary penalty be maintained when an official inquiry report has completely exonerated the concerned employee from liability?
  Read full judgment →
• The Secretary, Labour Department, Punjab, Lahore and another vs Raja2004 C.L.R. 315 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  senioritycivil servantregular appointmentservice tribunaldepartmental quota
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had accepted the respondent's appeal regarding his seniority position in the Labour Department. The respondent, a Labour Officer (BS-16), had been appointed through the Public Service Commission on a regular basis prior to the other respondents, who were promoted to the same rank later. Despite this, the department placed the respondent lower in the seniority list than those promoted later, citing delays in filling departmental quota posts. The core legal question was whether the department could relegate a regularly appointed civil servant's seniority based on administrative delays in filling other posts. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, dismissing the petition. The Court held that seniority must be determined based on the date of regular appointment. The key principle laid down is that under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, seniority of a civil servant is strictly reckoned from the date of their regular appointment to the post, and departmental administrative failures cannot override this statutory mandate.

  Questions settled

  • How is the seniority of a civil servant determined under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
  • Can a department relegate the seniority of a civil servant due to delays in filling departmental quota posts?
  Read full judgment →
• The Province of Punjab through, The Secretary Education (Ee), Government of the Punjab, Lahore and others vs Liaqat Ali2004 PLC (C.S.) 367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-05-05
  service tribunalremoval from servicebogus appointmentmisconductpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which set aside the removal from service of the respondent, a PTC teacher appointed in 1993, whose services were terminated in 2000 on allegations of misconduct and a bogus appointment. The core legal question was whether the respondent's removal from service on the ground of a bogus appointment was sustainable when the authenticity of his appointment documents had been officially verified and the alleged inquiry report could not be produced. The Supreme Court held that the charges against the respondent could not be substantiated by credible documentary evidence, the authenticity of the appointment documents was confirmed by the Deputy District Education Officer, and the failure to produce the inquiry report warranted an adverse presumption against the petitioners. The Court affirmed the Service Tribunal's decision, laying down the principle that a long-serving employee cannot be removed from service on vague, sketchy, and unsubstantiated grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee can be removed from service on the ground of a bogus appointment without substantiated documentary evidence?
  • What is the legal effect when an alleged inquiry report is not produced before the service tribunal despite various directions?
  • Does the non-mentioning of an employee's name in a dispatch register have a bearing on the merits of a service matter?
  Read full judgment →
• The Province of Punjab through, Secretary Education Department, Lahore and others vs Mst. Sarwari Begum2004 PLC (C.S.) 361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-05-06
  writ of mandamuscivil serviceappointment on meritjurisdictionapprobate and reprobateouster of jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Province of Punjab against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld a Single Judge's order directing the petitioners to issue an appointment letter to the respondent. The respondent had sought a writ of mandamus to compel the authorities to make appointments based on merit rather than extraneous considerations, pointing out that her appointment summary had already been approved by the competent authority but was delayed by bureaucratic bottlenecks. The petitioners contended that the High Court lacked jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 as the matter related to the terms and conditions of a civil servant. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction was not ousted because the matter did not involve the terms and conditions of service of an active civil servant, but rather the implementation of an approved appointment. The Court affirmed that public authorities cannot approbate and reprobate by withholding an appointment they themselves approved, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the ouster of jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 apply to a candidate seeking the implementation of an already approved appointment summary?
  • Can a government department refuse to issue an appointment letter after the candidate's appointment summary has been formally approved by the competent authority?
  • Whether the principle of 'approbate and reprobate' prevents a government department from withholding an appointment it has officially recommended and approved?
  Read full judgment →
• The Province of Punjab through Secretary C&W Department and others2003 PLC (C.S.) 1357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-06-19
  service tribunalpermanent absorptiondeputationrepatriationcivil servantlienpast and closed transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which set aside the repatriation and subsequent orders concerning the respondent, an Assistant Engineer initially appointed in the Lahore Development Authority and later permanently absorbed into the Communication and Works Department with the consent of both departments. The core legal question involved the validity of the respondent's repatriation to his parent department after serving in the borrowing department for over a decade, following permanent absorption and the termination of his initial lien. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that once an employee is permanently absorbed with the express consent of the parent and borrowing departments and fulfills the stipulated probationary and examination requirements, the matter becomes a past and closed transaction, and unilateral repatriation without a proper opportunity of hearing is unlawful. The Court laid down the principle that a civil servant cannot be arbitrarily repatriated after their lien has been severed through valid permanent absorption, and that pending inquiries against a civil servant must be pursued through proper legal proceedings rather than arbitrary transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant permanently absorbed in a borrowing department with the consent of the parent department can be unilaterally repatriated after a lapse of several years?
  • Does the termination of a civil servant's lien in their parent department upon permanent absorption preclude subsequent repatriation?
  • Can the validity of an initial appointment and subsequent permanent absorption be questioned after the passage of a decade without adhering to due process of law?
  • Is it permissible to repatriate a civil servant facing disciplinary inquiries instead of proceeding against them in accordance with the law?
  Read full judgment →
• The Managing Director, M.R.F.P.A.C., Kamra and others vs Tariq Bashir2003 PLC (C.S.) 1143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-10-29
  probationertermination of servicenatural justiceshow-cause noticestigmaFederal Service Tribunalmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which reinstated a respondent employee who had been terminated during an extended probation period. The respondent, a Civilian Assistant, was terminated following allegations of unauthorized absence, poor attendance, and indiscipline. The core legal question was whether the services of a probationer could be terminated for misconduct without providing a show-cause notice or an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court held that while the respondent was on extended probation, the termination order was based on specific allegations of misconduct and negative behavior, which cast a stigma upon the employee. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, ruling that the principles of natural justice required that the employee be afforded a minimum opportunity to present his case before such a termination. The Court further held that the matter did not involve a question of law of general public importance under the Constitution, and dismissed the appeal, upholding the reinstatement of the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Can the services of a probationer be terminated for misconduct without providing an opportunity to be heard?
  • Does a termination order based on allegations of indiscipline and poor performance against a probationer constitute termination with stigma?
  • Is a question regarding the procedural fairness of a probationer's termination a question of law of general public importance under Article 212(3) of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, Lahore and others vs Nazir Ahmad Sabir2004 PLC (C.S.) 401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-03-18
  service tribunalremoval from servicevoluntary retirementabsence from dutydepartmental appealefficiency and discipline
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the judgment dated 21-8-2002 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, whereby the respondent's service appeal was accepted and the penalty of removal from service was converted into retirement. The respondent, serving as an Agricultural Officer, had applied for retirement on the ground of his wife's ailment, subsequently absented himself from duty, and was proceeded against under disciplinary rules. The Inquiry Officer recommended retirement by treating the absence as extraordinary leave, but the competent authority removed him from service. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal was justified in converting the penalty of removal from service into retirement under the circumstances. The Supreme Court held that since the Inquiry Officer had recommended retirement and the respondent's early retirement application remained undecided by the departmental authorities, the Tribunal was fully justified in converting the penalty. The Court laid down the principle that the Service Tribunal's modification of a penalty under such factual circumstances involves no substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212(3) of the Constitution, warranting no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Punjab Service Tribunal is justified in converting the penalty of removal from service into retirement when the inquiry officer recommended retirement?
  • Does the modification of a disciplinary penalty by the Service Tribunal raise a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212(3) of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chief Engineer, Irrigation, Lahore Zone. Old Anarkali, Lahore and others vs Sajjad Hussain Bhatti2003 PLC (C.S.) 1153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-05-14
  seniorityservice tribunalvested rightstenographerredesignation of postcivil servantpromotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal whereby the respondent's service appeal regarding seniority as a Stenographer was accepted. The core legal question concerned whether the conversion and redesignation of the post of Stenotypist to Stenographer through a government notification could retrospectively affect and alter the established seniority rights of an existing Stenographer appointed prior in time. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that seniority is a valuable vested right that cannot be infringed without lawful justification or retrospective maneuvers not authorized by the relevant notification. The Court affirmed that nomenclature changes concerning posts do not automatically disrupt existing seniority inter se, and that the respondent, having been appointed as a Stenographer earlier, rightfully ranked senior to those whose posts were subsequently redesignated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether seniority in a graded service constitutes a vested right that cannot be infringed without justification?
  • Does a notification redesignating the post of Stenotypist to Stenographer have retrospective effect on seniority?
  • Can a civil servant claim seniority over colleagues whose posts were converted and redesignated subsequent to the civil servant's initial appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• Tehsil Municipal, Administration Faisalabad City vs Muhammad Saleem2003 PLC 413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-01-02
  Factories Actdefinition of factoryleave to appealstatus quolabor lawstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment regarding the applicability of labor laws to the petitioner, Tehsil Municipal Administration, Faisalabad City. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner's activities fall within the definition of a 'factory' under the Factories Act, 1934, specifically whether the petitioner is involved in making, altering, or preparing any article or substance for sale or transportation. The petitioner contends that the impugned judgment failed to adhere to the principles established by the Supreme Court in the case of Town Committee Ghakhar Mandi v. Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, Gujranwala and 57 others (PLD 2002 SC 452). The respondent argues that the factual controversy regarding the nature of the petitioner's operations requires the recording of evidence, which is currently underway. Upon preliminary review, the Supreme Court observed that the dictum laid down in the Town Committee case appeared to have been ignored by the lower forum. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider the contentions raised and directed that the status quo be maintained pending the final adjudication of the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of a factory under Section 2(j) of the Factories Act 1934 apply to a Tehsil Municipal Administration?
  • Is the determination of whether an entity constitutes a factory a matter requiring the recording of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Shafique alias Pappo and another2004 PLD Supreme Court 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-09-08
  criminal appealrecovery of weaponsjudicial confessionstock witnesspolice encounterburden of proofacquittalcustodial torture
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals filed by the State against a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of charges involving the possession of weapons and explosive substances and anti-state activities. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently established the recovery of incriminating materials from the respondents' possession and whether the judicial confessions were voluntary and reliable. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s acquittal, finding that the prosecution failed to prove the respondents occupied the premises where the recovery allegedly occurred. Furthermore, the Court noted that the recovery witness was a known "stock witness," undermining the credibility of the recovery evidence. Regarding the judicial confessions, the Court held that the delay in recording them and the context of police custody raised significant doubts about their voluntariness, suggesting they may have been coerced. The key principle laid down is that the gravity of a charge does not absolve the prosecution from its burden of proof, and an individual's liberty cannot be curtailed on presumptive grounds without credible, unimpeachable evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the recovery of incriminating items from premises where the accused's possession is not established?
  • Does the testimony of a 'stock witness' regarding the recovery of weapons undermine the prosecution's case?
  • Are judicial confessions reliable when recorded after a significant delay during police remand?
  • Does the gravity of a criminal charge relieve the prosecution of its burden to provide unimpeachable evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Tasneem Akhtar vs Government of Pakistan and 2 others2004 PLC (C.S.) 572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  government housingallotment of quartersout-of-turn allotmentseniority listtrespasseradministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the allotment of a government quarter in Islamabad. The petitioner, a government employee, sought allotment of a quarter on an out-of-turn basis, while the respondent was found to be an illegal occupant (trespasser) of the same property. The High Court had set aside the allotment in favor of the petitioner, declaring it without jurisdiction, and directed that the property be allotted strictly according to the seniority list under the Pakistan Allocation Rules, 1993. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and affirmed that the petitioner failed to meet the necessary conditions for out-of-turn allotment, such as hardship, and noted that she was already residing in a government-allotted house through her husband. The Court held that neither the petitioner nor the trespasser was entitled to the allotment. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, confirming that government housing must be allotted in accordance with the established seniority list and relevant allocation rules, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government employee claim out-of-turn allotment of government housing without fulfilling the prescribed hardship conditions?
  • Is an illegal occupant of government property entitled to equitable relief regarding the allotment of that property?
  • Must the allotment of government quarters be strictly governed by the seniority list under the Pakistan Allocation Rules, 1993?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood vs Government of Punjab and others2004 PLC (C.S.) 582 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-05-13
  willful absencemisconductservice lawstudy leaveadministrative discretionunlawful orderdepartmental permission
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which upheld the removal of the petitioner, a Sub-Engineer in the Irrigation Department, from service due to willful absence. The petitioner had sought admission to an engineering degree program without departmental permission and remained absent for over a decade despite his leave applications being rejected. The petitioner contended that a directive from the Chief Minister of Punjab, treating his absence as 'study leave,' should have been implemented. The Supreme Court examined whether the Chief Minister's order was lawful and binding. The Court held that the Chief Minister lacks unfettered or unbridled power to grant leave in violation of established leave rules and procedures. Finding the Chief Minister's order to be vague, lacking a proper summary, and based on extraneous considerations, the Court declared it ab initio void. The Court affirmed that leave must be sanctioned strictly according to prescribed rules and that unauthorized absence for over a decade constitutes misconduct justifying removal from service. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lacking merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Chief Minister have unfettered power to grant leave in violation of established leave rules?
  • Is an order passed by a Chief Executive based on extraneous considerations and without following prescribed procedure legally binding?
  • Does unauthorized absence from duty for a prolonged period constitute misconduct justifying removal from service?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Ahmed alias Tahri vs The State2004 SCMR 957 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-12-11
  criminal appealmurder convictionintoxication defensecriminal liabilityappreciation of evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's criminal appeal against his conviction for murder. The petitioner was convicted under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following the death of the deceased, Zahid Umer Khan. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's plea—that he committed the act while intoxicated and thus lacked the requisite intent—constituted a valid defense to mitigate or absolve him of criminal liability. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's plea of intoxication was improbable and did not align with the evidence, specifically noting the nature and extent of the injuries sustained by the deceased. Consequently, the Court found no illegality in the High Court's judgment and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that a plea of intoxication, when unsupported by credible evidence or logic in the context of the prosecution's case, is insufficient to negate criminal liability for a homicide.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of intoxication be accepted as a valid defense to negate criminal liability for murder when the circumstances of the crime render such a claim improbable?
  • Does the admission of the commission of an offense under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, coupled with an improbable defense, justify the dismissal of a criminal appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanvir Ahmed vs Chief Secretery, Government Of Punjab LahoreK.L.R. 2004 S.C. 31 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-07-03
  civil servantmisconductseniority listdepartmental enquiryreduction to lower scalefundamental rulesservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a civil servant serving as a Lecturer in English who was departmentally proceeded against under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 for tampering with the original seniority list to secure undue promotion. The departmental authority imposed a major penalty of reduction to the initial scale of B-17. The Punjab Service Tribunal dismissed the petitioner's appeal, leading to the present proceedings. The core legal question concerned the legality of reducing the petitioner to a lower scale and stage without specifying a time period. The Supreme Court held that while the charge of misconduct was established and move-over to B-18 did not amount to regular promotion, the penalty imposed violated Fundamental Rule 29 as it failed to specify the period for which the reduction was effective. The Court laid down the principle that an order reducing a government servant to a lower grade, post, or stage in a time-scale on account of misconduct or inefficiency must explicitly state the effective period and its impact on future increments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether move-over of a civil servant to B-18 amounts to regular promotion?
  • Does reduction of a civil servant to a lower stage without specifying a period violate Fundamental Rule 29?
  • Can a penalty of reduction in rank or scale be imposed without stating the period for which it shall be effective?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanvir Ahmed vs Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, Lahore2004 SCMR 647 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-07-03
  civil servicedepartmental inquirymisconductreduction in rankFundamental Rulesmove-overseniority list
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Lecturer in the Education Department, challenged a departmental penalty of reduction to the initial scale of B-17 imposed for tampering with a seniority list. The petitioner argued that as he was in B-18, the reduction violated the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that the petitioner's move-over to B-18 constituted a promotion, clarifying it is merely an advancement after reaching the maximum of a substantive scale. However, the Court examined the legality of the punishment under Fundamental Rule 29 (F.R. 29). The Court held that the departmental authority failed to specify the duration of the reduction, which is a mandatory requirement under F.R. 29. Consequently, the Court modified the penalty, restricting the reduction to a period of four years. The judgment establishes the principle that when a civil servant is reduced to a lower grade, post, or time scale due to misconduct, the competent authority must explicitly state the effective period of such reduction to comply with statutory requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of a move-over to a higher scale constitute a promotion for a civil servant?
  • Is it mandatory for a departmental authority to specify the duration of a penalty involving reduction to a lower grade or post?
  • What are the legal consequences under F.R. 29 if a reduction in rank is imposed without specifying the period of effectiveness?
  Read full judgment →
• Taj Din son of Pir Muhammad and others vs Taj Din son of Fateh Din and another2004 SCMR 1726 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-07-10
  civil revisionconcurrent findingsalienationgift-deeddeclarationpossessionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' civil revision and affirmed concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two lower courts. The core legal dispute involved a suit for declaration, permanent injunction, and possession filed by respondent No.1, asserting ownership of the suit-land and challenging its alienation through a registered gift-deed as illegal and void on the basis of identity and parentage. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of respondent No.1, and the lower appellate court dismissed the petitioners' appeal. The High Court subsequently dismissed the civil revision in limine. The Supreme Court examined the record, including oral and documentary evidence such as birth entries and Nikahnamas, and found no legal flaw in the appreciation of evidence by the courts below. The Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact based on solid evidence do not warrant interference in revisional or appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming the impugned judgments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two courts below can be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does a gift-deed executed by a person whose identity or title is disputed remain valid when oral and documentary evidence establishes the true ownership of the claimant?
  Read full judgment →
• Taj Din alias Taj Muhammad vs Province of the Punjab through Collector, Rahimyar Khan2004 PLJ SC 696 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  state land leaselease cancellationtenancy agreementrevenue authoritiescivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil revision judgment by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the dismissal of the petitioner's suit challenging the cancellation of a state land lease. The petitioner, having been allotted state land in Rahim Yar Khan for a five-year term, sought to contest the cancellation of said lease by revenue authorities, arguing that the cancellation was improper. The core legal question was whether the revenue authorities acted lawfully in cancelling the lease upon its expiration and whether the petitioner had a valid claim to the land despite the expiry of the tenancy agreement. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly appreciated the facts and law, finding that the lease was for a fixed term, was not renewed, and that the revenue authorities had provided the petitioner with a hearing before cancellation. The Court affirmed that there was no misreading of evidence or violation of statutory provisions, specifically Section 24 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, and consequently dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the cancellation of a state land lease by revenue authorities after the expiry of the lease period constitute a violation of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912?
  • Is a civil suit maintainable against the cancellation of a state land lease where the lease agreement explicitly requires the restoration of property to the government upon expiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Zafar Iqbal vs Commandant, Punjab Constabulary, Farooqabad, District Sheikhupura and another2004 PLC (C.S.) 744 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-06-12
  compulsory retirementwillful absenceservice appealdisciplinary proceedingsmedical certificateregular inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and maintained his compulsory retirement from service on account of inefficiency and misconduct arising from unauthorized absence. The core legal questions pertained to whether the petitioner remained absent for seventy-nine days and whether a regular departmental inquiry was mandatory to establish such absence. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's unauthorized absence was fully established from the official record, that unverified out-door patient tickets and belated medical certificates did not justify the absence, and that holding a regular inquiry could be dispensed with when no complex factual controversy existed. The key principles laid down are that leave cannot be treated as automatically sanctioned without following the procedure under the applicable leave rules, that absence without sanctioned leave amounts to willful absence constituting misconduct, and that a regular departmental inquiry is not mandatory in every case where the factum of absence is proven on record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a regular inquiry should be held to establish the factum of absence in departmental proceedings?
  • Can leave be treated as automatically sanctioned without following the procedure contemplated in the Revised Leave Rules, 1980?
  • Whether absence from duty supported by unverified out-door patient tickets justifies unauthorized absence amounting to misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Wajihul Hassan Zaidi vs Government of the Punjab and others2004 PLD Supreme Court 801 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-06-28
  review petitionevacuee propertysettlement lawsfraudulent transfervoid ordersjurisdictionpast and closed transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  These review petitions under Article 188 of the Constitution arose from a long-standing dispute regarding the illegal and fraudulent transfer of surplus evacuee land attached to the S.P. House in Jhelum to the petitioner, a former Superintendent of Police. The core legal questions involved whether a transfer of evacuee property obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or without a valid order by a competent authority could be treated as a past and closed transaction, and whether the Settlement authorities retained jurisdiction after the enactment of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The Supreme Court dismissed both review petitions, holding that void and illegal orders passed without jurisdiction confer no title and do not constitute closed transactions. The Court laid down the principle that the bar of jurisdiction shielding completed transfers under settlement laws only applies to lawful transfers made in good faith and does not protect ill-gotten gains or property usurped through undue influence, manipulation, and collusion with subordinate officials.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of transfer of evacuee property obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or without jurisdiction can be treated as a past and closed transaction?
  • Does the repeal of settlement laws under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 bar scrutiny of property transfers that were initially void ab initio?
  • Can finality be attached to transfer documents issued in excess of authority and in collusion with subordinate settlement staff?
  • What are the strict parameters for exercising review jurisdiction under Article 188 of the Constitution against a deliberate judicial decision?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Wajihul Hassan Zaidi and others vs Government of Punjab and others2004 PLJ SC 892 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertysettlement lawsfraudulent transfervoid ordersreview petitionpermanent transfer deedexcess land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from review petitions directed against a previous judgment of the Supreme Court concerning the transfer of evacuee property, specifically the S.P. House in Jhelum and surrounding large tracts of land, under the Settlement and Rehabilitation laws. The core legal questions involved whether excess land beyond three times the plinth area could be legally transferred without proper determination of market price, whether fraudulent manipulation and lack of conscious application of mind vitiated the transfer documents including the Permanent Transfer Deed, and whether finality could be attached to void orders. A Full Bench of the Supreme Court held that the transfer of surplus land and property belonging to a different evacuee owner, obtained through fraud, collusion, and manipulation by subordinate settlement staff while the petitioner held an official position, was ab initio void and non-existent in the eye of the law. The court laid down the principle that finality attached to statutory orders presupposes that the order is within the powers of the making authority, and void orders founded on fraud or lack of jurisdiction confer no title and can be ignored or set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of transfer of evacuee property obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or in the absence of jurisdiction can attain finality under settlement laws?
  • Can settlement authorities transfer land exceeding three times the plinth area of a house without proper determination of its market price by a competent authority?
  • Does the repeal of settlement laws under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act 1975 protect transfers that were void ab initio due to a total lack of jurisdiction?
  • What are the strict parameters for invoking the review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court against a considered judgment on questions of fact and law?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Shaukat Iqbal vs Secretary to the Government of the Punjab2004 SCMR 1315 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-05-28
  review petitiondisciplinary proceedingspension ruleslimitation periodcivil servantservice of noticemajor penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arises from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan which upheld the decision of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding disciplinary proceedings against a retired civil servant. The petitioner contended that disciplinary proceedings were invalid due to a lack of notice under the Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules. The core legal question was whether the initiation of proceedings within the statutory one-year limitation period under Rule 1.8(b) of the Pension Rules requires the actual service of notice within that timeframe, or merely the commencement of the process. The Court held that the institution of proceedings refers to the commencement or initiation of the process, not the service of notice. Furthermore, the Court determined that the petitioner was afforded a fair opportunity of hearing and that the proceedings were initiated within the mandatory one-year period following retirement. Emphasizing that review jurisdiction is limited to cases involving the discovery of new evidence or errors apparent on the face of the record, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the arguments raised.

  Questions settled

  • Does the institution of proceedings under Rule 1.8(b) of the Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules require the service of notice within one year of retirement?
  • What is the scope of review jurisdiction regarding errors apparent on the face of the record?
  • Can a review petition be maintained if the judgment is sustainable on other grounds despite an erroneous assumption of facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Shaukat Iqbal vs Secretary to Government of the Punjab2004 PLJ SC 739 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-05-25
  review petitiondisciplinary proceedingspensionerservice tribunalcivil servantlimitation periodmajor penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenges a previous Supreme Court judgment that upheld an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding disciplinary proceedings against a retired civil servant. The petitioner argued that the proceedings were invalid due to a lack of notice, contending that the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) of the Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules were not met. The core legal question was whether the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against a pensioner within one year of retirement, as mandated by Rule 1.8(b) of the Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules, requires the actual service of notice within that timeframe, or merely the commencement of the process. The Court held that the institution of proceedings refers to the initiation or commencement of the process, not the service of notice. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the petitioner was afforded a fair opportunity of hearing and that the proceedings were conducted in accordance with the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975. Finding no error apparent on the face of the record or new evidence, the Court dismissed the review petition as meritless.

  Questions settled

  • Does the institution of disciplinary proceedings against a pensioner under Rule 1.8(b) of the Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules require the service of notice within one year, or merely the commencement of the proceedings?
  • Under what circumstances is a review petition competent before the Supreme Court?
  • Is a review petition maintainable if a judgment is sustainable on other grounds despite an erroneous assumption of facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Qamar Iqbal Rizvi vs Government of Punjab and another2003 PLC (C.S.) 569 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2000-04-01
  civil servantmisconductfinancial irregularitiesremoval from serviceservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, was directed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal against his removal from service. The petitioner, employed as Administrator/District Sports Organizer, faced departmental proceedings under the Punjab Civil Servants (E&D) Rules of 1975 for financial irregularities, leading to a major penalty of removal from service imposed by the competent authority. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal's judgment was rendered without proper examination of the record and whether the petitioner's admitted financial irregularities constituted misconduct warranting removal. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's admission of making payments without prior approval and sanction constituted misconduct under the relevant rules, and found no factual or legal defect in the departmental order or the Tribunal's judgment. The Court established that unauthorized financial disbursements by a civil servant without proper sanction constitute actionable misconduct under the disciplinary rules, justifying the penalty of removal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether making payments without prior approval and sanction of competent authority constitutes misconduct under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1975?
  • Can a civil servant claim protection for financial irregularities committed on oral directions without written approval?
  • Whether a service tribunal's judgment dismissing an appeal against removal from service is sustainable when departmental proceedings and inquiry reports establish the charges?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Qadir Bakhsh Shah and others vs Additional District Judge, Dera2004 SCMR 1638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-07-06
  rejection of plaintpendente lite purchaserscaveat emptorappellate jurisdictiondeclaratory suitbinding judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment dismissing a writ petition which had upheld the rejection of a plaint in a declaratory suit filed by the petitioners challenging previous judicial decrees, a Supreme Court judgment, and consequential mutations. The core legal questions involved whether an order passed by a District Judge in revisional jurisdiction rejecting a plaint is appealable under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether purchasers of property pendente lite are bound by a prior judgment of the Supreme Court under the doctrine of caveat emptor. The Supreme Court held that an appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 only lies where the lower court exercised original jurisdiction, not revisional jurisdiction, but nevertheless dismissed the petition on the merits, holding that purchasers pendente lite who acquire property while litigation is pending before the Supreme Court are bound by the judgment and cannot challenge it through a fresh declaratory suit. The key principles laid down are that the maintainability of an appeal under section 96 depends on the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the lower court, and that pendente lite purchasers are bound by the final outcome of ongoing litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by a District Judge in revisional jurisdiction is appealable under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Are purchasers of property during the pendency of an appeal before the Supreme Court bound by the final judgment under the principle of caveat emptor?
  • Can a party challenge a binding Supreme Court judgment through a subsequent declaratory suit after purchasing the property pendente lite?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Zahir Shah vs Muhammad Anwar and 4 others2003 PLC (C.S.) 1195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-03-11
  service lawirregular appointmentcodal formalitiesrecruitment procedureback-benefitsservice tribunalselection committee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the N.W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which reinstated a respondent as a Junior Clerk with full back-benefits after his termination. The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s direct appointment as a Junior Clerk, made without observing mandatory recruitment formalities, was valid compared to the respondent, who possessed superior qualifications and long-standing service experience as a Sap Clerk. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s appointment, made without following codal formalities or advertising the post, was irregular, whereas the respondent was a better candidate with superior qualifications and extensive experience. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no legal infirmity in the Tribunal's judgment or any substantial question of law of public importance requiring interference. The key principle laid down is that appointments to government posts must strictly adhere to prescribed recruitment procedures, including the advertisement of vacancies and selection through a Departmental Promotion and Selection Committee, and that irregular appointments made in violation of these rules cannot be sustained against candidates with superior credentials.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government appointment made without observing mandatory codal formalities and public advertisement be sustained?
  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 to interfere in service matters absent a substantial question of law of public importance?
  • Is an employee with superior qualifications and long-standing experience entitled to preference over a candidate appointed irregularly?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Umer Shah vs Bashir Ahmed2004 SCMR 1859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-07-08
  rule of courtarbitration awardconcurrent findings of facthandwriting expertexpert evidenceforgeryleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the dismissal of the petitioner's revision petition by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, confirming the concurrent dismissals by two lower courts. The core legal matter involved the petitioner's application to make an out-of-court arbitration award a rule of the court, which the respondent resisted on grounds of fraud, claiming the petitioner was merely a tenant who forged the arbitration agreement and award. The primary issues were whether a valid arbitration reference existed and whether expert handwriting opinion should override strong factual evidence to the contrary. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of fact that no dispute was ever referred to arbitration and that the documents were forged. The Court held that an opinion of a Handwriting Expert is a weak piece of evidence and cannot prevail against compelling circumstantial and direct evidence indicating the contrary. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a favourable opinion of a Handwriting Expert prevail over strong factual evidence and circumstances to the contrary?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by three courts regarding the forgery of an arbitration agreement?
  • Can an out-of-court arbitration award be made a rule of the court if the underlying arbitration agreement is proved to be forged and fraudulent?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Iqbal Jafri vs Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore2004 PLJ SC 59 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-12-01
  departmental inquirydouble jeopardycivil servantmisconductcriminal acquittalservice disciplinejudicial officer
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an ex-Civil Judge, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his service appeal by the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal. The petitioner had been arrested in the UK for drug smuggling, initially convicted, and subsequently acquitted on appeal. Following his acquittal, he was reinstated but later subjected to a departmental inquiry regarding his conduct, leading to his dismissal from service. The core legal question was whether a departmental inquiry is maintainable against a civil servant after their acquittal in criminal proceedings, and whether such an inquiry constitutes double jeopardy under the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that departmental disciplinary proceedings are distinct from criminal trials, as the former concerns service discipline and the latter enforces criminal liability. The Court affirmed that acquittal in a criminal court does not bar departmental proceedings, as they are not coextensive. The principle laid down is that a judicial trial is not a substitute for a departmental inquiry, and competent authorities possess the discretion to initiate disciplinary action regardless of a criminal acquittal, particularly when the conduct involves serious allegations impairing the reputation of the judiciary.

  Questions settled

  • Does a criminal acquittal bar a subsequent departmental inquiry against a civil servant?
  • Are departmental disciplinary proceedings and criminal trials coextensive?
  • Does initiating a departmental inquiry after a criminal acquittal constitute double jeopardy under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Mohsin Raza Bukhari and otherss vs Syed Gulzar Hussain Kazmi2004 PLD Supreme Court 520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  oral giftmarz-ul-mautinheritancegift validityIslamic law of giftappreciation of evidencepreferential gift
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the validity of an oral gift of a bungalow made by a father to his daughter, which the appellants (other siblings) challenged as void, alleging it was executed during marz-ul-maut (death illness). The core legal questions were whether the factum of the oral gift was sufficiently proven and whether the donor was suffering from marz-ul-maut at the time of the transfer. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions, finding that the respondents provided credible evidence, including an acknowledgment of the disposition of property and consistent witness testimony, to establish the gift. Regarding marz-ul-maut, the Court held that the appellants failed to produce cogent medical or other evidence demonstrating that the donor was apprehending imminent death. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the principle that under Islamic Law, a father is competent to prefer one heir over others in a gift, and such a preferential transfer is not void. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, as the findings of the lower courts were supported by the evidence on record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a father validly gift property to one heir to the exclusion of others under Islamic law?
  • What evidence is required to establish the doctrine of marz-ul-maut in the context of a gift?
  • Does the failure of a court to discuss evidence in detail constitute a violation of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Match Company Ltd. through Managing Director vs Authority2003 PLC 395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-04-07
  Payment of Wages ActConstitutional jurisdictionStatutory remedyWrit petitionBeneficial legislationAppellate remedyLabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions filed by Syed Match Company Ltd. challenging a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed its writ petitions regarding claims for wages and compensation filed by workers under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The Company sought to bypass the statutory appellate remedy provided under Section 17 of the Act, which requires the deposit of the awarded amount as a condition precedent for filing an appeal. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to entertain a challenge to the Authority's order when the statutory remedy of appeal had not been exhausted. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly dismissed the petitions, noting that the Company invoked constitutional jurisdiction primarily to circumvent the mandatory deposit requirement of Section 17(1)(a). The Court affirmed that the Payment of Wages Act is beneficial legislation intended to protect workers, and parties cannot bypass statutory remedies to defeat legislative intent. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal and set aside the High Court's observation allowing the Company to file a time-barred appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to bypass the mandatory deposit requirement for an appeal under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936?
  • Is the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, considered beneficial legislation that must be construed to advance the remedy provided to workers?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to pre-emptively decide the issue of limitation for an appeal that has not yet been filed before the appropriate appellate forum?
  • Can a writ petition be entertained against an order of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, solely on the ground that the claim amount is allegedly exaggerated?
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• Syed Khalil-Ur-Rehman Chishti vs Abdul Hamid Khan2004 SCMR 838 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-04-03
  pre-emptionexchange of landburden of proofconcurrent findingscivil revisionnature of transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the dismissal of a civil revision petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts regarding a pre-emption suit. The petitioner sought to pre-empt a land transaction, alleging that an ostensible exchange of land was, in reality, a sale designed to defeat his right of pre-emption. The core legal question was whether the transaction constituted a sale or a genuine exchange, and whether the petitioner had successfully discharged the burden of proof to establish it as a sale. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to lead credible evidence to substantiate the claim of a sale. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that the authenticity of an exchange cannot be doubted or recharacterized as a sale based merely on conjectures regarding the disparity in the size of the land parcels exchanged. The principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding the nature of a transaction will not be interfered with in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary.

  Questions settled

  • Can a transaction of exchange be recharacterized as a sale solely based on the disparity in the size of the land parcels exchanged?
  • Is a party entitled to challenge concurrent findings of fact in a civil revision petition without presenting substantial evidence to the contrary?
  • Does the presumption under Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 mandate that an exchange of land be treated as a sale in the absence of evidence?
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• Syed Javed Iqbal Shah vs The Secretary Education and others2004 PLC (C.S.) 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-05-05
  service lawillegal appointmentvoid ab initiodisciplinary inquiryout of merit appointmentservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a PTC teacher, challenged his removal from service, which followed disciplinary action based on allegations that his appointment was procured out of merit and against a non-existing vacancy. The Punjab Service Tribunal had previously upheld the termination. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that his appointment was made by the competent authority, was not politically motivated, and that his termination without a formal inquiry constituted a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court examined the record and found that the petitioner was at Serial No. 68 for 58 allocated vacancies, meaning no vacancy existed for him. The Court held that the appointment was secured through the connivance of departmental officials and was therefore illegal and void ab initio. The Court further ruled that because the illegality was apparent from the record, a formal inquiry was not required. Finding no question of law of public importance, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as meritless, affirming the findings of the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appointment made against a non-existing vacancy be considered void ab initio?
  • Is a formal disciplinary inquiry mandatory when the illegality of an appointment is apparent from the record?
  • Does an appointment procured through the connivance of officials justify termination without a full inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Imam Shah and otherss vs Government of N.-W.F.P. and others2004 PLD Supreme Court 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-12-17
  direct recruitmentpromotionstatutory rulesprevalent practicevested rightterms and conditions of serviceuniversity service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' writ petition. The petitioners challenged a notification advertising vacant posts of Superintendent for direct recruitment, contending that the vacancies should have been filled via promotion in accordance with a prevalent practice that had allegedly attained the status of a rule. They further argued that the notification lacked the Chancellor's prior approval under Section 27 of the University of Peshawar Act, 1974. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that 'practice' and 'rule' are distinct, non-interchangeable terms. The Court ruled that a practice, characterized by uniformity and continuity, cannot mature into a statutory rule, which requires formal enactment and promulgation by a competent authority. Since no new statute was framed, the Chancellor's approval was unnecessary. Additionally, the Court held that the prescribed qualification for a post does not equate to the terms and conditions of service, and appointment to a post is not a vested legal right.

  Questions settled

  • Can a long-standing administrative practice within a statutory body attain the status of a statutory rule?
  • Whether the prescribed qualifications for initial recruitment to a post equate to the terms and conditions of service of an employee?
  • Is an employee's expectation of appointment or promotion to a particular post a vested legal right?
  • Does a change in the method of recruitment from promotion to direct recruitment require the prior approval of the Chancellor if no new statute is framed?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Imam Shah and others vs Government of N.W.F.P. and others2004 PLJ SC 719 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-12-17
  University of Peshawarstatutory rules versus practiceappointment of superintendentspowers of Vice-ChancellorChancellor's approvalterms and conditions of servicepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition regarding the filling of vacant Superintendent posts in the University of Peshawar. The vacancies were advertised for initial recruitment, whereas the petitioners contended they should have been filled by promotion based on a prevalent practice that had attained the status of a rule, requiring the Chancellor's prior approval under Section 27 of the University of Peshawar Act, 1974. The core legal question was whether a prolonged administrative practice can acquire the status of a statutory rule and restrict the competent authority's power to make direct appointments. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that 'practice' and 'rule' are distinct concepts; a practice lacks the binding statutory character of a rule and does not require the Chancellor's approval unless a formal statute is enacted. The Court laid down the principle that a prevalent practice cannot mature into a statutory rule by efflux of time, and the appointing authority retains the discretion to alter administrative practices in the interest of good governance, provided appointments comply with the governing statutes and merit criteria.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a prolonged administrative practice can attain the status of a statutory rule?
  • Does the Chancellor's prior approval under Section 27 of the University of Peshawar Act, 1974 apply to initial direct appointments?
  • Are 'practice' and 'rule' interchangeable terms in administrative and service law?
  • Does an employee have a vested or legal right to enforce a prior administrative practice regarding appointments?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Imam Shah and others vs Government of N.-W.F.P. and others2004 PLC (C.S.) 867 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-12-17
  service lawuniversity employeesstatutory rulesadministrative practicedirect recruitmentpromotionpowers of Vice-Chancellor
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition challenging the initial recruitment and direct appointments of Superintendents at the University of Peshawar instead of filling them by promotion based on a prevalent practice. The core legal question was whether a prevalent administrative practice could attain the status of a rule requiring prior approval of the Chancellor, and whether direct appointments made in deviation of such practice were illegal. The Supreme Court held that 'practice' and 'rule' are distinct concepts; a mere administrative practice cannot be equated with statutory rules, does not create a vested or legal right, and cannot restrict the competent authority from making direct appointments in accordance with the University of Peshawar Act, 1974 and the University of Peshawar Service Statutes, 1977. The key principle laid down is that administrative practice and statutory rules are neither interchangeable nor synonymous, and a practice cannot attain the binding status of a rule by efflux of time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an administrative practice can attain the status of a binding statutory rule by efflux of time?
  • Does a prevalent practice regarding the filling of vacancies create a vested or legal right that can be enforced through a court of law?
  • Are the terms 'practice' and 'rule' interchangeable in the context of service laws and university statutes?
  • Does section 27 of the University of Peshawar Act, 1974 require prior approval of the Chancellor for making fresh appointments?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ikhlaq Ahmed vs Administrator (Residual Properties)/ Additional2004 SCMR 413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-11-19
  ejectmentsublettingnecessary partyleave to appealtenancynon-impleadmentrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding an ejectment order passed by a Rent Controller. The core legal question was whether an occupant of rented premises, who was not the original tenant, could maintain an appeal against an ejectment order without impleading the original tenant as a necessary party, and whether such an occupant could resist ejectment without proof of an independent tenancy. The Supreme Court held that the original tenant is a necessary party in such proceedings, and failure to implead them renders the appeal incompetent. Furthermore, in the absence of evidence proving the delivery of possession by the original tenant with the landlord's permission or an acknowledgement of the occupant's status as a tenant by the landlord, the occupant is deemed to be in possession through the original tenant and lacks an independent right to retain the premises. The Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the appeal, ruling that the occupant had failed to establish a valid tenancy.

  Questions settled

  • Is the original tenant a necessary party in an appeal filed by an occupant against an ejectment order?
  • Can an occupant of premises resist an ejectment petition without proof of an independent tenancy or landlord's acknowledgement?
  • Does the failure to implead the original tenant in an appeal against an ejectment order render the appeal incompetent?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ibrar Shah vs Commissioner, Kohat Division and others2004 PLD Supreme Court 907 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-04-22
  Frontier Crimes RegulationPolitical AgentjurisdictionTribal AreaCouncil of EldersJirgawrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the appellant's writ petition. The core legal controversy concerns whether the Assistant Political Agent validly assumed jurisdiction under section 8 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901, to adjudicate a monetary dispute arising from the sale of a motor car, and whether the provisions of the said regulation applied to the parties. The Supreme Court held that the Political Agent rightly assumed jurisdiction under section 8 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901, as both parties belonged to the tribal area, the appellant had repeatedly consented to and participated in the Jirga proceedings, and the appellant could not selectively invoke and abandon forums of his own choice after having previously withdrawn his writ petition and surrendered to the jurisdiction. The Court laid down that jurisdiction under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901, is properly exercisable when the parties belong to a frontier tribe and the statutory conditions are met, and parties cannot approbate and reprobate by submitting to a forum and subsequently challenging its competence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Political Agent has the jurisdiction under section 8 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 to take cognizance of a dispute where the parties belong to a tribal area?
  • Can a party challenge the jurisdiction of a forum after voluntarily consenting to and participating in proceedings before a Council of Elders?
  • Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court is barred under Article 247(7) of the Constitution in matters pertaining to tribal areas?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Farasat Ali Shah vs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and others2003 CLD 952 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-05-07
  banking tribunalexecution proceedingscoram non judicewrit petitionleave to appealdecree execution
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had challenged the execution of a decree passed by a Banking Tribunal. The petitioner contended that because a previous Full Bench judgment of the Lahore High Court had declared certain provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, unconstitutional, the decree passed against him by the Tribunal was rendered coram non judice and thus unenforceable. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner had failed to file an appeal against the original decree passed in 1993. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner's reliance on the Full Bench judgment was misplaced, as the Supreme Court had previously affirmed the validity of execution proceedings in similar circumstances in Soneri Bank Limited v. Raja Weaving Mills Limited. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner did not challenge the original decree through the provided appellate mechanism, the respondent-Bank was entitled to proceed with execution. The petition was dismissed, affirming that the execution proceedings were legally sound.

  Questions settled

  • Can a judgment debtor challenge the execution of a decree on the grounds that the tribunal which passed it was later declared unconstitutional, if the debtor failed to file an appeal against the original decree?
  • Does the declaration of certain provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, as unconstitutional by a High Court automatically render all prior decrees passed by such tribunals coram non judice?
  • Are execution proceedings maintainable against a judgment debtor who failed to challenge the underlying decree through the appellate process provided by the governing statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ali Shah Bukhari vs Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, Lahore and another2004 PLD Supreme Court 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-09-25
  compulsory retirementdouble jeopardydisciplinary proceedingsmisconductcorruptionservice lawAnti-Corruption Establishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which upheld the compulsory retirement of a Deputy District Attorney for misconduct and corruption. The core legal question was whether disciplinary proceedings initiated under the Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, were barred by the principle of double jeopardy, given that a previous inquiry by the Anti-Corruption Establishment regarding the same allegations had been dropped. The Supreme Court held that the prior investigation by the Anti-Corruption Establishment was an independent process and did not constitute a final adjudication of innocence by a competent authority. Consequently, the subsequent disciplinary inquiry under the Ordinance was legally valid and not subject to the rule of double jeopardy. The Court affirmed that disciplinary proceedings are not precluded by prior dropped investigations that lack a final finding of not guilty. Finding no legal or factual infirmity in the impugned orders, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the compulsory retirement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of double jeopardy apply to disciplinary proceedings where a prior investigation by the Anti-Corruption Establishment was dropped?
  • Can a competent authority initiate disciplinary proceedings under the Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, after a separate agency has dropped an inquiry into the same facts?
  • Does an inquiry dropped by the Anti-Corruption Establishment constitute a final finding of not guilty for the purposes of disciplinary law?
  Read full judgment →
• Supreme Court Bar Association Of Pakistan vs Federation Of Pakistan And OtherK.L.R. 2004 S.C. 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-10-28
  review petitionappointment of judgescontempt of courtjudicial restraintre-hearingindependence of judiciary
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed by the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan against the Supreme Court's order dated April 10, 2002, which had dismissed their constitutional petition challenging the appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. During the proceedings, the petitioner's counsel declined to argue the review petition and submitted an application containing disparaging remarks against the judiciary. The Supreme Court observed that the contents of the application constituted gross contempt of court, but exercised judicial restraint from initiating immediate contempt proceedings in the interest of the institution, ordering instead that the scandalous paragraphs be struck off. On the merits of the review petition, the Court held that all points raised had already been comprehensively addressed in the original judgment. Emphasizing that a review petition cannot be used as a garb for re-hearing a matter, and finding no grounds for interference, the Supreme Court dismissed the review petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party seek a re-hearing of a matter under the garb of a review petition when the points raised have already been decided?
  • What is the appropriate course of action for the Court when a counsel submits an application containing scandalous and disparaging remarks against the judiciary?
  • Does the refusal of counsel to argue a review petition on political or extraneous grounds justify the reopening of decided constitutional issues?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Hussain vs National Bank of Pakistan and 2 others2003 PLC (C.S.) 1247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-09-27
  service appealmisconductembezzlementfinancial institutionbreach of trustFederal Service Tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973) against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld the dismissal of the petitioner from service. The petitioner, an employee of the National Bank of Pakistan, was dismissed following an inquiry that found him guilty of financial irregularities, embezzlement, and fraudulent encashment of a cheque, alongside misappropriation of utility bills under the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules. The core legal question addressed was whether the subsequent return of the fraudulently withdrawn amount to the account holder absolved the employee of the charge of misconduct and embezzlement. The Supreme Court held that the return of the funds does not exonerate the employee from misconduct, as employees of financial institutions must maintain a standard of conduct that is strictly above board, and temporary dishonest use of funds constitutes both misconduct and a criminal offense regardless of subsequent restitution. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused, laying down the principle that restitution of embezzled funds does not cure the foundational breach of trust in banking service.

  Questions settled

  • Does the subsequent return of fraudulently withdrawn funds absolve a bank employee of the charge of misconduct?
  • Is temporary dishonest use of private property for personal gain considered misconduct for employees of financial institutions?
  • Whether an inquiry officer's finding of guilt in a departmental proceeding warrants interference when fair opportunity was afforded?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Ali through Abdul Ghafoor and others vs Khuda Bakhsh and others2004 SCMR 742 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-emption suitcourt-fee deficiencyrejection of plaintprocedural inactioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a Regular Second Appeal regarding the rejection of a plaint in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the respondents failed to make up the deficiency in court-fee within the prescribed time, thereby warranting the rejection of their plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the trial court had not issued any specific order directing the respondents to make up the deficiency in court-fee. Consequently, the respondents could not be penalized for the trial court's inaction. The First Appellate Court had correctly allowed the respondents to deposit the deficient court-fee, a directive with which they complied. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, establishing the principle that a party cannot be made to suffer for the inaction of the court in failing to order the payment of deficient court-fee.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaint be rejected for non-payment of court-fee if the trial court failed to order the plaintiff to make up the deficiency?
  • Is a party liable to suffer for the inaction of the trial court regarding the payment of court-fee?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Ahmed vs Additional Sessions Judge-I, Mianwali and 2 others2004 PLD Supreme Court 758 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-05-07
  juvenile offenderdetermination of agechild definitionmedical reportossification testjuvenile justice system ordinanceqatl-i-amddeath penalty exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by the complainant challenged orders passed by the trial court and the High Court which had accepted the accused person's claim of being a child under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, thereby exempting him from the death penalty for murder. The core legal question concerned the proper procedure and standard of proof for determining an accused person's age when documentary evidence is seriously disputed by the opposing party. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that both lower courts erred in blindly accepting conflicting certificates and police records without inquiry, and in refusing a medical board examination. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision, laying down authoritative guidelines: courts must initiate an age inquiry whenever the question arises regardless of whether it is formally raised; inquiries must thoroughly test documentary veracity; medical reports including ossification tests are a statutory component of such inquiries; and belated claims without justification invite adverse inferences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the determination of an accused person's age under section 7 of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, is dependent strictly upon the question being formally raised by a party to the proceedings?
  • Does an inquiry into the age of an accused person require mandatory inclusion of a medical report and ossification test?
  • Can a court rely solely on school leaving certificates and birth entries when their genuineness and consistency are seriously challenged by documentary counter-evidence?
  • What evidentiary value and reliance should be placed on an accused person's age as recorded in police records without proper investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Suleman Ali Haideri and another vs Government of Balochistan and others2004 PLJ SC 493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Article 184(3) jurisdictionseniority disputemaintainabilitypublic importancefundamental rightsres judicataservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves Constitution petitions filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan by two Deputy Superintendents of Police challenging their seniority status, which had been previously adjudicated by the Balochistan Service Tribunal and upheld by the Supreme Court. The core legal question is whether the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) can be invoked to address individual seniority grievances or to challenge a prior judgment of the Supreme Court. The Court held that the petitions are not maintainable. It reasoned that Article 184(3) jurisdiction is strictly limited to matters of public importance involving the enforcement of fundamental rights, which an individual seniority dispute does not constitute. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that a Bench of the Supreme Court cannot sit as an appellate court over the judgment of another Bench, nor can Article 184(3) be utilized to reopen matters already finally adjudicated under Article 185. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed as they sought to re-litigate settled issues.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution be invoked to resolve individual seniority grievances?
  • Is a Constitution petition under Article 184(3) maintainable to challenge a judgment previously rendered by another Bench of the Supreme Court?
  • Can Article 184(3) of the Constitution be used to reopen a matter already finally adjudicated upon under Article 185?
  • Does an individual seniority dispute constitute a matter of public importance involving the enforcement of fundamental rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Subhanuddin vs National Reconstruction Bureau through Chairman2004 PLD Supreme Court 125 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-11-06
  no-confidence motionlocal governmentstatutory compliancemandatory formalitiesmala fidelocus standiopportunity of hearing
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment regarding a no-confidence motion initiated against the petitioner. The core legal questions involve whether the motion could be validly passed without strict compliance with the statutory provisions of the N.-W.F.P. Local Government Ordinance, 2001, particularly given that Village and Neighborhood Councils had not yet been constituted. The Court also examines whether the notice served upon the petitioner was lawful, given the alleged failure to adhere to mandatory procedural requirements, and whether the petitioner was afforded a proper opportunity of hearing and defence as required by the Ordinance. Furthermore, the Court considers whether the repetition of a rejected no-confidence motion, allegedly influenced by local government officials lacking locus standi, was tainted by mala fide intentions. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, converting the petition into an appeal, while rejecting the request for interim relief due to the prevailing circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a no-confidence motion be passed without strict compliance with the procedural requirements of the N.-W.F.P. Local Government Ordinance, 2001?
  • Is the notice requirement under section 85(1) of the N.-W.F.P. Local Government Ordinance, 2001, mandatory or directory?
  • Does the repetition of a rejected no-confidence motion, allegedly influenced by officials lacking locus standi, constitute mala fide action?
  • Must a petitioner be afforded a proper opportunity of hearing and defence as envisaged in section 85(6) of the N.-W.F.P. Local Government Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Subedar Manzoor Hussain (deceased) through LRs, vs Mst. Mehmooda Begum (deceased) through LRs,2004 PLJ SC 439 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  agreement to selltransfer of propertybureaucratic allotmentdefective titlepossession suitbona fide purchasersubsequent purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Article 185(2)(d) and (e) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had decreed a suit for possession filed by the respondents' predecessor-in-interest. The core legal question concerned whether an allottee holding merely under an agreement to sell containing a prohibitory clause against alienation could lawfully transfer title to a third party before execution of a formal sale-deed and acquisition of proprietary rights. The Supreme Court held that an agreement to sell does not create any interest in or charge on immovable property under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, and a transfer violating a prohibitory clause is unlawful and void under Section 6(h) of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 read with Section 23 of the Contract Act 1872. Consequently, the Court ruled that the plaintiff-respondent derived no valid title from the defective chain and allowed the appeal, dismissing the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement to sell creates any interest in or charge on immovable property?
  • Can a person transfer absolute proprietary rights in a property on the basis of an agreement to sell when a prohibitory clause bars alienation?
  • Does a subsequent acquisition of title by a vendor rectify a prior invalid sale-deed executed when the vendor had no proprietary rights?
  • Whether a transfer made in violation of statutory provisions or contractual prohibitions is lawful under Section 6(h) of the Transfer of Property Act?
  Read full judgment →
• State vs Muhammad Shafique alias Pappo and another2004 PLJ SC 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-09-08
  explosive substancesillegal weaponsrecovery witnessjudicial confessionpolice encounteracquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had set aside the conviction and death sentence of the respondents and dismissed the State's appeal in a case concerning alleged recovery of weapons, explosives, and anti-state activities. The core legal questions involved the proper scrutiny of evidence regarding the alleged recovery of explosive substances from premises not proven to be in the possession or control of the accused, the reliability of recovery witnesses, and the voluntariness of judicial confessions made after prolonged police custody. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the prosecution failed to establish the recovery through unimpeachable evidence, noting that the house owner's testimony negated the accused's occupation, the recovery witness was a stock witness, and the confessions were suspect given the circumstances of police custody. The court laid down the principle that the seriousness of a charge does not absolve the prosecution from proving its case beyond reasonable doubt, and individual liberty cannot be curtailed on presumptive grounds or tainted recoveries.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's acquittal based on doubtful recovery and uncorroborated evidence warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can a conviction under the Explosive Substance Act, 1908 be sustained when the prosecution fails to prove the accused's possession or control over the premises from where recoveries were allegedly made?
  • Whether judicial confessions obtained after prolonged police custody and under threats of fake police encounters can be relied upon to convict an accused?
  Read full judgment →
• State vs Khuda Dad and others2004 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-04-25
  acquittalleave to appealabductionzinaappraisal of evidencecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal matter arises from petitions filed by the State seeking leave to appeal against the acquittal of respondents Khuda Dad and Khalid Javed from charges under sections 11 and 13 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, following a judgment by the Federal Shariat Court which had set aside the conviction of Khuda Dad under sections 11 and 13 while maintaining his conviction under section 16. The core legal questions involve whether the lower appellate court erred in acquitting the respondents of abduction and related charges, and whether interference with an acquittal is warranted where the findings are based on a proper appraisal of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the essential ingredients of abduction or forced prostitution, noting discrepancies in ocular testimony and the non-recovery of the abductee, and that a judgment of acquittal cannot be interfered with unless it is perverse, arbitrary, or capricious. The key principle laid down is that the criteria for deciding an appeal against acquittal differ significantly from an appeal against conviction, and an acquittal will not be disturbed in the absence of perversity or arbitrariness.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acquittal judgment can be interfered with when it is based on a proper appraisal of evidence and does not suffer from perversity?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to prove the charge of abduction under section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can a conviction for abduction be sustained solely on the basis of discrepancies in the statements of ocular witnesses and the non-recovery of the alleged abductee?
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• State Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Corporation Limited vs Lateef Siddiqui and 2 others2004 SCMR 644 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2001-08-01
  service lawcompulsory retirementdismissal from servicemaster and servantFederal Service Tribunalproportionality of punishmentnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-petitions filed by State Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Corporation Limited and Dr. Lateef Siddiqui against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal. The Tribunal had modified the employee's dismissal from service to compulsory retirement, despite acknowledging findings of financial misappropriation and plundering of funds. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the Tribunal, having found serious charges of misconduct proven and acknowledging the master-servant relationship, possessed the jurisdiction to convert a dismissal order into compulsory retirement, particularly when the Corporation's Service Rules allegedly lacked a provision for such a penalty. Furthermore, the Court must determine if the Tribunal erred in its application of the law regarding the proportionality of punishment and the requirements of natural justice. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these contentions, specifically whether the Tribunal overstepped its jurisdiction by altering the penalty without setting aside the original dismissal order or establishing a nexus between the findings and the substituted punishment. The operation of the impugned judgment was suspended pending the final adjudication of these issues.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal convert an order of dismissal from service into compulsory retirement if the relevant Service Rules do not provide for such a penalty?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to modify a penalty without setting aside the original dismissal order?
  • Is the Federal Service Tribunal empowered to alter a punishment where the master-servant relationship exists and serious charges of misconduct have been proven?
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• State of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Deputy Attorney-General2003 PTD 675 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  quashing of criminal proceedingsabuse of processCustoms Actadmissibility of evidencepartial quashmentcriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court of Sindh judgment that quashed criminal proceedings against the respondents under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal questions were whether the High Court’s order quashing the proceedings was sustainable in law and facts, and whether partial quashment of proceedings is permissible. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction. The Court found that the prosecution failed to produce incriminating evidence, failed to examine the primary complainant, and failed to produce the case property despite multiple opportunities. The Court affirmed that criminal proceedings may be quashed where there is no reasonable possibility of conviction, as continuing such a trial would constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that convictions cannot be sustained on mere suspicion or conjecture, and that statements made by co-accused during investigation are generally inadmissible. Consequently, the High Court’s decision to terminate the proceedings was upheld as legally sound and justified by the lack of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if there is no possibility of conviction?
  • Is partial quashment of criminal proceedings permissible in law?
  • Can a conviction be based on the statement of a co-accused made during the investigation?
  • Does the failure to produce case property and examine material witnesses justify the quashment of criminal proceedings?
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• State Life Insurance Corporation vs Mst. Nusrat Imtiaz and others2004 SCMR 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-04-29
  adverse possessionencroachmentland disputeWafaqi Mohtasibstate-run organizationproperty rightswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over land ownership between the State Life Insurance Corporation and private respondents. The Corporation, which owned a large property in Khasra No. 3204, encroached upon an adjacent, smaller plot owned by the respondents in Khasra No. 3205. The respondents successfully sought relief from the Wafaqi Mohtasib, who ordered the Corporation to vacate the land. Although the President of Pakistan initially accepted the Corporation's representation against this order, the Lahore High Court subsequently set aside that decision in a writ petition. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the petitions filed by the Corporation, noted that the Corporation did not deny that the disputed land fell outside its own property boundaries and within the respondents' Khasra number. The Court expressed strong disapproval of a state-run organization encroaching upon private property and attempting to claim ownership through adverse possession against small landowners. Finding no legal or factual infirmity in the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, effectively upholding the order for the Corporation to vacate the usurped land.

  Questions settled

  • Can a state-run organization claim ownership of private land through adverse possession?
  • Is a High Court order directing a state entity to vacate encroached land sustainable when the entity admits the land falls outside its own property boundaries?
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• State Bank of Pakistan vs Khyber Zaman and others2004 PLJ SC 785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-06-10
  Golden Handshake SchemeBenevolent Fund GrantService TribunalRetrospective applicationApprobate and reprobateTime-barredVoluntary retirementContractual interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a Federal Service Tribunal judgment regarding the entitlement of retired State Bank of Pakistan employees to increased Benevolent Fund Grant (BFG) benefits following their retirement under a "Golden Handshake Scheme" (GHSS). The core legal question was whether employees who accepted the lump sum BFG provided under the GHSS were also entitled to claim increased monthly BFG rates introduced by a subsequent circular, and whether their claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the GHSS was a voluntary, irrevocable contract where the lump sum payment substituted the normal monthly BFG entitlement; thus, employees could not claim both. The Court ruled that the subsequent circular lacked retrospective application to those already retired under the GHSS. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that employees cannot approbate and reprobate by accepting scheme benefits while challenging its terms years later. Consequently, the claims were dismissed as meritless and time-barred, establishing that administrative circulars cannot be applied retrospectively to retired employees, and that voluntary retirement schemes constitute binding contracts that preclude simultaneous claims under superseded rules.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee who has accepted the benefits of a voluntary golden handshake scheme simultaneously claim benefits under subsequent administrative circulars?
  • Does a voluntary retirement scheme constitute a binding contract that precludes an employee from claiming additional benefits under superseded rules?
  • Can an administrative circular regarding benevolent fund grants be applied retrospectively to employees who retired prior to its issuance?
  • Is an appeal before a Service Tribunal competent if the underlying departmental appeal was time-barred?
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• Son. LDR. Farooq Janjua vs Secretary, M/O Defence and others2004 PLC (C.S.) 612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-06-04
  senioritydeputationpermanent absorptionCivil Aviation Authorityservice appealcontract servicedepartmental remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals filed by former Pakistan Air Force officers against judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding their seniority and promotion upon permanent absorption into the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). The core legal question was whether these officers were entitled to seniority from the date they commenced deputation or from the date of their formal, permanent induction into the CAA. The Supreme Court held that seniority must be reckoned from the date of regular appointment or permanent absorption, rather than the initial date of deputation. The Court affirmed that contract service does not confer seniority over employees already serving in a permanent capacity. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that service appeals are not maintainable if the aggrieved party fails to exhaust departmental remedies. The key principle laid down is that in the absence of specific rules to the contrary, seniority for employees absorbed by transfer is determined by the date of regular appointment to the post, and contract periods cannot be retrospectively counted to supersede the seniority of existing permanent staff.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil servant absorbed into a new department entitled to seniority from the date of their initial deputation or the date of regular appointment?
  • Does the period of service rendered on a contract basis count towards seniority against employees already serving in a permanent capacity?
  • Is a service appeal maintainable before the Federal Service Tribunal if the aggrieved party has not exhausted departmental remedies?
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• Sindh Agriculture University Tandojam, through V.C vs Muhammad2004 PLC (C.S.) 1409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-04-05
  date of birthsuperannuationservice appealmisconstruction of evidenceleave to appealprimary evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had allowed a service appeal regarding the determination of a public servant's date of birth. The respondent, an employee of the Sindh Agriculture University, challenged his retirement date, claiming his date of birth was 22-7-1948 rather than 22-7-1942, as recorded in his initial service documents. The University contended that the respondent's date of birth was 22-7-1942, citing his Matriculation certificate, Annual Confidential Reports, and Pakistan Engineering Council registration. The Tribunal had ruled in favor of the respondent, accepting his claimed date of birth. The petitioner University argued that the Tribunal misconstrued primary evidence, such as the Matriculation certificate and self-filled ACRs, while relying on documents allegedly manipulated by the respondent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the Tribunal was justified in its evidentiary scrutiny and whether it misconstrued the evidence and misinterpreted the relevant service rules regarding the determination of the date of birth for superannuation purposes.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Matriculation certificate considered primary evidence for determining the date of birth of a public servant?
  • Can a service tribunal re-evaluate the date of birth of an employee based on documents produced after the issuance of a retirement notice?
  • Does the misconstruction of documentary evidence by a service tribunal constitute valid grounds for granting leave to appeal?
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• Siddique Woollen Mills and others vs Allied Bank of Pakistan2003 CLD 1033 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2001-07-03
  banking recoveryleave to defendbona fide disputefinancial liabilitysummary proceedingsbanking court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld a Banking Court decree against the petitioners for the recovery of Rs. 22,12,374. The petitioners, who had availed credit facilities from the respondent bank, did not deny their financial liability but argued that the suit should have been dismissed because the bank had allegedly retained their imported goods, causing them financial losses exceeding the claimed amount. The Supreme Court examined whether this allegation constituted a valid defense to the recovery suit. The Court held that the petitioners' claim of loss due to the bank's conduct did not constitute a bona fide dispute regarding the admitted liability and could not be adjudicated within the summary proceedings of a Banking Court. The Court affirmed that under Section 10 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, a Banking Court only entertains defenses that disclose a bona fide dispute. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the alleged losses were a separate matter to be pursued in an appropriate forum.

  Questions settled

  • Can a borrower raise a claim of independent loss caused by a bank as a defense in a suit for recovery of loans?
  • What is the scope of a Banking Court's jurisdiction under Section 10 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 regarding the defense of a borrower?
  • Does the failure to deny financial liability in an application for leave to defend preclude a borrower from contesting the suit on other grounds?
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• Shipyard K. Damen International vs Karachi Shipyard and Engineering2003 CLD 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-07-11
  performance bank guaranteeinterim injunctionunconditional guaranteearbitrationindependent contractirretrievable injusticeestablished fraud
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions for leave to appeal arose from a High Court of Sindh judgment that affirmed a Single Judge’s refusal to grant interim injunctions restraining the respondent from encashing unconditional Performance Bank Guarantees. The core legal question was whether the encashment of an unconditional performance bank guarantee can be restrained by a court when there is an active dispute under the underlying contract that has been referred to arbitration. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petitions, holding that a performance bank guarantee is an autonomous, independent contract separate from the underlying agreement. The Court ruled that the bank's obligation to pay under an unconditional guarantee is absolute and must be honored free from judicial interference. The key principle laid down is that courts must not interfere with the enforcement of unconditional bank guarantees unless there is a clear, established fraud of which the bank has notice, or a strong prima facie case of irretrievable injustice. Extraneous claims, counter-claims, or pending arbitration proceedings regarding the underlying contract do not bar or postpone the enforcement of such guarantees.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a performance bank guarantee constitutes an independent contract separate from the underlying agreement between the parties?
  • Under what exceptional circumstances can a court grant an injunction to restrain the encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee?
  • Does the existence of a pending arbitration or contractual dispute between the parties bar or postpone the enforcement of an unconditional bank guarantee?
  • Can a guarantor rely on technicalities or conditions incorporated in the principal agreement to defeat the claim of a creditor under a contract of guarantee?
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• Sher Zaman Sher vs Jehanzeb Khan and others2004 PLD Supreme Court 505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-03-19
  election petitionjoint candidacydisqualificationnotorious disqualificationZilla Nazimdoctrine of sink or swimcasual vacancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an election dispute for the offices of Zilla Nazim and Naib Zilla Nazim, where the election was contested on a joint ticket. The core legal questions were whether the disqualification of one candidate invalidates the entire joint candidature and whether the runner-up can be declared the winner if the disqualification was not "notorious." The Supreme Court held that the election of the Zilla Nazim was void due to the submission of a forged matriculation certificate. Applying the doctrine of "sink or swim," the Court affirmed that the disqualification of one candidate in a joint-candidacy system invalidates the nomination of both, as they must possess statutory qualifications collectively. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the runner-up could not be declared the returned candidate because the disqualification of the successful candidate was not "notorious"—meaning it was not a matter of common public knowledge requiring no proof. The judgment reinforces that joint candidates share the same fate regarding disqualification and that a vacancy resulting from such disqualification is not a "casual vacancy."

  Questions settled

  • Does the disqualification of one candidate in a joint-candidacy election invalidate the nomination of the entire ticket?
  • Can a runner-up be declared the winner if the disqualification of the returned candidate was not 'notorious'?
  • Does a vacancy arising from the disqualification of a candidate by an Election Tribunal constitute a 'casual vacancy'?
  • Are joint candidates for local government offices required to possess statutory qualifications both individually and collectively?
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• Sher Zaman Sher and others vs Jehanzeb Khan and others2004 PLJ SC 463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-03-19
  joint candidacydoctrine of sinkernotorious disqualificationelection petitionZilla Nazimlocal government electioncasual vacancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an election dispute regarding the offices of Zilla Nazim and Naib Zilla Nazim, contested as joint candidates. The core legal questions were whether the disqualification of one candidate in a joint ticket invalidates the entire nomination under the doctrine of 'sink or swim,' and whether a runner-up can be declared the winner if the disqualification of the returned candidate was not 'notorious.' The Court held that under the joint candidacy system, candidates for Nazim and Naib Nazim must possess statutory qualifications both individually and collectively; the disqualification of one candidate invalidates the entire joint nomination. Relying on the doctrine of sinker, the Court affirmed that joint candidates share their fate regarding disqualification. Furthermore, the Court held that a runner-up cannot be declared elected unless the disqualification of the returned candidate was 'notorious'—meaning publicly known and requiring no evidence—which was not proven in this case. Consequently, the election of the returned candidate was voided, but the runner-up was not declared the winner, and the petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the disqualification of one candidate in a joint ticket invalidate the nomination of the entire pair?
  • Can a runner-up be declared the winner if the disqualification of the returned candidate was not notorious?
  • Does a vacancy caused by the disqualification of a candidate by an Election Tribunal constitute a casual vacancy?
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• Sher Muhammad and others vs Muhammad Khalid and others2004 SCMR 826 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-06-20
  adverse possessionrevenue recorddocumentary evidenceoral evidenceconcurrent findingscivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision and upheld the appellate judgment of the District Judge dismissing the petitioner's suit for a declaration of ownership based on adverse possession and permanent injunction. The core legal question revolved around whether oral evidence could override overwhelming documentary evidence in revenue records, especially when entries favoring the petitioner had been set aside by competent revenue authorities. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were based on sound documentary evidence and that oral evidence contrary to such records deserved no preference. The Court concluded that the judgments of the High Court and the lower appellate court suffered from no misreading or non-reading of evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, affirming the principle that documentary evidence in revenue records takes precedence over unsupported oral claims.

  Questions settled

  • Can oral evidence be given preference over overwhelming documentary evidence in revenue records?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts based on documentary evidence can be interfered with in civil revision?
  • Does a claim of adverse possession succeed without the support of consistent documentary revenue entries?
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• Sher Jang vs District Judge, Islamabad and 4 others2004 SCMR 1852 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-07-07
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentchange of ownershipnotice of transferlandlord and tenant relationshipcontumacious conductIslamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the leave of the Court arose from an ejectment order passed against the appellant-tenant on the ground of default in the payment of rent under the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether a tenant could be ordered to be evicted for default when the new landlords failed to issue a formal written notice of transfer of ownership under section 19 of the Ordinance, and whether the ejectment petition itself could serve as sufficient notice. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that even in the absence of a separate prior notice under section 19, the filing of an ejectment petition operates as sufficient notice to the tenant. The Court laid down the principle that a tenant who willfully denies the established relationship of landlord and tenant, fails to clear outstanding arrears upon notice, and acts contumaciously by not depositing rent as directed by the court is disentitled to statutory protection and equitable relief, thereby affirming the concurrent findings and the tenant's eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ejectment petition itself be considered a sufficient notice of transfer of ownership for the purposes of section 19 of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the failure to serve a prior notice under section 19 of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 vitiate an ejectment proceeding when the tenant has knowledge of the transfer?
  • Is a tenant who denies the relationship of landlord and tenant and fails to deposit rent as ordered entitled to discretionary relief against eviction?
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• Sher Afgan vs Sheikh Anjum Iqbal2004 PLJ SC 770 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2004-04-21
  evictiondefault in rentpersonal bona fide requirementrented premiseslandlord-tenant relationshipcommercial premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of an eviction application by the Rent Controller and the High Court of Sindh. The landlord sought the tenant's eviction on grounds of default in rent payment and personal bona fide requirement for commercial premises. The Supreme Court examined whether the tenant's failure to pay rent by the agreed quarterly dates constituted default and whether the landlord's personal need was established. The Court held that the tenant committed a wilful default by failing to pay rent, including water and conservancy charges, which are statutorily included in the definition of rent. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the lower courts erred in rejecting the landlord's claim of personal bona fide requirement based on speculative presumptions regarding his employment status and lack of business experience. The Court affirmed that the landlord’s intent to establish a business upon returning from abroad was sufficiently proven. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the lower courts' judgments were set aside, and the tenant was ordered to vacate the premises within one year.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of rent under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 include water and conservancy charges?
  • Can a tenant be evicted for default if they fail to pay rent by the date fixed by mutual agreement?
  • Does a landlord's current employment status or lack of prior business experience invalidate a claim of personal bona fide requirement for commercial premises?
  • Do the covenants of a tenancy agreement remain operative after the expiry of the agreement?
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• Sheikh Mukhtar and others vs The State2004 SCMR 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2000-12-18
  criminal breach of trustanti-corruptionillegal gratificationembezzlementleave to appealrecovery of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and sentences of the petitioners under sections 409, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, while reducing the sentence to the period already undergone due to the passage of time since the 1984 occurrence. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction based on the recovery of embezzled cement and tainted bribe money was sustainable and free from infirmity. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the factum of recovery of the embezzled cement bags and tainted money stood duly proved through the evidence on record and could not be discredited. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding the recovery of incriminating material, when supported by credible evidence, warrant no interference by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for embezzlement and corruption can be sustained when the recovery of incriminating material is proved on record?
  • Does an appellate court's reduction of sentence to the period already undergone preclude the Supreme Court from upholding the underlying conviction upon challenge?
  • Whether contradictions in cross-examination are sufficient to discredit a witness when the core recovery of embezzled goods remains established?
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