Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Dilawar Khan And Others vs Ghulam Nabi And Other1991 SCMR 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-26
  constructive res judicatacivil revisionrevenue recordspermanent injunctionco-ownershipleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction, wherein the plaintiffs sought to establish their status as co-owners in possession of the suit property, challenging the revenue entries designating the contesting defendants as owners. Having faced concurrent findings against them in lower courts, including the dismissal of their civil revision by the High Court, the petitioners challenged the revisional order before the Supreme Court. The core legal questions concerned whether the petitioners' suit was barred by the principles of constructive res judicata and the provisions of Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that previous judicial decisions did not operate as res judicata. The Court affirmed that if the issues raised were previously adjudicated, the suit is barred by res judicata; conversely, if the subject matter was omitted from prior litigation, it is barred by Order II, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Consequently, the leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suit become barred by res judicata if the issues raised therein were previously decided in earlier litigation?
  • Does Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar a suit if the subject matter was not included in previous litigation?
  • Can a party succeed in a civil suit if the claim is barred by either res judicata or Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Dil Ahsan Khan vs The State1991 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-10
  territorial jurisdictioncriminal misappropriationdowry articlesquashment of proceedingscriminal breach of trustCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns a challenge to the territorial jurisdiction of a trial court in Karachi regarding a criminal complaint filed against the appellant. The appellant, accused of misappropriating dowry articles, sought the quashment of proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, arguing that no offence occurred within the jurisdiction of Karachi. The core legal question was whether the Karachi court possessed the requisite jurisdiction to inquire into or try the complaint. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court correctly exercised jurisdiction. The Court relied on Section 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which stipulates that an offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust may be tried by a court within whose local limits the property was received, retained, or the offence committed. Since the complainant alleged that the entrustment of dowry articles occurred in Karachi, the Court affirmed that the Karachi court had the legal authority to proceed with the matter, thereby upholding the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court have jurisdiction to try a case of criminal misappropriation if the entrustment of the property occurred within its local limits?
  • Can proceedings be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 solely on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction when the complaint alleges entrustment within that jurisdiction?
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• Deputy Collector of Customs And 2 Others vs Messrs Reezan Trading1991 SCMR 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-28
  customs dutytariff classificationadministrative reviewmisdeclarationimport policyjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment, which had set aside a customs re-classification order issued against the respondent. The respondent imported a substance identified as 'Ethanol G.R.' (guaranteed reagent), which was initially cleared under Pakistan Customs Tariff heading 38.19. Subsequently, customs authorities, acting on secret information, sought to re-classify the product, alleging misdeclaration and short-payment of duty. The core legal question was whether the customs authorities were justified in re-classifying the imported chemical as an alcoholic beverage rather than a laboratory reagent, given its specific use for diagnostic and analytical purposes. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the administrative re-classification lacked a sound basis. The Court held that since the Government of Pakistan had previously permitted the import specifically as a chemical for laboratory use, and given the product's high purity (99.9%) rendering it unsuitable for human consumption, the original classification was correct. The principle established is that administrative re-classification of goods must be based on relevant data and consistent with the intended use authorized by the government at the time of import.

  Questions settled

  • Can customs authorities re-classify imported goods after the government has already permitted their import under a specific chemical classification?
  • Does the intended use of a chemical for laboratory and diagnostic purposes justify its classification under chemical tariff headings rather than as an alcoholic beverage?
  • Is a high-purity chemical substance unsuitable for human consumption properly classifiable as an alcoholic beverage for customs duty purposes?
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• Daulat Khan And Another vs The State1991 SCMR 290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-06
  leave to appealsmugglingcontrabandsearch and seizurepublic witnessmens reaCustoms Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a conviction under the Customs Act, 1969, where the petitioners, a driver and a cleaner of a coach, were found guilty of smuggling contraband goods discovered in a hidden compartment of the vehicle. The petitioners challenged the conviction before the Supreme Court, arguing that the search was conducted without independent public witnesses, that there was no evidence establishing their knowledge of the contraband, and that the vehicle belonged to a third party, suggesting the goods could have been secreted without their involvement. Furthermore, they contended that their defense of being detained during the search was ignored by the lower courts. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the submissions, determined that the issues raised regarding the evidentiary value of the search, the lack of public witnesses, and the requirement of proving mens rea in smuggling cases necessitated a deeper examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the conviction could be sustained in light of these legal and factual contentions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of public witnesses during a vehicle search under the Customs Act 1969 invalidate the recovery of contraband?
  • Is it necessary to prove the driver's knowledge of contraband secreted in a vehicle to sustain a conviction for smuggling?
  • Can a conviction under the Customs Act 1969 be upheld if the defense plea regarding the circumstances of the search was not considered by the trial court?
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• Crescent Sugar Mills & Distillery Limited vs Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs And 2 Other1991 SCMR 1670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-03
  leave to appealexcise dutyproduction capacitypenaltyabatementCentral Board of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the imposition of penalties under the Excise Duty on Production Capacity (Sugar) Rules, 1972. The core legal questions examined are whether a penalty under rule 5(3) of the said Rules follows as a matter of course regardless of abatement allowed by the Central Board of Revenue, and whether such penalty liability must be proportionate to the capacity duty for which abatement was not allowed while the main abatement claim remains pending finalization. The Court granted leave to appeal to consider these substantial questions of law regarding tax and excise duty penalties and directed security to be furnished.

  Questions settled

  • Whether penalty under rule 5(3) of the Excise Duty on Production Capacity (Sugar) Rules, 1972 follows as a matter of course and irrespective of the extent of the abatement allowed by the Central Board of Revenue?
  • Whether the liability to the penalty was dependent on, and had to be proportionate to the extent of capacity duty of which abatement was not allowed?
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• Commissioner of Incometax, Peshawar Zone, Peshawar vs Messrs Siemen A.G_1991 PLD Supreme Court 368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-21
  income taxdividendreturn on capitalinterpretation of statutesIslamic jurisprudencecontractual obligations
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Commissioner of Income Tax challenges the Peshawar High Court's decision holding that the return on capital paid by Telephone Industries of Pakistan Limited to Siemens A.G. constituted "dividend" under section 2(6-A) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, rather than "interest" or an "obligatory charge". The core legal question was whether the guaranteed return on share capital under the corporate agreements amounted to dividend income. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that the disputed return was indeed dividend, as dictionaries and the intention of the contracting parties established that the return was profit in the nature of dividend. Furthermore, the Court laid down the key principle that under Islamic jurisprudence and constitutional interpretation, when parties enter into a valid mutual contract not prohibited by Islam, third parties such as the income tax authorities or courts have no power to intervene and alter the nature of the contract.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the return on capital paid to a shareholder under an agreement is considered 'dividend' within the meaning of section 2(6-A) of the Income Tax Act, 1922?
  • Can income tax authorities alter the nature of a valid mutual contract between parties under the pretext of interpreting fiscal laws?
  • Does the interpretation of existing statutes in Pakistan require alignment with the Injunctions of Islam pursuant to Article 227 of the Constitution?
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• Commissioner of Incometax (Central), Karachi vs Messrs Fakir1991 PLD Supreme Court 280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-30
  Income Tax Actdepreciation allowancewritten down valuesurplus sale proceedscessation of businesstaxing statute interpretationcharging provisiondeeming provision
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses appeals regarding the interpretation of the Second Proviso to Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, concerning the taxability of surpluses arising from the sale of plant, machinery, and buildings when the assessee carried on no business during the relevant accounting period. The core legal question was whether the Second Proviso is an independent charging provision enabling the Revenue to tax the surplus even if the business was not active or the machinery was not used in the relevant accounting period. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court correctly interpreted the law, ruling that the condition precedent under Section 10(1) requiring business to be carried on in the year of account is implicit in the Second Proviso, and 'any such building, machinery or plant' refers back to properties used for business in the previous year. The key principle laid down is that in interpreting taxing statutes, courts must look strictly at what is clearly said without implying unexpressed provisions or treating a proviso as an independent charging section untethered to the main enactment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the second proviso to section 10(2)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 is an independent charging provision that operates regardless of whether the business was carried on or the machinery was used during the relevant accounting period?
  • Can surplus realized from the sale of plant, machinery, and buildings be assessed to tax under the Income Tax Act, 1922 if the assessee conducted no business in the accounting year of the sale?
  • How should the phrase 'any such building, machinery or plant' in the second proviso to section 10(2)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 be construed in relation to preceding clauses?
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• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Peshawar Zone, Peshawar vs Messrs Siemen A.G_1991 PTD 488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-21
  dividendincome taxinterpretation of statutesislamic jurisprudencemutual contractreturn on capital
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Commissioner of Income Tax arises from a decision of the Peshawar High Court regarding the nature of a return on capital paid by Telephone Industries of Pakistan, Limited to Siemens A.G. The core legal question was whether the return on capital paid on the shareholding constituted 'dividend' within the meaning of section 2(6-A) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, or interest/obligatory charge. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court rightly concluded the amount was dividend, noting that the intention of the parties and the term 'return' signified profit in the nature of dividend. Furthermore, invoking Islamic jurisprudence and principles of interpretation, the Court ruled that third parties, including tax authorities, cannot alter the nature of a mutually agreed valid contract freely entered into by parties. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the return on capital paid on shareholding constitutes dividend within the meaning of section 2(6-A) of the Income Tax Act, 1922?
  • Can tax authorities alter the nature of a mutually agreed valid contract between parties?
  • How do Islamic injunctions and principles of interpretation apply to the enforcement and interpretation of existing fiscal statutes?
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• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore vs Messrs Noorani Calandering1991 PTD 830 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-06
  Income-taxprevious yearaccounting periodassessment yearstatutory discretiontax evasiontax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two appeals by the Commissioner of Income-Tax challenging the High Court's decision regarding the authority of an Income-tax Officer to impose conditions when permitting an assessee to change their 'previous year' accounting period. The core legal question was whether, under Section 2(11) of the Income-tax Act, an Income-tax Officer, while consenting to a change in the accounting year, possesses the statutory discretion to impose a condition requiring the entire extended period (e.g., fifteen months) to be treated as a single 'previous year' for assessment purposes. The Supreme Court held that the Income-tax Officer acted within their statutory discretion. The Court reasoned that the proviso to Section 2(11) explicitly empowers the Officer to impose conditions upon granting consent for such changes. Furthermore, the Court established that the concept of two 'previous years' for a single assessment year is legally untenable under the Act. Consequently, the Officer may validly mandate that the transition period be consolidated into one assessment year to prevent income from escaping taxation, thereby safeguarding revenue interests.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Income-tax Officer impose a condition to count a period longer than twelve months as a single 'previous year' when allowing an assessee to change their accounting year?
  • Does the Income-tax Act permit the existence of two 'previous years' in relation to the same assessment year?
  • Does the proviso to Section 2(11) of the Income-tax Act grant the Income-tax Officer the power to impose conditions when consenting to a change in the 'previous year'?
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• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone, `A', Karachi vs Messrs1991 PTD 1028 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-12
  insurance businesstaxation reserveprovision for taxationexpenditureFirst Schedule Income Tax ActController of Insuranceassessment of income-tax
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals by leave of the Supreme Court arise from a common order of the Sindh High Court disposing of Income Tax References under section 66 of the Income Tax Act, 1922. The respondent, a non-life insurance company, had charged provision for taxation to its Profit and Loss account, which the Income Tax Officer disallowed and added back to the taxable profits. The core legal question was whether the provision for taxation constituted an 'expenditure' empowering the Income Tax Officer to make adjustments under Rule 6 of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1922. The Supreme Court held that the accounts submitted under the Insurance Act, 1938 are binding and final as a fait accompli, and the Assessing Officer's power is strictly limited to excluding items that constitute actual 'expenditure' not allowable under section 10. Ruling that taxation reserves or provisions do not constitute expenditure—as they are not sums paid out irretrievably—the Court held that the Income Tax Officer lacked the jurisdiction to disallow and add back such reserves. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the statutory scheme confines the assessing authority strictly to the mechanism provided.

  Questions settled

  • Whether provision for taxation or taxation reserve constitutes expenditure under Rule 6 of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1922?
  • Does an Income Tax Officer have the jurisdiction to alter or adjust items in the annual accounts of a non-life insurance company that do not constitute actual expenditure?
  • Are the annual accounts submitted by an insurance company to the Controller of Insurance binding on the Income Tax Officer for the purpose of computing taxable profits?
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• Commissioner of Income-Tax (Central), Karachi vs Masers Fakir1991 PTD 573 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-30
  income taxwritten down valuedepreciation allowancecessation of businesscharging provisionstatutory interpretationtaxable surplus
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns the interpretation of the second proviso to Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, specifically whether surplus arising from the sale of machinery and plant is taxable when the assessee has ceased business operations during the relevant accounting year. The Department contended that the proviso was an independent charging provision allowing taxation of such surplus regardless of business activity. The Supreme Court rejected this, holding that the proviso must be read in conjunction with Section 10(1), which requires that the business be carried on by the assessee during the accounting year. The Court reasoned that the phrase 'any such' in the proviso refers back to assets used for business purposes as defined in earlier clauses, and that the proviso does not create a standalone tax liability absent the existence of a business. The Court affirmed the High Court's view that the surplus is not exigible to tax unless the assessee conducted business during the accounting year and the assets were used for that business, dismissing the Department's appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Is the second proviso to Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, an independent charging provision that operates regardless of whether a business was carried on during the accounting year?
  • Does the phrase 'any such' in the second proviso to Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, limit the application of the proviso to assets used for business purposes?
  • Can surplus arising from the sale of machinery be assessed as profit under the Income Tax Act, 1922, if the assessee had ceased all business operations prior to the sale?
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• Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone, `A', Karachi vs Messrs1991 SCMR 2485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-12
  non-life insurance businessprovision for taxationtaxation reserveannual accountsController of InsuranceFirst Scheduleincome tax assessmentexpenditure definition
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arises from two appeals filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax against a common order of the Sindh High Court regarding income tax references under section 66 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, concerning assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71. The respondent, a foreign insurance company carrying on non-life insurance business in Pakistan, had created and charged a provision for taxation to its Profit and Loss Account and deducted income tax provisions from interest and dividend income. The Income Tax Officer disallowed and added back these amounts. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal deleted the addition, and the High Court answered the reference in favor of the assessee. The core legal question was whether the Income Tax Officer was justified under Rule 6 of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1922, in disallowing and adding back the provision for taxation (taxation reserve) shown in the annual accounts submitted to the Controller of Insurance. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that accounts submitted under the Insurance Act, 1938, are binding as a fait accompli, and the Income Tax Officer's power to adjust profits is strictly restricted to excluding items of `expenditure' that are not allowable under section 10 of the Income Tax Act, 1922. Since a taxation reserve is an appropriation of profit and does not constitute `expenditure' (defined as money paid out irretrievably), it falls outside the limited jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to add back under Rule 6. The Court laid down that finality attaches to the accounts submitted to the Controller of Insurance, and the Revenue cannot probe into or modify such accounts outside the explicit framework of the First Schedule.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provision for taxation or taxation reserve shown in the annual accounts of a non-life insurance company constitutes `expenditure' under Rule 6 of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1922?
  • Does the Income Tax Officer have the jurisdiction to probe into and modify the integrity of annual accounts submitted by an insurance company to the Controller of Insurance beyond excluding non-allowable expenditures?
  • Are the annual accounts furnished by an insurance company to the Controller of Insurance binding as a fait accompli for the purpose of computing taxable profits under the Income Tax Act, 1922?
  • Whether an Income Tax Officer can disallow a taxation reserve and add it back to the balance of profits of a non-life insurance business under Rule 6 of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1922?
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• Collector of Customs (Preventive) and 2 others vs Muhammad1991 PLD Supreme Court 630 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-18
  warrantless searchCustoms Act 1969territorial jurisdictionconfiscation of goodssmugglingsearch warrantconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged the High Court of Sindh's judgment declaring a search, seizure, and confiscation of imported tin ingots by Customs Officers to be without lawful authority. Customs authorities conducted a warrantless raid under Section 163 of the Customs Act, 1969 at premises located in Federal 'B' Area, Karachi, alleging foreign smuggling. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's ruling and dismissed the appeal. The Court held that Section 163 requires specific written grounds recording a genuine apprehension of danger that goods may be removed before a warrant under Section 162 can be obtained; a mere general assertion that obtaining a warrant is 'not expedient' is insufficient to bypass statutory safeguards protecting privacy and property. Additionally, the Court held that the phrase 'any place' in Section 163 is confined to places within the officer's legally notified territorial jurisdiction under Section 3 and Section 9 of the Act, which in this case was restricted to the Port of Karachi and did not extend to Federal 'B' Area.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Customs officer required to record specific grounds justifying an apprehension of danger of removal of goods before dispensing with a search warrant under Section 163 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does the term 'any place' used in Section 163 of the Customs Act, 1969 empower Customs officers to conduct searches outside their notified territorial jurisdiction?
  • Can search and seizure proceedings conducted by Customs officers outside their statutory territorial limits be sustained as lawful?
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• Cluett, Peabody and Company Inc. vs Assistant Registrar of Trade1991 SCMR 921 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-10
  trade markrectification of registerres judicatahonest and concurrent usertrade mark oppositionspecial circumstances
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal with leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which maintained the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks' order dismissing the appellants' opposition to respondent No. 2's trade mark registration application. The core legal question revolved around the proper construction of the proviso to section 37(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, and whether an earlier order declining a rectification application but noting special circumstances and honest concurrent user constituted res judicata against the appellants' subsequent opposition. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of a rectification application does not operate as res judicata to bar an opposition under section 15(2) of the Act, as the scopes of rectification and opposition proceedings are distinct. The Court laid down the principle that observations made in favor of an applicant whose rectification application is dismissed do not create a binding estoppel or res judicata precluding the registered proprietor from raising objections during opposition proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a trade mark rectification application operate as res judicata against the registered proprietor's subsequent opposition to registration under section 15(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940?
  • What is the correct construction of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 37 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 regarding the refusal of a rectification application?
  • Are the scopes of a rectification proceeding under section 37 and an opposition proceeding under section 15(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 distinct?
  • Does a finding of special circumstances and honest concurrent user in a dismissed rectification order constitute a binding final decision on the parties for all subsequent proceedings?
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• Chughatta vs The Province of Punjab And Other1991 SCMR 1463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-24
  proprietary rightsallotment of landretrospective effectconcurrent findings of factcivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that he was entitled to the conferment of proprietary rights under a memorandum dated September 3, 1979, and challenging the allotment of the disputed land in favor of the respondents as illegal. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the land had already been allotted to the respondents prior to the promulgation of the memorandum, which could not be given retrospective effect. The appellate court and the High Court in civil revision concurrently affirmed the dismissal. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner's contention was devoid of force because the land was allotted to the respondents before the scheme for proprietary rights came into effect, and the matter was conclusively settled by concurrent findings of fact by the courts below. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a notification or scheme for the conferment of proprietary rights can be given retrospective effect to affect prior land allotments?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by three lower courts regarding land allotment?
  • Whether a person cultivating land prior to the expiry of another's lease is automatically entitled to proprietary rights over subsequent allotments?
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• Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh vs Ali Gohar Abro1991 PLD Supreme Court 1016 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-07
  civil servantprobationerreversionunsatisfactory service recordservice tribunalpromotionstigmadisciplinary action
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal, which had set aside the reversion of the respondent from the post of Executive Engineer back to his substantive post of Assistant Engineer. The respondent, initially promoted on probation, was reverted after the expiry of his probationary period because his service record was found to be average and his reputation for integrity poor. The core legal question was whether the reversion of a civil servant on probation due to unsatisfactory performance amounted to a penalty or punishment requiring a show-cause notice, or whether it was a reversion simpliciter under the relevant civil servant laws. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Tribunal's judgment, holding that terminating or reverting a probationer on the ground of unsatisfactory work does not amount to dismissal or removal from service, nor does it cast a stigma, provided it is not based on specific misconduct. The key principle laid down is that a probationer holds no right to the post, and reverting a probationer for general unsatisfactory performance during probation is in accordance with the terms of service and rules, requiring no disciplinary proceedings or show-cause notice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the reversion of a civil servant during the probationary period on the ground of unsatisfactory work amount to reduction in rank or punishment requiring a show-cause notice?
  • What is the legal status of a civil servant whose probation period has expired without a formal order of confirmation or extension under the Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1973?
  • Can internal departmental proceedings and deliberations of a Departmental Promotion Committee be used to convert an order of reversion simpliciter into a penal order casting a stigma?
  • When does the termination or reversion of a probationer constitute a dismissal or removal from service amounting to a stigma?
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• Chief Secretary to the Government of N. W.F.P. And Another vs Mian1991 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-22
  civil servantappointmentGovernor's discretionary powersservice tribunaltermination of serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, Chief Secretary to the Government of N.-W.F.P. and another, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal dated 16-10-1989, which had set aside the termination order of respondent No.1 dated 20-10-1988 and directed the implementation of the Governor's order dated 25-5-1988 appointing the respondent as Comptroller, Governor's House. The core legal question was whether the Governor's appointment order required a formal notification by the N.-W.F.P. Government to take effect and whether the Government could defeat the order by refraining from issuing such notification. The Supreme Court held that since the Governor had discretionary powers under the relevant rules to make the appointment, the Government could not defeat the formal order of the Governor by refusing to issue the necessary notification. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the Provincial Government cannot nullify or defeat a valid discretionary appointment order made by the Governor by withholding the issuance of a consequential notification.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Provincial Government defeat a formal appointment order made by the Governor by refraining from issuing a notification?
  • Does the Governor possess discretionary powers to appoint officers of the Governor's House Staff under the Rules of Business?
  • Whether the Service Tribunal has the jurisdiction to set aside the termination of a civil servant appointed by the Governor?
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• Chief Engineer, Irrigation, Mailsi And Others vs Nazir Ahmad And Other1991 SCMR 974 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-24
  canal water supplyculturable commandable areacanal and drainagewater allocationwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court accepting a writ petition filed by the respondents, who sought the transfer of their lands from the Shujabad Canal Division to the Patti Minor Lodhran Canal Division for water supply. The core legal question concerned the proper procedure and authority under the Canal and Drainage Act for including lands in a culturable commandable area (C.C.A.) and whether statutory procedures, including notice to affected landowners, were followed. The Supreme Court observed that while the appellants' legal stand regarding the mandatory statutory procedure was correct, a strict technical application would cause grave hardship as the respondents had been receiving water since 1977. Through the cooperative intervention of the Court, the Chief Engineer (Irrigation) Bahawalpur agreed to take over the respondents' lands and supply a reduced quantum of water as a fair and equitable solution. The appeal was partly accepted, modifying the High Court's order to permit the supply of 0.42 cusecs of water pending proper permanent arrangements. The key principle laid down is that while statutory procedures regarding canal water allocation must be observed, equitable considerations and the prevention of public injury can shape practical resolutions in canal water disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land can be included in the culturable commandable area of a canal division without following the prescribed statutory procedure and notice to landowners?
  • What is the legal effect of recommendations made by subordinate canal officers regarding water supply transfers?
  • Can the Supreme Court facilitate an equitable settlement between canal authorities and landowners to prevent developed lands from becoming barren?
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• Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab vs Sh. Muhammad Jahangir And Another1991 SCMR 294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-15
  Waqf propertydedicationChilla Hazrat Mian Mir SahibWest Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinanceleave to appealprivate propertyconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Chief Administrator of Auqaf, sought leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the District Judge and the High Court, which had declared that the disputed property comprising Chilla Hazrat Mian Mir Sahib, a house, and shops was not Waqf property under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1960. The core legal question was whether the property constituted Waqf property by permanent dedication or user. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent factual findings by the lower courts—holding that the property had always been treated as private property, that the presence of a Chilla without permanent dedication did not convert it into Waqf, and that no public mosque existed on the site—suffered from no legal defect. The Court further ruled that the petitioner was rightly refused permission to produce additional documents at a belated stage after failing to do so for four years. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming that the mere historical association of a saint with a site does not suffice to render it Waqf property without proof of permanent dedication or public religious user.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere performance of a Chilla by a saint on a property convert it into Waqf property in the absence of permanent dedication?
  • Can a party be permitted to produce additional documents at a belated stage after failing to avail opportunities for several years?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-existence of a Waqf property can be interfered with without showing a legal defect?
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• Chhote Khan And 4 Others vs Deputy Commissioner, Sahiwal And 51991 SCMR 1825 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-22
  Mukhbari applicationinformant locus standiallotment of landSettlement Commissionerwrit petitionLetters Patent Appealleave to appealevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing their Letters Patent Appeal, which had affirmed the dismissal in limine of their writ petition. The petitioners claimed to be the earlier informers (mukhbars) regarding an illegal allotment of evacuee land cancelled by settlement authorities, which land was subsequently allotted to respondents who were held to be the true informants. The core legal questions pertained to whether the petitioners had the locus standi to challenge the settlement authorities' order via a writ petition, and whether statutory protection under Section 14(2)(1-A)(a) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 (Act XLVII of 1958) applied to them. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings of fact that the petitioners failed to establish their status as the valid informants. The Court held that an informer lacks locus standi to file a writ petition, and the statutory protections for allottees of resumed land were inapplicable to their factual circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an informer (mukhbar) possesses the requisite locus standi to challenge an allotment or settlement order through a constitutional writ petition?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities and the High Court regarding the identity of an informant can be reopened before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether statutory protections granted under Section 14(2)(1-A)(a) of Act XLVII of 1958 apply to claimants whose status as informants is negated on facts?
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• Chaudhry Rahimuddin vs Chaudhry Jalaluddin1991 PLD Supreme Court 484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-11
  tentative rent ordersummary inquiryrent controlstriking off defenceejectment proceedingslandlord and tenantSindh Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that set aside a Rent Controller’s order striking off a tenant’s defense for non-compliance with a tentative rent order under Section 16 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question concerned the scope of the summary inquiry required to determine rent tentatively for deposit purposes. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in requiring a full-fledged inquiry involving the examination of witnesses. The Court ruled that a Rent Controller is not obligated to conduct a detailed trial or frame issues at the tentative stage. The determination of rent under Section 16 is intended to be summary and approximate, serving only to regulate rent payments during the pendency of proceedings. Requiring an in-depth inquiry would defeat the legislative intent of ensuring speedy disposal of rent cases. The Court emphasized that the tentative nature of the order does not preclude a final determination of rent later, thereby protecting the interests of both parties. The Rent Controller’s original order was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Rent Controller required to conduct a full-fledged inquiry or examine witnesses before passing a tentative rent order under Section 16 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does the failure to conduct a detailed inquiry into the rate of rent render a tentative rent order arbitrary or invalid?
  • What is the legal purpose of a tentative rent order passed during the pendency of rent proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, Regional Transport Authority, Rawalpindi vs Pakistan1991 PLD Supreme Court 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-29
  Regional Transport AuthorityMotor Vehicles Ordinancestructured discretionstage carriage permitsinsurance guarantorbank guaranteemala fides in lawconstitutional petitionabuse of discretionpublic trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a High Court judgment accepting a constitutional petition filed by the respondent insurance company against the Chairman, Regional Transport Authority (RTA), Rawalpindi. The respondent had sought recognition as an approved guarantor under Sections 49 and 67 of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965. The RTA rejected the request on discriminatory grounds, imposing an unjustified bank guarantee requirement and comparing statutory deposits unequally against a newer rival insurer. The Supreme Court examined whether the respondent possessed an enforceable legal right, the validity of the RTA's discretion, and whether the High Court improperly substituted its discretion. Dismissing the appeal with costs, the Supreme Court held that public office is a public trust requiring reasonable, timely, and non-discriminatory exercise of discretion. When statutory authorities fail to structure discretion or act arbitrarily upon irrelevant considerations, courts must intervene. The Court affirmed that an actionable legal right arises when an authority neglects its statutory duties, clarifying that the RTA's arbitrary conduct constituted established mala fides in law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory authority reject an application based on irrelevant considerations such as comparing historical statutory deposits of different entities?
  • Does a citizen have an enforceable legal right through a constitutional petition when a public authority fails or refuses to exercise its statutory discretionary powers?
  • Can a statutory functionary demand that an applicant show an express legal provision permitting the filing of an application where the law does not prohibit it?
  • Does the arbitrary, discriminatory, and unguided exercise of statutory discretion constitute mala fides in law justifying judicial intervention?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, District Evacuee Trust Committee, Rawalpindi vs Sharif1991 PLD Supreme Court 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-07
  limitation periodexclusion of timespecial lawsettlement appealsexpress exclusioncertified copies
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals by leave of the Court challenged the High Court's judgment dismissing the appellant's settlement appeals as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the time spent in obtaining a copy of the Settlement Commissioner's order could be excluded when computing the period of limitation under Section 4(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, by virtue of Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Supreme Court held that since the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, is a special law, and Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908, explicitly provides that sections 4, 9 to 18, and 22 apply unless expressly excluded, the time-exclusion provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act apply to appeals under Section 4(4) unless there is an express statutory exclusion. The Court ruled that implied exclusion through statutory interpretation or maxims is insufficient under Section 29(2)(a), overruled a contrary Lahore High Court precedent, approved the Sindh High Court view, allowed the appeals, and remanded the matters for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, apply to appeals filed under Section 4(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can the application of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, be excluded by implication under Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Does Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908, require an express exclusion by a special or local law to oust the application of sections 4, 9 to 18, and 22 of the Limitation Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, Area Electricity Board, WAPDA, Multan And Another vs Muhammad Shafi1991 SCMR 1145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-19
  compulsory retirementmisconductunauthorized absenceservice tribunaldisciplinary actionearned leavemedical grounds
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of a Service Tribunal, which had set aside the compulsory retirement of the respondent, Muhammad Shafi. The respondent, an employee of WAPDA, was initially removed from service for unauthorized absence from duty following a transfer. Upon departmental appeal, this was converted to compulsory retirement. The respondent challenged this before the Service Tribunal, asserting his absence was due to illness, supported by medical certification. The Tribunal found that the competent authority had subsequently sanctioned earned leave on medical grounds for the entire period of absence and had even paid the respondent's salary arrears for that duration. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the basis for the disciplinary action—alleged willful absence—was factually incorrect. The Supreme Court, upon review, affirmed the Tribunal's findings, noting that the grant of leave and payment of arrears effectively negated the charge of misconduct. The Court concluded that no question of law was involved and dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the reinstatement of the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Can disciplinary action for willful absence be sustained when the competent authority has subsequently sanctioned leave on medical grounds for the same period?
  • Does the payment of salary arrears for a period of absence imply that the absence was authorized?
  • Is a finding of fact by a Service Tribunal regarding the nature of an employee's absence subject to interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of a question of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, Admission Board of Medical Colleges of the Punjab And Another vs Muhammad Ayub And Another1991 SCMR 1827 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-30
  medical college admissioninterim orderleave to appealadministrative erroracademic admission disputecancellation of admission
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an interim order passed by the High Court concerning the admission of two respondents to a Medical College. The dispute arose after the petitioner, the Admission Board, initially granted admission to respondent No. 1 based on an inadvertent computer error, which was subsequently cancelled upon discovery of the mistake. The High Court initially intervened against this cancellation, but the Board later reaffirmed the cancellation and admitted respondent No. 2 in his place. By the time the matter reached the Supreme Court, respondent No. 2 had been studying for two years under the High Court's interim orders, while the status of respondent No. 1 remained unclear. The Supreme Court, noting the complexity and the need to ensure justice for both parties, converted the petition into an appeal. The Court directed the parties to file necessary documentation for a final disposal and ordered the petitioner to clarify the academic status of respondent No. 1 during the relevant period to facilitate a fair adjudication of the competing claims.

  Questions settled

  • Can an admission granted due to a computer error be cancelled by the Admission Board?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to interfere with the cancellation of an admission based on a clerical error?
  • What factors should be considered when balancing the rights of two candidates in a medical college admission dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Masood Akhtar Khan vs Muhammad Siddique And Other1991 SCMR 199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-03
  pre-emptionconcurrent findings of factsecond appealappellate interferenceappreciation of evidenceexchange deeds
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a pre-emption suit wherein the appellant claimed a superior right of pre-emption over the respondents regarding land sold in a village. The trial court and the first appellate court decreed the suit in favor of the appellant, finding that the respondents' exchange deeds were ante-dated and attested after the suit's institution. However, the High Court, in second appeal, set aside these concurrent findings and dismissed the suit. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact made by the lower courts. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly intervened because the lower courts had failed to properly appreciate the evidence. Specifically, the lower courts ignored crucial documentary evidence, including admitted exchange deeds and official records, while relying on scanty oral testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing that concurrent findings of fact are not sacrosanct when lower courts fail to consider material evidence or misread the record, thereby justifying appellate interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal if the lower courts failed to properly appreciate the evidence?
  • Is a court justified in setting aside concurrent findings of fact when material documentary evidence was ignored by the lower courts?
  • Does the failure to consider official records and admitted deeds constitute a valid ground for appellate interference in second appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Khan And Others vs Allah Ditta And Other1991 SCMR 1750 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-27
  civil suitdeclaration of titleconcurrent findingsproprietary rightsleave to appealownership dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit instituted by the petitioners seeking a declaration of ownership regarding Ihata No. 64 in Village Abadi of Daultala. The petitioners claimed that the property belonged to their predecessor-in-interest, Saran Das, and challenged the validity of previous judicial decrees passed in 1978 and 1981, asserting that the respondents held only rights of residence and ownership of the malba, rather than full title. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had established their proprietary title to the disputed property and whether the lower courts erred in dismissing their claim. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the concurrent findings of the three lower courts, noting that the petitioners failed to prove their ownership or that the property had devolved upon them from Saran Das. Furthermore, the Court observed that the petitioners' failure to intervene in previous litigation concerning the property indicated a lack of clarity regarding their own title. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that concurrent findings of fact regarding title, absent proof of ownership, do not warrant interference in appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to intervene in prior litigation concerning a property indicate a lack of clear title by a claimant?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by three lower courts regarding property ownership?
  • Is a party entitled to a declaration of ownership if they cannot prove the devolution of title from their predecessor-in-interest?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Hussain, Assistant Commissioner And Others vs Muhammad Jameel And Other1991 SCMR 1923 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-17
  writ petitionleave to appealprocedural irregularityHigh Court practicesettlement authoritiesdisposal of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal filed by Settlement authorities challenging an order passed by the High Court in a writ petition. The core legal question before the Supreme Court concerned the propriety of the High Court's procedure in 'disposing' of a writ petition in a manner that granted significant relief to the respondents without formally accepting the petition or providing adequate justification. Upon hearing the arguments, the Supreme Court observed that the impugned order, which granted major relief without a formal acceptance of the petition, appeared prima facie inconsistent with the established practice of the High Court when adjudicating matters of vital importance to the parties involved. Consequently, the Court held that the petition for leave to appeal should be converted into a regular appeal to allow for a full review of the proceedings. The Court directed the parties to prepare the appeal based on the existing record while permitting the submission of necessary additional documents to facilitate a proper determination of the issues raised.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court grant major relief in a writ petition without formally accepting the petition?
  • Is the disposal of a writ petition without a formal order of acceptance consistent with established High Court practice in matters of vital importance?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Hussain vs Third Additional District and Sessions1991 SCMR 1861 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-23
  election petitionrecount of ballot-paperselection tribunalconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the dismissal of his election petition and subsequent attempts to secure a recount of ballot-papers after losing an election to the Municipal Corporation, Faisalabad. After his initial election petition was dismissed on a technical ground, he pursued remedies through multiple constitutional petitions in the High Court and an additional application before the Election Tribunal, all of which failed. Seeking leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the core legal question concerned the jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal to order a recount after having already dismissed the election petition. The Supreme Court held that once the Election Tribunal dismissed the election petition, it became functus officio and was left with no jurisdiction to order a recount of the ballot-papers. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed as misconceived and without merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Election Tribunal retain jurisdiction to order a recount of ballot-papers after dismissing an election petition?
  • Can a candidate challenge the dismissal of an election petition through successive constitutional petitions and subsequent recount applications before the tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Azim vs The Chief Engineer, Irrigation And Other1991 SCMR 255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-06
  service appealdepartmental inquirywilful absencetermination of serviceopportunity of hearingfinding of factservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service appeal filed by an Assistant Vernacular Clerk against the dismissal of his service by the Irrigation Department, which was subsequently upheld by the Service Tribunal. The core legal question was whether the appellant was denied an opportunity to participate in the departmental inquiry prior to his termination. The appellant had been absent from duty for an extended period, claiming medical grounds, but failed to comply with departmental directives to undergo a second medical opinion and refused to attend a personal hearing before the Superintending Engineer. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the appellant had been provided with sufficient opportunity to defend himself and that his absence was willful. The Court held that the findings of the Service Tribunal regarding the appellant's conduct and the adequacy of the opportunity provided were findings of fact, which did not warrant interference by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as it raised no substantial question of law of public importance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of fact by a Service Tribunal be interfered with by the Supreme Court in the absence of a substantial question of law?
  • Does the refusal of an employee to appear for a personal hearing despite being given an opportunity constitute a denial of the right to be heard?
  • Is an employee's failure to comply with a directive to undergo a second medical opinion relevant to determining willful absence from duty?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Aslam vs Assistant Commissioner1991 SCMR 1318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-26
  no-confidence motionUnion CouncilChairmanspecial meetingleave to appealprocedural legality
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Chairman of a Union Council challenging the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the High Court regarding a no-confidence motion passed against him. The core legal questions involve whether sufficient notice of a special meeting was provided and whether proceedings conducted after the appointed time, following the adjournment of the meeting by the Chairman upon the presiding officer's failure to arrive on time, were legal and valid. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contention regarding the legality of holding the meeting after the appointed hour when the petitioner and members had left after waiting for half an hour needed examination, as it had allegedly prejudiced the petitioner. The key principle established is that holding a convened meeting outside the appointed time after the departure of the Chairman and members due to the absence of the presiding officer warrants detailed judicial examination regarding procedural fairness and prejudice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether proceedings of a no-confidence meeting held after the appointed time and after the departure of the Chairman are legal?
  • Does the failure of a nominated presiding officer to arrive at the appointed time justify the adjournment of a meeting by the Chairman?
  • Whether insufficient notice and delayed proceedings of a no-confidence meeting cause material prejudice to the affected Chairman?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Akbar Ali vs Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi And Another1991 SCMR 2114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-02
  service matterfrivolous litigationsubstantial justiceIslamic jurisprudencefinality of judgmentabuse of processconstitutional set up
  Summary & questions settled

  This service matter concerns a petitioner who sought to challenge his dismissal from service by filing a miscellaneous application over a decade after his initial petition for leave to appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The core legal question addressed was whether a litigant is permitted to reopen settled service litigation through frivolous applications based on technicalities to secure unearned financial gains. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the matter had long reached finality and that the petitioner’s attempt to revive it was an immoral effort to exploit the public exchequer. The Court laid down the principle that judicial forums must not act as passive spectators but must actively curb the tendency to prolong litigation through technicalities. It emphasized that the adversary system, when reliant solely on technicalities that ignore the root of the case, is outdated. Under the current Constitutional framework, which incorporates Islamic jurisprudence, the pursuit of substantial justice is paramount, and courts must look beyond technical traps to ensure justice for both citizens and the State.

  Questions settled

  • Can a litigant reopen a service matter that has already been decided by the Supreme Court through a miscellaneous application filed years later?
  • Is the adversary system of law in Pakistan permitted to rely on technicalities that defeat the ends of substantial justice?
  • What is the duty of courts and legal forums when faced with frivolous litigation intended to extract unearned financial gains from the State?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Abdul Ghafoor and 2 others vs Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, Lahore and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-20
  service tribunalseniorityvested rightpromotioncompetitive examinationselect listcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute concerning the seniority of Deputy Superintendents of Central Excise and Land Customs. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the Service Tribunal could treat seniority as a vested right contrary to section 8 of the Civil Servants Act, whether qualifying examinations for promotion could be treated as competitive examinations, and the effect of departmental policies regarding promotion criteria from February 1957 to July 1959. The core legal question centered on whether the departmental examinations held during that specific period operated merely as qualifying tests or created a select list conferring vested rights to promotion without further selection. The Supreme Court held that during the period from February 1957 to July 1959, Departmental Promotion Committees were abolished, and the examinations held during this window functioned to prepare a select list of candidates awaiting promotion based purely on examination merit, thereby accruing vested rights unlike examinations held prior or subsequent thereto. The Court laid down the principle that pre-enactment seniority rights are governed by conditions and instructions prevailing under previous rules, and that where examinations during a specific window directly formed a select list without intervening selection boards, successful candidates acquired a distinct promotion status.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal could treat seniority as a vested right by reference to a rule of seniority of an earlier date in the face of section 8 of the Civil Servants Act?
  • Whether departmental examinations held between February 1957 and July 1959 operated as competitive examinations creating a select list with vested promotion rights?
  • How does the absence of Departmental Promotion Committees during a specific period affect the promotion and seniority rights of civil servants?
  Read full judgment →
• Central Board of Revenue and another vs Messrs Sheikh Gulzar Ali and 21 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 464 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-30
  dismissal for non-prosecutionadjournment requestpublic revenuesduty of Advocate-on-Recordrestoration of appealapex court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprised old appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan involving public revenues, wherein leave to appeal had been granted to examine the validity of Rule 50 of the Income Tax Rules 1972 vis-a-vis the Income Tax Act 1922. Upon the hearing, the Advocate-on-Record (A.O.R.) requested an adjournment on the ground that the counsel was unavailable and that he himself was unprepared to argue the case. The core legal question was whether seeking casual adjournments and failing to prepare appeals involving public exchequer revenue constitutes a lack of diligence warranting dismissal for non-prosecution. The Supreme Court deprecated the casual practice of seeking adjournments in the apex Court, holding that lethargy and lack of preparation in apex litigation amount to glaring non-prosecution. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals for non-prosecution. However, considering that public revenues were involved, the Court granted the appellants liberty to seek revival of the appeals if the subject matter remained alive and if so advised.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of counsel and Advocate-on-Record to prepare or appear for arguments in an apex court appeal justify dismissal for non-prosecution?
  • Can an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution involving public revenue be left open for revival by the appellants?
  Read full judgment →
• Captain Sarfaraz Ahmad Mufti vs Government of the Punjab And Other1991 SCMR 1637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-14
  pro forma promotionservice lawdepartmental promotionminor penaltieswrit jurisdictionseniorityadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that directed the Provincial Selection Board to consider the respondent's case for pro forma promotion to NPS-18. The respondent, a Superintendent of Jail, had been previously overlooked for promotion due to pending inquiries that resulted only in minor penalties. Despite government policy letters suggesting eligibility, his representation for pro forma promotion was rejected. The High Court found this rejection was improperly manoeuvred and that minor penalties did not legally justify withholding promotion. The petitioner, a junior officer who had been promoted, argued that the High Court's order effectively mandated the respondent's promotion, potentially affecting his own seniority. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's directions were merely to ensure the respondent's case was considered in accordance with government policy and did not foreclose the Board's discretion or predetermine the outcome. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the High Court had not expressed any final opinion on the issue of seniority, thereby preserving the rights of all parties involved.

  Questions settled

  • Can minor penalties imposed during an inquiry serve as a valid legal ground to withhold promotion?
  • Does a High Court direction to consider a candidate for promotion constitute an order to grant such promotion?
  • Can a court order the consideration of a promotion case without foreclosing the discretion of the relevant selection board?
  Read full judgment →
• Cantonment Board, Kharian Cantt. through Executive Officer vs Muhammad Shafi1991 PLD Supreme Court 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-19
  Limitation ActTime requisiteCondonation of delayCertified copiesCopying BranchDue diligenceAppellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the dismissal of a revision petition regarding a time-barred appeal. The core legal question concerns whether the period between the preparation of certified copies and their actual delivery constitutes 'time requisite' under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, or if it requires condonation under Section 5. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions. It held that 'time requisite' under Section 12 is limited to the period between the application and the date the copies are ready. While specific rules allow for the exclusion of time if a delivery date is provided by the Copying Branch, an applicant cannot claim this benefit if no date was provided without demonstrating due diligence. The key principle laid down is that where no specific date for delivery is provided by the Copying Branch, the applicant must prove they exercised due diligence by regularly visiting the office to collect the copies. Failure to explain the delay or demonstrate such diligence precludes the exclusion of time under Section 12 or condonation under Section 5.

  Questions settled

  • What constitutes 'time requisite' for obtaining certified copies under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Can an applicant claim the exclusion of time for the period between the preparation of certified copies and their delivery if no specific date was provided by the Copying Branch?
  • Is an applicant required to demonstrate due diligence in collecting certified copies to seek condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  • Does the failure to obtain a delivery date from the Copying Branch automatically entitle an applicant to exclude the time taken for delivery from the limitation period?
  Read full judgment →
• Brig. Sher Ali Baz and another vs The Secretary, Establishment Division1991 PLD Supreme Court 143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-13
  civil service senioritylateral entryprinciple of equivalenceSecretariat Groupmilitary servicestatutory interpretationgeneralia specialibus non derogant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two appeals filed by former Army Brigadiers who were appointed as Joint Secretaries in the Federal Government. The appellants challenged the refusal of the Establishment Division to count their prior military service as Brigadier towards their seniority in the civil service Grade-20. The core legal question was whether the 'principle of equivalence' established by the Presidential Order dated 8th August 1979, which equated military ranks with National Pay Scales, entitled the appellants to reckon their military service for seniority purposes in the Secretariat Group. The Supreme Court held that the appellants could not claim such seniority. The Court reasoned that the specific Secretariat Group Service Rules governing seniority, which mandate that seniority be determined from the date of continuous regular officiation in Grade-20, are special provisions that prevail over general equivalence formulas. The Court further clarified that the equivalence formula was intended for pay and perquisites, not for determining seniority in civil cadres. The principle laid down is that general administrative dispensations regarding equivalence do not override specific, formal statutory rules governing seniority in civil service, and military rank service is irrelevant for civil seniority unless explicitly provided for by specific service rules.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'principle of equivalence' between military ranks and National Pay Scales entitle military officers to count their military service for seniority purposes upon induction into the civil service?
  • Can a general administrative order or equivalence formula override specific statutory rules governing seniority in the civil service?
  • Is seniority in the civil service a vested right under the Civil Servants Act?
  • Does the definition of 'Grade' in the Civil Servants (Change of Nomenclature of Services and Abolition of Classes) Rules, 1973, encompass military ranks?
  Read full judgment →
• Brig. (Retd.) N.A. Ashraf vs Federation of Pakistan, Through Secretary, Establishment Division And 2 Other1991 SCMR 372(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-19
  pensionary benefitsleave to appealemployment contractterms and conditions of serviceservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the entitlement of the petitioner, a retired Brigadier, to pensionary benefits. The core legal question presented for the Court's consideration is whether the specific terms and conditions of the petitioner's employment, particularly condition No. 1, inherently contemplated or visualized the payment of a portion of the pension to the petitioner, regardless of other factors. The Supreme Court, finding merit in the petition, granted leave to appeal to examine this issue in depth. The Court directed that the matter be heard on the existing record, while granting liberty to the parties to submit additional documentation. Furthermore, the Court ordered that this case be heard alongside other pending matters involving similar subjects to ensure consistency in the adjudication of pensionary rights and employment contract interpretations. The decision establishes that the interpretation of specific employment conditions regarding pension eligibility requires a detailed examination by the Court to determine the scope of contractual obligations owed to the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term of employment under condition No. 1 visualize the payment of part of the pension to the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Brig. (Retd.) Abdur Rashid vs Secretary, Establishment Division And Other1991 SCMR 1288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-21
  service lawsecretariat allowancecivil servantattached departmentservice appealallowance entitlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's claim for a Secretariat Allowance. The petitioner, then Chairman of the Central Board of Film Censors, argued that because the Finance Division granted a 20% Secretariat Allowance to employees of the Federal Secretariat and the Central Board of Revenue, he was entitled to the same benefit as an attached department head. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had a legal right to claim an allowance granted to other classes of civil servants in the absence of a specific provision extending that benefit to his department. The Supreme Court held that an allowance is only payable when specifically made applicable to a particular class of persons. The Court determined that no law or statutory rule mandates that an allowance granted to one class of civil servants must automatically extend to all other civil servants. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as the petitioner failed to establish a violation of service terms or statutory rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of a Secretariat Allowance to one class of civil servants automatically entitle other civil servants to the same allowance?
  • Is a civil servant entitled to an allowance not specifically made applicable to their department or class of service?
  • Can a service appeal be maintained in the absence of a specific statutory provision or rule supporting the claim for an allowance?
  Read full judgment →
• Bonifacio A. Burayag vs The State1991 PLD Supreme Court 988 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-25
  narcotics smugglingsentencing discretionjudicial confessioncarrier of narcoticsleave to appealCustoms Actcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, convicted under the Customs Act, 1969 for smuggling 8 Kgs of heroin, challenged his 7-year rigorous imprisonment sentence, arguing it was harsh and that he was merely a 'carrier' entitled to leniency. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the sentence was excessive and if the status of a 'carrier' necessitated a reduction. The Court held that the sentence was not harsh, noting that a carrier could be liable for life imprisonment. Furthermore, the Court observed that the petitioner’s attempt to resile from his earlier judicial confession undermined any claim for leniency. Emphasizing that sentencing must balance the nature of the offence and its detrimental impact on society against potential extenuating circumstances, the Court ruled that there were no such circumstances in this case. Consequently, the Court affirmed that it would rarely interfere with a properly exercised sentencing discretion and dismissed the petition, reiterating that courts must prioritize the welfare of society over the interests of convicts in narcotics cases.

  Questions settled

  • Is a person convicted of smuggling narcotics entitled to a reduced sentence solely on the ground of being a carrier?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with a sentence where the trial court has properly exercised its discretion?
  • Does an attempt to resile from a judicial confession negate a claim for leniency in sentencing?
  • Should the impact of narcotics on society be a primary consideration when determining the quantum of sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Boladar And Others vs Abdul Ghafoor And Other1991 SCMR 1650 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-08
  leave to appealdocumentary evidencejurisdictionappellate reviewHigh Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court. The petitioners contended that the High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction properly by neglecting to consider documentary evidence on record that allegedly established their claim. The core legal question was whether the High Court was under a legal obligation to examine the documentary evidence presented by the petitioners during the proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court found merit in the submission that the High Court had not adequately addressed the jurisdictional and evidentiary issues raised. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, directed that the appeal be prepared on the existing record, and permitted the parties to file additional documents within a specified timeframe. The Court further ordered the continuation of its previous interim order dated 27-8-1989 and directed that the appeal be scheduled for an early hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court under a legal obligation to examine documentary evidence produced by a party on the record?
  • Does a failure by the High Court to advert to the question of jurisdiction and evidence constitute valid grounds for granting leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Sargodha and another vs Muhammad Rafique1991 PLD Supreme Court 231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-21
  educational institutionunfair meansnatural justicecross-examinationdisqualificationdomestic enquirysubstitution of answer books
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examines whether the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education was justified in requiring a deposit of Rs. 70 for expenses to summon examination staff for cross-examination, and whether the Board applied its mind before disqualifying a candidate for unfair means involving substituted answer books. The Controller of Examinations discovered that answer books of certain candidates, including the respondent, had been replaced, and their scripts lacked authorized signatures. The respondent was issued a charge-sheet, heard, and subsequently disqualified. The High Court set aside the disqualification, holding that requiring a deposit violated natural justice and that the Board acted without a handwriting expert report. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the deposit rule for summoning external witnesses for cross-examination is reasonable, that the conditional order seeking an expert report showed proper application of mind, and that strict rules of evidence do not apply to domestic academic inquiries regarding substitution of records. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgments and restored the Board's order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether requiring a candidate to deposit expenses for summoning a witness on duty in an examination hall for cross-examination violates natural justice?
  • Whether a conditional order passed by an educational board awaiting an expert opinion shows a lack of application of mind?
  • Whether strict rules of evidence requiring direct proof of forgery apply to domestic enquiries conducted by educational institutions regarding substituted answer books?
  Read full judgment →
• Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Peshawar vs Muhammad Iqbal and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-17
  service lawcompetent authoritydisciplinary proceedingsremoval from serviceboard of intermediate and secondary educationwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arise from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning the removal from service of board employees for alleged corruption and misconduct regarding the leakage of examination question papers. Initially, the High Court set aside their removal on the ground that the Board, rather than the Chairman, was not the competent authority under the service rules, leaving it to the Chairman to pass appropriate orders. Following this, the Chairman passed removal orders after appeals to the Board were dismissed. The employees challenged these orders in a second round of writ petitions, which the High Court allowed, holding procedural flaws in the disciplinary proceedings. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Chairman had acted validly in accordance with the prior High Court judgment, as no fresh proceedings were mandated and the competent authority had properly exercised its jurisdiction after affording an opportunity of defense. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's judgment, while protecting the employees from salary reimbursement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chairman of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education is the competent authority for the appointment, suspension, and removal of Class B employees under the 1978 Calendar Rules?
  • Does a previous judgment setting aside a removal order on the sole ground of competency necessitate a complete de novo disciplinary inquiry, or can the competent authority pass orders based on the existing record?
  • Whether an employee's right of appeal is safeguarded when an order of removal is passed by the Chairman and an appeal is subsequently heard and decided by the Board?
  Read full judgment →
• Bibi Khatoon vs Taj Muhammad And Other1991 SCMR 1984 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-02
  declaration of ownershipcancellation of sale deedappreciation of evidencesettlement recordscivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil dispute concerning a declaration of ownership and the cancellation of a sale deed regarding specific land. The petitioner claimed ownership based on an alleged gift from her father twenty-two years prior to the suit, while the respondents asserted ownership through purchase from the original owners, supported by long-standing possession and settlement records. Following conflicting decisions by the Qazi and the Majlis-i-Shoora, the High Court dismissed the petitioner's revision, finding that her witnesses failed to substantiate her claim and that the settlement entries favored the respondents. The Supreme Court examined whether the lower courts had properly appreciated the evidence and whether there was any misreading of the record. The Court held that the petitioner failed to prove her title or the alleged gift, noting that the respondents' possession was undisputed and corroborated by settlement records. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the evidence had been correctly appreciated by the lower courts and finding no grounds for interference with the concurrent findings of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner can succeed in a suit for declaration of ownership without proving the underlying title or gift?
  • Does the failure of witnesses to support a claim of ownership justify the dismissal of a civil suit?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact where there is no misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Bibi and another vs Noor Muhammad (deceased) through Legal Heirs and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 1007 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-16
  limitation periodamendment of plaintinheritance disputeremand of caseadditional evidencedeclaratory suithostile act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed the appellants' suit as time-barred, overturning concurrent findings of the lower courts. The dispute concerned the inheritance of property from a deceased individual, where the appellants (claiming to be the sister and heir) were excluded by a mutation in favour of a paternal aunt. The core legal question was whether the suit for declaration was time-barred from the date of the mutation's attestation or from the date of a subsequent hostile act (a gift deed). The Supreme Court held that the plaint could be amended to seek possession, bringing the suit within the limitation period calculated from the date of the hostile act (the gift). Furthermore, acknowledging the need for a fair adjudication on merits, the Court allowed the respondents to introduce additional evidence regarding the appellants' lineage and inheritance shares. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for a fresh decision on the merits, incorporating the amended pleadings and additional evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaint be amended to seek possession in a suit originally filed for declaration to overcome a limitation bar?
  • Does the limitation period for a suit challenging inheritance start from the date of mutation or the date of a subsequent hostile act?
  • Can an appellate court remand a case to the High Court to allow for the introduction of additional evidence and fresh adjudication on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Bhag Mal vs Muhammad Sharif And 2 Other1991 SCMR 2118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-11
  Border Area Allotment Committeequasi-judicial tribunalapplicability of Evidence Actstatus of Courtadministrative lawland allotmentprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court decision that had set aside an order of the Border Area Allotment Committee. The core legal question was whether the Border Area Allotment Committee, when exercising powers under the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation, 1959, constitutes a 'Court' within the meaning of the Evidence Act, 1872, thereby making the strict provisions of the Evidence Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applicable to its proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the mere conferment of specific powers—such as summoning witnesses or compelling document production—does not automatically elevate a quasi-judicial tribunal to the status of a 'Court' governed by the Evidence Act or the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court reaffirmed that such tribunals act in a quasi-judicial capacity and are not bound by the technicalities of the Evidence Act or the Code of Civil Procedure, although they may adopt general principles of fairness and justice. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case for fresh adjudication on merits without applying the strict rules of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conferment of powers to summon witnesses and compel document production make a tribunal a 'Court' under the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Are the strict provisions of the Evidence Act 1872 and the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to proceedings before the Border Area Allotment Committee?
  • Is a quasi-judicial tribunal bound by the technical rules of evidence in the absence of a specific statutory mandate?
  • Can a tribunal exercise quasi-judicial functions without being classified as a Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Behram Khan vs Government of Balochistan And Other1991 SCMR 1238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-23
  dismissal for non-prosecutionsupreme court practiceadjournmentrevival of appealprocedural compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a show-cause notice issued to the appellant's Advocate-on-Record. The core legal question concerns the grant of further time to the appellant's counsel to contact clients and comply with procedural requirements, and whether the appeal should be dismissed for non-prosecution upon failure to do so. The Court held that no further time should be granted and accordingly dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution, while observing that the Advocate-on-Record may request for the revival of the appeal if instructions are subsequently obtained. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court may dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution when a request for adjournment or extension of time is refused, subject to a potential subsequent application for revival upon obtaining instructions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution when the appellant's counsel fails to proceed?
  • Can an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution be revived upon a subsequent request by the Advocate-on-Record after obtaining instructions?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Alias Sarwar And Another vs Fateh Muhammad1991 SCMR 1366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-20
  leave to appealconnected petitionstitle and possessioncondonation of delaysecurity for costsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the possession of land, while a related civil petition involving the title to the same land was already pending before the Supreme Court. The core legal question examined by the court was whether the success of the petitioners in the connected appeal regarding title would react upon and impact the present case concerning possession, thereby necessitating an examination of the merits of both matters. The Supreme Court held that leave to appeal should be granted to examine the interlinked controversy between the parties. The court further condoned the delay in filing the petition, exempted the petitioners from depositing separate security for costs in view of their indigent circumstances, and directed that both related matters be heard together.

  Questions settled

  • Will the success of a party in an appeal concerning land title react upon a connected case regarding possession of the same land?
  • Can the Supreme Court condone delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal based on the grounds stated in an application?
  • Whether separate security for costs needs to be deposited when a related matter between the same parties already has security ordered?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad, Line Superintendent I, Lahore vs Water and Power1991 SCMR 2093 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-02
  compulsory retirementdisciplinary proceedingsWAPDA ActEfficiency and Discipline Rulesadministrative justicecriminal prosecutionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal against his compulsory retirement, which was ordered under Section 17(1-A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958. The petitioner, a Line Superintendent, had been caught accepting a bribe during a Magistrate-supervised raid but avoided criminal prosecution. The core legal question was whether the conversion of departmental proceedings from the Efficiency and Discipline Rules to Section 17(1-A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958, rendered the retirement order illegal. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that such a procedural shift does not vitiate the proceedings, provided substantial justice is served. The Court affirmed that modern administrative justice favors shorter inquiry procedures, meaning the petitioner suffered no prejudice. Furthermore, the Court expressed grave concern regarding the failure to prosecute the petitioner for the criminal offence of bribery, emphasizing that departmental proceedings should not shield public servants from criminal accountability, and directed relevant authorities to investigate the abandonment of the criminal case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conversion of disciplinary proceedings from Efficiency and Discipline Rules to Section 17(1-A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958 vitiate the final order?
  • Does the initiation of departmental proceedings preclude the criminal prosecution of a public servant for bribery?
  • Is there a limitation period for the criminal prosecution of criminal cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad vs Deputy Inspector General of Police And Another1991 SCMR 348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-26
  service tribunaldepartmental inquiryreduction in rankcondonation of delaydiscipline in police forceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a former Sub-Inspector of Police against the departmental reduction in rank for disobedience and avoidance of superior orders, which was upheld by the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the petition under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The core legal questions involved the condonation of a 23-day delay in filing the appeal and the propriety of interfering with a concurrent finding of fact regarding disciplinary action within a disciplined force. The Court held that the petition was barred by time with no sufficient cause shown for condonation, and further held on merits that findings of fact concerning disobedience of orders in a disciplined force do not warrant interference. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused, establishing that unexplained delays in service appeals will not be condoned and factual determinations in departmental disciplinary matters of disciplined forces are final.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained delay of 23 days in filing an appeal before the Supreme Court can be condoned without sufficient cause?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a concurrent finding of fact regarding disciplinary action against a member of a disciplined force?
  • Does the punishment of reduction in rank for disobedience of superior orders in a disciplined force call for review by the apex court?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad vs Bashir Ahmad And 3 Other1991 SCMR 1938 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-22
  land allotmentagreement to sellpriority of agreementsrestoration of allotmentpermanent injunctioncivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a Civil Revision by the High Court in a suit for permanent injunction concerning land allotted under the Thal Development Law. The petitioner claimed rights to the land based on an alienation by his father, acting under a power of attorney from the allottees, while the respondents relied on an earlier agreement to sell executed by the same allottees. The core legal question was whether the respondents' prior agreement to sell took precedence over the petitioner's subsequent claim. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, affirming that the earlier agreement to sell in favour of the respondents must be given preference over the petitioner's later agreement. Furthermore, the Court held that the restoration of an allotment, following a cancellation, relates back to the date of the original cancellation, thereby validating the agreement made during the interim period. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petitioner's arguments and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an earlier agreement to sell land take precedence over a subsequent agreement to sell the same land?
  • Does the restoration of a cancelled land allotment have the effect of validating transactions made during the period of cancellation?
  • Can a party raise new legal arguments in a petition for leave to appeal that were not pressed before the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad And Others vs Punjab University Academic Staff1991 SCMR 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-04
  land allotmentbuilding sitesDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actmukhbari applicationurban landsettlement commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of land previously allocated to displaced persons, which was subsequently cancelled and re-allotted to informants via a mukhbari application. The core legal question was whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner possessed the legal competence to allot this specific land to the informants after it had been declared a 'building site' under a notification dated 16th May 1973, and after it had been sold to the University authorities under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the Punjab University Academic Staff Association, setting aside the allotment to the informants. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, dismissing the petition for leave to appeal. The ratio of the judgment establishes that once urban land is officially declared a 'building site' via notification, it is removed from the pool of land available for allotment based on claimant units, whether urban or rural. Consequently, any subsequent allotment of such land based on claimant units is legally invalid and void, regardless of prior mukhbari proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can land declared as a 'building site' by notification be allotted on the basis of claimant units?
  • Does a notification declaring land as a 'building site' preclude the Settlement Commissioner from making further allotments of that land?
  • Is an allotment of land made after it has been sold to a third party under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, legally valid?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad and others vs Lal Khan and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-14Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad And Others vs Ghulam Ali And Other1991 SCMR 1656 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-22
  lis pendensimpleadmentpending litigationproperty disputemutationadministration of justiceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order dismissing an application by the petitioners to be impleaded as parties in a pending Regular Second Appeal (RSA 84 of 1975). The petitioners, who had purchased a portion of the disputed property during the pendency of the litigation, sought to join the proceedings, arguing that their claim was supported by official mutation attestations. They expressed apprehension that their vendors might not pursue the appeal diligently or might collude with the opposing party, thereby prejudicing the petitioners' interests. The lower court had previously denied the application, invoking the doctrine of lis pendens. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the contentions raised by the petitioners warranted further consideration. The Court granted leave to appeal, emphasizing that for the effective administration of justice, it is generally conducive to allow parties with a genuine interest in the subject property to be heard and to defend their rights, notwithstanding the potential application of the doctrine of lis pendens at the conclusion of the litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a purchaser of property during pending litigation be impleaded as a party to the proceedings?
  • Does the doctrine of lis pendens automatically bar a purchaser from being impleaded in a pending appeal?
  • Is it conducive to the administration of justice to allow parties with an interest in the subject property to be heard even if they purchased the property pendente lite?
  Read full judgment →
• Barkat vs Shahab Din And 2 Other1991 SCMR 1212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-28
  land reformswrit petitionalternative remedyremand orderconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioner's writ petition by the High Court, which had originated from a dispute over land surrendered under land reforms. The petitioner challenged an order of the Additional Chief Land Commissioner remanding the case for fresh decision by filing a writ petition directly in the High Court, bypassing the hierarchical review mechanism available under the Land Reforms Act, 1977. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that an adequate alternative remedy was available under Section 27 of the Land Reforms Act, 1977, enabling the Federal Government or Federal Land Commission to review the case. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioner failed to avail the adequate alternative remedy provided by law and that the remand order ought to have been scrutinized through the statutory hierarchy before invoking constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 be maintained when an adequate statutory remedy is available under the Land Reforms Act, 1977?
  • Whether the availability of a revisional remedy under the land reforms hierarchy bars the invocation of the High Court's writ jurisdiction?
  • Is a remand order passed by a land commissioner required to be challenged through the available departmental hierarchy before seeking constitutional remedies?
  Read full judgment →
• Barkat Ali vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Multan and 8 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-26
  urban settlementevacuee propertydivisibility of propertyapplication of judicial mindwrit jurisdictionSettlement Commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from the dismissal of the appellant's Constitutional (Writ) Petition by the High Court regarding the transfer of an evacuee urban house. The dispute involved two occupants—a claimant occupying the upper floor and a non-claimant occupying the lower floor—seeking transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner had issued an order declaring the house indivisible and transferring the entire house to the claimant, despite a prior order from the Assistant Settlement Commissioner transferring respective portions based on physical possession. The core legal questions pertained to whether a finding of indivisibility under Section 2(4) proviso of the Act without considering factual physical division constitutes a failure to apply judicial mind, rendering the order unlawful. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that declaring a physically divided house indivisible without giving reasons or applying a judicial mind is an illegal exercise of power. The Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction to set aside the High Court's judgment and ordered the transfer of respective portions to the occupants based on possession.

  Questions settled

  • Is a finding of indivisibility under Section 2(4) proviso of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 invalid if passed without application of judicial mind to existing physical division?
  • Can the Settlement Authorities contradict an admitted factual physical division of evacuee property without recording proper reasons?
  • Can the High Court or Supreme Court directly grant final relief in Constitutional jurisdiction to avoid prolonging litigation in concluded settlement matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Bahadur Khan And Others vs CH. Muhammad Hussain And Other1991 SCMR 429 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-17
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentdeposit of rentlandlord and tenantrent controllerre-constructionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court dismissing the petitioners' constitutional petitions arising from concurrent orders of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge. The core legal questions concern whether the deposit of rent in the name of a person other than the admitted landlord constitutes a valid tender and whether non-compliance with the Rent Controller's direction to deposit rent under section 13(6) amounts to a default. The Supreme Court held that remitting or depositing rent in the name of an unauthorized person or someone other than the true landlord does not absolve the tenant of liability, and depositing rent in favor of a wrong person constitutes a clear violation of the Rent Controller's order. The Court laid down the principle that a deposit of rent in the name of a person other than the landlord is not in conformity with the law, and inordinate delay in seeking action against a tenant does not amount to a waiver of the landlord's rights. The petitions were consequently dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deposit of rent in the name of a person other than the landlord constitute a valid tender?
  • Does depositing rent in favor of a wrong person amount to a violation of the Rent Controller's order to deposit rent?
  • Does an inordinate delay by a landlord in requesting the striking off of a tenant's defense amount to a waiver of the landlord's right?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide requirement of re-construction be re-examined by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Bahadur Khan And 5 Others vs The State1991 SCMR 1589 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-18
  criminal appealsentence reductionsentence of fineminor roleSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court concerning multiple petitioners convicted in a criminal case. The core legal question involves the appropriateness of maintaining sentences of fine for petitioners who played a comparatively minor role in the transaction and whose substantive sentences of imprisonment were already reduced to the period undergone. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the imposition of the sentence of fine upon the petitioners with minor roles was unjustified under the circumstances and warranted interference. The Court converted the petition into an appeal and set aside the sentence of fine qua the minor petitioners while dismissing the petition regarding the principal offenders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sentence of fine can be set aside for co-accused who played a minor role in the criminal transaction?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be converted into an appeal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Baghpatee (Pvt.) Ltd. And Others vs Messrs Pak Libya Holding Company1991 SCMR 33 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-28
  Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinanceconditional leave to defendretrospective application of lawmortgaged propertysecurity for suitSpecial Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of a Special Court constituted under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The respondent filed a suit for recovery of a loan against the petitioners, who were granted conditional leave to defend the suit upon furnishing security. The petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the Special Court, arguing that the loan agreement predated the notification designating the respondent as a banking company under the Ordinance, and that applying the Ordinance would constitute retrospective application. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the relevant factor is the forum available at the time of filing the legal proceeding, not the date of the underlying contract. Consequently, the filing of the suit after the notification was valid. However, the Court modified the impugned order, directing the Special Court to determine the approximate value of the mortgaged property and adjust that value against the security amount required from the principal debtor, as the initial security fixation failed to account for the existing mortgage security.

  Questions settled

  • Can a banking company file a suit under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, for a loan agreement entered into before the company was notified as a banking company?
  • Does the filing of a suit under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, after the issuance of a notification constitute retrospective application of the law?
  • Is a court required to consider the value of mortgaged property when fixing the amount of security for granting leave to defend a banking recovery suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Azizullah vs Mst. Bakht UN Nisa1991 SCMR 1773 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-12
  evictionlandlord and tenantdefault in rentconcurrent findings of factleave to appealcompromise agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which upheld an eviction order against the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties, a fact contested by the petitioner in the eviction proceedings. The Rent Controller, the District Judge, and the High Court all concurrently found that such a relationship existed, relying on a compromise agreement dated 14-11-1978 where the petitioner explicitly admitted the respondent's status as landlord and agreed to a rent increase. Additionally, the petitioner's own written statement acknowledged a prior suit filed by the respondent's representative regarding the disputed premises. The Supreme Court held that given the concurrent findings of fact regarding the landlord-tenant relationship and the petitioner's failure to demonstrate payment of rent, the eviction order was justified. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition, affirmed the lower courts' findings, and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prior compromise agreement admitting a landlord's title establish the relationship of landlord and tenant for the purposes of eviction?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship?
  Read full judgment →
• Aziz Din And Another vs Qadir Bakhsh And 2 Other1991 SCMR 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-30
  leave to appealcivil revisionlachesnon-prosecutiondelaytitle declarationpaternity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by defendants against the dismissal of their civil revision by the High Court. The underlying dispute involved a suit for declaration regarding title and paternity, which was initially decreed in favor of the respondents. The petitioners' subsequent appeal was dismissed, and their civil revision was later dismissed for non-prosecution. A subsequent application for restoration was also dismissed, leading to a further civil revision, which the High Court rejected on the grounds of laches. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners sought to challenge this dismissal. The Supreme Court examined the delay in filing, applying the principles established in 'Manager, Jammu & Kashmir, State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another' (PLD 1975 SC 678). Finding that the petitioners failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay, the Court held that there was no justification for interference with the High Court's order. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil revision dismissed on the ground of laches warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a failure to explain delay in legal proceedings justify the refusal of leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Azhar Muhammad Khan And Others vs Deputy1991 SCMR 1374 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-24
  writ jurisdictionquestions of factallotment of landdisplaced personssettlement departmententitlement certificate
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, displaced persons from India, challenged the cancellation of agricultural land allotted to them in Karak tehsil, District Kohat, which had been re-allotted to the respondents. The Settlement Department maintained that the disputed land had been allotted to the respondents since 1963 and remained in their possession, rendering it unavailable for allotment to the petitioners. The petitioners contended that the respondents' allotment exceeded their entitlement. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' challenge, holding that the determination of whether the respondents' allotment exceeded their entitlement involved a question of fact, which could not be adjudicated within writ jurisdiction, particularly as the competent authority had already verified the allotment. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision. The Court affirmed that writ jurisdiction is not the appropriate forum for re-opening disputed questions of fact, especially where the competent authority has scrutinized the record and found no excess entitlement. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that appellate or writ courts should generally refrain from interfering with factual findings established by competent administrative authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Can questions of fact regarding land allotment entitlement be re-opened in writ jurisdiction?
  • Is the High Court empowered to interfere with factual findings made by a competent authority in writ proceedings?
  • Does the allotment of land to displaced persons remain valid if the land was previously allotted to others and never cancelled?
  Read full judgment →
• Atta Muhammad vs Sahibzada Manzoor Ahmad Through Legal Heirs And Other1991 SCMR 1648 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-26
  civil revisionShamlat Dehrevenue recordmutationleave to appealpossession of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant against the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court, which originated from a property dispute concerning the possession of land in the Shamlat Deh. The core legal question involves the evaluation of revenue records, the extent of permissible possession of Shamlat land in accordance with an owner's share or holding, and the legal effect of a mutation attested pursuant to orders of higher authorities under the Land Revenue Act. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised regarding the selective reliance on revenue entries by the courts below and the interpretation of statutory provisions concerning mutations require deeper examination. The principle laid down is that revenue record entries must be considered comprehensively, and mutations implemented pursuant to higher authorities' orders warrant scrutiny regarding the effect of parties' absence during attestation.

  Questions settled

  • Can revenue record entries be selectively relied upon by courts while ignoring entries in favor of the opposing party?
  • Whether an owner of Shamlat land can retain possession in excess of their share according to Hasab Rasad-Khewet?
  • What is the legal effect of a mutation attested in the absence of a party when such mutation is implemented pursuant to orders of higher authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Atta Muhammad And 2 Others vs The State And Other1991 SCMR 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-07
  leave to appealmurdercommon intentionmisreading of evidenceacquittalappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from two cross-petitions for leave to appeal, one filed by the convicted persons challenging their convictions and sentences for murder, and the other by the complainant seeking leave against the acquittal of two co-accused and the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal questions involve the appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the presence of eye-witnesses, alleged misreading of evidence by the High Court, the recovery of a blood-stained brick, and whether an accused who threw a stone shared the common intention for murder with those who subsequently fired lethal weapons. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions to ensure the safe administration of criminal justice and issued bailable warrants of arrest against the acquitted respondents. The key principle laid down is that leave to appeal will be granted where substantial questions regarding the correct appreciation of evidence, misreading of the record, and common intention under criminal law require detailed examination by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused who threw a brick can share the common intention with co-accused who subsequently fired lethal weapons?
  • Does the misreading of material evidence by the High Court warrant interference by the Supreme Court in a criminal petition?
  • Whether the testimony of a natural and independent witness is sufficient to sustain the conviction and implication of co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Atiq Ahmad Khan vs Chairman, P.O.F. Wah Cantt. And Another1991 SCMR 1838 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-12
  service tribunallimitationtime-barred appealmercy petitionremoval from servicecondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the petitioner's service appeal as time-barred. The petitioner was removed from service on 18-9-1986 for prolonged absence from duty. After his initial removal, he pursued various representations and a mercy petition, the final rejection of which was communicated on 29th October, 1988, before approaching the Service Tribunal in November, 1989. The core legal question was whether the time spent pursuing mercy petitions and miscellaneous representations extends the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Service Tribunal correctly concluded that the appeal was time-barred, as miscellaneous applications and mercy petitions do not earn condonation of delay in service matters. The key principle laid down is that the pursuit of extra-statutory representations or mercy petitions does not extend the prescribed period of limitation for approaching a service tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the time spent in making mercy petitions or miscellaneous representations extend the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • Is an appeal filed before the Federal Service Tribunal long after the original removal order maintainable when the intervening delay is only explained by unauthorized representations?
  Read full judgment →
• Assistant Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs, Lahore II And Another vs Shafqat Shah And Other1991 SCMR 2525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-26
  search warrantCustoms Actconstitutional jurisdictionseizure of goodspremature interferencewrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from judgments of the Lahore High Court allowing constitutional petitions filed by the respondents against the seizure of goods by customs officials. The High Court had held the search and seizure illegal on the ground that the officials conducted the raid without search-warrants as required under Sections 162 and 163 of the Customs Act 1969. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court's premature interference in its constitutional jurisdiction was justified before the factual questions under Sections 162 and 163 could be determined during proceedings. The Supreme Court held that strict legal position did not justify the High Court's interference or the issuance of a writ at that stage, as the application of Sections 162 and 163 involved questions of fact to be decided upon evidence. However, noting that the proceedings against the respondents had already been dropped following the High Court's order, the Supreme Court corrected the legal position but declined to revive the dropped proceedings, disposing of the appeals accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Is High Court interference in constitutional jurisdiction premature when factual determinations under Sections 162 and 163 of the Customs Act 1969 remain to be decided on evidence?
  • Does the absence of a search warrant automatically invalidate a search under Section 163 of the Customs Act 1969 where an exception applies?
  Read full judgment →
• Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs and 21991 PLD Supreme Court 992 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-23
  excise dutymanufacture definitionstrawboardancillary processtaxationstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the levy of excise duty on strawboard. The respondent manufactured strawboard at Kotri, paid the requisite excise duty, and subsequently transported it to Karachi for manual pasting and cutting processes. The appellant authorities demanded additional excise duty, contending that these processes constituted 'manufacture' under Section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The High Court ruled in favor of the respondent, holding that the processes did not create a new or different marketable product. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the definition of 'manufacture' in the Act, which includes processes incidental or ancillary to the completion of a product, applied to the respondent's activities. The Court held that while the definition of 'manufacture' is broad and includes processes that enhance quality or utility, it requires that the process be necessary or subsidiary to completing the manufactured goods. Finding that the pasting and cutting of strawboard did not alter its nature, quality, or utility, the Court concluded these activities did not constitute 'manufacture' and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the process of pasting and cutting strawboard constitute 'manufacture' under Section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
  • Does the statutory definition of 'manufacture' require the creation of a new article, or does it include processes that merely enhance the quality or utility of existing goods?
  • Is a process that is neither incidental nor ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product subject to excise duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
  Read full judgment →
• Asmatullah vs Haji Syed Abdul Majid And Another1991 SCMR 1969 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-04
  landlord and tenantevacuee propertyejectmentstatutory tenancyex gratia paymenteviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the possession of a plot of land, specifically questioning whether a relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the appellant, an occupant, and the respondents, who were the purchasers of the property. The property had been acquired through a chain of title originating from a public auction of evacuee property. The appellant claimed to occupy the land under a third party, Abdul Wahid, who had previously failed in litigation against the original auction purchaser. The Supreme Court held that the relationship of landlord and tenant was established between the respondents and the appellant by operation of law under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and maintained the eviction order. However, exercising its powers under the Constitution, the Court directed the respondents to deposit an ex gratia sum of Rs. 200,000 for the benefit of the appellant and his wife, ensuring the appellant's rehabilitation despite the legal eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the purchase of evacuee property establish a landlord-tenant relationship with existing occupants under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct an ex gratia payment to an appellant as a condition of an eviction order under its constitutional powers?
  Read full judgment →
• Aslam Warraich And Others vs Secretary, Planning and Development1991 SCMR 2330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-16
  civil servantsacting charge appointmentregular promotionseniorityservice tribunalvested rightdepartmental representation
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from appeals and petitions concerning a service dispute over seniority and regular promotion dates between direct appointees and promotees in the Planning and Development Division. The core legal question examined whether acting charge appointments under Rule 8-B of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973, confer rights to seniority or regular promotion from the date of completing the requisite length of service, and whether departmental authorities properly evaluated such claims. The Supreme Court held that while sub-clauses (6) and (7) of Rule 8-B correctly dictate that acting charge appointments do not confer a vested right to regular promotion or seniority automatically, the departmental authorities erred by failing to independently examine whether the civil servants qualified for regular promotion on merits once they fulfilled the service length requirement and were cleared by the selection board. The Court laid down the principle that the departmental authorities must examine such promotion cases on merits through reasoned orders, and as a procedural guidance, tribunals should ordinarily remand matters to departmental authorities rather than filling procedural lacunae themselves.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appointment on acting charge basis under Rule 8-B of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973, confer a vested right for regular promotion or seniority?
  • Does the disqualification of an acting charge appointment for automatic regular promotion mean a civil servant loses the right to be considered for regular promotion upon completing the requisite length of service?
  • Should the Service Tribunal undertake factual exercises and fill lacunae for the first time, or should it remand the matter to the departmental authority?
  • Is it mandatory for departmental authorities to issue reasoned orders when deciding representations regarding promotion and seniority?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashfaq Ahmed vs Mst. Sheerin Bai Muhammad Ali1991 SCMR 1497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-01
  cantonment rent restrictionevictionreconstructioncommercial buildingleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the High Court's judgment ordering his eviction from a cantonment rent property on the ground of reconstruction. The core legal question addressed is whether section 14 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act bars the eviction of a tenant where a commercial building is sought to be reconstructed into a composite commercial and residential building without prior permission for conversion. The Supreme Court held that the bar under section 14 of the Act is not attracted when the proposed reconstruction results in a composite building comprising both commercial and residential units rather than a purely residential conversion. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision and refused leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that section 14 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act does not operate as a bar to eviction for reconstruction when the new structure constitutes a composite commercial and residential building.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 14 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act bar the eviction of a tenant for reconstruction when a commercial building is proposed to be converted into a composite commercial and residential building?
  • Can a landlord seek eviction of a tenant for the purpose of reconstructing a building consisting of multiple units?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs The State1991 SC M R151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-22
  grave and sudden provocationdouble murderdeath sentencecommutationSection 382-B CrPCleave to appealcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a decision of the Lahore High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his wife and minor daughter, for which he was sentenced to death on two counts. The petitioner alleged grave and sudden provocation, claiming he intended to attack a third party found in a compromising position with his wife, who intercepted the assault. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the defense plea of grave and sudden provocation was plausible given the evidence and whether the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 following a general presidential commutation of death sentences to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that the presence of 18 injuries on the wife and 7 on the minor daughter contradicted the petitioner's version, and declined to grant the statutory benefit of period of detention under Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. due to the heinous nature of the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of grave and sudden provocation be accepted when the medical evidence reveals numerous injuries inflicted upon multiple victims?
  • Whether the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be withheld by the Court based on the extreme severity and brutal nature of the offense?
  • Does the Supreme Court have discretion to condone delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal in a criminal matter involving the death penalty?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali And 15 Others vs S.C.O. Circle Canal, Bahawalnagar And 61991 SCMR 1890 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-20
  time-barred petitionsWarabandicanal water supplyfundamental rightsfair treatmentinterim order
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed petitions that were found to be barred by time and thus liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that in a similar prior case regarding an interim order in connection with Warabandi under the Canal and Drainage Act, the Court had issued directions for fair treatment in canal water supply based on an undertaking by the canal authorities. Although no such undertaking existed in the present case, the Supreme Court of Pakistan noted that the right to justice and fair treatment is a recognized basic human right in Islamic dispensation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions as time-barred while observing that the petitioners must be dealt with fairly and in accordance with justice during the pendency of the ongoing litigation. The core legal question concerned the treatment of time-barred petitions seeking interim relief regarding canal water supply, and the holding affirmed the dismissal on limitation grounds while emphasizing fundamental principles of fairness.

  Questions settled

  • Are petitions that are barred by time liable to be dismissed?
  • Does Islamic dispensation recognize the right to justice and fair treatment as a basic human right?
  • Can directions for fair treatment in canal water supply be issued in the absence of an undertaking by canal authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Arif Ali vs Muhammad Ramzan Alias Janan And 4 Other1991 SCMR 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-04
  extra-judicial confessionacquittalcriminal jurisprudencereappraisal of evidenceleave to appealcorroborative evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal case involving the murder of Mukhtar Ali. The trial court had convicted Muhammad Ramzan and Mst. Surraya under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing them to life imprisonment, while acquitting other co-accused. The High Court subsequently acquitted the respondents, rejecting the prosecution's reliance on extra-judicial confessions and delayed recoveries. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's acquittal, based on the rejection of weak evidence, warranted interference. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the extra-judicial confessions were not inspiring and the recoveries were unreliable due to significant delays and accessibility to the public. The Court held that in the absence of strong evidence, the acquittal was based on sound principles of criminal jurisprudence and did not necessitate a reappraisal of evidence. The key principle affirmed is that extra-judicial confessions must be inherently credible and corroborated by reliable evidence to sustain a conviction, and appellate courts will not interfere with acquittals based on sound evidentiary analysis.

  Questions settled

  • Can an extra-judicial confession be relied upon if the circumstances surrounding the confession are not inspiring?
  • Does a significant delay in the recovery of incriminating articles render the recovery evidence unreliable?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to reappraise evidence in a criminal petition where the High Court's acquittal is based on sound legal reasoning?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwar Aziz Chaudhry Ma. Suhail Ahmad Ghazali Mian Abdul Rahman1991 SCMR 994 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-03
  public servantquashment of criminal proceedingsanti-corruptionstatutory corporationpecuniary interests of governmentjurisdiction of special judge
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan disposes of eight criminal appeals arising from the dismissal of petitions filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of corruption proceedings pending before the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption. The core legal question was whether officers and employees of the Punjab Livestock, Dairy and Poultry Development Board qualify as 'public servants' within the meaning of section 21, clause Ninth of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether criminal proceedings against certain appellants ought to be quashed on merits. The Supreme Court held that senior executives and officers of the Board, by virtue of performing duties affecting the pecuniary interests of the government and managing government-funded projects, fall within the definition of public servants under section 21(Ninth) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court affirmed that the absence of a specific deeming provision in the Punjab Livestock, Dairy and Poultry Development Board Act 1974 does not exclude its officers from being public servants if their functions satisfy the criteria of clause Ninth. Consequently, the appeals of contractors whose disputes had been conclusively resolved through civil arbitration without allegations of falsified measurement books were allowed and proceedings against them quashed, while the appeals of the Board officials and other contractors facing prima facie allegations of corruption and misappropriation were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees and officers of the Punjab Livestock, Dairy and Poultry Development Board are public servants within the meaning of section 21 clause Ninth of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the absence of a specific provision declaring employees to be public servants in a statutory enactment preclude them from falling under section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can criminal proceedings under anti-corruption laws be quashed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when a prima facie case is made out against the accused?
  • Whether the settlement of commercial disputes through arbitration and civil court decrees warrants the quashment of pending criminal proceedings regarding overpayments?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwar Ali Khan And Others vs Wahid Bux And Other1991 SCMR 1608 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-11
  private complaintpreliminary inquirySection 202 Cr.P.C.FIRsubstantive evidencecriminal revisioncounter-versionjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court order remanding a private criminal complaint for reconsideration after its initial dismissal by an Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question concerns whether an FIR lodged by an accused can be used as substantive evidence during a preliminary inquiry under Section 202, Cr.P.C. to dismiss a private complaint, and the extent of the court's revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that while an FIR is not substantive evidence, it may be referenced for limited purposes, such as identifying parties or examining counter-versions. However, it cannot be used to summarily dismiss a complaint without proper consideration of the complainant's evidence. The Court established that a preliminary inquiry is not a full-dress trial; the burden of proof is significantly lighter for the complainant than at the trial stage. Consequently, minor contradictions in witness statements at the preliminary stage do not justify dismissal. The Court affirmed that while public functionaries require protection from frivolous litigation, the judiciary must ensure that citizens' fundamental rights are not compromised by the premature dismissal of legitimate grievances.

  Questions settled

  • Can an FIR be used as substantive evidence during a preliminary inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Is the burden of proof for a complainant in a preliminary inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. the same as the burden of proof required at a full criminal trial?
  • Can a court dismiss a private complaint based on minor contradictions in witness statements during a preliminary inquiry?
  • Does the issuance of notice to an accused person during a preliminary inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. vitiate the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Anjuman Masjid I Farooqia And 3 Others vs Mst. Fazal Begum And 31991 SCMR 2112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-10
  Waqf propertylong userdedicationdeclaration suitrecord of rightscharitable purpose
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for declaration filed by the respondents, claiming that certain shops were private property and not Waqf property, despite entries in the record of rights. The trial court and the first appellate court had dismissed the suit, primarily on the grounds of limitation and the finding that the property was Waqf due to long usage. The High Court reversed these findings, decreeing the suit in favor of the respondents. The Supreme Court, upon review, addressed whether long user of property constitutes sufficient evidence to declare it as Waqf. The Court held that long user is not conclusive proof of Waqf status; it depends on the circumstances of each case, specifically whether the property itself was dedicated or merely its income was utilized for charitable purposes. Finding no evidence of permanent dedication of the property, the Court concluded that the mere use of rental income for a mosque did not render the property Waqf. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does long usage of a property as Waqf automatically establish it as Waqf property?
  • Does the use of income from a property for the maintenance of a mosque constitute a permanent dedication of the property as Waqf?
  • Is long user sufficient evidence to declare property as Waqf without proof of permanent dedication?
  Read full judgment →
• Anar Gul vs Gulfam and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-06Read full judgment →
• Amir Bakhsh Through Legal Heirs vs Sanwal Khan And Another1991 SCMR 1574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-15
  specific performancebona fide purchaseragreement to sellconcurrent findings of factnotice of prior agreementnovation of contractcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal concerns a dispute over the specific performance of a contract for the sale of agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the appellants, who entered into a subsequent agreement to purchase the land, qualified as bona fide purchasers for value without notice of a prior agreement between the seller and the respondent. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the appellants had actual knowledge of the prior agreement and the pending litigation at the time they executed their agreement. The Court held that the subsequent agreement, which superseded the initial one, was entered into with full awareness of the respondent's prior claim. Consequently, the appellants could not claim the status of bona fide purchasers. The principle established is that a subsequent purchaser cannot claim protection against a prior contract if they had notice of the prior interest or pending litigation at the time of their transaction, and the Court will not disturb concurrent findings of fact supported by evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent purchaser who has knowledge of a prior pending suit for specific performance qualify as a bona fide purchaser without notice?
  • Can a court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding a party's knowledge of a prior property transaction?
  • Does a subsequent agreement that supersedes an earlier contract constitute a new transaction for the purpose of determining notice of prior claims?
  Read full judgment →
• Ami Chain vs Fajroo1991 PLD Supreme Court 1001 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-12
  gifthibamutationdelivery of possessionfraudulent transfercivil appealdonor and donee
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged the dismissal of a suit seeking a declaration that a mutation of gift regarding agricultural land was fraudulent and void. The appellant, the donor, contested a gift mutation that allocated five-sixths of his land to a remote relative, Fajroo, while granting only one-sixth to his own daughters. The core legal question was whether the gift was validly executed, specifically concerning the delivery of possession and the donor's intent. The Supreme Court observed that the donor consistently denied making the gift and that the donee failed to establish the delivery of possession, a fundamental requirement for a valid gift. Furthermore, the court found the disproportionate distribution of property to a remote relative, to the detriment of the donor's daughters, highly suspicious and inconsistent with Islamic principles regarding the protection of female interests. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the gift was never made, set aside the impugned judgments of the lower courts, and decreed the suit in favor of the appellant, emphasizing that the absence of possession and the donor's denial invalidated the alleged transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Is the delivery of possession a mandatory requirement for the validity of a gift under Islamic law?
  • Can a mutation of gift be set aside if the donor denies the transaction and the donee fails to prove possession?
  • Does the unnatural distribution of property in a gift transaction constitute a valid ground for challenging the mutation?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah Khan And Other vs The Federal Government Of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Finance, Islamabad And OtherPTCL 1991 CL. 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  stock exchange registrationconstitutional petitionmala fides of factministerial immunitystatutory hearingadministrative discretionfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves six appeals and two miscellaneous applications arising from a consolidated decision of the Lahore High Court concerning the refusal of registration applications and the subsequent grant of a no-objection certificate for establishing a Stock Exchange at Islamabad. The core legal questions involved whether the requirements of Section 5(3) of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 and the Rules of Business were complied with, whether the Minister of State for Finance acted with factual mala fides, and the extent of constitutional immunity under Article 248 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Supreme Court held that the order of the Minister of State granting registration suffered from fundamental statutory infirmities, specifically the failure to provide a hearing to refused applicants, failure to record reasons as mandated by Section 5, and failure to properly communicate the refusal. The Court ruled that while constitutional protections under Article 248 must be construed strictly and cannot be indirectly bypassed by natural justice without properly impleading a party for findings of factual mala fides, the administrative decision itself was unsustainable due to procedural and statutory non-compliance. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, the registration granted was set aside, and all applications were remanded for fresh consideration in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to provide a hearing to an applicant under Section 5(3) of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 vitiates the refusal of registration?
  • Does Article 248 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 afford absolute immunity to a Minister from court proceedings when actions are challenged on the grounds of factual mala fides?
  • Can a finding of factual mala fides be legally recorded against a protected public functionary without formally impleading them as a party to the proceedings?
  • Whether the delegation of powers under Section 28 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 prevents the delegator from concurrently exercising or reserving powers in a particular administrative matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah And 2 Others vs The State1991 SCMR 463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-13
  bail cancellationexpedited trialfresh bail applicationeyewitness testimonycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Baluchistan, which had cancelled the bail previously granted to the petitioners by the Sessions Judge, Sibi. The core legal question involved the propriety of the bail cancellation in the context of pending trial proceedings and the availability of a key eyewitness. During the hearing, the Assistant Advocate General informed the Court that the sole eyewitness, Yar Muhammad, had not yet been examined in the trial under Section 302/307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The State proposed that the trial be expedited to record this witness's testimony. Consequently, the petitioners' counsel did not press the petitions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions as not pressed, directing the trial court to expedite the proceedings and record the testimony of the eyewitness within one month. The Court held that upon the recording of this evidence, the petitioners are at liberty to file a fresh bail application before the trial court, which must decide the matter on its merits, uninfluenced by the High Court's previous cancellation order.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused file a fresh bail application after the recording of key prosecution evidence?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to direct the trial court to expedite the recording of a specific witness's evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain vs Abdul Majeed1991 SCMR 2523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-27
  pre-emptioncustomary lawconcurrent findings of facturban propertyappreciation of evidencepre-emption suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, by leave of the Supreme Court, challenged the dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had affirmed a decree for possession through pre-emption granted by the District Judge. The core legal dispute concerned whether the custom of pre-emption prevailed in the specific locality (Taraf Ismail) where the disputed urban property was situated. The appellant contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of this custom. Upon review, the Supreme Court examined the evidence, noting that the District Court and the High Court had rendered concurrent findings of fact, relying on a Municipal certificate and other supporting documentation to conclude that the property fell within a locality where the custom of pre-emption prevailed. The Court found the testimony of the vendor—the appellant's father—unreliable due to admitted ill-will toward his son. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower appellate courts, ruling that there was no justification to interfere with the factual determination. The Court further observed that a son filing a pre-emption suit against his father is not inherently indicative of collusion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of a custom of pre-emption in a specific locality?
  • Is a pre-emption suit filed by a son against his father inherently indicative of collusion?
  • Does the testimony of a vendor who admits to having ill-will against his son carry significant evidentiary weight in a pre-emption dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Allied Bank of Pakistan LT.D. Muhammad Aslam vs Khalid Farooq the State1991 SCMR 599 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-19
  post-arrest bailpre-arrest bailsuspension of sentencespecial courtbanking offencesouster of jurisdictionappellate jurisdictioninherent powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from two criminal appeals concerning the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, IX of 1984. The first appeal challenged the High Court's order allowing bail to an accused pending trial on the ground that an earlier pre-arrest bail granted by the Sessions Judge remained in force. The second appeal challenged the High Court's refusal to suspend a sentence and grant bail to a convict pending appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the interaction between the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and the special provisions of the Ordinance. The Court held that while Section 5(6) of the Ordinance does not completely oust the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 497 of the Code to grant bail to an accused during investigation or trial, Section 10(1) of the Ordinance contains an express and absolute bar against the High Court suspending a sentence or releasing a convict on bail under Section 426 of the Code pending appeal. Consequently, the Court accepted the Bank's appeal, setting aside the High Court's bail order, and dismissed the convict's appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court retain jurisdiction under Section 497 of the Cr.P.C. to grant bail to an accused during investigation or trial under the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984?
  • Does Section 10(1) of the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984, bar the High Court from suspending a sentence and granting bail to a convict under Section 426 of the Cr.P.C. pending appeal?
  • Can the High Court invoke its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Cr.P.C. to bypass an express statutory prohibition against releasing a convict on bail pending appeal?
  • Does a pre-arrest bail granted by a Sessions Court remain valid and effective after the accused has been subsequently arrested and the case transferred to a Special Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha and another vs Muhammad Yousuf and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 601 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-11
  abatement of suitdeath of partyconclusion of hearingredemption of mortgagecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellants' Regular Second Appeal, which had challenged concurrent findings regarding the non-abatement of a redemption suit. The core legal question was whether the date fixed for hearing arguments constituted a step short of the conclusion of the hearing under Order XXII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, thus causing the suit to abate upon the death of a plaintiff after the close of evidence but before judgment. The Supreme Court held that where parties fail to appear to address arguments, the hearing is deemed to have concluded with the close of evidence for the purposes of Order XXII, Rule 6, preserving the proceedings and preventing abatement. The key principle laid down is that the hearing of arguments is not strictly essential before disposing of a case if the parties do not avail themselves of the opportunity, and in such instances, the conclusion of evidence marks the end of the hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suit abate if a party dies after the close of evidence but before the pronouncement of judgment?
  • Is the hearing of arguments essential under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 before a case can be disposed of?
  • When does a hearing conclude for the purposes of Order XXII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 if parties fail to address arguments?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta and another vs Rehmat Ali1991 PLD Supreme Court 540 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-12
  civil revisiondismissal in defaultrestoration applicationpre-emptionlimitation periodexclusion of time
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants challenged the High Court's judgment accepting the respondent's civil revision in a pre-emption matter. The respondent's initial civil revision was dismissed in default, and a subsequent restoration application was also dismissed. Instead of challenging the restoration refusal, the respondent filed a fresh civil revision. The core legal questions were whether filing a restoration application exhausts the remedy and bars a fresh proceeding under Order IX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether the time spent pursuing the restoration application can be excluded for limitation purposes. The Supreme Court held that the remedies of seeking restoration and bringing a fresh proceeding are not mutually exclusive, and a fresh proceeding is permissible subject to the law of limitation. Furthermore, the period spent pursuing the restoration application is excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908. The appeal was consequently dismissed, establishing that a party may pursue a fresh proceeding after the dismissal of a restoration application.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a restoration application bar the filing of a fresh suit or revision under Order IX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can the time spent in pursuing an application for restoration of a dismissed proceeding be excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Are the remedies of seeking restoration of a dismissed proceeding and filing a fresh proceeding mutually exclusive under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Din Akhtar vs The Deputy Director, Food, Sargodha Region, Sargodha Ant Another1991 SCMR 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-20
  leave to appealservice tribunaldepartmental inquirynegligenceloss of government propertyrailways commercial manual
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed by Allah Din Akhtar against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which dismissed his appeal against the imposition of financial liability for the loss of government property. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner had the legal authority or departmental instruction to appoint a watchman for goods lying at a railway station, whether the railway watch and ward staff were responsible for the safe custody of the goods, and whether the established negligence of a railway constable in causing the fire exonerated the petitioner from liability. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine these points, holding that the submissions required detailed examination, and suspended the recovery of the penalty pending the decision of the appeal. The key principle relates to the determination of departmental liability and negligence when multiple parties are involved in the custody of government goods.

  Questions settled

  • Whether it was the duty of the Railways Watch and Ward Staff for the safe custody of the goods lying under the shed at the Jauharabad Railway Station in view of the Pakistan Railways Commercial Manual?
  • Whether the petitioner had any authority under any provision of law or departmental instruction to appoint a whole time Chowkidar at the Jauharabad Railway Station for the safe custody of goods?
  • Whether the finding that the fire was caused by the negligence of a Railways Constable releases the petitioner from all liability?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dad vs Mehmood Shah And Other1991 SCMR 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-04
  leave to appealres judicataOrder II Rule 2 CPCdeclaratory suitfrivolous litigationabandonment of claim
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his civil revision in a declaratory suit, having lost across all previous forums. The core legal question concerned whether the current suit was barred by the principles of res judicata and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, given that the petitioner attempted to relitigate an alternative claim based on title documents allegedly not decided in the previous round of litigation spanning decades. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner had effectively abandoned the alternative claim regarding title deeds during the initial trial and could not be permitted to reagitate the matter. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot initiate fresh litigation on alternative pleas that were abandoned or could have been raised and decided in earlier conclusive proceedings, and attempts to do so constitute frivolous litigation barred by res judicata and procedural estoppel.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can bring a fresh suit on an alternative claim that was abandoned or not pursued during previous litigation?
  • Does the principle of res judicata bar a subsequent suit based on title documents when the same were used or could have been adjudicated in earlier proceedings?
  • Whether the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to prevent splitting of claims in successive rounds of litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dad vs Government of Pakistan And Other1991 SCMR 1770 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-27
  leave to appealconcurrent findings of factsuit for declaration and possessionownership by prescriptionmortgagecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of the petitioner's civil revision by the High Court. The underlying litigation originated from a suit for declaration and possession, wherein the plaintiff claimed ownership of the suit land by prescription based on a mortgage after the lapse of sixty years, contesting primarily against the Government of Pakistan. The trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, but the District Court and the High Court subsequently dismissed the claim through concurrent findings of fact. In the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that documentary evidence, including the mislea haquiat, Khasra Pemash, and a musavi of 1872, supported his claim. The Supreme Court evaluated the reasoning of the lower courts and found that the High Court had adopted a reasonable approach without misreading or non-reading of evidence, particularly noting that the disputed Khasra number was situated within a compact block owned by the Government characterized as a civil-military Rakh. Concluding that no sufficient grounds existed to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts based on a proper appreciation of evidence?
  • Can ownership of land be established by prescription on account of a mortgage after the lapse of sixty years against government property?
  • Does the misreading or non-reading of documentary evidence vitiate concurrent findings of fact by lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh vs Umar And Another1991 SCMR 1692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-29
  pre-emptionmarket valuelocal commissioneragricultural landcompensationN.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment regarding pre-emption suits and the determination of the market value of agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in determining the market value of the suit land by ignoring evidence of its irrigation status and refusing to appoint a local commissioner when standard average data was unavailable. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts failed to properly account for evidence indicating the land was partially Chahi (irrigated) rather than Banjar Qadeem (barren). While the Court acknowledged the procedural deficiency, it declined to remand the case for further evidence due to the parties' failure to provide necessary data despite being granted time. Instead, the Court exercised its discretion to enhance the compensation awarded to the appellant by Rs. 30,000. The judgment underscores that while courts must determine market value based on available evidence or statutory guidelines, they may exercise discretion to finalize compensation when parties fail to provide sufficient data for precise calculation, thereby avoiding unnecessary remands.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court required to appoint a local commissioner to assess market value when standard average data is unavailable in a pre-emption suit?
  • Can a court enhance compensation in a pre-emption suit when parties fail to provide sufficient data for market value determination?
  • Does the failure of lower courts to consider the irrigation status of land in a pre-emption suit constitute a legal error?
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• Allah Bakhsh vs The State1991 SCMR 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-06
  post-arrest bailcriminal liabilityfirearm injuriesco-accusedpolice investigationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court refusing bail to the petitioner, Allah Bakhsh, in a case involving charges under Section 307 and Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, accused of attacking the complainant and another witness with firearms, sought bail on the grounds that two co-accused were found innocent by the police during the investigation and were not challaned, which he argued cast doubt on the prosecution's case. He further contended that a cross-complaint had been filed against the complainant party. The Supreme Court observed that the findings of innocence regarding other co-accused did not automatically entitle the petitioner to bail, nor did the filing of a subsequent cross-complaint assist his case. Crucially, the Court noted that the petitioner was specifically attributed with causing firearm injuries, including a grievous one, which remained uncontested. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner failed to establish grounds for bail, finding no merit in the petition, and accordingly refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the police finding of innocence regarding some co-accused automatically entitle the remaining accused to the concession of bail?
  • Can a subsequent cross-complaint filed by an accused's relative against the complainant party serve as a valid ground for granting bail in a pending criminal case?
  • Is the attribution of specific firearm injuries to an accused a sufficient basis for refusing bail?
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• Ali Zaman vs Yaqub1991 SCMR 1933 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-08
  pre-emptionlimitationattestation of mutationdelivery of possessioncivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld a pre-emption decree in favour of the respondent after reversing the trial court's dismissal of the suit on the ground of limitation. The core legal question concerned the correct starting point for the period of limitation in a pre-emption suit where mutation proceedings had been remanded and re-attested. The Supreme Court held that while the date of delivery of possession under a sale can be decisive for limitation—rendering the date of final attestation of mutation insignificant—the petitioner failed to substantiate the factual plea regarding the alleged earlier date of possession. Consequently, the High Court's view that limitation commenced from the date of final attestation of the fresh mutation order was unexceptionable. The key principle laid down is that the limitation period for a pre-emption suit is determined by the actual established date of possession under the sale, failing which it runs from the final attestation of the valid mutation order following remand.

  Questions settled

  • Does the period of limitation for a pre-emption suit start from the date of the final attestation of a mutation when an earlier mutation order was set aside and remanded?
  • Does the date of delivery of possession under a sale override the date of final attestation of mutation for the purpose of computing limitation in a pre-emption suit?
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• Ali Muzaffar vs Taj Muhammad And 2 Other1991 SCMR 1724 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-25
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantrelationship of landlord and tenantdisplaced personsagreement of associationadverse possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from an ejectment application filed by the respondent against the appellant on the grounds of default in payment of rent, personal need, and damage to the property. The appellant contested the application by denying the relationship of landlord and tenant, claiming entry into possession via an agreement of association and asserting ownership by adverse possession. The Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment application after finding no landlord-tenant relationship existed. However, the Additional District Judge reversed this finding and remanded the case. The appellant's subsequent writ petition before the Lahore High Court was dismissed. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed. The Court held that since the agreement of association was not approved by the Settlement Authorities and the appellant was inducted into the premises, his status as a tenant was duly established under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant is established under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 when a person is inducted into the property?
  • Can a party claim ownership by adverse possession against the transferee of a property under settlement laws?
  • Does an unapproved agreement of association with a settlement transferee confer ownership rights to override statutory tenancy?
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• Ali Muhammad And Others vs Qaisar Mehmood Shah And Other1991 SCMR 1114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-19
  limitationfraudulent mutationsuit for possessionconcurrent findingsleave to appealancillary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of the petitioners' civil revision by the High Court, which maintained the concurrent decrees in favor of the respondents in a suit for possession of land. The core legal question raised was whether the suit was barred by limitation, specifically turning on whether the limitation period was governed by the rules applicable to fraudulent transactions or those applicable to a complete non-existence of an alienation. The Supreme Court held that where the transaction itself is proved to be non-existent and fabricated rather than merely procured through fraud or misrepresentation, the suit is one for recovery of possession on the basis of title and is governed by Article 144 of the Limitation Act, making it within time. The key principle laid down is that a distinction exists between challenging an alienation on the ground of fraud in its procurement, which triggers a limitation period based on knowledge, and challenging a transaction as wholly non-existent and forged, where a suit for possession based on title falls under Article 144 of the Limitation Act, and alternative pleadings or claims for setting aside a mutation are merely ancillary to the primary relief of possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit challenging a mutation on the ground of complete non-existence of alienation rather than fraud is governed by Article 144 of the Limitation Act?
  • Does an averment regarding knowledge of a fraudulent mutation in a mufassil drafted plaint deprive the plaintiff of relying on Article 144 of the Limitation Act for a possession suit?
  • Is a separate suit for cancellation of a mutation mandatory when seeking possession on the basis of title, or is it merely ancillary?
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• Ali Muhammad And Others vs Bashir Ahmad Through Legal Heirs1991 SCMR 1928 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-25
  arbitration awardpublic policystifling prosecutioncriminal proceedingscivil disputearbitrator jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside an arbitration award. The dispute arose from a civil suit for rendition of accounts and dissolution of partnership, alongside a concurrent criminal complaint regarding misappropriation of funds. The parties referred all disputes, including the criminal case, to arbitration. The arbitrator's award directed the withdrawal of the criminal complaint as part of the settlement. The High Court held the award void, ruling that referring a criminal matter to arbitration and conditioning a settlement on the withdrawal of criminal proceedings is opposed to public policy. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that an arbitrator lacks jurisdiction over criminal proceedings, as the Arbitration Act is limited to civil disputes. The Court established that an award directing the withdrawal or non-prosecution of a criminal case is illegal and unenforceable, as it constitutes an attempt to stifle criminal prosecution through the judicial process, which is contrary to public policy.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pending criminal case be validly referred to arbitration?
  • Is an arbitration award that directs the withdrawal of a criminal case enforceable?
  • Does an arbitrator have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon criminal matters?
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• Ali Muhammad And Another vs Chief Mining Engineer And 5 Other1991 SCMR 1468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-23
  daily allowancetravelling allowancelabour disputesupreme court of pakistanconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Baluchistan High Court dismissing a constitutional petition filed by school-van drivers employed by P.M.D.C. Collieries, Degari. The petitioners sought daily allowances for periods of driving school-vans transporting employees' children between Degari and Quetta. The core legal question was whether drivers performing routine daily school-transport duties are entitled to daily allowances under the P.M.D.C. Travelling Allowance Rules, or whether such duties fall under normal working hours compensated by overtime. The Supreme Court held that the High Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal correctly interpreted the rules, finding that daily allowance relates to touring duties and conveyance travel beyond specified limits, whereas driving a school-van on a fixed daily route does not constitute travelling on official tour under the rules, and the petitioners were rightly compensated through overtime allowances. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are school-van drivers entitled to daily allowances under the Travelling Allowance Rules for regular daily runs between Degari and Quetta?
  • Does driving a school-van provided by the corporation constitute travelling on official duty for the purpose of claiming daily allowance under Rule 30?
  • Whether working beyond normal hours while operating school transport entitles an employee to daily allowances or overtime?
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• Ali Mardan vs Maqbool Ahmad And Other1991 SCMR 1836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-27
  ex parte decreecivil revisionremandleave to appealtrial on merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a civil revision by the High Court, which arose from the recall of an ex parte decree previously granted in the petitioner's favour. The trial court had initially dismissed the respondent's application to set aside the ex parte decree, but the appellate court reversed this decision and remanded the case for trial. The petitioner challenged the appellate order in the High Court, which upheld the remand. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner reiterated technical arguments regarding the setting aside of the ex parte decree. The Supreme Court, having considered the arguments and the precedent established in Messrs Rehman Weaving Factory (Regd.), Bahwalnagar v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan PLD 1981 SC 21, found no merit in the petitioner's attempt to avoid a trial on the merits. Consequently, the Court refused the leave to appeal, affirming that technical objections cannot be used to circumvent a trial on the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner successfully challenge an appellate order remanding a case for trial on the basis of technical objections alone?
  • Is a trial court's dismissal of an application to set aside an ex parte decree final if reversed by an appellate court?
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• Ali Jan vs I.Atif Ullah Shah And Another1991 SCMR 2006 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-04
  evictionbona fide requirementrent controllandlord-tenant disputereconstruction of premisespersonal need
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an eviction order passed against the petitioner by the Rent Controller, which was subsequently upheld by the High Court. The respondents had sought eviction of the petitioner from a shop on the grounds of personal need—specifically, to accommodate the respondent's son, Dr. Naseeb Ullah, to run a medical clinic—and for the reconstruction of the premises. The petitioner challenged the eviction, arguing that the respondent's need was not bona fide, citing the lack of a medical license for the proposed clinic and the potential for accommodating another son in the premises. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts had correctly assessed the evidence regarding the landlord's bona fide requirement. The Court affirmed that obtaining a medical license is not a legal prerequisite for initiating the reconstruction of a building. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that the potential accommodation of an additional family member in the same premises does not negate the landlord's established bona fide requirement for the property.

  Questions settled

  • Is the possession of a medical license a prerequisite for a landlord to seek eviction for the purpose of constructing a clinic?
  • Does the potential accommodation of an additional family member in the same premises negate a landlord's established bona fide requirement?
  • Can a landlord seek eviction on the combined grounds of personal use and reconstruction of the premises?
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• Ali Gul Khan vs Lahore High Court, Lahore And Other1991 SCMR 445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-11
  constitutional petitionfundamental rightsreinstatementjudiciarywithdrawal of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter is a Constitution Petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, wherein the petitioner sought enforcement of fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 13, challenging the refusal of the Lahore High Court to accept him back into the judiciary following reinstatement orders passed in his favour by the Governor of the Punjab as the Appellate Authority. During the proceedings, after an adjournment was previously granted to enable the Advocate-General to consult the Government regarding a suitable post, the petitioner made an oral request to withdraw the petition to seek an interview with the new Chief Justice. The Assistant Advocate-General having no objection, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as withdrawn.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner withdraw a constitution petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 upon making an oral request?
  • Whether a petition seeking enforcement of fundamental rights can be dismissed as withdrawn when the respondents raise no objection?
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• Ali Aksar And Others vs Bagh Ali And Other1991 SCMR 342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-28
  compromise decreeclarification of judgmentHigh Court orderjudicial reviewremedy for aggrieved party
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a petition before the Supreme Court seeking clarification of an order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, which had recorded a compromise between the parties in a Regular Second Appeal. The petitioners contended that a specific sentence added by the High Court judge in the judgment, intended to clarify the compromise, actually altered the fundamental basis of the agreement between the parties. The Supreme Court held that it could not review a judgment passed by a High Court judge that was based on the parties' own agreement and recorded in their presence with explanatory remarks. The Court determined that the appropriate remedy for the petitioners, if they felt aggrieved by the clarification or the recording of the compromise, was to approach the same High Court judge who passed the impugned order to seek necessary clarification. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, with the liberty reserved for the parties to move the original High Court judge for any required clarification of the impugned judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court review a High Court judgment based on a compromise between parties?
  • What is the appropriate forum for seeking clarification of a judgment recording a compromise?
  • Does a clarification added by a judge to a compromise order constitute an alteration of the agreement?
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• Ali Ahmad And Another vs Rahim Bakhsh Through Legal Heirs And Other1991 SCMR 1829 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-13
  leave to appealdismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of appealnegligence of counselsupreme court review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal by the High Court of the petitioners' application for restoration of an appeal previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question concerns whether the negligence of a counsel should penalize the client and whether the High Court erred in refusing to restore the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the reasoning of the High Court in refusing restoration was unexceptionable, and upon examining the merits of the appeal sought to be restored, found that it merited dismissal in any event. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that where an appeal lacks merit on its face, the refusal to restore it from a dismissal for non-prosecution does not warrant interference by the Supreme Court, and leave to appeal is accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Should the negligence of a counsel operate as a punishment to the client in the context of restoring a dismissed appeal?
  • Does an appeal that lacks merit warrant the granting of leave to appeal against the refusal to restore it from dismissal for non-prosecution?
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