Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• The Chairman, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore and. anothers vs Mst. Fazeelat Sultana and 2 others1998 SCMR 880 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-09
  leave to appealconstitutional jurisdictionintermediate examinationwithheld resulteducational board rules
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, being the Chairman of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore and another, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court which accepted a writ petition filed by respondent No. 1. The respondent had appeared in the 1995 Annual Intermediate Examination, but her result was withheld for want of verification of practicals and a school discharge certificate. After the certificate was eventually provided and her result declared, she failed in English and sought to appear in the supplementary examination, which the Board refused. The High Court directed the Board to afford her an additional opportunity to appear without imposing a late fee, holding that her result was delayed without her fault. The core legal question concerns the applicability and interpretation of the Board's rules regarding examination forms, completion of requirements, and the responsibilities of candidates versus the Board. The Supreme Court held that the case warranted a detailed examination of the rules and granted leave to appeal to examine the applicability of Rule 2.5(ii)(f) read with Rules 6 and 21 of Chapter 2 of the Calendar of the Board, laying down that the interplay between candidate obligations and institutional rules requires authoritative interpretation upon appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a candidate whose intermediate examination result is delayed without their fault is entitled to an additional opportunity to appear in subsequent examinations?
  • Do the rules governing the submission of certificates and completion of examination forms place the sole responsibility on the candidate?
  • How do Rules 6 and 21 of Chapter 2 of the Calendar of the Board apply when an examination result has been declared late?
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• The Board of Trustees through Chairman, Islamabad vs Saiyid Munirul1998 PLD Supreme Court 127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-01-23
  abandoned propertycitizenship statusspecified personsuo motu reviewproperty rightsadministrative lawconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the status of a property in Islamabad, originally allotted to the respondent in 1966, which was subsequently declared 'abandoned property' by the Board of Trustees. The core legal question was whether the respondent had ceased to be a citizen of Pakistan following the events of 1971, thereby falling under the definition of a 'specified person' under the Abandoned Properties (Taking Over and Management) Act, 1975. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that the respondent had not ceased to be a citizen of Pakistan. Evidence confirmed the respondent was not residing in the territories constituting former East Pakistan after December 16, 1971, and he held a valid citizenship certificate issued by the Government of Pakistan. The Court affirmed that the Board of Trustees’ suo motu review was unjustified and that the respondent did not meet the criteria for a 'specified person.' The judgment establishes that citizenship status is a valuable right and that administrative bodies cannot rely on conjectures to divest individuals of property rights based on disputed nationality claims when contrary evidence exists.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person who was domiciled in former East Pakistan but resided elsewhere on December 16, 1971, automatically cease to be a citizen of Pakistan?
  • Can the Board of Trustees exercise suo motu revisional powers under the Abandoned Properties (Taking Over and Management) Act, 1975, after the expiry of the prescribed limitation period?
  • Is a certificate of citizenship issued by the Government of Pakistan sufficient to rebut a claim that an individual is a 'specified person' under the Abandoned Properties (Taking Over and Management) Act, 1975?
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• Tariq vs The State1998 SCMR 1586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-29
  criminal appeallife imprisonmentpremeditated murdergrave and sudden provocationquantum of sentencejuvenile offenderSection 302 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, by leave of the Court, challenged the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon the appellant for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the appellant, a fifteen-year-old at the time of the offense, deserved a reduced sentence due to his tender age and the alleged influence of his elder sister, who had previously engaged in a dispute with the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment were appropriate and did not warrant interference. The Court reasoned that the murder was not the result of grave and sudden provocation, as there was a significant time interval between the initial altercation and the shooting, indicating premeditation. Furthermore, the Court noted that the trial court had already exercised judicial discretion by awarding life imprisonment rather than the death penalty, considering the appellant's youth. The appeal was consequently dismissed, affirming that the sentence met the ends of justice given the circumstances of the premeditated act.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant time interval between an initial provocation and the commission of a crime negate the defense of grave and sudden provocation?
  • Is a fifteen-year-old offender entitled to a reduced sentence solely based on the influence of an elder sibling?
  • Can a sentence of life imprisonment be maintained for a juvenile offender if the trial court has already exercised leniency in lieu of the death penalty?
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• Tariq Akhtar vs The Plant Protection Adviser and Director, Department of Plant Protection, Karachi and others1998 SCMR 945 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-14
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingspower of reviewFederal Service Tribunalprocedural extensionjurisdiction of tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had granted an extension of time to the respondent department for completing disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The petitioner argued that the Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to extend the time limit previously set in its own judgment, contending that such an extension constituted an impermissible review of its own order, as the Service Tribunals Act does not expressly confer review powers. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the Tribunal's extension of the deadline for inquiry proceedings amounted to a review of the judgment. The Court held that the Tribunal's original judgment, which reinstated the petitioner, remained intact and operative. The Court clarified that the power to fix a time limit for departmental inquiries inherently includes the power to extend that period for cogent reasons. Consequently, the Court determined that the extension did not constitute a review of the judgment, but rather a procedural adjustment within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Service Tribunal have the inherent power to extend a time limit it previously set for the completion of departmental inquiry proceedings?
  • Does the extension of a time limit for departmental proceedings by a Service Tribunal constitute a review of its own judgment?
  • Can a Court or Tribunal exercise the power of review without express statutory authorization?
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• Taqweemul Haq vs The Provincial Government through the Secretary, Education and others1998 SCMR 554 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-07
  leave to appealservice regularisationadvance incrementsservice tribunalad hoc appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, whereby the petitioner's appeal for regularisation of service in BPS-16 along with graded/running pay, advance increments, and back benefits was partially allowed. The petitioner, possessing a B.Sc. (Hons.) Agriculture degree, was appointed on an ad hoc and temporary basis as a Science-cum-English Teacher (S.E.T.) in BPS-15 (Fixed), which posts were later upgraded to BPS-16 (Fixed). The Service Tribunal granted him graded pay from the date he acquired the requisite B.Ed. qualification, but declined regularisation and advance increments. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to regularisation of service from his initial appointment and to multiple advance increments based on his academic qualifications and applicable government notifications. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised substantial questions requiring consideration and granted leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that claims for service regularisation and advance increments based on higher academic qualifications warrant a full hearing by the apex court upon the grant of leave.

  Questions settled

  • Is a temporary and ad hoc appointee entitled to regularisation of service from the initial date of appointment?
  • Whether an employee holding specific educational qualifications is entitled to advance increments under government notifications?
  • Does the acquisition of a requisite professional qualification like B.Ed. entitle an S.E.T. to graded pay from the date of acquisition?
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• Taj & Company through General Manager Muhammad Hussain-- vs Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Railways through Secretary and 5 others1998 SCMR 1256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-09
  catering licensewrit of mandamusdiscretionary reliefadministrative lawlachesrailway policycontractual privilege
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a catering company, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed its writ petition challenging the refusal of the Pakistan Railways to renew its catering licenses for dining cars on the Tezgam train. The petitioner argued that under the Railway Policies of 1970 and 1992, it was entitled to a renewal. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner had a vested right to the renewal of a catering license and whether a writ of mandamus could be issued to compel such renewal. The Supreme Court held that a catering license is a mere privilege, not a legal right, and that even if policy instructions exist, the renewal of such a license remains within the discretion of the railway authorities. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the writ petition was rightly dismissed due to the petitioner's delay in approaching the High Court. The key principle laid down is that the grant or renewal of a commercial license is a discretionary administrative act, not enforceable through a writ of mandamus, particularly when the petitioner fails to seek timely judicial intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Does an applicant for a catering license possess a legal right to its renewal based on policy guidelines?
  • Can a writ of mandamus be issued to compel the renewal of a commercial license?
  • Is the grant or renewal of a catering license by railway authorities a matter of administrative discretion?
  • Does the failure to approach the court promptly after the expiry of a license justify the dismissal of a writ petition?
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• Syed Zulfiqar Mehdi and others vs Pakistan International1998 PLC (C.S.) 615 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  original jurisdictionpublic importancefundamental rightsdiscriminationback benefitsservice matterconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses constitutional petitions filed directly in the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 by certain employees of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (P.I.A.C.), who alleged discriminatory treatment in the denial of back benefits upon their re-employment after removal under Martial Law Regulation 52. The core legal question was whether individual service grievances concerning back benefits and allegations of discrimination among a limited group of corporate employees constitute matters of 'public importance' so as to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3). The Court held that the petitions were not maintainable, concluding that the controversy affected only a limited group of employees rather than the public or community at large, and that disputed factual inquiries regarding preferential treatment could not be appropriately undertaken in these proceedings where alternate remedies under the law were available. The key principle laid down is that an individual or group service grievance does not acquire the character of 'public importance' under Article 184(3) unless its decision affects the legal rights and liberties of the people or community at large.

  Questions settled

  • Whether individual service grievances concerning the denial of back benefits on re-employment constitute a question of public importance under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
  • Can a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution be entertained when an alternate remedy is provided under the law for the redress of service matters?
  • Does an allegation of discriminatory treatment among a limited group of corporate employees invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?
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• Syed Zulfiqar Mehdi and others vs Pakistan International Airlines1998 SCMR 793 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  original jurisdictionpublic importancefundamental rightsdiscriminationservice mattersback benefitsmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses petitions filed by employees of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (P.I.A.C.) under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, alleging discriminatory treatment in the denial of back benefits upon re-employment following removal under M.L.R. 52. The core legal question is whether service-related grievances regarding back benefits and allegations of discrimination by employees of a public corporation constitute a 'question of public importance' necessary to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3). The Court held that the petitions are not maintainable as the grievances pertain to a limited group of employees rather than the public or community at large, and involve factual inquiries better suited for alternate remedies available under the law. The key principle laid down is that for a matter to qualify as a question of public importance under Article 184(3), the decision must affect the legal rights or liberties of the people at large or the community as a whole, rather than being restricted to the private or individual grievances of a specific group.

  Questions settled

  • Whether service-related grievances concerning back benefits for employees of a public corporation constitute a question of public importance under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
  • Can individual or group grievances regarding discriminatory treatment in employment terms be entertained under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?
  • What jurisdictional requirements must be established to invoke the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
  • Does the existence of an alternate legal remedy bar the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction for service matters?
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• Syed Ziaul Hasan alias Thah Peer vs The State1998 SCMR 1582 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-27
  plea of insanityunsoundness of minddesecration of Holy Quranburden of proofcriminal liabilitydiminished responsibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, with leave of the Court, arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's criminal appeal against his conviction under Section 295-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for desecrating the Holy Qur'an, which resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the plea of insanity under Section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at the time of the commission of the offence. The Supreme Court held that the burden of proving unsoundness of mind at the crucial time of the occurrence rests squarely upon the accused, and the evidence adduced failed to establish that the appellant was suffering from any mental abnormality or was incapable of knowing the nature of his act when the crime was committed. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence. The key principle laid down is that the crucial point of time for establishing unsoundness of mind under Section 84 is the exact moment of the commission of the offence, and mere prior history or subsequent mental illness without proof of incapacity at that time does not exempt the accused from criminal liability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the burden of proving unsoundness of mind under Section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 lies upon the accused?
  • At what crucial point of time must unsoundness of mind be established to claim exemption under Section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the law in Pakistan recognize the defense of diminished responsibility or lesser forms of mental abnormality?
  • Whether subsequent fits of insanity create a presumption that the accused was insane at the time the crime was committed?
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• Syed Shaukat Ali Bokhari vs Secretary, National Assembly Secretariat, Islamabad and another1998 PLC (C.S.) 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-08
  civil servantNational Assembly Secretariatservice tribunalwrit jurisdictionArticle 212service mattersleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Additional Secretary (B-21) in the National Assembly Secretariat, challenged a notification that reinstated him to a lower post of Joint Secretary (B-20) following his suspension. The Lahore High Court dismissed his writ petition, determining that he was a civil servant as defined under the Civil Servants Act, thereby barring the petition under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Upon seeking leave to appeal, the petitioner contended that employees of the National Assembly Secretariat are not civil servants and that their service terms are regulated by specific rules framed under Article 87(3) of the Constitution, thus placing them outside the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the classification of National Assembly Secretariat employees as civil servants required further examination in light of conflicting precedents. Pending the final hearing, the Court ordered the maintenance of the status quo as it existed on the date of the impugned notification.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the National Assembly Secretariat considered civil servants under the Civil Servants Act?
  • Does the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal extend to disputes regarding the terms and conditions of service for employees of the National Assembly Secretariat?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained against service-related orders if the petitioner is classified as a civil servant under Article 212 of the Constitution?
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• Syed Shabbir Hussain Shah and others vs Mirza Maqbool Ahmad through Legal Heirs and others1998 SCMR 679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-09
  ejectmentrestitution of possessionapprobate and reprobateestoppelrent restrictionsettlement schemeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment concerning an ejectment dispute. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, having previously entered into a voluntary agreement before the Supreme Court to vacate the premises within a specified timeframe, could subsequently seek restitution of possession based on a claim that the property was improperly included in the respondents' title deed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners were strictly bound by their prior undertaking to vacate the premises. The Court reasoned that the petitioners, having previously accepted the respondents as their landlords and committed to vacating the property, could not subsequently resile from that commitment or attempt to blow hot and cold. The key principle laid down is that a party is estopped from challenging an ejectment order or seeking restitution of possession after voluntarily entering into a binding agreement before the court to vacate the premises, as they cannot approbate and reprobate regarding their status as tenants or the validity of the landlord's title.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party seek restitution of possession under Section 144, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after voluntarily agreeing to vacate the premises in a prior court proceeding?
  • Is a tenant who has recognized a landlord's title and agreed to vacate the premises permitted to later challenge the landlord's title?
  • Does the principle of 'blowing hot and cold' prevent a party from resiling from a voluntary undertaking made before the Supreme Court?
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• Syed Nazar Hussain Shah and anothers vs Shah Muhammad and 3 others1998 SCMR 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-23
  pre-emptionleave to appealsuperior right of pre-emptioncivil revisionsale considerationpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' civil revision and upheld the dismissal of their pre-emption suit. The petitioners had filed a suit for pre-emption claiming a superior right to purchase the suit property sold by Bashir Ahmed to the respondents. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, holding that the petitioners lacked a superior right, which decision was subsequently reversed in appeal by the Additional District Judge who decreed the suit. Upon civil revision by the respondents, the High Court set aside the appellate decree and dismissed the suit, prompting the current petition. The core legal question concerns the determination of superior pre-emption rights and the proper evaluation of evidence regarding possession and title documents. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised by the petitioners regarding the application of the Transfer of Property Act and the evaluation of documentary and possession evidence require a deeper examination of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court erred in omitting to examine the title documents produced by the pre-emptor petitioners?
  • Does the question of possession play a crucial role in determining pre-emption suits in the Bahawalpur area where the Transfer of Property Act is applicable?
  • Whether a co-sharer or pre-emptor loses their right of pre-emption by joining a stranger in purchasing the suit land?
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• Syed Mazhar Hussain Bukhari vs Secretary, Government of Punjab1998 SCMR 1948 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-17
  service matterconstitutional petitionjurisdiction of service tribunaltransfer ordermala fidemaintainabilitycivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil appeals challenging orders of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed writ petitions filed by civil servants regarding their transfer orders. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is maintainable by a civil servant challenging service-related matters, specifically transfers, or if such matters fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed both appeals, affirming the High Court's decisions. The Court held that Article 212 of the Constitution creates an absolute bar against the filing of a constitutional petition under Article 199 by a civil servant in relation to any matter connected with the terms and conditions of service, provided the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction. The Court further clarified that this constitutional bar applies even in cases where the impugned order is alleged to be mala fide, as such allegations must also be adjudicated by the Service Tribunal rather than the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution maintainable by a civil servant regarding terms and conditions of service?
  • Does the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution apply to service-related orders alleged to be mala fide?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction over transfer orders of civil servants?
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• Syed Javaid Iqbal Bukhari vs Government, of Pakistan and anothers1998 SCMR 2029 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-20
  disciplinary proceedingscivil servantmisconductauthorised officerservice tribunalquestion of fact vs lawwaiver of objection
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the Federal Service Tribunal's dismissal of a civil servant’s petition against his removal from service for corruption and misconduct. The core legal questions concerned whether the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated due to the alleged incompetence of the Chief Secretary as the 'Authorised Officer' and non-compliance with Rule 9 of the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1973. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to challenge the competence of the Authorised Officer or the Enquiry Committee at the earliest opportunity, thereby waiving the right to raise these factual issues on appeal. The Court affirmed that the Federal Government had granted the requisite approval for the proceedings. The key principle laid down is that while a lack of jurisdiction is a question of law that can be raised at any stage, the competence of an appointed authority or enquiry committee is a question of fact that must be agitated before the relevant forum; otherwise, such objections cannot be entertained for the first time before the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can an objection regarding the competence of an 'Authorised Officer' in disciplinary proceedings be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Does the misuse of official authority to obtain loans for relatives constitute misconduct under the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1964?
  • Is there a legal distinction between a question of law regarding jurisdiction and a question of fact regarding the appointment of an enquiry committee?
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• Syed Javaid Iqbal Bukhari vs Government of Pakistan and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-20
  service tribunalremoval from servicemisuse of authoritydisciplinary proceedingsgovernment servants efficiency and disciplinelending and borrowingconduct rulesborrowing authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's service appeal upholding his removal from service. The appellant, a BPS-20 officer of the Secretariat Group serving as Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Cooperatives Department, was proceeded against under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 for obtaining large sums of money as loans in his own name and in the names of his close relatives by misusing his official authority. The core legal questions involved whether the Chief Secretary of Punjab was a competent authorized officer, whether the enquiry proceedings stood vitiated, and whether loans advanced to the appellant's brother-in-law constituted misconduct under the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to challenge the appointment of the authorized officer and the composition of the enquiry committee at the earliest opportunity, noting a distinction between a question of fact regarding an officer's authority and a question of law regarding judicial jurisdiction. The Court further held that obtaining substantial loans through exploitation of official position constituted grave misconduct. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a question regarding the competence of an authorized officer under the disciplinary rules constitute a question of fact or a question of law?
  • Whether obtaining loans through the exploitation of official position amounts to misconduct under the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1964?
  • Can an objection regarding the constitution of an enquiry committee or the status of an authorized officer be raised for the first time before the apex court?
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• Syed Jamat Ali Shah and anothers vs The Investment Corporation of Pakistan1998 SCMR 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-02-28
  leave to appealpower of attorneyfrustration of contractnationalizationunderwriting agreementsuit institution
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a civil suit instituted by the Investment Corporation of Pakistan against the petitioners for the recovery of an amount based on an agreement to purchase shareholdings following an underwriting agreement. The suit was decreed by the trial court, and the High Court dismissed the petitioners' appeal. The core legal questions raised before the Supreme Court concern whether the person instituting the suit on behalf of the respondent-corporation had valid authority, specifically regarding the admissibility and presumption of a notarized power of attorney under section 85 of the Evidence Act 1872, and whether the contract stood frustrated under section 56 of the Contract Act due to the subsequent nationalization of the Ghee industry and acquisition of shares under the Hydrogenated Vegetable Oil Industry (Control and Development) Act 1973. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these contentions, subject to the petitioners furnishing a bank guarantee and security for the decreed amount. The key principle laid down relates to the requirements for establishing authority to institute a suit and the doctrine of frustration of contract in the wake of state nationalization.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a power of attorney notarized by a Notary Public carries a presumption of due execution under section 85 of the Evidence Act 1872 when not executed directly before the Notary Public?
  • Does the nationalization of an industry and acquisition of shares by the Federal Government operate to frustrate a contract to purchase shares under section 56 of the Contract Act?
  • Whether a suit instituted by an agent is competent when only a photocopy of the power of attorney is produced rather than the original?
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• Syed Iqbal Haider vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad1998 SCMR 1318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-16
  constitutional petitionnon-prosecutionfrivolous litigationThirteenth Amendmentdismissal of petitioncostsjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the validity of the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1997. The petitioner sought a judicial declaration that the Thirteenth Amendment was ultra vires to Articles 5, 238, and 239, and the Third Schedule of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, arguing that the amendment, which removed the power to dissolve the National Assembly and dismiss the Federal Government under Article 58(2)(b), was harmful. During the proceedings, the petitioner's counsel failed to appear on multiple scheduled hearing dates and subsequently requested to withdraw from the case. The Court refused the request for withdrawal at that late stage. Given the absence of any party prepared to argue the merits of the petition, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for non-prosecution. Furthermore, the Court observed that the petition was prima facie frivolous and imposed costs of Rs. 10,000 on the petitioner, to be deposited within one month. The judgment underscores the Court's authority to dismiss petitions for non-prosecution when counsel fails to appear and to impose costs for frivolous litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be dismissed for non-prosecution if the petitioner's counsel fails to appear and argues they are not ready to proceed?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to impose costs on a petitioner for filing a frivolous constitutional petition?
  • Is a request by counsel to withdraw from a case permissible at a late stage of proceedings?
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• Syed Iqbal Haider vs Federation of Pakistan and others1998 SCMR 179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-12-02
  judicial authority13th AmendmentSupreme Court orderChief Justice under restraintconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose during the hearing of Constitution Petition No. 248-Q of 1997, wherein the Attorney-General for Pakistan informed the Supreme Court that a three-member bench, presided over by the Chief Justice (under restraint), had passed an order suspending the operation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan. The Supreme Court, referencing its previous order dated 30-11-1997, reiterated its stance that any judicial order passed by a bench presided over by the Chief Justice (under restraint) would not be given effect. The Court expressed regret regarding the defiance of its earlier directive. Consequently, the Supreme Court issued a formal direction to the Federal Government, the President of Pakistan, and all relevant government functionaries, mandating that the order passed by the bench comprising the Chief Justice (under restraint), Mr. Justice Muhammad Bashir Jehangiri, and Mr. Justice Ch. Muhammad Arif be stayed and not acted upon. The Court reaffirmed the binding nature of its prior collective decision regarding the authority of the bench in question.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by a bench presided over by the Chief Justice (under restraint) is legally effective?
  • Can the Supreme Court stay the operation of an order passed by a bench of its own judges?
  • Is the Federal Government bound to disregard judicial orders declared ineffective by the Supreme Court?
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• Syed Iqbal Haider vs Federation of Pakistan and anothers1998 SCMR 1494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-04-30
  constitutional petitiondate of birthsupreme court judgeretirement agejurisdictionservice rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a constitutional petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution by the petitioner, challenging the continuation of respondent No. 2 in office as a Judge of the Supreme Court and Chief Justice of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the respondent's actual date of birth was July 1, 1932, as claimed by the petitioner on the basis of unverified school records from Agra, India, which would mean he had already attained the age of retirement of sixty-five years under Article 179, or July 1, 1934, as recorded in official and university records. The Supreme Court held that the petition was devoid of merit, finding that the respondent's date of birth had been lawfully corrected to July 1, 1934, by a resolution of the Syndicate of the University of Sindh in 1952, which had remained unchallenged for over four decades, and that official documents including his passport, advocate enrolment, and identity card consistently reflected the same. The key principle laid down is that an entry regarding a date of birth duly corrected and settled by a competent authority decades prior cannot be belatedly challenged or reopened after a lapse of many years, and that the principle limiting the correction of date of birth in service rules applies analogously to prevent administrative and judicial complications.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a correction of date of birth made by a competent university syndicate decades prior can be challenged belatedly?
  • Does a constitutional petition under Article 184(3) regarding a judge's date of birth require a hearing by a Full Court?
  • Can unverified school records from abroad override official records and a long-standing university resolution regarding a person's date of birth?
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• Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah and others vs Government of Pakistan and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-02
  service tribunalpromotionseniority-cum-fitnessdepartmental promotion committeefederal investigation agencycivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arise from orders of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the appellants' applications seeking implementation of earlier Tribunal directions regarding their promotion to Grade-17 posts in the Federal Investigation Agency. The core legal question is whether the Departmental Promotion Committee validly considered the appellants' promotions based on the principle of seniority-cum-fitness and whether the mere assertion of a lack of vacancies constitutes lawful compliance with Tribunal orders. The Supreme Court held that the Departmental Promotion Committee failed to properly evaluate the appellants' merits and annual confidential reports, and arbitrarily ignored them in favor of junior officers without recorded reasons or legal justification. The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned orders and directing the respondents to re-examine the appellants' promotion cases on merits in juxtaposition with junior officers. The key principle laid down is that a statutory body such as a Departmental Promotion Committee must faithfully, honestly, and diligently perform its duties by considering candidate merits and records rather than issuing perfunctory denials of vacancies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Departmental Promotion Committee is required to consider annual confidential reports and merits when superseding senior officers?
  • Does a bare assertion by a department that no vacancies exist satisfy the legal requirement to implement a service tribunal's direction to consider promotion cases?
  • Can junior officers be promoted while ignoring senior candidates without recording valid reasons?
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• Syed Ift1khar Hussain Shah vs Syed Sabir Hussain Shah and 2 others1998 SCMR 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-16
  leave to appealpre-arrest bailcompromisecompounding of offencesacquittalcriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench, which accepted a criminal revision and directed the acquittal of the respondents. The petitioner had lodged a police report against the respondents under Section 336/34, Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.), alleging they inflicted nose blows using a knuckle-duster due to a family dispute. During pre-arrest bail proceedings, the petitioner made a statement on oath that the parties had amicably patched up the matter, he had received four thousand rupees as compensation, and he had no objection to bail confirmation. Subsequently, the respondents sought acquittal based on this compromise. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's statement during bail proceedings constituted a valid compounding of the offence warranting acquittal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner's statement and receipt of money clearly amounted to a settlement and compensation for the case, justifying the High Court's order of acquittal. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, affirming that a compromise reached and acted upon during proceedings precludes further prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statement made by a complainant during bail proceedings acknowledging a compromise and receipt of compensation amount to a valid compounding of the offence?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in directing the acquittal of the accused based on a compromise reached between the parties?
  • Is a complainant bound by a statement made before the court regarding the amicable settlement of a family dispute?
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• Syed Ather Hussain Jafri vs Masood Hussain Qureshi and 2 others1998 SCMR 2468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-04-17
  evacuee propertyresidual property schemetransfer of propertyvested rightpublic auctionsettlement scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee plot. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner acquired a vested right to the plot through a prior unexecuted auction order, and whether the contesting respondent was lawfully entitled to its transfer under the Residual Property Scheme due to his continuous possession and construction thereupon. The Supreme Court held that an unexecuted order for public auction does not create a vested right in an individual, and the subsequent promulgation of the Residual Property Scheme revived the respondent's right to claim the property as available property. The key principle laid down is that an order for auction simpliciter, if not acted upon prior to statutory changes, does not confer a vested right of transfer upon a claimant, and a party in continuous possession who has raised construction may qualify under available property schemes.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexecuted order for public auction of evacuee property create a vested right in favour of a claimant?
  • Can a party in continuous possession who has raised construction seek transfer of property under the Residual Property Scheme?
  • Does the repeal of evacuee legislation affect the disposal of available urban properties under subsequent schemes?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Altaf Hussain Shah vs Haider Zaman and anothers1998 SCMR 654 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-12-15
  leave to appeallandlord and tenantsettlement transferjurisdiction of civil courtpossession suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit for possession of a house filed by the petitioner against the respondent, claiming ownership and a landlord-tenant relationship. The respondent denied the relationship, asserting ownership through allotment. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the respondent had no notice of the transfer of the house to the petitioner by the Settlement Department. On appeal, the Additional District Judge upheld the dismissal, ruling that the house was erroneously transferred to the petitioner and that the respondent had become the owner under Scheme No. VII of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's revision. The petitioner contended that the legality of the transfer was not an issue before the courts below and that the civil courts lacked jurisdiction to go behind the transfer order of the Settlement authority. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these questions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil court has the jurisdiction to go behind a transfer order passed by the Settlement Department and determine its legality?
  • Whether an appellate court can decide a civil suit on issues that were not raised as disputes or framed as issues between the parties in the trial court?
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• Syed Abdul Rauf vs Abdul Sattar1998 SCMR 2525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-07-02
  ejectment applicationbona fide personal useattorney testimonyadverse inferencelandlord-tenant disputerent restrictionwitness appearance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment by the High Court of Balochistan, which upheld an eviction order against the appellant-tenant in favor of the respondent-landlord. The landlord sought eviction on grounds of default in rent payment and personal bona fide use. While the default issue was decided against the landlord by lower courts, the primary legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the landlord's failure to personally appear in the witness-box, instead relying on an attorney to testify regarding personal need, was fatal to his case. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no hard and fast rule requiring a party to personally testify in every instance. The Court emphasized that each case must be decided on its own facts, and that non-appearance does not automatically warrant an adverse inference, especially when a credible attorney—such as a close family member—testifies and is subject to cross-examination. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, noting the appellant failed to rebut the landlord's bona fide requirement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a landlord to personally appear in the witness-box to testify on personal bona fide use automatically invalidate an ejectment application?
  • Can an attorney testify on behalf of a landlord regarding the landlord's personal bona fide need for rented premises?
  • Is there a mandatory legal requirement for a party to a civil suit to personally appear in the witness-box to avoid an adverse inference?
  Read full judgment →
• Supreme Court of PakistaniHaji Muhammad Mansha vs Allahyar and 3 others1998 SCMR 1265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-30
  criminal appealmisreading of evidenceacquittalremandappellate reviewmurderrobberyappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which had acquitted the respondents of charges under sections 302/34, 307/34, and 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and section 17 of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hodood) Ordinance, 1979. The trial court had originally convicted the respondents for murder and robbery. The core legal question was whether the Federal Shariat Court’s acquittal was legally sustainable or if it resulted from a material misreading and non-reading of the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Federal Shariat Court’s judgment relied on erroneous assumptions, including the incorrect belief that an eyewitness was not mentioned in the FIR or site plan, the false premise that the complainant’s injuries were not recorded, and a miscalculation regarding the timeline of incriminating recoveries. Holding that these misreadings materially influenced the acquittal, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment. The principle laid down is that an appellate court’s finding of acquittal cannot stand if it is based on a fundamental misreading or non-reading of material evidence, necessitating a remand for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court's judgment of acquittal be set aside if it is based on a misreading of material evidence?
  • Is a case liable to be remanded to the lower appellate court when its findings are influenced by erroneous assumptions regarding the record?
  • Does the failure to correctly identify the presence of an eyewitness in the FIR and site plan constitute a misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Supreme Court of Pakistani Pakistan Engineering Council through Registrar, Islamabad and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment, Islamabad and others1998 SCMR 811 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-02-27
  service tribunalprofessional engineerpromotiondiploma-holderengineering councilservice rulescivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals by leave were filed against the Federal Service Tribunal's judgment upholding the promotion of a diploma-holder to the post of Deputy Director (Engineering), challenging it on the ground that the appointee was not registered as a 'Professional Engineer' under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act. The core legal question was whether a government employee holding a diploma rather than an engineering degree, and lacking registration with the Pakistan Engineering Council, is barred from promotion to a post requiring engineering duties. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that while the provisions of the Pakistan Engineering Council Act apply to government employees undertaking professional engineering works, the promotion itself was valid under the applicable Service Rules, as there was no conclusive evidence on record establishing that the specific post of Deputy Director (Engineering) required the performance of professional engineering work within the meaning of the Act. The key principle laid down is that the government may appoint non-graduate engineers to service posts in accordance with service rules, but penalties under the Act are attracted only if such persons actually undertake professional engineering work without registration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the registration requirements for a Professional Engineer under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act apply to persons employed in government departments?
  • Does the promotion of a diploma-holder engineer to a higher grade post violate the Pakistan Engineering Council Act if the post does not involve professional engineering work?
  • When are the penal provisions of section 27 of the Pakistan Engineering Council Act attracted against a non-registered person in government service?
  Read full judgment →
• Supreme Court of Pakistani Mrs. Saeeda Bibi vs The Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore and 4 others1998 SCMR 2642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-29
  criminal processexecution of warranttransfer of custodyinter-provincial transferapprehension of dangerconstitutional petitionfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, wherein the petitioner sought to restrain authorities from transferring her husband from judicial custody in Sargodha, Punjab, to Quetta, Balochistan, where he faced a criminal case and arrest warrants, due to alleged threats to his life from rival tribal factions. The core legal question was whether a detainee lawfully required by a court in another province could be restrained from being transferred based on apprehensions of danger to his life when authorities were acting in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the execution of warrants and transfer of a detainee across jurisdictions are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and if authorities act within legal parameters, courts cannot interfere merely on the petitioner's apprehensions. The key principle laid down is that lawful execution of statutory duties regarding the transfer of an accused under criminal process overrides general apprehensions of danger unless specific legal violations are established.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court restrain authorities from executing an arrest warrant and transferring an accused to another province based on mere apprehensions of danger to his life?
  • Does the execution of an arrest warrant outside the local limits of the issuing court's jurisdiction fall under the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Can authorities be restrained from performing legal obligations under criminal law when acting within statutory parameters?
  Read full judgment →
• Supreme Court of Pakistani Capital Development Authority, Islamabad1998 SCMR 1038 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-12
  land acquisitioncompensationreview powersCapital Development Authorityeminent domainadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the compensation awarded to landowners whose properties were acquired by the Capital Development Authority (C.D.A.). Initially, compensation was granted in 1979, which was subsequently enhanced by the Commissioner, C.D.A., through several orders between 1979 and 1983. However, the Deputy Commissioner, Islamabad, acting under Section 36 of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, reviewed and reduced this compensation. The affected landowners challenged this reduction in the High Court, which set aside the Deputy Commissioner's order, finding that the conditions for review were not met and that the reduction was not in accordance with the law. The High Court restored the original enhanced compensation orders. The C.D.A. and the landowners subsequently filed petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the compensation awarded to the landowners adhered to the legal requirements and mandates set forth in the relevant provisions of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Deputy Commissioner has the legal authority under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960 to review and reduce compensation orders passed by a predecessor?
  • Does the power of review under Section 36 of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960 allow for the reduction of compensation without sufficient material on record?
  • What are the legal requirements for determining fair compensation under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Muhammad Khan vs Kala Khan1998 SCMR 2054 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-06
  pre-emptiongift vs saleconcurrent findingsrevision petitionleave to appealappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a revision petition challenging concurrent findings of the trial court and the appellate court. The petitioner had filed a suit for possession through pre-emption, alleging that a transaction between the respondent and the vendor, ostensibly a gift, was in reality a sale designed to defeat his superior right of pre-emption. The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court and the High Court, concluded based on evidence that the transaction was indeed a bona fide gift and not a sale. The Supreme Court examined the petitioner's contentions regarding the nature of the transaction and the relationship between the parties. Finding that the lower courts had properly appraised the evidence—including documentary evidence regarding the land's valuation which contradicted the petitioner's claim of a sale price—the Supreme Court held that the findings of fact were sound and free from legal error. Consequently, the Court refused to interfere with the concurrent findings and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a transaction characterized as a gift can be reclassified as a sale for the purpose of pre-emption when the evidence supports the finding of a gift?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
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• Suleman vs Mst. Zeenat Jan and 2 others1998 SCMR 2361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-02-25
  civil suitsale considerationburden of proofmutationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a civil suit for declaration and injunction filed by the petitioner claiming ownership in possession of the suit land and seeking cancellation of a mutation on the ground that the sale consideration was not paid. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff. Upon appeal, the appellate court modified the decree, granting Rs. 40,000 as the price of the land instead of a declaration. The High Court subsequently allowed a revision application and dismissed the suit in toto. The core legal question concerns the proper assessment of evidence regarding the burden of proof for the payment of sale consideration and possession. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine the evidence in light of these contentions, holding that further examination is warranted as to whether the burden of proof regarding payment was properly discharged and assessed by the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the burden of proof regarding the payment of sale consideration lies on the defendant who asserts making the payment after denial by the plaintiff?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the suit in toto upon a revision application?
  • Whether the lower appellate court and the High Court properly assessed the evidence produced by the parties regarding possession and sale consideration?
  Read full judgment →
• Sufi Mukhtar Ahmad vs The State and others1998 SCMR 643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-12-12
  leave to appealacquittalprosecution evidencecoercive measuresattendance of witnessespolice-challan casetrial procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, the first informant in a criminal case registered under sections 337-A(ii), 337-A(iii), and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the trial court's acquittal of the accused. The petitioner contended that the trial court had improperly closed the prosecution's evidence after only three witnesses were examined, without making any effort to secure the attendance of remaining witnesses through coercive legal measures, despite the case having been pending since 1991. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether a trial court in a police-challan case can finalize proceedings in favor of the accused solely due to the non-production of evidence, without first attempting to secure the attendance of prosecution witnesses through coercive measures as mandated by law. The Court's decision highlights the procedural obligation of trial courts to actively ensure the presence of witnesses before concluding a trial in a manner that results in acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court in a police-challan case finalize proceedings in favor of the accused solely because the prosecution failed to produce all evidence?
  • Is a trial court legally required to resort to coercive measures to secure the attendance of prosecution witnesses before closing the prosecution's evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Subhan Khan and others vs Sulleh Khan and others1998 SCMR 1195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-23
  pre-emption suitpartial pre-emptionamendment of plaintleave to appealprocedural defectstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a pre-emption suit filed by respondent No. 1 in 1971 regarding a sale transaction. The core legal dispute concerns whether the suit was maintainable despite the initial plaint lacking a precise description of the suit land, which the plaintiff sought to rectify through multiple amendment applications. While the trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff after allowing a late amendment, the appellate court reversed this decision, finding the suit defective due to partial pre-emption. The High Court subsequently set aside the appellate judgment and restored the trial court's decree. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court was legally justified in reversing the appellate court's findings on the issue of partial pre-emption, particularly in light of the procedural history involving the rejected and eventually allowed amendments to the plaint. The Court ordered the parties to maintain the status quo regarding the suit property pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit is maintainable when the initial plaint lacks a precise description of the suit land?
  • Can a trial court allow an amendment to a plaint after multiple previous applications for the same amendment were dismissed?
  • Does the inclusion of a note in a plaint regarding the future correction of property description cure a defect in the original pleading?
  Read full judgment →
• State through Advocate-General, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar vs Sajid Hussain and anothers1998 SCMR 1138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-19
  leave to appealnarcotics smugglingrecovery at police stationnon-production of case propertydelay in chemical examinationbeneficial doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court which set aside the conviction and sentence of the respondents and acquitted them of charges relating to narcotics smuggling. The prosecution alleged that the respondents were apprehended transporting heroin concealed in a motor car, which was subsequently searched at the police station where the contraband was recovered. The trial court had convicted the respondents under Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. However, the Federal Shariat Court found multiple fatal flaws in the prosecution's case, including the non-production of the case property during trial, recovery conducted at the police station rather than the spot without independent local witnesses, unexplained prolonged delay in sending samples to the Chemical Examiner, and failure to establish safe custody of the case property. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Shariat Court's appraisal of evidence was sound, noting no misreading or non-reading of evidence, and laid down that failure to produce case property at trial and unexplained delays in transmitting forensic samples fatally undermine the prosecution case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-production of case property during trial is fatal to the prosecution's case in narcotics matters?
  • Does an unexplained delay in sending recovered contraband samples to the Chemical Examiner vitiate the conviction?
  • Is a recovery made at the police station rather than at the spot of interception legally sustainable without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• State through Advocate-General, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar vs Muhammad Ashraf1998 SCMR 1221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-24
  acquittal appealzinaconsenthouse trespassreduction of sentenceleave to appeal refused
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal is filed by the State against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court acquitting the respondent of the charge under Section 457 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and converting his conviction from Section 10(3) to Section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance 1979, with a reduction in sentence. The core question before the Supreme Court was whether the Federal Shariat Court's appreciation of evidence regarding the victim's consent and the resultant alteration of conviction and acquittal under Section 457 suffered from any legal infirmity. The Supreme Court held that the conclusions reached by the Federal Shariat Court regarding the consenting nature of the act and the absence of house trespass were sound and free from legal defect. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused, affirming the principle that where evidence reflects consent, conviction under Section 10(3) cannot be sustained and must be converted to Section 10(2), while setting aside conviction for lurking house-trespass or house-breaking.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the conviction under section 10(3) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance 1979 can be converted to section 10(2) when evidence reflects consent?
  • Is a conviction under section 457 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 sustainable when the female is found to be a consenting party to the sexual intercourse?
  • Whether non-raising of cries by the complainant during the alleged incident indicates consent?
  Read full judgment →
• State through Advocate-General, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar and others vs Gulzar Muhammad and others1998 SCMR 873 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-02-04
  quashment of criminal proceedingsinherent jurisdictionabuse of processinordinate delaytrial court powerscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal petitions filed by the State challenging a Peshawar High Court order that quashed criminal proceedings against the respondents under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings when alternative remedies under Sections 249-A and 265-K Cr.P.C. were available, and whether an inordinate delay of nearly twenty-five years constituted an abuse of the court's process. The Supreme Court held that while the powers under Sections 249-A/265-K Cr.P.C. and 561-A Cr.P.C. are co-extensive and it is generally prudent to approach the trial court first, the High Court is not precluded from entertaining a 561-A application directly in appropriate cases. The Court affirmed that inordinate, unjustified delay, which subjects an accused to unnecessary harassment, constitutes an abuse of the process of the court. Consequently, the Court upheld the quashment of the proceedings, finding the delay of over two decades without conclusion to be oppressive and a valid ground for intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Are the powers of the High Court under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. and the trial court under Sections 249-A and 265-K Cr.P.C. co-extensive?
  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings if an alternative remedy is available before the trial court?
  • Does an inordinate and unjustified delay in the conclusion of a criminal trial constitute an abuse of the process of the court?
  • Is mere delay in the disposal of a criminal case sufficient to warrant the quashment of proceedings?
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• State through Advocate-General, N.-W.F.P., and others vs Arsala Khan1998 SCMR 1116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-17
  QasamatDiyatQanun-e-Shahadat OrderCriminal ProcedureSharia LawLeave to AppealTribal AreasEvidence
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal challenge a consolidated judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which addressed multiple criminal cases originating from the Tribal areas. The core legal questions concern whether a Sessions Judge or Zilla Qazi, when adjudicating criminal matters, is strictly bound by the provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order or possesses the discretion to adopt independent procedures based on Sharia principles. Specifically, the Court examined whether trial courts may impose liability for Diyat through the administration of oaths (Qasamat) after rejecting prosecution evidence, and whether Qasamat constitutes a valid mode of proof in cases where the incident is unseen or evidence is insufficient. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that these issues are of first impression and possess significant legal importance, likely affecting a substantial number of pending cases. The Court held that the interplay between Sharia-based evidentiary practices and the statutory framework of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order requires detailed judicial examination to determine the correct legal standard for criminal trials in these jurisdictions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Sessions Judge or District Qazi bound by the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order when deciding criminal cases, or may they adopt independent procedures based on Sharia?
  • Can a court, upon disbelieving prosecution evidence, legally decide a criminal matter on the basis of oath (Qasamat) instead of proceeding under Tazir?
  • Does the administration of repeated oaths constitute a valid and sufficient mode of proof to hold an accused liable for Diyat?
  • Did the High Court err by directing the acquittal of accused persons without properly evaluating the material evidence on record?
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• State through Advocate-General, Balochistan vs Shad Muhammad1998 SCMR 568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-09
  retracted confessionconfession on oathadmissibility of evidenceacquittal appealvoluntary confessioncriminal trialmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the State against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, which dismissed the State's appeal against the acquittal of the respondent, Shad Muhammad, for the murder of one Mughal. The core legal question was whether a confessional statement recorded on solemn affirmation (oath) after a significant delay of 14 days following arrest could be relied upon to secure a conviction, and whether such a retracted confession, even if corroborated by motive, was sufficient to overturn an acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly concluded the confession was inadmissible and unreliable. The Court affirmed that a confessional statement recorded on oath is inadmissible in evidence. Furthermore, the Court held that where trial and appellate courts have concurrently found a confession to be neither voluntary nor true, and where the confession suffers from legal infirmities such as being recorded on oath, it cannot form the basis for a conviction. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, as no grounds for interference with the acquittal were established.

  Questions settled

  • Is a confessional statement recorded on solemn affirmation admissible in evidence?
  • Can a conviction be based on a retracted confession that has been concurrently found by lower courts to be neither voluntary nor true?
  • Does the existence of a motive for a crime cure the legal infirmity of a confessional statement recorded on oath?
  Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan, Lahore through Chief Manager vs Ch.1998 PLC 506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-07-03
  administration of the Statelabor lawindustrial relationswrongful dismissaldomestic inquirybank employeereinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that reinstated a State Bank of Pakistan employee dismissed for alleged misappropriation of funds. The core legal questions were whether the respondent, as a bank employee, was excluded from the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, under the 'administration of the State' exception, and whether the bank's internal disciplinary inquiry was procedurally flawed. The Supreme Court held that the 'administration of the State' exception in Section 1(3)(b) of the Ordinance is limited and does not encompass all employees of state-run entities; specifically, a note examiner's duties do not constitute 'administration of the State.' Furthermore, the Court found no procedural illegality in the bank's decision to remand the case for a fresh inquiry, as the relevant rules did not prohibit such action. However, on the merits, the Court upheld the reinstatement, noting that the evidence against the respondent was circumstantial and insufficient, particularly given that the primary evidence implicated another employee. The principle established is that the 'administration of the State' exclusion must be interpreted narrowly to avoid arbitrarily stripping employees of labor law protections.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'administration of the State' exception in Section 1(3)(b) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 apply to all employees of state-owned banks?
  • Can a manager remand a disciplinary case to an Inquiry Officer for a fresh inquiry under the Efficiency and Discipline (Banks and Financial Institutions) Rules 1975?
  • Are employees whose terms and conditions are governed by a Wage Commission Award entitled to seek redress under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan and 2 others vs Syed Asif Ali1998 SCMR 1338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-27
  service lawseniority rightstransfer on requestdemotionnecessary partiesFederal Service Tribunalequitable relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had directed the State Bank of Pakistan to place a transferred employee at the top of the seniority list for the post of Assistant at the Lahore office. The respondent, originally a Senior Assistant at Sialkot, had requested a transfer to Lahore on the condition of accepting a demotion to Assistant. The Tribunal found the department's insistence on demotion and subsequent placement at the bottom of the seniority list to be unjust. The Supreme Court examined whether the respondent had waived his seniority rights by accepting the transfer conditions and whether the appeal was maintainable without impleading affected employees. The Court held that the Tribunal's decision to grant the respondent the top position in the seniority list for Assistants was just and equitable. The Court distinguished the precedent regarding non-impleadment of necessary parties and refused to entertain a new plea regarding the maintainability of the appeal under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, as it was not raised before the Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant claim seniority rights after accepting a demotion as a condition for transfer?
  • Is an appeal before the Service Tribunal maintainable if the affected employees are not impleaded as parties?
  • Can a petitioner raise a plea regarding the maintainability of an appeal for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not urged before the Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Standard Insurance Co. vs Pak Garments Ltd.1998 SCMR 1239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-06
  jurisdiction clauseforum selectionleave to appealinsurance policycivil procedureterritorial jurisdictioncontractual restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a civil revision challenging the trial court's refusal to return a plaint under Order VII, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner, an insurance company, argued that the suit was improperly filed in Haripur because the insurance policy contained a jurisdiction clause restricting legal proceedings exclusively to courts in Karachi. The core legal question is whether a contractual agreement between parties to limit the venue of litigation to one of several courts having concurrent jurisdiction is legally valid and enforceable, or if it violates statutory provisions regarding jurisdiction and contract law. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that while parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that lacks it under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, an agreement to select one of several competent forums is not contrary to public policy or the Contract Act 1872. The Court stayed the trial proceedings pending a final determination of this legal issue.

  Questions settled

  • Can parties to a contract validly agree to restrict legal proceedings to only one of several courts that otherwise possess jurisdiction?
  • Does a contractual clause limiting the venue of litigation violate Section 28 of the Contract Act 1872?
  • Can parties confer jurisdiction upon a court through mutual agreement if that court does not otherwise possess jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Slkandar Abdul Karim vs The State1998 P.C.T.L.R. 1398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-25
  review petitionbail amountbank fraudstatutory interpretationexcessive bailcriminal procedurefinancial capacity of accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had fixed the bail amount for an accused charged with bank fraud under the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984. The core legal question was whether the bail amount of Rs. 104 million was excessive and whether the Court erred by failing to properly apply Section 5(7) of the Ordinance, which mandates that bail amounts be fixed at not less than twice the amount specified in the charge. The Court held that the bail amount was indeed excessive and that the previous order failed to account for the statutory requirement of Section 5(7), which serves as a benchmark for bail fixation. The majority ruled that the purpose of bail is to ensure attendance, not to penalize the accused, and that financial capacity must be considered. Consequently, the Court allowed the review petition and reduced the bail amount to Rs. 40 million, establishing that while courts have discretion, they must adhere to statutory minimums and consider the accused's financial circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to consider a relevant statutory provision in a bail order constitute an error apparent on the face of the record justifying review?
  • Is the purpose of fixing a bail amount to penalize the accused or to ensure their attendance during trial?
  • Under Section 5(7) of the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance 1984, what is the standard for fixing the amount of bail when a specific amount is mentioned in the charge?
  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution vs Messrs Spencer &1998 SCMR 440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-26
  social security contributionalternative medical arrangementemployer liabilitynon-registration of employeesprovincial employees social securitystatutory benefitsbeneficial enactment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh upholding a Social Security Court decision that relieved the respondent employer from paying social security contributions under the Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965, for a specified period on the ground that alternative medical allowances were provided. The core legal question was whether the provision of a general medical allowance by an employer constitutes an adequate alternative arrangement exempting them from statutory social security contributions when comprehensive benefits like maternity, death grants, and disablement pensions mandated by the Ordinance are not provided. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the lower court judgments, holding that partial or general allowances do not satisfy the criteria for exemption established in prior jurisprudence unless equivalent alternative arrangements covering all statutory benefits are proven. Furthermore, an employer cannot escape liability for contributions merely due to the non-registration of its employees, as an establishment cannot benefit from its own default.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employer is exempt from paying social security contributions by merely paying a general medical allowance instead of providing all statutory benefits mandated by the Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965?
  • Does the failure of an employer to register its employees under the Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 absolve it from the statutory liability to pay social security contributions?
  • Can an establishment take advantage of its own wrong of non-registration to avoid statutory social security contributions?
  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution vs Messrs Spencer &1998 PLC 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-26
  social security contributionProvincial Employees' Social Security Ordinancealternative medical arrangementsemployer liabilityemployee registrationbeneficial enactment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the appellant institution's appeal and affirming the Sindh Security Court's decision that the respondent employer was not liable to pay social security contributions for a specified period. The core legal question was whether the medical allowance and alternative arrangements provided by the employer were adequate and equivalent to the statutory benefits under the Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965, to exempt them from contributions. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the lower judgments, holding that an employer cannot evade statutory social security contributions merely by failing to register its employees or by providing a partial medical allowance that does not cover the full spectrum of statutory benefits. The court laid down the principle that an establishment notified under the Ordinance is strictly liable to pay contributions by operation of law, and non-registration of employees cannot be used by the employer to take advantage of its own wrong or absolve it from statutory liabilities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employer is absolved from paying social security contributions if it fails to get its employees registered under the Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965?
  • Does the payment of a mere medical allowance exempt an employer from social security contributions under the Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965?
  • Can an employer take advantage of its own failure to register employees to avoid statutory liabilities?
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• Sikandar Abdul Karim vs The State1998 SCMR 908 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-25
  bail reductionreview petitionbank frauderror apparent on the face of the recordstatutory interpretationexcessive bailOffences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance 1984
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought a review of a Supreme Court order fixing bail at Rs. 104 million in a bank fraud case, contending it violated Section 5(7) of the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984. The core legal question was whether the Court erred in fixing bail exceeding twice the amount specified in the charge without recording special reasons, and whether such an amount effectively denied bail. The majority held that the review petition was maintainable as the failure to consider the statutory mandate regarding bail fixation constituted an error apparent on the face of the record. The Court ruled that while Section 5(7) prescribes a minimum bail amount of twice the specified charge, the Court must exercise discretion to ensure bail is not punitive or beyond the accused's financial capacity. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition and reduced the bail amount to Rs. 40 million, establishing that bail fixation must balance statutory requirements with the principle that bail serves to ensure attendance rather than to penalize the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a court to consider a statutory provision regarding bail fixation constitute an error apparent on the face of the record?
  • Is the amount of bail fixed under Section 5(7) of the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984, limited to twice the amount specified in the charge?
  • Can the court fix a bail amount that is effectively punitive or beyond the financial means of the accused?
  • Does the term 'charge' in Section 5(7) of the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984, refer to the formal charge-sheet or the allegations in the F.I.R.?
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• Siddiq Akbar, A.S.I. and others and Others vs Sanobar Khan, A.S.I. and others and Others1998 SCMR 2013 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-08
  service lawseniority listpolice servicestatutory approvaladministrative discretionnull and voidcivil servant promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which declared a seniority list and the underlying Standing Order No. II (issued by the Inspector-General of Police) to be null and void. The core legal question was whether the Inspector-General of Police could unilaterally issue a Standing Order affecting seniority and promotion criteria without obtaining the mandatory approval of the Provincial Government as required by Section 12 of the Police Act, 1861. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, holding that the Standing Order was issued without lawful authority because it lacked the requisite governmental approval. The Court rejected the argument of 'implied approval' based on the passage of time. The key principle laid down is that the term 'approval' under Section 12 of the Police Act, 1861, requires a deliberate act of passing judgment, discretion, and affirmative sanction by the Provincial Government. Administrative actions affecting the seniority and promotion of civil servants must strictly adhere to statutory requirements and cannot be validated by mere administrative practice or the passage of time.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'approval' in Section 12 of the Police Act, 1861, imply a requirement for affirmative sanction by the Provincial Government?
  • Can an administrative order issued by the Inspector-General of Police without Provincial Government approval be considered valid based on the passage of time?
  • Is a Standing Order issued by the Inspector-General of Police that lacks mandatory statutory approval legally enforceable?
  • Does the preparation of a seniority list for civil servants require strict compliance with governing rules and statutory procedures?
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• Siddiq Akbar, A.S.-I. and others Inspector-General of Police, N.-W.F.P.1998 PLC (C.S.) 1450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-08
  service tribunalsenioritypromotionstanding orderapproval of provincial governmentpolice actcivil servants
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals with leave of the Court were directed against a judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which had allowed a service appeal filed by respondent No. 1 and declared seniority given to the appellants under section 23 of the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants Act, 1973 as null and void, while setting aside Standing Order No. II issued by the Inspector-General of Police. The core legal question was whether the Standing Order issued by the Inspector-General of Police without the statutory approval of the Provincial Government was lawful and could form the valid basis for promotions and altering seniority. The Supreme Court held that the Standing Order, having been issued without the mandatory approval of the Provincial Government as required under section 12 of the Police Act, 1861 and Rule 1.2 of the Police Rules 1934, was devoid of legal status, without lawful authority, and a nullity in the eyes of the law. The Court laid down the principle that the term 'approval' under section 12 of the Police Act implies the active exercise of sound judgment, wise discretion, and final direct affirmative action by the Provincial Government, and cannot be presumed by mere passage of time or implied ratification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Standing Order issued by the Inspector-General of Police without the approval of the Provincial Government has any legal effect under section 12 of the Police Act 1861?
  • Can the approval of the Provincial Government for a departmental Standing Order be presumed or implied merely because the order has held the ground for a number of years?
  • Does the Inspector-General of Police possess the power to alter police seniority lists and make promotions based on unapproved administrative instructions?
  • What is the true legal definition and scope of the term 'approval' when required under a statutory provision like section 12 of the Police Act 1861?
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• Sher Muhammad vs Province of Punjab through District Collector, Vehari1998 SCMR 2636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  proprietary rightsIslamabad Oustees Schemesub-tenantres judicatacivil revisionleave to appealstate land allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a civil revision dismissed by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the dismissal of the petitioner's civil suit regarding proprietary rights over state land. The petitioner, claiming as a sub-tenant, initially obtained a favorable order from the Assistant Commissioner, but the Collector subsequently allotted the land under the Islamabad Oustees Scheme. The petitioner's writ petition challenging the adverse findings of the Board of Revenue was earlier dismissed by the High Court. The petitioner then instituted a civil suit, which was decreed by the trial court but reversed in appeal by the Additional District Judge, whose judgment was affirmed in revision by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could re-agitate his eligibility and claim for proprietary rights through a civil suit after the matter had been finally adjudicated against him by the Board of Revenue and affirmed by the High Court in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent civil suit was barred by the principle of res judicata, as the petitioner's lack of entitlement and eligibility had already been conclusively determined up to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, and the petitioner had also suppressed the prior High Court order in his civil suit. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil suit challenging revenue authorities' orders is barred by the principle of res judicata when the plaintiff's entitlement has already been adjudicated and dismissed in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does a sub-tenant under a short-term lease scheme possess the right to acquire proprietary rights in state land under the Islamabad Oustees Scheme?
  • Can a party maintain a subsequent civil suit after suppressing a material prior judgment of the High Court rendered against them on the same subject matter?
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• Sher Muhammad vs Mst. Khurshid Jehan Begum and others1998 SCMR 1291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-28
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantrent arrearsmisreading of evidenceleave to appealrent control
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld an ejectment order against the petitioner, Sher Muhammad, from premises known as Aziz Hotel. The respondent, Mst. Khurshid Jehan Begum, had sought ejectment on grounds of default in rent payment and unauthorized structural changes. The Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge had previously affirmed the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and ordered ejectment. The High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's challenge while allowing the respondent's cross-petition for recovery of rent arrears. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court had misread the evidence regarding the landlord-tenant relationship and the entitlement to rent arrears. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts had fairly examined the evidence and that no misreading had occurred. The Court affirmed that once a landlord-tenant relationship is established, the landlord is entitled to recover rent arrears. Finding no merit in the petitioner's arguments, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the establishment of a landlord-tenant relationship automatically entitle the landlord to recover rent arrears?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts absent a clear case of misreading of evidence?
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• Sher Muhammad through Legal Heir and others vs Allah Rakha and others1998 SCMR 2648 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-04-29
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionpedigree tablecontradictory pleadingsconcurrent findingsregular second appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a pre-emption suit filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents claiming a superior right of pre-emption as a collateral against a registered sale-deed of agricultural land. The trial court decreed the suit, and the lower appellate court as well as the Lahore High Court in regular second appeal maintained the concurrent findings. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the lower forums and the High Court correctly evaluated the evidence regarding the contradictory claims of parentage and relationship of the parties. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff-respondents failed to establish a consistent case regarding their pedigree and relationship to the vendors, and that material contradictions in the pleadings and evidence regarding parentage vitiated the findings of the lower courts. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and dismissed the pre-emption suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether without tangible proof regarding relationship of vendor and others with the predecessor of the respondents, his superior right to claim pre-emption over suit land could be lawfully accepted?
  • Whether appellate forums without making any comments or giving reasons could lawfully reject appeals and disregard evidence available on record?
  • Whether documentary evidence showing glaring differences about parentage of the vendor or plaintiff-respondents could be consciously ignored or omitted without assigning reasons?
  • Whether or not appellate forums were bound to thoroughly re-evaluate evidence brought on record and rectify defects of the trial court?
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• Sher Bahadur vs The State1998 SCMR 2610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-29
  murderocular testimonysole testimonyappreciation of evidencenatural witnessesbenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants under Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for murder. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in maintaining the conviction of the appellants based on the uncorroborated testimony of eye-witnesses after rejecting other pieces of prosecution evidence such as the dying declaration and weapon recoveries. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the eye-witnesses were natural, independent, and reliable witnesses whose testimony inspired confidence and was sufficient in itself to sustain a conviction. The key principle laid down is that a criminal conviction can lawfully rest on the sole testimony of reliable and natural eye-witnesses, even in the absence of corroborative evidence, provided such witnesses are found to be untainted and free from mala fides or improper motives.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal conviction can be maintained on the sole uncorroborated testimony of eye-witnesses?
  • Can the evidence of an eye-witness be discarded solely on the ground that he is a domestic servant of the complainant?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in maintaining the conviction of the appellants while disbelieving the dying declaration and recovery evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Ali alias Sheri vs The State1998 SCMR 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-19
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayabscondencecriminal procedurebail entitlementmurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner, who was charged with murder. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) due to the statutory delay in his trial. The Supreme Court held that while the third proviso creates a statutory right to bail upon the expiry of the specified period (two years for offences punishable with death), this right is forfeited if the delay is attributable to the accused's own acts or omissions. The Court determined that the petitioner's initial abscondence for several years directly caused the trial to be delayed, as it prevented him from being tried alongside his co-accused and necessitated the subsequent retrieval of case records from the High Court. Consequently, the Court ruled that the statutory period had not effectively expired in a manner entitling the petitioner to bail, as the delay was self-occasioned. The principle established is that an accused cannot benefit from their own wrong, and abscondence that contributes to trial delay disentitles an accused from claiming bail on the ground of statutory delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory right to bail under the third proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. apply if the delay in trial is attributable to the accused?
  • Can an accused person claim bail on the ground of statutory delay if their own abscondence caused the trial to be delayed?
  • Is the 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal' exception in the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. limited only to previously convicted offenders?
  • Does the word 'shall' in the third proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. mandate the grant of bail regardless of the court's discretion?
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• Sheikh Sajjad Hussain vs Managing Director (T & G), WAPDA, Lahore1998 PLC (C.S.) 1055 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-04
  service appealmajor penaltydepartmental inquirybenefit of doubtmala fide inquirySupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal with leave against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's service appeal against the imposition of a major penalty of reduction to a lower stage in the existing time scale. The core legal question concerns whether the penalty could be sustained when the inquiry committee did not record a clear-cut finding of guilt, granting the benefit of doubt, and when a co-accused's appeal arising from the same inquiry proceedings was previously allowed by the Tribunal on the ground that the inquiries were mala fide and invalid. The Supreme Court held that the imposition of the major penalty was unwarranted given the lack of a definite finding of guilt and the Tribunal's inconsistent treatment of co-accused subjected to the same vitiated inquiries. The Court laid down the principle that a penalty cannot be sustained where the inquiry report exonerates the employee or extends the benefit of doubt, and where identical inquiry proceedings have already been judicially declared mala fide in respect of a co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a major penalty be sustained when the inquiry committee's findings give the accused the benefit of doubt rather than recording a clear-cut finding of guilt?
  • Does a finding by the Service Tribunal regarding the invalidity and mala fide nature of an inquiry in the case of one co-employee enure to the benefit of another co-employee tried under the same inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Sajjad Hussain vs Managing Director (T & G) WAPDA, Lahore1998 SCMR 1565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-04
  service tribunaldepartmental inquirymajor penaltybenefit of doubtmala fide inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal with leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's service appeal against the imposition of a major penalty. The core legal questions involved whether the departmental inquiries were mala fide and whether the findings of the Inquiry Committee warranted the imposition of a major penalty. The Supreme Court held that the imposition of the major penalty was unwarranted as the Inquiry Committee had exonerated the appellant or given him the benefit of doubt on all charges, and noting that the Tribunal had already found in a co-employee's parallel appeal that the same inquiries were not bona fide. The Court laid down the principle that a major penalty cannot be sustained where the inquiry report fails to record a clear-cut finding of guilt and grants the benefit of doubt, especially when foundational inquiries are vitiated by a lack of bona fides.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a major penalty can be sustained when the inquiry committee gives the accused the benefit of doubt on the charges?
  • Does a finding by the Service Tribunal regarding the mala fide nature of an inquiry in a co-employee's case enure to the benefit of another employee tried under the same inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Rafiq And Others vs United Bank Limited And Others1998 P.C.T.L.R. 844 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-08-01
  Banking Tribunals Ordinancedecretal amountmandatory depositmaintainability of appealnullity of orderex-parte orderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed an application to recall an ex-parte order. The petitioners had filed appeals against Banking Tribunal decrees without depositing the decretal amount as mandated by the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984. The core legal question was whether such appeals were maintainable and whether the High Court correctly treated the initial admission of these appeals as a nullity due to non-compliance with statutory deposit requirements. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the first proviso to subsection (1) of section 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, are mandatory, requiring the deposit of the decretal amount as a condition precedent for entertaining an appeal. Consequently, the Court affirmed that an order admitting an appeal in violation of this statutory requirement is a nullity. The principle laid down is that where a statute explicitly bars the entertainment of an appeal absent a mandatory deposit, any judicial order admitting such an appeal without compliance is void ab initio and may be recalled.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal against a decree of a Banking Tribunal maintainable without the deposit of the decretal amount as required by the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984?
  • Can an order admitting an appeal that fails to comply with mandatory statutory deposit requirements be considered a nullity?
  • Does a court have the authority to recall an ex-parte order that was passed to correct an initial order which was void in law?
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• Sheikh Muhammad Ayub vs Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gujar1998 SCMR 2739 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-08
  service lawdismissal from serviceembezzlementwrit petitionreinstatementright of hearing
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court whereby a writ petition filed by a municipal employee challenging his dismissal from service was accepted and he was reinstated. The core legal question concerned whether the employee was guilty of embezzling funds collected from the Food Department, and whether the contractor, who was allegedly implicated, was entitled to a pre-decision hearing in the constitutional petition. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court rightly concluded, based on official records and the statement of the Chief Officer of the Municipal Committee, that the employee had paid the amount to the contractor and was not guilty of embezzlement. The Court further held that since no relief was sought against the contractor in the writ petition, he was not a necessary party entitled to a personal hearing, though his rights to dispute liability in subsequent recovery proceedings remained protected. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee dismissed for alleged embezzlement is entitled to reinstatement when official records and chief officer statements refute the charge?
  • Is a third-party contractor a necessary party entitled to a pre-decision hearing in a service writ petition filed against a municipal committee?
  • Can a person potentially burdened by findings in a service dispute challenge liability in subsequent recovery proceedings?
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• Shaukat Ali vs Sikandar Hayat and others1998 SCMR 1201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-23
  specific performancejoint khataco-sharerundivided landleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's regular first appeal in limine against a trial court judgment decreeing a suit for specific performance. The core legal question involves whether a suit for specific performance concerning an agreement to sell land executed by a co-sharer out of an undivided joint khata should be decreed in respect of specific khasra numbers or out of the joint khata as a whole. The Supreme Court held that two co-sharers being in possession of specific khasra numbers does not amount to a legal partition of joint land, and therefore the trial court committed no error in decreeing the sale out of the joint khata to the extent of the share coupled with possessory rights. The court established the principle that possession of specific portions of joint land by co-sharers does not constitute partition, and specific performance of an agreement by a co-sharer must respect the undivided nature of the joint khata.

  Questions settled

  • Does possession of specific khasra numbers by co-sharers in an undivided joint khata amount to a legal partition of the land?
  • Can a suit for specific performance of land from an undivided joint khata be decreed in respect of specific khasra numbers rather than out of the joint khata?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ali vs Ghulam Abbas and others1998 SCMR 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-11
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaystatutory ground for bailmurder trialleave to appealdelay in conclusion of trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant against the order of the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to the respondents in a case registered under sections 302, 34, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the respondents were entitled to the statutory concession of bail on the ground of delay in the conclusion of their trial under the third proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, notwithstanding certain adjournments and delays attributed to the defense or co-accused. The Supreme Court held that the respondents had remained incarcerated for a period exceeding two years without conclusion of the trial, and the minor delays sought on behalf of the accused did not suffice to exclude them from the benefit of the statutory proviso, nor could delays caused by co-accused in column No. 2 be attributed to them. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused, laying down the principle that statutory delay entitlement under the third proviso to section 497 Cr.P.C. applies unless the delay is directly occasioned by an act or omission of the specific accused seeking bail or persons acting on their behalf.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person is entitled to post-arrest bail on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does minor delay caused by adjournments sought on behalf of the accused disentitle them from statutory bail under the third proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can delay caused by the non-appearance or summoning of co-accused placed in column No. 2 of the challan be attributed to the respondents for the purpose of denying statutory bail?
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• Shaukat Ali and 18 others vs Land Acquisition Collector, Rawalpindi and 13 others1998 SCMR 395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-06
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompensationleave to appealmutationintervening period
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the determination of compensation for land acquired for the extension of Ayub National Park under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The core legal questions involve whether small-piece sale mutations should be excluded when determining market value, whether landowners are entitled to compensation enhancement for the extensive intervening period between the section 4 notification and the award, and whether post-notification sale deeds can serve as the basis for assessing market value. The Supreme Court held that these questions of public importance regarding land valuation principles require authoritative examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the legal rules governing market value assessment in compulsory acquisition cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the price of a small piece of acquired land can be legally fixed at a lower rate than similar land acquired in a large quantity?
  • Are landowners entitled to enhancement in compensation for the intervening period between the date of notification under section 4 and the award?
  • Can registered sale deeds executed after the date of notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act form the basis for determining market price?
  Read full judgment →
• Sharafud Din Sheikh vs The State1998 SCMR 2444 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-04-10
  joint trialsame transactionjurisdiction of special judgebriberynarcotics offenceleave to appealcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a revision petition regarding the jurisdiction of the Special Judge (Central) to try the petitioner. The petitioner, a Deputy Superintendent of Police, was accused of offering a bribe to a Deputy Director of the Anti-Narcotics Task Force to assist accused persons in a narcotics case. While the petitioner was initially involved in the narcotics investigation, he was subsequently charged with bribery under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act. The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to try these bribery charges alongside the narcotics case, arguing they were separate transactions. The High Court held that the offences were committed in the course of the same transaction and that the petitioner was liable to be tried with the co-accused under the Control of Narcotics Substances Ordinance, 1995. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the bribery offence and the narcotics recovery constituted the same transaction and whether joint trial was legally permissible.

  Questions settled

  • Can an offence of offering a bribe be tried jointly with a narcotics offence if the bribery is alleged to have occurred on a different date?
  • Does the act of offering a bribe to an official investigating a narcotics case constitute the same transaction as the original narcotics recovery?
  • Under what circumstances can a public servant be tried jointly with co-accused persons for separate offences under the Control of Narcotics Substances Ordinance 1995?
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• Shamshad Ali vs Senior Postmaster (Dely) and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 907 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-04-08
  compulsory retirementdisciplinary proceedingsregular enquirysummary proceduregovernment servantmisappropriationprocedural fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a government servant, challenged an order of compulsory retirement imposed upon him following allegations of temporary misappropriation of funds. The petitioner argued that he had provided an explanation for the delay in depositing the funds, citing an excessive workload, but his explanation was rejected. Crucially, the petitioner contended that the authorities imposed a major penalty without conducting a regular departmental enquiry. The petitioner asserted that the procedure mandated by the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, was violated because the competent authority failed to record reasons for dispensing with a regular enquiry and opting for a summary procedure instead. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the compulsory retirement order, passed without a regular enquiry and without assigning reasons for adopting a summary procedure, was legally sustainable in light of established jurisprudence requiring strict adherence to disciplinary procedures. The core legal question concerns the procedural necessity of holding a regular enquiry versus a summary enquiry in disciplinary proceedings against government servants.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for the competent authority to record reasons for dispensing with a regular enquiry under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
  • Can a major penalty of compulsory retirement be imposed on a government servant without holding a regular enquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamshad Ali vs Senior Postmaster (Delivery) and others1998 SCMR 2322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-04-08
  compulsory retirementdisciplinary proceedingsregular enquirysummary proceduregovernment servantmisappropriation of funds
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a government servant, challenged his compulsory retirement from service, which was imposed following an allegation of temporary misappropriation of funds. The petitioner contended that the disciplinary authority failed to follow the mandatory procedure prescribed under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. Specifically, the petitioner argued that the authority dispensed with a regular departmental enquiry without recording any reasons or passing a formal order to justify the adoption of a summary procedure, despite the petitioner having provided an explanation for the delay in depositing the funds. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the disciplinary authority acted in accordance with the law by bypassing a regular enquiry without assigning reasons, particularly in light of established precedents regarding the necessity of following prescribed disciplinary procedures. The core legal question concerns the procedural validity of dispensing with a regular enquiry in disciplinary proceedings against a civil servant without explicit justification.

  Questions settled

  • Can a disciplinary authority dispense with a regular enquiry against a government servant without recording reasons for adopting a summary procedure?
  • Is it mandatory to follow the procedure prescribed under Rule 5 of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1973 before imposing a major penalty?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakir Ullah Khan and 2 others vs Madad Khan Orakzai and others1998 SCMR 324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-26
  leave to appealpre-emption suitland acquisitioncompensation depositSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court arising from a pre-emption suit. During the pendency of the suit, a portion of the disputed land was acquired by the Peshawar Development Authority (P.D.A.). The core legal question concerned whether the compensation amount in respect of the acquired land received by the petitioners should be deposited in the pending pre-emption suit pursuant to previous directions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the clear and unambiguous directions in its earlier order mandated that the compensation amount received by the petitioners must be deposited in the pending pre-emption suit to be disbursed to the rightful party upon final adjudication. The key principle laid down is that parties who receive compensation for land subject to a pending pre-emption suit are bound to deposit such amounts in court in accordance with judicial directions for ultimate determination of entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether compensation received for land acquired during the pendency of a pre-emption suit must be deposited in court?
  • Are parties bound by clear and unambiguous directions given in prior appellate orders regarding deposited funds?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakil Ahmed and anothers vs Sardar Ali and anothers1998 SCMR 226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-24
  leave to appealappraisal of evidencemedical evidenceocular testimonysentence enhancementcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had partly accepted an appeal by a convict, Sardar Ali, by reducing his death sentence to imprisonment for life while maintaining the fine. The complainant, Shakil Ahmad, sought enhancement of the sentence, while the convict challenged the conviction itself. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court had properly appraised the evidence on record, specifically regarding contradictions between the ocular testimony and the medical evidence. The convict argued that the presence of blackening around the injuries, as noted by the medical witness, contradicted the complainant's claim that shots were fired from a distance of 40-45 feet. Furthermore, the defense challenged the credibility of the recovery of the weapon. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that these features required a thorough reappraisal of the evidence. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions to examine the merits of the conviction and sentencing.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of blackening around gunshot wounds contradict ocular testimony claiming shots were fired from a distance?
  • Is a reappraisal of evidence required when the High Court fails to address material contradictions between medical and testimonial evidence?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted to examine the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakeel Ahmed vs Commandant 502 Central Workshop E.M.E., Rawalpindi and anothers1998 SCMR 1970 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-07-01
  misconductcivil servantdepartmental inquirydismissal in liminenatural justicecharge-sheetappellate authorityservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the Federal Service Tribunal's dismissal of an appeal against the removal of a civil servant for misconduct. The petitioner contended that the removal was illegal due to the non-supply of a statement of allegations, the conduct of a 'sham' inquiry, and the appellate authority's failure to provide reasons. The Supreme Court held that while a civil servant must be provided with a charge-sheet and statement of allegations, the non-supply of the latter is not fatal if the charge-sheet is self-explanatory and causes no prejudice. The Court found the inquiry proceedings were procedurally compliant, as the petitioner was afforded opportunities to cross-examine witnesses. Although departmental appellate authorities are required to assign reasons for their decisions, the Court held that the Tribunal’s independent scrutiny of the record cured any such procedural defect. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that dismissal in limine of a first appeal is permissible in simple cases where no complex questions of law or fact arise. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as no question of law of public importance was involved.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-supply of a statement of allegations along with a charge-sheet automatically invalidate disciplinary proceedings against a civil servant?
  • Is a departmental appellate authority required to assign reasons for its decision when rejecting an appeal?
  • Under what circumstances can a first appeal be dismissed in limine?
  • Does the failure of a departmental appellate authority to provide reasons render the Tribunal's subsequent order illegal?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakeel Ahmed vs Commandant 502 Central Workshop E.M.E., Rawalpindi and another1998 PLC (C.S.) 1338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-07-01
  removal from servicemisconductdismissal in liminestatement of allegationsinquiry proceedingsdepartmental appealservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, whereby the service appeal of the petitioner, a Lower Division Clerk removed from service on charges of corruption and misconduct, was dismissed in limine. The core legal questions involved whether the removal proceedings violated the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 due to the non-supply of a statement of allegations, whether the inquiry procedure was defective, and whether the appellate authority was bound to assign reasons. The Supreme Court held that since the charge-sheet was self-explanatory and caused no prejudice, and the inquiry afforded due opportunity of hearing and cross-examination, the removal was valid. While reiterating that departmental appellate authorities should assign reasons for their decisions, the Court held that the Tribunal's proper scrutiny of the record cured any such defect. The petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused as no substantial question of law of public importance under the Constitution was involved.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-supply of a statement of allegations vitiate disciplinary proceedings where the charge-sheet is self-explanatory and causes no prejudice to the civil servant?
  • Whether inquiry proceedings conducted by a Court of Inquiry are invalid merely because some questions are put in the form of a questionnaire alongside the examination and cross-examination of witnesses?
  • Is a departmental appellate authority legally required to assign reasons when rejecting a departmental appeal?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal dismiss a first service appeal in limine under circumstances analogous to Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaikh Muhammad Khalil vs Haji Chand Muhammad1998 SCMR 2374 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-07-21
  Sindh Rented Premises OrdinanceArticle 115 Qanun-e-Shahadatestoppel of tenantrelationship of landlord and tenantevictiondefault in rentconcurrent findingsoral tenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the High Court ordering the petitioner's eviction on the ground of default. The respondent, father-in-law of the petitioner, was the admitted titleholder of the property and sought eviction, alleging a tenancy at Rs. 1,500 per month. The petitioner denied the landlord-tenant relationship, claiming he facilitated the property's transfer to the respondent, occupied it, and funded construction. The core legal questions pertained to the determination of the landlord-tenant relationship in the absence of written tenancy documentation between close relatives, and the applicability of estoppel against questioning the owner's title. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings, ruling that the lack of written documentation was understandable given the familial relationship and that the petitioner entered possession prior to the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance. The Court held that under Article 115 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, a person inducted into possession is estopped from denying the landlord's title. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, granting the petitioner three months to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of a written tenancy agreement under Section 5(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance invalidates an eviction proceeding when possession was inducted prior to the Ordinance's promulgation?
  • Whether an occupant inducted into possession by an admitted property owner is estopped under Article 115 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 from challenging the owner's title or entitlement to repossess?
  • Can a landlord-tenant relationship be established on a preponderance of evidence without rent receipts or a written agreement where the parties share a close familial relationship?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzad Naveed Gauhar vs Syed Jamil Safdar and 2 others1998 SCMR 2743 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-04
  civil servanttransfer and postingconstitutional petitionjurisdictional barservice tribunalinterim orderstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arose from an interim status quo order passed by the Lahore High Court in a constitutional petition filed by a civil servant challenging his transfer and posting orders. The core legal question concerned the maintainability of the writ petition before the High Court in view of the jurisdictional bar under Article 212 of the Constitution regarding matters relating to the terms and conditions of civil servants. The Supreme Court declined to examine the merits or the constitutional jurisdictional bar at the interim stage, choosing instead to dispose of the appeal by directing the High Court to decide the pending writ petition expeditiously within three months, while leaving all parties at liberty to raise the jurisdictional question before the High Court and preserving the status quo prevailing on a specific date in the interim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition filed by a civil servant challenging transfer and posting orders is maintainable in view of the Constitutional bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution?
  • Can the High Court entertain a constitutional petition directed against matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahtaj Sugar Mills Ltd. and 3 others vs Province of Punjab and others1998 SCMR 2492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-30
  sugarcane development cessprovincial legislative competenceconstitutional validationArticle 270-Ainter-provincial tradefiscal legislationMartial Law ordinances
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, sugar manufacturing companies, challenged the levy and enhancement of the Sugarcane Development Cess imposed by the Province of Punjab. They contended that the levy was unauthorized following the removal of sugarcane supply zones, that the amending Ordinances (XI of 1978 and XX of 1983) had lapsed due to constitutional time limits, that the cess created an imbalance in inter-provincial trade, and that the Provincial Legislature lacked the competence to impose such a tax, which allegedly fell under the Federal Legislative List. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the Sugarcane Development Cess is a valid provincial levy aimed at specific development purposes, such as road maintenance and plant protection, which are within the provincial legislative domain under Article 142(c). The Court further held that Article 270-A of the Constitution validated the challenged Ordinances, curing any defects regarding their duration or promulgation during the Martial Law period. The Court also rejected the argument that the cess violated inter-provincial trade principles, noting a lack of evidence, and expressly disapproved of the reasoning in the cited Peshawar High Court judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the removal of sugarcane supply zones render the levy of Sugarcane Development Cess unlawful?
  • Are Ordinances promulgated during the Martial Law period validated by Article 270-A of the Constitution despite the expiry of their statutory duration?
  • Does the imposition of a Sugarcane Development Cess by a provincial legislature fall within the scope of Item 49 of the Federal Legislative List?
  • Can a provincial legislature impose a cess for the development of roads and plant protection services under its legislative authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahro and others vs Mst. Fatima and others1998 PLD Supreme Court 1512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-07-27
  inheritanceShariat lawadverse possessionlimitationco-sharersfemale heirsOrder XLI Rule 22 CPCOrder XLI Rule 33 CPCrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a property dispute between female legal heirs and male co-sharers regarding inheritance governed by custom versus Shariah law, alongside questions of limitation and adverse possession. The core legal questions pertained to whether male co-sharers could establish adverse possession against female co-heirs through exclusive possession and revenue record entries, and whether a respondent in appeal can challenge adverse trial court findings without filing cross-objections under Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the appellate and High Court decrees in favor of the female heirs. The Court held that under Order XLI, Rule 22 CPC, a respondent supporting a decree may rely on grounds decided against them without lodging cross-objections, and under Order XLI, Rule 33 CPC, appellate courts possess wide powers to do complete justice. The Court further laid down that possession of one co-sharer is for the benefit of all; entries in revenue records do not create title or constitute ouster; and male heirs cannot claim adverse possession against female heirs absent express, hostile repudiation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a respondent support a decree on grounds decided against them by the trial court without filing cross-objections under Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Does an appellate court have the power under Order XLI, Rule 33 of the CPC to grant appropriate relief to a party in the absence of a cross-objection or appeal?
  • Can a male co-sharer establish adverse possession or ouster against female co-heirs solely through exclusive possession and fraudulent mutation entries in revenue records?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahid Hussain vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, State and Frontier Region (Safran), Islamabad and 2 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1035 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-05-29
  service appealtermination of servicetemporary employeeretrenchmentAfghan Refugee Organizationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Service Tribunal whereby the petitioner's service appeal against the termination of his services was dismissed. The petitioner, a temporary employee of the Afghan Refugee Organization appointed in BPS-11 and later promoted to BPS-15, had his services terminated following the alleged winding up of the organization. The Service Tribunal dismissed his appeal on the ground that he was a temporary employee with no vested right to retention upon the retrenchment of the organization. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider contentions that the Tribunal failed to address legal and factual aspects raised in the appeal, that the organization was still functioning, that rules regarding the retrenchment of the junior-most employees were not followed, and to examine the terms of removal applicable to a Federal Government employee who had completed ten years of service.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a temporary employee's services can be terminated without following rules pertaining to retrenchment?
  • Does a Service Tribunal fail to exercise its jurisdiction when it dismisses an appeal without deciding the legal and factual aspects raised by the appellant?
  • Whether an employee who has completed ten years of service has a right to be retained or governed by specific terms upon the winding up of an organization?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahid Hussain vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, State &1998 SCMR 2370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-05-29
  service lawtermination of serviceretrenchmenttemporary employeeleave to appealservice tribunalAfghan Refugee Organization
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against the termination of his services from the Afghan Refugee Organization. The petitioner, initially appointed on a temporary basis, challenged his termination, arguing that the organization remained operational and that established retrenchment rules, specifically the principle of 'last in, first out,' were ignored. The Service Tribunal had dismissed the appeal in limine, citing the winding up of the organization and the petitioner's temporary status, despite a prior Supreme Court remand order directing a decision on merits. The core legal questions concern whether the Tribunal failed to adjudicate the factual and legal aspects of the case, whether the organization was actually wound up, and whether the petitioner, as a Federal Government employee with ten years of service, was entitled to procedural protections regarding retrenchment. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting the Tribunal's failure to address these substantive contentions and the necessity of determining the petitioner's rights regarding termination and retrenchment procedures.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Service Tribunal err in law by dismissing an appeal in limine without addressing the specific factual and legal contentions raised by the appellant?
  • Is a temporary employee of a government organization entitled to the protection of retrenchment rules, such as the principle of seniority, upon the winding up of the organization?
  • Does the failure of a Service Tribunal to decide a case on merits after a remand order constitute a failure to exercise jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaheen Construction Company vs Karachi Development Authority1998 SCMR 1348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-28
  locus standiMaster Planwrit petitioncommercial plotswater conduit lineKarachi Development Authorityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the Karachi Development Authority's (KDA) decision to carve out three commercial plots from an area previously reserved for a water conduit line, which allegedly violated the area's Master Plan and the petitioners' property rights. The High Court of Sindh dismissed the writ petitions, citing a lack of locus standi for one petitioner and the fact that the other petitioner had allegedly benefited from similar land allocations. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the petitioners had the standing to challenge the KDA's actions, particularly in light of the alleged violation of the Master Plan. The Court noted the contention that the High Court erred in relying on unrelated precedents and failing to apply the principles regarding locus standi established in Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the KDA's actions were ultra vires the Master Plan and if the petitioners possessed the requisite standing to maintain their challenge, while maintaining the existing interim orders pending final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Does a property owner have locus standi to challenge the conversion of reserved open space into commercial plots if such action violates the Master Plan?
  • Can a court dismiss a writ petition based on the factual findings of an unrelated case where the current parties were not involved?
  • Is the carving out of commercial plots from land reserved for public utility infrastructure by a development authority subject to judicial review?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Muhammad and others vs Malik Abdul Rauf and others1998 SCMR 1363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-17
  revenue courtslandlord and tenantjurisdictional factsquestion of titleejectmentconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, which dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition challenging concurrent orders of the revenue hierarchy regarding their ejectment from disputed government land. The core legal question was whether Revenue Courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain an ejectment application when a question of title was raised by the petitioners claiming tenancy rights. The Supreme Court held that the Revenue Courts possessed the initial jurisdiction to determine jurisdictional facts, specifically the relationship of landlord and tenant, and that a mere assertion by the petitioners denying tenancy or raising a question of title did not oust the jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts. The ratio laid down is that a plea of title by a defendant does not alter the forum or divest a Revenue Court of its competence to determine the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship unless the finding on that jurisdictional fact suffers from a legal infirmity. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Revenue Courts are deprived of jurisdiction in an ejectment matter simply because a party raises a question of title?
  • Is the determination of the relationship of landlord and tenant a jurisdictional fact to be decided by the Revenue Court?
  • Whether the High Court's exercise of constitutional jurisdiction is warranted where Revenue Courts commit no legal infirmity in deciding jurisdictional facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Muhammad and others vs Central Government and others1998 SCMR 341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-10
  rejection of plaintevacuee propertylimitation actcivil revisionjurisdiction of civil courtleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' civil revision petition in limine and upheld the concurrent rejection of their plaint by the lower courts. The petitioners had filed a suit in 1990 for declaration and permanent injunction challenging an evacuee property auction held in September 1974, asserting that the disputed land was not evacuee property. The core legal questions concerned whether the suit was barred by limitation and whether the civil court had jurisdiction to grant such a declaration without approaching the Custodian under the relevant legal framework. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts committed no illegality in rejecting the plaint as barred by limitation and barred by law, noting that the petitioners failed to plead knowledge of the auction date and omitted to seek the necessary declaration from the Custodian. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused, reinforcing the principles governing the rejection of plaints under limitation laws and the bar on civil court jurisdiction in evacuee property matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit challenging an evacuee property auction filed sixteen years after the auction is barred by limitation?
  • Does the civil court have jurisdiction to grant a declaration that a property is not evacuee property without approaching the Custodian?
  • Whether a plaint can be rejected under law when the facts disclosed therein show it is barred by limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Zaheer Ahmad vs Qaimat Zamin and anothers1998 SCMR 535 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-12
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayleave to appealPATA Regulationmurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Peshawar High Court granting bail to the respondent, who is facing trial for murder and assault within the premises of the Sessions Court, Swat. The core legal question is whether the period for which the criminal case against the respondent remained pending in forums under the PATA Regulation—subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court—can be counted towards the statutory period prescribed under the third proviso to subsection (1) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the purpose of granting post-arrest bail on the ground of statutory delay. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine this question, holding that arguable points of law regarding the computation of the statutory detention period under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in cases originating from PATA Regulation jurisdictions require detailed consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Can the period of detention under an unconstitutional PATA Regulation be counted towards the statutory period for bail under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether bail can be granted on the ground of delay when the statutory period under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 has not been fulfilled in the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Nazir Ahmad vs The Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore and 2 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-26
  service tribunaldepartmental appealexhaustion of remediespremature appealtermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Court arises from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The appellant, a teacher whose services were terminated following prolonged absence from duty after being transferred, had filed an appeal before the Tribunal prematurely before exhausting the remedy of a departmental appeal. Although the Supreme Court had previously remanded the matter for re-examination, the Tribunal by a majority view dismissed the appeal as incompetent due to the lack of a prior departmental appeal at the time of its institution. The core legal question was whether a service tribunal can entertain an appeal filed before the filing of a departmental appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the majority view of the Tribunal, holding that the appeal before the Tribunal was indeed incompetent when filed, while directing the departmental authority to decide the pending departmental appeal within two months.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal is competent when filed prior to the filing of a departmental appeal?
  • Does the remand of a case by the Supreme Court automatically cure the initial incompetence of a prematurely filed service appeal?
  • Is a civil servant required to exhaust departmental remedies before approaching the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Abdul Shakoor and others vs Settlement & Rehabilitation1998 SCMR 1177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-13
  Rehabilitation and Settlement SchemeLand AllotmentPreferential RightConstitutional JurisdictionDisplaced PersonsFraudulent AllotmentSettlement Authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding land allotment disputes under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme. The core legal question was whether the respondent, a claimant displaced person and sitting allottee, held a preferential right to land over subsequent allottees, and whether the alleged transfer of her units to another district was valid. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Authorities and the High Court correctly determined that the respondent possessed a preferential right to the land. The Court affirmed that the evidence regarding the transfer of the respondent's units was fraudulent, unsigned, and undated, and thus invalid. Furthermore, the Court ruled that factual findings by Settlement Authorities, based on a proper appraisal of the record, are not subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that a sitting temporary allottee holds a superior right to land allotment against later claimants, and that fraudulent, unsubstantiated administrative records cannot divest a rightful claimant of their entitlement, nor can such findings of fact be disturbed by the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sitting temporary allottee possess a preferential right to land allotment over subsequent claimants under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme?
  • Can the High Court interfere with factual findings of Settlement Authorities in its constitutional jurisdiction when those findings are based on a proper appraisal of the record?
  • Is an unsigned and undated administrative note sufficient to prove the transfer of land units from one district to another?
  Read full judgment →
• Sezai Turkes Feyzi Akkaya Construction Company, Lahore through Project Manager Usman Akgul And Other vs (M_S.) Crescent Services, Lahore through Muhammad Saeed And Another(K.L.R. 1998 SC 40) · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  arbitration clausenovation of contracttermination agreementsub-contractsuperseded contractapplication for referencesurvival of arbitration clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking reference of a dispute to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in a sub-contract for Lahore By-Pass Project works. The petitioner resisted the application, contending that the sub-contract had been novated and superseded by a subsequent termination agreement which lacked an arbitration clause. The trial court and the High Court both repelled this contention and directed the parties to nominate their arbitrators, holding that the termination agreement had a clear nexus with the original sub-contract and both had to be read together. The Supreme Court affirmed these findings, holding that a subsequent agreement that relies upon the mechanism and obligations of the original contract does not wipe out or novate the original contract so as to abrogate its arbitration clause, which survives to govern disputes arising from the interrelated arrangements. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent termination agreement that relies on the mechanism of an original sub-contract extinguish the arbitration clause contained in the original agreement?
  • Whether an arbitration clause survives the termination or novation of a contract when the disputes are connected to the original agreement?
  • Are two related agreements between the same parties required to be read together to determine the applicability of an arbitration clause?
  Read full judgment →
• Senior Postmaster, G.P.O., Mardan and another vs Noor Din, Postmaster, Gujar Garhi. Mardan1998 SCMR 1096 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-02
  service appealgrace periodmotor vehicle taxdepartmental penaltypost officeSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the judgment dated 17-7-1995 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which accepted the service appeal filed by the respondent. The respondent, working as a Postmaster, had been charge-sheeted for renewing Motor Vehicle Tax Registration Books without charging admissible penalty, thereby allegedly causing a loss of revenue to the Government. The departmental authority imposed a penalty of recovery of the loss amount upon the respondent, whose defence was that the renewals were made within the grace period of one calendar month as provided under Rule 14 of the Provincial Tax Rules read with Fundamental Rule 9(18). The Service Tribunal set aside the penalty, observing that the grace period included the last day of the month and that numerous routine inspections of the post office revealed no irregularities. Aggrieved, the department filed a petition before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the grace period of one calendar month included the last date of the month. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's interpretation was sound and free from infirmity, and consequently dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, laying down that concurrent findings regarding departmental rules and grace periods without any question of public importance do not warrant interference.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grace period of one calendar month under the relevant tax rules include the last day of the month for the renewal of Motor Vehicle Tax Registration Books?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the factual findings of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding departmental disciplinary matters involving no question of law of public importance?
  Read full judgment →
• Senior Post Master, G.P.O., Mardan and another vs Noor Din, Post1998 PLC (C.S.) 712 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-02
  civil servantPakistan RangersFederal Service Tribunaljurisdictiondisciplinary rulesterms and conditions of serviceservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses several matters concerning service law and disciplinary proceedings against employees of the Pakistan Rangers and the Post Office Department. The core legal questions involve the jurisdictional competence of the Federal Service Tribunal over members of the Pakistan Rangers, their status as civil servants, and whether the Pakistan Rangers (Efficiency, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967 prevail over the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. The Court held that members of the Pakistan Rangers are deemed to be civil servants performing duties in connection with the affairs of the Federation, making appeals regarding their terms and conditions of service competent before the Federal Service Tribunal under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Furthermore, the Court established that the Pakistan Rangers (Efficiency, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967 are all-embracing and prevail over the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 in case of any conflict, pursuant to the overriding provisions of the West Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959.

  Questions settled

  • Are members of the Pakistan Rangers considered civil servants for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal?
  • Do the Pakistan Rangers (Efficiency, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967 prevail over the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain service appeals filed by members of the Pakistan Rangers?
  • Whether the grace period of one calendar month under tax rules for renewing motor vehicle registration books includes the last day of the month?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology and others vs Nasrullah Khan and anothers1998 SCMR 2742 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-03
  Service Tribunal jurisdictionlegal entitygovernment resolutionemployment statusleave to appealstatutory body
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology, challenging a decision of the Service Tribunal regarding the employment status of the respondent, Nasrullah Khan. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an employee serving in an organization established merely by a government resolution, which lacks the status of a legal entity, is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court examined the nature of the respondent's employer and determined that the organization in question did not constitute a legal entity. Relying on established precedents, including Mrs. M.N. Arshad and others v. Mrs. Naeema Khan and others, Saeed Rabbani v. Director-General, Leather Industry Development Organization and another, Chairman, Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, Islamabad v. Nasir Ahmad and others, and Dr. Rashid Anwar v. Federation of Pakistan, the Court held that the Service Tribunal had correctly adjudicated the matter. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming the Tribunal's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an organization formed by a government resolution without being a legal entity can be sued in the Service Tribunal?
  • Does an employee of a non-legal entity organization have the right to approach the Service Tribunal for service-related grievances?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology and others vs Nasrullah Khan and another1998 PLC (C.S.) 1033 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-03
  Service Tribunal jurisdictionlegal entitygovernment resolutionemployment statusleave to appealservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute concerning the employment status of the respondent, Nasrullah Khan, who served in an organization established via a government resolution. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an employee serving in an organization created by a government resolution, which lacks the status of a legal entity, falls within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court examined the nature of the respondent's employer and determined that the organization in question did not constitute a legal entity capable of being sued or treated as a statutory body for the purposes of service law jurisdiction. Relying on established precedents, including Mrs. M.N. Arshad v. Mrs. Naeema Khan, Saeed Rabbani v. Director-General, Leather Industry Development Organization, Chairman Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation v. Nasir Ahmad, and Dr. Rashid Anwar v. Federation of Pakistan, the Court upheld the decision of the Service Tribunal. The Court concluded that the Service Tribunal had correctly adjudicated the matter, finding no grounds for interference, and consequently dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an organization formed solely by a government resolution without independent legal status qualify as a legal entity for service law purposes?
  • Is the decision of a Service Tribunal regarding the employment status of an individual in a non-legal entity organization subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary, Education, Government of Punjab, Lahore and 3 others vs Shazia Abbas1998 PLC (C.S.) 899 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-07
  service matterwrit jurisdictionService Tribunaltermination of serviceconstitutional barleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the termination of the respondent's service as a P.T.C. Teacher. The core legal question is whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition challenging the termination of a government employee, or if such a matter fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The petitioners argued that the High Court's jurisdiction was barred by Article 212, while the respondent contended that her case did not fall under Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1974. The Supreme Court, finding that the point raised regarding the competency of the writ petition versus the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal required detailed consideration, granted leave to appeal to examine the scope of judicial review in service matters involving government employees. The Court did not issue a final ruling on the merits but established that the jurisdictional conflict warrants a full hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition against the termination of a government employee's service?
  • Is a dispute regarding the termination of a government employee's service exclusively triable by the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary, Education Department, Lahore and others vs Mst. Nasim1998 SCMR 557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-30
  civil servanttransfer and postingarbitrary transferservice tenureadministrative discretionPunjab Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had reinstated the respondent to her position as District Education Officer. The respondent, a senior educator, challenged her transfer and the subsequent placement of her services at the disposal of the Director of Education, arguing it was arbitrary and contrary to government policy regarding female employees. The core legal question was whether the transfer order, issued without assigned reasons and violating the principle of normal tenure, was legally sustainable or arbitrary. The Supreme Court held that while a civil servant has no vested right to a particular post, the arbitrary removal of a civil servant from a post before the completion of their normal tenure, without valid reasons, constitutes an improper exercise of authority. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, emphasizing that administrative transfers must not be arbitrary and that the Service Tribunal is justified in intervening when departmental orders lack transparency or justification, particularly when they deviate from established norms of service tenure.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to hold a particular post?
  • Can a transfer order be set aside if it is issued without assigning reasons and deviates from normal tenure?
  • Is the Service Tribunal justified in interfering with departmental transfer orders that appear arbitrary?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of the Punjab vs Bashir Akhtar Sahi1998 PLC (C.S.) 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-18
  Service Tribunalinterim orderexhaustion of remediessuspension of orderadministrative lawservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was directed against an interim order passed by the Service Tribunal, which had suspended the operation of an administrative order dated 22-8-1996. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the procedural status of the matter, noting that the Tribunal's interim order was subject to notice and that a subsequent hearing date had been fixed. Upon inquiry, the petitioner's counsel was unable to confirm the status of the proceedings on the subsequent date of hearing, while the respondent's counsel indicated that the Government had failed to appear before the Tribunal on that date. The Supreme Court held that in such circumstances, where an interim order remains pending and the petitioner has failed to pursue the matter before the forum of first instance, the appropriate remedy is to approach the Service Tribunal directly to seek the recall or modification of the interim order. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, establishing the principle that a party must exhaust remedies before the original forum, particularly regarding the recall of interim orders, before invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Is it appropriate for a petitioner to approach the Supreme Court against an interim order of a Service Tribunal without first seeking its recall from the Tribunal itself?
  • Does the failure of a party to appear before a Service Tribunal on a fixed date preclude the Supreme Court from entertaining a petition against an interim order?
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• Secretary Education, Government of Punjab, Lahore and 2 others vs 'Musarrat Afzal1998 SCMR 1394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-19
  writ jurisdictionservice matterfactual controversyappointment withdrawalconstitutional petitionsalary arrearsbar of jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a judgment by the Lahore High Court, which directed the Education Department to pay salary arrears to the respondent, Mst. Musarrat Afza, who claimed appointment as a primary school teacher. The appellants contended that the respondent's appointment order was withdrawn on the same day it was issued due to her ineligibility, and that the respondent was never a government employee. The core legal questions were whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain a service-related matter under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and whether the High Court could resolve disputed factual claims regarding employment status and salary entitlement in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in exercising writ jurisdiction because the case involved highly disputed factual controversies—specifically the validity of the appointment withdrawal—which could not be resolved without evidence. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the High Court failed to address the legal consequences of the appointment's revocation. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ruling that the matter was not suitable for adjudication under Article 199.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court resolve disputed questions of fact regarding employment status in its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199?
  • Does the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 preclude the High Court from entertaining service-related petitions?
  • Is a claim for salary arrears maintainable in writ jurisdiction when the underlying appointment is disputed and alleged to have been withdrawn?
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• Sarhad Development Authority through Chairman, Peshawar vs Land1998 SCMR 730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-16
  land acquisitionlocal commissionerpotential value of landspot inspectionadditional evidencefair compensationcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court order appointing a Local Commissioner to ascertain the actual location and potential value of land acquired for the Hattar Industrial Estate. The petitioner argued that the appointment was unnecessary as the location had already been fixed by Patwaris and that the order amounted to allowing additional evidence in violation of procedural rules. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, noting that the Patwaris' reports were deficient and lacked proper verification. The Court held that under Order XXVI, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, courts possess the discretion to appoint a Commissioner for local investigation to elucidate points in dispute, particularly when the existing evidence is insufficient to determine fair compensation or potential land value. Furthermore, the Court clarified that such an appointment does not constitute the illegal admission of additional evidence but serves to clarify doubtful or deficient points on the record. The petition was dismissed, affirming the High Court's authority to order such investigations to ensure just adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court appoint a Local Commissioner to inspect a site if the existing evidence on record is deficient or doubtful?
  • Does the appointment of a Local Commissioner for spot inspection constitute the illegal admission of additional evidence under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a court empowered to order a local investigation to determine the potential value of acquired land for compensation purposes?
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• Sardara and 4 others vs Muhammad Khan1998 PLD Supreme Court 1509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-19
  co-sharersjoint holdingpartitioninjunctiondocumentary evidencecivil revisionproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute between co-sharers regarding land in Khasra No. 772. The respondent, claiming a one-third share, sought an injunction to restrain the appellants from cutting trees and raising construction on the joint land. The appellants contended they held exclusive possession and had improved the land, arguing the respondent lacked a cause of action. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the First Appellate Court reversed this, finding the respondent remained a co-sharer based on documentary evidence, a decision affirmed by the High Court in revision. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether a co-owner in possession of a specific Khasra number within a joint holding could be restrained from using the land when partition was an available remedy. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the land remained joint and unpartitioned, the appellants could not unilaterally alter the character of the property, such as by cutting trees or constructing buildings, to the prejudice of other co-sharers. The Court emphasized that until formal partition, the rights of all co-sharers must be respected.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-sharer in possession of a specific portion of joint land unilaterally cut trees or raise construction thereon?
  • Does a co-sharer have a cause of action to restrain other co-sharers from altering the nature of joint property before formal partition?
  • Is a co-sharer entitled to injunctions against other co-sharers regarding joint property if the land has not been partitioned?
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• Sardar Hira Singh and another vs The State and others1998 PLD Supreme Court 1500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-08-06
  possession disputereligious property managementSection 145 Cr.P.C.sealing of propertyHigh Court jurisdictionfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the management of the Sree Guru Nanak Darbar in Karachi, which arose in 1993 between members of the Hindu community and two individuals claiming to be Sikh converts. The dispute led to proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before the Assistant Commissioner and S.D.M., who ordered the premises to be sealed due to an inability to determine which party held initial possession. While an Additional Sessions Judge initially reversed this order, the High Court subsequently restored the S.D.M.'s order. The petitioners approached the Supreme Court challenging the High Court's decision. The Supreme Court examined the record and found that the High Court's order was based on evidence recorded by the S.D.M. and that there was no misreading of evidence or oversight of material facts. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings of fact, dismissed the petition, and refused leave to appeal, affirming the restoration of the S.D.M.'s order regarding the possession and sealing of the property.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court restore an order of a Magistrate regarding the possession of property under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the Supreme Court inclined to interfere with findings of fact made by a High Court when there is no misreading of evidence?
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• Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others1998 SCMR 1616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-07-28
  proclamation of emergencyfundamental rightssuspension of fundamental rightsconstitutional petitionsjudicial reviewpowers of the president
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves constitutional petitions challenging the imposition and continuation of an emergency and the suspension of fundamental rights. The core legal questions relate to the maintainability of the petitions, the justification of the President's Proclamation of Emergency under the Constitution, the legality of suspending fundamental rights during such an emergency, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review the continuation of the emergency. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the petitions were maintainable, that the President was justified in issuing the Proclamation of Emergency under Article 232(1), but that the orders suspending the enforcement of Fundamental Rights were not justified and were therefore without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The Court further held that it retains the jurisdiction to review or re-examine the continuation of the emergency at any subsequent stage if circumstances so warrant. The key principle laid down is that while the executive proclamation of emergency may be justified under specific constitutional provisions, the blanket suspension of fundamental rights requires strict justification which, in this case, was found lacking, and the judiciary retains continuous oversight over the continuation of emergency circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Are constitutional petitions challenging a proclamation of emergency maintainable before the Supreme Court?
  • Was the President justified in issuing the Proclamation of Emergency under clause (1) of Article 232 of the Constitution?
  • Is an order suspending the enforcement of Fundamental Rights under clause (2) of Article 233 of the Constitution lawful?
  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review and re-examine the continuation of an emergency at subsequent stages?
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• Sar Dar Khan and 3 others vs The State1998 SCMR 1823 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-04
  criminal appealinterested witnessocular testimonyabscondencefalsus in uno falsus in omnibusmurdercorroborationcapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants for the murders of two individuals and misappropriation of property. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular testimony from interested witnesses, the necessity of corroboration following the acquittal of co-accused, and the evidentiary value of abscondence. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions for murder under Section 302/34 PPC, finding that the ocular testimony was consistent and credible. The Court held that the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus does not apply universally in Pakistan; courts may sift the grain from the chaff, accepting evidence against some accused while rejecting it against others. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that abscondence can corroborate prosecution evidence depending on the specific facts and circumstances. However, the Court set aside the conviction under Section 404 PPC, ruling that the prosecution failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt due to discrepancies in the recovered weapon's identification. The judgment reinforces that interested witness testimony is admissible and sufficient if confidence-inspiring, with corroboration requirements varying based on the case's specific context.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of some co-accused automatically render the testimony of eye-witnesses unreliable regarding the remaining accused?
  • Can the evidence of an interested witness be accepted without corroboration in a criminal case?
  • Does the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus apply to criminal proceedings in Pakistan?
  • Can the abscondence of an accused person serve as corroboration for other prosecution evidence?
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• Sajjad Hussain Kazmi vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 2 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-02
  service appealgazetted statusBPS-16upgradationservice tribunalcorrigendumservice rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal arose from a challenge to a Federal Service Tribunal judgment concerning the cancellation of a notification that had previously upgraded the appellant's status. The appellant, an Electronic Assistant, had been placed in BPS-16 and subsequently notified as a Gazetted Officer. The respondent department later issued a corrigendum cancelling this notification, asserting that the post remained in BPS-13 and did not qualify for gazetted status. The core legal question was whether the cancellation of the gazetted status notification adversely affected the appellant's service rights, specifically his pay, pension, and status. The Supreme Court observed that the classification between gazetted and non-gazetted officers had been abolished in 1973, with BPS-16 employees being equated to former Class-II officers. Finding that the respondents conceded the appellant retained his status as a Class-II officer and that his pay, allowances, seniority, and pension remained unaffected by the corrigendum, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the cancellation of the gazetted notification did not prejudice the appellant's substantive service entitlements.

  Questions settled

  • Does the cancellation of a gazetted notification for a government servant in BPS-16 necessarily affect their substantive service rights such as pay, pension, and seniority?
  • Are government servants in BPS-16 equated to the status of former Class-II officers following the abolition of the gazetted/non-gazetted classification?
  • Can a department issue a corrigendum to cancel a notification if the underlying service benefits and status of the employee remain protected?
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• Sajid Saeed and others vs Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan1998 PLC (C.S.) 864 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-15
  dismissal from servicemisconductreview petitioncondonation of delayleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprises six civil petitions filed against the judgments of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' writ petitions against their dismissal from service for misconduct, as well as subsequent review petitions. The petitioners sought review based on the newly discovered Circular dated 20-8-1990 issued under the A.D.B.P. Officers Service (E & D) Regulations, 1975, arguing that their dismissal orders were not passed by the competent authority, a ground upon which a similarly situated employee's writ petition was previously allowed. The core legal questions involved whether the learned Judge in Chambers was justified in refusing the review petition upon the discovery of the circular and whether the dismissal of the writ petitions in limine was in accordance with law. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these questions, while noting that the first three petitions were barred by time due to prosecution of review proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the learned Judge in Chambers was justified in refusing to review the order passed in the writ petitions upon the discovery of a new circular?
  • Whether the order of the learned Judge in Chambers dismissing the petitioners' writ petitions in limine is in accordance with law?
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• Said Nadeem Electro Limited through Chairman vs Collector of Customs and Central Excise_ Commissioner Sales Tax, Peshawar and 3 others1998 PTD 2410 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-19
  constitutional petitionalternate remedywrit jurisdictionexhaustion of remediesjudicial restraintsales tax exemptionappellate tribunal jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition regarding a sales tax exemption claim for television sets. The High Court held that the writ petition was incompetent due to the availability of an alternate adequate remedy before the Central Board of Revenue and the presence of factual controversies. Additionally, the High Court proceeded to record findings on the merits, concluding that the petitioner's case was not covered by the relevant notification. Following this, the petitioner unsuccessfully appealed to the Customs, Central Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction to review a High Court judgment. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether, upon finding a writ petition incompetent due to the failure to exhaust alternate remedies, a High Court should refrain from expressing views on the merits of the controversy. The Court noted that the High Court's findings on merits potentially prejudiced the petitioner's ability to seek relief before the appropriate statutory forum.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court, after determining that a writ petition is incompetent due to the existence of an alternate adequate remedy, should refrain from expressing views on the merits of the case?
  • Does a High Court's finding on the merits of a case, while simultaneously dismissing a writ petition for lack of jurisdiction, prejudice the petitioner's right to seek relief before the appropriate statutory appellate forum?
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• Said Nadeem Electro Limited through Chairman vs Collector of Customs and Central Excise Commissioner, Sales Tax, Peshawar and 3 others1998 SCMR 2339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-19
  constitutional petitionalternate remedyleave to appealsales tax exemptionappellate tribunal jurisdictiondismissal on merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition seeking a declaration of exemption from sales tax on television sets under a notification. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of availability of an alternate adequate remedy and the presence of factual controversies, while also recording findings on the merits against the petitioner. Following this, the petitioner pursued an appeal before the Customs, Central Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the Tribunal could not review the High Court's judgment. The core legal question is whether the High Court, after concluding that a constitutional petition was incompetent due to failure to exhaust alternate remedies, should have refrained from deciding the matter on merits. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine this issue, holding that expressing views on merits after dismissing a petition as incompetent was legally questionable. The key principle laid down is that when a court finds a constitutional petition incompetent due to alternate remedies, it ought to refrain from determining the controversy on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court ought to have refrained from expressing views on the merits of the case after having found that the writ petition was not competent for failure to exhaust alternate remedies?
  • Does an appellate tribunal have the jurisdiction to sit in review over a judgment of a High Court passed in a constitutional petition?
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• Sahibzada K.A.K. Afridi vs Pakistan International Airlines Corporation1998 SCMR 2607 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-05
  Service Tribunals ActSection 2-AJurisdiction of Service TribunalTermination of serviceCivil servant statusCorporation employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the Federal Service Tribunal's dismissal of a service appeal regarding the termination of the appellant's employment with the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation. The core legal question was whether the insertion of Section 2-A into the Service Tribunals Act 1973, via Act XVII of 1997, conferred jurisdiction upon the Federal Service Tribunal to adjudicate the service grievance of a corporate employee whose services were terminated prior to the amendment. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred in non-suiting the appellant. By virtue of Section 2-A, which declared service under corporations controlled by the Federal Government to be service of Pakistan, the Tribunal possessed the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The Court established the principle that such procedural amendments, which define the forum for adjudication, apply to matters brought before the Tribunal after the effective date of the legislation. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the case was remanded to the Tribunal for a decision on the merits in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the insertion of Section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act 1973 confer jurisdiction on the Federal Service Tribunal to hear appeals from employees of corporations controlled by the Federal Government?
  • Is an employee of a corporation established by Federal Law deemed a civil servant for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 following the enactment of Act XVII of 1997?
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• Sahib Khan vs Mir Adam Khan and 9 others1998 SCMR 663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-01-08
  pre-emptionrejection of plaintlimitationcause of actiondate of knowledgecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had affirmed the rejection of the petitioner’s plaint in a pre-emption suit. The petitioner sought possession of property, but the trial court, affirmed by the appellate and revisional courts, rejected the plaint on the grounds that it was barred by limitation. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in rejecting the plaint without allowing the petitioner to lead evidence on the issue of limitation. The Supreme Court held that while the rejection of a plaint should generally occur at the initial stage based on the averments, the petitioner had failed to disclose the date of knowledge regarding the alienation or delivery of possession of the suit property. The Court established the principle that where a plaintiff relies on the date of knowledge to overcome a limitation bar, the plaint must specifically assert that date. Because the petitioner omitted these essential details, the Court found no illegality in the lower courts' dismissal of the suit and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if it fails to disclose the date of knowledge required to overcome a limitation bar?
  • Is it mandatory for a plaintiff to specifically plead the date of knowledge in a pre-emption suit when claiming limitation based on such knowledge?
  • Does the rejection of a plaint require the court to allow the production of evidence regarding limitation?
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• Sahib Khan vs Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan And Others1998 P.C.T.L.R. 852 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-16
  Banking Tribunalex-parte decreeexecution of decreestay of executionbank guaranteeintra-court appealpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of the petitioner's writ petition and Intra-Court Appeal, which challenged execution proceedings before the Banking Tribunal arising from an ex-parte money decree. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in declining the writ petition and whether execution of a decree by the Banking Tribunal should be stayed merely because the validity of certain provisions of the governing law was referred to a larger bench. The Supreme Court held that the Banking Tribunal was fully justified in recalling the stay order upon the petitioner's failure to furnish the required bank guarantee, and the pendency of a reference regarding the statute's validity before a larger bench does not warrant staying the execution of a validly passed decree. The court laid down the principle that failure to comply with lawful conditions for a stay of execution disentitles a party to relief, and mere pendency of constitutional challenges in other matters does not automatically operate to stay execution proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to furnish a bank guarantee justifies the recall of a stay order of execution granted by a Banking Tribunal?
  • Does the mere referral of the validity of provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance to a larger bench operate to stay the execution of a decree?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing in limine a writ petition challenging execution proceedings before the Banking Tribunal?
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• Saeedullah Khan vs Central Board of Revenue And Others1988 P.C.T.L.R. 588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-15
  withholding taxturnover taxleave to appealincome tax ordinancelegislative competencetax deduction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil contractor engaged in road, bridge, and dam construction, filed a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's order dismissing his writ petition. The writ petition challenged the levy of withholding tax at the rate of 3% under section 80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and its increase to 5% under the Finance Act, 1995. The High Court had relied on earlier judgments upholding the validity of section 80-C and determining that the deduction rate is governed by the time of receipt of payment. The Supreme Court considered that leave to appeal had already been granted in similar matters to examine whether imposing income tax based solely on turnover without adjustment for actual income is a permissible exercise of legislative taxing power under Item 47 of the Federal Legislative List, Part I, of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Supreme Court consequently granted leave to appeal and issued interim orders for the pending appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the imposition of income-tax on the basis of turnover alone, without providing an opportunity to adjust with reference to actual income, is a permissible exercise of the legislative power of taxation?
  • Whether the deduction of income tax under section 80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, shall be at the rate prevalent at the time of receipt of payment or at the date of the contract?
  • Is section 80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, a valid piece of legislation?
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• Saadullah Khan Marri vs Federation of Pakistan and anothers1998 SCMR 1386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-02
  date of birthcivil servantservice tribunalretirementmatriculation certificate
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his appeal against his retirement from service with effect from 1-3-1994. The core legal question concerned the determination of the petitioner's correct date of birth after discrepancies appeared in gradation lists, and whether a school leaving certificate could replace a missing matriculation certificate for altering the recorded date of birth near retirement. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Service Tribunal rightly rejected the petitioner's belated plea for alteration of his date of birth, as he failed to produce an authentic matriculation certificate as required by the rules and his service documents consistently recorded his birth year as 1934. The key principle laid down is that a civil servant's request for the alteration of his date of birth near the end of his career, without producing authentic primary documentation such as a matriculation certificate, must be rejected as an afterthought when official service records consistently support an earlier date.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a school leaving certificate can be accepted for the alteration of a civil servant's date of birth in the absence of a matriculation certificate?
  • Can a civil servant seek the alteration of his date of birth towards the end of his career based on delayed pleas?
  • Are entries in official service documents and history cards considered reliable for determining a civil servant's date of birth?
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