Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Pervaiz Akhtar vs The State1991 SCMR 1909 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-29Read full judgment →
• Peer Muhammad Shah vs Secretary to the Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore And Another1991 SCMR 1336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-18
  service matterlimitation periodexclusion of timegood faithdue diligencecivil court jurisdictionservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former driver for the Additional Commissioner (Consolidation), challenged his termination of service through a civil suit after his departmental appeal to the Board of Revenue failed. The trial court initially decreed in his favor, but the Additional District Judge set aside the decree, ruling that the civil court lacked jurisdiction and that the proper forum was the Service Tribunal. Subsequent revision proceedings in the High Court were unsuccessful. The petitioner then approached the Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal as time-barred. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued for the exclusion of time spent litigating in the civil court when computing the limitation period for the Service Tribunal appeal. The Supreme Court held that under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908, a party seeking exclusion of time must demonstrate that prior proceedings were prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith. As the Service Tribunal had already made a factual finding that these elements were absent, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with those findings and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can time spent in civil court proceedings be excluded when calculating the limitation period for an appeal before a Service Tribunal?
  • Is a finding by a Service Tribunal regarding the lack of 'good faith' and 'due diligence' under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 a question of fact that the Supreme Court will decline to interfere with?
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• Parkash Kumar vs Chairman, Selection Committee, Balochistan1991 SCMR 1962 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-06
  res judicataexecutive decisionsadmission to collegereserved seatsdomicile certificatediscriminationarbitrary rejection
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose out of a challenge to the rejection of the appellant's application for admission to Baluchistan Engineering College against reserved seats for Kachhi District. The appellant's candidate claim was initially refused and deemed barred by the High Court under the principle of res judicata because he had studied outside Baluchistan Province during certain educational years. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether executive or administrative determinations operate as res judicata to bar subsequent reconsiderations, and whether the rejection of the appellant's claim was discriminatory and arbitrary. The Supreme Court held that administrative and executive decisions do not attract the principles of res judicata or finality so as to preclude correction or alteration. Finding that the appellant's father was a resident of Jhal Magsi, and that his siblings had been granted admission and employment on the same basis, the Court declared the rejection arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed that the appellant be considered for admission on merit without mark deduction for lapse of time.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to administrative or executive decisions?
  • Can an executive decision or determination be altered or corrected despite a prior contrary determination?
  • Whether treating similarly situated candidates differently regarding provincial residence for college admission amounts to unlawful discrimination?
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• Pakistan.Medical and Dental Council vs Dr. Zeb UN Nisa1991 SCMR 536 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-14
  medical qualificationsequivalence of degreespost-graduate diplomastatutory regulationsconstitutional petitionPakistan Medical and Dental Council
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the High Court could lawfully declare the refusal of the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council to treat a foreign post-graduate qualification as a "medium" qualification to be without lawful authority. The respondent, a medical teacher holding a Diploma in Clinical Pathology from London and a Diploma in Pathology from England, sought a writ to have her qualifications registered or declared as major or medium qualifications equivalent to M. Phil (Pak). The High Court allowed the petition, holding that the Council had applied double standards. The Supreme Court examined the Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962 and the framed Regulations, noting that the law provides for recognized medical qualifications, recognized additional medical qualifications, and specific categories for appointment, but does not recognize a "medium" category of qualifications for registration. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in creating or enforcing a non-existent category of qualification and substituting its own judgment for technical evaluations properly falling within the domain of the Council. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court judgment was set aside, and the constitutional petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council is empowered under its statutory framework to classify post-graduate medical qualifications into a category known as "medium" qualifications for registration?
  • Can a High Court substitute its own technical assessment and notions of equivalence for the evaluation of professional medical qualifications conducted by the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council?
  • Whether additional medical qualifications obtained abroad require classification as major or minor for the mere purpose of statutory registration under the Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962?
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• Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority And Others vs Abdul Sattar And Other1991 SCMR 1150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-15
  WAPDAforged appointmentsdepartmental proceedingsstay of proceedingsservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves three petitions filed by the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) challenging the employment of respondents who allegedly secured their appointments through forged signatures of a Federal Minister. The core legal question concerns the validity of these appointments in light of the alleged fraud and the status of the departmental proceedings initiated against the Superintending Engineer involved in the recruitment process. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, noting that the departmental proceedings against the Superintending Engineer had been stayed by the High Court in a separate writ petition, determined that the current petitions could not be effectively adjudicated without the outcome of that related litigation. Consequently, the Court held that the matters should be adjourned pending the High Court's judgment in the Superintending Engineer's writ petition. The key principle established is that where the legality of an administrative action is inextricably linked to a pending judicial determination in a related proceeding, the Court may stay the proceedings to avoid conflicting decisions and ensure a comprehensive resolution of the underlying dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court adjourn proceedings pending the outcome of a related writ petition in the High Court?
  • Should a court proceed with a case involving alleged employment fraud when the disciplinary proceedings against the official responsible are currently stayed by another court?
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• Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority and another vs Alam Khan1991 PLD Supreme Court 374 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-10
  limitation periodmisdescription of partyamendment of plaintcivil procedurerecovery suitWAPDAprocedural error
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a suit for the recovery of money filed by the respondent against the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) regarding electricity connection charges. The trial court decreed the suit, finding that WAPDA failed to produce sufficient evidence to justify additional charges discovered by its audit party. WAPDA’s subsequent appeal and civil revision were dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, WAPDA argued that the suit was time-barred because it was initially filed against the Chairman of WAPDA, and WAPDA itself was impleaded only after the limitation period expired. The Supreme Court examined whether this constituted the addition of a new party under the Limitation Act 1908. The Court held that the initial filing against the Chairman was merely a misdescription of the party, not the addition or substitution of a new defendant. Consequently, the amendment to correct the description did not trigger the limitation provisions of Section 22(1). The Court affirmed that the trial court possessed the authority under Section 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to correct such procedural errors to determine the real issue in controversy.

  Questions settled

  • Does the correction of a misdescribed party in a plaint constitute the addition of a new defendant under Section 22(1) of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can a court exercise its power under Section 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to correct a misdescription of a party in a suit?
  • Is a suit time-barred if the initial plaint misdescribed the defendant as the Chairman of a statutory body rather than the body itself?
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• Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Ofdefence, And Others vs Late Ch.1991 SCMR 2180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-17
  land acquisitionrequisitioned landofficial gazettegazette notificationDefence of India Actoccupancy tenantslimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns four appeals brought before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the validity of land acquisition for an aerodrome in Sargodha. The lands of the respondents (occupancy tenants) were originally requisitioned in 1942–43 under the Defence of India Act, 1939. The respondents challenged the subsequent acquisition and arbitration proceedings, contending that no acquisition notice was published in the official Gazette as required under Section 5(1) of the Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Powers) Ordinance, 1946 (effective 1-10-1946). The High Court decreed the respondents' suits. Upon reviewing the available record, the Supreme Court held that the land was in fact permanently acquired prior to 1 October 1946. Consequently, publication in the official Gazette was not required under the law applicable at the relevant time. The Court further observed that even if the acquisition notice was issued after 1 October 1946, the failure to gazette it immediately constituted a mere technical irregularity where actual notice was served and acted upon for decades. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and dismissed the respondents' suits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to publish an acquisition notice in the official Gazette invalidate a land acquisition if the governing law at the time of acquisition did not mandate gazette publication?
  • Does a delay in publishing an acquisition notification in the official Gazette invalidate the acquisition where actual notice was served on the landowners and acted upon?
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• Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Defence And Others vs Late Ch.1991 SCMR 275 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-26
  land acquisitionrequisition of propertyleave to appealcompensationoccupancy tenantsburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns four petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Government of Pakistan against judgments of the Lahore High Court. The respondents, claiming to be occupancy tenants, alleged their lands were requisitioned in 1942 under the Defence of India Act, 1939, for an aerodrome, but that compensation ceased after 1946 without proper acquisition proceedings. The respondents successfully sued in Civil Court for a declaration that the acquisition and arbitration proceedings were illegal and for recovery of lease money. The Supreme Court observed that the Government failed to produce the relevant notification under the Defence of India Act, 1939, or the Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Powers) Ordinance, 1946, to substantiate the acquisition. Given the aerodrome's construction and the uncertainty regarding compliance with legal formalities, the Court granted leave to appeal. The Court directed the Deputy Attorney General to locate and produce the official records and notifications concerning the acquisition proceedings to determine whether the legal requirements for land acquisition were satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government claim land acquisition without producing the relevant statutory notification?
  • Is a civil court competent to declare acquisition proceedings illegal if the government fails to prove compliance with statutory formalities?
  • What is the duty of the state to produce official records when the legality of land acquisition is challenged?
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• Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and 2 others vs Salahuddin and 3 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-09
  Promissory EstoppelNon-Repatriable Investment SchemeImport LicenceNo-Objection CertificateAdministrative InactionExecutive DiscretionConcluded Contract
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals were filed by the Federal Government challenging a consolidated judgment of the Sindh High Court. The respondents, overseas Pakistanis, had obtained No-Objection Certificates (NOCs) under the lawful Non-Repatriable Investment (N.R.I.) Scheme and subsequently entered into concluded contracts to import machinery using their own foreign exchange. Later, the Government issued a prohibitory notification under Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950, and refused to issue import permits or allow customs clearance, citing executive policy change and absence of a vested right. The Supreme Court dismissed the Government's appeals, holding that the issuance of import licences following a valid NOC was a consequential step where parties had altered their positions. The Court ruled that the doctrine of promissory estoppel operates against the Government's executive and public functions, preventing it from arbitrarily reneging on promises solemnly made under a lawful scheme, subject to defined limitations such as legality, absence of fraud, and detrimental reliance.

  Questions settled

  • Is the doctrine of promissory estoppel applicable against the Government in the exercise of its executive and public functions?
  • Can the Government rely on a subsequent prohibitory notification under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 to defeat rights arising from concluded contracts entered into pursuant to a valid No-Objection Certificate under a lawful scheme?
  • What are the recognized limitations on the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against public authorities?
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• Pakistan Through Secretary Ministry of Food, and Agriculture vs Special Court (Banking) Sindh And Other1991 SCMR 2355 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-01
  constitutional jurisdictionBanking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinanceinterlocutory orderwrit petitionlawful authorityamendment of plaintSpecial Court (Banking)
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, by leave, challenged a High Court judgment that had set aside an order of the Special Court (Banking). The underlying dispute involved a suit for recovery filed by a partnership firm against a bank, which was later transferred to the Special Court. The Special Court had dismissed the plaintiff's application to implead additional parties and amend the plaint, citing the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, set aside this order, holding that because the interlocutory order did not dispose of the entire case, it was not appealable under the Ordinance, thus justifying intervention. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling that the High Court erred in exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199. The Court held that a tribunal acting within its jurisdiction has the authority to decide matters rightly or wrongly; an erroneous decision does not equate to an act without lawful authority. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be used to bypass statutory remedies or replace the discretion of a trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 to interfere with an interlocutory order passed by a Special Court merely because the order is allegedly erroneous?
  • Can a party challenge an interlocutory order of a Special Court (Banking) via a Constitution Petition if the order is not appealable under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is a decision made by a court or tribunal acting within its jurisdiction subject to judicial review simply because the decision is incorrect?
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• Pakistan Through Military Estate Officer vs Assistant Commissioner, Mianwali And Another1991 SCMR 1748 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-13
  land acquisitiontemporary occupationcompensation for landstatutory renttime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding the payment of rent for land occupied by the Defence Department. The core legal question concerned the obligation of the petitioner to pay rent for land temporarily occupied under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, after the sanctioned period had expired. The facts established that the Defence Department had taken possession of land in Mianwali for a three-year period under Section 35 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but failed to pay rent as required by Section 35(2). The Land Acquisition Collector had determined the rent, and the Land Acquisition Judge upheld this determination. The Supreme Court found no legal infirmity in the lower courts' decisions, noting that the petitioner remained in possession without payment. Furthermore, the Court observed that the petition was time-barred. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the principle that the state cannot occupy private land without complying with the statutory requirement to pay compensation or rent as determined by the relevant authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Is the government liable to pay rent for land temporarily occupied under the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Can a petition be dismissed on the grounds of being time-barred?
  • Does the failure to initiate formal acquisition proceedings absolve the government from paying rent for temporary possession of land?
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• Qutabuddin vs Gulzar and 2 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 1109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-19
  res judicatalimitationconsolidation of suitscopying agencyOrder XVII Rule 3 CPCcivil revisionremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from consolidated suits concerning the ownership of a bus, where the appellant claimed purchase on instalments and the respondents claimed ownership. The trial court dismissed the appellant's suit under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) for failure to produce evidence, and subsequently decreed the respondents' suit. The District Judge dismissed the appellant's appeal against the respondents' decree as time-barred, and consequently dismissed the appeal against the dismissal of the appellant's own suit on the ground of res judicata. The High Court upheld these decisions. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the original copying application and found that the copying agency's stamp cancellation date contradicted the finding that the application was returned to the appellant on an earlier date. Holding that the appeal was within time and res judicata did not apply, the Court also noted that Order XVII, Rule 3 CPC was wrongly applied as the adjournment was not at the appellant's request. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments, and remanded both consolidated suits to the trial court for fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal can be dismissed as time-barred based on copying agency register entries when physical evidence on the application contradicts those entries?
  • Does the dismissal of an appeal on the ground of limitation operate as res judicata to bar a companion appeal arising from consolidated suits?
  • Can a court invoke Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure to close a party's evidence and dismiss a suit when the adjournment was not granted at the request of that party?
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• Pakistan Railways, Through The District Controller Of Stores, Shop Depots1991 SCMR 372(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-19
  Payment of Wages Actjurisdiction of Authorityrunning staffStores Departmentservice lawleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Pakistan Railways against an order regarding the entitlement of employees in the Stores Department to be classified as running staff. The core legal questions presented for the Supreme Court's consideration are twofold: first, whether the Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, possesses the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputed questions of entitlement; and second, whether employees specifically engaged in the Stores Department can be legally equated with running staff operating on the open line. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these issues, noting that similar petitions involving the same legal questions had already been admitted for hearing. Consequently, the Court ordered that the appeal be prepared for an early hearing alongside connected matters to resolve the dispute affecting a large number of employees. Pending the final adjudication of the appeal, the Court suspended the operation of the impugned order, subject to all just exceptions, thereby maintaining the status quo until the matter is fully heard and decided.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act 1936 have jurisdiction to determine entitlement when the question is disputed?
  • Can employees of the Stores Department be legally equated with running staff on the open line?
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• Pakistan Railways vs Abdul Aziz And 9 Other1991 SCMR 781 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-20
  leave to appealservice promotiontemporary appointmentlocal arrangementdirect recruitment quotareversion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Pakistan Railways against the respondents, Abdul Aziz and nine others, concerning service promotions and appointments. The core legal question is whether specific administrative instructions applied by the lower forums were applicable to the respondents' case, given that their promotion and appointment orders explicitly stated they were purely temporary local arrangements against the direct recruitment quota, conferred no right to regular promotion, and subjected them to reversion without notice upon the availability of senior or regular staff. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine this question and ordered the suspension of the impugned order of the Labour Court in the interim. The holding establishes that leave is granted to scrutinize the applicability of departmental instructions to temporary promotions made under specific limiting conditions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether departmental instructions can be applied to temporary promotions made under specific terms excluding regular rights?
  • Does a temporary promotion order explicitly stating liability to reversion without notice confer any right to regular promotion?
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• Pakistan Railways Through The Secretary/Chairman, Ministry Of Railways1991 SCMR 1811 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-28
  arbitration proceedingsappointment of arbitratordeath of arbitratorfresh nominationpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from arbitration proceedings wherein the appointment of a sole arbitrator was challenged before the High Court. During the proceedings before the Supreme Court, it was acknowledged by both parties that the appointed arbitrator, a retired judge, had passed away, thereby necessitating a fresh nomination and initiating new proceedings before the lower court. The core legal question concerned the procedural mechanism following the demise of a sole arbitrator and the validity of subsequent unilateral appointments without recourse to the competent court. The Supreme Court held that the death of the arbitrator and the subsequent notice of a new appointment created a changed factual situation requiring fresh objections and applications to be formally raised before the lower court concerned. The key principle laid down is that upon the demise of an appointed arbitrator, fresh appointment procedures and any related objections must be properly brought before the appropriate court of law rather than bypassed through unilateral notices.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal effect of the death of a sole arbitrator on ongoing arbitration proceedings?
  • Must fresh proceedings and objections be commenced before the lower court when a new arbitrator is to be nominated?
  • Can a party circumvent the lower court by directly serving a notice for a new arbitrator appointment after the demise of the original arbitrator?
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• Pakistan Railway vs Abdul Haqique And Other1991 SCMR 657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-22
  vicarious liabilityfatal accidentsmaster and servanttortious liabilityinterest on compensationstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit for compensation filed under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, following a fatal traffic accident caused by the rash and negligent driving of an employee of the Pakistan Railway. The core legal question was whether the master (the employer) could be held vicariously liable for compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, or if liability was restricted solely to the actual wrongdoer. The appellant argued that the preamble of the Act indicated an intention to hold only the direct wrongdoer liable. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the phrase 'the party who would have been liable' in Section 1 of the Act is broad enough to encompass the master's vicarious liability for torts committed by a servant in the course of employment. The Court affirmed that the preamble cannot be used to restrict the clear and unambiguous meaning of the enacting provisions. Consequently, the Court upheld the master's liability but modified the award of interest, ruling that interest should accrue from the date of the decree rather than the date of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a master be held vicariously liable for compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855 for a tort committed by their servant?
  • Does the preamble of the Fatal Accidents Act 1855 restrict the scope of Section 1 to the actual wrongdoer only?
  • From what date should interest on compensation be calculated in a suit under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855 where the defendant's liability is vicarious?
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• Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. And Others vs Ishaque Mirza And Other1991 SCMR 491 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-01
  writ jurisdictionmaster and servantcontractual employmentleave to appealdissolution of corporation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which accepted a writ petition filed by former employees of the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (P.I.D.C.). P.I.D.C. was dissolved and its business and properties were transferred to Bannu Sugar Mills Ltd., a private company. Employees were given the option to join the new company or resign and receive admissible dues. Certain employees resigned and accepted their dues, but later challenged the transfer of their services and resignations through a writ petition. The High Court granted partial relief, entitling certain respondents to encashment of earned leave, notice period compensation, provident fund, and gratuity. The core legal question was whether the High Court could entertain a writ petition regarding contractual employment and issue a money decree. The Supreme Court held that contracts of employment are not amenable to writ jurisdiction, and the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition or pass a money decree on disputed facts without evidence. Leave to appeal was accordingly granted.

  Questions settled

  • Are employment contracts amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to pass a money decree in writ proceedings involving disputed questions of fact without recording evidence?
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• Pakistan Engineering Council vs Afzal Anwar Associates And Other1991 SCMR 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-04
  ultra viresstatutory interpretationdelegated legislationregulatory authorityengineering professionlicensing requirementsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sindh High Court, which declared Bye-law No. 3 of the Construction and Operation of Engineering Works Bye-laws, 1987, ultra vires. The Pakistan Engineering Council, a statutory body established under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976, had framed these bye-laws under section 25 of the Act, requiring contractors and operators of engineering works to obtain licenses from the Council. The High Court had struck down the bye-law, reasoning that the parent Act was intended to regulate the engineering profession rather than engineering works or contractors, and that the bye-law exceeded the Council's statutory authority under section 8 of the Act. The petitioner contended that the High Court misinterpreted the scope of the Council's functions, citing definitions of professional engineering works and penalty provisions within the Act. The Supreme Court, observing that the contentions raised were of first impression and required authoritative determination, granted leave to appeal to examine the scope of the Council's regulatory powers under the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976, authorize the Council to regulate engineering works and contractors through bye-laws?
  • Is the scope of the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976, limited strictly to the regulation of the engineering profession?
  • Can a statutory body frame bye-laws that impose licensing requirements on contractors if the parent Act does not explicitly grant such authority?
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• Pakistan Engineering Council And 2 Others vs Engineer I. A. Osmani And 3 Other1991 SCMR 654 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-16
  Pakistan Engineering Councilderegistrationinfamous professional conductEnrolment Committeeinterim reliefexhaustion of statutory remedieselection participationconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Pakistan Engineering Council and its functionaries against an interim order of the Lahore High Court. The High Court had permitted deregistered engineers, found guilty of infamous professional conduct by the Enrolment Committee, to participate as candidates and voters in Council elections while declining to suspend their deregistration orders. The core legal questions involved whether a constitutional petition could be entertained before exhausting statutory appellate remedies under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976, and whether interim relief permitting election participation could be granted while the underlying disqualification remained intact. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and set aside the interim order. The Court held that statutory appellate remedies before peer bodies must ordinarily be exhausted prior to invoking constitutional jurisdiction. It further laid down that it is inequitable and inconsistent to permit deregistered professionals to participate in elections without first suspending their underlying disqualification orders.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be entertained against an order of a professional enrolment committee without first exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal?
  • Whether interim relief allowing participation in professional body elections can be granted while the order of disqualification or deregistration remains intact?
  • Should peer-review remedies under a regulatory statute be exhausted before a court undertakes judicial review of disciplinary actions against professionals?
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• Pakistan and 3 others vs Civil and Military Press Ltd. and 3 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 619 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-13
  Central Excise Dutycorrugated boardpaper boardstatutory interpretationall sortstaxing statutetrade usagevested rightsejusdem generis rulemanufacture
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Sindh High Court judgment that declared the levy of Central Excise Duty on "corrugated board" illegal under Item No. 37 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The core legal question was whether "corrugated board" falls within the description of "Paper and Paper Board all sorts" for excise duty purposes. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that "corrugated board" is indeed covered by Item No. 37. The Court reasoned that the phrase "all sorts" has the widest possible connotation, encompassing all kinds of paper boards, including corrugated board. It was further held that the existence of a different manufacturing process or characteristics does not exclude an item from a broadly worded category. The Court also found that the argument for a special trade meaning for "paper board" was not factually established and was negated by the words "all sorts." Claims of vested rights due to past departmental practice were rejected as the statutory language of Item No. 37 had changed over time, and the ejusdem generis rule was deemed inapplicable.

  Questions settled

  • Does "corrugated board" fall within the meaning of "Paper and Paper Board all sorts" under Item No. 37 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
  • How should the phrase "all sorts" be interpreted in a taxing statute?
  • Can a special trade meaning of a term override the plain meaning of a broadly worded statutory description like "all sorts"?
  • Does a past departmental practice of not levying excise duty create a vested right if the relevant statutory language has changed?
  • Is the ejusdem generis rule applicable when a statutory provision uses the phrase "all sorts"?
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• Packages Limited through its General Manager and others vs Muhammad1991 PLD Supreme Court 258 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-10
  industrial relationstermination of serviceredress of individual grievancesnon obstante clausestatutory interpretationlabour court
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of five civil appeals addressing whether the addition of subsection (6) to section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 by the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1973 provided an exclusive remedy for termination of service or an additional, concurrent remedy alongside subsections (1) to (4). The core legal question involves the interpretation of the non obstante clause in subsection (6) and its effect on the pre-existing grievance redressal mechanism. The Supreme Court held that the remedy provided under subsection (6) is an additional and concurrent remedy rather than an exclusive one, as there is no inherent inconsistency or repugnancy between the two sets of procedures allowing them to co-exist. The key principle laid down is that a non obstante clause operates as an ouster of earlier provisions only where a direct conflict and inconsistency exists between them, and special provisions do not exclude general provisions unless they are absolutely repugnant to each other.

  Questions settled

  • Whether subsection (6) of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 provided an exclusive or an additional remedy for the termination of a workman's service?
  • Does a non obstante clause necessarily oust the application of earlier statutory provisions in the absence of a direct conflict or inconsistency?
  • Can a workman still avail of the remedies under subsections (1) to (4) of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 after the insertion of subsection (6)?
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• Nusrat and others vs Zulfiqar and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-14
  sudden fightfree fightcommon intentionculpable homicideindividual liabilityself-defencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction for murder and assault under sections 302/34 and 323/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the incident constituted a 'free fight' or a 'sudden fight,' and the resulting applicability of common intention under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court held that the occurrence was a sudden fight, characterized by a chance encounter without premeditation, rather than a free fight, which requires prior preparation for a pitched battle. Consequently, the Court ruled that the principle of common intention was inapplicable. The convictions under sections 302/34 and 323/34 were set aside. Instead, the Court determined individual liability, convicting one appellant under section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for grievous hurt and section 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for hurt, and the other under section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The judgment clarifies that in sudden fights, individual liability prevails over joint liability.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal distinction between a 'free fight' and a 'sudden fight' in criminal law?
  • Does the doctrine of common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply to a sudden fight?
  • Can an accused be held individually liable for specific injuries in a sudden fight where common intention is absent?
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• Nur Ali Through Legal Heirs And Others vs Mst. Niamat Bibi And Other1991 SCMR 283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-02
  inheritancereview petitiondoctrine of mergerpartition suitleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal by the High Court of a review application concerning a long-standing inheritance dispute. The core legal question involved the propriety of the High Court refusing to exercise its review jurisdiction on the ground that the original High Court judgment had already merged into a prior appellate judgment of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where the matter has been finally decided by the appellate court and the relief sought in review could have been urged and granted in the earlier appeal before the Supreme Court, the High Court correctly declined to exercise its power of review. The key principle laid down is that a High Court appropriately refuses a review application when the underlying judgment has merged into the judgment of the Supreme Court and the points raised could have been addressed in the prior apex court proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise review jurisdiction after the underlying judgment has merged into the appellate judgment of the Supreme Court?
  • Does the failure to file copies of the Supreme Court judgment and grounds of appeal warrant the dismissal of a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Whether relief that could have been sought in an appeal before the Supreme Court can subsequently be pursued through a review application in the High Court?
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• Nooruddin vs Sirajuddin1991 SCMR 762 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-24
  rented premisesevictiondefault in rentnotice of transferlandlord and tenantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant against a High Court order directing his eviction from a shop on the grounds of default in rent payment. The High Court had ruled that a formal notice under Section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, was unnecessary because the tenant possessed contemporaneous knowledge of the landlord's purchase of the property. The core legal questions involve whether the absence of a formal Section 18 notice renders the eviction order invalid despite the tenant's actual knowledge of the ownership transfer, and whether the tenant's deposits of rent under Section 10(3) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, were sufficient to negate the claim of default, even if technical defects existed in those deposits. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the tenant's intent to pay rent to avoid eviction warrants the exercise of judicial discretion in his favour, notwithstanding the alleged default period.

  Questions settled

  • Is a formal notice under Section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, mandatory even when the tenant has contemporaneous knowledge of the change in ownership?
  • Does the deposit of rent under Section 10(3) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, protect a tenant from eviction for default if technical defects exist in the deposit process?
  • Should judicial discretion be exercised in favour of a tenant who demonstrates an intent to pay rent to avoid eviction despite technical defaults?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs The State1991 PLD Supreme Court 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-22
  murderextra-judicial confessionretracted confessionco-accused confessioncorroborationwajtakkarres gestaeillicit liaisoncapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a murder conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code, where the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The prosecution's case rested on a retracted extra-judicial confession of the co-accused (the deceased's wife), motive stemming from an illicit relationship, and 'wajtakkar' (chance meeting) witness testimony. The core legal question was whether a retracted extra-judicial confession of a co-accused, in the absence of direct ocular evidence, could sustain a conviction on a capital charge, and what constitutes sufficient corroboration. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while a retracted extra-judicial confession of a co-accused requires corroboration in material particulars, sufficient corroboration existed in this case. The Court identified corroborative factors including the co-accused being an inmate of the house who was last seen with the deceased, the consistent and identical false explanations given by both accused to 'wajtakkar' witnesses, and the immediate statements of the co-accused forming part of the res gestae. The Court also observed that murder resulting from an illicit liaison generally warrants capital punishment rather than a lesser sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction on a capital charge be solely based on the retracted extra-judicial confession of a co-accused without corroboration?
  • What circumstances can serve as sufficient corroboration to a retracted extra-judicial confession of a co-accused in a murder case?
  • Does the fact that a wife was an inmate of the house and the person 'last seen' with her deceased husband serve as corroborative evidence of her complicity?
  • Is a lesser sentence of life imprisonment legally tenable in a murder case where the motive is the prosecution of an illicit liaison?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Salabat Bibi And Other1991 SCMR 1299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-20
  occupancy rightsfraudulent sale-deedmisreading of evidenceleave to appealState landsanction for sale
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that affirmed a decree setting aside a sale-deed of occupancy rights in State land. The respondent had initially sold her occupancy rights to the petitioner, but subsequently filed a civil suit alleging the sale-deed was obtained through fraud. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court and the High Court ruled in favor of the respondent. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court misread the evidence regarding the respondent's participation in the administrative proceedings for obtaining sanction to sell the land. The petitioner argued that he had indeed summoned the original record from the Collector's office and examined a witness who identified the respondent during those proceedings, contrary to the High Court's finding that he failed to prove these steps. The Supreme Court found substance in the petitioner's contention that the record was misread, holding that the evidence had been overlooked. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court's finding regarding the failure to prove a document be challenged if the record shows the relevant evidence was actually produced?
  • Does the failure to summon original records or verify thumb impressions constitute a fatal defect in proving a transaction when other corroborative evidence exists?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad Through His Legal Heirs vs Muhammad Tufail And Other1991 SCMR 512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-19
  pre-emptioncolony areaexemption from pre-emptionColonization of Government Lands Actprivate landcivil appeals
  Summary & questions settled

  This order deals with civil appeals arising from pre-emption suits decreed against the purchasers of land originally owned by a private individual in Bahawalpur. The core legal question was whether the suit land was exempt from pre-emption under the relevant notification issued pursuant to the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 and the Pre-emption Act, 1913, and which of the conflicting previous Supreme Court precedents applied. The Supreme Court held that the exemption notification under section 8(2) of the Pre-emption Act applies only to land that was government-owned under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, and not to land that was privately owned at the relevant time. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. The key principle laid down is that exemption from pre-emption for colony areas under the applicable Bahawalpur notifications is contingent upon the disputed land being government property rather than privately owned.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land in dispute was subject to pre-emption or was exempted under the Notification of the Bahawalpur Government?
  • Does the exemption from pre-emption under section 8(2) of the Pre-emption Act apply to privately owned land governed by the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad And Others vs The Assistant Settlement Commissioner (Lands)/ Collector, Vehari And Other1991 SCMR 1283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-11
  civil reviewtemporary allotteerehabilitation schemeland allotmentsettlement authorityvested right
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from four civil review petitions filed against three previous judgments of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 18th June, 1989, which had dismissed the petitioners' appeals. The core legal question involved whether a married daughter, Mst. Fatima, could claim the status of a temporary allottee for land adjustment based on her father and brother's temporary allotments under Paragraph 5 of Rehabilitation Scheme Part-II, and whether grievances concerning the implementation of rehabilitation guidelines could be raised through review proceedings. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner was not a recorded member of the family of the temporary allottees, was married, and resided in a different village, she could not claim the status of a temporary allottee as of right in a congested district. Furthermore, the court held that grievances regarding the implementation of rehabilitation guidelines must be pursued before the appropriate Settlement Authority in accordance with law rather than through a review petition. Consequently, the review petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a married daughter claim the status of a temporary allottee based on the temporary allotments of her father and brother in a congested district?
  • Whether grievances regarding the implementation of rehabilitation guidelines can be agitated through a review petition before the Supreme Court?
  • Does a claimant have a vested right to land adjustment without holding the status of a recorded temporary allottee in the relevant estate?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad And Others vs Muhammad Siddique And Other1991 SCMR 1549 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-31
  leave to appealreview petitionstatus quopossessionappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two review petitions filed against an earlier order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan that had refused leave to appeal in two separate cases. Upon initial review, the Court determined that the contentions raised by both parties warranted further examination, leading to the scheduling of a regular hearing for the review petitions. After hearing the arguments again, the Court recalled its previous order dismissing the leave to appeal petitions. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in both matters. The Court directed that the appeals be prepared based on the existing record, with liberty granted to the parties to file necessary additional documents. Furthermore, the Court ordered that the status quo regarding the possession of the subject matter be maintained pending the final adjudication of the appeals, and set the security amount at Rs. 5,000 for each case.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court recall an order refusing leave to appeal upon a review petition?
  • Does the granting of leave to appeal necessitate the maintenance of status quo regarding possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad And Another vs Punjab Province And 2 Other1991 SCMR 1361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-27
  leave to appealtemporary injunctioncivil revisioninterlocutory ordersprejudice at trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed by the plaintiffs against the dismissal of their civil revisions by the High Court, which had upheld the rejection of their applications for temporary injunction against the defendants. During the hearing, the petitioners' counsel conceded that their primary grievance stemmed from certain observations made in the refusal orders that could potentially prejudice their case during the trial. The Supreme Court addressed the core legal question of whether interim observations in interlocutory orders can prejudice a substantive trial on merits. The Court held that while the discretionary refusal of a temporary injunction was maintained and the petitions were dismissed as without merit, the observations made in the refusal orders shall not influence or affect the course of the trial before the lower court. The key principle laid down is that interlocutory observations regarding temporary injunctions are tentative and must not prejudice the independent adjudication of the suit on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether observations made in an order refusing a temporary injunction can adversely affect the trial of the suit?
  • Can a discretionary order refusing to grant a temporary injunction be interfered with when the grievance is limited to prejudicial interlocutory observations?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad and another vs M Ehdi1991 PLD Supreme Court 711 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-08
  tentative rent orderstriking off defencedefault in rentSindh Rented Premises Ordinanceejectment proceedingsbona fide error
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh upholding an ejectment order against the appellants for alleged default in complying with a tentative rent order passed under section 16(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether a technical or bona fide error in depositing rent into a wrong case file, promptly rectified, warrants the striking off of the tenant's defence and eviction. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that where there is no deliberate or contumacious disregard of the Rent Controller's order, a technical default in depositing rent does not attract the penal consequence of striking off the defence and eviction. The key principle laid down is that bona fide mistakes or technical irregularities in complying with tentative rent orders, absent contumacy, should not result in the harsh penalty of eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a technical or bona fide error in depositing rent into a wrong case file warrants striking off the tenant's defence under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does a default in complying with a tentative rent order that is not deliberate or contumacious attract the penalty of eviction?
  • Can a tenant be penalized for disobedience of a Rent Controller's order when the misplacement of rent deposit arose from confusion regarding the case number and was promptly rectified?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Ahmad And 20 Others vs Mst. Zeba And 12 Other1991 SCMR 1990 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-30
  constitutional jurisdictionmutation proceedingslimitationtitle and possessionrevenue recordsremand orderBoard of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from leave to appeal granted to examine whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, could lawfully set aside a remand order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue. The parties were engaged in a serious contest over the possession and ownership of extensive land, leading to multi-forum litigation involving revenue authorities, criminal proceedings, and civil suits. The core legal question concerned whether a suit of title and possession could be time-barred by reference to mutation proceedings conducted in the absence of the affected parties and treated merely as a correction of revenue entries. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in treating the civil proceedings as confined to the correction of a mutation register, noting that mutation proceedings lack determinative value regarding title and that the suit was fundamentally one of title and possession. The Court laid down the principle that the bar of limitation cannot be applied to a title suit by reference to an ex parte mutation having no value other than for fiscal purposes, and that questions of limitation relating to title, possession, and dispossession must be determined after a proper and full trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether mutation proceedings possess determinative value regarding the question of title?
  • Can a civil suit for title and possession be held time-barred by reference to an ex parte mutation entry made without notice to the affected parties?
  • Does the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction have the power to set aside a remand order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue directing a fresh trial on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Nook Hassan And Another vs Sakhi Muhammad And Other1991 SCMR 783 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-30
  agricultural landcancellation of landleave to appealstatus quoright of purchase
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the cancellation of agricultural land measuring 11 Bighas 8 Biswas previously held in the name of one Dona, whose sons are the petitioners. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the petitioners are entitled to be offered the disputed land for sale under the provisions of Act XIV of 1975, notwithstanding any alleged lack of original title, given that the land has not been allotted to any other party under the impugned orders. The Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioners' counsel merit detailed examination. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, ordered security in the sum of Rs. 2,000, directed that status quo be maintained, and permitted the processing of the appeal on the existing record with liberty to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether petitioners are entitled to be offered cancelled agricultural land for sale under Act XIV of 1975?
  • Does a contention regarding statutory entitlement to purchase unallotted cancelled land warrant the grant of leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Nizam Din vs Syed Ashfaq Ali Shah And 2 Other1991 SCMR 1878 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-01
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionrival pre-emptorseasementcontiguityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court involving a dispute between rival pre-emptors regarding the superior right of pre-emption over a suit property. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who claimed a right based solely on contiguity, possessed a superior right compared to the respondents, who claimed rights based on both contiguity and the existence of an easement (windows opening towards the suit property). The Supreme Court held that the respondents established a superior right because the petitioner failed to specifically deny the respondents' claim regarding the easement, and the petitioner admitted that the respondents' windows opened towards the suit property. Consequently, the Court found the respondents' case fully covered under the relevant statutory provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the lower courts, concluding that the respondents held the superior right of pre-emption, and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of an easement, such as windows opening towards a suit property, establish a superior right of pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
  • Is a failure to specifically deny an opponent's claim in a written statement considered an admission of that claim in pre-emption litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Nikhat Riaz vs Manzoor Hassan1991 SCMR 1434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-25
  ejectmentpersonal needbona fide needlandlord and tenantrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an appeal against the dismissal of an ejectment application filed by the appellant-landlady seeking the eviction of the respondent from the demised premises on the ground of bona fide personal need. The core legal question was whether the sufficiency of accommodation available to the landlady while residing with her father in a house not owned by her, alongside her alleged past conduct of enhancing rent instead of pursuing eviction, constituted valid grounds to reject her claim of personal need. The Supreme Court held that a landlord has the prerogative to occupy their own property and cannot be compelled to continue living as a licensee or in accommodation owned by relatives, and that the finding of mala fides based on unproven past conduct was not sustainable on the evidence. The Court laid down the principle that the fact that a landlord is residing in premises belonging to relatives or in rented property does not disentitle them from seeking the eviction of a tenant for their own bona fide personal use.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the fact that a landlord is living with relatives or in another house provides a valid ground to dismiss an ejectment application for personal need?
  • Can an ejectment application be dismissed on the ground of mala fides based on a tenant's unproven allegations of past rent enhancements?
  • Does a landlord have the prerogative to occupy their own property rather than residing in a house owned by a relative?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Ahmad And 2 Others vs Habib Bank Ltd. And Other1991 SCMR 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-16
  Banking CourtRecovery of loansLeave to defendConditional leaveJudicial discretionMortgaged property valuationBanking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against orders passed by a Banking Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioners challenged conditional orders granting leave to defend suits for the recovery of financial facilities, arguing that the Banking Court should have granted unconditional leave and that the mortgaged property was undervalued for security purposes. The Supreme Court held that the Banking Court possesses the discretion to grant leave to defend either conditionally or unconditionally, provided such discretion is exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily. In these cases, because the petitioners did not deny receiving the financial facilities and failed to produce evidence regarding the current market value of the mortgaged properties, the Banking Court’s assessment was deemed reasonable. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with the Banking Court's exercise of discretion and refused the petitions. The judgment reinforces that conditional leave is appropriate when the underlying liability is not denied and the court has applied its mind to the facts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Banking Court have the discretion to impose conditions when granting leave to defend a recovery suit?
  • Is the imposition of security as a condition for leave to defend a recovery suit permissible when the defendant admits to receiving financial facilities?
  • Can a party challenge the valuation of mortgaged property by a Banking Court without providing evidence of its current market value?
  Read full judgment →
• Nek Muhammad vs The State1991 SCMR 1630 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-19
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirypolice investigationmurdervicarious liabilityinnocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for bail in a murder case registered under Section 302, Section 148, and Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was named in the FIR but subsequently found innocent by three successive police investigations, was entitled to bail, particularly when no specific injury was attributed to him. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail. The ratio of the decision is that where an accused is not alleged to have caused any physical injury to the deceased and multiple police investigations have consistently declared him innocent, his precise liability constitutes a matter of further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court granted the bail petition. The key principle laid down is that the findings of successive investigating officers regarding innocence, coupled with the absence of specific injury attribution, provide sufficient grounds for the court to determine that the case against the accused requires further inquiry, thereby warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a finding of innocence by successive police investigations constitute a ground for further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail if they are not alleged to have caused any specific injury to the deceased?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant bail to an accused whose bail application was previously dismissed by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore Through Its Chairman1991 SCMR 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-10
  service appealsalary arrearsback benefitscivil servantremanddepartmental proceedingsreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a service matter where the appellant challenged the Service Tribunal's failure to adjudicate his entitlement to salary and allowances for the period between his initial dismissal and subsequent reinstatement. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal correctly abstained from passing an order regarding these arrears. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred by failing to address the prayer for salary arrears, which was a matter explicitly raised before it. The Court emphasized that under the second proviso to Section 16 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, a civil servant whose dismissal or removal is set aside is entitled to such arrears of pay as the authority setting aside the order may determine. Because the Tribunal had not exercised this discretion or adjudicated the claim on its merits, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal to that extent and remanded the case to the Service Tribunal for a decision in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Service Tribunal required to adjudicate a claim for salary arrears when an order of dismissal is set aside?
  • Does Section 16 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974 mandate that the authority setting aside a dismissal order must determine the entitlement to arrears of pay?
  • Can a Service Tribunal abstain from deciding a specific prayer regarding back benefits raised in a service appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad Khan vs Member (Colonies), Borad of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore And Other1991 SCMR 1726 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-19
  leave to appealdiscretionary reliefwrit jurisdictionillicit cultivationpenaltyBoard of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a constitutional petition challenging the recovery of a penalty imposed for illicit cultivation of resumed Government land under the Colonization of Government Lands Act. The core legal question concerns the entitlement of the petitioner to discretionary relief regarding the quantum of penalty. The Supreme Court held that since the amount being recovered was admittedly not commensurate with the benefit obtained by the petitioner, discretionary relief under writ jurisdiction as well as leave to appeal should be denied. The key principle laid down is that a party seeking discretionary equitable relief must demonstrate clean hands and entitlement thereto, and disproportionate benefits or lack of merit disentitles them to interference from superior courts.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petitioner entitled to discretionary relief in writ jurisdiction when the penalty amount is not commensurate with the benefit obtained?
  • Can leave to appeal be refused by the Supreme Court on the ground that the petitioner is not entitled to discretionary relief?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Muhammad vs Messrs Marker Alkaloids And Other1991 SCMR 1351(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-24
  constitutional jurisdictionlabor disputemisconductdomestic inquiryunchallenged evidencecorroborationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a Constitution Petition by the Baluchistan High Court, which upheld the Labour Appellate Tribunal's order setting aside the reinstatement of the petitioner workman with back benefits. The petitioner had been dismissed from service following a departmental inquiry for disorderly behavior, hurling filthy abuses at a co-worker, and threatening a supervisor. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court rightly declined to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with the factual findings of the Labour Appellate Tribunal regarding the validity of the domestic inquiry and the reliance on unchallenged witness testimony. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that where a witness's statement is left unchallenged and no motive for false implication is established, the inquiry officer can lawfully rely upon it without requiring corroboration, and the High Court correctly refused to re-appreciate evidence in its constitutional jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that an unchallenged statement of a witness not suffering from any impeachable motive constitutes strong proof and does not require corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Can an inquiry officer rely on an unchallenged statement of a witness without corroboration?
  • Whether the High Court can re-appreciate evidence in its constitutional jurisdiction regarding findings of a Labour Appellate Tribunal?
  • Does the failure to cross-examine a complainant or establish a motive for false implication validate the reliance on witness testimony in a domestic inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Muhammad And Another vs Talib Hussain1991 SCMR 1320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-29
  pre-emptionwaiver of pre-emptionsale transactioncivil revisionpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 21-2-1989, arising out of a pre-emption suit. The core legal question raised was whether the respondent had waived his right of pre-emption by participating in the sale transaction. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the absence of waiver were unexceptionable, noting that the assertion of the petitioners that the respondent took part in the transaction was merely oral, unsupported by any written undertaking, and stood successfully rebutted by the unrebutted evidence that the respondent was not present in the village on the day of the sale. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the right of pre-emption.

  Questions settled

  • Whether oral assertion alone is sufficient to establish waiver of a right of pre-emption?
  • Can a pre-emptor's right to pre-empt be defeated without proof of active participation and a clear undertaking at the time of sale?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Muhammad And Another vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner And Another1991 SCMR 1896 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-29
  leave to appealwrit petitioninordinate delaysettlement lawLetters Patent Appealrent assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' appeal against an order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner regarding property demarcation and rent assessment. The petitioners, Nazar Muhammad and Muhammad Siddiq, challenged the High Court's dismissal of their earlier Constitution petition. The High Court had dismissed the initial petition on two primary grounds: first, that there was an inordinate and unexplained delay in approaching the court against the order passed in the second revision petition; and second, that if a review petition was still pending before the Settlement Officers, the writ petition was premature. The Letters Patent Bench affirmed these findings. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the lower courts had thoroughly examined the facts, claims, and entitlements of the parties. As the petitioners failed to demonstrate any error of law in the impugned judgment, the Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal, holding that no case for interference was made out.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ petition be dismissed on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay in approaching the court?
  • Is a writ petition premature if a review petition regarding the same matter is still pending before the administrative authority?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal when the petitioner fails to demonstrate an error of law in the impugned judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawabzada Muhammad Shah Khan Through His Attorney Haji Sharfuddin1991 SCMR 732 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-14
  tribal areascurative legislationFederal Land Commissiondistributive interpretationArticle 247revisional powersvalidation of orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose out of land dispute proceedings originating from the provincially administered tribal areas under the Settlement of Immovable Property Disputes (Dir and Swat) Regulation, 1972. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court of Pakistan were whether the Chairman or a Member of the Federal Land Commission could individually exercise revisional powers under Martial Law Regulation No. 123, and whether the Chairman and Members of Federal Land Commission (Validation of Orders) Ordinance 1981 (Ordinance XXII of 1981) applied without formal extension under Article 247 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that statutory conferment of authority designating officers individually is to be read distributively unless a contrary intention appears. Furthermore, as a remedial and curative statute validating specified past orders, Ordinance XXII of 1981 did not require formal extension to tribal areas under Article 247. The Court established that curative statutes must be given full remedial effect once the targeted defect and remedy are clear.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chairman or a Member of the Federal Land Commission singly exercise revisional powers conferred upon designated officers?
  • Does a remedial and validating Ordinance require formal extension under Article 247 of the Constitution to affect orders originating from tribal areas?
  • How should statutory authorisations enumerating or designating specific officers be interpreted where joint exercise of power is not expressly required?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab vs Mst. Rabia Bibi Through Legal Heirs And 13 Other1991 SCMR 1280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-26
  land reformsnecessary partyaggrieved personimpleadmenttenantinterlocutory orderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an interlocutory order of the High Court, which refused to implead the petitioner as a respondent in a pending case relating to Land Reforms. The petitioner claimed to be a tenant of the land in question and asserted that proper application of the relevant law would ultimately entitle him to ownership of a portion of the land. The core legal question was whether the petitioner qualified as a necessary or aggrieved party entitled to be impleaded in the pending proceedings. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court correctly noted the petitioner had not yet suffered a direct grievance making him a necessary party, in the interest of justice and given the circumstances, the petitioner should be granted an opportunity of being heard through counsel during the hearing of the main writ petition. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that assistance from a claimant asserting a potential proprietary interest through tenancy under land reforms can be accommodated by permitting an appearance and hearing in pending constitutional petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant claiming potential ownership under Land Reforms is a necessary party to be impleaded in pending constitutional proceedings?
  • Can the High Court permit a party to be heard through counsel during the hearing of a writ petition even if they are not strictly a necessary party?
  • Does an interlocutory order refusing to implead a party warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• National Radio and Telecommunication Corporation Employees &1991 SCMR 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-03
  condonation of delaylimitation periodcertified copyignorance of lawcancellation of trade union registrationArticle 184(3)conversion of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a registered trade union whose registration was cancelled by the Labour Court and affirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the High Court on statutory and standing grounds, filed a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan with a 14-day delay. The core legal questions were whether ignorance of the limitation period or delay in picking up a certified copy constitutes sufficient cause for condoning delay under the Pakistan Supreme Court Rules, 1980, and whether a time-barred petition for leave to appeal can be converted into a direct constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 when fundamental rights under Article 17 are alleged for the first time. The Supreme Court held that each day of delay must be explained, collecting a copy late without justifiable reason and ignorance of law do not constitute sufficient cause, and refused to convert the petition into one under Article 184(3) as the constitutional issue was not raised before the High Court. The petition was dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does failure to collect a certified copy on the date fixed by the copying agency constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay under the Pakistan Supreme Court Rules 1980?
  • Is ignorance of the law governing limitation periods a valid ground for condoning delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Can a time-barred petition for leave to appeal be converted into a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution when the fundamental rights issue was not agitated before the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan vs Muhammad Akram Khan And Other1991 SCMR 1535 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-23
  petition for leave to appealdepartmental proceedingsnatural justicepersonal hearingconstitutional petitionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, whereby a constitution petition filed by the first respondent was allowed and a departmental punishment order dated 30-12-1986 was set aside due to the failure to afford an opportunity of personal hearing. The core legal question raised in the petition is whether, upon finding a departmental order bad in law for violating principles of natural justice, the High Court ought to have set aside the entire proceedings from the commencement or merely the proceedings held after the illegality, and whether consequential benefits could be granted. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these points, suspended the operation of the impugned judgment of the High Court, and directed that the appeal be heard on the existing record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to afford an opportunity of personal hearing vitiates the entire departmental proceedings or only the proceedings held after the illegality?
  • Can consequential benefits be granted when a departmental punishment order is declared to be without lawful authority?
  Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan And Another vs Muhammad Riaz And Another1991 SCMR 1572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18
  labour lawquantum of punishmentdismissal from servicecriminal negligencegrievance petitionjurisdiction of labour courtdepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the dismissal of an employee from the National Bank of Pakistan for embezzlement. The employee was dismissed following an inquiry, and his subsequent grievance petition was allowed by the Labour Court, which ordered reinstatement with back benefits. While the Labour Court acknowledged the employee's guilt regarding criminal negligence, it deemed the punishment of dismissal too harsh, yet simultaneously noted it lacked the authority to substitute the punishment. The High Court initially set aside the Labour Court's order on jurisdictional grounds, but the Supreme Court previously held that the Labour Court possessed jurisdiction to enforce Wage Commission awards. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the Labour Court is justified in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by an employer when the employee's guilt of misconduct has been established. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the Labour Court, having found the employee guilty of criminal negligence, erred in law by failing to uphold the departmental punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Labour Court justified in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by an employer after establishing the employee's guilt of misconduct?
  • Does a Labour Court have the authority to substitute a punishment of dismissal with a lesser punishment once criminal negligence is proven?
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• Nasir Ali vs Muhammad Tufail And Other1991 SCMR 782 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-24
  election disputelocal governmentjurisdictionstatutory interpretationelection authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the jurisdiction of the Punjab Local Council Election Authority in an election dispute. The core legal question involves interpreting the scope of Section 17(1) versus Section 17(2) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, specifically determining which subsection governs the adjudication of the election matter at hand. The Chairman of the Punjab Local Council Election Authority had previously asserted jurisdiction under Section 17(1), relying on Supreme Court precedents. Conversely, a Division Bench of the High Court held that the matter fell under the ambit of Section 17(2), distinguishing the precedents cited by the Chairman. The Supreme Court, recognizing the delicacy of the issue and the conflicting interpretations regarding the applicability of its prior rulings, granted leave to appeal. The Court ordered that the appeal be prepared on the existing record and scheduled for hearing, while directing that the interim order dated 13-11-1989 remain in operation pending the final adjudication of the jurisdictional dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Punjab Local Council Election Authority have jurisdiction under Section 17(1) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, to decide an election dispute?
  • Does an election dispute fall within the ambit of Section 17(2) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
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• Naseer Ahmed Uppal vs Pakistan Water and Power Development1991 SCMR 792 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  WAPDA ActService TribunalRemoval from serviceDiscretionary powerFinancial irregularitiesBack benefitsService law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-appeals against a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that set aside the removal of a Divisional Accountant from the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal correctly interfered with WAPDA’s discretionary power to remove an employee under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, and whether the employee was entitled to back benefits. The Supreme Court allowed WAPDA's appeal, holding that the Service Tribunal erred in setting aside the removal order. The Court established that where an authority exercises its discretionary power under Section 17(1-A) to remove an employee without assigning reasons, the Tribunal should not interfere if there is sufficient material justifying the action and no proof of mala fides. In this case, a high-powered committee report detailing the employee's complicity in significant financial irregularities constituted sufficient material to support the removal. Consequently, the Court upheld the original removal order and dismissed the employee's appeal for reinstatement and back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Service Tribunal interfere with an order of removal passed under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act when there is sufficient material supporting the action?
  • Does the absence of specific reasons in a removal order under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act render the order invalid?
  • Is a report from a high-powered committee sufficient material to justify the removal of an employee under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act?
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• Naseer Ahmed Uppal vs Pakistan WAPDA1991 SC M R1998 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-28
  WAPDA Acttermination simpliciterservice tribunalmala fidespenal orderreview petitionemployment termination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns review petitions filed against a Supreme Court judgment that had set aside a Service Tribunal's decision, which had previously overturned the removal of an employee from WAPDA. The core legal questions were whether the removal of an employee under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act constitutes a penal order requiring proof of fault or adherence to disciplinary standards, and whether the Tribunal applied the correct legal test in evaluating the validity of such removal. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions, affirming its previous holding. The Court laid down the principle that an order of removal under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act is a termination simpliciter, not a penal order. Therefore, such an order does not require the existence of a specific fault, nor must it be commensurate with disciplinary standards like the Efficiency and Discipline Rules. Furthermore, allegations of mala fides must be specifically pleaded and particularized to be considered, and qualitative performance assessments of different employees do not constitute discrimination.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order of removal under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act considered a penal order?
  • Does the termination of service under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act require the existence of a specific fault attributable to the employee?
  • Must allegations of mala fides be specifically pleaded and particularized to be considered in service matters?
  • Does a qualitative difference in performance evaluation between two employees constitute discrimination?
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• Naseebullah vs The State1991 SCMR 2450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-17
  post-arrest bailmurder trialeye-witness testimonystatutory delaysupreme court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of post-arrest bail to an accused facing trial in a murder case before the Sessions Court. The core legal questions involve whether bail should be granted on the ground that the sole eye-witness has exonerated the accused at trial despite an earlier statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the discretion exercised by lower courts in refusing bail while the trial is ongoing. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that it does not normally sift and assess the value of evidence while a trial is still proceeding and thus declined to interfere with the lower courts' orders. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts will generally refrain from evaluating evidence prematurely during an ongoing trial, leaving the assessment of witness statements and recoveries to the trial court while directing the trial court to conclude the proceedings expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will sift and assess the value of evidence while a trial is still proceeding for the purpose of granting bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail solely because the sole eye-witness examined at trial has exonerated the accused, notwithstanding an earlier statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What directions may the appellate court issue when a criminal trial is unreasonably delayed?
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• Najmuddin vs Mst. Anis Fatima1991 SCMR 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-19
  ejectmentstriking off defencerent depositSindh Rented Premises Ordinancelandlord and tenantrent controllermiscellaneous rent case
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an ejectment order where the tenant's defense was struck off for non-compliance with a rent deposit order. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller was justified in striking off the tenant's defense for failing to deposit rent in the current proceedings, despite the tenant having already deposited the equivalent amount in a separate Miscellaneous Rent Case. The Supreme Court held that the order striking off the defense was illegal and unjust. The Court found that the tenant had acted in good faith by depositing the rent in the Miscellaneous Rent Case and had repeatedly requested the Rent Controller to facilitate the transfer or adjustment of these funds before the deadline. The key principle laid down is that a Rent Controller has a duty to apply their mind to the facts and assist in the adjustment of rent deposits rather than mechanically striking off a defense when the tenant has demonstrated a bona fide effort to comply with payment obligations. The Rent Controller's failure to facilitate the adjustment of funds already held by the court constituted a failure of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller strike off a tenant's defense for non-payment when the rent has already been deposited in a separate miscellaneous rent case?
  • Is a Rent Controller required to facilitate the adjustment of rent deposited in a separate proceeding before striking off a tenant's defense?
  • Does the failure of a Rent Controller to apply his mind to the availability of previously deposited rent render an order striking off a defense illegal?
  Read full judgment →
• Najjat Hussain And Others vs Allah Ditta And Other1991 SCMR 2056 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-01
  representative suitwithdrawal of suitrestoration of appealcompromise decreeleave to appealstale litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order refusing to restore a Regular Second Appeal (R.S.A.) that had been previously disposed of following the withdrawal of the suit by one of the appellants. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, who claimed to be interested parties in a representative suit, were entitled to the restoration of an appeal that had been withdrawn and dismissed years prior, particularly in light of an alleged compromise reached between the parties. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the petitioners had failed to seek restoration for a considerable period. The Court held that the High Court's order was legal and proper, emphasizing that the petitioners' remedy for enforcing an alleged compromise was not through the restoration of a long-disposed appeal, but rather by instituting a fresh suit and filing the compromise agreement within those proceedings. The principle laid down is that where a suit or appeal has been withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit, the appropriate legal recourse for enforcing subsequent compromises is the institution of a new suit rather than seeking to revive stale litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party seek the restoration of an appeal that was previously withdrawn with permission to file a fresh suit?
  • Is the institution of a fresh suit the appropriate legal remedy for enforcing a compromise agreement after the original appeal has been disposed of?
  • Does the dismissal of an appeal due to withdrawal preclude parties from later seeking restoration based on an alleged compromise?
  Read full judgment →
• N.P. Cotton Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. And Others vs Collector of Customs (Appraisement) And Other1991 SCMR 1226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-27
  leave to appealconversion of petition into appealcustoms appraisalsupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon petitions for leave to appeal involving questions already raised in pending matters where leave had previously been granted. The core legal question concerns the determination of customs-related issues similar to those under consideration in leading petitions. The Court decides to convert the current petitions into appeals so they may be heard alongside the connected matters already fixed for hearing. The key principle laid down is that related petitions raising identical questions of law and fact as pending granted leave matters should be converted into appeals and heard together for consistent adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Whether petitions for leave to appeal can be converted into appeals when identical questions are involved in pending matters?
  • Can related appeals be clubbed together for hearing on the existing record with directions to file necessary documents?
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• M/s. Volkervam (Pakistan) Ltd. vs Sindh Employees' Social Security1991 SCMR 2361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-27
  social security contributionbest judgment assessmentemployer liabilitystatutory inspectionproduction of recordsSind Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the validity of social security contribution assessments made by the Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution against the appellant. The core legal question was whether the Institution could lawfully assess contribution arrears for the years 1979 to 1981 based solely on findings derived from an inspection of the employer's records for the year 1982, without having issued a specific demand for the production of records for those earlier years. The Supreme Court held that while the assessment for 1982 was valid due to the employer's failure to rebut the findings, the assessment for 1979-1981 was unsustainable. The Court established that the power to assess contributions under Section 22(3) of the Sind Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965, based on satisfactory evidence, is contingent upon the employer's failure to produce records after a specific demand. Because no such demand was made for the 1979-1981 period, the Institution could not extrapolate liability from one year to another. The Court set aside the demand for 1979-1981, granting the Institution liberty to issue fresh notices for those years.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Social Security Institution assess contribution arrears for previous years based solely on the findings of a single year's inspection?
  • Does the power to assess contributions under Section 22(3) of the Sind Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965 require a prior demand for records?
  • Is an employer's failure to rebut a specific assessment of contribution liability sufficient to uphold that assessment?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. Novitas International vs Income Tax Officer (Films Circle) and1991 PTD 968 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-11
  Self Assessment SchemeDetailed ScrutinyIncome Tax OfficerCondonation of delayDiscretionary powerConstitutional PetitionNon-application of mindRemand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh dismissing in limine the appellant's constitutional petition against the Income Tax Officer's decision to select the appellant's income tax return for detailed scrutiny under paragraph 5(b) of the Self Assessment Scheme for the assessment year 1984-85. The core legal question was whether non-compliance within the prescribed 30-day period for submitting requisitioned documents automatically excluded an assessee from the Self Assessment Scheme, or whether the Income Tax Officer had discretion to condone the delay and evaluate the assessee's explanation. The Supreme Court held that the word 'eligible' in paragraph 5(b) confers discretionary power rather than imposing an automatic exclusion. The Court ruled that statutory discretion must be exercised reasonably, upon sound principles, and not mechanically. Concluding that the officer failed to apply his mind to the explanation furnished for the delay, the Court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the Income Tax Officer for a fresh decision in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Does failure to submit requisitioned documents within the 30-day period automatically exclude an assessee from the benefits of the Self Assessment Scheme under paragraph 5(b)?
  • Does an Income Tax Officer possess the discretionary power to condone delay and accept documents submitted after the prescribed period under paragraph 5(b) of the Self Assessment Scheme?
  • Is constitutional jurisdiction available to challenge the mechanical or arbitrary exercise of, or failure to exercise, a statutory discretionary power by an administrative authority?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. Ebrahim Brotehrs (Pvt.) Limited vs The Commissioner of Income1991 SCMR 2289 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-09
  capital gainsbonus sharestax computationvaluation of sharesleave to appealjudicial conflict
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh regarding the computation of capital gains for tax purposes. The core legal question concerns the correct valuation method for bonus shares: whether the cost of bonus shares should be calculated based on their face value or by averaging the cost of all shares, including the bonus shares. The High Court of Sindh answered this question in the negative, holding against the assessee's position. The petitioner contends that there is a conflict of judicial opinion on this matter, citing a contrary decision by the Lahore High Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore v. Umar Saigol. The Supreme Court, noting the existence of this conflicting interpretation between the High Courts, granted leave to appeal to resolve the legal inconsistency regarding the appropriate method for determining the cost of bonus shares for capital gains computation.

  Questions settled

  • Is the cost of bonus shares for the computation of capital gains to be determined by their face value or by the average cost of all shares?
  • Does a conflict of view between High Courts on a tax interpretation matter warrant the grant of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan vs Akhtar Ali Bhatti And Other1991 SCMR 1148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-03
  bank employeereinstatementmisconductback benefitsleave to appeallabour lawdisciplinary action
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the National Bank of Pakistan against a Lahore High Court order that upheld the reinstatement of a bank cashier. The respondent had been removed from service in 1982 following allegations of theft involving two currency notes totaling Rs. 150. While the Punjab Labour Court initially dismissed the respondent's grievance petition, the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal subsequently ordered his reinstatement without back benefits. The petitioner challenged this reinstatement through a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court. The Supreme Court considered whether leave to appeal should be granted in light of the circumstances. The Court held that leave to appeal was not warranted. It reasoned that the respondent had already faced significant litigation, monetary loss, and mental anguish since his removal in 1982, which served as a sufficient penalty for his misconduct. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the reinstatement without back benefits, establishing that prolonged litigation and the resulting hardship can serve as an adequate disciplinary consequence for minor employee misconduct.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court should grant leave to appeal against a High Court order upholding an employee's reinstatement where the employee has already suffered significant hardship through prolonged litigation?
  • Can the mental torture and monetary loss resulting from years of litigation serve as a sufficient disciplinary consequence for an employee's minor misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Muzaffar Hussain vs The Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Lands), Chairman, District Kasur And Other1991 SCMR 1424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-09
  rehabilitation settlementinterim orderwrit petitionsupreme court appealacademic question
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging an order of the High Court regarding rehabilitation and settlement authorities. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner's order dated 8-6-1976 was invalid because it relied upon a previous High Court order that had been suspended by an interim order in separate writ proceedings. The core legal question was whether the subsequent final disposal of those connected writ petitions rendered the initial suspension and the technical defect of the Commissioner's order academic. The Supreme Court held that since the High Court's earlier order was ultimately not interfered with when the connected writ petitions were finally decided, the challenge to the Commissioner's order became academic and did not warrant interference. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an interim suspension order passed in a writ petition precludes a rehabilitation authority from relying on a primary order that is subsequently upheld?
  • Does the final disposal of connected writ petitions rendering a technical defect academic justify refusing interference in an appeal?
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• Mutali And Another vs Shera And 2 Other1991 SCMR 1358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-01
  consolidationconstitutional petitionwrit petitionexchange of landfactual controversyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court in a consolidation dispute. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the consolidation authorities' orders regarding the exchange and allotment of land parcels. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of a pre-consolidation map and due to the unsubstantiated factual controversy, the High Court rightly declined to interfere with the impugned orders. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that factual controversies not substantiated by necessary documentation, such as pre-consolidation maps, do not warrant constitutional interference by superior courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere in a consolidation matter involving a factual controversy where the pre-consolidation map has not been produced?
  • Is leave to appeal maintainable against the dismissal of a constitutional petition arising from concurrent findings in consolidation proceedings without establishing material legal infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal And Other1991 SCMR 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Hussain Shah And Others vs Sikandar1991 SCMR 467 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-27
  leave to appealremand of caseredemption of mortgagecivil proceduredeclaration suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed by Mushtaq Hussain Shah and others against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Circuit Bench, Abbottabad, which had remanded a civil suit regarding declaration of ownership and redemption of mortgaged land back to the trial court for fresh decision after recording further evidence. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's remand order was legally flawed for failing to specify the exact nature or points of evidence to be produced. The Supreme Court held that the order of the High Court did not call for any interference and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with a High Court's order remanding a case for further evidence unless a compelling legal infirmity is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in remanding a civil case for recording further evidence without specifying the exact points of evidence?
  • Does an order of the High Court remanding a case to the trial court for fresh decision warrant interference by the Supreme Court when no jurisdictional defect is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Hussain Bokhari vs The State And 6 Other1991 SCMR 2136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-28
  Section 197 Cr.P.C.sanction for prosecutionpublic servantofficial dutyinterlocutory orderscriminal procedurespeedy trialcognizance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a criminal complaint against police officials for the murder of the complainant's father. The central legal question concerned the necessity of prior sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) for prosecuting public servants, and whether such sanction remains mandatory after the accused's retirement. The High Court had ruled that retirement obviated the need for sanction. The Supreme Court set aside this judgment, noting that cognizance was taken while the accused were in service. The Court held that the trial court must determine, based on the evidence, whether the alleged acts were performed in the discharge of official duty. If the acts were not in the discharge of duty, no sanction is required; if they were, but exceeded legal authority, sanction might be necessary. The Court emphasized that the trial court must provide reasoned orders on this issue rather than withholding them to avoid prejudice. Furthermore, the Court deprecated the practice of challenging interlocutory orders, which causes excessive delays, and directed the trial court to proceed with the case on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Is prior sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. required for the prosecution of a public servant who has retired after the court has already taken cognizance of the offence?
  • At what stage of a criminal trial should a court determine the necessity of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C.?
  • Does the act of a public servant exceeding their legal powers while believing they are acting in good faith for the discharge of duty necessitate sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C.?
  • Should courts encourage the practice of challenging interlocutory orders regarding the necessity of sanction during the pendency of a trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmed vs WAPDA And Another1991 SCMR 1526 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18
  service lawseniorityWAPDAtransfer orderestoppelservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a service dispute regarding the determination of seniority for an employee of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The petitioner, who joined WAPDA in 1966, was transferred to Lahore in 1977, with his seniority reckoned from the date of his joining the Lahore office. Although a subsequent order in 1986 attempted to fix his seniority from his original date of appointment in 1966, this order was later withdrawn. The petitioner challenged this withdrawal before the Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal. The Supreme Court examined the terms of the 1977 transfer order, which explicitly stipulated that seniority would be assigned from the date of joining the Lahore office. The Court noted that the petitioner had requested this transfer and accepted the conditions therein without objection at the time. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner could not later challenge the seniority terms he had voluntarily accepted. Leave to appeal was refused, and the petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that an employee is bound by the terms of a transfer order accepted without protest.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee challenge the terms of a transfer order regarding seniority after having accepted the transfer without objection?
  • Does a transfer made at the request of an employee preclude them from later claiming seniority from their original date of appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmed vs The State And Another1991 SCMR 2395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-09
  quashment of criminal proceedingsinherent powers of High Courtprivate complaintOffence of Qazfpremature applicationSection 561-A CrPCleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of criminal proceedings. The petitioner, a tenant, had faced a private complaint initiated by his landlady under Section 7 of the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979, and Sections 500 and 506-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a dispute involving allegations of defamation and public nuisance. The petitioner contended that the averments in the complaint did not constitute an offence under Section 3 of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court examined the High Court's refusal to quash the proceedings. The Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in determining that the application for quashment was premature at that stage of the proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no legal infirmity in the impugned judgment and refused leave to appeal. The principle affirmed is that the High Court's inherent power to quash proceedings under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is discretionary and should not be invoked prematurely when a case is pending before a subordinate court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court quash criminal proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the application is deemed premature?
  • Does the High Court have discretion in exercising its inherent powers to quash pending criminal proceedings?
  • Is a private complaint under the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979 subject to immediate quashment if the petitioner claims no offence is made out?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmed And Others vs The State1991 SCMR 2270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-09
  benefit of doubtocular testimonycriminal appealmurder convictionappreciation of evidencereasonable doubtself-defense
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellants for murder and attempted murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the appellants attacked the complainant party in a cotton field, resulting in three deaths and several injuries. The trial court convicted the appellants, and the High Court confirmed these convictions and death sentences. Upon review, the Supreme Court identified significant discrepancies in the prosecution's case, including the absence of evidence supporting the presence of the complainant party's crops at the alleged site, the failure of the investigating officer to recover evidence of the alleged self-defense by the complainant party, and medical evidence suggesting the complainant party was also armed. The Court held that the prosecution's ocular testimony was inconsistent and that the defense's version of events, which was rejected by the lower courts, raised reasonable doubts. Applying the principle that where two versions of an incident exist, the one favoring the accused must be adopted, the Court granted the appellants the benefit of the doubt, set aside their convictions, and ordered their acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • When two conflicting versions of a criminal occurrence exist, which version must the court adopt?
  • Does the presence of injuries on the accused that are not explained by the prosecution weaken the prosecution's case?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution's ocular testimony is contradicted by physical evidence at the crime scene?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmad vs The State1991 SCMR 543 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-26
  Prohibition Orderintoxicating liquorrectified spiritillegal possessioncriminal appealsubstitute for alcoholdefinition of intoxicant
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by Mushtaq Ahmad against the dismissal of his revision petition, maintaining his conviction under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979 for possessing three bottles of liquid recovered from him. The core legal question was whether diluted rectified spirit contained in the bottles constitutes an 'intoxicant' or 'intoxicating liquor' within the meaning of clauses (g) and (h) of Article 2 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that since diluted rectified spirit can be used as a good substitute for an alcoholic beverage, it falls within the category of a liquid consisting of or containing alcohol normally used for purposes of intoxication, thus satisfying the statutory definition of 'intoxicating liquor'. The key principle laid down is that industrial alcohols such as rectified spirit, when prepared and diluted in a manner making them usable as substitutes for alcoholic beverages, qualify as intoxicating liquor under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979.

  Questions settled

  • Whether diluted rectified spirit constitutes an intoxicating liquor within the meaning of Article 2(h) of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979?
  • Does the possession of rectified spirit capable of being used as a substitute for alcoholic beverages attract criminal liability under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979?
  • How should the expression 'intoxicating liquor' be construed when it includes liquids consisting of or containing alcohol normally used for purposes of intoxication?
  Read full judgment →
• Murtaza Khan and 2 others vs Mst. Dil Ara Nasrin and 2 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-05
  pre-emptionvicinageleave to appealcross-objectionsKhata
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through leave of the Court arises from a pre-emption suit regarding land measuring 22 kanals. The trial court decreed the suit for 4 kanals and 4 marlas while dismissing it for the rest. First appellate and revisional proceedings modified the decree to include an additional Khasra number, but left Khasra No. 46/27 un-decreed, prompting the plaintiffs' appeal on the ground of vicinage within the same Khata and block. The core legal question was whether pre-emption can be claimed on the ground of vicinage for Khasra No. 46/27 situated in the same block and Khata as the decreed land. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, as counsel for the appellants fairly conceded that the plea of vicinage had been consistently rejected by the Supreme Court in earlier precedents. Additionally, the respondents' cross-objections seeking to set aside the decree in favour of the appellants were dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the plea of pre-emption based on vicinage in such circumstances stands rejected in light of settled binding precedents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-emption can be claimed on the ground of vicinage for a Khasra number situated in the same block and Khata as the decreed land?
  • Can respondents maintain cross-objections to challenge a decree when leave to appeal had already been refused to them by a separate earlier order?
  Read full judgment →
• Mursaleen vs Ghulam Sarwar Through Legal Heirs And Another1991 SCMR 2042 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-30
  eviction petitiondefault in rentpersonal bona fide requirementwritten statementonus of proofdeath of landlordexecution by legal heirsconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court was directed against the judgment of the High Court confirming an eviction order against a tenant. The landlord sought eviction on grounds of default in rent payment and bona fide personal requirement for business following retirement from service. On the question of default, the Court noted that the tenant failed to specifically controvert the non-payment of rent for several months in his written statement, holding that uncontroverted factual allegations in pleadings need no further proof and that the onus shifted to the tenant to show payment through cogent evidence, which he failed to do. Regarding personal requirement, the Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, rejecting unpleaded and unsubstantiated allegations raised at a late stage concerning the landlord's alleged mental incapacity or lease of another shop. Finally, the Court held that the subsequent death of the landlord after the eviction order was passed did not abate the proceedings, as the decree of eviction remains executable by his legal heirs. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether facts specifically alleged in an ejectment application and not controverted in the written statement stand established without further proof?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie to establish payment of rent once the landlord alleges non-payment?
  • Can a tenant raise new factual pleas regarding the landlord's mental incapacity or leasing of another property for the first time in appeal without having pleaded or led evidence on them at trial?
  • Does an eviction order passed in favor of a landlord become inexecutable or abate upon the landlord's subsequent death during appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Murid Hussain vs Nazir Ahmad And 3 Other1991 SCMR 162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-04
  leave to appealacquittalcorroborationbenefit of doubtcriminal revisionocular testimonymedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the High Court's judgment, which acquitted certain respondents of murder charges while maintaining the convictions of others. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in acquitting the respondent, Nazir Ahmad, despite the complainant's assertion that ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence was sufficient for conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court correctly distinguished the case of the acquitted respondent from the convicted co-accused. The ratio of the decision is that where there is no corroborative evidence, such as abscondence, to support the ocular testimony against a specific accused, that accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The Court affirmed that the High Court’s assessment of evidence was sound, noting that the absence of corroboration for the acquitted respondent necessitated his acquittal, unlike his co-accused whose convictions were supported by additional evidence. The principle laid down is that in the absence of corroborative material, an accused cannot be convicted solely on ocular testimony if other co-accused have been acquitted on similar grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt in the absence of corroborative evidence?
  • Can an appellate court distinguish between co-accused based on the presence or absence of abscondence?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused by a trial court create a basis for extending the benefit of doubt to other accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Murad And Others vs Government of the Punjab And Other1991 SCMR 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-19
  writ petitionexhaustion of remediesland lease resumptionjoinder of partiesdepartmental appealtemporary cultivation scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against the dismissal of writ petitions by the High Court regarding the resumption of government land leases. The petitioners, who held cultivation leases under a 15-year scheme, challenged the cancellation of their leases, arguing that the non-availability of canal water rendered the cultivation conditions impossible to perform. They also contended that the denial of proprietary rights conflicted with the Federal Government's Peasants Charter. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions on the grounds that the petitioners had failed to exhaust available departmental remedies and that the joint writ petition was procedurally flawed due to the distinct facts and circumstances of each individual case. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that a consolidated writ petition is misconceived when the underlying causes of action, dates of resumption, and specific factual circumstances differ for each petitioner. The Court established that the existence of common legal questions does not exempt individual petitioners from the necessity of exhausting departmental remedies or filing separate proceedings to address the unique facts of their respective cases.

  Questions settled

  • Is a consolidated writ petition maintainable when the underlying causes of action and factual circumstances differ for each petitioner?
  • Does the existence of common legal questions exempt petitioners from the requirement to exhaust departmental remedies?
  • Must petitioners approach departmental authorities separately before invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Munir Ahmad Khan vs Water and Power Development Authority1991 SCMR 1869 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18
  service lawdismissal from serviceregular inquiryshow-cause noticeadmission of guiltWAPDA employees
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had upheld the dismissal of the petitioner, a Meter Reader, from service with the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The petitioner had been dismissed following allegations of furnishing bogus meter readings. The core legal question was whether the failure to conduct a regular inquiry, as mandated by the WAPDA (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978, vitiated the dismissal order. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal was lawful because the petitioner had explicitly admitted to the incorrectness of the meter readings in his reply to the show-cause notice. The Court established the principle that where an employee admits to the misconduct charged in response to a show-cause notice, the necessity for a formal, regular inquiry is dispensed with, as the facts are no longer in dispute. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming the Tribunal's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Is a formal regular inquiry mandatory under the WAPDA (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978, when the employee has admitted to the misconduct in response to a show-cause notice?
  • Does an admission of guilt in a reply to a show-cause notice dispense with the requirement for a regular inquiry in disciplinary proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Munir Ahmad And Others vs Mulla Baz Muhammad And Other1991 SCMR 2010 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-04
  leave to appealdeclaration and injunctionpossessionconcurrent findingsKhasra Girdawari
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court dated 30-7-1990, which had set aside the trial court's decree in favor of the petitioners in a suit for declaration and injunction regarding the suit land. The petitioners contended that they were in possession of the suit land based on concurrent findings of lower forums and an old document (Exh.P.1), while the High Court noted that the purchase of the land was not established though possession was proven through oral testimony and Khasra Girdawari entries. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to examine whether the petitioners were entitled to the claim over the suit land in view of the concurrent findings regarding their possession. The Court granted leave, ordered security, and directed that the stay regarding possession shall continue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the petitioners are entitled to the claim to the suit land in view of concurrent findings of possession?
  • Does proof of long-standing possession through oral testimony and Khasra Girdawari entries substantiate a claim for declaration in a civil suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Municipal Committee, Lalamusa vs Punjab Appellate Tribunal And Other1991 SCMR 1762 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-24
  workman statusjurisdiction of Labour Courtwrit jurisdictionreinstatementIndustrial Relations Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the dismissal of a primary school teacher. The teacher, dismissed for unauthorized absence, successfully challenged his termination before a Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which ordered his reinstatement. The petitioner (Municipal Committee) challenged these orders in the High Court, arguing the teacher was not a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and thus the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction. The High Court agreed that the teacher was not a workman and that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction. However, the High Court proceeded to examine the dismissal's legality on its own merits and granted relief to the teacher. The core legal question is whether a High Court, having determined that a lower tribunal lacked jurisdiction over a matter, can proceed to adjudicate the merits of the underlying dispute and grant relief. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting the contention that the High Court should have merely quashed the lower orders without granting relief.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court, after determining that a Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a grievance petition, proceed to adjudicate the merits of the case and grant relief?
  • Does a primary school teacher fall within the definition of a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Municipal Committee And 3 Others vs Muhammad Ramzan1991 SCMR 1643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-26
  leave to appealdamagesChhajja Taxcivil revisionrecovery of damagestax exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the defendant Municipal Committee against the dismissal of their civil revision by the High Court in a suit for recovery of damages. The respondent's suit was founded on the assertion that despite an exemption from a tax known as Chhajja Tax, he was subsequently compelled to pay it, causing humiliation and insult. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court allowed the respondent's appeal, and the High Court dismissed the petitioners' civil revision. Upon hearing the learned counsel, the Supreme Court considered the controversy a fit case for further examination and granted leave to appeal, directing the appeal to be prepared on the existing record with instructions for the parties to file essential documents necessary for the disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the wrongful demand of a tax previously exempted amount to humiliation and insult warranting damages?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the concurrent findings of lower courts in a suit for recovery of damages?
  Read full judgment →
• Munawar Hussain Alias Asghar Ali vs The State1991 SCMR 1601 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-11
  last seen togethercriminal appealmurderstatement of accusedappreciation of evidencecorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, based solely on the circumstance that the deceased was last seen alive in his company. The core legal questions involved the correctness of applying the principle of 'last seen alive together' without corroborative evidence and the legal effect of omitting to put this incriminating circumstance to the accused during his examination under section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, holding that uncorroborated 'last seen' evidence is generally insufficient to sustain a murder conviction and that failure to put such a circumstance to the accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 renders the evidence inadmissible against him. The key principle laid down is that the circumstance of an accused having been last seen with the deceased requires strong corroboration, and any material piece of evidence not put to the accused in his examination under section 342 cannot be used to support a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction can be sustained solely on uncorroborated 'last seen' evidence?
  • What is the legal effect of omitting to put an incriminating circumstance of 'last seen' to the accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the circumstance of the deceased being last seen alive in the company of the accused normally require corroborative evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz/Taj Muhammad vs Subedar Muhammad Amin And Other1991 SCMR 1521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-21
  evacuee propertyevacuee trust propertysettlement commissionertransfer orderauctionjurisdictionlocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee property (Shop No. 265/C) originally auctioned to the respondent in 1961. The petitioner challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that had set aside an order by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, which had cancelled the respondent's transfer order. The core legal question was whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to declare the property as evacuee trust property and subsequently cancel a validly issued transfer order in favour of the respondent, particularly when the petitioner had withdrawn his own claim to the property. The Supreme Court held that the Additional Settlement Commissioner lacked the competence to declare the property as evacuee trust property, a matter falling under the purview of the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that a party who has failed to prove their own entitlement to a property cannot maintain a claim based solely on the alleged infirmities of an adversary's title. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Additional Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to declare a property as evacuee trust property?
  • Can a party who has failed to prove their own entitlement to a property challenge the title of an adversary?
  • Is a transfer order valid if the property was auctioned as evacuee property but later claimed to be evacuee trust property?
  Read full judgment →
• Mukhtar Pipe Company Through Its Proprietor Mukhtar Ahmad vs Mian1991 SCMR 1229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-22
  ejectment applicationpersonal needconstructive res judicatasuppression of material factsleave to appealrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute between a tenant and a landlord regarding an ejectment application. The petitioner-tenant challenged an order allowing the landlord's son to evict the tenant based on personal need, despite a previous failed attempt by the father to evict the same tenant from the same premises. The core legal questions involved whether Section 14 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, barred a subsequent ejectment application based on personal need due to the principle of constructive res judicata, and whether the landlord's failure to disclose existing business premises constituted a suppression of material facts invalidating the claim of bona fide personal requirement. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the contentions regarding the alleged mechanization of the landlord and the potential applicability of res judicata, found that the issues raised required detailed consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, directed the deposit of security, and issued an interim order restraining the disturbance of the petitioner's possession, pending the final adjudication of the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 14 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 preclude a fresh ejectment application on the ground of personal use if a previous application was dismissed?
  • Does the principle of constructive res judicata apply to successive ejectment applications filed by family members regarding the same tenancy?
  • Is a landlord's failure to disclose the possession of other suitable business premises a valid ground to defeat an ejectment application based on personal need?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammada Through Legal Heirs And Others vs Maula Dad And Other1991 SCMR 1119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-03
  shamilatsale of landvillage common landproprietary rightspartitioncivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from a civil dispute concerning whether the sale of a share in a well along with proprietary land in 1882 automatically conveyed a proportionate share in the village Shamilat. The appellants, legal heirs of the vendor Azmat, filed a suit for possession of the Shamilat land, arguing that it was not included in the original sale. The trial court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate court and the High Court dismissed it. The core legal questions involved whether a sale of proprietary land without explicit mention of Shamilat conveys village common land, and the application of the West Pakistan Land Disposition (Saving of Shamilat) Ordinance, 1959. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of the lower courts, holding that the Shamilat was not sold under the original sale deed and that, under section 3 of the West Pakistan Land Disposition (Saving of Shamilat) Ordinance, 1959, a share in the Shamilat is not conveyed along with the sale of land unless specifically stated. The key principle laid down is that the sale of land does not carry with it a conveyance of Shamilat rights in the absence of an explicit stipulation to that effect in the instrument of sale.

  Questions settled

  • Does the sale of a share in a well and proprietary land automatically convey a proportionate share in the village Shamilat?
  • Whether the West Pakistan Land Disposition (Saving of Shamilat) Ordinance, 1959 applies retrospectively to affect prior sales under custom?
  • Can a civil suit for possession of land be barred under section 26 of the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Act when it is based on title rather than challenging the partition order?
  • Does a share in the Shamilat pass with the sale of land when the sale deed is silent regarding the Shamilat?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zulfiqar vs Gulab Khan And Other1991 SCMR 1781 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-21
  pre-emptiondisplaced personsagricultural landstatutory exemptionCapital Development Authorityright of pre-emptionsinker doctrine
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit concerning the sale of agricultural land in Rawalpindi. The petitioner, claiming a right of pre-emption, challenged the sale made to respondents who were displaced persons due to the construction of the Capital at Islamabad. The core legal question was whether the statutory bar against pre-emption, provided under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, applied to the respondents, given the specific notification issued by the Board of Revenue exempting sales to displaced persons certified by the Capital Development Authority. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which determined that the respondents were indeed displaced persons holding valid certificates. The Court held that the mandatory exemption under Section 8(2) extinguished the right of pre-emption against such certificate holders. The key principle laid down is that where a sale falls within the scope of an exemption notification issued under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, the right of pre-emption is effectively barred, and the doctrine of sinker does not override this statutory exemption.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of pre-emption exist against a sale of land to a person certified as a displaced person by the Capital Development Authority under the notification issued pursuant to Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  • Can the doctrine of sinker be applied to override the statutory exemption provided under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  • Is a certificate issued by the Capital Development Authority sufficient to establish the status of a displaced person for the purpose of claiming exemption from pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zulfiqar Ali Khan vs Province of the Punjab And Another1991 SCMR 1803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-24
  senioritypromotionsupersessionservice lawjudicial serviceProvincial Selection Board
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Additional District and Sessions Judge, challenged his seniority position relative to respondent No. 2, who had been placed senior to him in the seniority list. The petitioner had previously been senior to respondent No. 2 while serving as a Civil Judge. However, the Provincial Selection Board, on May 8, 1979, declared the petitioner unfit for promotion to the rank of Additional District and Sessions Judge due to an indifferent service record, while approving respondent No. 2 for promotion. Consequently, the petitioner was superseded by respondent No. 2 and was not approved for promotion until March 10, 1981. The petitioner's departmental representation and subsequent appeal before the Provincial Service Tribunal were dismissed. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could claim seniority over respondent No. 2 despite having been formally superseded by him during the promotion process. The Supreme Court held that because the petitioner was specifically superseded by respondent No. 2, he could not claim seniority over him in the higher grade. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant claim seniority over a colleague who was promoted to a higher grade earlier due to the civil servant's own supersession?
  • Does a formal supersession by a selection board preclude a claim of seniority in the promoted grade?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaman vs Inayat Ali And Another1991 SCMR 1901 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-13
  civil court jurisdictionevacuee landco-allotteejoint allotmentleave to appealjurisdictional objection
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondents filed a civil suit seeking a declaration of their share in the suit land as co-allottees, alleging they and the defendant were members of the same family and the land was allotted jointly. The trial court decreed the suit, and the lower appellate court as well as the High Court maintained the decree. In the petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the civil court lacked jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court held that since the jurisdictional objection was not raised in the written statement before the trial court and no issue was framed regarding it, and given that the allotment chit established the parties belonged to the same family, interference was unwarranted. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that a belated objection to civil court jurisdiction will not be entertained when the matter was contested on merits below.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise the objection of lack of civil court jurisdiction for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal when it was not pleaded in the written statement?
  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit regarding joint allotment of evacuee land when the objection to jurisdiction was never raised or framed as an issue before the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaman vs Hasb UN Nisa And Another1991 SCMR 1307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-08
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantcommercial premisespersonal useCantonments Rent Restriction Actleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal seeking to determine whether a landlady can eject her tenant under Section 17(4)(5)(i) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963 to establish a joint business with her husband or family member, particularly when she is an illiterate housewife. The core legal question involves the interpretation of the landlord's right to seek ejectment for personal use involving family members. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the issue is no longer res integra as it has already been settled by this Court in previous jurisprudence, specifically establishing that a co-owner or landlord can take advantage of the relevant statutory provisions for personal or joint business needs. The key principle laid down is that a landlord or landlady is entitled to seek ejectment of a tenant for personal use or for establishing a business jointly with family members under the applicable rent restriction laws.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlady seek the ejectment of her tenant under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963 to establish a joint business with her husband or family member?
  • Whether a co-owner or landlord can take advantage of Section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963 for premises needed by one of the co-owners or landlords?
  • Is the question of ejectment for establishing a joint business with a family member considered res integra before the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaman Khan And Others vs Muhammad Ramzan Khan1991 SCMR 1158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-10
  petition for leave to appealmisreading of evidencestatus quotenancySupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal, challenging the judgment of the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court misread the material evidence on record, specifically the testimony of Nazir Ahmad Patwari (P.W.1) regarding the petitioners' status as tenants in the suit land. The Supreme Court held that the case requires further examination as the contention regarding the misreading of the record has prima facie substance. Consequently, the Court granted leave for further examination, ordered security of Rs. 2,500, and directed that status quo be maintained in the meanwhile, thereby establishing the principle that leave to appeal will be granted when a credible allegation of misreading of evidence by the High Court is made out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the High Court is alleged to have misread material evidence on the record?
  • Can status quo be ordered by the Supreme Court while granting leave to appeal in a property dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaman and 8 others vs Abdul Malik Khan and 7 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-11
  usufructuary mortgagelimitation periodacknowledgment of liabilityrevenue mutationredemption of mortgageSection 19 Limitation Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a civil suit concerning the redemption of a usufructuary mortgage. The plaintiffs, as mortgagees, sought a declaration of ownership, claiming the mortgage remained unredeemed for over sixty years. The High Court had dismissed the suit, ruling that revenue mutations constituted an acknowledgment of the mortgage under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908, thereby extending the limitation period. The Supreme Court addressed the core legal question of whether revenue mutations, which record oral transactions, satisfy the requirement of an acknowledgment in writing signed by the party against whom the right is claimed. The Court held that mutations are not signed by the parties in the manner mandated by Section 19 and thus do not constitute a valid acknowledgment. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the trial court's decision. The key principle laid down is that for an acknowledgment to extend the period of limitation under Section 19, it must be in writing and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed; mere revenue mutations of oral transactions do not satisfy this statutory requirement.

  Questions settled

  • Do revenue mutations constitute a valid acknowledgment in writing under Section 19 of the Limitation Act?
  • What are the essential requirements for an acknowledgment to extend the period of limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act?
  • Does the creation of a sub-mortgage through mutation amount to an acknowledgment of the original mortgage?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zahoor vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner And Other1991 SCMR 1862 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-29
  lacheswrit petitionsettlement authoritiesdelay in filingleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court. The petitioner, Muhammad Zahoor, had challenged an order passed by the Settlement Authorities. The High Court had dismissed his writ petition primarily on the ground of laches, noting that the petitioner had failed to challenge the impugned order for a period exceeding six years. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that he was not a party to the original proceedings before the Settlement Authorities and, therefore, could not be held accountable for the delay, as he lacked knowledge of the order when it was passed. Upon reviewing the record and hearing arguments from both sides, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner was, in fact, fully aware of the proceedings in which the impugned order was passed. Consequently, the Court held that the finding of laches by the High Court was fully justified. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner claim ignorance of proceedings to excuse a delay of six years in challenging an administrative order?
  • Is a finding of laches justified when a petitioner was aware of the proceedings despite not being a formal party?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yusuf Chauhan and another vs Sarfraz Khan Jadoon and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-09
  civil servicesenioritysurplus personnelabsorptionvested rightEstablishment Division memorandumtransfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal concerning a seniority dispute between civil servants. Appellant Muhammad Yusuf Chauhan, originally appointed in BPS-18 in the Ministry of Industries, was absorbed into the Ministry of Education in the same grade after his former department was phased out. Pursuant to Establishment Division Memorandum dated 7-6-1980, his past service in BPS-18 was counted toward his seniority, placing him senior to respondent Sarfraz Khan Jadoon, who was promoted to BPS-18 later. The Service Tribunal set aside this seniority placement, holding the memorandum lacked statutory backing. The Supreme Court reversed the Tribunal's decision and allowed the appeals, holding that Section 8 of the Civil Servants Act 1973 explicitly provides that seniority is not a vested right. The Court held that the Establishment Division, as the competent authority under Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973, possessed the statutory power to issue binding policy instructions determining seniority of surplus personnel upon absorption.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to a particular seniority position under Section 8 of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Do policy instructions issued by the Establishment Division regarding the seniority of absorbed surplus personnel carry statutory effect?
  • Can the competent authority count the past service of an absorbed civil servant towards seniority in an equivalent grade upon transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousuf vs The State1991 PLD Supreme Court 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-28
  sudden fightfree fightException 4 to Section 300alteration of convictionculpable homicide not amounting to murderlack of premeditationirrigation water dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose by leave against the judgment of the High Court, which maintained the appellant's conviction under Section 302 and altered his conviction from Section 307/149 to Section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to life imprisonment and five years' rigorous imprisonment respectively. The incident originated as a sudden dispute over irrigation water resulting in an exchange of lathi blows between both parties, causing multiple injuries on both sides and the death of one person. The Supreme Court examined whether the occurrence constituted a free fight or a sudden fight falling within Exception 4 to Section 300, PPC. The Court held that the absence of premeditation or pre-planning established that the clash was a sudden affair and a sudden fight, rather than a premeditated free fight, thereby attracting Exception 4 to Section 300, PPC. Consequently, the appellant's conviction under Section 302, PPC was converted to Section 304 Part I, PPC with ten years' rigorous imprisonment, and his conviction under Section 326, PPC was altered to Section 325, PPC.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sudden clash arising without premeditation qualifies as a sudden fight attracting Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than a free fight?
  • Under what circumstances can a murder conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be converted to Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can liability for an unlawful assembly under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be fastened on participants when a sudden fight occurs without common premeditation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousuf And 12 Others vs Abdul Khaliq And Other1991 SCMR 1981 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-04
  additional evidencecivil appealnon-consideration of applicationremand of caseappellate court powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the High Court. The core grievance of the petitioners was that the High Court failed to consider, dispose of, or address the efficacy and relevance of applications filed under Section 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure along with particulars of documents to produce additional evidence concerning the title to the disputed property, despite notices having been issued and there being no opposition at the hearing. The Supreme Court examined the record, found the grievance substantiated, and noted that respondent No.1 did not object to the matter being remanded. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, accepted it, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, and remanded the case back to the High Court for a fresh disposal after duly addressing and deciding the applications for additional evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is bound to dispose of pending applications for the production of additional evidence?
  • Can a judgment of the High Court be set aside for failing to consider material documents and applications relating to additional evidence?
  • What is the appropriate course of action when an appellate court omits to deal with an application for additional evidence filed under Section 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf vs The Government of Pakistan, Through The Chairman_Secretary, Railway Board, Ministry Of Railways And Another1991 SCMR 395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-21
  service appealcurrent chargeleave to appealhigher post payfederal service tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his service appeal. The petitioner, while holding Grade-16, was asked to perform the functions of an Assistant Personnel Officer in Grade-17 and claimed full pay of the higher post along with specific travelling allowances. The core legal question concerned whether an employee holding a current charge of a post is entitled to the full pay and perquisites of that higher post without being regularly promoted in the manner prescribed by the rules. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner was merely holding the current charge of the post on his own pay and was not regularly promoted, thus disentitling him to the claimed financial benefits. The Court ruled that no question of law of public importance arose, as the matter involved a question of fact determined by the Tribunal, while granting liberty to the petitioner to seek revival of the petition within sixty days of the disposal of his pending service appeal if the outcome thereof affected his entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee holding the current charge of a higher post entitled to the full pay of that post?
  • Does a service dispute regarding current charge versus regular promotion raise a question of law of public importance?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf vs The Chairman, Railway Board_Secretary, Ministry of Railways, Islamabad And Other1991 SCMR 1559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-22
  service appealpro forma promotionselection gradeacting chargeback benefitsFederal Service Tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, whereby the petitioner's service appeal seeking pro forma promotion, re-designation, and associated back benefits was dismissed. The core legal question concerned the legality of the revocation of the petitioner's retrospective promotion to a selection grade and his entitlement to claim regular promotion and full pay while serving on an acting charge basis. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the revocation of the retrospective promotion was justified because the promotion order of the petitioner's junior, upon which it was pegged, had itself been rescinded, and that the Service Tribunal could not direct the department to fill promotion posts forthwith or claim full pay for acting charge duties. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee claim full pay and benefits while holding a post on an acting charge basis without regular promotion?
  • Does a civil servant have the right to compel a department to fill a promotion post on a particular date?
  • Whether the revocation of a retrospective promotion is justified when the promotion order of the employee's junior has been rescinded?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf vs Sayed Ghayyur Hussain Shah And Other1991 SCMR 1697 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-23
  malicious prosecutionlibeltort liabilityabatement of appealsurvival of cause of actionIslamic lawcivil liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner, Muhammad Yousaf, challenging a common judgment of the Lahore High Court. The High Court had accepted two Regular Second Appeals, setting aside judgments of the Additional District Judge and restoring the original judgments of the Civil Judge. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to examine several significant legal issues arising from the underlying litigation. The core legal questions involve whether a cause of action for malicious prosecution or libel exists under the specific facts, and whether a cause of action for damages for a tort survives the death of either the tort-feasor or the victim. Furthermore, the Court seeks to determine if civil liability for damages can be adjudicated based on concepts outside of English common law without retrospective legislation, and whether Islamic law principles regarding compensation can be applied by analogy to civil liabilities. Finally, the Court addresses whether such liability constitutes a charge on the estate of a deceased tort-feasor and whether an appeal abates upon the death of a party against whom no decree existed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a cause of action for damages for malicious prosecution or libel survive the death of the tort-feasor or the victim?
  • Can Islamic law concepts of compensation be imported by analogy to determine civil liabilities in the absence of specific legislation?
  • Is a liability for damages arising from a tort a charge on the estate of a deceased tort-feasor under Muslim Law?
  • Does an appeal abate upon the death of a party if no decree existed against them at the time of their death?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf vs P.O.F. Through Chief Administrative Officer And Another1991 SCMR 1502 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-22
  back benefitsreinstatementdisciplinary proceedingsFundamental Rule 54service appealservice tribunalexoneration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which denied the petitioner back benefits following his reinstatement. The petitioner, an Assistant Foreman at Pakistan Ordnance Factories, was initially dismissed for unauthorized absence. Although the Tribunal previously ordered his reinstatement without back benefits, it granted the department liberty to hold a fresh inquiry. The department subsequently chose not to proceed with the charges. The petitioner argued that this decision not to press charges effectively exonerated him, thereby entitling him to back benefits under Fundamental Rule 54. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the employer's decision to abandon disciplinary proceedings against a reinstated employee creates an entitlement to back benefits under the specified rule. The Court held that the legal question regarding the applicability of Fundamental Rule 54 in such circumstances warrants further consideration, and accordingly granted leave to appeal, directing the parties to prepare the appeal on the existing record with the option to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the decision of a department not to proceed with disciplinary charges against a reinstated employee entitle that employee to back benefits under Fundamental Rule 54?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal consider subsequent departmental orders that were not part of the original Service Tribunal judgment?
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• Muhammad Yousaf Jamil vs Haji Shabbir Ahmad And Another1991 SCMR 1886 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-17
  ejectmentbona fide requirementconcurrent findingsleave to appeallandlord and tenantwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition, which had challenged concurrent orders of the lower forums directing the ejectment of the tenant. The core legal question concerns whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the landlord's bona fide personal requirement of the disputed premises for his son warrant interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts, being based on proper appreciation of evidence on record, do not merit interference. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact concurrently rendered by courts below regarding a landlord's bona fide requirement in rent matters will not be disturbed by the apex court in appellate jurisdiction unless shown to be suffering from misreading or non-reading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's bona fide requirement are open to interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a landlord's requirement of the disputed premises for the use of his son constitute a valid ground for ejectment?
  • Can a writ petition against an order of the District Judge in rent proceedings be maintained on questions of fact?
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• Muhammad Younas vs Chief Controller, Imports and Exports And Another1991 SCMR 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-01
  service tribunalmisconductleave to appealdisciplinary proceedingsadmission of guiltremoval from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had partly allowed the petitioner's appeal by converting his dismissal from service into removal. The petitioner, a Naib-Qasid, was dismissed following disciplinary proceedings initiated after he was found physically fighting with a fellow employee on office premises over the division of money received from a visitor. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner could challenge the proof of the charge or the lack of opportunity to cross-examine witnesses despite having admitted to the incident and the core facts before the Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having admitted to the fight and the circumstances surrounding it, could not turn around and contest the proof of the charge. The Court concluded that engaging in an office fight amounting to unruly behavior constitutes misconduct justifying disciplinary action, regardless of any minor misunderstandings regarding ancillary findings in the enquiry report. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who admits to the factual basis of a disciplinary charge before a tribunal can subsequently challenge the proof of that charge?
  • Does physical fighting between employees on office premises constitute misconduct warranting disciplinary action?
  • Whether a minor misunderstanding in the enquiry report regarding specific allegations changes the core complexion of a proven charge of unruly behavior?
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• Muhammad Yasin vs Aleem Ud Din1991 SCMR 1871 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-17
  leave to appealejectmentdefault in payment of rentsublettingpersonal bona fide needappellate jurisdictionpleadings and evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the appellate order of the Lahore High Court directing the petitioner's ejectment from tenancy on the grounds of default in payment of rent, personal bona fide need, and subletting. The core legal question concerns whether a plea regarding security deposit allegedly available for rent adjustment, which was neither pleaded in the reply nor deposed to during evidence, can be raised before the appellate or apex court. The Supreme Court held that a plea not taken in the reply or supported by evidence cannot be urged in proceedings, and finding no misreading of evidence or illegality in the High Court's reappraisal, dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that matters not pleaded or substantiated by evidence at trial cannot be raised as a ground of challenge in appellate or constitutional proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea regarding a security deposit be raised for the first time in appellate proceedings if it was not pleaded in the reply or supported by evidence?
  • Whether the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction can reappraise evidence to reverse a Rent Controller's findings?
  • Does the non-payment of rent due to an unpleaded security deposit constitute a valid defense against ejectment?
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• Muhammad Yasin Khan And Another vs Rehmat Khan And Another1991 SCMR 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-03
  compromise decreecollateral challengerejection of plaintjurisdiction of civil courtreview petitionland allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns review petitions filed against a Supreme Court order that had previously dismissed petitions for leave to appeal. The underlying dispute arose when the petitioners filed a civil suit challenging a compromise decree entered into by the respondents before the Supreme Court in a separate matter involving land allotment. The petitioners, who claimed title to the land through previous sales from one of the parties to the compromise, argued that the compromise was unlawful and prejudicial to their interests. The trial court rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, a decision upheld by the appellate and revisional courts. The Supreme Court held that once a compromise has been accepted and an appeal allowed by the Supreme Court, a subordinate civil court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain a suit that essentially seeks to set aside or challenge the validity of that Supreme Court order. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the review petitions, affirming that the civil court correctly dismissed the suit as it constituted an impermissible collateral challenge to a final order of the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil court entertain a suit that seeks to set aside a compromise order passed by the Supreme Court?
  • Is a suit challenging a Supreme Court order liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does a party claiming interest in land have the right to challenge a compromise decree between other parties in a separate proceeding through a fresh civil suit?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob vs Wali Muhammad And Other1991 SCMR 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-29
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertydeed of associationsettlement authoritiesfinality of orderwrit petitionestoppel by conduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of an evacuee shop originally jointly transferred to the petitioner Muhammad Yaqub and respondent Wali Muhammad. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could challenge transfer findings and revive a claim after failing to challenge an adverse revisional order passed by the Settlement Commissioner for over fourteen years. The Supreme Court held that the unchalleged revisional order of 20-9-1972 had attained finality, sealing the fate of the petitioner, and that subsequent remand proceedings did not afford him a fresh cause of action. The ratio decidendi is that a party who acquiesces in an adverse administrative or quasi-judicial order by failing to challenge it within the prescribed time is estopped by conduct and barred by finality from subsequently re-agitating the matter upon a remand order arising from proceedings initiated by another party.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party failing to challenge a revisional order of the Settlement Commissioner can re-agitate the matter after a prolonged delay following remand proceedings?
  • Does an order passed on remand in favor of another party furnish a fresh cause of action to a petitioner who accepted an earlier adverse finding?
  • Whether an unchallenging party is estopped by conduct from reasserting an interest in disputed evacuee property?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob vs Muhammad Arif1991 SCMR 1783 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-27
  pre-emptionrevisional jurisdictionmisreading of evidencesuperior right of tenancyleave to appealfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal filed by a pre-emptor against a High Court order that accepted the respondent's civil revisions. The underlying dispute involved a suit for pre-emption regarding two Khasra numbers. While the trial court decreed the suit for one Khasra number but dismissed it for the other based on the respondent's superior right of tenancy, the appellate court reversed this regarding the second Khasra number. The High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, set aside the appellate findings, citing misreading and non-reading of essential evidence, specifically Khasra Girdawari entries. The petitioner challenged the High Court's interference with findings of fact and raised a legal argument regarding the applicability of the judgment in Malik Said Kamal Shah v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1986 SC 360) concerning the cut-off date for decrees based on superior rights of tenancy. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in its intervention due to the lower courts' misreading of evidence. Furthermore, the Court rejected the petitioner's legal contention regarding the cut-off date, citing established precedent, and consequently refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court set aside findings of fact in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Does the judgment in Malik Said Kamal Shah v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1986 SC 360) preclude the passing of a decree in favour of a vendee claiming a superior right of tenancy after 31 July 1986?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob vs Haji Muhammad Siddique1991 SCMR 1324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-28
  leave to appealrejection of plaintcivil revisionallotment disputeCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the concurrent orders of the lower courts which rejected the petitioner's suit under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner sought a declaration that he was the allottee in possession of the disputed shop. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 were correctly applied by the courts below to reject the plaint. Granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioner were arguable and warranted a comprehensive examination by the Court. The key principle laid down is that where the application of rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 raises substantial arguable points regarding the proper exercise of judicial discretion, leave to appeal should be granted to scrutinize the legality of the lower courts' concurrent findings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 has been rightly applied for the rejection of a plaint in a suit for declaration of allotment?
  • Do the concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the rejection of a plaint warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Are the points regarding the mechanical rejection of a suit under Order VII Rule 11 arguable for the grant of leave to appeal?
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