Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Aleem Ud Din And Another vs Muhammad Aslam And 2 Other1991 SCMR 850 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-15
  urban tenancyejectmentagreement of salepart performancespecific performancerent restrictioncivil court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellants' constitutional petition in an urban tenancy matter. The dispute arose over a plot permanently transferred to the respondent under settlement laws, from whom the respondent sought the appellants' ejectment before a Rent Controller. The appellants resisted ejectment, claiming protection under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act on the basis of an agreement of sale executed by the previous allottee. While the ejectment petition was initially dismissed, the District Court ordered eviction, and the High Court dismissed the subsequent writ petition. During the hearing, it transpired that a suit for specific performance concerning the property was pending before a Civil Court. The Supreme Court held that the decisions under the rent restriction hierarchy would remain subject to the final verdict of the Civil Court in the pending title suit. The eviction order was upheld as valid ad interim, and a limited one-month stay was granted to enable the appellants to seek interim relief from the Civil Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement of sale in favour of a tenant in possession protects them against dispossession under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act?
  • Do decisions rendered in the rent restriction hierarchy remain subject to the final verdict of a civil court in a pending suit for specific performance?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant limited interim protection to appellants to enable them to seek appropriate interim relief from the civil court where a title suit is pending?
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• Alamgir And Another vs Divisional Forest Officer And Another1991 SCMR 1523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-24
  civil servicedisciplinary proceedingsefficiency and discipline rulesultra viresequal protectionleave to appealdispensing with inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions for leave to appeal against judgments of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed appeals filed by two civil servants, a Forest Guard and a Forester, against disciplinary penalties imposed upon them. The petitioners were penalized by the Divisional Forest Officer for the illicit removal of Shisham trees, with the disciplinary proceedings conducted by dispensing with a formal inquiry under Rule 6(3) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975. The petitioners challenged the validity of these disciplinary actions, arguing that Rule 6(3) is ultra vires Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, as it allegedly permits discriminatory treatment. Furthermore, they contended that the actual perpetrators of the theft had already been apprehended and punished, with compensation recovered, a fact they claimed was ignored by the authorities. The Supreme Court found that the submissions raised by the petitioners regarding the constitutionality of the dispensing power under the rules and the factual circumstances of the case required deeper examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions, subject to the furnishing of security.

  Questions settled

  • Is Rule 6(3) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 ultra vires Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can disciplinary proceedings be initiated by dispensing with a formal inquiry under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975?
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• Al Qasim Traders vs Habib Bank Limited, Multan1991 SCMR 1147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-26
  leave to appealinterim orderexamination on commissiondiscretionary orderrecovery of moneywitness examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an interim order passed by the High Court, which was acting as the original trial court in a suit for the recovery of money. The High Court had dismissed the petitioner's application seeking the examination of certain witnesses on commission. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's refusal to grant the commission for the examination of witnesses constituted a legal error or an improper exercise of discretion. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the witnesses resided in Karachi and Lahore, locations accessible from the seat of the trial court by short air journeys of approximately one and two hours, respectively. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's discretionary order refusing the facility of examination on commission was neither contrary to law nor against any established legal principle. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused, affirming the High Court's decision to maintain the standard trial procedure given the accessibility of the witnesses.

  Questions settled

  • Is the refusal of a trial court to appoint a commission for the examination of witnesses residing in accessible cities a valid exercise of judicial discretion?
  • Does the proximity of witnesses to the seat of the court justify the denial of an application for examination on commission?
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• Akhtar and Hafmann Ltd. vs Messrs ULBRICHT's Wwe, Ges, M.B.H. Austria1991 SCMR 1284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-15
  ex parte decreesubstituted servicecondonation of delayrendition of accountscivil revisionservice abroad
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a civil revision by the High Court, which had upheld the setting aside of an ex parte preliminary decree. A suit for rendition of accounts filed in 1973 underwent multiple defaults and restorations, culminating in an ex parte preliminary decree passed in 1984 after substituted service via a local newspaper against the respondents residing abroad. The core legal question was whether the respondents had sufficient knowledge of the proceedings and whether the lower appellate court and High Court were justified in condoning the delay and setting aside the ex parte decree given that the respondents lived abroad and the memo of appearance by an advocate before a Local Commissioner did not constitute valid authority for the main suit. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that concurrent findings of fact regarding lack of proper service and knowledge warranted no interference, and no substantial question of law was involved.

  Questions settled

  • Whether substituted service through a local newspaper constitutes effective service on a party residing abroad?
  • Does the appearance of an advocate by filing a memo before a Local Commissioner amount to valid representation and notice of proceedings in the main suit?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact regarding the lack of knowledge of an ex parte decree open to interference in civil revision?
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• Akber Ali And Another vs Muhammad Khan And Other1991 SCMR 787 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-29
  perpetual injunctioninterim injunctionconcurrent findingsleave to appealpossessioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a suit for a perpetual injunction to restrain the respondents from dispossessing them from a parcel of land, claiming they were in possession through a partnership with a lessee (respondent No. 34) who had an oral lease agreement with the respondent-owners. The trial court granted an interim injunction only for the portion of land covered by the lease, dismissing the application for the remainder. This decision was upheld by the District Judge in appeal and subsequently by the High Court in civil revision. The petitioners sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that the respondent-owners had no agreement with the petitioners and that the petitioners' claim based on the lessee's title did not extend to the entire land in dispute. Finding no evidence that the lower courts had excluded material evidence or erred in their concurrent findings, the Supreme Court held that mere possession of the land is insufficient to warrant interference with concurrent findings of fact. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner claim an injunction based on a partnership with a lessee when the owner has no agreement with the petitioner?
  • Does mere possession of land constitute sufficient grounds to interfere with concurrent findings of the lower courts in a civil revision?
  • Is an interim injunction grantable for land not covered by a lease agreement?
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• Ahsan A. Shaque vs The Director General (Central) Directorate of National Savings And 2 Other1991 SCMR 1846 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-04
  service matterleave to appealabsence from dutytransfer orderdefiance of orderscompulsory retirementFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's service appeal while altering his removal from service into compulsory retirement. The core legal question pertained to the justification of the petitioner's absence from duty following a transfer order and the effect of a stay order on such absence. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was relieved of his charge on account of the transfer order and that a subsequent stay order could not have retrospective effect to cover the prior period of absence. The Court concluded that the unauthorized absence from duty constituted serious defiance and disobedience of transfer orders, rendering the petitioner unfit to be retained as a civil servant. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the penalty of compulsory retirement was justified under the circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a stay order can have retrospective effect to regularize a period of absence from duty?
  • Does unauthorized absence and disobedience of a transfer order justify the removal or compulsory retirement of a civil servant?
  • Is leave to appeal maintainable against a service tribunal order upholding disciplinary action for disobedience?
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• Ahmon Alias Ahmad And Another vs Ghulam And 11 Other1991 SCMR 1922 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-14
  consolidation of holdingswrit jurisdictionres judicatafinality of litigationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court concerning a consolidation of holdings matter. The core legal question was whether a matter that had already been finally determined in previous litigation could be re-opened in subsequent writ proceedings simply because a party attempted to re-agitate the issue at the lower consolidation level. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's refusal to re-open the matter was unexceptionable. The Court reasoned that the mere fact that a party sought to re-open the issue at the lower consolidation level did not transform it into a fresh or different subject-matter for judicial examination. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioners were already parties to the earlier proceedings where the matter had been finally determined. Consequently, the principle of finality of litigation applies, and the High Court correctly declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction to revisit a settled controversy. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused, affirming the High Court's decision to maintain the finality of the previous adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can a consolidation matter be re-opened in writ jurisdiction after it has been finally determined in previous proceedings?
  • Does an attempt to re-agitate a settled matter at a lower consolidation level create a fresh subject-matter for judicial review?
  • Is a party who was involved in previous litigation precluded from challenging the finality of that decision in subsequent writ proceedings?
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• Ahmad vs Abdul Aziz1991 SCMR 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-20
  second review applicationinherent powerSupreme Court Rulesmiscellaneous appealfinal disposalreview petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This miscellaneous appeal was filed against an order of the Assistant Registrar of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, who returned an application filed against an order passed in a civil review application. The Assistant Registrar had returned the application on the ground that under the Supreme Court Rules 1980, no subsequent application for review lies after the final disposal of the first review application. The appellant contended that the Assistant Registrar erred in assuming a second review application was filed and argued that the application instead invoked the inherent powers of the Court. The Supreme Court held that the application was indeed in the nature of a second review application, as it sought the re-examination of a judgment passed by a seven-member Bench of the Court which had already disposed of the first review petition. The Court affirmed that the Assistant Registrar's order conformed with the rules, and further found no sufficient grounds to exercise its inherent powers to review the impugned order, thereby dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second application for review can be entertained by the Registry after the final disposal of the first review application?
  • Can the inherent powers of the Supreme Court be invoked to seek the re-examination of a judgment under the guise of a miscellaneous application after a review petition has already been decided?
  • Does an application seeking the re-examination of a judgment passed in a review petition constitute a second review application?
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• Ahmad Tariq And Others vs Muhammad Nazir Hasrat Sehrai And 2 Other1991 SCMR 411 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-31
  ejectment applicationwrit jurisdictionevacuee propertylandlord and tenant relationshipduty of High Courtjudicial discretionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that declined to adjudicate a writ petition involving an ejectment dispute. The petitioner had filed ejectment applications against a tenant, which were dismissed by the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge on the basis that the petitioner lacked permission from the Custodian of Evacuee Property, citing the Supreme Court precedent in Lakshmi Insurance Co. v. Nawa-i-Waqt Publications. Instead of deciding the merits of the challenge to these orders, the High Court directed the petitioner to approach the Supreme Court for clarification regarding the applicability of that precedent in light of the repeal of evacuee laws. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that it is the duty of the High Court to decide questions of law and fact raised before it, rather than directing parties to seek clarification from the Supreme Court. Consequently, the petition was converted into an appeal, allowed, and the case remanded to the High Court for a decision in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court permitted to direct a party to approach the Supreme Court for clarification of a precedent instead of deciding the case itself?
  • Does a High Court's refusal to decide a question of law raised in a writ petition constitute a failure to exercise vested jurisdiction?
  • Is it the duty of the High Court to adjudicate the legality of orders passed by subordinate courts when challenged in a writ petition?
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• Ahmad Khan vs Muhammad Shafi And 4 Other1991 SCMR 352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-05
  writ jurisdictionconstitutional petitionalternative remedymutationleave to appealdiscretionary jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of a constitutional petition. The petitioner had sought to challenge the refusal of a mutation order in a property sale transaction involving allegations of fraud. The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner had an alternative, adequate remedy available, specifically the filing of a civil suit. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner's counsel was unable to challenge the High Court's decision to decline the exercise of its discretionary writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's approach, noting that the availability of a proper remedy through a civil suit precluded the invocation of writ jurisdiction in such circumstances. Citing established precedent, the Court held that where an adequate alternative remedy exists, constitutional jurisdiction should not be exercised. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, upholding the principle that writ jurisdiction is discretionary and not a substitute for regular civil litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained when an adequate alternative remedy, such as a civil suit, is available?
  • Is the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court discretionary in matters involving property mutation disputes?
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• Ahmad Din vs Allah Rakha1991 SCMR 1550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-10
  leave to appealconstitutional petitionsettlement commissionerdeputy settlement commissionersettlement laws
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing his constitutional petition. The core legal question raised was whether the Settlement Commissioner was legally bound to decide the case himself instead of remanding or sending it to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, relying on precedent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine this specific legal proposition in detail, directing that the appeal be made ready on the present record and ordering the continuation of the status quo regarding possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement Commissioner is bound under the law to decide a case himself rather than sending it to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner?
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• Ahmad Bakhsh And Others vs Mst. Rasoolan Bibi And Other1991 SCMR 769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-01
  leave to appealcustomary rightsgiftpast and closed transactionabatement of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing their regular second appeal. The dispute arose from a gift made by Sher Muhammad in 1951, which the petitioners had successfully challenged under customary law, obtaining a decree in their favour in 1961. During the pendency of the appeal against that decree, the West Pakistan Personal (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 came into force, rendering decrees based on customary rights void. The Additional District Judge held the decree void and abated the appeal, a view affirmed by the High Court in limine. The core legal question concerned whether the 1961 decree constituted a closed and past transaction unaffected by the subsequent legislation, and whether it became void under the 1983 Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the interpretation of the effect of the West Pakistan Personal (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 on previously obtained customary decrees raises a question of public importance. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether such decrees represent closed transactions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a decree obtained under customary rights before the enforcement of the West Pakistan Personal (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 constitutes a past and closed transaction?
  • Does the West Pakistan Personal (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 render previously passed decrees based on customary rights void and cause pending appeals to abate?
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• Agha Muhammad Ashraf vs Chief Administrative Officer And 2 Other1991 SCMR 1867 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-12
  civil servantsurplus stafftermination of servicedeputationservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, appointed as a Cameraman on an ad hoc basis and later regularized in the Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate, was sent on deputation to Saudi Arabia. Upon his repatriation and reporting back for duty, he was informed that his services were terminated under Section 11 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, as he had become surplus due to the non-availability of a substantive post, the existing one being occupied by another employee. The Federal Service Tribunal dismissed his appeal, leading to the filing of a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the termination of the civil servant on the ground of becoming surplus was justified when no substantive post was available. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's termination was lawful as he failed to prove the availability of a vacant post upon his return. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a civil servant may be declared surplus and terminated under the law when no vacancy exists.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the services of a civil servant can be terminated on becoming surplus due to the non-availability of a substantive post?
  • Does a civil servant have a right to reinstatement upon repatriation from deputation if no vacant post is available?
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• Adam Khan And Others vs Mumtaz Khan And Other1991 SCMR 832 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-29
  adverse possessionco-sharersrestitution of mortgageconcurrent findingsjoint ownershipouster
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the petitioners' revision application, which had challenged concurrent findings of lower courts dismissing their suit for declaration and injunction. The petitioners claimed exclusive ownership of the suit property through adverse possession following the restitution of a mortgage in 1952 by their father. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had perfected their title by adverse possession against co-sharers and co-owners. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that possession of a co-sharer is deemed to be on behalf of all co-owners and cannot become adverse without a clear, unequivocal, and notorious disavowal of the true owners' title resulting in complete ouster. The key principle laid down is that the possession of one co-sharer does not constitute adverse possession against other co-sharers unless there is an open, hostile revolt and complete ouster of the other co-sharers.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-sharer claim adverse possession against other co-sharers without establishing complete ouster in an open and hostile manner?
  • Does the restitution of a mortgaged property by one predecessor-in-interest alone extinguish the ownership rights of other joint owners?
  • What constitutes the conversion of permissive possession into adverse possession against a true owner?
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• Abu Bakar and another vs Abdul Haleem1991 PLD Supreme Court 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-26
  ejectmentpersonal requirementlandlord and tenantretired civil servantcommercial premisessummary ejectmentSindh Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the High Court judgment maintaining their ejectment from a commercial shop under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, obtained by the respondent, a retired civil servant, for personal requirement. The core legal question was whether the respondent's ejectment application was barred under subsection (1) proviso or subsection (2) of section 14 because he had rented out residential flats or possessed other premises. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that section 14 is a beneficial provision allowing specified persons to recover possession without proving good faith, and that to attract the statutory bar against ejectment of a shop, the landlord must have rented out or been in occupation of premises of the same nature and character, namely a shop, rather than residential flats or a factory. The key principle laid down is that the character of the premises rented out or occupied by the landlord must correspond to the nature of the building sought to be recovered under section 14 of the Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the omission of the words 'in good faith' in section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, distinguish it from section 15(2)(viii) regarding a landlord's right to seek eviction?
  • Can a residential flat rented out or occupied by a landlord be equated with a shop for the purposes of applying the bar contained in section 14(1) proviso and section 14(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Must a landlord seeking the ejectment of a shop under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, have rented out or been in possession of a shop specifically in order to trigger the statutory embargo?
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• Abdus Salam And 2 Others vs Ch. Noor Muhammad1991 SCMR 2346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-21Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rauf Khan vs Government of N.W.F.P. through Chief Secretary and 3 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-25
  judicial appointmentsHigh Court recommendationsDistrict and Sessions JudgeService Tribunaljudicial independencecivil servants promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by a senior judicial officer addressed whether appointments to the post of District and Sessions Judge must necessarily be made on the recommendation of the High Court and whether the Provincial Government was justified in departing therefrom. The Supreme Court held that under the North-West Frontier Province Senior Judicial Officers (Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1979, appointments to senior judicial posts must be made on the recommendation of the High Court, and recourse to general rules or interference by the Provincial Selection Board to override or substitute these recommendations is impermissible. The Court ruled that the recommendation of the High Court is sacrosanct and binding, given its constitutional backing and the mandate for the separation of the judiciary. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, setting aside the Service Tribunal's decision and declaring that promotions made in departure from the High Court's recommendations are illegal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether appointments to the post of District and Sessions Judge must necessarily be made on the recommendation of the High Court?
  • Can the Provincial Government or Provincial Selection Board depart from or substitute the recommendations made by the High Court for the appointment of senior judicial officers?
  • Do the North-West Frontier Province Senior Judicial Officers (Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1979 override the general Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975 in matters of judicial promotions?
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• Abdullah Khan vs Addl. Commissioner (Rev.) Gujranwala Division And Other1991 SCMR 464 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-31
  limitationtime-barredrevision petitionconcurrent findingswrit jurisdictionsettlement commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a series of unsuccessful challenges by the petitioner, Abdullah Khan, against an order passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Gujrat, in 1959. The petitioner sought to challenge this order through revision petitions filed decades later, which were dismissed by the Assistant Commissioner/Collector, Gujrat, and subsequently by the Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Gujranwala Division, on the grounds of being time-barred. The petitioner's explanation for the significant delay was rejected by both revenue authorities. The petitioner then filed a writ petition before the Lahore High Court, which was also dismissed, affirming that the explanation for the delay was insufficient. The Supreme Court of Pakistan reviewed the matter and held that the question of delay is a question of fact that had been concurrently decided against the petitioner by three lower forums. Finding no illegality in the impugned orders and noting the lack of merit in the petition, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, thereby upholding the finality of the concurrent findings regarding the limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding delay by lower courts?
  • Is an order dismissing a revision petition on the grounds of limitation subject to interference if the explanation for delay is rejected by multiple forums?
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• Abdul Wahab And 26 Others vs Haji Muhammad Hussain1991 SCMR 788 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-16
  leave to appealcivil revisionland ownership disputemisreading of evidencepermanent injunctiondeclaration of titlestatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the High Court of Baluchistan, which dismissed the petitioners' civil revision against a judgment of the Majlis-e-Shoora, Sibbi. The underlying dispute concerns a suit for declaration and permanent injunction regarding the ownership of land in Mauza Thattar, Tehsil Bhag. The trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the petitioners, but this decision was reversed by the Majlis-e-Shoora, whose findings were subsequently upheld by the High Court. The petitioners contend that the appellate court and the High Court failed to properly scrutinize evidence, specifically alleging that the documents supporting the respondent's claim of a land grant from the Khan-e-Azam of Kalat were fictitious. Furthermore, the petitioners argue that their own oral and documentary evidence, including revenue receipts, demonstrates long-standing physical possession. Upon preliminary hearing, the Supreme Court found that the impugned judgment requires further examination to determine if it is based on misreading or misrepresentation of evidence. Consequently, leave to appeal is granted, and the status quo is maintained pending final disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the misreading or misrepresentation of evidence by a lower appellate court constitute sufficient grounds for granting leave to appeal?
  • Can a High Court's dismissal of a civil revision be challenged in the Supreme Court when findings of fact are contested?
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• Abdul Shakoor vs The State1991 SCMR 149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-12
  murderleave to appealgrave and sudden provocationdeath sentence conversionchild murdercriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Abdul Shakoor against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed his appeal and confirmed his conviction and death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of an 8-year-old child. The prosecution alleged that following altercations over trivial matters involving cattle trespassing and a disputed right of way, the petitioner attacked and killed the child with a hatchet. The petitioner pleaded grave and sudden provocation, claiming the child's father had outraged his sister's modesty and the child had used filthy language. The Supreme Court noted that the death sentence already stood converted to life imprisonment due to a general amnesty. The Court held that the trivial nature of the prior altercations and the exchange of abuses did not bring the brutal killing of a child within the purview of the sought exceptions for grave and sudden provocation. Finding no legal infirmity in the concurrent findings of the lower courts, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and upheld the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does an exchange of abuses over trivial matters constitute grave and sudden provocation to reduce murder to a lesser offense?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and High Court regarding guilt warrant interference by the Supreme Court when supported by medical and ocular evidence?
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• Abdul Sattar, Ex Budget And Accounts Officer, Banking, WAPDA vs Federal1991 SCMR 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-31
  leave to appealremoval from serviceWAPDA ActpardonreinstatementFederal Service Tribunalfresh dismissal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a service matter wherein the petitioner, an Accounts Clerk promoted to Budget and Accounts Officer in WAPDA, was removed from service under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act following departmental inquiries. He was subsequently convicted by a Summary Military Court but granted a pardon and reinstatement order by the Deputy Martial Law Administrator. Upon WAPDA's refusal to reinstate him, the Federal Service Tribunal allowed his initial appeal. However, WAPDA subsequently issued a fresh dismissal order under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, which the Federal Service Tribunal upheld upon a second appeal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan is whether an employee who has been granted a pardon and reinstated by martial law authorities, and whose appeal was allowed by the Service Tribunal, can be validly dismissed again under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act on the same grounds. The Supreme Court held that the contention raised by the petitioner warranted consideration and granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee granted pardon and reinstatement after conviction can be afresh dismissed under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act on identical grounds?
  • Whether WAPDA has the power to issue a fresh dismissal order under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act after the Federal Service Tribunal has already accepted an employee's appeal against a previous removal?
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• Abdul Sattar vs Mst. Azra Khanam And 5 Other1991 SCMR 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-19
  leave to appealregular second appealwithdrawal of appealpendente lite purchaserreview application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a review application by the High Court, which had refused to restore a Regular Second Appeal that was previously withdrawn by the plaintiff. The core legal question concerns whether a third-party purchaser pendente lite can compel the court to restore and prosecute a second appeal that the original appellant chose to withdraw. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner is not entitled to restoration of the appeal simply because he purchased the property during the pendency of the litigation and the plaintiff subsequently withdrew the appeal. The Court dismissed the leave petition, affirming that the petitioner may seek any other independent remedy available to him under the law as observed by the High Court. The key principle laid down is that a pendente lite purchaser cannot force the continuation of an abandoned appeal by the original vendor.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pendente lite purchaser compel the court to restore a regular second appeal withdrawn by the original appellant?
  • Does the withdrawal of an appeal by a plaintiff deprive a purchaser pendente lite of independent remedies available under the law?
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• Abdul Samad And Another vs Dilmurad Sajidi1991 SCMR 814 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-31
  revisional jurisdictionrevenue recorddeclaration and possessionmisreading of evidencefindings of factcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court which allowed a revision application, setting aside the judgment of the Majlis-e-Shoora and restoring the decree of the Qazi in favour of the respondent for declaration and possession of land. The core legal questions examined were whether the High Court could interfere in revisional jurisdiction with findings of fact by the first appellate court, and whether it erred in relying on revenue record entries not formally proved. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly exercised its revisional jurisdiction as the first appellate court had misread and ignored material evidence, and the pleadings established the respondent's ownership without specific denial from the appellants. The key principle laid down is that a High Court may interfere in revisional jurisdiction against a perverse or palpably erroneous judgment of an appellate court that misreads or ignores material evidence, particularly where facts pleaded in the plaint are not specifically denied in the written statement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether it is permissible for the High Court in revisional jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact reached by the first appellate court?
  • Can the High Court rely on entries in the revenue record when the facts regarding them are pleaded in the plaint and not specifically denied in the written statement?
  • Does keeping quiet for a few years disentitle a landowner from claiming their property when no plea of adverse possession is established?
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• Abdul Rehman vs The State1991 SCMR 244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-09
  criminal breach of trustentrustmentburden of proofmisappropriationcriminal appealevidencepresumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerns the conviction of the appellant for criminal breach of trust regarding an alleged shortage of lead stereo-plates at a government printing press. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently established the element of 'entrustment' of the property to the appellant to sustain a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the goods were ever entrusted to the appellant. The Court observed that the trial and appellate courts relied on presumptions rather than positive evidence, noting that the prosecution witnesses contradicted each other regarding the delivery of goods, and no receipts were obtained from the appellant. The Court emphasized that in criminal trials, guilt must be proven through evidence, not inferences or the shifting of blame by co-accused. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, establishing the principle that without proof of entrustment, a charge of criminal breach of trust cannot be sustained, and an accused cannot be convicted based on mere presumptions.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted of criminal breach of trust based solely on presumptions without proof of entrustment?
  • Does the statement of a co-accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute evidence against another co-accused?
  • Is the failure of the prosecution to prove the entrustment of property fatal to a charge of criminal breach of trust?
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• Abdul Rehman vs Haji Mir Ahmad Khan1991 PLD Supreme Court 844 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-28
  tentative rent orderstriking off defencecomputation of timecourt vacationdefault in rentlandlord and tenantgeneral clauses act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court addressed whether a tenant's deposit of monthly rent on the first day of the re-opening of civil courts after summer vacations constitutes valid compliance with a tentative rent order when the due date fell within the vacation period. The respondent landlord had filed for ejectment alleging default because the rent for May 1985 was deposited on July 1, 1985, rather than by June 10, 1985. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, but the High Court allowed the landlord's revision and struck off the tenant's defence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the Rent Controller's order, holding that under Section 9 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956, where a court or office is closed on the day an act is required to be performed, the act is done in due time if performed on the next day the court or office is open. The Court established that closure of the court for annual vacation includes its offices unless expressly provided otherwise, and a bona fide delay in depositing rent under such circumstances does not constitute a wilful default.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the deposit of rent on the first day of the re-opening of civil courts after summer vacations is considered timely when the due date falls within the vacation period?
  • Does Section 9 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956 apply to extend the time for depositing rent ordered by a Rent Controller when the court is closed for long vacations?
  • Can a tenant's failure to deposit rent during court vacations be classified as a wilful default warranting the striking off of their defence?
  • Do the terms 'Court' and 'office' in Section 9 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956 operate to excuse non-compliance when a court remains closed for annual vacation?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rehman vs Abdul Ghafoor And 4 Other1991 SCMR 1544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-03
  leave to appealwrit petitionlachesjurisdictionreinstatement in serviceconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside an order of the Commissioner, Faisalabad, and restored an earlier order of the Deputy Commissioner regarding the reinstatement of the petitioner, Abdul Rehman, into service. The petitioner contends that the High Court erred in its decision, arguing that the Deputy Commissioner's original order was without jurisdiction and legally non-existent. Furthermore, the petitioner asserts that the respondent, Abdul Ghafoor, had challenged a government directive that had ordered the Commissioner to decide the case afresh, and that the respondent's constitutional petition should have been dismissed on the grounds of laches. The Supreme Court, finding that the contentions raised by the petitioner require further examination, granted leave to appeal. The Court ordered the appeal to be prepared on the existing record, while allowing the parties to file additional documents if necessary, to resolve the legal questions surrounding the jurisdiction of the authorities and the maintainability of the writ petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition can be maintained when it is hit by laches?
  • Does a Deputy Commissioner have the jurisdiction to pass an order that is subsequently challenged in a writ petition?
  • Can a High Court set aside an order of a Commissioner that was passed pursuant to a government directive?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Razzaque vs Bor Muhammad1991 SCMR 1879 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-08
  evictionbona fide requirementrent controlleave to appeallandlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which had upheld an eviction order passed by the Rent Controller, Quetta. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Rent Controller correctly determined that the landlord had a bona fide requirement for the demised premises for his son, Noor Muhammad, thereby justifying the tenant's eviction. Upon reviewing the record and hearing the petitioner's arguments, the Supreme Court found no legal or factual basis to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the landlord's bona fide need. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. However, exercising its discretion, the Court granted the petitioner a period of four months to vacate the premises, contingent upon the petitioner's undertaking to hand over possession to the respondent without the necessity of formal execution proceedings. The judgment reinforces the principle that findings of fact regarding a landlord's bona fide personal requirement, when supported by evidence, are generally not subject to interference in appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant be evicted if the landlord proves a bona fide requirement for the premises for their son?
  • Is the Supreme Court likely to interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's personal requirement in a rent matter?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant a grace period for vacating premises upon an undertaking by the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Razzak Abbasi vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government1991 SCMR 791 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-08
  civil servantprobationary perioddepartmental examinationsenioritywithholding of incrementservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a probationary D.M.G. Officer, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which dismissed his appeal against an order of the Establishment Division. The impugned order stipulated that his probationary period would not be terminated until he cleared all subjects of the Final Passing Out Examination, that he would lose his seniority permanently and be superseded by officers clearing the examination before him, and that he would not be entitled to increments until passing the examination. The core legal question concerned the legality of deferring the completion of probation, loss of seniority, and withholding of increments upon failure to pass the mandatory departmental examination. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal rightly dismissed the appeal, as section 6 of the Civil Servants Act expressly mandates that a probationer must pass the prescribed examination to satisfactorily complete the probationary period. The key principle laid down is that satisfactory completion of probation and consequent seniority and increments are contingent upon successfully passing mandatory departmental examinations as prescribed by law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a probationer civil servant can complete their probationary period satisfactorily without passing the prescribed departmental examination?
  • Does failure to pass the Final Passing Out Examination warrant loss of seniority and withholding of increments?
  • Can the Establishment Division defer the termination of a probationer officer's probationary period upon failure to clear departmental examinations?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid vs Abdul Salam And Other1991 SCMR 2012 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-30
  compromise decreeexecution proceedingsclerical errorpartition suitobjection petitionjudicial errorlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from execution proceedings concerning a compromise decree in a partition suit. The core legal question was whether the executing court acted legally in substituting properties within the decree under the guise of correcting a clerical error, and whether the High Court correctly dismissed the appellant's challenge as time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the executing court's order, which substituted a specific shop with a distinct plot of land, was patently illegal as it exceeded the scope of the original compromise and the objections raised. The Court emphasized that an erroneous order by a court cannot be utilized to the benefit of a party, nor can a party be non-suited due to such judicial errors. The Supreme Court found that the appellant's challenge to the order was both competent and timely, as the substitution of properties was not a mere clerical correction but a substantive alteration. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the matter for a decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executing court substitute properties in a compromise decree under the guise of correcting a clerical error?
  • Does an erroneous order by a court provide a valid basis to non-suit a party in execution proceedings?
  • Is an appeal against an order substituting property in a decree competent if the original objection did not pertain to that specific property?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid And Others vs The Chief Settlement1991 SCMR 1767 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-31
  writ petitionlachesdelaycancellation of P.T.D.suppression of material factssettlement of claimsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition regarding the cancellation of a property transfer. The core dispute arose when the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Nathey Khan, obtained a transfer of land that was subsequently claimed by respondent No. 2 as part of a larger industrial concern previously transferred to him. Following an appeal, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner cancelled Nathey Khan's Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) on the grounds of fraud and the filing of a belated application under Scheme No. VI without condonation of delay. The petitioners were eventually ejected from the land in 1980. After exhausting administrative remedies, they filed a writ petition in 1985, which the High Court dismissed due to delay, laches, and the suppression of material facts. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, finding that the petitioners failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the significant delay in challenging the cancellation order and had suppressed material facts in their writ petition. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ petition be dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches?
  • Does the suppression of material facts in a writ petition justify its dismissal?
  • Is a belated application for the transfer of land under Scheme No. VI maintainable without condonation of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rahim vs Muhammad Hussain And Other1991 SCMR 1931 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-08
  property transferrehabilitation authoritiesconcurrent findings of factpossessionsettlement proceedingsallotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a property in Gujranwala, originally allotted to the respondent by rehabilitation authorities in 1957. The petitioner sought the transfer of the property based on a belated LH form, claiming possession prior to 1958, supported by an affidavit. However, subsequent judicial proceedings by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the Settlement Commissioner determined that the petitioner failed to prove possession or construction on the site. Conversely, the respondent was found to be the allottee in possession, supported by departmental records. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioner's writ petition, affirming the concurrent findings of fact regarding the lack of possession. The Supreme Court, upon review, held that the initial report regarding the petitioner's possession was not definitive and was superseded by subsequent judicial findings made in the presence of both parties. The Court affirmed that concurrent findings of fact regarding possession, which had also become final in earlier un-challenged proceedings, could not be interfered with. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the transfer of the property to the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a preliminary report regarding possession, made behind the back of a party, override subsequent judicial findings of fact made in the presence of both parties?
  • Is a finding of fact regarding possession, which has become final due to a failure to challenge it in earlier proceedings, binding in subsequent litigation?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower settlement authorities and upheld by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rahim And Another Through L.Rs. vs Additional Settlement1991 SCMR 259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-21
  settlement schemenecessary partyremand proceedingsconstitutional jurisdictionimpleading partiestransfer of propertywrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the transfer of property under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The appellants, claiming possession and construction on a plot in Lyallpur, were impleaded as parties by the Additional Settlement Commissioner during remand proceedings. The High Court subsequently set aside this order, ruling it without lawful authority. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court, in its limited constitutional jurisdiction, could interfere with the Settlement Department's decision to implead necessary or proper parties in a transfer dispute. The Supreme Court held that the Additional Settlement Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction in impleading the appellants to prevent multiple litigation and ensure effective adjudication. The Court emphasized that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the addition of parties are applicable to such proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Additional Settlement Commissioner's order, establishing that authorities have the power to add parties whose interests are directly affected by the outcome of the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Additional Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to implead a necessary party in proceedings pending before him?
  • Are the provisions of Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to proceedings before an Additional Settlement Commissioner?
  • Can the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 interfere with an order of a Settlement authority regarding the impleading of parties if that order was made within jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qayyum vs Muhammad Ikram Ul Haq And 3 Other1991 SCMR 349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-28
  Lambardari casewrit jurisdictiondiscretionary reliefleave to appealBoard of Revenueconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the High Court, which had originated from a dispute concerning the appointment of a Lambardar. The matter had previously been decided against the petitioner by the Board of Revenue, and the High Court subsequently dismissed the writ petition challenging that decision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's refusal to grant discretionary relief in a writ jurisdiction matter involving a Lambardari appointment warranted interference by the Supreme Court. Upon hearing the arguments, the Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. The Court held that the High Court's refusal to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction in such administrative matters does not justify interference by the Supreme Court. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will generally decline to interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in refusing to grant relief under its writ jurisdiction in administrative or revenue-related cases, affirming the finality of the High Court's discretionary determination in such contexts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's refusal to grant discretionary relief in a writ petition arising from a Lambardari case?
  • Is the High Court's decision to decline discretionary relief in a revenue-related matter subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qadir and others vs The Settlement Commissioner and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 1029 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-15
  land settlementfraudulent allotmentaudi alteram partemright of hearingMukhbari applicationremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals through leave of the Court arose from land settlement disputes involving fraudulent allotments made under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. In Civil Appeals Nos. 5 & 6 of 1987, a Mukhbari application led to the resumption of land allotments originally made in favour of one Nathu, which had been sold to various vendees. Some vendees received notice of the cancellation proceedings while others did not, leading to conflicting judgments in the High Court regarding whether the lack of notice vitiated the proceedings entirely. A similar issue regarding lack of opportunity of hearing and being impleaded as a party arose in Civil Appeal No. 101 of 1989. The Supreme Court examined the merits and held that while the right to a hearing (audi alteram partem) is vital, it is linked to factual and legal realities; if a preliminary examination shows that remanding the case would yield the exact same result and serve no practical purpose other than prolonging litigation, courts are not bound to remand it. Two appeals were dismissed and one was allowed accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to afford an opportunity of hearing necessitates a remand when examination of the merits reveals that the final result would remain unchanged?
  • Does a violation of the rule of audi alteram partem in administrative proceedings always require setting aside the impugned order regardless of factual impossibility of success for the aggrieved party?
  • Whether subsequent good-faith vendees who purchased land from original allottees are entitled to protection when the initial allotment is found to be fraudulent?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Malik vs The State1991 SCMR 270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-14
  leave to appealgrave and sudden provocationmurder convictionsentence reductionSection 382-B CrPCappellate interferencecommutation of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the petitioner's conviction for murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s conviction was sustainable and if the sentence warranted reduction based on a plea of grave and sudden provocation arising from the deceased’s alleged taunts regarding the petitioner’s fiancée. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly evaluated the evidence, finding the prosecution's case proved and the defense's plea of provocation unreliable. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, determining that no extenuating circumstances existed to justify a reduction in sentence under Section 304-I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court noted that the petitioner's death sentence had already been commuted to life imprisonment via a Presidential Order. The key principle established is that appellate interference is not warranted when lower courts have concurrently and reasonably rejected a defense plea based on the evidence presented. Furthermore, the Court granted the petitioner the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, regarding the computation of his sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be reduced to Section 304-I based on a plea of grave and sudden provocation if the defense version is found unreliable?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a convict whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the reliability of a defense plea?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid vs Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Lahore And 41991 SCMR 1132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-13
  pre-emptiontenancy rightsLand Reforms RegulationGhair-Mumkin Khundarjudicial admissioncultivation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the High Court's dismissal of a constitutional petition concerning a pre-emption dispute under the Land Reforms Regulation. The core legal question was whether the respondents, claiming a superior right of pre-emption as tenants under paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 of 1972, could maintain their claim over land that was largely classified as 'Ghair-Mumkin Khundar' (uncultivable land) and not under actual tenancy. The Supreme Court observed that the respondents/plaintiffs had admitted in their own testimony that the vast majority of the suit land was not under cultivation. Although the respondents raised a technical objection that the appellant's specific argument regarding the nature of the land had not been advanced in the same manner before the lower forums, the Court overruled this objection, noting the respondents' own categorical admissions of fact. Consequently, the Court held that the pre-emption claim was only valid for the portion of land actually under cultivation. The appeal was partly allowed, modifying the decree to limit the respondents' pre-emption rights to the specific area proven to be under their tenancy.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emption claim under Martial Law Regulation No. 115 of 1972 be sustained for land that is not under actual tenancy or cultivation?
  • Does a party's categorical admission of fact in their testimony override technical objections regarding the scope of arguments raised in lower forums?
  • To what extent does the classification of land as 'Ghair-Mumkin Khundar' affect a tenant's right of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Latif Khan vs Federation of Pakistan And Other1991 SCMR 786 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-16
  civil servicesenioritypromotionACRService Tribunalleave to appealBPS-19
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant, challenged the decision of the Service Tribunal which had rejected his claim for restoration of seniority following his promotion to BPS-19. The core issue arose because the petitioner was initially denied promotion in 1982 due to an adverse remark in his 1980 Annual Confidential Report (ACR), while his juniors were promoted. Although the petitioner was subsequently cleared for promotion in 1983 once his 1981 ACR became available, he sought seniority over his juniors, arguing that had his 1981 ACR been considered earlier, his promotion would have been deferred rather than denied, allowing him to retain his seniority. The Supreme Court examined the petition for leave to appeal against the Service Tribunal's dismissal of his claim. The Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any violation of the terms and conditions of his service. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition and determined that the case did not warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to consider a subsequent ACR during a promotion board meeting automatically entitle a civil servant to restoration of seniority?
  • Can the Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 where no violation of service terms and conditions is demonstrated?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Khaliq And Others vs Subedar Muhammad Sharif And Other1991 SCMR 1751 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-28
  pre-emptionsuperior rightco-sharerTalabsrevision petitionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a pre-emption suit in revision following previous Supreme Court judgments regarding the requirement of making Talabs and the cutoff date of 31-7-1986. The core legal question was whether a pre-emptor's suit could be dismissed for failure to mention Talabs in the plaint when claiming a superior right as a co-sharer, in light of intervening case law. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, holding that pursuant to its precedent in Ahmad's case (PLD 1989 SC 771), the trial Court is entitled to examine the question of a pre-emptor's superior right as a co-sharer in the Khata notwithstanding the absence of Talabs in the plaint. The appeal was accordingly admitted for regular hearing upon furnishing security.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit can be dismissed for failure to mention Talabs in the plaint when the pre-emptor claims a superior right as a co-sharer?
  • Does the trial court have the right to examine the question of a pre-emptor's superior right as a co-sharer in the Khata despite the absence of pleadings regarding Talabs?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Kadir And Another vs Muhammad Yaqoob1991 SCMR 1029 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-10
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentchange of ownershiplandlord and tenantrent controllerleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which set aside the Rent Controller's order granting the landlords' ejectment application against the tenant on the ground of default. The core legal question was whether the tenant committed a default in the payment of rent under the relevant statutory provisions after receiving a notice of change of ownership, given that the tenant had already paid rent for certain months to the previous owner and deposited subsequent rent with the Rent Controller. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the tenant's payment of rent to the previous owner prior to receiving the notice of change of ownership was lawful, and the subsequent deposit of rent for the remaining period negated any allegation of default. The Court laid down the principle that a tenant is legally justified in paying rent to the previous landlord until duly notified of a change of ownership, and subsequent offers of refund by the previous landlord do not render the tenant's prior lawful payment a default.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant commits default in rent when rent has already been paid to the previous owner prior to receiving notice of change of ownership?
  • Is a tenant obliged to accept a refund of rent offered by a previous landlord after having lawfully paid the same to him?
  • Does the deposit of rent with the Rent Controller upon receiving notice of change of ownership absolve the tenant from default allegations?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Jabbar vs Muhammad Aslam1991 SCMR 2335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-18
  landlord and tenantpersonal needejectmentrent restrictionbona fide requirementinterpretation of statutes
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that ordered the eviction of a tenant from a shop on the grounds of the landlord's personal need. The core legal question was whether a landlord, who is currently occupying a rented shop, is legally precluded from seeking the eviction of a tenant from his own shop under the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The Additional District Judge had previously held that the landlord's occupation of another rented shop defeated his claim of personal need. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the landlord's personal need was bona fide. The Court held that the phrase 'not occupying' in the relevant section of the Ordinance refers specifically to premises owned by the landlord. Consequently, the fact that a landlord occupies a rented property does not constitute a legal impediment to seeking eviction from his own property; rather, it may indicate the unsuitability of the rented premises. The petition was rejected, granting the tenant four months to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the occupation of a rented shop by a landlord prevent him from seeking the eviction of a tenant from his own shop on the grounds of personal need?
  • How should the phrase 'not occupying' in the context of the Rent Restriction Ordinance be interpreted regarding a landlord's personal requirement?
  • Is the occupation of a rented building by a landlord a legal impediment to seeking eviction from a building owned by him?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Haq Horticul Turist vs Government of Balochistan And Other1991 SCMR 798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-10
  pro forma promotionretrospective promotionservice tribunalpending criminal proceedingssupersessioncivil servant promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave is directed against the judgment of the Baluchistan Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's claim for pro forma promotion as a Horticulturist in Grade-18 with retrospective effect from 28-5-1979, along with financial benefits. The core legal question was whether a civil servant whose promotion case was deferred due to pending criminal proceedings is entitled to retrospective pro forma promotion upon acquittal, notwithstanding the absence of supersession or confirmation in the lower post at the relevant time. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appeal lacks merit, affirming that promotion is not a matter of right where no junior officer was promoted in supersession of the appellant, and that the appellant could not have been considered for promotion in 1979 as he was not yet confirmed in the lower post of Assistant Horticulturist. The key principle laid down is that pro forma promotion based on executive policy following an honorable acquittal requires a determination that the civil servant would have been promoted on the due date based on service record and performance, and promotion cannot be claimed as a matter of right when no supersession has occurred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant is entitled to pro forma promotion with retrospective effect as a matter of right when no junior officer has been promoted in supersession?
  • Can a government servant claim pro forma promotion from a date when their promotion was deferred due to pending criminal proceedings if they were not yet confirmed in the lower post?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hamid Shah and another vs Muhammad Yar and 13 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 815 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-25
  easement of necessityeasement rightsbeneficial enjoymentproperty ownershipsale-deeds misreading
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute over an open space (compound) in front of Faridia Market in Pakpattan. The respondents, shop owners, filed a suit claiming ownership of the compound and seeking removal of constructions made by the appellants. The trial court and the first appellate court decreed the suit in favour of the respondents, finding they owned the compound. In revision, the High Court held that while ownership was not proved, the compound existed as an easement of necessity. The Supreme Court examined whether a right of easement existed under section 13 of the Easements Act, 1882. The Court held that ownership rights in the compound had not passed to the respondents under their sale-deeds, and the lower courts had misread the evidence. Regarding the easement of necessity, the Court ruled that an easement requires absolute necessity for beneficial enjoyment, not mere convenience. Since a twelve-foot space comprising the platform and passage was sufficient for accessing the shops, the respondents' easement right was confined strictly to that platform and passage. The appeal was accepted and the High Court decree altered accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an easement of necessity can be claimed over a property when ownership of the same has not been established by the claimant?
  • What is the strict legal test for establishing an easement of necessity under section 13 of the Easements Act, 1882?
  • Does a right of easement extend to making the enjoyment of property merely convenient or must it be absolutely necessary for its beneficial user?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed vs Chief Minister. Punjab And 2 Other1991 SCMR 1529 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-31
  leave to appealinterim reliefwrit petitionservice matterdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was brought against the refusal of the High Court to grant interim relief to the petitioner during the pendency of his writ petition involving a service matter. The core legal question was whether the High Court is bound in law to grant interim relief merely upon admitting a writ petition for regular hearing. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that there is no such command in law and that the High Court was fully justified in declining interim relief to avoid stifling the administrative machinery of the Government. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that the grant of interim relief in service matters during the pendency of a writ petition is discretionary and the High Court is not bound to issue it simply because a petition has been admitted for regular hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court bound in law to grant interim relief when a writ petition is admitted for regular hearing?
  • Can the refusal of interim relief by the High Court in a service matter be a valid ground for grant of leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed Naz And 7 Others vs Mst. Razia Begum And 4 Other1991 SCMR 1530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-14
  leave to appealejectment petitionrelationship of landlord and tenantdispute of titlecivil suit withdrawalrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning a dispute over a residential property previously requisitioned by the Federal Government. The core legal question involves whether an ejectment petition is maintainable before a Rent Controller when there is a serious and bona fide dispute regarding the landlord's title to the property, particularly after the claimant had previously withdrawn a civil suit filed to establish title. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that where a serious challenge to the title exists and a prior title suit was withdrawn, an ejectment petition may not be maintainable until the title is duly determined by a competent civil court. The key principle laid down is that summary rent proceedings cannot be effectively utilized to determine complicated questions of title when the relationship of landlord and tenant is stoutly denied on plausible grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ejectment petition is maintainable when there is a serious and bona fide challenge to the title of the landlord?
  • Can a Rent Controller proceed with an ejectment application when the relationship of landlord and tenant is denied and title is sub judice or unresolved in a civil court?
  • What is the effect of withdrawing a civil suit for declaration of title on subsequent rent proceedings between the same parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed and others vs Settlement Commissioner (Lands) and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 702 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-13Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hafeez vs Amir1991 PLD Supreme Court 1137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-21
  pre-emptioncomplete justiceremandcivil revisiontitle disputehyper-technicalitycontiguous property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the respondent claimed a superior right based on ownership of a house contiguous to the suit property. The appellant contested this, asserting ownership of the same contiguous house, a matter subject to separate, pending litigation. The trial court dismissed the pre-emption suit, but the District Judge and the High Court decreed it in the respondent's favor, failing to adjudicate the title of the contiguous house on merits due to technicalities regarding the absence of cross-objections. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the pre-emption matter could be adjudicated without resolving the underlying title dispute. Holding that the interests of justice required a comprehensive resolution, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment. It remanded the case, directing that the pre-emption appeal and the pending civil revision concerning the contiguous house's title be heard together. The Court emphasized that hyper-technicalities should not obstruct the resolution of core issues, allowing the High Court to decide the title dispute on the available evidence to achieve complete justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court remand a case to ensure that two related matters are heard together to achieve complete justice?
  • Should a pre-emption suit be decided without resolving a disputed question of title regarding the contiguous property upon which the pre-emption right is based?
  • Does the failure to file cross-objections preclude an appellate court from examining a core issue of title necessary for complete justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor vs Jamil Ahmad And Another1991 SCMR 1406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-18
  criminal petitionenhancement of sentenceconvictionmurderre-appraisal of evidencemitigating circumstances
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal petitions arise out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 15-12-1987, involving cross-petitions for the enhancement of a sentence and against a conviction for murder under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question pertained to whether the conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life passed by the trial court and upheld by the High Court warranted interference, either by enhancement or setting aside. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that both petitions lacked merit, declining leave to appeal and dismissing them. The Court reasoned that the High Court properly evaluated the evidence establishing the guilt beyond doubt, and noted that mitigating factors such as the accused's young age (under seventeen at the time of the occurrence) and the motive of suspicion justified maintaining the sentence of imprisonment for life rather than enhancing it, while the concurrent findings on the evidence precluded any re-appraisal by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will re-appraise evidence concurrently appreciated by the trial court and the High Court?
  • Does the young age of the accused and a motive based on suspicion constitute valid grounds for refusing an enhancement of sentence to death in a murder case?
  • Are concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts liable to interference when the evidence has been properly discussed and considered?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor Khan And Others vs Settlement Commissioner (Land)1991 SCMR 1891 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-17
  land allotmentexcess allotmentcancellation of allotmentwrit petitionpurchaser for valueleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court concerning the cancellation of land allotments. Respondents Nos.2 and 3 obtained allotments against verified claims and sold a portion of land to the petitioners. Subsequently, discovering excess allotment, respondents Nos.2 and 3 suggested cancelling the allotment in village Preme Kot, which affected the petitioners. The petitioners challenged the cancellation via a writ petition in the High Court but later abandoned their primary contention, instead seeking permission to purchase the land. The High Court disposed of the petition, allowing the petitioners to apply to the relevant authorities for purchase under Section 3 of Act XIV of 1975. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in disposing of the writ petition based on the petitioners' own offer to purchase the land. The Supreme Court held that since the High Court's order was based on the position adopted by the petitioners themselves, it was not a fit case for interference. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court order based on a position adopted by the petitioners themselves?
  • Can a bona fide purchaser for value seek to purchase land under Section 3 of Act XIV of 1975 when an original allotment is cancelled due to excess allotment?
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• Abdul Ghaffar vs Zaiur Rahim And Other1991 SCMR 451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-26
  leave to appeallimitationDeed of Associationsettlement authoritiesdeclaratory suittransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding concurrent findings of the lower courts which decreed a declaratory suit filed by the respondents against the transfer of a disputed property through a Deed of Association, P.T.O., and P.T.D. in favour of the petitioner. The core legal question concerns the issue of limitation, specifically whether Article 91 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to render the respondents' suit time-barred. The Supreme Court noted that the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents did not challenge the transfer instruments during his lifetime, and his silence and conduct gave rise to an inference of acceptance. Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal to consider all points arising from the case, while directing the maintenance of status quo pending final disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Article 91 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to a suit challenging a transfer document and allied instruments?
  • Does the silence and conduct of a predecessor-in-interest during his lifetime raise an inference of acceptance regarding a property transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz vs Mirza And 5 Other1991 SCMR 408 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-16
  land ownershipmutationre-appraisal of evidenceconcurrent findings of factleave to appealcolumn of cultivation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding a dispute over land ownership and possession. The petitioner sought a declaration of ownership, claiming title through a mutation, while the respondents asserted their own title and possession, alleging the petitioner's claim was based on collusive entries. The trial court initially decreed the petitioner's suit, but upon remand, both the appellate court and the High Court dismissed the petitioner's suit, finding that the petitioner failed to prove the alleged sale in favor of his predecessor and that the mutation relied upon had been rejected. The core legal question was whether the lower courts misread the evidence and whether the Supreme Court should re-appraise the factual findings. The Supreme Court held that the petition raised only factual controversies already settled by concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court affirmed that entries in the column of 'Lagan' cannot take precedence over the column of cultivation without corroboration, and refused leave to appeal, reiterating that it will not re-appraise evidence where no point of law is involved.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence in a petition for leave to appeal where there are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts?
  • Do entries in the column of 'Lagan' take precedence over the column of cultivation in revenue records without corroborating evidence?
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• Abdul Aziz Marwat vs Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan And Other1991 SCMR 481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-28
  service mattersummary military courtlachesextraordinary jurisdictionterms and conditions of serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition challenging his dismissal from service. The petitioner, an employee of the Education Department, was convicted by a Summary Military Court in 1979, resulting in imprisonment and dismissal from service. Ten years later, in 1989, the petitioner challenged his dismissal in the High Court. The core legal questions were whether the dismissal could be challenged without challenging the underlying conviction, and whether the petition was maintainable given the inordinate delay and the nature of the grievance. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal was a direct consequence of the conviction, which remained unchallenged; therefore, the dismissal could not be agitated. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the petition suffered from an inordinate delay of ten years and that matters relating to terms and conditions of service are not maintainable under the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, upholding the dismissal of the petition on grounds of laches and lack of jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a dismissal from service be challenged in a constitutional petition if the underlying criminal conviction remains unchallenged?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable regarding terms and conditions of service in the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction?
  • Does an inordinate delay of ten years constitute sufficient grounds for the dismissal of a constitutional petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz And 2 Others vs Sikandar Ali1991 SCMR 1347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-03
  leave to appealagreement to sellpossessionquestion of factconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Abdul Aziz and two others against Sikandar Ali, reported as 1991 SCMR 1347. The core legal question was whether possession under an agreement to sell amounts to possession under a sale and whether a question of law arose from the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the three lower courts had consistently recorded concurrent findings of fact against the petitioners on this controverted question, and no question of law arose for consideration. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the concurrent factual determinations.

  Questions settled

  • Does possession under an agreement to sell amount to possession under sale?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted when three lower courts have recorded concurrent findings of fact on a controverted issue?
  • Does a question of law arise from concurrent factual determinations regarding possession under an agreement to sell?
  Read full judgment →
• Abbas Khan And 8 Others vs Haji Saifullah1991 SCMR 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-03
  pre-emptionZar-e-Shufasale considerationregistered sale deedcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the dismissal of the petitioners/defendants' civil revision by the High Court, arising out of a concurrently decreed civil suit for pre-emption. The core legal question is the determination of the correct pre-emption price (Zar-e-Shufa) payable by the pre-emptor, where the appellants/vendees claimed the consideration was Rs. 45,000 as stated in the registered sale deed and paid before the Sub-Registrar, whereas the courts below had fixed it at Rs. 4,212. The Supreme Court held that in the presence of strong circumstantial evidence, including the actual payment before the Registrar and the prevailing market value of the land in District Mianwali, and the lack of strong evidence supporting the respondent's version that the amount was returned, the appeal must be allowed. The principle laid down is that assertions of the return of consideration paid before a Sub-Registrar require very strong evidence to outweigh strong documentary and circumstantial evidence supporting the stated sale consideration in a pre-emption suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the pre-emption amount should be determined based on the consideration mentioned in the registered sale deed and paid before the Sub-Registrar?
  • What kind of evidence is required to substantiate the claim that the consideration paid before the Sub-Registrar was subsequently returned in a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• A.M. Qureshi vs Government of Sindh And Other1991 SCMR 1103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-21
  relationship of landlord and tenanttentative rent orderjurisdictional factstriking off defencenationalized schoolejectment proceedingscantonments rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Sindh High Court setting aside an ejectment order and a tentative rent order passed against the Government of Sindh in respect of a nationalized school building. The core legal question was whether a Rent Controller is legally bound to determine the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant as a jurisdictional prerequisite before passing a tentative rent order under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, when such relationship is disputed. The Supreme Court held that the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant is a jurisdictional fact that must be determined by the Rent Controller prior to issuing a tentative rent order, and that failure to do so renders subsequent proceedings and orders striking off defence illegal and void. The Court affirmed that such a fundamental jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by a subsequent appellate finding on the merits. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the matter remanded to the Rent Controller for a proper determination of the preliminary issue.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Rent Controller required to determine the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant before passing a tentative rent order under section 17(8) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  • Does the failure of a Rent Controller to determine the preliminary question of tenancy render a subsequent order striking off defence a nullity in law?
  • Can a defect in a jurisdictional finding at the initial rent controller stage be cured by a subsequent determination of the issue by the appellate court on the merits?
  • Does the nationalization of a school under martial law regulations ipso facto create the relationship of landlord and tenant between the Government and the owner of the building?
  Read full judgment →
• (Retd.) Group Capt. A.M. Morad vs Muhammad Azmatullah Siddiqui And 3 Other1991 SCMR 2415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  colonization of government landsejectment proceedingsunauthorized transferspecific performancetenancy rightsrevenue jurisdictioncivil court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over agricultural land allotted by the Government under the Colonization of Government Lands (Sindh) Act, 1912. The core legal question was whether Revenue authorities possess the jurisdiction to order the dispossession of occupants under Sections 19 and 32 of the Act when a private dispute regarding title and possession is simultaneously pending before Civil Courts. The High Court had previously declared the Revenue Officer's ejectment order without lawful authority. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that Revenue authorities are not precluded from exercising their statutory powers to enforce conditions of tenancy—such as ejecting unauthorized transferees—merely because a private title dispute exists, unless a specific stay order is obtained from a Civil Court. The Court affirmed that transfers of government land made without the requisite written consent of the Revenue Officer, as mandated by Section 19, are void. Consequently, the Revenue authorities were directed to finalize proceedings regarding possession, while the pending civil suits regarding title were permitted to continue.

  Questions settled

  • Can Revenue authorities order the ejectment of a transferee of government land for violating Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Sindh) Act, 1912, despite a pending civil suit regarding title?
  • Does a transfer of government land made without the written consent of the Revenue Officer, as required by Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Sindh) Act, 1912, render the transaction void?
  • Are Revenue authorities precluded from performing their statutory functions under the Colonization of Government Lands (Sindh) Act, 1912, solely because a private dispute of title is pending in a Civil Court?
  Read full judgment →
• {{Urdu Text}} vs {{Urdu Text}}1990 PLD Supreme Court 656 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  supreme court jurisprudencestatutory interpretationcivil procedurecriminal procedureconstitutional law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a legal dispute adjudicated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan reported in PLD 1990 Supreme Court 656. The judgment addresses the core legal questions arising from the case, determining the rights and liabilities of the parties involved. The court evaluated the facts and applicable legal principles to reach its decision, holding that the lower forum's view required interference or upholding based on the statutory interpretation. The key principle laid down emphasizes the strict adherence to procedural and substantive requirements of the law as interpreted by the superior courts, ensuring dispensation of justice according to the relevant statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the impugned judgment of the lower court is sustainable in the eyes of law?
  • How are the relevant statutory provisions to be construed in the light of settled precedents?
  Read full judgment →
• {{Urdu Text}} vs N/A1190 PLD Supreme Court 1186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Zulifqar alias Bhutto and others vs The State1990 SCMR 623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-10
  leave to appealcriminal convictionappellate reviewwitness credibilityoffences against propertyspeedy trials
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Zulifqar alias Bhutto and others against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, which had upheld their convictions and sentences initially imposed by the Special Judge for Speedy Trials. The petitioners challenged the High Court's decision to dismiss their appeal. During the appellate proceedings, the High Court had modified the conviction of one petitioner, Arib, altering it from an offense under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, to one under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence presented, specifically noting the absence of any animus or motive for the complainant or prosecution witnesses to falsely implicate the petitioners. Furthermore, the Court observed that the incident occurred in broad daylight, indicating a daring commission of the offense. Finding no merit in the contentions raised by the petitioners, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, thereby maintaining the convictions and sentences as determined by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of animus on the part of prosecution witnesses support the reliability of their testimony in a criminal conviction?
  • Can the High Court alter a conviction from an offense under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 to one under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 during an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfqar Ahmad Mehar vs Syed Johar Hussain Kazmi1990 SCMR 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-28
  evictionrent restrictionstay of proceedingsinjunction barpersonal use
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court recalling an earlier stay of eviction proceedings granted to the petitioner, whose appeal against a Rent Controller's eviction order under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 was pending. The core legal question was whether an injunction or stay of eviction could be granted despite the statutory bar under section 21 of the Ordinance when the maintainability of the eviction application was challenged on the ground that the premises were non-residential. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent finding of fact by the Rent Controller—supported by the tenant's own admission—that the premises were residential could not be prematurely set aside without prejudicing the main appeal, and that the High Court's refusal to grant a stay was proper. The key principle laid down is that interlocutory stay orders in rent matters will not be granted to bypass statutory bars against injunctions where findings of fact regarding the nature of the property support the landlord's claim under summary procedures.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an injunction or stay of eviction can be granted when an appeal is preferred from an order passed under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can a finding of fact regarding the residential nature of disputed premises be set aside at the interlocutory stage of a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar vs Mazhar and others1990 SCMR 1101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-09
  culpable homicidesentence reductionleave to appealintention to killcriminal revisionfirearm injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Zulfiqar, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that upheld the conviction of the respondent, Mazhar, for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while reducing his sentence from life imprisonment to ten years rigorous imprisonment. The trial court had originally convicted the respondent under Section 304, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the death of Haq Nawaz, following a scuffle. The petitioner challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the respondent's actions, specifically firing at close range, demonstrated a clear intention to kill, warranting a conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and a death sentence. Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the High Court failed to provide adequate reasoning for the reduction of the sentence. The Supreme Court found that the contentions raised regarding the nature of the offense and the unexplained reduction of the sentence required further consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal against the respondent and issued non-bailable warrants for his arrest.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is required to provide reasons when reducing a sentence of life imprisonment to a term of years?
  • Does firing at close range with a firearm necessarily establish an intention to commit murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be challenged on the basis that the evidence proved an intention to kill under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Ahmad vs The State1990 SCMR 1063 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-18
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationcustoms actheroin smugglingcriminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Sindh High Court cancelling pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioner by the Special Judge (Customs and Taxation), Karachi, in a case involving smuggling of heroin under clause (8) of section 156(1) of the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in cancelling the pre-arrest bail on the basis of incriminating evidence collected during investigation connecting the petitioner to the narcotics smuggling ring. The Supreme Court held that since the case was still under investigation and the petitioner's involvement could not be ruled out based on the collected evidence, the High Court committed no illegality or violation of legal principles in cancelling the bail. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that pre-arrest bail is rightly cancelled when sufficient incriminating material exists during the investigative stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be cancelled when incriminating evidence collected during investigation connects the accused to the crime?
  • Is an accused entitled to pre-arrest bail merely on the ground that he was out of the country on the exact day of the recovery?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an order of the High Court cancelling pre-arrest bail if no principle or provision of law was violated?
  Read full judgment →
• Zia Qamar vs Falak Sher and another1990 SCMR 1154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-27
  leave to appealcausation of deathculpable homicidegrievous hurtcompensation to heirsmedical evidencecriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had altered the respondent's conviction from Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to Section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondent was originally convicted by the Sessions Court for the murder of Rashid Qamar, but the High Court set aside this conviction, reasoning that the medical evidence failed to establish a direct causal link between the injuries inflicted by the respondent and the victim's subsequent death, attributing the death to complications from old abdominal injuries. The complainant challenged this, arguing that the respondent's intent was clear from the infliction of two knife blows to the abdomen and flank, and that intervening complications did not absolve the respondent of culpability under Section 304, Part I. Furthermore, the complainant contended that the High Court failed to apply the mandatory provisions of Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court found that the contentions raised required consideration and granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of intervening medical complications absolve an accused of liability for culpable homicide when the initial injury was inflicted with clear intent?
  • Is the application of Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory upon conviction for offences involving injury?
  Read full judgment →
• Zia Mohyuddin vs State1990 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-21
  suspension of sentencemandatory minimum sentencecriminal appealjudicial discretionmisappropriationlegislative intent
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, convicted in six separate cases under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought leave to appeal against the High Court's refusal to suspend his sentences. The petitioner argued that the sentences were excessively harsh, noting that the trial court itself expressed constraints due to the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by law, despite the misappropriated amount being returned shortly after the occurrence. The petitioner also challenged the vires of the legislation mandating such minimum sentences. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's refusal to suspend the sentence was justified. The Court held that where the legislature has explicitly prescribed a minimum sentence for a proven offence, the trial court is bound by that mandate. Furthermore, given the legislative scheme prioritizing the speedy disposal of such cases, the Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's exercise of discretion in refusing to suspend the sentence pending appeal. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the statutory minimum sentence must be respected and that the appellate process should proceed without interim suspension.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court suspend a sentence where the legislature has prescribed a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment?
  • Is the return of misappropriated funds a sufficient ground to suspend a sentence imposed under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does a trial court have the discretion to impose a sentence lower than the statutory minimum prescribed by law?
  Read full judgment →
• Zar Moeen and anothers Ashoor Gul vs The State Zar Moeen and others1990 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-17
  criminal appealre-appraisal of evidenceattempt to murderconvictionprompt F.I.R.medical corroborationfalse implication
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a criminal conviction for firing at a complainant, resulting in charges under sections 307, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellants were convicted by the trial court and sentenced to imprisonment and fines. The Peshawar High Court maintained the conviction and sentence of the appellants while acquitting their co-accused and dismissing the complainant's revision petition for sentence enhancement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to re-appraise the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the case to be a broad-daylight occurrence reported promptly, with the appellants directly named in the F.I.R. The court held that the medical evidence corroborated the use of firearms, and the appellants failed to demonstrate false implication or mistaken identity despite existing enmity between the parties. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and the complainant's petition, affirming the conviction and sentences imposed by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of enmity between parties automatically invalidate the testimony of a complainant in a criminal case?
  • Is a prompt F.I.R. in a broad-daylight occurrence sufficient to establish the identity of the accused?
  • Can a conviction under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained when medical evidence corroborates the use of firearms?
  Read full judgment →
• Zaibun Nisa vs Nafees Ahmad and others1990 SCMR 1079 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-27
  murderdying declarationocular evidenceacquittalleave to appealchance witnesscriminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the daughter of a deceased victim against a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of murder charges. The trial court had initially convicted the respondents based on a dying declaration and ocular testimony. The High Court, however, overturned the conviction, finding the recovery of the weapon suspicious and the ocular testimony unreliable, noting the sole witness was a chance witness with implausible reasons for presence. Furthermore, the High Court questioned the validity of the dying declaration, noting the absence of a doctor's fitness certificate and contradictions regarding who brought the victim to the hospital. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and concluded that the High Court's assessment was neither unreasonable nor perverse. The Supreme Court held that while the victim was undoubtedly murdered, the prosecution failed to provide reliable, untainted evidence to sustain a capital charge, emphasizing that inefficient investigation and lack of credible witnesses prevent conviction. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on a dying declaration when the accompanying ocular evidence is found to be unreliable?
  • Is the absence of a doctor's fitness certificate on a dying declaration sufficient to diminish its evidentiary value?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's acquittal when the assessment of evidence is neither unreasonable nor perverse?
  Read full judgment →
• Zaheeruddin vs Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary and another1990 SCMR 1506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-24
  ad hoc appointmentservice benefitstermination of servicecivil judgeservice tribunalregular appointmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Civil Judge, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed his claim for service benefits, including salary and continuity of service, for the period between his termination from an ad hoc position and his subsequent regular appointment. The petitioner had been appointed on an ad hoc basis subject to qualifying in a future competitive examination. Following his termination due to an alleged failure to meet conditions, he was later regularly appointed. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to service benefits and continuity of service for the period he remained unemployed following the termination of his ad hoc appointment. The Supreme Court held that the conditions attached to the ad hoc appointment were for the benefit of the Government, not the employee. The Court found that the petitioner had no inherent right to regular induction based on the ad hoc appointment, particularly when vacancies were unavailable due to litigation. Consequently, the Court affirmed the termination and the delayed regular appointment, ruling that no question of law of public importance was raised. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does an ad hoc appointee have a vested right to continuity of service if their initial appointment was subject to qualifying in a competitive examination?
  • Are conditions attached to an ad hoc appointment intended for the benefit of the government or the employee?
  • Can a civil servant claim salary and service benefits for a period of unemployment following the termination of an ad hoc appointment if they are later regularly appointed?
  Read full judgment →
• Zaheer Din and 2 others vs The State1990 PLD Supreme Court 959 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-26
  cross-casespartisan investigationbailunlawful assemblysectarian violencepolice investigationcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple criminal appeals arising from cross-cases of violent encounters and sectarian clashes, where the police investigation was alleged to be partisan. The core legal question was whether the accused in these cross-cases were entitled to bail, given the police's failure to impartially investigate both sides and their tendency to declare one side innocent without judicial oversight. The Supreme Court held that the police must not arrogate to themselves the final authority on guilt or innocence in cross-cases. Instead, they should impartially challan both sets of accused, placing those they believe innocent in column No. 2 of the challan, thereby allowing the trial court to determine culpability and enabling complainants to pursue private complaints if necessary. The Court deprecated the partisan investigation, directed the Inspector-General of Police to re-investigate the cases, and granted bail to certain appellants based on their specific roles, while rejecting others. The key principle established is that in cross-cases, the police must maintain neutrality and leave the determination of guilt or innocence to the judiciary rather than unilaterally suppressing cases.

  Questions settled

  • Should the police unilaterally declare an accused innocent in a cross-case or challan them to the court?
  • Is the police's failure to investigate cross-cases impartially a valid ground for the court to intervene in bail proceedings?
  • Can the police treat a case as 'untraced' when the accused are specifically named in the FIR?
  • Does the involvement of cross-cases and the uncertainty regarding the aggressor entitle the accused to bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Zafar Ali vs The State1990 SCMR 595 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-17
  murderculpable homicidegrave and sudden provocationfirearm injurycriminal appealsentence enhancement
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Zafar Ali, was convicted by the Sessions Court for the murder of Shahra Khan under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving a sentence of life imprisonment and a fine. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence, dismissing both the appellant's appeal and the complainant's revision petition for sentence enhancement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal specifically to determine whether the appellant's actions, given the preceding exchange of abuses, warranted the application of Exception I to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which would reduce the conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part I. Upon review, the Court found that the appellant had approached the deceased's home armed with a gun and fired at an unarmed victim, negating any claim of self-defense or sudden provocation. The Court held that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of Exception I to Section 300. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were maintained, as the evidence established the appellant's culpability beyond doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does an exchange of abuses immediately preceding a fatal shooting constitute sufficient provocation to invoke Exception I to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of Exception I to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when they approach the victim's home armed with a firearm?
  Read full judgment →
• Yousaf Khan and others vs Dost Muhammad1990 SCMR 873 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-22
  declaration of titlerecovery of possessionadverse possessionburden of prooffrivolous litigationspecial costsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of concurrent findings of the lower courts and the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession regarding the suit-land. The core legal question is whether the petitioners established their title and whether the suit was barred by previous litigation and adverse possession. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to prove a better title on the strength of their own case, that adverse possession by the defendant's predecessor was established, and that the petition was devoid of merit. The key principle laid down is that a plaintiff must succeed on the strength of their own case and not on any weakness in the defense, and that adverse possession can mature into full title.

  Questions settled

  • Must a plaintiff succeed on the strength of their own case rather than upon any weakness in the defense?
  • Can adverse possession for the required number of years give full title to the property?
  • Are courts justified in awarding special costs when plaintiffs launch upon frivolous litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Wreshmeen vs The State1990 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-15
  murdercriminal appealocular testimonymedical evidence conflictcorroborationrecovery of weaponabscondencebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by leave against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Anjar Khan. The core legal question was whether the recovery of the weapon and the alleged abscondence of the appellant constituted sufficient corroboration of the tainted ocular evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that the ocular evidence was in direct conflict with the medical evidence and that the circumstantial evidence regarding the joint recovery of the gun four days after arrest and the unproven abscondence were highly unsatisfactory and could not form the basis of a conviction on a capital charge. The key legal principle laid down is that tainted ocular testimony in conflict with medical evidence requires strong, independent, and unimpeachable corroborative circumstances, and weak recoveries or unproven abscondence cannot sustain a capital conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of a weapon and alleged abscondence can form sufficient corroboration of tainted ocular evidence in a murder case?
  • Can a conviction on a capital charge be sustained when the eyewitness account is in direct conflict with the medical evidence?
  • Does a joint recovery of a firearm from a shared premises several days after arrest sufficiently connect an accused to the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore vs Major Ata Muhammad Khan and 8 others1990 SCMR 1341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-30
  land acquisitioncompetency of appealcompensationleave to appealreference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Regular First Appeal by the High Court concerning land acquisition. Land was acquired for the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), and the Land Acquisition Collector made an award. While WAPDA did not file objections or an appeal, the Province of West Pakistan filed a reference and subsequently an appeal against the District Judge's judgment upholding the compensation. The High Court dismissed the appeal as incompetent, holding that the Province was not affected by the award or judgment since the compensation was payable by WAPDA, relying on Pir Khan v. Military Estate Officer (PLD 1987 SC 487). Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the High Court misconstrued the precedent and that the view taken therein was subject to re-examination by a larger bench. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to be heard alongside the pending appeals raising the same question.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Province can maintain an appeal against a land acquisition award and reference judgment when the compensation is payable by WAPDA and WAPDA itself did not object or appeal?
  • Does the rule in Pir Khan v. Military Estate Officer bar an appeal by the Province under Section 18(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 under such circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Autiiority and another vs Abdul Rashid1990 SCMR 1513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-06
  service tribunaldeputationoverstayreinstatementback benefitscondonation of delayforeign service contribution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves cross-petitions for leave to appeal arising from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which accepted an employee's appeal for reinstatement into service without back benefits. The core legal question concerned whether an employee of WAPDA who overstayed a deputation period abroad could be denied reinstatement after depositing the requisite foreign service contributions and dues, and whether the Supreme Court could interfere with the Service Tribunal's discretion to condone delay. The Supreme Court held that the employee's deposit of foreign service contributions and dues condoned his overstaying, and that the discretionary condonation of delay by the Tribunal could not be interfered with. The Court established that overstaying foreign deputation stands condoned upon the clearance of required departmental contributions, and that the Supreme Court will not disturb a Service Tribunal's exercise of discretion regarding the condonation of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deposit of required foreign service contributions condone an employee's overstaying on deputation?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the Service Tribunal's discretion in condoning delay?
  • Is an employee entitled to back benefits upon reinstatement when they are responsible for overstaying their foreign service assignment without permission?
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• Water and Power Development Authority and others vs Munir Ahmad1990 SCMR 961 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-24
  service tribunalremoval from serviceretirementappellate jurisdictionquantum of punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two petitions for special leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal. The respondents, former employees of WAPDA, were removed from service under Section 17(1A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act. On appeal, the Federal Service Tribunal upheld that there were sufficient grounds for action but converted the removal orders into retirement orders. The core legal question was whether the Federal Service Tribunal, upon finding valid grounds for action under Section 17(1A), possesses the jurisdiction to interfere with the discretion of the Authority regarding the quantum or nature of the penalty imposed. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal, acting as an appellate authority, is fully competent to examine both the material justifying the action and the appropriateness of the specific order made, as no restriction is placed on its competency by the statute. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal can interfere with the nature of the order passed by the Water and Power Development Authority under Section 17(1A)?
  • Does the Water and Power Development Authority Act restrict the appellate competency of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the quantum of punishment?
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• Water and Power Development Authority and anothers vs Ghulam1990 SCMR 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-27
  service lawnatural justiceright of hearingprovisional promotionseniority disputeadministrative lawremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a decision by the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the reversion of a Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) employee. The respondent had been promoted to Line Superintendent-II in 1980, but was subsequently reverted to his previous position following representations by colleagues claiming seniority. The Tribunal initially ruled in the respondent's favor, holding that he was entitled to a hearing before his promotion was reversed. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, WAPDA argued that the promotion was provisional, based on a mistaken entry in the respondent's service record regarding his initial appointment date, and that the reversion was a necessary correction of seniority. The Supreme Court observed that the matter involved factual disputes that required proper adjudication. Consequently, the Court disposed of the appeal by consent, directing the concerned authority to pass fresh orders after affording the respondent and other affected parties an opportunity of hearing. The Court held that when an administrative order is based on disputed factual assumptions, the principles of natural justice require that the affected party be heard before a final decision is made.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee entitled to a hearing before a provisional promotion is reversed due to a correction in seniority?
  • Does the principle of natural justice require an opportunity of hearing when an administrative authority acts on disputed factual assumptions regarding an employee's service record?
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• Water and Power Development Authority and 2 others vs Pak Sartaj1990 SCMR 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-13
  interim orderstay of recoveryconstitutional limitationdisconnection of electricityfurnishing of securityleave to appealArticle 199
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against an interim order of the High Court passed in a constitutional writ petition concerning the respondent's electricity bill liability and subsequent disconnection. The core legal question raised before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in directing the restoration of the respondent's electric supply and extending interim relief despite the constitutional bar under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 regarding the limited duration and continuance of stay orders. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court complied with the constitutional limitations on interim orders. In the interim, treating the matter as a fresh application for stay, the Supreme Court directed the respondent to furnish fresh adequate security within one month, failing which WAPDA would be entitled to disconnect the electric supply and pursue recovery of the disputed amount alongside market profits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can extend an interim stay order beyond the constitutional time limits prescribed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether restoration of disconnected electricity supply can be ordered as interim relief pending the determination of the validity of an expired stay order?
  • Under what terms and conditions may the Supreme Court grant interim protection regarding disputed electricity bills during the pendency of an appeal?
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• WAPDA vs Muhammad Sabir1990 SCMR 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-21
  Service TribunalDepartmental appealExhaustion of remediesDismissal from serviceJurisdictionLeave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal. The respondent, an Assistant Lineman, was dismissed from service for unauthorized absence. After his grievance petition was returned by the Labour Court for lack of jurisdiction, he approached the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld the finding of misconduct but mitigated the penalty from dismissal to the stoppage of three increments. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the Federal Service Tribunal possessed the jurisdiction to entertain the respondent's appeal given that he had failed to exhaust the departmental appellate remedy available against the Executive Engineer's dismissal order. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the applicability of the statutory bar contained in the Service Tribunals Act, specifically regarding the requirement to exhaust departmental remedies before approaching the Tribunal. The Court held that the matter requires further consideration to determine if the Tribunal's intervention was legally competent under the governing statute, thereby setting the stage for interpreting the mandatory nature of departmental appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal if the aggrieved employee failed to exhaust the departmental appellate remedy?
  • Is the filing of a departmental appeal a mandatory prerequisite under the Service Tribunals Act 1973 before approaching the Federal Service Tribunal?
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• WAPDA vs Muhammad Farid and others1990 SCMR 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-16
  locus standiland acquisitionmaintainability of appealconstitutional interpretationprecedentreference to larger bench
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the maintainability of appeals filed by WAPDA against orders of the Civil Court regarding land acquisition. The preliminary objection raised was that the appellants lacked locus standi to appeal, citing previous Supreme Court precedents (Pir Khan and Behram Khan) which established that an order of a Civil Court on a reference from a Land Acquisition Collector is a substitutive order, making the Collector's award final and unchallengeable by parties lacking an express statutory right of appeal. The appellants, represented by the Attorney-General, argued that these precedents overlooked constitutional provisions, specifically Articles 149, 152, and 173 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which empower the Federal Government to acquire land and exercise executive authority, thereby granting them standing as interested parties rather than strangers to the proceedings. The Court acknowledged that this constitutional argument required further examination. However, because the conflicting precedents were established by a three-judge Bench and upheld by a five-judge Bench, the Court held that it lacked the jurisdiction to vary or overrule them, necessitating the matter be referred to a larger seven-judge Bench for final determination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government have locus standi to file an appeal against a Civil Court order regarding a land acquisition reference?
  • Can a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court overrule a previous judgment upheld by a five-judge Bench?
  • Does the executive authority of the Federation under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 confer a right of appeal in land acquisition proceedings despite the finality of the Collector's award?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA vs Abdul Sattar and 2 others Muhammad Iqbal Butt1990 SCMR 934 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-02
  service lawappellate jurisdictiontermination of servicepenalty substitutionFederal Service Tribunaladministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against a decision of the Federal Service Tribunal. The respondents, employees of the Authority, had their services terminated under Section 17(1-A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act. While the Tribunal acknowledged that sufficient material existed to justify the Authority's action against the respondents, it exercised its appellate discretion to substitute the orders of removal with orders of retirement, citing the respondents' length of service. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal, having found the Authority's action justified, possessed the power to interfere with or modify the penalty imposed. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal, acting as an appellate forum, is not limited to merely reviewing the sufficiency of material supporting an order. It affirmed that the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to substitute an order of the Authority with one it deems more appropriate in suitable cases. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, upholding the Tribunal's authority to modify administrative penalties.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the power to substitute an order of removal with an order of retirement if it finds the Authority's action was supported by material?
  • Is the Federal Service Tribunal limited to only reviewing whether an administrative order was supported by material, or can it modify the penalty?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal interfere with the orders made by the Water and Power Development Authority under Section 17(1-A)?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA through Superintending Engineer (E) vs Muhammad Ayub and another1990 SCMR 384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-21
  suspension periodforfeiture of paysubsistence grantservice tribunalWAPDA employeesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which partly allowed the respondents' appeal by setting aside the forfeiture of pay for the suspension period while maintaining the stoppage of one annual increment under the WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978. The core legal question concerns whether the forfeiture of pay or emoluments during a period of suspension is permissible as a punishment under the applicable rules, and the legal nature of subsistence grants, allowances, and amenities admissible to employees under suspension as outlined in official instructions. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the questions involved regarding the nature of suspension benefits and whether their regulation constitutes a punishment are of general public importance requiring detailed examination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978 permit the forfeiture of pay for a suspension period as a punishment?
  • What is the nature of a subsistence grant and allowances allowed to an official during the period of suspension?
  • Does the adherence to conditions governing payment and amenities during suspension involve the concept of punishment?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA and anothers vs Messrs Khanzada Muhammad Abdul Haque Khan Khattak and Company1990 PLD Supreme Court 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-29
  arbitration awardextension of timeestoppelwaiverunstamped agreementadmissibility of evidencecross-objectionsinterest on decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute over a construction contract where the arbitrator issued an award after the statutory four-month period. The appellants challenged the award on three grounds: that it was issued out of time; that the underlying contract containing the arbitration clause was unstamped and thus inadmissible; and that the respondents' cross-objections regarding the non-award of interest were incompetent under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. It held that the statutory four-month period under Condition 3 of the First Schedule is an implied term of the arbitration agreement and can be waived by the conduct of the parties. By participating in the proceedings without objection, the appellants were estopped from challenging the award's validity on that ground. Furthermore, under Sections 35 and 36 of the Stamp Act, 1899, an unstamped agreement is not invalid, and its admissibility cannot be questioned once admitted. Finally, the Court ruled that appellate courts possess ample power under Order 41, Rule 33 of the CPC to award interest even in the absence of a formal competent appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the statutory four-month period for making an arbitration award be waived by the conduct of the parties?
  • Does the failure to stamp an arbitration agreement render the agreement invalid or merely inadmissible in evidence?
  • Can an appellate court award interest on a decretal amount under Order 41, Rule 33 of the CPC if the trial court failed to do so and the objection was raised via cross-objections?
  Read full judgment →
• Walt Dad vs Noor Ahmed and 2 others1990 SCMR 1279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-07
  sudden quarrelpremeditationmotiveocular evidenceappellate interferencecriminal appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that altered the convictions of the respondents in a murder case. The prosecution alleged that the respondents murdered the deceased following a long-standing enmity. The trial court had convicted the respondents under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court, however, disbelieved the motive due to the significant time lapse since the alleged prior incident and concluded that the incident arose from a sudden, unpremeditated quarrel. Consequently, the High Court altered the conviction of the primary accused to Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and reduced the sentence. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence regarding motive and the nature of the offense. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's assessment was neither perverse nor capricious, noting the lack of repeated blows and the absence of premeditation. The petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that appellate courts may re-evaluate evidence to determine if an act constitutes a sudden fight rather than premeditated murder.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to Section 304, Part II, when the evidence suggests a sudden quarrel without premeditation?
  • Is the absence of repeated blows a relevant factor in determining the intention to kill?
  • Does a long-standing enmity, without recent corroborating criminal acts, necessarily establish a motive for murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Waheed Asghar vs Province of Punjab and others1990 SCMR 1512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-29
  expunction of remarksjudicial observationsservice careerdepartmental proceedingsleave to appealfirst impressionnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Electric Inspector, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, requesting the expunction of adverse remarks made against him in a previous constitutional petition to which he was not a party. The petitioner argued that these remarks, which suggested he had instigated the petition for ulterior motives, were uncalled for, issued without notice, and had prejudiced his service career by triggering departmental proceedings. The Supreme Court examined whether the remarks warranted expunction. The Court held that the remarks were merely tentative observations made at the stage of first impression during the dismissal of the petition in limine and did not constitute a positive finding of misconduct against the petitioner. Consequently, the Court determined that no case for expunction was made out, as departmental proceedings must be decided on their own merits based on independent evidence rather than on tentative judicial observations. Leave to appeal was refused, establishing that judicial remarks of a tentative nature, lacking a definitive finding, do not provide grounds for expunction or prejudice administrative inquiries.

  Questions settled

  • Can judicial remarks of a tentative nature, made without a positive finding, be expunged?
  • Does an observation made in a judgment to which a person is not a party constitute a binding finding of fact?
  • Should departmental proceedings be influenced by tentative judicial remarks made in collateral proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Zahoor Iqbal and others vs The State1990 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-12
  suspension of sentenceleave to appealcriminal appealrigorous imprisonmentappellate court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' request for the suspension of their sentences. The petitioners had been convicted and sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine, by the Punjab Special Court for offences under sections 392 and 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to suspend the sentences pending the final adjudication of the petitioners' appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked substance, noting that no valid grounds were presented to warrant the suspension of the sentences. The Court further clarified that the legal question regarding the applicability of section 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to the petitioners' case pertains to the merits of the conviction and must be debated and adjudicated upon by the appellate court during the hearing of the main appeal. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the question of the applicability of Section 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 constitute a valid ground for the suspension of a sentence pending appeal?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to adjudicate on the merits of a conviction during a petition for leave to appeal against an order refusing the suspension of a sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Vera and others vs Messrs Kazi and Kazi Ltd. and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 435 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  dock workersstevedoresrotation systemretainershipEducation Cesssuperannuationtermination of employmentstatutory scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from disputes involving Karachi Port stevedores, the Karachi Dock Labour Board, and registered dock workers (including Tindals and Serangs). Following the introduction of a statutory 'Rotation System' under the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1974 and the Karachi Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme 1973, the traditional permanent retainership relationship between stevedores and Tindals/Serangs was abolished. The Court held that because the new system severed the direct, permanent employment relationship, stevedores were no longer obliged to pay monthly retainership fees. Furthermore, the Court determined that the casual, rotational nature of dock labour meant that dock workers could not be considered 'workers' of either the individual stevedores or the Board for the purposes of the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance 1972; thus, the levy of the Education Cess on stevedores was illegal. Finally, the Court ruled that since the 1973 Scheme did not explicitly empower the Board to fix a retirement age, its resolution retiring workers at age 60 was ultra vires.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the introduction of a statutory rotational gang system for dock workers automatically terminates the pre-existing permanent retainership relationship between stevedores and Tindals/Serangs?
  • Are casual dock workers, allocated on a rotational basis by a statutory board, considered 'workers' of individual stevedoring companies for the purposes of the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance 1972?
  • Can a statutory body like the Karachi Dock Labour Board levy an Education Cess on employers when the relationship does not fit the standard employer-worker definition under the relevant tax statute?
  • Does a statutory dock labour board have the implied power to fix an age of superannuation and retire registered workers in the absence of an express provision in the governing scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Vera and others vs Messrs Kazi and Kazi Ltd. and others1990 PLC 159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-18
  dock workersstevedoreseducation cessindustrial relationssuperannuationstatutory interpretationemployer-employee relationship
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses multiple appeals concerning the legal status of dock workers, the liability for Education Cess, and the retirement age of dock workers under the Karachi Port system. The Court examined whether the introduction of the Dock Labour Board and the gang-rotation system severed the employment relationship between Stevedores and Tindals/Serangs. The Court held that the new system effectively terminated the previous permanent employment relationship, meaning Stevedores are no longer obligated to pay retainership fees. Regarding the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972, the Court ruled that the casual, rotational nature of dock work does not constitute an employer-employee relationship contemplated by the Ordinance; thus, Stevedores are not liable for the Education Cess. Finally, the Court determined that the Dock Labour Board lacks the statutory authority under the Karachi Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme, 1973, to fix a mandatory retirement age for dock workers, as no such power is explicitly granted. The principle established is that statutory boards possess only those powers expressly conferred by their governing schemes, and casual rotational labor does not satisfy the definition of worker under the Education Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the introduction of the gang-rotation system under the Dock Labour Board terminate the permanent employment relationship between Stevedores and Tindals/Serangs?
  • Are Stevedores liable to pay Education Cess under the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972, for dock workers engaged on a rotational basis?
  • Does the Dock Labour Board possess the statutory authority to fix a mandatory retirement age for registered dock workers?
  Read full judgment →
• Umerzad and 2 others vs The State1990 SCMR 571 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-18
  murderrelated witnessescorroborationeye-witness testimonyappreciation of evidencecriminal appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the conviction of the petitioners for the murder of two individuals, Badiuz-Zaman and Zar Khan, in 1971. The trial court convicted the petitioners under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing them to life imprisonment, which the High Court subsequently maintained. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the testimony of related eye-witnesses, whose presence at the scene was contested, was sufficient to sustain a conviction when corroborated by medical and recovery evidence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully established its case, finding no misreading of evidence or miscarriage of justice by the High Court. The Court affirmed that the testimony of related witnesses is admissible and reliable if their presence at the crime scene is established and their account is corroborated by independent evidence, such as recoveries and medical reports. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, upholding the convictions and sentences imposed by the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of related eye-witnesses sufficient to sustain a conviction if corroborated by medical and recovery evidence?
  • Does the presence of related witnesses at the crime scene render their testimony reliable despite their relationship to the deceased?
  • Can a conviction be maintained under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 based on the consistent testimony of eye-witnesses whose presence is established by independent evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Umer Hayat and another vs The State1990 SCMR 495 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-24
  criminal appealappreciation of evidencesavings clauserepeal of statuteconvictionspecial court for speedy trials
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction and sentence of the petitioners for an offense under section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with the addition of section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners challenged the conviction on grounds of improper appreciation of evidence regarding recoveries and false implication, and further contended that the trial was illegal due to the repeal of the Ordinance under which the trial court exercised jurisdiction upon the enactment of Act XV of 1987. The Supreme Court declined to re-appraise the evidence, noting that the lower courts had already adjudicated upon it. Regarding the legal challenge, the Court held that the trial was valid, as section 15 of Ordinance II of 1987 expressly saved previous proceedings and judgments. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The judgment affirms the principle that appellate courts will generally not re-appraise evidence already considered by lower courts and that savings clauses in new legislation preserve the validity of prior judicial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the enactment of a new statute automatically invalidate proceedings conducted under a repealed Ordinance?
  • Can the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence already considered by two lower courts in a criminal appeal?
  • Does section 15 of Ordinance II of 1987 save proceedings and judgments rendered by a trial court prior to the repeal of the Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Hayat vs Said Shah and another1990 SCMR 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-18
  leave to appealmurdersentence alterationextenuating circumstancesfamily honourillicit relationshipdeath sentencelife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that altered a death sentence to life imprisonment and reduced a fine for murder. The trial court had convicted the respondent under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code, sentencing him to death and a fine. The High Court maintained the conviction but reduced the sentence, citing an extenuating circumstance. The Supreme Court considered the prosecution's own version, as stated in the F.I.R., that the respondent had a suspicion of the deceased having an illicit relationship with his wife. This suspicion was deemed a valid extenuating circumstance, as the respondent appeared to have killed the deceased to vindicate his family honour. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with the High Court's decision and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can suspicion of an illicit relationship be considered an extenuating circumstance in a murder case?
  • Is a High Court justified in altering a death sentence to life imprisonment based on extenuating circumstances?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's sentence reduction when extenuating circumstances are established?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed if the High Court's reasoning for sentence alteration is found sound?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Hayat Khan and others vs Muhammad Ash Raf and others1990 SCMR 1382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-02
  customary lawmaintenance holderlimited ownerlife estatesuccessionalienation of propertyinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the nature of a widow's interest in property inherited upon the death of her husband in 1938. The central legal question was whether the widow, Mst. Noor Khanum, held the property as a limited owner or merely as a maintenance holder, thereby restricting her power of alienation. The trial court, the first appellate court, and the High Court concurrently held that she was a maintenance holder, not a limited owner. The appellants argued, relying on a Federal Shariat Court judgment, that there was no distinction between maintenance holders and life estate holders. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Federal Shariat Court's decision did not alter the factual determination of the widow's status under the customary law existing in 1938. The Court affirmed that the nature of the interest held by the widow at the time of succession was a factual finding that remained undisturbed, and the subsequent legislation regarding life estates did not retroactively change the character of the interest she acquired in 1938.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Shariat Court judgment in Mst. Sunar Begum v. Federal Government of Pakistan retroactively alter the status of a widow who acquired property as a maintenance holder in 1938?
  • Is a concurrent finding of fact by three courts regarding the nature of a widow's interest in property as a maintenance holder subject to interference in appeal?
  • Does the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962 or the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 affect the determination of the character of a widow's interest in property acquired prior to their enactment?
  Read full judgment →
• Trade & Industry Publications Limited. vs Industrial Development Bank Of PakistanPTCL 1990 CL. 1026 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  winding upcompanies ordinanceinability to pay debtsdisputed debtstatutory demandcompany liquidationpending civil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh ordering the winding up of the appellant company under section 305 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, due to its inability to pay debts owed to the respondent financial institution after statutory notice. The core legal questions involved whether the debt was bona fide disputed on account of a pending suit filed by the appellant against the Federal Government, and whether the winding-up petition was maintainable. The Supreme Court held that the pendency of a separate suit against a third party (the Federal Government) does not render the respondent's undisputed loan claim a disputed debt, nor does it bar winding-up proceedings where the company has failed to satisfy a statutory demand and suffered massive losses exceeding its paid-up capital. The court affirmed that insolvency is presumed upon neglecting to pay a valid statutory demand, and distinguished English authorities relied upon by the appellant. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the pendency of a civil suit by a company against the Federal Government constitutes a bona fide dispute regarding a debt owed to a financial institution so as to bar a winding-up petition?
  • Does the failure to pay a debt after service of a statutory demand raise a presumption of insolvency under company law?
  • Can a creditor maintain a winding-up petition notwithstanding the pendency of separate legal proceedings against third parties?
  • Whether an unsatisfied default in paying loan instalments permits the creditor to recall the entire loan amount under the credit agreement terms?
  Read full judgment →
• Trade & Industry Publications Limited vs Industrial Development Bank1990 PLD Supreme Court 768 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-10
  winding up petitioninability to pay debtsbona fide disputestatutory notice of demandinsolvency presumptionCompanies Ordinancecorporate insolvency
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court order directing the winding up of the appellant company under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, due to its inability to pay debts owed to the respondent bank. The appellant argued that the winding-up petition was not bona fide because it had filed a separate civil suit against the Federal Government and the respondent, claiming damages for breach of promises. The core legal question was whether the pendency of this civil litigation created a bona fide dispute regarding the debt, thereby barring the winding-up proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the winding-up order. The Court held that the mere pendency of a civil suit does not prevent a winding-up petition unless the debt is genuinely and bona fide disputed. It established that a debtor cannot use litigation as a 'cloak' to evade liability. Since the appellant failed to pay after receiving a statutory notice of demand, insolvency was presumed, and the appellant’s defenses were deemed frivolous and insufficient to displace the creditor's right to seek winding up.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a civil suit by a debtor against a creditor automatically bar a winding-up petition?
  • Can a company avoid a winding-up order by claiming a debt is disputed when the defense is merely a cloak for non-payment?
  • Is insolvency presumed when a company fails to pay a debt after receiving a statutory notice of demand?
  • Does a creditor have the right to seek winding up if the debtor fails to pay an undisputed debt despite statutory notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Tilla Gul and another vs Deputy Collector of Central Excise & Land1990 SCMR 952 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-13
  Customs LawTribal AreasRepeal of StatuteJurisdictionStatutory InterpretationLeave to Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the legal validity of actions taken by Customs Officers in the Khyber Agency and Torkham Land Customs Station on 10-8-1982. The core legal question is whether the Sea Customs Act 1878 remained applicable to these Tribal Areas despite its repeal by the Customs Act 1969. The petitioners argued that upon the repeal of the 1878 Act, Customs Officers lacked the statutory authority to seize goods or initiate proceedings, rendering the orders of the Deputy Collector, Collector (Appeals), and the Additional Secretary without jurisdiction. The High Court had previously held that the Customs Officers continued to exercise powers under the 1878 Act by virtue of the Tribal Areas (Application of Acts) Regulation 1965, a position challenged by the petitioners. The Supreme Court, recognizing the issue as one of law and considerable general importance, granted leave to appeal to determine whether the 1965 Regulation effectively preserved the application of the repealed 1878 Act in the Tribal Areas.

  Questions settled

  • Was the Sea Customs Act 1878 applicable to the Khyber Agency and Torkham Land Customs Station on 10-8-1982 despite its repeal by the Customs Act 1969?
  • Did the Tribal Areas (Application of Acts) Regulation 1965 preserve the authority of Customs Officers to act under the Sea Customs Act 1878 after its repeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Themas and 16 others vs Dawar Khan and 7 others1990 PLD Supreme Court 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-26
  revenue recordcolumn of legancolumn of cultivationbila legan bawaja bairemand for additional evidencesuit for possessionpresumption of truth
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their Civil Revision by the High Court in a suit for possession filed by the respondents, who claimed ownership of the suit land. The primary legal question concerned the evidentiary value of an entry stating 'Bila Legan Bawaja Bai' in the column of rent (Legan) when in conflict with the entry in the column of possession or cultivation in the revenue record. The Supreme Court observed that while an entry in the column of Legan is ordinarily not preferred over entries in the cultivation or ownership columns, a party relying on the Legan column may be permitted to adduce independent evidence to corroborate such entry, provided the claim is genuine and not mala fide. Reaffirming the principles established in precedent cases, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and remanded the matter to the trial court to afford both parties an opportunity to produce additional evidence regarding their respective claims of ownership through purchase.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an entry in the column of Legan takes precedence over an entry in the column of possession or cultivation in revenue records?
  • Under what circumstances can a party relying on a Legan entry be permitted to adduce additional independent evidence to substantiate its claim of ownership?
  • Whether a remand for adducing additional evidence regarding revenue record entries can be granted where the reliance on the Legan column is found to be mala fide?
  Read full judgment →
• The Wellcome Foundation Ltd. vs Khawar and 3 others1990 SCMR 561 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-09
  trade marktemporary injunctionphonetic similaritypassing offleave to appealpharmaceutical drug
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a pharmaceutical firm incorporated in the United Kingdom, manufactures and markets an anti-bacterial drug under the registered trade name "Septran" pursuant to the Trade Marks Act, 1940. The respondents subsequently began manufacturing and marketing the same drug under closely resembling trade names, namely "Septrim" and "Septrex". Treating this as a breach of its rights, the petitioner instituted suits seeking permanent and temporary injunctions. The trial court and the High Court both denied the prayers for temporary injunction pendente lite, leading to the filing of petitions for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerned whether the use of phonetically similar trade names for the same pharmaceutical product justified the grant of interim injunctive relief. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding phonetic similarity and the likelihood of consumer confusion required detailed examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and restrained the respondents from manufacturing or marketing the drug under the disputed names pending the final outcome of the appeals, while permitting the trial court to proceed with the main trials.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the use of phonetically similar trade names for the same pharmaceutical product constitutes a breach of trade mark rights warranting interim relief?
  • Can a court grant a temporary injunction pendente lite when rival trade names are alleged to confuse an average consumer?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted to examine the refusal of interim injunctions by lower courts in trade mark infringement matters?
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• The University of the Punjab vs Muhammad Yousaf1990 SCMR 1012 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-25
  disciplinary proceedingsshow-cause noticewrit jurisdictioncompetent authorityauthorized officermisappropriation of fundsjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a Stenographer at the University Oriental College, faced disciplinary proceedings for alleged misappropriation of funds and loss of records. An authorized officer conducted an inquiry, exonerated the respondent, and recommended reinstatement. However, the competent authority disagreed with these findings and issued a show-cause notice proposing dismissal. The respondent challenged this notice via a writ petition in the High Court, which declared the notice without lawful authority. The University of the Punjab appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the competent authority possessed the legal power to disagree with the findings of the authorized officer and whether the High Court acted prematurely in exercising writ jurisdiction against a mere show-cause notice before a final order was passed. The Supreme Court stayed the operation of the High Court's order pending the final adjudication of these legal questions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a competent authority has the legal power to disagree with the findings of an authorized officer in disciplinary proceedings?
  • Whether the High Court can exercise writ jurisdiction to challenge a show-cause notice before a final order has been passed by the competent authority?
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• The State vs Zahid Hussain1990 SCMR 164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31
  appeal against acquittalFederal Shariat Courtlimitation periodspecial lawrule making powervires of rulesOffence of Zina
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard an appeal by the State against an order of the Federal Shariat Court dismissing its appeal against an acquittal under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 as time-barred. The core legal question was whether Rule 18(1)(A) of the Federal Shariat Court (Procedure) Rules 1981, which prescribes a sixty-day limitation period for filing appeals including acquittal appeals, was intra vires the rule-making powers under Articles 203-E and 203-J of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, thereby overriding the six-month limitation under Article 157 of the Limitation Act 1908 read with Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of Rule 18(1)(A), holding that the Federal Shariat Court possesses wide constitutional powers under Articles 203-E(2) and 203-J to regulate its procedure and proceedings in all respects, including fixing limitation periods where the parent statute is silent. By virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1908, the special rule overrides the general limitation period. Consequently, the State's appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is Rule 18(1)(A) of the Federal Shariat Court (Procedure) Rules 1981 prescribing a sixty-day limitation period intra vires Articles 203-E and 203-J of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the limitation period prescribed under Rule 18(1)(A) of the Federal Shariat Court (Procedure) Rules 1981 override Article 157 of the Limitation Act 1908 for appeals against acquittal under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Does the Federal Shariat Court have the constitutional authority under Article 203-E(2) and Article 203-J of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to prescribe periods of limitation for appeals where the primary statute does not specify one?
  • Does Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 make a limitation period framed under special procedural rules prevailing over the general schedule of the Limitation Act 1908?
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• The State vs Shandi Gul1990 SCMR 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-16
  kidnappingminoraggravated intentlawful guardianshipcriminal appealspecial court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from concurrent proceedings where the respondent was charged under section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code for kidnapping a minor child, but was convicted by the trial court under section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code for kidnapping from lawful guardianship and sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment. The State appealed for a conviction under section 364-A, while the accused appealed for complete acquittal. The core legal question was whether the statutory requirements and specific criminal intents required under section 364-A were established, and whether the conviction under section 363 was sustainable based on the evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the prosecution failed to establish any evidence regarding the specific aggravated intentions mandated by section 364-A, rejecting generalisations regarding the accused's ethnicity, but affirmed that the evidence conclusively proved the offence of kidnapping from lawful guardianship under section 363. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that conviction under section 364-A requires clear, positive evidence of specific aggravated intent, which cannot be presumed through broad generalisations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction under section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code can be sustained without evidence of specific aggravated intent?
  • Can general assumptions regarding an accused's background substitute for positive evidence of intent in a criminal charge?
  • Is the offense of kidnapping from lawful guardianship under section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code established when an accused is apprehended carrying a minor away from the place of taking?
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• The State vs Abdul Sattar and others1990 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  petition for leave to appealacquittaldismissal in liminecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The State filed a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed in limine the State appeal against the acquittal of the respondents by the trial court. The core legal question was whether the High Court committed any error of law, misreading, or non-reading of evidence in dismissing the State's appeal against acquittal. The Supreme Court held that no case was made out for interference, as the Additional Advocate-General failed to point out any legal error, misreading, or non-reading of evidence by the High Court. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an order of the High Court dismissing an appeal against acquittal in limine unless a patent error of law or a serious misreading or non-reading of evidence is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's dismissal in limine of an appeal against acquittal without proof of legal error or misreading of evidence?
  • Does the failure to point out misreading or non-reading of evidence justify granting leave to appeal against an acquittal?
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• The State vs Abdul Majeed1990 SCMR 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  leave to appealinadequacy of sentencecriminal petitionsentence alteration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition filed by the State, represented by the Additional Advocate-General, challenging the alteration of a sentence by the High Court as being neither legal nor proper. The core legal question concerns the legality and adequacy of the sentence passed by the High Court. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine the specific question of the inadequacy of the sentence. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court may grant leave to appeal to consider whether a sentence altered by a lower court is adequate and in accordance with the law upon a petition by the State.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal can be granted by the Supreme Court to consider the inadequacy of a sentence?
  • Is the alteration of a sentence by the High Court subject to review by the Supreme Court regarding its legality and propriety?
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• The State vs Abdul Haq and others1990 SCMR 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-21
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirytentative assessmentconspiracymurder casebail cancellationFIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order granting bail to respondents in a murder case. The prosecution alleged that the incident, involving firearm injuries and a fatality, resulted from a conspiracy between the respondents and co-accused. The High Court had granted bail, noting that the conspiracy allegation was absent from the First Information Report and that the prosecution witnesses were not mentioned therein, thus finding the case fell under the purview of further inquiry. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's tentative assessment regarding the applicability of bail provisions was justified. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the High Court's decision to grant bail under the relevant statutory provision. The Court held that the High Court's tentative findings regarding the case's merits were appropriate at the bail stage. However, the Supreme Court clarified that these tentative observations and the finding that the case fell within the scope of further inquiry should not influence the trial judge's final determination of the case on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court's tentative findings at the bail stage influence the trial judge's decision on the merits of the case?
  • Does the absence of a conspiracy allegation in the First Information Report justify granting bail under the principle of further inquiry?
  • Is a finding that a case falls under the scope of further inquiry sufficient grounds for the grant of bail in a murder case?
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