Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Mushtaq Hussain Shah vs Director, Food, Lahore Region and others1990 SCMR 1492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-23
  service lawpro forma promotionlimitation periodservice tribunal jurisdictionfitness for promotiondepartmental promotion committeecivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal as incompetent. The petitioner, a former Assistant Food Controller, sought pro forma promotion after his reinstatement in service, claiming he was overlooked in favor of a junior colleague. Although the High Court had previously directed the authorities to consider his representations, the Departmental Promotion Committee rejected his promotion on 14-1-1987 due to an unsatisfactory service record. The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal in October 1987. The core legal question was whether the appeal before the Tribunal was time-barred and whether the Tribunal could adjudicate upon the fitness of a civil servant for promotion. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's own representations to the Secretary Food in February and July 1987 demonstrated his prior knowledge of the Committee's decision, rendering the appeal filed in October 1987 time-barred. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a Service Tribunal lacks the jurisdiction to re-evaluate evidence regarding a civil servant's fitness for promotion, as this is a departmental prerogative.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Service Tribunal has the jurisdiction to re-evaluate evidence regarding a civil servant's fitness for promotion?
  • Does the filing of departmental representations toll the limitation period for an appeal before a Service Tribunal if the petitioner had prior knowledge of the adverse decision?
  • Is a decision regarding a civil servant's fitness for promotion by a Departmental Promotion Committee subject to judicial review on the merits of the service record?
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• Mushtaq Ahmad vs The State (Copy)1990 SCMR 405 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-06
  capital convictiondying declarationocular testimonyreasonable doubtchance witnessescriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentences imposed by the trial court and upheld by the High Court for the murder of two individuals. The core legal question was whether the prosecution’s evidence, primarily comprising dying declarations and ocular testimony, was sufficient to sustain a capital conviction given significant evidentiary inconsistencies. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court identified critical flaws: the absence of blood at the alleged crime scene, medical evidence suggesting the use of two weapons rather than one, the lack of established motive, and the fact that police officials were unaware of the assailant's identity immediately after the incident, contradicting the prosecution's claim of eyewitness identification. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reaffirms the principle that where prosecution evidence is riddled with material contradictions and lacks independent corroboration, it cannot form the basis for a capital conviction, as the benefit of any reasonable doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on dying declarations and ocular testimony when significant physical evidence contradicts the prosecution's version of the crime scene?
  • Does the absence of blood at an alleged crime scene cast doubt on the prosecution's narrative of the occurrence?
  • Is ocular testimony reliable when the witnesses are employees of the complainant and their presence at the scene is unexplained?
  • Should an appellate court set aside a conviction if the prosecution fails to establish a motive and the evidence contains material inconsistencies?
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• Musa Khan vs Begum Jan and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 982 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-11
  limited ownercustomary lawinheritancegift deedres judicatasuccessionalienation of propertyPunjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1948
  Summary & questions settled

  The appeal arose from a dispute over property inherited by a daughter as a limited owner under customary law. The core legal question was whether the enactment of the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, transformed her limited interest into full ownership, thereby validating a gift made to her son, or whether her interest remained limited, causing the property to devolve upon the collaterals of the last full owner upon her death. The Supreme Court held that the 1948 Act did not retroactively confer full ownership rights on limited customary holders. Consequently, the female owner remained subject to customary restrictions, and the gift was invalid as she lacked the power to alienate the property beyond her life interest. The Court affirmed that under Section 3 of the Act, the limited interest terminates upon the female's death, and succession opens to the heirs of the last full owner. The principle established is that the 1948 Act does not abrogate customary limitations on property tenure unless specific rights are conferred, and limited owners cannot alienate property without established customary authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, retrospectively convert a limited customary interest into full ownership?
  • Can a female limited owner under customary law validly gift property to her son without proof of a specific custom authorizing such alienation?
  • Upon the death of a female limited owner, does the property devolve upon the heirs of the last full owner under Section 3 of the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948?
  • Does a prior judicial finding regarding the nature of property as self-acquired operate as res judicata in subsequent litigation concerning the nature of the estate held by the successor?
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• Munshi Bar Kat Ali, Patwari vs Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore and others1990 SCMR 1469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-30
  service tribunaldismissal from servicetemporary embezzlementformal inquirypatwarileave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Patwari, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his service appeal by the Punjab Service Tribunal. He had been dismissed from service by the Assistant Commissioner on allegations of temporary embezzlement of government dues collected by him, which he failed to deposit in the treasury in a timely manner. His departmental appeals before the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue were unsuccessful. In the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that his dismissal was illegal because no formal inquiry was conducted during the departmental proceedings. The core legal question was whether the dispensing with a formal inquiry vitiated the dismissal proceedings under the circumstances. The Supreme Court held that in light of the petitioner's own statement and admission before the Naib-Tehsildar and his failure to abide by his undertaking to deposit the recovered amounts, there was sufficient basis for the competent authority to dispense with a formal inquiry. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that a formal departmental inquiry may be dispensed with where the accused's own admissions and uncontroverted conduct provide sufficient evidentiary basis for establishing the charge. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a formal inquiry is mandatory in departmental proceedings when the accused admits to the default?
  • Can the competent authority dispense with a formal inquiry in light of an admission made during a preliminary inquiry?
  • Whether delayed deposit of government dues constitutes temporary embezzlement warranting dismissal?
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• Munir Ahmad vs Punjab Service Tribunal and 2 others1990 SCMR 1005 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-25
  service tribunalleave to appealinterpolation in revenue recordquantum of penaltypast service recordfindings of factpatwaridismissal from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed by a dismissed Patwari challenging the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed his service appeal. The core legal questions involved whether concurrent findings of fact regarding tampering with revenue records could be interfered with, and whether pending enquiries could be considered while determining the quantum of penalty after establishing guilt. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact based on record examination and handwriting comparison by the Tribunal, confirming concurrent findings of lower authorities, are not open to challenge under Article 212(3). It further held that once a finding of guilty is recorded, past service record and pending enquiries can legitimately be reviewed to determine the appropriate penalty, provided they do not form the basis of the finding of guilt itself. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused, laying down the principle that factual determinations by the Service Tribunal are final and past service records are relevant for sentencing in disciplinary matters.

  Questions settled

  • Can findings of fact recorded by the Service Tribunal regarding tampering with revenue records be challenged in a petition under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Is it permissible to consider pending enquiries or past service records when determining the specific penalty to be imposed after a finding of guilt has been established?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by departmental authorities and the Service Tribunal?
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• Munir Ahmad vs Bara Khan1990 SCMR 973 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-25
  landlord and tenantsublettingestoppelRent Restriction Ordinanceejectmentcompetency of application
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that set aside an ejectment order against a respondent. The petitioner, himself a tenant of a plot, had sublet the property to the respondent in violation of his own tenancy agreement. Upon discovering this, the respondent attorned to the original owner. When the petitioner sought the respondent's eviction, the respondent denied the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. The High Court held that the petitioner did not meet the statutory definition of 'landlord' under the Rent Restriction Ordinance because he lacked authorization to sublet. The Supreme Court examined whether the estoppel principle under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872, applied. The Court held that while Section 116 generally prevents a tenant from denying a landlord's title, the special definitions within the Rent Restriction Ordinance prevail in proceedings under that special law. Because the petitioner was not authorized to sublet, he did not qualify as a 'landlord' under the Ordinance, rendering the eviction application incompetent. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act 1872 override the specific definitions of 'landlord' and 'tenant' provided in the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Can a tenant who sublets property without authorization maintain an eviction application against the sub-tenant under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Does a person who sublets property in violation of their own tenancy agreement qualify as a 'landlord' under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
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• Municipal Corporation, Faisalabad vs Atta Muhammad and others1990 SCMR 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-11
  octroi dutyoctroi limitsdefinition of useiron beamstemporary retentionre-exportpermanent injunctionmunicipal taxation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave arose out of a suit for permanent injunction filed by the respondents against the appellant, Municipal Corporation, Faisalabad. The respondents, who operated powerlooms outside the municipal octroi limits, regularly imported empty iron loom beams into the municipal limits to have cotton yarn re-wrapped onto them at a local mill before re-exporting the wrapped beams back to their looms. The core legal question was whether importing the empty iron beams into municipal limits solely for re-wrapping with yarn and subsequent re-export constituted an import for 'use' within the meaning of the West Pakistan Municipal Committees Octroi Rules, 1964, thereby attracting liability for octroi duty. Reversing the concurrent judgments of the trial court, appellate court, and the High Court, the Supreme Court held that the iron beams were brought into the octroi limits for 'use'. Relying on established precedent, the Court ruled that 'use' denotes utilization, employment, or application for a specific aim or purpose and is not limited to consumption or total transformation; subjecting articles to a processing operation such as re-filling or re-wrapping within municipal limits constitutes 'use' under the rules. The appeal was accordingly allowed, and the suit was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does importing empty iron beams into municipal octroi limits to be wrapped with yarn for subsequent re-export constitute an import for 'use' under the West Pakistan Municipal Committees Octroi Rules, 1964?
  • Whether subjecting imported goods to a processing or re-filling operation within municipal limits deprives the importer of exemption as mere temporary retention for export?
  • Is octroi duty leviable on articles that are repeatedly imported into municipal limits for a specific purpose even if they are not consumed or sold therein?
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• Munawar Shah vs The State1990 SCMR 1293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-25
  criminal appealocular evidencemotivemurder convictioneyewitness credibilityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner, Munawar Shah, for the murder of Muhammad Hamayun, which was upheld by the Peshawar High Court. The petitioner challenged the conviction, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged motive, that the failure to send medical swabs for chemical examination prejudiced his defense, and that discrepancies regarding the type of firearm used (gun versus Kalashnikov) undermined the credibility of the eyewitnesses. The Supreme Court addressed whether the failure to prove motive or minor discrepancies in witness testimony regarding the weapon type invalidates a conviction supported by strong ocular evidence. The Court held that the failure to prove a suggested motive does not inherently destroy a prosecution case, especially when independent eyewitness testimony is consistent and credible. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the failure to analyze medical swabs was immaterial absent a specific defense theory of an unnatural offense, and that lay witnesses cannot be expected to technically distinguish between firearms. Leave to appeal was refused, affirming the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to prove a suggested motive in a murder case automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can discrepancies in the description of a firearm by lay witnesses undermine the credibility of eyewitness testimony?
  • Does the failure to send medical swabs for chemical examination prejudice the defense if the defense does not allege an unnatural offense?
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• Mumtaz and another vs The State and 2 others1990 SCMR 1197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-17
  criminal petitionmurderenhancement of sentencesudden happeningimprisonment for lifeocular testimonyreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal petitions filed respectively by the convict-petitioner against his conviction for murder and by the complainant for enhancement of sentence. The convict Mumtaz was tried under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Ghulam Sarwar committed by firing an unlicensed gun following a dispute over the damaging of a water-course by a tractor. The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death, which the High Court subsequently altered on appeal to imprisonment for life, holding the incident to be a sudden happening. The core legal questions related to the sustainability of the conviction based on ocular testimony and weapon recovery, and whether the High Court was justified in reducing the sentence to imprisonment for life on the ground of a sudden occurrence. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was well-founded and that the High Court's finding of a sudden happening was neither a result of misreading of evidence nor perverse, declining to interfere with the alternate sentence. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily reappraise evidence to interfere with concurrent findings regarding suddenness of an occurrence where the alternate sentence is within jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's finding that an offence was the result of a sudden happening?
  • Is a single gun shot fired during a sudden dispute sufficient to warrant the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Can the Supreme Court reappraise evidence when the lower court's findings are shown not to be the result of misreading or perversity?
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• Mumtaz Ahmad and another vs Assistant Commissioner and anothers1990 PLD Supreme Court 1195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-17
  writ jurisdictionexhaustion of remediesMartial Law Regulation 115tenancy evictionIslamic injunctionsrepugnancyrevenue courts
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the High Court's dismissal of a Constitutional Petition filed by tenants seeking the annulment of pending eviction proceedings. The petitioners contended that the Supreme Court's judgment in Qazilbash Wakf v. Chief Land Commissioner (PLD 1990 SC 99) had declared Paragraph 25(1) of Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972 repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, thereby rendering the eviction proceedings ineffective. The Supreme Court observed that the previous judgment did not strike down the entirety of Paragraph 25(1), but only to the extent that it failed to give sanctity to valid contracts between landlords and tenants. The Court held that the petitioners had prematurely approached the High Court under its writ jurisdiction without exhausting the available remedies within the hierarchy of Revenue Forums. The Court emphasized that complex questions regarding the interaction of repealed provisions with other prevailing laws and the potential conversion of proceedings should first be adjudicated by the appropriate Revenue Courts. Consequently, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the petitioners failed to exhaust statutory remedies, rendering the writ petition premature.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction while proceedings are still pending before a special tribunal or revenue forum?
  • Does the declaration of a legal provision as repugnant to the injunctions of Islam under Article 203-D of the Constitution automatically invalidate the entirety of that provision?
  • Is it necessary for a party to exhaust all available remedies within the hierarchy of revenue forums before approaching the High Court for relief?
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• Mumrez Khan vs Muhammad Hussain and others1990 SCMR 1175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-18
  leave to appealintra-court appealland settlementallotment cancellationwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 30-11-1985, which dismissed the petitioner's Intra-Court Appeal. The underlying dispute relates to the cancellation and subsequent re-allotment of land originally confirmed in favor of the respondents' father, Ghulam Qadir, under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. After various administrative proceedings and an affidavit by the competing allottee disclaiming the land, the Additional Settlement Commissioner dismissed the respondents' application. However, a learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the respondents' writ petition, setting aside the Additional Settlement Commissioner's order and restoring the land to the respondents. A Division Bench subsequently dismissed the Intra-Court Appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the core legal question of whether the Intra-Court Appeal was competent or not, ordering security for costs and preparation of the appeal on the present record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Intra-Court Appeal was competent against the order of the learned Single Judge passed in the writ petition?
  • Can land cancelled from the name of an allottee be restored pursuant to instructions of the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  • What is the effect of an allottee's disavowal of an allotment during settlement proceedings?
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• Mulazim Hussain and 4 others vs Noor Muhammad1990 SCMR 436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-27
  inheritancefindings of factregular second appealfamily settlementleave to appealproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal challenging the dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal by the High Court regarding a dispute over inheritance and property shares between cousins whose fathers were brothers. The core legal question concerns whether interference by the Supreme Court is justified when concurrent findings of fact have been rendered against the petitioners by all lower courts regarding both the inheritance claim based on incurred expenditure and the alleged family settlement or partition. The Supreme Court held that the main controversy stands concluded by concurrent findings of fact, and no point of law justifying interference is involved. The ratio decidendi is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact on inheritance and property disputes where no substantial question of law or justification for leave to appeal is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a property and inheritance dispute?
  • Can a regular second appeal be maintained against concurrent findings of fact regarding inheritance shares?
  • Does an alleged family settlement or partition raise a question of law sufficient to justify leave to appeal when rejected by lower courts?
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• Muhammad Zubair vs The Commissioner, Lahore Division and others1990 SCMR 1254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-12
  service promotionzila councilsubordinate services rulesfactual controversyremandconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the promotion to the post of Assistant Superintendent Vaccination in Zila Council Kasur. The core legal question was whether the West Pakistan Health Department Vaccination Subordinate Services Rules, 1968 or the West Pakistan Local Councils and Municipal Committees Services Rules, 1963 governed the parties. Counsel for both parties conceded that the 1968 Rules had not been adopted by the concerned Zilla Council, rendering the 1963 Rules applicable. However, the Supreme Court found an unresolved factual controversy regarding whether the appointment constituted a promotion from a lower to a higher grade or a transfer between classes in the same grade. The Court held that the material on record was insufficient to determine this factual issue. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the judgments of the High Court and the Commissioner, and remanded the case to the Commissioner for a fresh decision in accordance with the applicable law. The key principle laid down is that unadopted subordinate rules do not govern local council service matters, and unresolved factual controversies regarding promotions necessitate a remand to the competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Do the West Pakistan Health Department Vaccination Subordinate Services Rules, 1968 govern employees of a Zilla Council without formal adoption?
  • What is the proper course of action when the record lacks sufficient material to resolve a factual controversy regarding promotion versus transfer?
  • Whether the Commissioner as an appellate authority correctly applied the 1968 Rules instead of the 1963 Rules?
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• Muhammad Zaman vs Mst. Sardar Begum1990 SCMR 990 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-15
  ejectmentrent defaultconcurrent findings of facttenancy disputesublettingleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for special leave to appeal filed by a tenant against concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Lahore High Court, which ordered his ejectment from a shop and a residential flat. The core legal questions involved whether the tenant had committed default in the payment of rent and whether the unauthorized conversion and subletting of the residential premises justified eviction. The Rent Controller found that the tenant failed to pay the agreed rent and breached the terms of the tenancy, leading to eviction orders. The High Court upheld these findings, noting the tenant's failure to prove payment or obtain court permission to deposit rent. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the matter was concluded by concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts. The Court affirmed that where a tenant fails to pay rent as agreed and fails to produce evidence of payment or valid deposit, the finding of default is legally sound. The judgment reinforces the principle that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts, absent legal defects, are generally not disturbed in appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant's failure to produce evidence of rent payment or court-authorized deposit constitute default justifying ejectment?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in rent control matters?
  • Does the unauthorized conversion of a residential flat into an office and subsequent subletting constitute valid grounds for eviction?
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• Muhammad Yousif and another vs Province of Sindh and others1990 SCMR 922 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-20
  civil suit maintainabilitysettlement authorityland allotment cancellationrepealed statutesleave to appealadministrative orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment which held that a civil suit challenging an order of a Settlement Authority was not maintainable. The petitioners had filed a suit for declaration and injunction, contending that the Settlement Authority's order cancelling their land allotment was void because it was issued after the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, by the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court's finding regarding the non-maintainability of the suit was prima facie unsustainable, citing established precedents which suggest that such challenges are cognizable by civil courts. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, confirmed the existing interim order, and directed that the appeal be prepared on the current record with liberty for parties to submit additional documents. The core principle affirmed is that civil courts retain jurisdiction to examine the validity of administrative orders passed by authorities under repealed statutes when such orders are challenged as void.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil suit maintainable to challenge an order passed by a Settlement Authority after the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Does the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 by the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, oust the jurisdiction of civil courts to declare orders passed thereunder as void?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs The State1990 SCMR 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-30
  public servantanti-corruptioncriminal misappropriationjurisdiction of special judgeacquittal applicationevidentiary trialAfghan Refugees Organization
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner’s application for acquittal under sections 249-A and 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner, charged under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, contended he was not a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and thus not triable by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption. The lower courts relied on certificates to determine his status. The Supreme Court observed that such status is a mixed question of law and fact that cannot be conclusively determined based solely on certificates produced by the parties. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders and directed the Special Judge to decide the issue of the petitioner's status as a public servant during the trial, after affording both parties a full opportunity to lead evidence. This ensures that the jurisdictional question is resolved through a proper evidentiary process rather than summary determination.

  Questions settled

  • Can the status of an accused as a public servant be determined solely on the basis of certificates without a full trial?
  • Is an employee of the Afghan Refugees Organization a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Should the question of jurisdiction based on the definition of a public servant be decided during the trial after evidence is led?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs Pakistan Ordnance Factories and another1990 SCMR 5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-17
  service tribunalback benefitsreinstatementcivil servantdismissal from serviceefficiency and discipline rulesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Service Tribunal which had set aside his dismissal from service on technical grounds while denying him back benefits and granting liberty to the department to hold a fresh inquiry. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal was justified in denying back benefits entirely upon setting aside a dismissal order on technical grounds when charges were not quashed. The Supreme Court held that since the dismissal order was set aside on technical grounds without quashing the charges, the Tribunal could properly defer regulating remuneration until the final disposal of the matter by the competent authority. The key principle laid down is that where a civil servant is reinstated due to procedural defects without the charges being quashed, the competent authority determines back benefits upon the final conclusion of the inquiry, and the Tribunal may lawfully withhold back benefits for the interim period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal can deny back benefits in entirety when setting aside a dismissal order on technical grounds without quashing the charges?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal take into consideration subsequent orders passed by the competent authority that were not before the Service Tribunal?
  • At what stage does the rule regarding remuneration of a reinstated civil servant get attracted under the civil service laws?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs Muhammad Bashir and others1990 SCMR 557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-05
  rent restrictionstriking off defencedeposit of rentrent controllerstatutory defaultleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant whose defence was struck off by the Rent Controller for failure to comply with a direction to deposit rent under Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The petitioner challenged the High Court's dismissal of his writ petition, arguing that the one-day delay in depositing the rent for March 1986 was caused by unavoidable circumstances, specifically his father's illness, and that a single instance of delay should not warrant the striking off of his defence. The Supreme Court addressed the legal question of whether the Rent Controller possesses discretion to condone a default in depositing rent as ordered under Section 13(6). The Court held that the Rent Controller lacks the discretion to condone such defaults, distinguishing this specific statutory obligation from other rent payment provisions. Consequently, the Court refused the leave to appeal, affirming that the failure to comply with the deposit order is a strict liability matter, and found no merit in the petitioner's plea regarding mitigating circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have the discretion to condone a default in the deposit of rent under Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Is a delay of one day in depositing rent under a Rent Controller's order sufficient to justify striking off a tenant's defence?
  • Are compelling personal circumstances a valid legal ground to excuse a failure to comply with a rent deposit order under Section 13(6)?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs Mst. Sharifan and another1990 SCMR 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-12
  petition for leave to appealremandsettlement authoritiesland allotmentfindings of factwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court Bahawalpur Bench, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging the orders of the settlement authorities. The core legal question concerns whether the Settlement Commissioner decided the case in accordance with the terms of remand previously laid down by the High Court regarding the allotment of disputed land measuring 40 kanals. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner substantially complied with the terms of remand and that the respondent had a superior right to the allotment as she was not allotted any other land. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact concurrently recorded by the High Court and settlement authorities regarding the compliance of remand terms will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court when supported by the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement Commissioner passed orders in accordance with the terms of remand?
  • Does a party have a superior right to land allotment if no other land was previously allotted to them?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the compliance of remand terms?
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• Muhammad Yousaf Qureshi vs The Province of Punjab and others1990 SCMR 538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-23
  departmental inquirydismissal from servicenatural justiceright to be heardservice lawleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal filed by a former Stamper in the District Treasury Office, Lahore, against the dismissal of his service following a significant financial defalcation. The petitioner challenged his dismissal, arguing that the departmental inquiry proceedings were conducted without his participation, thereby denying him a fair opportunity to defend himself. He contended that the Deputy Commissioner's reliance on the findings of an inquiry officer, to which the petitioner was not a party, violated fundamental principles of natural justice. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an order of dismissal based on inquiry proceedings conducted in the absence of the accused employee constitutes a violation of the principles of natural justice. Upon examination of the contention, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine the validity of the dismissal order. The Court recognized the necessity of examining whether the departmental process adhered to due process requirements, specifically the right to be heard and the right to defend oneself against allegations leading to termination of employment.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of dismissal based on inquiry findings where the accused was not a party violate the principles of natural justice?
  • Is an employee entitled to defend themselves in departmental inquiry proceedings before a dismissal order can be passed?
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• Muhammad Younus Khan and anothers vs Settlement Commissioner, Karachi and 3 others1990 SCMR 1164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-03
  evacuee propertyearmarkingtransfer of propertyconstitutional petitionres judicatasettlement lawsverified claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal concerning the entitlement to transfer of an evacuee property previously placed in earmarking and transferred to respondent No. 4. The core legal questions involved whether the appellants had a preferential right to the property as claimant occupants and whether previous adjudications regarding the non-filing of the C.H. Form and the nature of the property as a non-trust property operated as a bar. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that the prior findings of the High Court in earlier writ proceedings were conclusive and that the appellants' claims regarding priority and the status of the property stood finally settled against them. The Court laid down that questions of fact and entitlement conclusively determined in earlier rounds of litigation between the same parties cannot be reopened or re-litigated through subsequent collateral proceedings in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether findings of fact recorded in earlier writ proceedings operate as a bar to re-agitating the same questions in subsequent litigation?
  • Can claimant occupants reopen the issue of preferential entitlement to an evacuee property after the issuance of a Provisional Transfer Order to another transferee?
  • Does an unsuccessful challenge to the transfer of an evacuee property in earlier rounds of litigation preclude a subsequent collateral challenge?
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• Muhammad Younus and others vs Muneer Ahmad and others1990 SCMR 498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-04
  leave to appealcriminal revisionprivate complaintdismissal of complaintadditional sessions judgeinherent powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a criminal revision against an order of the Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question concerns the competency of a revision petition filed under Section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against an order of a Magistrate dismissing a private complaint under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether such an order is revisable under Section 436 or Section 439-A of the Code. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the powers of the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court merit detailed examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, stayed the proceedings before the trial court, and set the appeal for hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order dismissing a private complaint under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is revisable under Section 436 or Section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an Additional Sessions Judge direct a Magistrate to make a further probe into a matter upon setting aside an order of dismissal?
  • Whether the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when a revision is barred as a second revision?
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• Muhammad Younas and another vs The State and others1990 SCMR 1272 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-30
  murderocular evidencemedical evidenceinterested witnessacquittalleave to appeallalkara
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered two petitions for leave to appeal: one by the convict Muhammad Younas against his conviction and death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and another by the complainant Abdul Rehman against the acquittal of two co-accused. The prosecution alleged that the convict shot the deceased to avenge a previous murder, while the co-accused merely fired in the air and raised a 'Lalkara'. The convict argued that the eye-witnesses were interested relatives and that medical evidence conflicted with ocular testimony regarding the number of gunshots. The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions. It held that the presence of the eye-witnesses was established and minor discrepancies in time did not invalidate their testimony. Furthermore, the Court ruled that ocular evidence accepted by the courts is not automatically overridden by conflicting medical expert opinions. The acquittal of the co-accused was upheld as their roles were distinguishable and lacked corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eye-witnesses must be discarded solely because they are related to the deceased?
  • Does medical expert evidence automatically override credible ocular testimony in case of a conflict?
  • Do minor discrepancies in the witnesses' estimation of the time of occurrence invalidate their testimony?
  • Can the acquittal of co-accused be maintained if their roles are distinguishable from the principal accused and lack corroborative evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasin and others vs Khan Muhammad and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 1060 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-07-18
  pre-emptionsuo motu reviewshariat appellate benchrepugnancy to injunctions of islamabatement of suitssupreme court rulesconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerns the true effect, scope, and legal validity of the Shariat Appellate Bench's judgments regarding the repugnancy of sections 15 and 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, to the Injunctions of Islam, specifically following its suo motu review. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent clarification and interpretation rendered by the Shariat Appellate Bench in its suo motu review hold the field, superseding earlier conflicting interpretations by larger benches, and that sections 15 and 30 ceased to have legal effect from 31-7-1986, thereby abating pending pre-emption suits lacking pre-existing decrees. The key principles laid down are that the Shariat Appellate Bench has inherent jurisdiction to clarify, explain, or review its judgments suo motu, and such suo motu reviews are not barred by restrictions applicable to second private review applications under the Supreme Court Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judgment delivered by the Shariat Appellate Bench in suo motu review override earlier interpretations rendered by larger Benches of the Supreme Court?
  • Is the Shariat Appellate Bench empowered to explain, clarify, or review its own previous orders?
  • Does Rule 9 of Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, bar the Supreme Court or its Shariat Appellate Bench from undertaking a suo motu review after a prior review application has been disposed of?
  • What is the legal effect of the Shariat Appellate Bench's judgment on sections 15 and 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, with effect from 31-7-1986?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yar vs Superintendent of Police and 2 others1990 SCMR 1442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-30
  service appeallimitationtime-barreddismissal from servicecivil servantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 8-7-1987, which had dismissed his service appeal against dismissal as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal correctly dismissed the appeal as barred by time without any application for extension of the limitation period. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal passed a correct order on the question of law and no further question of law arose for examination. The key principle laid down is that an appeal filed before the Service Tribunal beyond the prescribed period of limitation, without any formal application for claiming an extension of time, is rightly dismissed as time-barred, and incompetent departmental remedies do not extend the period of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal is liable to be dismissed if filed beyond the period of limitation without an application for extension of time?
  • Does the pursuit of an incompetent second departmental appeal extend the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yar and others vs Additional Chief Land Commissioner and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-15
  non-prosecutionrestoration of petitionAdvocate-on-Recordduty of counseldismissal for defaultprofessional negligence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a miscellaneous application filed for the restoration of a Civil Review Petition that was previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The petitioners sought restoration, citing the absence of their counsel due to a lack of telephonic communication at his office in Multan. The Supreme Court examined the circumstances surrounding the dismissal, noting that neither the petitioners, the Advocate-on-Record (A.O.R.), nor the Advocate were present on the date of the hearing. The Court held that the absence of the A.O.R. and the Advocate, which hindered the progress of the proceedings, constituted non-prosecution. The Court rejected the argument that the lack of a telephone connection excused the counsel's absence, emphasizing that lawyers practicing before the Supreme Court must ensure they have adequate arrangements to remain informed of case progress. The Court affirmed that non-prosecution includes any act of omission or commission that thwarts the progress of a hearing. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for restoration, finding the grounds offered insufficient to justify the failure to prosecute the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of an Advocate-on-Record and an Advocate constitute non-prosecution of a case?
  • Can a lack of telephonic communication be accepted as a valid ground for the restoration of a petition dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • What constitutes non-prosecution in the context of Supreme Court proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob vs The Punjab Labour Court No. 1 and 5 others--1990 SCMR 1539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-01
  work-charge establishmentpermanent workmantermination of servicelabour disputeconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which had declined to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with an appellate court's decision reversing a Labour Court's order. The petitioner, employed as a Mate Mali on a work-charge basis for eight years by the Lahore Development Authority, challenged his oral termination. The core legal question was whether the length of employment on a work-charge basis automatically qualifies an employee as a permanent workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan refused leave to appeal, holding that a permanent workman is defined by reference to the nature of the work on which he is engaged, rather than the duration of his employment. The Court laid down the principle that if the underlying work is not of a permanent nature, an employee cannot be classified as a permanent workman, regardless of how long the period of employment may have lasted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the length of employment by itself determine whether an employee is a permanent workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance?
  • Can a work-charge employee be classified as a permanent workman if the nature of the work they are engaged in is not of a permanent character?
  • Whether an oral termination of a work-charge employee can be successfully challenged as a permanent workman solely based on eight years of service?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaq00b vs The State1990 SCMR 343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-30
  bail pending trialmurderself-defenceprejudice to trialassessment of evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the Baluchistan High Court's dismissal of a bail application in a murder case involving charges under Sections 302 and 353 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, accused of murdering a traffic sergeant, sought bail on the grounds of self-defence. The High Court rejected the bail application, noting that six eyewitnesses supported the prosecution's version and that there was no evidence of a lethal weapon in the deceased's possession, while simultaneously acknowledging that a deeper assessment of evidence at the bail stage would be premature and could prejudice the trial court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner requested clarification that the High Court's observations would not prejudice the trial court's eventual determination of the case. The Supreme Court held that such clarification was unnecessary, as the High Court's observations were clearly not intended to influence the merits of the trial, and the High Court had correctly recognized its own limitations regarding the assessment of evidence at the bail stage. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn.

  Questions settled

  • Does an observation by a High Court regarding evidence at the bail stage bind or prejudice the trial court?
  • Is it appropriate for a High Court to conduct a detailed assessment of evidence during bail proceedings?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed as withdrawn if the petitioner seeks clarification on observations made by the lower court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yakoob vs Saleem Akhtar1990 SCMR 745 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-08
  ejectmentpersonal and bona fide requirementreappraisal of evidencefinding of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the High Court, which had reversed the Rent Controller's findings and ordered the ejectment of the petitioner-tenant on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement of the disputed premises by the respondent-landlord. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in reversing the factual finding of the Rent Controller regarding personal bona fide need upon reappraisal of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the finding recorded by the High Court on the issue of personal requirement was based on a reappraisal of evidence and constituted a pure finding of fact, raising no question of law. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact rendered by the High Court on the question of personal requirement based on evidence do not warrant interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of any substantial question of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a finding on the issue of personal requirement of premises based on a reappraisal of evidence constitute a question of fact?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's factual finding regarding personal bona fide requirement when no question of law arises?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Wasim Warsi and others vs Shamsuddin Shah and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 851 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service tribunalpromotion quotaseniority listcustoms departmentdepartmental promotion committeecivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from leave granted under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to examine whether the Service Tribunal correctly set aside the promotion of the appellants by reference to an outdated seniority list. The core legal question concerned the validity of selections made by the Departmental Promotion Committee based on a functional quota policy across multiple wings of the Customs Department, as opposed to a unified seniority list. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred by failing to examine the Departmental Promotion Committee's record, by invalidating matters not under challenge, and by ignoring the established policy of quota-based promotions across different departmental wings. The Court laid down the principle that promotion quotas determined on the basis of sanctioned cadre strength and approved by competent authorities take precedence over general or outdated combined seniority lists, and that service tribunals cannot substitute lawful administrative promotion policies with abstract notions of equity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Service Tribunal can set aside departmental promotions without examining the record of the Departmental Promotion Committee?
  • Does a combined seniority list override a functional quota policy adopted for promotions across different wings of a department?
  • Can a Service Tribunal invalidate past promotion and seniority orders that were not challenged in the appeal before it?
  • Whether equitable considerations can transcend applicable administrative rules and promotion policies in civil service matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Umar Mtrza vs Waris Iqbal and others1990 SCMR 964 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-18
  documentary evidencelate production of documentsOrder XIII Rule 2 CPCcivil procedureprejudice to partyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from a suit for possession of properties and cancellation of a partition deed, where the petitioner sought leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of his revision petition. The trial court had refused to allow the petitioner to introduce approximately eighty documents into evidence at the stage of recording his evidence, on the ground that the documents were neither produced nor relied upon earlier, and their late introduction would prejudice the respondents. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined Order XIII, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, which bars the subsequent production of documentary evidence unless satisfactory cause is shown for its non-production at the first hearing. The Court held that while the rule is to be construed liberally, the petitioner failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Furthermore, the trial court's finding of prejudice to the opposite party justified the exclusion. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not act arbitrarily or violate any legal principle, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can documentary evidence in the possession of a party be received at a subsequent stage of a suit if it was not produced at the first hearing?
  • What constitutes sufficient cause under Order XIII, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code for the late production of documents?
  • Does the potential prejudice to the opposing party justify a trial court's refusal to admit late-filed documents under the Civil Procedure Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tufail vs Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division, Lahore1990 SCMR 1708 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-09
  service lawback benefitsreinstatementextraordinary leavedepartmental enquiryService Tribunaldiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a grant of leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal, after setting aside an order of dismissal against a civil servant, possessed the discretion to deny him back benefits, specifically by treating the period of absence as extraordinary leave without pay. The appellant contended that since the dismissal was set aside, he was entitled to full back benefits. The Supreme Court held that under Section 16 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, the authority setting aside an order of dismissal has the power to determine the entitlement to arrears of pay. The Court further observed that the Tribunal had applied an overly lenient standard of proof ('beyond reasonable doubt') in the departmental enquiry, and in that context, the Tribunal acted within its lawful discretion to deny back benefits. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Tribunal's authority to exercise discretion regarding back benefits upon reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have the discretion to deny back benefits when setting aside an order of dismissal?
  • What is the scope of the authority to determine arrears of pay under Section 16 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
  • Can a Service Tribunal treat the period between dismissal and reinstatement as extraordinary leave without pay?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tufail and others vs Muhammad Ikhtiar Khan and others1990 SCMR 1034 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-30
  pre-emptionPattisub-division of estatepreferential righthomogeneity of descentrevenue estate
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a revisional order of the Lahore High Court, which set aside a pre-emption decree previously granted in favour of the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the petitioner possessed a preferential right of pre-emption based on ownership of land within a specific 'Patti' (sub-division) of a village, where the vendee owned land in a different 'Patti' of the same estate. The petitioner argued that ownership within a Patti constitutes a sub-division for the purposes of pre-emption. The Supreme Court, relying on established precedents including Wazir Din v. Hidayat and Yaqoob Ali v. Ch. Muhammad Sultan, upheld the High Court's decision. The Court held that for a Patti to qualify as a distinct sub-division under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, it must demonstrate homogeneity of descent and area, rather than merely serving fiscal purposes. Finding the trend of judicial authority consistent and against the petitioner's interpretation, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the mere existence of separate Pattis for revenue purposes does not automatically satisfy the requirements for pre-emption.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of separate Pattis in a village for fiscal purposes automatically constitute distinct sub-divisions for the purposes of the Punjab Pre-emption Act?
  • What criteria must be met for a Patti to be considered a distinct sub-division under the Punjab Pre-emption Act?
  • Is ownership of land in a separate Patti sufficient to establish a preferential right of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tahir vs Abdul Latif and 5 others1990 SCMR 751 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-03
  subsequent cause of actionpendente litebar of subsequent suitamendment of plaintdismissal for non-prosecutionres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court examines whether the appellant's third civil suit was barred under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure or by the dismissal of the first suit under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The factual matrix involves multiple suits filed regarding property alterations, construction of a staircase, and disputed municipal building plans. The Supreme Court observed that the third suit was based on subsequent events and fresh causes of action that arose after the institution of the first suit, specifically regarding new constructions and walls raised in excess of the sanctioned plan during the pendency of the earlier litigation. The Court held that a plaintiff is not under a legal compulsion to amend an existing plaint to incorporate subsequent causes of action arising pendente lite and is legally competent to institute a fresh suit on such subsequent grounds. Consequently, the Court set aside the judgments of the lower courts which had barred the suit, allowed the appeal, and remanded the matter to the trial court for a decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff is bound to amend an existing plaint to include a cause of action that arises during the pendency of a suit?
  • Does the institution of a subsequent suit on a cause of action arising after the filing of the first suit attract the bar under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a plaintiff be penalized for filing a fresh suit on a subsequent cause of action instead of amending the plaint in a pending suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Suleman vs Mst. Aziz Begum1990 SCMR 306 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-10
  civil suitexchange deedleave to appealmoulding of reliefprocedural technicalitycancellation of deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent findings of the lower courts, which dismissed the petitioner's civil suit seeking the cancellation of an exchange deed. The core legal question addressed is whether a court may refuse to grant relief in a civil suit solely on the technical ground that a formal declaration was not explicitly sought in the plaint, despite the underlying facts supporting the claim. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the absence of a specific prayer for declaration does not preclude the court from granting appropriate relief. The Court affirmed that it possesses the inherent power to mould the relief according to the circumstances of the case, allowing it to declare an exchange deed ineffective, void, and illegal, and to consider alternative prayers such as the possession of land. The key principle laid down is that procedural technicalities, such as the omission of a specific prayer for declaration, should not defeat the ends of justice when the court has the authority to grant effective relief based on the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant relief in a civil suit even if a specific declaration was not formally prayed for in the plaint?
  • Does the absence of a specific prayer for declaration justify the dismissal of a suit when the facts support the claim?
  • Is the court empowered to mould relief in civil proceedings to ensure justice is served?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique vs The State and another1990 SCMR 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-20
  leave to appealacquittalappreciation of evidencemisreading of evidenceocular evidencemedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had acquitted the respondent of a death sentence by setting aside his conviction. The petitioner challenged the High Court's findings, specifically arguing that the court erred in concluding that prosecution witnesses had not witnessed the occurrence merely because they failed to intervene during the incident. The Supreme Court examined the petitioner's contentions regarding the appreciation of evidence and the alleged conflict between the ocular account and medical evidence. The Court held that the appreciation of evidence falls exclusively within the domain of the High Court. Finding no instance of misreading or non-reading of evidence by the High Court, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the acquittal. The petition was dismissed, reaffirming the principle that the Supreme Court will not reappraise evidence in the absence of a demonstrated error such as misreading or non-reading of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of prosecution witnesses to intervene during a criminal occurrence automatically render their testimony unreliable?
  • Is the appreciation of evidence exclusively the domain of the High Court in criminal appeals?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court reappraise evidence in a criminal case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddiq and anotherPtitioners vs Abdul Rashid and others1990 SCMR 1015 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-16
  concurrent findings of factencroachmentcivil revisionproperty disputeleave to appealmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a civil suit filed by the respondents, heirs of a property transferee, against the petitioners, who had acquired adjacent property. The respondents alleged that the petitioners had encroached upon 2-1/2 Marlas of land belonging to the respondents' predecessor. The trial court, after evaluating the evidence, decreed the suit in favor of the respondents. This decision was subsequently upheld by the Additional District Judge upon appeal, and the High Court dismissed the petitioners' civil revision in limine. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the encroachment, established by three lower courts, warranted interference by the apex court, particularly given the petitioners' argument that equal transfer prices for both properties implied equal land area. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of fact were based on evidence and free from any misreading. The Court affirmed the principle that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts, which are not shown to suffer from misreading of evidence, do not warrant interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of a substantial question of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a concurrent finding of fact by three lower courts warrant interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of a misreading of evidence?
  • Is an argument regarding the equality of transfer prices sufficient to overturn concurrent findings of fact regarding land encroachment?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddioue vs Mobeen Ahmad and others1990 SCMR 624 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-02
  residual propertyundisposed of propertyjurisdictional factejectmenttenancytransfer of propertyconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that resolved disputes regarding the ejectment of a tenant and the status of property as 'undisposed of' under settlement laws. The petitioner, a tenant of the respondents, sought to claim a portion of the shop as 'undisposed of' property, alleging he had amalgamated it with his tenancy after acquiring it from a third party. The Administrator (Residual Property) had initially accepted this claim. The High Court, however, set aside this order, finding that the entire property had been validly transferred to the respondents years prior, leaving no portion available for further transfer. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, affirming that the Administrator lacked jurisdiction because the property was not 'available' for transfer. The Court held that when property has been fully disposed of through valid transfer orders and rent apportionment, the Administrator cannot retrospectively declare portions as 'undisposed of' based on later structural changes. Furthermore, a tenant cannot unilaterally amalgamate rented property with other portions without the landlord's permission to create a new claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Administrator (Residual Property) have jurisdiction to declare property as 'undisposed of' if the property has already been fully transferred to others?
  • Can a finding on a jurisdictional fact by the Administrator (Residual Property) be scrutinized under the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Can a tenant unilaterally amalgamate a portion of rented property with another portion to create a claim for transfer as 'undisposed of' property?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs The State1990 SCMR 570 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-25
  leave to appealappreciation of evidencecriminal appealmurder convictionreappraisal of evidencefalse implication
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by Muhammad Sharif, who, along with two co-accused, Shaukat Ali and Riasat Ali, was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Abdul Jabbar, which occurred on July 1, 1981, at the Rahwali Railway Station. The trial court's conviction and sentence were subsequently upheld by the Lahore High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that he had been falsely implicated due to his relationship with the co-accused and that his participation in the alleged occurrence was doubtful. The Supreme Court declined to interfere, holding that the arguments raised by the petitioner pertained to the appreciation of evidence, a task already performed by the High Court. The Court affirmed that it would not reappraise the evidence in the absence of any demonstrated error of law or fact requiring examination. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court reappraise evidence in a criminal appeal where the High Court has already evaluated it?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere in a conviction based on factual disputes regarding the participation of an accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and others vs Administrator Thal Bhakkar1990 SCMR 107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-22
  civil court jurisdictionex-parte decreede novo trialquestion of law for the first timeallotment cancellationThal Development Authoritysupreme court discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a long-standing property dispute concerning the dispossession of the original allottee of land in 1957 by the Thal Development Authority. The allottee's successors filed a civil suit in 1965, subsequently refiled in 1967, and obtained an ex-parte decree in 1972. Upon an application by one respondent, the ex-parte decree was set aside as a whole, leading to a de novo trial which resulted in the dismissal of the suit. Subsequent appeals before the District Court and the Lahore High Court were dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the appellants attempted to raise a fresh legal question regarding the retrospective bar of civil court jurisdiction under Ordinance XIX of 1975. The Supreme Court held that while a pure question of law concerning the competency of a court can theoretically be raised for the first time before the apex court, such permission is discretionary. Given the extreme delay of over three decades in pursuing the litigation and the fact that remitting the matter would protract proceedings further, permission was declined. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pure question of law regarding the competency of a court be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • What is the legal effect of setting aside an ex-parte decree against one defendant on the decree passed as a whole?
  • Whether the jurisdiction of civil courts was barred with retrospective effect by the Thal Development (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance 1975?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and anothers vs The State1990 SCMR 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-30
  culpable homicidesudden fightgrave and sudden provocationException IVmurder convictionmitigation of sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants for murder and attempted murder. The core legal question was whether the appellants were entitled to the benefit of Exception IV to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, based on the High Court's observation that the incident involved a sudden flare-up following an exchange of abuses. The Supreme Court held that the appellants were not entitled to this exception. The Court reasoned that Exception IV requires a 'fight' or 'quarrel' beyond a mere exchange of abuses, and that the incident must be sudden and without undue advantage taken by the assailants. In this case, the attack was one-sided, involved lethal weapons, and targeted individuals who were not participants in the initial dispute. The Court affirmed the convictions but upheld the High Court's decision to grant the lesser sentence. The key principle laid down is that a mere exchange of abuses does not constitute a 'fight' or 'quarrel' under Exception IV to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which requires active, mutual combat without undue advantage.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mere exchange of abuses constitute a 'fight' or 'quarrel' sufficient to invoke Exception IV to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What are the essential elements required to bring a case within the ambit of Exception IV to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can an attack be considered a 'sudden fight' under Exception IV to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, if the assailants use lethal weapons against unarmed victims who did not participate in the initial dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and another vs Asghar and others1990 SCMR 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  leave to appealquantum of sentencecompensationcriminal appealinterim custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had partially allowed an appeal and dismissed a revision petition. The petitioners challenged the High Court's decision, specifically contending that the court failed to properly appreciate the quantum of sentence and compensation awarded in the case. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan found merit in the petitioners' submission regarding the assessment of the sentence. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, strictly limiting the scope of the proceedings to examine the question of the sentence. Furthermore, the Court issued specific interim directions regarding the custody of the respondents, ordering that one respondent currently incarcerated remain in jail until the final disposal of the appeal, while directing the issuance of bailable warrants for the remaining respondents. The Court also noted the familial relationship between the parties and granted them liberty to file an application should they reach a mutual settlement concerning the compensation amount.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal limited solely to the question of sentence?
  • Is a respondent in custody entitled to release pending the final disposal of an appeal where leave has been granted?
  • Are parties permitted to settle the issue of compensation during the pendency of an appeal before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and 3 others vs Mst. Ghulam Zohra and 3 others1990 SCMR 543 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-03
  consolidation of holdingswrit jurisdictionleave to appealboard of revenueland distribution
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their writ petition by the High Court, which had declined to interfere in a consolidation of holdings matter regarding the withdrawal of two khasras from their allotments. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly refused to exercise its constitutional writ jurisdiction in land distribution matters arising from consolidation proceedings, and whether the Board of Revenue's decision upholding the lower authorities' orders was sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the distribution of land is not a matter for the High Court to consider under writ jurisdiction and that the Board of Revenue had rightly applied its mind to the merits of the case. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the High Court will not interfere with the distribution of land in consolidation matters through writ jurisdiction, and concurrent findings on merits by revenue authorities will not be disturbed unless suffering from jurisdictional defects.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with the distribution of land in consolidation matters under writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of revenue authorities in consolidation proceedings where no jurisdictional defect is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shakil vs The State1990 PLD Supreme Court 686 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-27
  criminal convictionseparate trialjudicial noticeprohibition enforcementevidence actfair trialcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for the possession of heroin. The trial court and the High Court had relied significantly on the record and findings from a separate, independent trial of a co-arrested minor, Munir Ahmad, to establish the appellant's guilt. The core legal question was whether a criminal court may lawfully convict an accused person by relying upon the evidence, findings, or judicial record of a separate trial involving a different accused. The Supreme Court held that this approach is legally unsustainable. It established the principle that every criminal case must be decided strictly on its own record, independent of the proceedings of other cases. The Court ruled that a judgment in a separate trial cannot be used to prove facts against an accused who was not a party to that proceeding, as doing so violates fundamental principles of criminal justice. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, as the prosecution failed to establish the appellant's guilt through independent evidence presented within the appellant's own trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court convict an accused person based on the findings or record of a separate trial involving a different accused?
  • Is it permissible for a trial court to take judicial notice of the evidence and judgment from a separate, unrelated criminal case to determine the guilt of an accused?
  • Does the conviction of an accused in a separate trial constitute admissible evidence in the trial of another person not charged as a co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahzada alias Shada and others vs The State and others1990 SCMR 252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-10
  murdercriminal appealdying declarationapprover testimonybenefit of doubteye-witness credibilityacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the Lahore High Court’s judgment upholding the appellants' convictions for murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution’s evidence—comprising an alleged oral dying declaration, an approver’s testimony, and an eye-witness account—was sufficient to prove the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and acquitted the appellants. The Court held that the prosecution case was riddled with material contradictions, rendering the evidence unreliable. Specifically, the Court found the oral dying declaration doubtful due to inconsistencies with other testimonies. Furthermore, the eye-witness’s delayed appearance, coupled with the fact that other witnesses failed to mention his presence, indicated a fabrication of evidence. The Court also rejected the approver’s testimony due to internal contradictions and lack of corroboration. Ultimately, the Court established that when prosecution evidence is inconsistent and fails to explain the absence of physical evidence at the scene, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused, necessitating acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution's evidence, including the dying declaration and eye-witness testimony, contains material contradictions?
  • Is the testimony of an eye-witness who appears for the first time after a significant delay, without a plausible explanation, reliable?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to explain the absence of physical evidence at the crime scene entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shah and another vs The State1990 SCMR 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-14
  leave to appealforgeryhandwriting expertcriminal convictionanti-corruption
  Summary & questions settled

  The two petitioners, real brothers along with others, were tried and convicted under sections 468, 471, and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption. On appeal, the High Court upheld their convictions but reduced the substantive sentences of imprisonment to the period already undergone while maintaining the fine. The petitioners sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The prosecution alleged that a power of attorney was forged to collect compensation cheques awarded for land acquisition, and the petitioners were involved in the forgery, identification, and encashment of the cheques. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal for Muhammad Amir Shah as evidence showed he withdrew the money from the bank. However, regarding Muhammad Shah, whose conviction was based entirely on the opinion of a handwriting expert, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether it is safe to rely solely on such an opinion for a criminal conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether it is safe to rely entirely upon the opinion of a handwriting expert to sustain a criminal conviction on a serious charge?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted when a conviction is based solely on disputed expert testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shah and 3 others vs The Government of Pakistan through Collector Rahimyar Khan1990 SCMR 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-07
  state land allotmentAbadkari conditionsBoard of Revenuewithdrawal of appealcause of actionadministrative policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the allotment of state land on Abadkari conditions. The core legal question addressed was whether the petitioners could withdraw their appeal in light of a specific administrative clarification issued by the Board of Revenue, Punjab, which offered a pathway for regularization of land allotments for those willing to withdraw pending civil litigation. The Court permitted the petitioners to withdraw their petition for leave to appeal, noting that the administrative communication provided a clear mechanism for the petitioners to pursue their claims. The Court held that the petitioners' apprehension regarding the potential lack of future remedy was unfounded, as any subsequent refusal by the authorities to honor the terms of the Board of Revenue's communication would constitute a fresh cause of action. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the petitioners could seek appropriate legal remedies, including writ jurisdiction, should their grievances persist after attempting to resolve the matter through the administrative process outlined in the Board of Revenue's letter.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of a petition for leave to appeal preclude a party from seeking future legal remedies if an administrative offer is subsequently refused?
  • Can a fresh cause of action arise from an administrative refusal to implement a previously issued policy directive regarding land allotment?
  • Is the writ jurisdiction of the High Court available to a party aggrieved by an administrative authority's failure to adhere to its own stated policy on land regularization?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafiq vs Capital Development Authority through its1990 SCMR 521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-05
  leave to appeallocus standiconstitution petitioncapital development authoritysanctioned scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Shafiq against the Capital Development Authority. The core legal questions examined by the Court include whether the petitioner possessed the requisite locus standi to maintain a Constitution Petition in light of the precedent established in Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, and whether the sanction granted to the respondents violated the approved scheme, established practice, and policy of the Capital Development Authority given that the sanctioned scheme was not altered. The Court granted leave to appeal to consider these questions, ordered security of Rs. 5,000, directed that the appeal be heard on the existing record with liberty to file additional documents, and declined to grant any interim relief while laying down directions for summoning any necessary record from the Capital Development Authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the petitioner had the locus standi to successfully maintain the Constitution Petition in view of the decision in Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust?
  • Was the sanction granted to the respondents in violation of the Scheme and the established practice and policy of the Capital Development Authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shabbir vs Government of the Punjab and 18 others1990 SCMR 533 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-04
  service tribunalseniorityapprobate and reprobatecivil servantspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal rejecting the petitioner's claim to seniority from an anterior date. The petitioner had previously been removed from service under Section 11-A of the Punjab Service Act, 1974, but successfully avoided its application by successfully contending before the Tribunal that he was to be treated as a fresh appointee with effect from a date outside the statutory period, resulting in his reinstatement. Subsequently, the petitioner claimed seniority based on regular appointment from an earlier date. The core legal question is whether a civil servant, having successfully avoided the application of Section 11-A of the Punjab Service Act, 1974 by claiming appointment from a later date, can subsequently claim seniority from an earlier date. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not approbate and reprobate by taking inconsistent stances regarding his date of appointment for different service benefits. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing the principle that a litigant cannot blow hot and cold by adopting mutually contradictory positions in service matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant who avoids removal under Section 11-A of the Punjab Service Act, 1974 by claiming a later appointment date can subsequently claim seniority from an earlier date?
  • Is a civil servant permitted to take contradictory stances regarding the effective date of his appointment for different service benefits?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shabbir Hussain vs The State1990 SCMR 205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-10
  criminal breach of trustmisappropriationhearsay evidenceentrustment of moneyanti-corruptionacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant, a bus conductor, under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act for alleged criminal breach of trust regarding misappropriation of bus fares. The core legal question was whether there was sufficient evidence of actual entrustment and receipt of money by the appellant. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, holding that the prosecution's case rested entirely on hearsay evidence as none of the passengers or the helper were produced at trial, and the raiding officers' testimony admitted fatal flaws. The Court laid down the principle that a criminal conviction for misappropriation cannot be sustained when the foundational evidence of entrustment and receipt of funds is based on uncorroborated hearsay and lacks direct proof from affected parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction under section 409 Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be sustained when the evidence of fare entrustment and misappropriation is based entirely on hearsay?
  • Is the non-production of direct witnesses, such as passengers or helpers, fatal to the prosecution's case in a charge of criminal breach of trust against a transport conductor?
  • Whether the testimony of raiding ticket examiners alone is sufficient to prove actual receipt of money without corroboration from the persons who allegedly paid the fare?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sarwar vs Khudadad and another1990 SCMR 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-20
  murderacquittalappraisal of evidenceprivate defenceocular testimonycriminal petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby the respondent's conviction and death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of the deceased were set aside, and he was acquitted. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the conviction on grounds of unproven motive, discrepant recovery evidence, biased ocular testimony, and physical circumstances indicating that the incident occurred inside the respondent's house where he also sustained injuries. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's evaluation of the evidence and physical circumstances was based on sound reasons and warranted no interference. The key principle laid down is that where ocular testimony is partisan, motive is unproved, recoveries are discrepant, and physical circumstances strongly support the defense version of the occurrence taking place inside the accused's house with injuries sustained by the accused, acquittal by the appellate court will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of acquittal based on a proper evaluation of ocular testimony and physical circumstances?
  • Does the presence of injuries on the person of the accused inside his own house support the plea of self-defense?
  • Can partisan eye-witness testimony be relied upon without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem vs The State1990 SCMR 1142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-14
  bailsuccessive bail applicationforgerypower of attorneyleave to appealcriminal discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's bail application on the ground that no new ground had been agitated that was not available in the earlier application. A criminal case was registered against the petitioner under sections 419, 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with the allegation that he had forged a power of attorney. The Supreme Court heard the learned counsel and held that it was not a fit case for interference in the discretion exercised by the High Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. The key principle affirmed is that appellate interference with the discretionary refusal of bail by the High Court, particularly regarding successive bail applications lacking new grounds, is unwarranted unless proper justification is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's discretion in dismissing a successive bail application lacking new grounds?
  • Can a bail application be dismissed on the ground that no new ground has been agitated since the rejection of an earlier application?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem vs Superintendent of Police and another1990 SCMR 1454 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-29
  Service Tribunalsuo motu powersback benefitsreinstatementdismissal from servicepolice officer
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Sub-Inspector of Police dismissed for misconduct, was reinstated in service with back benefits by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police following his acquittal by a court of law, though with a modification treating the period out of service as leave of the kind due. Subsequently, upon implementation, the period was treated as extraordinary leave without pay, prompting the petitioner to appeal to the Service Tribunal for full back benefits. The Service Tribunal not only refused back benefits but also suo motu set aside the reinstatement order and restored the original dismissal order passed by the Superintendent of Police. The petitioner sought leave to appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the Service Tribunal possessed the jurisdiction to suo motu set aside the reinstatement order while adjudicating an appeal solely concerning back benefits, and granted leave to appeal, holding that the matter required detailed examination while continuing the interim order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal has the jurisdiction suo motu to set aside an order of reinstatement while dealing with an appeal filed by a civil servant for the grant of back benefits?
  • Can the Service Tribunal restore an original dismissal order that was not challenged before it in an appeal concerning back benefits?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem Memon vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary1990 SCMR 1531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-01
  service matterdisciplinary actionremoval from servicecompetent authorityservice tribunalpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal concerning his removal from service for corruption. The petitioner, a former Civil Judge, challenged the disciplinary proceedings and his subsequent removal, primarily contending that the charge-sheet issued by the Acting Chief Justice was void ab initio as only the Chief Justice was the competent authorized officer under the relevant notification. The Supreme Court examined the arguments and noted that an identical prior petition raising the same question of law had been dismissed by the Court upon final hearing. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that there was no merit in the petition and refused to grant leave to appeal, thereby upholding the dismissal of the petitioner's service appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a charge-sheet issued by an Acting Chief Justice instead of the Chief Justice renders disciplinary proceedings void ab initio?
  • Can a civil judge dismissed for corruption challenge the disciplinary action successfully on the ground of competency of the authorized officer?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when an identical question of law was previously raised and dismissed by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saeed vs Mst. Sardar Begum and 4 others1990 SCMR 1176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-22
  leave to appealspecific performanceagreement to sellattestationexecution of documentsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a plaintiff's suit for specific performance and possession, which was initially decreed but subsequently reversed on appeal. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's Regular Second Appeal on the ground that the underlying agreement to sell was excluded from consideration due to the absence of valid attestation. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that while attestation prior to execution is improper, an agreement to sell does not legally require attestation by witnesses and is valid upon execution alone, relying on the Transfer of Property Act. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether an agreement to sell requires attestation to be legally enforceable and whether it can be relied upon solely on the basis of its execution.

  Questions settled

  • Is an agreement to sell required by law to be attested by witnesses to be legally enforceable?
  • Can an agreement to sell be read and relied upon as duly executed in the absence of valid attestation?
  • Does attestation of a document prior to its execution render the attestation invalid?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saeed and 7 others vs Muhammad Ayub and another1990 SCMR 475 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-07
  pre-emption suitjurisdictioncivil revisionacquiescenceres judicataleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court in a pre-emption suit. The petitioners, who were defendants in the original suit, initially challenged the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Their objection was overruled by the trial court, and a subsequent civil revision challenging that order was dismissed. The petitioners accepted the revisional order and did not challenge it further, proceeding to litigate the suit on its merits. After the trial court passed a decree against them, they unsuccessfully pursued a First Appeal before the District Court and a Regular Second Appeal before the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners sought to reagitate the issue of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioners had accepted the earlier revisional order regarding jurisdiction and proceeded with the trial, they were precluded from reopening the issue. The Court dismissed the petitions, establishing the principle that a party cannot acquiesce to an adverse interlocutory order on jurisdiction, participate in the trial on merits, and subsequently seek to challenge that same jurisdictional point after an unfavorable final decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party that has accepted an adverse revisional order regarding jurisdiction and proceeded to trial on the merits later challenge that same jurisdictional point?
  • Does the failure to challenge an interlocutory order on jurisdiction at the appropriate stage preclude a party from raising it in subsequent appeals?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saeed and 5 others vs Altaf Hussain and 3 others1990 SCMR 1141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-14
  petition for leave to appealdeclaratory suitagreement to sellconcurrent findings of factconsideration receiptHisadar ownershipdelivery of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' regular second appeal in limine. The petitioners' predecessor-in-interest had filed a declaratory suit asserting sole ownership and possession over suit land measuring 99 kanals 8 marlas, claiming to have purchased the 1/12th share of his sister, whose heirs were the respondents demanding their share of the produce. The primary legal issue was whether the petitioners proved the alleged sale agreement, payment of consideration, and delivery of possession so as to displace the respondents' ownership. The Supreme Court observed that all three lower forums had concurrently recorded findings of fact that the sale agreement, payment of consideration, and transfer of possession were not established, as no receipt was produced. The Court held that a mere revenue entry of Hisadar ownership does not disentitle co-owners from retaining their property rights. As the challenge pertained purely to concurrent findings of fact, leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mere revenue entry of Hisadar ownership disentitle co-sharers or their legal heirs from retaining ownership of property?
  • Can an agreement to sell be enforced without proving the payment of consideration or delivery of possession?
  • Will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal to interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by three lower courts in the absence of legal infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq vs The State1990 SCMR 577 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-01
  murderculpable homicideocular testimonymedical corroborationcompromiselesser sentenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner against his conviction and sentence concurrently recorded by the trial court and the High Court under Section 302/34 and Section 325/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of a female deceased and for causing hurt to her husband. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular testimony, corroboration by medical evidence and recovery, and the relevance of a compromise where a lesser sentence of life imprisonment was already awarded. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of guilt based on trustworthy eyewitness accounts, medical corroboration, and weapon recovery were well-founded and immune to interference, and noted that a compromise is immaterial when the accused has already received the lesser sentence. The court laid down that concurrent factual findings supported by reliable ocular and medical evidence will not be disturbed, and a compromise does not alter the sentence where the lesser penalty has already been imposed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts based on ocular testimony and medical evidence warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a compromise between the accused and the legal heirs hold relevance where the accused has already been awarded the lesser sentence of life imprisonment for murder?
  • Whether the testimony of injured and related prosecution witnesses can be relied upon without independent corroboration in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq and others vs Syed Ijaz Hussain Shah and others1990 SCMR 962 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-25
  settlement of propertyclaimant allotteedisplaced personsproperty divisionactual possessionintra-court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had modified a previous decision regarding the transfer of the 'Sohan Lal Building' in Lahore. The core legal question concerned the appropriate distribution of disputed property between two claimant allottees, both of whom were displaced persons. The property had been subject to protracted litigation involving multiple settlement authorities, with conflicting orders regarding whether the property was divisible or indivisible. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, which had directed that the property be divided between the parties according to their respective actual possession. The Court reasoned that the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners had consistently described the property as divisible, noting it contained separate staircases and independent sets. The Court affirmed that both parties, as claimant displaced persons, were entitled to the allotment of the specific portions they occupied. Finding no legal infirmity in the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, thereby confirming the division of the property based on practical occupation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether property containing separate staircases and independent sets should be treated as divisible for the purpose of allotment between claimant allottees?
  • Are claimant displaced persons entitled to the allotment of the specific portions of property they are in actual occupation of?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rifatullah Alvi vs Imran Ansari1990 PLD Supreme Court 369 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-03
  ejectmentpersonal uselandlord and tenantoccupation versus possessionSind Rented Premises Ordinancesummary evictionretiring landlord
  Summary & questions settled

  This landlord's appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court setting aside an eviction order granted under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The landlord sought eviction of the tenant from the ground floor as he was retiring within six months and required the premises for his personal use, having explained that the first floor was occupied by his married sister, handicapped brother, and unmarried sister. The core legal question was whether the occupation of the upper floor by the landlord's relatives, gratuitously, constituted 'occupation' by the landlord himself under subsection (2) of Section 14, thereby disqualifying him from seeking summary eviction. The Supreme Court held that 'occupation' denotes actual physical possession or immediate holding, distinct from mediate possession or ownership. The Court ruled that since the first floor was genuinely in the physical occupation of the landlord's relatives and not kept ready for the landlord's own habitation, the landlord was not in occupation of another building under Section 14(2). The appeal was accepted, and the Rent Controller's eviction order was restored, laying down the principle that gratuitous occupation by relatives does not equate to occupation by the landlord unless specifically maintained for his personal habitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the gratuitous occupation of a building by a landlord's relatives constitute 'occupation' by the landlord under subsection (2) of Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is there a distinction between the terms 'possession' and 'occupation' as used in the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does temporary stay by a landlord on a property occupied by his relatives during occasional visits amount to actual physical occupation of the premises?
  • Can a landlord seeking summary eviction under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, be disqualified solely because his relatives reside gratuitously on another property owned by him?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Riaz vs Ghulam Qadir and another1990 SCMR 1301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-05
  leave to appealmurdergrave and sudden provocationre-appraisal of evidencealteration of convictioncriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, brother of the deceased, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court which had set aside the respondent's conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code and altered it to one under Section 304, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code, reducing the sentence to the period already undergone. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in accepting the defence version of extreme sustained provocation based on the statements of the accused and his daughter. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no violation of law or principle in accepting the defence version on the evidence available, and declined to undertake a re-appraisal of evidence. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily re-appraise evidence in a criminal matter where the High Court has reasonably appreciated the evidence to find grave and sudden or sustained provocation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will re-appraise evidence to interfere with a High Court judgment altering a conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
  • Does acceptance of the defence version of sustained provocation by the High Court warrant interference when no principle of law is violated?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Riaz and others vs Fateh Muhammad and others1990 SCMR 1178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31
  pre-emptiontenancy rightsale-deeddistinct interestleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioners' revision petition by the High Court, upholding the lower courts' judgments in pre-emption suits. The petitioners, along with other respondents, had purchased agricultural land through a registered sale-deed wherein their share was stated as one-half and the others as the other half. The petitioners defended the pre-emption suits claiming a superior right as tenants of the land. The trial court, appellate court, and High Court concurrently held that by joining strangers in the purchase, the petitioners had lost their status as tenants and sunk to the level of non-tenants. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the sale-deed embodied two separate transactions, relying on Section 46 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 regarding distinct interests in a transfer. The Supreme Court found the contentions raised need examination and granted leave to appeal, confirming the status quo regarding possession.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant who joins non-tenants in purchasing land lose their superior pre-emption right?
  • Whether a sale-deed specifying separate shares and distinct contributions constitutes separate transactions for the purpose of pre-emption?
  • Does Section 46 of the Transfer of Property Act apply to determine distinct interests in a property transfer for consideration?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rashid and 2 others vs The State and others1990 SCMR 227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-25
  surety bondforfeiture of bondjoint and several liabilitybailnarcotics caseleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by sureties challenging a High Court order regarding the forfeiture and recovery of surety amounts in a narcotics case. The petitioners sought to challenge the forfeiture, arguing that the terms of the surety bonds implied only joint liability, which would limit their individual financial exposure. The core legal question was whether the language used in the surety bonds created joint or several liability for the sureties. Upon examination, the Court determined that the Urdu terminology used in the bonds translated to 'severally,' meaning each surety was independently liable for the full amount, in addition to being jointly liable. The Court found that the High Court had already exercised discretion by reducing the penalty amount from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 40,000 per surety. Finding no merit in the arguments for further leniency or a different interpretation of the bond terms, the Supreme Court refused the leave to appeal, affirming the principle that surety bonds can impose both joint and several liability.

  Questions settled

  • Does the use of specific terminology in a surety bond create joint or several liability for the sureties?
  • Can a surety be held independently liable for the full amount of a forfeited bail bond?
  • Is a surety entitled to leniency regarding the forfeiture amount if the High Court has already exercised discretion in reducing it?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Province of the Punjab and 3 others1990 SCMR 446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-11
  arbitration awardcontractor disputemisconduct of arbitratorleave to appealcivil contractappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding an arbitration award. The dispute arose from a construction contract between the petitioner-contractor and the respondent-Department concerning the installation of steel collapsible sliding gates. Following the completion of work, the matter was referred to an arbitrator, who allowed three of the petitioner's four claims but rejected claim No. 3. The petitioner challenged the rejection of this specific claim, alleging misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. The Supreme Court examined the record and the findings of the High Court. The Court held that the arbitrator's rejection of the specific claim did not constitute legal misconduct. Consequently, the Court found no error of law or question of public importance necessitating further examination. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the principle that an arbitrator's decision on specific claims, absent clear evidence of misconduct or legal error, remains binding and is not subject to interference by the appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rejection of a specific claim by an arbitrator constitute misconduct sufficient to set aside an award?
  • Is an arbitrator's finding on a disputed claim subject to judicial interference in the absence of an error of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique vs The State1990 SCMR 1125 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-06
  misappropriationcriminal breach of trustprevention of corruptionenhancement of sentencerevisional jurisdictionregistration feeappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Registration Moharrir, challenged an order of the Lahore High Court which, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, enhanced his sentence for misappropriation of government funds. The petitioner had been convicted by the trial court under the Prevention of Corruption Act for failing to deposit registration fees collected during his tenure. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction and the subsequent enhancement of the sentence by the High Court were justified based on the evidence presented. The Supreme Court reviewed the prosecution's evidence, including witness testimonies and the recovery of misappropriated funds from the petitioner's residence, and found the conviction to be sound. The Court upheld the conviction and the fine imposed but, considering the significant passage of time since the case was registered in 1976 and the period the petitioner had already spent in custody, exercised its discretion to reduce the substantive imprisonment sentence to the period already undergone. The principle affirmed is that where prosecution evidence comprehensively establishes guilt, concurrent findings of lower courts regarding conviction are not open to interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court reduce a substantive sentence to the period already undergone while maintaining a fine upon conviction for corruption?
  • Is a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 sustainable when the prosecution establishes the misappropriation of government funds through witness testimony and recovery of evidence?
  • Does the failure to produce every single witness who paid a registration fee create a presumption that the prosecution's case is unproven?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique vs The State (Copy)1990 SCMR 602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-11
  narcotics recoveryprohibition enforcementhostile witnessrevisional jurisdictionsentence enhancementpossession of heroincriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a Federal Shariat Court judgment that upheld the appellant's conviction under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, while enhancing his sentence in revisional jurisdiction. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of evidence for conviction when independent recovery witnesses turn hostile, and the propriety of enhancing a sentence without considering mitigating factors admitted by the prosecution. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, ruling that the testimony of a credible, impartial raiding officer can sustain a conviction even in the absence of independent corroboration. However, the Court set aside the enhanced sentence, restoring the trial court’s original punishment. The ratio establishes that while the gravity of a narcotics offense justifies severe punishment, appellate courts must weigh all evidence, including admissions by prosecution witnesses that favor the accused—such as the lack of evidence of smuggling or ownership—before exercising revisional powers to enhance sentences. Sentencing must remain proportionate to the specific role of the offender rather than relying solely on the nature of the contraband.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for narcotics possession be sustained based on the testimony of a raiding officer alone when independent witnesses turn hostile?
  • Does an appellate court, when exercising revisional jurisdiction to enhance a sentence, have a duty to consider mitigating admissions made by prosecution witnesses?
  • Is the possession of narcotics in a locked room within a private house sufficient to establish criminal liability under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique vs Nasrullah and others1990 SCMR 1196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-08
  sudden fightpremeditationindividual liabilityreappraisal of evidencecriminal appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal matter where the respondents were initially convicted by an Additional Sessions Judge under Section 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Muhammad Boota. Upon appeal, the Lahore High Court re-evaluated the evidence, concluding that the incident constituted a sudden fight without premeditation rather than a pre-planned attack. Consequently, the High Court modified the convictions, holding each accused liable only for their individual acts under Section 304, Part I, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, the deceased's nephew, challenged this finding in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the High Court's determination was well-founded in evidence, particularly noting that both parties were armed and injuries were sustained by both sides. The Court reiterated the principle that it does not normally undertake a reappraisal of evidence and that where a finding is reasonably supported by the record and conceded by counsel, no interference is warranted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court normally undertake a reappraisal of evidence in criminal appeals?
  • When can a court hold each accused liable for their individual acts rather than under vicarious liability?
  • Is a finding of a sudden fight without premeditation sufficient to warrant interference by the Supreme Court if it is supported by evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique and others vs The Border Area Committee, Lahore and 10 others1990 SCMR 817 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-18
  Border Area CommitteeMartial Law Regulation No. 9Evacuee propertyLand allotment cancellationUrban agricultural landRehabilitation Settlement SchemeJurisdiction of statutory bodies
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment concerning the cancellation of a land allotment by the Border Area Committee. The core legal question was whether the Border Area Committee possessed the jurisdiction to cancel allotments of urban agricultural land, given that the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme generally excluded urban land from its purview. The Supreme Court held that the Border Area Committee indeed possessed the requisite jurisdiction. The Court established the principle that Martial Law Regulation No. 9 conferred broad, overriding powers on the Border Area Committee to scrutinize allotments of all evacuee property within border areas. These powers were not constrained by the limitations or exclusions contained within the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, as the Regulation incorporated the Scheme's standards for scrutiny while subordinating its restrictive provisions. Consequently, the High Court’s initial finding that the Committee lacked jurisdiction over urban land was erroneous. As the appellants failed to demonstrate that the original allotment met the necessary criteria under the Border Area Scheme, the cancellation was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Border Area Committee have jurisdiction to cancel allotments of urban agricultural land under Martial Law Regulation No. 9?
  • Are the restrictions on urban land in the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme applicable to the scrutiny powers of the Border Area Committee?
  • Does Martial Law Regulation No. 9 override the limitations contained in the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme regarding the allotment of evacuee property?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq vs Ramzan and others1990 SCMR 655 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-12
  Had Barariconcurrent findingsencroachmentrevenue recordsleave to appealpossession of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns five petitions for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed his civil revisions regarding a dispute over possession of property. The petitioner claimed ownership and alleged that the respondents had forcibly and unauthorizedly constructed on his land. The trial court, after ordering a fresh 'Had Barari' (demarcation) by revenue officials, dismissed the suits, finding that the respondents were in occupation of their own areas and had not encroached upon the petitioner's land. The Additional District Judge dismissed the subsequent appeals, and the High Court dismissed the civil revisions in limine. The core legal question was whether the 'Had Barari' conducted by the revenue staff was procedurally flawed due to improper measurement techniques. The Supreme Court held that the revenue officials correctly utilized established 'Burjis' and revenue records to determine boundaries. Finding no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and refused leave to appeal, affirming the principle that concurrent findings of fact based on proper revenue records generally warrant no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding property boundaries made by lower courts based on revenue reports?
  • Is a 'Had Barari' report conducted by revenue officials valid if it relies on established 'Burjis' and existing Khasra numbers?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq vs Province of the Punjab and another1990 SCMR 1143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-29
  departmental proceedingspolice disciplineacquittal on benefit of doubtmisconductdismissal from serviceforgeryservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an ex-Constable of the Punjab Police, challenged his dismissal from service following disciplinary proceedings. He had been absent from duty for fifteen months and was subsequently prosecuted for forgery and cheating, leading to an initial conviction by a Special Judge, which was later set aside by the High Court on appeal, granting him the benefit of doubt. The petitioner argued that the Deputy Inspector General (D.I.-G.) dismissed his departmental appeal based on the erroneous assumption that his criminal conviction still stood. The Supreme Court examined the findings of the Service Tribunal, which had upheld the dismissal despite the acquittal. The Court held that the acquittal by the High Court, based on the benefit of doubt, did not automatically exonerate the petitioner from departmental misconduct. Furthermore, the evidence indicated the petitioner had fabricated documents to cover his unauthorized absence. The Court affirmed that the police force requires strict discipline, and an officer who wanders without reporting for duty is unfit for retention, regardless of the outcome of criminal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does an acquittal in criminal proceedings based on the benefit of doubt automatically invalidate a departmental dismissal order?
  • Can a departmental authority dismiss an employee for misconduct even if the employee has been acquitted of related criminal charges?
  • Is an order of a departmental appellate authority liable to be set aside if it relies on a criminal conviction that was subsequently overturned?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq vs Chief Administrator, Auqaf, Punjab and others1990 SCMR 471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-05
  service lawdismissal from serviceconstitutional petitionspecial leave to appealAuqaf Department
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Rafiq, an Ex-Qanoongo of the Auqaf Department, who was dismissed from service on 24 August 1982 for approving a faulty and fictitious survey report regarding a graveyard without proper verification. His departmental revision before the Secretary Auqaf and his subsequent constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court were both dismissed. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the dismissal order suffered from any error of law, breach of rules, or involved a question of public importance warranting interference. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's counsel was unable to point out any error of law, breach of rules, or refute the established charge, and no question of public importance was involved. Consequently, the Court declined leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent decisions below.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a public servant can be dismissed for approving an unverified survey report containing fictitious entries?
  • Does a petition against dismissal from service involving no error of law or public importance warrant leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq Khan vs Miraj Din and 4 others1990 SCMR 439 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-27
  specific performanceagreement to sellconcurrent findings of factleave to appealcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal seeking to challenge the concurrent dismissal of the petitioner's suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land by the trial court, appellate court, and revisional court. The core legal question is whether the authenticity of the disputed agreement to sell was established and whether any substantial question of law arose from the concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that the agreement to sell was not established as authentic and, finding no question of law involved against the concurrent findings of fact, refused leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the execution and authenticity of an agreement to sell where no substantial question of law is made out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the authenticity of an agreement to sell?
  • Is leave to appeal granted when no substantial point of law is involved in a suit for specific performance?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Qayyum vs Talib Hussain and 7 others1990 SCMR 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-18
  leave to appealmurderreduction of sentencelife imprisonmentbenefit of doubtunlawful assemblyballistics expertocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal was instituted by petitioner Muhammad Qayyum against a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning convictions and sentences arising from the murder of Khushal Khan. The trial court had convicted six accused persons under Sections 148, 302/149, and 404 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing the main accused Talib Hussain to death. On appeal, the High Court acquitted five co-accused on the basis of benefit of doubt and lack of corroboration for ocular testimony. Consequently, the High Court set aside the application of unlawful assembly under Sections 148 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, maintained Talib Hussain's conviction under Section 302, but reduced his sentence from death to life imprisonment due to uncertainty regarding which simultaneous shot was fatal. The Supreme Court evaluated whether the High Court's appraisal of the evidence warranted interference. Upholding the High Court's findings, the Supreme Court held that the evidence was thoroughly and properly evaluated on sound legal principles, declining leave to appeal and dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquittal of co-accused renders convictions under Sections 148 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 inapplicable against a remaining individual accused?
  • Can a death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to life imprisonment when there is uncertainty regarding which of two simultaneous firing accused caused the fatal injury?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court judgment where the appreciation of ocular and corroborative evidence is based on sound legal principles?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nazir vs The Superintendent of Police, Toba Tek Singh and others1990 SCMR 1556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-30
  leave to appealservice tribunaldismissal from servicedepartmental inquiryacquittal in criminal trialsimultaneous proceedingsstandard of proofmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against the judgment of the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his appeal against an order of dismissal from service. The petitioner had been dismissed following disciplinary proceedings for misconduct involving manhandling a witness, beating him, and depriving him of money, while his parallel criminal trial resulted in acquittal by the High Court. The core legal question was whether an acquittal in criminal proceedings automatically vitiates or exonerates an employee from concurrent departmental proceedings based on similar allegations. The Supreme Court held that departmental proceedings can continue simultaneously and independently of criminal trials, as there is no legal bar to doing so and the standard of proof differs. Furthermore, the departmental charges included specific elements not directly forming the subject-matter of the criminal trial, and an acquittal grounded on delay and proof beyond reasonable doubt does not impair the conclusiveness of a valid departmental inquiry. The Supreme Court consequently refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether acquittal in a criminal trial automatically results in exoneration from departmental proceedings based on similar charges?
  • Does a departmental inquiry share the same standard of proof as a criminal trial?
  • Can departmental disciplinary proceedings be initiated and continued simultaneously without waiting for the outcome of a criminal trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nazir vs The State1990 SCMR 1083 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-07
  leave to appealmurderocular evidencecorroborationforensic science laboratoryweapon recoverydeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed his criminal appeal and confirmed his death sentence for murder under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular evidence and corroborative forensic evidence regarding the identification of the accused and the recovery of the weapon. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of guilt based on credible eye-witness accounts—corroborated by the matching of a crime-empty recovered from the spot with the petitioner's licensed gun as confirmed by the Forensic Science Laboratory—were unexceptionable. The key principle laid down is that ocular testimony, even from related or allegedly inimical witnesses, when corroborated by reliable forensic evidence such as the matching of crime empties with the recovered weapon of the accused, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular testimony of related and inimical witnesses can be relied upon without corroboration in a murder case?
  • Does the matching of a crime-empty with the recovered gun of the accused provide sufficient corroboration to sustain a murder conviction?
  • Whether concurrent findings of guilt by the trial court and the High Court warrant interference under leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs The State1990 SCMR 1105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18
  leave to appealgrave and sudden provocationculpable homicideappraisal of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Nawaz against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained his conviction and sentence under Section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for killing his wife and her paramour after allegedly finding them in a compromising position. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court properly re-appraised the evidence to set aside the trial court's finding of grave and sudden provocation and whether the sentence awarded was appropriate. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the submissions regarding the appraisal of evidence and the nature of the provocation require detailed examination. The key principle laid down is that inferences drawn by an appellate court regarding premeditation and provocation must be firmly rooted in a proper appraisal of the evidence and circumstances on record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the trial court's finding of sudden and grave provocation based on the evidence on record?
  • Does the presence of multiple injuries necessarily negative the existence of sudden and grave provocation?
  • Whether the petitioner is entitled to a reduced sentence under Section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs The State1990 SCMR 256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-17
  criminal petitionleave to appealculpable homicidereappraisal of evidenceconcurrent findingssupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court maintaining the petitioner's conviction and sentence under section 304 Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the culpable homicide not amounting to murder of Ghulam Shah. The petitioner was originally tried by the Sessions Judge, Attock, convicted, and sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine and the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether interference was warranted in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that no question of law of public importance was raised and declining to undertake a reappraisal of the evidence. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not normally reappraise evidence in a criminal petition where concurrent findings of lower courts are challenged and no substantial question of law of public importance is involved.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court reappraise evidence in a criminal petition against concurrent findings of lower courts?
  • Does a petition challenging concurrent factual findings without raising a question of law of public importance warrant leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Member, Colonies and others1990 SCMR 1010 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-21
  constitutional petitionspecial leave to appealcancellation of allotmentlimitationlachesGrow More Food Scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's Constitution petition challenging the cancellation of his State land allotment. The core legal question concerns the condonation of delay and laches in pursuing remedies against the termination of a land allotment under the Grow More Food Scheme. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing his revision petition before the Board of Revenue and took nearly two years to approach the High Court in its writ jurisdiction, rendering the petition unfit for interference. The key principle laid down is that unexplained delay and lack of vigilance in pursuing appellate, revisional, and constitutional remedies disentitle a litigant to discretionary relief under writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unexplained delay in filing a revision petition before the Board of Revenue bars relief in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does a delay of two years in approaching the High Court after the dismissal of a revision petition constitute fatal laches?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to special leave to appeal when there is no satisfactory explanation for failing to pursue remedies within the prescribed limitation period?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Afsaruddin and others1990 SCMR 1183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-17
  leave to appealacquittalright of private defenseforcible dispossessionre-appraisal of evidencetrespasscriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the conviction and sentence of the respondents for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondents were initially convicted by a Magistrate for their involvement in a quarrel over the possession of a property, where the complainant party attempted to forcibly dispossess the respondents. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence and its subsequent acquittal of the respondents. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings, which established that the complainant party were trespassers and the respondents acted within their rights to defend their possession, were supported by the evidence on record. The Court affirmed that it does not normally undertake a re-appraisal of evidence in such petitions absent clear misreading or illegality. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the principle that a person in possession of property is entitled to defend it against forcible dispossession, provided the force used does not exceed legal limits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court normally undertake a re-appraisal of evidence in a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal?
  • Is a person in possession of property entitled to use force to prevent forcible dispossession by a trespasser?
  • Can a conviction be maintained when the evidence establishes that the complainant party were the initial aggressors and trespassers?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz Toor and another vs Government of the Punjab1990 SCMR 1554 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-02
  departmental proceedingsdisciplinary actionservice tribunalwithholding of incrementsnatural justiceenquiry reportleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, teachers in nationalized institutions, sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The petitioners had been subjected to departmental disciplinary proceedings regarding charges of absenteeism and poor academic performance, resulting in the withholding of four increments and the treatment of their suspension period as extraordinary leave without pay. The petitioners challenged the proceedings on two legal grounds: first, that the Authorised Officer failed to personally deal with the case or submit specific recommendations for a major penalty, thereby prejudicing the petitioners; and second, that one of the charges was vague. The Supreme Court held that the departmental proceedings, having been reopened to provide the petitioners with the enquiry report, were conducted fairly. The Court found that the Authorised Officer’s referral to the Authority for determination of punishment, including potential major penalties, was procedurally sound and did not prejudice the petitioners. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim of vagueness regarding the charges, noting the petitioners had provided full explanations. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, finding no merit in the legal grounds raised.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an Authorised Officer to personally impose a minor penalty or submit a specific recommendation for a major penalty invalidate departmental proceedings?
  • Can a party claim a charge is vague in departmental proceedings if they have already provided a full explanation in response to that charge?
  • Is a petitioner prejudiced if they are provided with the enquiry report and given an opportunity to show cause before the Authority determines the punishment?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz and others vs Muhammad Aslam and others1990 SCMR 968 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-emption suitcourt-fee deficiencylimitation periodleave to appealcompetent courtnew plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit concerning a sale mutation dated 20-4-1974. The suit was instituted on 15-4-1975. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding it time-barred because the court-fee deficiency was made up after the prescribed period. The first appellate court reversed this decision, and the High Court maintained the decree in second appeal. The petitioners sought leave to appeal, raising two grounds: first, that the suit was initially filed in an incompetent court and became time-barred by the time it reached the competent court; and second, that the plaintiffs failed to supply the court-fee deficiency within the limitation period, relying on case law regarding net assets. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. Regarding the first ground, the Court held it could not be raised for the first time at the leave stage as it involved unexplored factual content. Regarding the second ground, the Court held that the issue was settled by the authoritative pronouncement in Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan (PLD 1984 SC 289), leaving no scope for the petitioners' argument.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a plea involving unexplored factual content for the first time at the leave to appeal stage?
  • Does the failure to make up court-fee deficiency within the limitation period automatically render a pre-emption suit time-barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz and another vs The State and others1990 SCMR 576 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-03
  special leave to appealmurder chargeocular evidencemedical evidencesentence enhancementtime-barred petitioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves two separate petitions for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 28-11-1988, one filed by the convict seeking acquittal from the murder charge and the other by the complainant seeking enhancement of the sentence from imprisonment for life to death. The core legal questions pertain to the appreciation of ocular versus medical evidence regarding pellet injuries allegedly caused by a pistol, and the condonation of a 443-day delay in filing the complainant's petition. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to the convict to examine the material contradiction between the ocular version and the medical evidence, while dismissing the complainant's petition as being heavily time-barred by 443 days and devoid of merit. The key principle laid down is that material contradictions between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the weapon used warrant a detailed examination by the court, and an inordinate delay without sufficient cause is fatal to a petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contradiction between the ocular version and medical evidence regarding pellet injuries warrant the grant of leave to appeal?
  • Can a petition for special leave to appeal barred by 443 days be entertained without sufficient cause?
  • Whether the High Court erred in commuting the death sentence to imprisonment for life based on the evidence presented?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz and another vs Inayat Muhammad and another1990 SCMR 1027 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-28
  special leave to appealconcurrent findings of factgift deedburden of proofappellate interferencecivil litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' regular second appeal and upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding a disputed land gift. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred by failing to record a specific finding on an issue regarding the validity of a gift deed, which the petitioners alleged was fictitious. The Supreme Court examined the record and observed that although an issue regarding the fictitious nature of the gift was framed, it was never urged or brought to the attention of the lower appellate courts by the petitioners' counsel. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that no case for interference was made out, as the trial court had already established valid findings of fact regarding the existence of the gift, which were affirmed by the first appellate court and the High Court. The judgment reinforces the principle that parties cannot seek appellate interference on issues that were not actively pursued or argued before the courts below.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party seek appellate relief on an issue that was framed but never argued or brought to the attention of the lower courts?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of a gift?
  • Is a failure to explicitly record a finding on an issue fatal to a judgment if that issue was not pursued by the parties during the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nasim Akhtar vs The State1990 SCMR 1199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-30
  illegal gratificationanti-corruptiondecoy witnesstainted moneyleave to appealsettlement patwari
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court Multan Bench dated 16th April 1989, which dismissed the criminal appeal of the petitioner. The petitioner, a Settlement Patwari, was tried and convicted under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 for accepting illegal gratification amounting to Rs. 200 from a complainant for entering a redemption mutation. The core legal question raised was whether the receipt of tainted money by the petitioner, allegedly on behalf of another person where the raiding party did not overhear the conversation, constitutes the charged offense. The Supreme Court held that the very act of receiving the illegal gratification amounted to the commission of the offense, especially as the tainted money was recovered from his person. The court refused leave to appeal, holding that the cited precedents were distinguishable and the petition lacked merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the receipt of tainted money by a public servant constitute an offense under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 even if the money was allegedly intended for another person?
  • Is a conviction sustainable for accepting illegal gratification when the raiding party did not overhear the conversation between the decoy witness and the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nabi vs The Secretary, Establishment Division and others1990 SCMR 1481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-11
  service and seniorityad hoc appointmentwork-charge appointmentregularization of serviceService Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Service Tribunal regarding a service and seniority dispute between Assistant Engineers in the Northern Area. The core legal question concerns whether appointments made in the capacity of work-charge or ad hoc basis, subsequently brought onto a permanent footing, entitle the incumbents to count their previous service for the purpose of seniority over a later appointee. The Supreme Court observed that the question is not free from difficulty and disposed of the matter at the preliminary stage by issuing notice to the respondents to appear and explain the authority supporting the Service Tribunal's findings on regularization and seniority. The key principle noted is that initial ad hoc or work-charge service regularised from a specific past date raises complex legal questions regarding the computation of seniority that require detailed examination of the underlying rules and factual basis.

  Questions settled

  • Whether appointments made on a work-charge or ad hoc basis can be counted for the purpose of seniority upon regularization?
  • Does regularization of posts from a past date entitle employees to count their previous service for all purposes including seniority?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mustafa and 3 others vs Muhammad Akbar and others1990 SCMR 532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-30
  pre-emptionpre-emption decreeShariat Appellate Benchlimitation of lawSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves three pre-emption petitions sharing a common question regarding the effect of the judgment delivered by the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Malik Said Kamal Shah. The core legal question is whether a pre-emption decree can be passed under the old pre-emption law after it ceased to have effect. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioners had not succeeded in obtaining a pre-emption decree at any stage before 31st July 1986—the date the old law ceased to have effect pursuant to the aforementioned judgment—no decree under that law can be passed in their favour. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emption decree be passed under the old pre-emption law after 31st July 1986 if the plaintiff had not secured a decree before that date?
  • What is the effect of the Shariat Appellate Bench judgment in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Malik Said Kamal Shah on pending pre-emption suits without a prior decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mushtaq and another vs Muhammad Arif alias Shana and others1990 SCMR 488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-18
  criminal appealleave to appealappreciation of evidencecorroboration of evidencecommutation of sentencemurder convictionmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which partially acquitted co-accused persons and commuted the death sentence of the primary convict, Muhammad Arif, to imprisonment for life in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the acquittal of two co-accused and the commutation of the sentence for the primary convict. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s findings were based on a sound evaluation of the evidence, noting that the testimony of eye-witnesses, while credible, required corroboration due to their relationship with the deceased and their alleged prior misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing that it would not re-appraise evidence where the lower court's reasoning was legally sound and free from misreading of evidence. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the factual findings of a High Court in criminal appeals absent a clear error of law or misreading of evidence resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence in a petition for leave to appeal when the High Court's findings are based on a sound evaluation of the record?
  • Is corroboration of eye-witness testimony necessary when the witnesses are related to the deceased and have a history of alleged misconduct?
  • Can a sentence of death be commuted to imprisonment for life if the convict acted under the influence of an elder brother and lacked a direct motive?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Murad vs The State1990 SCMR 345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-08
  criminal appealunlicensed armsrecovery of rifleappreciation of evidencenew plea at supreme courtleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld his conviction under Section 13-E of the Arms Ordinance, 1965, along with a sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment as recorded by the Additional Sessions Judge, Quetta. The core legal question involves the appreciation of evidence regarding the recovery of an unlicensed rifle from the possession of the petitioner during a police raid. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts were founded on proper and cogent evidence produced by the prosecution. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that a new plea regarding alleged discrepancies in recovery evidence, which was neither raised at the trial nor before the High Court, cannot be entertained for the first time before the apex court. Accordingly, the petition for leave to appeal was found to be without merit and was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a new plea regarding discrepancies in recovery evidence be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether the concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the possession of an unlicensed weapon warrant interference when based on proper evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Munir Ahmad vs Water and Power Development Authority1990 SCMR 907 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-25
  service appealdismissal from servicefindings of factnew plea at appellate stageleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by an employee of the Water and Power Development Authority against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed his service appeal upholding his dismissal from service for misconduct involving unauthorized installation of meters and failure to recover consumer dues. The core legal questions relate to whether a mixed question of fact and law regarding the applicability of the Standing Orders Ordinance can be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court, and whether concurrent findings of fact by departmental authorities and the Tribunal are open to interference. The Supreme Court held that a new legal question requiring factual resolution cannot be permitted to be raised at the belated stage of the Supreme Court, and that concurrent findings of fact suffering from no legal infirmity warrant no interference. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused, laying down the principle that mixed questions of fact and law not raised before lower forums cannot be entertained for the first time.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mixed question of fact and law be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact recorded by departmental authorities and the Service Tribunal can be interfered with by the Supreme Court without showing legal infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Maqsood vs WAPDA through Chairman, WAPDA House, Lahore and 2 others1990 SCMR 875 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-11
  service tribunalremoval from serviceenhancement of penaltydepartmental appealleave to appealillegal gratification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his removal from service by WAPDA. The petitioner was initially charge-sheeted for corruption, leading to an inquiry and an initial penalty of reduction in rank and forfeiture of certain dues. Subsequently, after the rejection of his departmental appeal by the Chairman WAPDA, the authority issued a second show-cause notice seeking to enhance the punishment, ultimately resulting in the petitioner's removal from service. The core legal question is whether an already concluded penalty, following the rejection of a departmental appeal, can be reviewed and enhanced against an employee. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the legality of enhancing a finalized punishment after the conclusion of departmental appellate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether on account of rejection of departmental appeal against the penalty imposed on an employee, the same can be reviewed or enhanced against the employee?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Manzoor Ahmad vs Commissioner, Multan Division and others1990 SCMR 560 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-12
  service matterPatwaridepartmental inquirydismissal from servicere-appreciation of evidencesubstantial question of lawrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a Patwari from service following a departmental inquiry regarding unauthorized interpolations in the Revenue Record. The petitioner challenged his dismissal, arguing that his alterations to the record were merely corrections of erroneous entries, a defense rejected by both the departmental authorities and the Service Tribunal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the findings of the departmental inquiry and the Service Tribunal warranted interference by the apex court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's contention essentially amounted to a request for the re-appreciation of evidence, which does not constitute a substantial question of law of public importance. The Court affirmed that in the absence of a significant legal issue, it will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by departmental authorities and the Service Tribunal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that the Supreme Court does not sit as a court of appeal to re-examine factual determinations in service matters absent a substantial question of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a challenge to the appreciation of evidence in a departmental inquiry constitute a substantial question of law of public importance?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by departmental authorities and the Service Tribunal in service matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Latif Khan and 4 others vs Additional Settlement1990 SCMR 1592 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-27
  land settlementexcess allotmentresumption of landconstitutional jurisdictionproduce index unitssuccessors-in-interestrefugee claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the allotment of land to a refugee claimant, Mst. Hasso, and the subsequent challenge by the successors-in-interest of the original informant. The core legal questions addressed were whether the petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the informant, possessed a vested right to continue the proceedings, and whether excess allotments under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, are mandatorily resumable by law, leaving no scope for judicial discretion. The Supreme Court found that while the High Court's reasoning regarding the petitioners' status and the non-resumability of excess land was flawed, the dismissal of the writ petition was ultimately justified. The Court held that the appellants failed to establish that the land in question was excluded from the benefits of the 1956 correction slip, a factual determination made by departmental authorities that could not be agitated for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, establishing that factual findings regarding land classification and entitlement made by competent departmental authorities are generally final in constitutional proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a question of fact regarding land classification be agitated for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the High Court have the discretion to refuse the resumption of excess land allotted under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Are the successors-in-interest of an informant entitled to continue legal proceedings regarding land allotment?
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• Muhammad Khaleel vs Muhammad Yousaf and others1990 SCMR 1317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-20
  leave to appealcommutation of sentencemurder convictionacquittaldiscretionary powerenhancement of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal trial where the respondent was convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and sentenced to death by the trial court, while two co-accused were acquitted. On appeal, the Lahore High Court maintained the conviction but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment and enhanced the fine. The complainant filed a revision petition against the acquittal of the co-accused, which the High Court dismissed. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, challenging the commutation of the sentence and the acquittal of the co-accused. The Supreme Court examined the record and held that the High Court's discretion in commuting the sentence was neither whimsical nor arbitrary. The Court determined that the case did not involve a 'wanton murder' warranting the enhancement of the sentence to death. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition, concluding that it was not a fit case for granting leave to appeal, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's discretion to commute a death sentence to life imprisonment is subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a case involving the murder of an individual automatically warrant a death sentence, or is the nature of the murder a relevant factor for sentencing?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against a High Court's judgment in a criminal matter?
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• Muhammad Javed Rashid vs The Chief Engineer, 0 & M, WAPDA, Tarbela1990 SCMR 1543 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-06
  leave to appealservice appealprobationer terminationback benefitsshow-cause noticeFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the termination of service of a probationer employee. The core legal question concerns the legality of terminating a probationer's service during an extended probation period without a show-cause notice based on an adverse police report, and the entitlement to back benefits upon reinstatement. The Supreme Court observed that both members of the Tribunal agreed the termination during the extended probation period without a show-cause notice and based on an erroneous police report was illegal, though they differed on the award of back benefits. The Court held that the contention regarding the petitioner's clean antecedents and entitlement to back benefits warrants consideration. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter further.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the termination of a probationer's service during an extended period of probation without a show-cause notice is illegal?
  • Is an employee whose termination is declared illegal entitled to back benefits upon reinstatement?
  • Whether an adverse police report can form the sole basis for terminating the service of a probationer without inquiry?
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• Muhammad Javed Mughal vs The Secretary to Government of Punjab, Education Department and others1990 SCMR 438 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-09
  leave to appealservice tribunalwillful absenceemployment terminationservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated 7-6-1981, which had dismissed the appellant's grievance regarding his employment status. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant had demonstrated sufficient grounds to challenge the Tribunal's finding that he had been afforded ample opportunity to resume his duties but had willfully chosen to remain absent. Upon reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court questioned the appellant's counsel regarding the factual basis for challenging this specific observation made by the Tribunal. The counsel failed to provide a satisfactory explanation or justification for the appellant's prolonged absence despite the opportunities provided by the employer. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that no valid ground for leave to appeal was established. The principle laid down is that where a service tribunal has recorded a finding of fact regarding a public servant's willful absence after being given ample opportunity to resume duty, and the appellant fails to controvert such findings, leave to appeal will not be granted.

  Questions settled

  • Does a finding by a Service Tribunal that an employee was given ample opportunity to resume duty constitute a valid basis for dismissing an appeal?
  • Is leave to appeal granted when a petitioner fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for willful absence from duty?
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• Muhammad Ismail vs Abdul Waheed, Deputy Commissioner, Faisalabad1990 SCMR 1533 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-01
  civil servantmisconductservice tribunalproper channelemployees associationleave to appealdisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant and president of a staff association, challenged a Service Tribunal judgment that reduced his penalty for misconduct but refused full exoneration. The petitioner had sent a telegram to the Commissioner criticizing the Deputy Commissioner's actions regarding another employee's dismissal. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's actions, taken in his capacity as an association president, constituted misconduct despite the existence of departmental instructions governing such representations. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was indeed guilty of misconduct. The Court relied on specific government instructions (O & M Manual) which mandate that employees' associations must confine representations to matters of general interest, avoid involvement in individual cases, and follow the prescribed 'proper channel' for communications. By bypassing these channels and intervening in an individual disciplinary matter, the petitioner violated established service rules. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the Service Tribunal's decision and refused leave to appeal, affirming that association activities do not exempt civil servants from adhering to prescribed disciplinary and communication protocols.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant, acting as an association president, bypass prescribed official channels to communicate grievances regarding individual cases?
  • Does the withdrawal of criminal proceedings under the Telegraph Act 1885 automatically exonerate a civil servant from departmental disciplinary action for the same conduct?
  • Are civil servants' associations permitted to intervene in individual disciplinary cases of their members under the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974?
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• Muhammad Nawaz Khan and another vs Muhammad Ijaz Rashid and others1990 SCMR 1482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-12
  service lawseniority determinationdirect recruitmentdepartmental promotionfederal service tribunalad hoc appointmentseniority list
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the determination of seniority between direct recruits and departmental promotees in the T&T Department. The petitioners, appointed as Assistants on an ad hoc basis in 1979 and subsequently regularized, were initially placed senior to the respondent, who was promoted to the same grade in 1979. The Service Tribunal, relying on general principles of seniority, held that departmental promotees in a particular year are senior as a class to direct recruits appointed in the same year, regardless of the specific date of appointment. The petitioners contend that because they were appointed against vacancies from 1977 and 1978, the principle regarding seniority within the same year does not apply to them. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying significant questions of law regarding whether a direct recruit appointed earlier can be declared junior to a departmental promotee appointed later, and whether seniority is governed by the specific vacancy year or the actual date of appointment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Government servant appointed from the direct quota on an earlier date can be declared junior to a Government servant appointed from a subsequent date from the quota of departmental promotees?
  • Whether a Government servant appointed from the direct quota arising out of vacancies for the year 1977-78 on an earlier date can be declared junior to a Government servant appointed from a subsequent date against the quota of promotees for the year 1979?
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• Muhammad Islam vs The State1990 SCMR 1304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-25
  leave to appealcriminal appealsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, titled Muhammad Islam versus The State, reported in 1990 SCMR 1304. The core legal question concerned whether leave to appeal should be granted against the impugned judgment or order of the lower forum. The court's decision was to refuse leave to appeal, thereby maintaining the existing order. The principle laid down is that where no substantial question of law or grounds for interference are made out, leave to appeal stands refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the impugned decision?
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• Muhammad Ishaque Soomro vs Water and Power Development1990 SCMR 924 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-07
  pro forma promotionpromotion examinationservice appealdiscriminationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal concerning the pro forma promotion of the petitioner in Grade-17. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner's promotion with effect from a specific date was unlawfully made subject to passing a promotion examination when no such requirement was prescribed under the applicable rules at the time, and whether the petitioner faced unreasonable discrimination compared to similarly situated individuals who received exemptions. The court granted leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to examine these questions. As part of its interim holding, the court ordered that the condition requiring the petitioner to pass the promotion examination shall remain in abeyance pending the final disposal of the appeal, while directing the respondent to submit comments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the pro forma promotion of a civil servant can be made subject to passing a promotion examination when no such examination was prescribed under the rules at the relevant time?
  • Whether a civil servant is subjected to unreasonable discrimination when similarly situated colleagues are granted exemptions from passing the same promotion examination?
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• Muhammad Irshad vs The State1990 SCMR 1055 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-20
  leave to appealculpable homicideself-defencesudden fightappreciation of evidencecriminal liabilityconcurrent sentences
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had modified the convictions of the petitioner and others from murder under Section 302 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a violent incident involving two deaths and multiple injuries. The core legal question was whether the High Court's assessment of the evidence, which rejected the accused's plea of self-defence and characterized the encounter as a sudden fight, was legally sound, or whether the prosecution had failed to prove its case. The Supreme Court, upon re-examining the prosecution evidence alongside the defence version, affirmed the High Court's findings. The Court held that the prosecution successfully established the occurrence and that the High Court correctly rejected the defence's plea of self-defence. Consequently, the Court found no legal infirmity in the High Court's judgment, determining that the conviction and sentence did not warrant further alteration. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, as no grounds for interference were established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is maintainable when the court finds the encounter was a sudden fight?
  • Can an appellate court alter a conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder based on the nature of the encounter?
  • Is a plea of self-defence sustainable when the prosecution evidence establishes a premeditated attack and the accused's version is not supported by the facts?
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