Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Zubeda Versus Additional Settlement Commissioner, Multan1994 SCMR 2046 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hassan Versus Zakir Hussain1994 SCMR 2015 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Sadiq Hussain Shah Versus Zamin Shah1994 SCMR 1868 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bakhsh Versus Province of Punjab1994 SCMR 1836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-04Read full judgment →
• Government of N.-W.F.P. Versus Devlikund Forest and Multipurposes Cooperative Society Limited1994 SCMR 1829 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-31Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir Versus Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Education Department, Lahore1994 SCMR 1801 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-16
  back benefitsservice lawreinstatementintervening periodcivil servantarrears of payservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a Subject Specialist, challenged his retirement from service under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The Punjab Service Tribunal allowed his appeal, reinstating him but treating the intervening period of his absence as leave without pay, thereby denying back benefits. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal was justified in withholding back benefits without proper inquiry or reasoning. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred by failing to adhere to the prescribed procedure for determining back benefits. The Court emphasized that under F.R. 54 and Section 16 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, the determination of arrears and the adjustment of income earned during the period of absence requires a specific process involving a committee. The Court rejected the respondents' claim that the appellant had waived his right to back benefits, noting this was not recorded in the impugned judgment. Consequently, the case was remanded to the official respondents to determine the appellant's entitlement to arrears in accordance with the relevant rules and statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Service Tribunal authorized to deny back benefits to a reinstated civil servant without assigning reasons?
  • Does the determination of back benefits for a reinstated civil servant require the constitution of a committee under F.R. 54?
  • Can a Service Tribunal rely on unrecorded oral concessions regarding the waiver of back benefits to deny such claims in its judgment?
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• Amir Siab Versus Government of N.-W.F.P.1994 SCMR 1778 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-07
  land disputeconcurrent findings of factrevisional jurisdictionappreciation of evidencepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a civil land dispute where the petitioners sought a declaration regarding title to the suit land situated in the erstwhile Swat State, but lost before the lower forums and the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact rendered by the two courts below in its revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly declined to interfere, as there was no compelling reason to set aside concurrent findings of fact that did not suffer from any infirmity of law or principle, and the mere possibility of a different conclusion upon reappraisal of evidence is no ground for interference. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts upheld in revisional jurisdiction unless the appreciation of evidence suffers from a serious legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact in its revisional jurisdiction without compelling reasons?
  • Does the mere possibility of a different conclusion upon reappraisal of material constitute sufficient ground for interference by the Supreme Court?
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• Muhammad Arshad Versus State1994 SCMR 1749 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-27
  leave to appealappreciation of evidenceocular evidencemedical evidencematerial discrepanciescriminal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the convictions and sentences of the petitioners for the murder of the deceased under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners were sentenced to death and life imprisonment respectively for causing fatal injuries to the deceased using a dagger and a hatchet. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the lower courts failed to properly appreciate the evidence, specifically regarding alleged contradictions between ocular and medical evidence, and material discrepancies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses concerning the timing and circumstances of the petitioners' arrest. The Supreme Court, finding that the petitioners' contentions regarding these evidentiary infirmities and discrepancies required deeper judicial scrutiny, granted leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that where material discrepancies in prosecution evidence—such as conflicting accounts of the arrest of the accused and potential suppression of initial medical reports—are raised, the appellate court must examine the record to ensure the conviction is based on reliable and consistent evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant discrepancy between the testimony of prosecution witnesses and the investigating officer regarding the date of arrest warrant a re-examination of the conviction?
  • Is leave to appeal justified when there are allegations of material contradictions between ocular and medical evidence that were not adequately addressed by the lower courts?
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• Barkat Ullah Versus Wali Muhammad1994 SCMR 1737 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-14
  specific performancealternative reliefnovation of contractimmovable propertydiscretionary reliefbreach of contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent findings of the lower courts decreeing a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property. The petitioners challenged the decree on two grounds: first, that the respondents had prayed for compensation in the alternative, thereby precluding a decree for specific performance; and second, that an agreement to postpone the execution of the sale pending the outcome of a separate litigation constituted a novation of the original contract, which was not binding on the heirs of a deceased party. The Supreme Court rejected both contentions. Relying on established legal principles, the Court held that seeking compensation as an alternative relief does not waive the right to specific performance, as courts are empowered to grant specific performance even where compensation is mentioned. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that an agreement to extend the time for performance does not amount to a novation of the original contract, but merely defers its execution. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prayer for compensation in the alternative in a suit for specific performance preclude the court from granting specific performance?
  • Can a court grant specific performance of a contract even if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of breach?
  • Does an agreement to extend the time for the performance of a contract constitute a novation of the original agreement?
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• Majeedan Versus Amanullah1994 SCMR 1735 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-03Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bakhsh Versus Muhammad Jan , Muhammad Younas (Office Assistant)1994 SCMR 1668 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-30Read full judgment →
• Texas Versus Gregory Lee Jhonson1994 SCMR 1569 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Abdul Wahid Alias Wahdi Versus State1994 SCMR 1517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-08Read full judgment →
• Attorney-General for Hong Kong Versus Reid1994 SCMR 1431 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constructive trustbribefiduciary dutybreach of trustsecret profitequitable remedies
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal from New Zealand addressed whether a bribe accepted by a fiduciary in breach of duty, and any property representing it, is held on a constructive trust for the injured principal, or whether the relationship is merely that of debtor and creditor. The respondent, a former Crown prosecutor in Hong Kong, accepted substantial bribes and invested a portion of the proceeds in freehold properties in New Zealand. The Privy Council held that as soon as a bribe is received, the fiduciary holds it and any property derived from it on a constructive trust for the injured person, and is accountable for any subsequent increase in value. The Board overruled prior English authorities, including Lister & Co v. Stubbs and Metropolitan Bank v. Heiron, concluding that a fiduciary must not be permitted to retain any profit or benefit derived from a criminal breach of duty. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, recognizing the Crown's equitable interest in the properties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a bribe accepted by a fiduciary in breach of duty is held on a constructive trust for the injured principal?
  • Does a fiduciary who invests a bribe account for the increased value of the property representing the bribe?
  • Whether the decision in Lister & Co v. Stubbs correctly states the equitable principles regarding bribes received by fiduciaries?
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• Pratt Versus Attorney-General for Jamaica Anthony Metzer and Anthony Bradley (instructed by Simons Muirhead & Burton) , The Director of Public Prosecutions of Jamaica (Glen R. Andrade QC) and Lloyd Hibbert (Senior Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions of Jamaica) (instructed by Charles Russell) for the Suprerintendent1994 SCMR 1405 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-24
  death penaltyconstitutional appealinhuman or degrading treatmentdeath row phenomenoninordinate delaycommutation of sentencedue processhuman rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional appeal addressed whether the execution of prisoners after prolonged detention on death row constitutes "inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment" under the Constitution of Jamaica. The appellants had been held under sentence of death for 14 years. The Privy Council departed from its previous majority decision in Riley v. A-G of Jamaica, holding that the constitutional prohibition against inhuman treatment is not restricted by pre-independence laws. The Board determined that while capital punishment is not per se unconstitutional, the state has an imperative duty to ensure executions follow swiftly after sentencing. Prolonged delay, particularly when attributable to the state's failure to expedite appellate processes, renders the execution of a death sentence inhuman and degrading. Consequently, the Board held that executing the appellants after such inordinate delay would violate their constitutional rights. The death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. The Board further indicated that a delay exceeding five years between sentencing and execution provides strong grounds for finding a violation of constitutional protections, necessitating commutation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the constitutional prohibition against inhuman or degrading punishment apply to the execution of a death sentence after an inordinate delay?
  • Does Section 17(2) of the Constitution of Jamaica authorize the execution of a death sentence regardless of the length of delay between sentencing and execution?
  • Is the delay caused by an accused's pursuit of appellate procedures to be excluded when determining if the total delay in execution is inhuman or degrading?
  • What is the constitutional effect of a delay exceeding five years between the imposition of a death sentence and the execution?
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• Mccarthy & Stone (Developments) Ltd. Versus London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames1994 SCMR 1393 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  statutory interpretationlocal government powersultra viresplanning permissionlevy of chargespre-application adviceimplied powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerned the legality of a policy adopted by the London Borough of Richmond upon Thames, which imposed a fee for consultations regarding speculative development proposals prior to formal planning applications. The core legal question was whether the council possessed the statutory authority to charge for such pre-application advice. The House of Lords allowed the appeal, holding that the council lacked the power to levy these charges. The court affirmed the fundamental principle that no pecuniary burden, such as a fee or tax, can be imposed upon the subject without clear and distinct statutory authority. While Section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 permits local authorities to perform acts incidental to their functions, the court ruled that this does not grant an implied power to charge for services that are merely incidental to the council's duties. The court rejected the argument that charging for a discretionary service is permissible simply because the service itself is discretionary, emphasizing that an activity being 'incidental to the incidental' is insufficient to establish statutory authority for levying charges.

  Questions settled

  • Does a local authority have the implied power under Section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 to charge for pre-application planning advice?
  • Can a local authority impose a pecuniary burden on the public without express statutory authority?
  • Is a service that is incidental to a statutory function automatically subject to a power to charge for that service?
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• Noor Muhammad Versus Muhammad Siddique1994 SCMR 1248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-23Read full judgment →
• Abdul Haq Versus Sardar Shah1994 SCMR 1238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-22Read full judgment →
• Fateh Bibi Versus Talib Hussain1994 SCMR 1232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-29
  leave to appealsentence reductiondeath penaltyimprisonment for lifemotivecriminal appealfactual error
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that had converted the death sentences of two convicts into life imprisonment for the murder of an eighteen-year-old youth. The petitioner challenged the reduction of the sentence, arguing that the High Court proceeded on the erroneous factual assumption that the complainant party still resided in the village where the incident occurred, despite evidence of their prior migration. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s reduction of the death sentence to life imprisonment was legally sustainable given the alleged factual error regarding the parties' residence. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court may have erred regarding the residency status of the complainant party, the reduction of the sentence remained justified. The Court reasoned that the motive for the murder was directed against the deceased's brother, Zulfiqar, rather than the deceased himself, who was a minor at the time of the prior incident. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, holding that the reduction of the sentence did not constitute an error of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a factual error regarding the residence of the complainant party necessarily invalidate the High Court's decision to reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Is the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment legally sustainable when the prosecution fails to prove motive beyond doubt?
  • Can the appellate court maintain a conviction while altering the quantum of sentence based on the specific circumstances of the motive?
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• Bahadur Khan Versus Noor Muhammad1994 SCMR 1228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam Versus State1994 SCMR 1218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-16
  Zina-bil-Jabrcriminal appealdelay in FIRaccomplice testimonycorroborationmiscarriagebenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan calls in question the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which had modified the appellant's conviction for Zina-bil-Jabr from section 10(3) to section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, and upheld his conviction under section 312 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for causing a miscarriage. The core legal questions involved the justification of the conviction based on the evidence, the effect of an inordinate and unexplained delay of nine months in lodging the First Information Report, and whether the prosecutrix's testimony required independent corroboration as an accomplice. The Supreme Court held that given the finding that the prosecutrix was a consenting party, her status was that of an accomplice, and her uncorroborated testimony could not safely sustain a conviction, especially in light of the unexplained delay in reporting and medical evidence indicating prior sexual habits. The appeal was consequently allowed, the lower courts' judgments were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the evidence in the case justified the conviction of the petitioner under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 and section 312 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Was the delay of 9 months in lodging the F.I.R. fatal in the circumstances of the case?
  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of a consenting party, treated as an accomplice, is sufficient to base a conviction for Zina?
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• Muhammad Afzal Versus Muhammad Hayat1994 SCMR 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-15Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique Versus State1994 SCMR 1179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-15Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Zone D, Karachi Versus Jennings Private School1993 SCMR 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-20Read full judgment →
• Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Ltd. Versus Provincial Ombudsman1993 SCMR 948 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-13
  Provincial OmbudsmanAgencySindh Industrial Trading EstateGovernment DepartmentLeave to AppealConstitutional Petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition which impugned a notice issued by the Provincial Ombudsman. The core question before the court was whether the petitioner, Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Ltd., falls within the definition of 'Agency' under clause 1 of section 2 of the Establishment of the Office of Ombudsman for the Province of Sindh Act, 1991. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner is an 'Agency' under the said Act, as previous judicial pronouncements established that the petitioner operates just like a department of the Provincial Government despite its corporate incorporation. Consequently, the petition was found to be without merit, and leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that corporate incorporation does not prevent an institution from being treated as a government department or agency for statutory and constitutional purposes when it performs essential governmental functions for and on behalf of the Provincial Government.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Ltd. falls within the definition of 'Agency' under the Establishment of the Office of Ombudsman for the Province of Sindh Act, 1991?
  • Does corporate incorporation prevent an entity from acting as a department of the Provincial Government for statutory purposes?
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• Muhammad Sadiq Versus State , Nemo1993 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-05
  acquittalinterference with acquittalreappraisal of evidencecriminal appealmurderattempted murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal appeals against a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had set aside the trial court's acquittal of the accused persons and convicted them under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with a well-reasoned order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The Supreme Court held that an order of acquittal is not to be interfered with unless it is perverse, totally unreasonable, or based on a misreading of evidence, which was not the case here, especially given that the eyewitnesses were related or chance witnesses and the defence plea had been ignored. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restored the trial court's order of acquittal, and dismissed the complainant's petition.

  Questions settled

  • When can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by a trial court?
  • Whether the testimony of related and chance witnesses requires corroboration when co-accused on the same evidence stand acquitted?
  • Does an acquittal order based on reasoning flowing from the record warrant reversal by the High Court?
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• Bashir Ahmad Versus State1993 SCMR 919 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-01Read full judgment →
• Sojhro Khan Versus Ghulam Murtaza1993 SCMR 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-16
  murderocular testimonyinterested witnessminor witnessre-appraisal of evidenceacquittal appealremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, arising from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh which set aside the conviction and death sentence of respondent No. 1 under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, addresses the proper evaluation of ocular and circumstantial evidence in a murder trial. The core legal questions involved whether a conviction can be sustained on the testimony of a minor or related eye-witness, how relationship and alleged enmity affect witness credibility, and the applicability of evidentiary standards under Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984 in trials under ordinary law. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misevaluated the evidence by erroneously rejecting related and minor eye-witnesses without analyzing their rigorous cross-examination, misinterpreting the requirements of Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984 for cases tried under ordinary penal law, and disregarding corroborative recovery evidence. The Court laid down that mere relationship to the deceased does not render a witness 'interested' unless animosity or a motive to falsely implicate is established, that a minor's evidence is subject to scrutiny rather than summary dismissal, and that ocular testimony must be properly evaluated in light of cross-examination. The appeal was allowed and the case remanded to the High Court for a fresh hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a minor eye-witness can be discarded solely on the ground of minority?
  • Does mere relationship to the deceased or complainant render an eye-witness an interested witness requiring corroboration?
  • Are the strict evidentiary requirements of Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984 regarding adult male witnesses applicable to murder cases tried under ordinary penal law?
  • Can the evidence of a recovery mashir be brushed aside solely on the ground that the mashir is related or acts as a common mashir for the police?
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• Sujanmal Versus Abdul Hai1993 SCMR 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-29Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz Versus Manzur Mai (Mst.)1993 SCMR 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-23Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Matlub Khan Versus Government of Pakistan Faqir Muhammad Khokhar, Deputy Attorney-General instructed by Ch. Akhtar Ali , M.S. Siddiqi, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Imtiaz Muhammad Khan & Bashir Ahmad Ansari, Advocate Supreme Court1993 SCMR 798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-22
  service tribunalretrospective absorptionseniority disputedeputation and contractintelligence bureauinduction policy
  Summary & questions settled

  These cross-appeals challenge a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the service seniority and retrospective regular absorption of an army officer deputed to the Intelligence Bureau. The core legal question concerned whether an armed forces officer could be absorbed into the civil service on a regular basis retrospectively from the date of his initial secondment, bypassing statutory recruitment and induction policies, and thereby superseding existing civil servants. The Supreme Court held that retrospective regular absorption and grant of seniority from a date prior to the completion of the mandatory qualifying service and in contravention of applicable service rules and induction policies was unlawful. The Court laid down that civil servants appointed on contract or deputation cannot be regularized retrospectively to the detriment of the legally vested seniority rights of other civil servants, and that executive directives cannot override mandatory statutory service rules governing absorption and seniority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be absorbed into a civilian department retrospectively from the date of initial secondment in violation of recruitment rules?
  • Does a contract employee acquire the status of a civil servant for the purpose of claiming seniority from the date of initial contract employment?
  • Can an executive directive override statutory service rules and policies to grant retrospective seniority affecting other civil servants?
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• Abdul Fateh Versus Abdul Sattar1993 SCMR 736 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-03
  right of pre-emptionSerai exemptionpartial pre-emptionco-sharerurban immovable propertyagricultural landburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Court addresses the dismissal of a pre-emption suit by the Peshawar High Court, which had set aside the trial court's decree in favor of the plaintiff/appellant, Haji Abdul Fateh. The core legal questions involved whether the suit property was pre-emptible, whether the sale transaction was exempt from pre-emption as a 'Serai' under section 5(a) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, and whether the suit was barred by the principle of partial pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that the land in dispute fell within the definition of pre-emptible property under the Act, that the vendee/respondent failed to discharge the burden of proof to establish that the property was a 'Serai' or used as such at the relevant time, and that the suit was not hit by partial pre-emption. The appeal was accepted, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the trial court's decree was restored, subject to conditions regarding compensation for new construction or its removal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property claimed as a 'Serai' is exempt from pre-emption under section 5 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, in the absence of evidence showing its use for temporary accommodation of travellers?
  • Does a suit for pre-emption covering the entire area purchased through the sale-deeds violate the principle of partial pre-emption?
  • Upon whom lies the burden of proof to establish an exemption from pre-emption under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950?
  • What are the essential legal ingredients that constitute a building as a 'Serai' for the purposes of pre-emption law?
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• Khizar Hayat Versus Additional Sessions Judge, Toba Tek Singh1993 SCMR 724 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-08Read full judgment →
• Chena Versus Shabbir Ahmad1993 SCMR 705 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza Versus Muhammad Arif1993 SCMR 693 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  death sentencecommutation of sentenceGeneral Amnesty Orderculpable homicideappellate interferencesentencing discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a High Court judgment that commuted a death sentence to life imprisonment for a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The complainant party challenged the High Court's decision, specifically questioning whether the absence of an immediate motive for the murder was sufficient legal justification to deviate from the normal penalty of death. The Supreme Court examined the timeline of the case, noting that the occurrence took place in 1981 and the trial court judgment was delivered in 1984. Crucially, a General Amnesty Order was issued by the President in December 1988. The Supreme Court held that had the High Court confirmed the death sentence, the respondent would have been entitled to the benefits of this General Amnesty Order. Consequently, the Court determined that it would be inappropriate to interfere with the sentence imposed by the High Court at this stage. The appeal was dismissed, effectively maintaining the life imprisonment sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of an immediate motive for murder provide sufficient justification for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Should the Supreme Court interfere with a commuted sentence if the respondent would have been eligible for a General Amnesty Order had the original death sentence been confirmed?
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• Zarina Doosani Versus Abdul Mehdi1993 SCMR 691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-24
  urban rent restrictionevictionreconstructionsanction for reconstructionleave to appealdilapidated building
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the dismissal of her First Rent Appeal by the High Court, which affirmed her eviction order passed by the Rent Controller on the ground of property reconstruction. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether the sanction for reconstruction obtained by the landlord continues to enure for his benefit even after the original period for which it was granted has expired. The Court held that whether a sanction enures in favour of the landlord till the conclusion of proceedings depends upon the circumstances of each case, noting that eviction proceedings ordinarily take longer than the standard one-year validity of such sanctions. Furthermore, the Court observed that the building was in a dilapidated condition, other tenants had already vacated, and the tenant had a statutory right to reoccupy after reconstruction. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that the validity of a reconstruction sanction during protracted litigation depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sanction for reconstruction obtained by a landlord enures for their benefit notwithstanding the expiration of the original period for which it was granted?
  • Does the expiration of a reconstruction sanction prior to or during eviction proceedings invalidate the landlord's right to seek eviction for reconstruction?
  • Is resistance to eviction by a tenant based on bona fide reasons when the building is in a dilapidated condition and other tenants have vacated?
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• Aslam Industries Ltd., Khanpur Versus Pakistan Edible Corporation of Pakistan1993 SCMR 683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-11Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan Versus Punjab Labour Court No.5, Faisalabad1993 SCMR 672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-23Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan Versus Settlement Commissioner, Sargodha , Nemo1993 SCMR 657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-24
  evacuee propertyproperty identitysettlement authoritiesmistake of counselsubstantial justicesuo motu review
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a property dispute concerning the identity and transfer of evacuee shops bearing numbers 46 and 53 in Sargodha, involving conflicting claims by auction-purchasers and local occupants. The core legal question revolves around the correct identification and demarcation of the independent units claimed by the respective parties, and whether relief can be granted to satisfy substantial justice when parties make bona fide mistakes or concessions regarding property identification. The Supreme Court held that the properties in question constituted distinct units and, after correcting an initial concession made under a mistake of fact prior to the signing of the judgment, adjusted the claims equitably between the parties to ensure substantial justice. The key principle laid down is that courts may rectify unfinalized or unsigned orders rendered under a mistaken concession of counsel and mould relief to ensure substantial justice between competing claimants of evacuee property based on equity and factual inspection.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can reconsider a matter upon a request regarding a mistake in marking property units before the judgment is formally signed?
  • Can rival claimants be granted portions of disputed evacuee property based on equitable adjustment of possession and auction rights?
  • Whether separate independent properties wrongly merged or confused under settlement proceedings can be demarcated through site plans and counsel endorsements?
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• Sultan Versus State1993 SCMR 654 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-21
  eye-witness testimonySection 164 Cr.P.C. statementpolice detentioncorroborationres gestaecriminal appealmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two criminal appeals filed by the appellant, Sultan, against his conviction for murder and illegal possession of arms. The core legal question was whether the testimony of the sole eye-witness, Kasho (P.W.6), was reliable given his admission in cross-examination that he was detained by the police for several days to secure a statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court examined whether this detention rendered the witness's testimony involuntary or coerced. The Court held that while the witness's detention by the police was improper, his testimony remained credible because it was corroborated by the independent testimony of another witness, Ahmed Shah (P.W.7), and by the witness's own contemporaneous declarations to villagers shortly after the incident. The Court established the principle that where a witness's testimony is otherwise consistent and supported by independent evidence or res gestae, the fact that the police improperly secured a statement under Section 164, Cr.P.C. does not automatically invalidate the witness's substantive evidence, especially when the witness is vulnerable to external influence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the improper detention of a witness by police to secure a statement under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically render their testimony unreliable?
  • Can testimony recorded under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be considered credible if it is corroborated by independent evidence and contemporaneous declarations?
  • Does the doctrine of res gestae apply to statements made by bystanders or witnesses shortly after a crime occurs?
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• Khan Muhammad Versus State1993 SCMR 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-24Read full judgment →
• Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab, Lahore Versus Ghulam Fareed1993 SCMR 643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-11Read full judgment →
• Arz Muhammad Umrani, Assistant Political Agent, Dera Bugti Versus Atta Muhammad1993 SCMR 633 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-13
  adverse remarksexpungementjudicial immunityconstitutional jurisdictionrepealed lawsmalafideadministrative control of courts
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, seeking the expungement of adverse remarks passed against the appellant, an Assistant Political Agent who had tried and convicted a person under sections 497 and 498 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether a judicial or quasi-judicial officer is entitled to immunity from adverse remarks or a prior hearing when their judgment is set aside under constitutional jurisdiction for acting without jurisdiction on repealed laws. The Supreme Court held that while judicial officers enjoy statutory immunity for bona fide acts, the High Court acting under Article 199 of the Constitution is fully competent to examine the legality of subordinate judicial orders, comment on the conduct of the officer, and direct adverse remarks to be placed on their confidential record without granting a prior hearing, especially when the officer acted mala fide and without jurisdiction on repealed provisions. The appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are judicial officers entitled to a prior hearing before a superior court makes adverse remarks regarding their judicial conduct?
  • Does the statutory immunity provided under section 77 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prevent a High Court from recording adverse remarks against a judicial officer exercising judicial functions?
  • Is the High Court competent under Article 199 and Article 203 of the Constitution of Pakistan to supervise subordinate courts and pass strictures on their judgments?
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• Muhammad Younis Khan Versus Government of N.-W.F.P. , M. Munir Peracha, Advocate Supreme Court and Ejaz M. Khan, Advocate-on-Record1993 SCMR 618 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-10
  land reformsmutationfraudpartitionco-ownershiprevenue recordsconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants challenged the dismissal of their writ petition by the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of land mutations (Nos. 36 and 41) by the Chief Land Commissioner. The appellants claimed ownership of land in village Naryala, District Mansehra, as co-sharers with the Nawab of Amb, based on revenue entries made after the Nawab surrendered land under Martial Law Regulation No. 64. The respondents alleged that these mutations were fraudulent, collusive, and executed after the land had already vested in the Provincial Government. The Supreme Court, by a majority, dismissed the appeal. The Court held that the appellants failed to establish their entitlement to be recorded as co-sharers. It was affirmed that entries in mutation records are fiscal in nature and do not conclusively establish title, serving only as rebuttable evidence. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, should not interfere with factual controversies or substitute findings of fact made by lower tribunals unless they are based on no evidence or misreading of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the entry of a name in a mutation record conclusively establish ownership of land?
  • Can a High Court interfere with findings of fact made by lower tribunals in a constitutional petition?
  • Is a mutation entry in revenue records rebuttable evidence of title?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan Versus Rais Khan1993 SCMR 609 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-17
  ad hoc servicelength of servicepromotioncurrent charge basiscivil servantseniorityservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Federation of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which partly allowed the respondent employee's appeal by treating his promotion from BPS-17 to BPS-18 as regular from an earlier date rather than on a current charge basis. The core legal question was whether continuous ad hoc service in a lower pay scale, followed by regular appointment in the same scale, can be counted towards the minimum length of service prescribed for promotion to a higher scale. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of any statutory prohibition or rule excluding ad hoc service, such service counts towards the required length of experience for promotion, a position supported by official government memoranda. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the principle that ad hoc service followed by regular service in the same scale qualifies for calculating length of service for promotion or move-over.

  Questions settled

  • Can ad hoc service followed by regular appointment in the same scale be counted towards the length of service prescribed for promotion to a higher post?
  • Does an ad hoc appointment confer any right to seniority under the civil servants law?
  • What is the scope of powers of the Federal Service Tribunal under the Civil Servants Act 1973 on appeal?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal grant relief under section 23 of the Civil Servants Act 1973 if such relief is not granted by the President?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Ahmad Versus Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore , S. Abul Aasim Jafferi, Ejaz Ahmad Khan & Nemo1993 SCMR 606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-27
  seniorityservice tribunalvested righttransfer of servicedistrict establishmentretrospective effect
  Summary & questions settled

  These are two appeals by special leave against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed service appeals filed by the appellants regarding their seniority. The appellants originally served under the Thal Development Authority, which was wound up and its functions transferred to the Thal Project Colony under the Provincial Government in 1957. Later, the colony was wound up, and the staff was transferred to the District Administration. The Board of Revenue initially determined that the appellants' seniority should be fixed from the date of continuous service in their cadre, but subsequently reversed this decision, treating them as new entrants. The core legal question was whether the Board of Revenue was competent to alter the seniority rule retrospectively to the detriment of the appellants who had already been promoted based on the earlier determination. The Supreme Court held that the appellants' seniority was governed by Rule 9(1)(b) of the West Pakistan Revenue Department District Ministerial Services Rules, 1964, and that the initial determination by the Board was in accordance with the rules. The Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and restored the seniority based on the Board's earlier direction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the seniority of government servants transferred along with their posts to a district establishment is to be determined from the date of continuous service in their cadre?
  • Can the Board of Revenue retrospectively alter a previously determined seniority rule to the detriment of civil servants who have already been promoted?
  • Does Rule 9(1)(b) of the West Pakistan Revenue Department District Ministerial Services Rules, 1964 apply to members appointed otherwise than by initial recruitment?
  Read full judgment →
• Alamgir Versus Divisional Forest Officer, Multan1993 SCMR 603 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-04
  service appealefficiency and disciplineshow-cause noticeformal inquirycontroverted factsreduction in ranknatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal by two forest department employees against the dismissal of their service appeals by the Service Tribunal, challenging their reduction in rank following disciplinary proceedings. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether rule 6(3) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 is ultra vires of Article 25 of the Constitution and whether the departmental action was justified. The Supreme Court observed that the penalty was imposed through a summary show-cause procedure without holding a formal inquiry or associating the appellants with the preliminary fact-finding inquiry, despite controverted questions of fact. The Court held that where charges involve disputed questions of fact requiring evidence and cross-examination, resorting to the shorter show-cause procedure is unjustified, and findings based on visual inspection and conjectures rather than proper evidence cannot sustain. Declining to address the larger constitutional question regarding the vires of the rules, the Court accepted the appeals, set aside the Service Tribunal's judgment and the punishment orders, while clarifying that the competent authority is not precluded from initiating a fresh formal inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether recourse to the shorter show-cause procedure is justified for resolving controverted questions of fact in civil servant disciplinary proceedings?
  • Is a formal inquiry mandatory where charges of misconduct against a civil servant are disputed and require the recording of evidence and cross-examination?
  • Does a finding of guilt based on visual inspection and preliminary inquiry conducted behind the back of the accused employee sustain under service law?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah Khan Versus Akhtar Begum1993 SCMR 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-05Read full judgment →
• Union Council, Ali Wahan, Sukkur Versus Associated Cement (Pvt.) Limited1993 SCMR 468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-07
  octroi taxlifting the corporate veiltax exemptionFederal Governmentconstitutional petitionseparate legal entitycommercial activity
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court addressed whether Associated Cement (Pvt.) Limited, a company managed by the State Cement Corporation of Pakistan whose shares are owned by the Federal Government, is entitled to exemption from octroi tax under Article 165 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The High Court had allowed the respondent's petition by lifting the corporate veil and holding that the respondent essentially performed functions of the Federal Government. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that the respondent is engaged in the commercial manufacture and sale of cement like any other private company, and that no justifiable reason existed to lift the corporate veil to grant tax exemption. The Court laid down that the doctrine of lifting the corporate veil cannot be pressed into service as a matter of course to reduce tax burdens or grant tax immunities to commercial corporations competing in the market, particularly in light of the distinct legal personality recognized by company law and Article 165-A of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a company owned or controlled by the Federal Government engaged in commercial manufacturing is entitled to tax exemption under Article 165 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can the doctrine of lifting the corporate veil be invoked to grant tax immunity to a commercial corporation competing with other private entities?
  • What is the impact of Article 165-A of the Constitution of Pakistan on the legal ownership of property and corporate identity for fiscal purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Zila Council, Jhelum Versus I.C.I. Pakistan Ltd. (Formerly ICI Pakistan Manufacturers Limited), Khewra, District Jhelum1993 SCMR 454 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique Versus Hameedullah1993 SCMR 451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-30Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Saeed Kirmani Versus Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd., Islamabad1993 SCMR 441 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-29
  equitable set-offbreach of contractbanking suitdamagespleadingsmitigation of damagesloan disbursement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a banking suit where the appellant challenged a decree for the recovery of a loan, claiming an equitable set-off for damages allegedly caused by the respondent bank's failure to disburse the full loan amount. The core legal questions were whether the appellant had sufficiently pleaded and proved the claim for damages, and whether the bank's failure to disburse the full loan absolved the appellant from the obligation to repay the loan or pay interest. The Supreme Court held that while an equitable set-off for unascertained sums is maintainable when claims arise from the same transaction, the party claiming it must adhere to strict rules of pleading and prove the quantum of damages. The Court found the appellant's pleadings vague and the evidence insufficient to establish the alleged loss of rent or the contract with a third party. The Court further held that the bank's failure to disburse the full loan did not automatically relieve the borrower of the obligation to repay the loan, as the covenants were not conditional or reciprocal. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant claim an equitable set-off for an unascertained sum of money?
  • Does a bank's failure to disburse the full loan amount automatically relieve the borrower of the obligation to repay the loan?
  • What are the requirements for a party to successfully claim damages for breach of contract under Section 73 of the Contract Act 1872?
  • Is a party claiming equitable set-off required to follow the rules of pleading regarding the particulars of the claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasin Versus Hanif Ahmed1993 SCMR 437 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-18Read full judgment →
• Hikmat Khan Versus Shamsur Rehman1993 SCMR 428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-30Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Hussain Versus State1993 SCMR 417 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-08-26
  murderbenefit of doubtocular evidencecorroborative evidencealibiprosecution burdenacquittaldiscrepanciesrecovery of weaponsinvestigation flaws
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the appellant's murder conviction but reduced his death sentence to life imprisonment, while dismissing the complainant's revision against the acquittal of co-accused. The Supreme Court considered whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the acquittal of co-accused on similar evidence, discrepancies in ocular and medical evidence, and issues with the investigation and recovery of weapons. The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond doubt, highlighting inconsistencies in witness statements, the unreliability of recovery evidence, and the questionable handling of the investigation. It reiterated that the prosecution's burden to prove guilt beyond doubt remains constant, irrespective of the strength or weakness of the defense's alibi. Consequently, the Supreme Court extended the benefit of doubt to the appellant, setting aside his conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the benefit of doubt be extended to an accused when co-accused, named by the same eye-witnesses, are acquitted due to lack of corroborative evidence?
  • Does the prosecution's burden to prove its case beyond doubt diminish if the defense fails to substantiate its plea of alibi?
  • What impact do significant discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence have on the prosecution's case?
  • Is recovery evidence reliable if there are unexplained delays in arrest and recovery, and inconsistencies in the recovery memo and witness testimony?
  • Can a defense plea, even if not fully proven, be sufficient to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Qudrat Ali Versus Government of N.-W.F.P.1993 SCMR 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-09-09
  Wajibul ArzShamilat landFederal Shariat CourtIslamic injunctionscustomary lawvillage common propertyconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed under Article 203-F of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged a decision of the Federal Shariat Court which dismissed a petition against certain entries in the Wajibul Arz of village Bhooja, Mansehra, concerning village common property (Shamilat) and customary rights. The core legal question was whether entries in a Wajibul Arz reflecting village agreements regarding the apportionment and limitation of common land rights constitute 'law' under the Constitution and whether they are repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The Supreme Court held that the entries in the Wajibul Arz regarding the distribution and reservation of Shamilat land were based on mutual agreements and covenants among the original settlers and proprietors rather than on custom having the force of law, and thus did not fall within the definition of law reviewable by the Federal Shariat Court. Furthermore, the court held that such private covenants are fully consistent with Islamic injunctions upholding the sanctity of contracts. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether entries in a Wajibul Arz recording village common property rights amount to law or private agreement?
  • Does the Federal Shariat Court have jurisdiction under the Constitution to examine agreements and compacts relating to immovable property?
  • Are restrictive entries in a Wajibul Arz concerning Shamilat land repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
  Read full judgment →
• Excise and Taxation Officer, Karachi Versus Burmah Shell Storage and Distribution Company of Pakistan Ltd.1993 SCMR 338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-11
  taxing statuteinterpretation of statutescharging sectionschedule inconsistencyimport and export licence taxstrict constructionfiscal law
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan, which declared the levy and demand of tax under sections 10 and 8 of the West Pakistan Finance Acts, 1962 and 1963, along with penalties, to be illegal, without lawful authority, and of no legal effect. The core legal question was whether an apparent irreconcilable inconsistency between the charging sections and the Third Schedules of the Acts—where the charging section levied tax on the value of goods imported or exported under an import/export licence, while the Third Schedule provided a fixed amount of tax based on the value of the licence itself—could be resolved through judicial interpretation to harmonize the provisions and achieve the legislative object. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that in fiscal and taxing statutes, courts must look strictly to the letter of the law, and where a conflict between the body of an Act and its schedule creates an insuperable ambiguity that cannot be reconciled without rewriting the statute, the enactment cannot be enforced. The key principle laid down is that taxing statutes are to be construed strictly according to their plain language, allowing no room for intendment, equity, presumption, or supplying assumed deficiencies by judicial legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an irreconcilable inconsistency between the charging section and the schedule of a taxing statute can be resolved by judicial construction to enforce the levy?
  • Can courts supply an omission or rewrite provisions in a fiscal statute to support an assumed legislative deficiency?
  • Does a tax schedule that prescribes the amount of tax based on the value of a licence prevail over a charging section that levies tax on the value of goods imported?
  • What are the established canons of construction when interpreting fiscal and taxing statutes regarding intendment, equity, and the plain meaning of words?
  Read full judgment →
• Ibrahim Ishaq Johri Versus Commissioner of Income Tax (West), Karachi1993 SCMR 287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-01
  residential statusordinary residenttribal areaSwat Stateincome taxdwelling placetaxable territoryreference to high court
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave challenges the Sindh High Court's judgment regarding the taxability of income earned by an ordinary resident of Pakistan from business in Swat State, a tribal area where the Income-tax Act, 1922 was not formally extended. The core legal questions involved whether an ordinary resident of Pakistan is liable to tax under the Income-tax Act, 1922 for income derived from Swat State despite its constitutional exemption, and whether the inference that the appellant maintained a dwelling place in Pakistan for the requisite statutory period was correct in law. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant had the status of a resident and ordinary resident in taxable territory in Pakistan, his global income, including income from Swat State, was subject to tax under the charging and application provisions of the Act, equating Swat State income in this context to foreign income of a resident. Furthermore, the court held that concurrent findings regarding the maintenance of a dwelling place and residential status were findings of fact conclusive upon the tribunal. The appeals were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ordinary resident of Pakistan is liable to pay income tax under the Income-tax Act, 1922 in respect of business income earned in Swat State when the said Act was not formally applied to Swat State under Article 223 of the Constitution of 1962?
  • Whether the maintenance of a dwelling house by an assessee's wife in Karachi where a telephone is installed in the assessee's name constitutes the maintenance of a dwelling place for the assessee under section 4-A(a)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  • Whether the findings of fact regarding an assessee's residential status and maintenance of a dwelling place recorded by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal can be disturbed by the High Court in reference jurisdiction under section 66 of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  Read full judgment →
• Regional Commissioner, Income-Tax Companies II, Karachi Versus S. Sultan Ali Jeoffrey S. Muhammad Shahudul Haque, Advocate Supreme Court and Akhlaque Ahmed Siddiqui1993 SCMR 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-25
  cash rewardinformer schemetax evasionsales tax assessmentincome tax lossquantification of taxexcise duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two connected appeals arising from a dispute over a cash reward claimed by a non-official informer under the Cash Reward to Informers Scheme, 1974, for supplying information regarding tax evasion by Valika Chemical Industries. The core legal question was whether the informer was entitled to cash rewards for information concerning the evasion of income tax and sales tax where assessments resulted in reduced losses or additional tax demands without subsequent recovery. The Supreme Court held that the informer was entitled to a reward regarding sales tax because the information led to the detection of evaded sales tax and the creation of an additional demand, and recovery was not a prerequisite under the Scheme. However, the Court held that the informer was not entitled to a reward for income tax because the company remained in a net loss position, making it impossible to quantify the amount of tax sought to be evaded, which is a mandatory basis for calculating rewards under paragraph 2 of the Scheme. The appeals were disposed of accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Is an informer entitled to a cash reward under the Cash Reward to Informers Scheme when information leads to the detection of tax evasion but no tax recovery is made due to the company going into liquidation?
  • Does the reduction of carried-over losses resulting from an informer's information constitute evasion of income tax for the purpose of calculating a cash reward under the Scheme?
  • Can a cash reward be granted under the Cash Reward to Informers Scheme when the amount of tax sought to be evaded cannot be quantified?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jaffar Versus State1993 SCMR 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-06-29Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Khan Versus Government of Pakistan1993 SCMR 2385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-09-13Read full judgment →
• Riffat Akram Versus Chairman, Admission Board/Principal, King Edward Medical College, Lahore , Abdul Samad Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Mehdi Khan Mehtab, Advocate -on-Record1993 SCMR 2370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-08-17
  medical college admissiondisabled students quotajudicial reviewexpert opinionmedical boardeducational institutionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition filed by a student seeking admission to a medical college under a reserved quota for disabled persons. The petitioner, suffering from polio, was denied admission after a Board of Medical Specialists determined she was not physically fit to pursue medical studies or perform professional duties, as required by the prospectus governing the 1992-93 academic session. The core legal question was whether the court could interfere with the expert determination of a medical board regarding a candidate's physical fitness for a professional course. The Supreme Court held that the Admission Board's decision, based on the expert opinion of five senior specialists, was valid and that the court could not substitute its own opinion for that of the specialized medical board. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition, affirming that judicial review does not extend to replacing expert medical assessments with judicial findings, and accordingly refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court substitute its own opinion for the findings of a specialized medical board regarding a candidate's physical fitness for medical studies?
  • Is the decision of an admission board to deny entry to a disabled student based on an expert medical report subject to judicial interference?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas Versus Muhammad Ashraf1993 SCMR 2289 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-27
  pre-emption suitamendment of pleadingsMofussil areaoccupancy rightsIslamic jurisprudenceliberal construction of pleadingsremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit regarding the sale of occupancy rights. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s suit, holding that the ground of 'ownership in the estate' was not explicitly pleaded in the plaint. The Supreme Court examined whether the strict construction of pleadings in Mofussil areas was appropriate and whether the court should permit an amendment to the plaint to clarify the grounds for pre-emption. The Court held that the right of pre-emption is a valid legal right under Islamic jurisprudence and should not be treated as 'predatory' or denied on technical grounds. Emphasizing that pleadings from Mofussil areas should be construed liberally, the Court ruled that where a fact is essentially established or undisputed, the court has a duty to allow the amendment of pleadings in the interest of justice, even at a late stage. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the amendment, set aside the High Court's judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court for a fresh trial, subject to the payment of costs.

  Questions settled

  • Should pleadings in Mofussil areas be subjected to strict rules of construction?
  • Is the right of pre-emption considered a predatory right under Pakistani Islamic jurisprudence?
  • Can a court allow the amendment of a plaint at a late stage if the underlying facts are undeniable?
  • Does the failure to explicitly state a ground in a plaint necessarily preclude a plaintiff from relief if the fact is otherwise established?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahbaz Afghan Versus State1993 SCMR 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-21
  narcoticsprohibitionleave to appealsentencing mitigationtaubahudoodcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a convict sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment, whipping, and a fine under section 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 following the recovery of large quantities of narcotics including charas, opium, and heroin. The core legal questions involve whether the convict was entitled to the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, whether such relief could be granted by the Federal Shariat Court, and whether the principle of repentance or Tauba could be applied to mitigate the sentence. The Supreme Court held that while the general principle underlying section 9(5) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 regarding reformation and Tauba may be applied where not prohibited, the petitioner had already received adequate leniency through a substantial reduction of his heavy sentence by the Federal Shariat Court. The Court affirmed that no further interference was warranted given the heinous nature of the crime, thereby refusing leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that equitable considerations of reformation like Tauba can be considered in criminal sentencing unless prohibited by law, but adequate relief already granted by lower forums precludes further interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be claimed in narcotics cases?
  • Can the principle of repentance or Tauba be applied in sentencing under laws dealing with crimes other than property offences?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a sentence substantially reduced by the Federal Shariat Court for a heinous narcotics offense?
  Read full judgment →
• Ameena Bi Versus Kuppuswami Naidu1993 SCMR 2172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-09
  execution of decreeCourt Receiverpartition suitlimitation periodadverse possessionCode of Civil Procedurenullity of sale
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that dismissed the appellant's suit for possession, holding it barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Limitation Act. The core legal question was whether a money decree obtained against a Receiver, specifically targeting the estate of a co-defendant (Muhammad Sheriff), could be legally executed against properties allotted to the appellant (Ameena Bi) in a separate partition suit, and whether the appellant's subsequent suit for recovery of possession was time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the decree in question was limited to the personal liability of Muhammad Sheriff and his share in the estate held by the Receiver; it did not bind the estate of the appellant's father. Consequently, the execution proceedings against the appellant's properties were unauthorized and void. The Court affirmed that the appellant, not being a party to the original suit, was not subject to Section 47 proceedings. Furthermore, the suit for possession, filed within twelve years of dispossession, was within the limitation period under Article 65 of the Limitation Act.

  Questions settled

  • Can a money decree passed against a specific defendant's estate in the hands of a Receiver be executed against properties allotted to a third party in a separate partition suit?
  • Is a suit for possession filed by a third party whose property was illegally auctioned in execution proceedings barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • When does the limitation period begin to run for a suit for possession based on title under Article 65 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Kamu Alias Kamu Ammal Versus M. Muthayya1993 SCMR 2153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-09-25Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique Versus State1993 SCMR 2114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-14
  murderright of private defenceexceeding right of private defenceculpable homicide not amounting to murdercommon intentionconflicting versionsproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals arise out of a murder case involving a dispute over a plot of land, which resulted in the death of Muhammad Ajmal and injuries to other parties. The trial court convicted Muhammad Siddique under section 302/34, P.P.C., and sentenced him to death, while acquitting some co-accused and convicting others. The Lahore High Court maintained the conviction and death sentence of Muhammad Siddique, dismissed the State's appeal against certain acquittals, but acquitted Inayatullah. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court examined the conflicting versions of the occurrence, the medical evidence showing injuries on the accused party, and the question of self-defense. The Supreme Court held that the appellant caused the death without premeditation while exceeding his right of private defence, thereby altering the conviction from section 302, P.P.C. to section 304, Part I, P.P.C., and sentenced him accordingly, while also convicting Inayatullah under section 304, Part I/34, P.P.C. The key legal principle laid down is that where the prosecution suppresses injuries sustained by the accused and the evidence reveals a sudden fight arising from a property dispute, the accused may be entitled to the partial benefit of the right of private defence, converting a murder conviction under section 302 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304, Part I, P.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused in a criminal altercation affects the veracity of the prosecution case?
  • When does an accused person exceed the right of private defence of person and property?
  • Can a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to section 304, Part I, P.P.C. when the homicide is committed without premeditation during a sudden dispute?
  • Is a co-accused liable under section 304 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for acting in furtherance of a common intention during a sudden fight?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz Versus Sainan Bibi Alias Hussaina Bibi1993 SCMR 2110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob Versus Jehangir Khan1993 SCMR 2108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-09Read full judgment →
• Quetta Hindu Panchayat Versus Dilshad Akhtar1993 SCMR 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-08-30
  evacuee propertyevacuee trust propertyHindu Panchayatcremation groundallotment of landSettlement LawsBoard of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Quetta Hindu Panchayat challenges the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, which had set aside the Member, Board of Revenue's order declaring a disputed cremation ground property as non-evacuee. The core legal questions concerned whether the property was ever validly treated as evacuee property prior to the statutory target date under evacuee laws, and whether it could be legally allotted to displaced claimants given its ownership by a non-migrating religious community and continuous use for religious purposes. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant Hindu Panchayat did not migrate and retained physical and administrative control of the property, it was never legally declared or treated as evacuee property prior to the critical date under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957, making the subsequent allotments and transfers void, coram non judice, and without lawful authority. The ratio is that property belonging to a non-migrated religious institution and used for religious purposes cannot be treated as evacuee property or included in the compensation pool without a valid declaration by the Custodian before the relevant statutory cutoff date.

  Questions settled

  • Whether property belonging to a non-migrating religious institution can be treated as evacuee property?
  • Can property be validly treated as evacuee property after the target date mentioned in section 3 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957?
  • Does the Board of Revenue acting under the Settlement Laws (Repeal) Act 1974 have jurisdiction to determine if a property is non-evacuee?
  • Are allotments of religious or trust properties made to claimants in satisfaction of claims valid without a prior determination by the Custodian?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Waris Versus Sohbat Khan1993 SCMR 2093 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-26
  agreement to sellpre-emption suitco-vendeesmisreading of evidenceconcurrent findingsmutation
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals by leave of the Court are directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 25-11-1985, which dismissed the appellants' regular first appeal arising from concurrent findings regarding a disputed land transaction and pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the High Court and trial court misread or ignored material evidence regarding an alleged agreement to sell and whether the appellants proved their status as co-vendees. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly interpreted the document as an agreement to sell rather than a sale deed, and that concurrent findings regarding discrepancies, interpolations in the scribe's register, and lack of proof of consideration were based on proper appreciation of evidence without any misreading. The Court laid down that concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence and the validity of transaction documents will not be interfered with by the apex court unless clear misreading or omission of material evidence is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement to sell can be construed as a completed sale deed?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding document interpolation be interfered with in appeal?
  • Whether the High Court misread the evidence regarding the status of co-vendees in the disputed land transaction?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad Versus State1993 SCMR 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-14
  sudden and grave provocationreasonable doubtculpable homicidecriminal appealre-appraisal of evidencebenefit of doubtmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction for murder, where the appellant challenged the findings of the lower courts. The core legal question was whether the appellant’s plea of sudden and grave provocation—arising from discovering his sister in a compromising position with the deceased—was sufficient to mitigate the offence, particularly when the prosecution’s version of a planned attack was contested. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution’s evidence was not free from reasonable doubt and that the defence version could not be dismissed as entirely false. The Court held that in such marginal cases, where the prosecution fails to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, the benefit must be extended to the accused. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction for murder, substituting it with a conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under the relevant statutory provision. The principle established is that where the defence version of sudden and grave provocation is plausible and the prosecution case is doubtful, the benefit of the doubt warrants a reduction in the offence and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the discovery of a sister in a compromising position with a man constitute sudden and grave provocation sufficient to mitigate a murder charge?
  • When the prosecution case is not free from reasonable doubt and the defence version is plausible, is the accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Can a conviction for murder be converted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder based on the plea of sudden and grave provocation?
  Read full judgment →
• M. K. Muhammad Versus Muhammad Abu Bakar1993 SCMR 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ishaq Alias Kali Versus State1993 SCMR 1989 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-19
  murdercompromiseBadal-e-Sulhacquittalcriminal appealdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Muhammad Ishaq alias Kali, was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Muhammad Ashraf and sentenced to death. While his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the legal heirs of the deceased—specifically the mother, father, and brother—entered into a compromise with the appellant. They acknowledged receiving Rs. 2,25,000 as Badal-e-Sulh and formally forgave the appellant. The Court examined and approved this compromise in chambers and verified it in open court. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant, ordering his immediate release unless required in any other case. This judgment affirms the legal validity of a compromise (Badal-e-Sulh) between the heirs of a deceased and the accused in a murder case, leading to the acquittal of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code be set aside based on a compromise between the accused and the heirs of the deceased?
  • Does the payment of Badal-e-Sulh to the legal heirs of a deceased victim justify the acquittal of an appellant convicted of murder?
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• Shafi Muhammad Versus Imam Din1993 SCMR 1953 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tariq Versus Hasin Jahan1993 SCMR 1949 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-11
  dismissal for defaultdate of hearingtemporary injunctionnon-prosecutionrestoration of suitvoid ordercivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a revision petition arising from a suit's dismissal for default. The appellant filed a civil suit seeking a share in property and applied for a temporary injunction. The trial court fixed a date solely for hearing arguments on the injunction application, but on that date, neither the appellant nor his counsel appeared, whereupon the trial court dismissed the entire suit for want of prosecution. Subsequent applications for restoration and appeals up to the High Court were unsuccessful. The core legal question was whether a date fixed for hearing arguments on an interim injunction application constitutes a date of hearing of the suit itself, empowering the court to dismiss the suit for non-prosecution under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the trial court could only dismiss the injunction application in the plaintiff's absence and lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the suit itself on a date not fixed for its hearing, rendering the dismissal order void. The Supreme Court established that a date fixed exclusively for interlocutory matters such as temporary injunctions is not a date of hearing for the substantive suit, and a dismissal of the suit on such a date is void without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a date fixed for hearing arguments on a temporary injunction application considered the date of hearing of the main suit under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether a trial court is competent to dismiss a substantive suit for non-prosecution on a date fixed solely for hearing an interlocutory application?
  • What is the legal status of an order dismissing a suit for non-prosecution on a date not fixed for the hearing of the suit?
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• Basharat Iqbal Versus State1993 SCMR 1901 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-21
  quashmentterritorial jurisdictioncriminal complaintsecond marriageabetmentfamily dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of a quashment application filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The underlying dispute involved a private complaint against the petitioner for allegedly abetting a second marriage without requisite proceedings before an arbitration council, in violation of Section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. The petitioner challenged the territorial jurisdiction of the Lahore court, arguing the marriage occurred in Hyderabad. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that under Section 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, both the courts at Hyderabad and Lahore possessed jurisdiction to try the matter. Regarding the merits of the case and the applicability of Section 6(5), the Court declined to intervene, directing the petitioner to raise these arguments before the trial court, with the liberty to seek further remedies if unsuccessful. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 confer concurrent territorial jurisdiction on courts in different cities for the trial of a criminal complaint?
  • Can a High Court dismiss a quashment application filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the trial court has not yet adjudicated the merits of the case?
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• State Versus Muhammad Naseer1993 SCMR 1822 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-06
  appeal against acquittalretracted confessionZina-bil-JabrOffence of Zina Ordinanceexhumationcorroboration of confessionpolice custodyjudicial lock-up
  Summary & questions settled

  The State appealed against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which set aside the respondent's conviction and death sentence under Section 6(3)(b) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, and acquitted him of committing Zina with a deceased woman's exhumed corpse. The primary issue was whether the respondent could be convicted for Zina liable to Tazir based exclusively on his retracted judicial confession under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, purportedly corroborated by medical evidence and recovery. The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal, holding that conviction on a retracted confession requires strong, independent corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused to the crime. The Court observed that the confession was doubtful as to voluntariness because the respondent was provided negligible reflection time and was returned to police custody rather than sent to judicial lock-up. Furthermore, medical evidence established only the act itself without linking the respondent to it. Adhering to the settled principles governing appeals against acquittal, the Court found no misreading or disregard of material evidence justifying interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be sustained solely on a retracted confession without independent corroboration connecting the accused to the commission of the offence?
  • Does remanding an accused to police custody instead of judicial lock-up immediately after recording a confession under Section 164 Cr.P.C. render its voluntariness doubtful?
  • Does medical evidence confirming the commission of an offence suffice as corroboration to link an accused to a retracted confession?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal rendered by an appellate court?
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• M. Ismail Qureshi Versus M. Awais Qasim, Secretary-General, Islami Lamiat Tulba, Pak1993 SCMR 1781 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-10
  student politicseducational institutionsexamination malpracticefundamental rightsstudent unionsparental jurisdictionnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the regulation of student conduct and examination integrity in educational institutions across Pakistan. The Supreme Court addressed two primary issues: the prohibition of student "indulgence in politics" and the management of examination malpractices. Regarding student politics, the Court confirmed its interim order requiring students and guardians to provide an undertaking against political involvement, while clarifying that such measures must adhere to principles of natural justice, including the right to a fair opportunity of defense. The Court prohibited the association of student unions with the organizational setup of educational institutions but permitted the formation of student groups focused on educational and extra-curricular activities under institutional supervision. Regarding examination malpractices, the Court established a procedural framework requiring institutional decisions to be reviewed by the Advocate-General of the respective province, with subsequent references to the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that while it exercises parental jurisdiction, institutional authorities must ensure fairness, reasonableness, and the avoidance of coercion, maintaining that the Supreme Court retains supervisory oversight over these matters.

  Questions settled

  • Can educational institutions require students to sign an undertaking prohibiting indulgence in politics as a condition for admission?
  • Does the prohibition of student politics in educational institutions violate fundamental rights?
  • What is the required procedure for handling examination malpractices in educational institutions to ensure fairness?
  • Can student unions be prohibited from associating with the organizational setup of educational institutions?
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• Muhammad Nasim Butt Versus State1993 SCMR 177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-19
  narcoticsheroin possessionleave to appealappreciation of evidenceconfession before policewitness credibilitycarrier liability
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for the possession of 65 kilograms of heroin. The petitioner contended that the prosecution evidence was unreliable, citing the failure of independent witnesses (Mashirs) to support the case, alleged collusion between a raiding officer and a co-accused, and the inadmissibility of a confession made before the police. The petitioner further argued that, excluding the inadmissible confession, he should be treated as a mere carrier rather than an owner. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, holding that the failure of independent witnesses to support the prosecution, in the context of high-stakes narcotics cases, often indicates the winning over of witnesses rather than the falsity of the prosecution's case. The Court found that, even excluding the petitioner's statement to the police, sufficient evidence existed to establish his culpability beyond that of a mere carrier. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of independent witnesses (Mashirs) to support the prosecution case necessarily invalidate a conviction in a narcotics case?
  • Can a conviction for narcotics possession be sustained if the accused's confession before the police is excluded from consideration?
  • Is an accused person who is found in possession of a large quantity of narcotics automatically entitled to be treated as a mere carrier?
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• Rehmat Ali Versus Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab1993 SCMR 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-31Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ilyas Versus State1993 SCMR 1602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-09
  criminal appealmurderocular and medical conflictbenefit of doubteyewitness credibilitycorroborationballistic expertacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal with leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code and their sentence of death for the murder of two persons. The core legal questions involved the credibility of related eye-witnesses, the presence of corroborative evidence, and the direct conflict between ocular evidence and medical evidence regarding the distance and angle of firing. The Supreme Court evaluated the evidence and noted serious infirmities, including delay in the First Information Report, unexplained delays in police investigation, the withholding of a material eye-witness, and medical testimony confirming scorching and direct trajectories inconsistent with firing from a rooftop at a distance of 18 feet. Holding that the ocular testimony was unreliable and uncorroborated, and that tainted evidence cannot corroborate another piece of tainted evidence, the Court gave the benefit of the doubt to the appellants. The appeal was consequently allowed, the conviction and sentences were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether tainted evidence can be used to corroborate another piece of tainted evidence?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the distance of firing?
  • Does the withholding of a material eye-witness by the prosecution give rise to an adverse inference against its case?
  • Whether inconsistencies in recovery evidence and delayed first information reports warrant extending the benefit of the doubt to the accused in a capital case?
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• Muhammad Nawaz Versus Muhammad Aslam1993 SCMR 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-17
  acquittalZinaQazfLian proceduredivorceburden of proofHudood Ordinancemarriage dissolutionenticementTazir punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the acquittal of respondents in a case involving charges under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, and the Pakistan Penal Code, following a husband's accusation of Zina against his wife. The trial court had conducted the procedure of Lian under Section 14 of the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979, dissolving the marriage and acquitting all respondents, a decision affirmed by the Federal Shariat Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the wife's demand is a prerequisite for Lian and if a wife can be punished for Zina (Tazir) after Lian. The Court held that while Lian ideally requires the wife's demand, mutual participation without objection validates the procedure. It also found the wife failed to prove her claim of divorce, confirming the marriage's subsistence. The Court dismissed the appeal, noting insufficient evidence for Zina against the wife, thus declining to rule on the Tazir punishment question.

  Questions settled

  • Is a wife's demand a prerequisite for initiating the procedure of Lian?
  • Can the procedure of Lian be nullified if the parties participated without objection, even if the wife did not formally demand it?
  • Does the burden of proof for divorce lie with the party claiming it when a previous marriage is admitted?
  • Is mere presence of a woman with a male relative sufficient to prove the offence of Zina?
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• Sahibzada Mustafa Versus Wazir Muhammad Awan1993 SCMR 1584 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-12Read full judgment →
• Javaid Masih Versus State1993 SCMR 1574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-18
  retracted confessioncorroborationQatal-e-AmdcompromiseWaliQisasleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a conviction for the murder of the petitioner's sister and another individual, Shahzad. The petitioner sought to challenge the conviction, arguing that the confession was retracted and inadmissible, and further attempted to file a compromise application under Islamic law provisions. The core legal questions were whether the conviction could be sustained upon a retracted confession corroborated by other evidence, and whether a compromise could be accepted when the legal heirs of one of the two victims were not identified or present. The Court held that the conviction was sound, as the retracted confession was sufficiently corroborated by the recovery of the weapon, cartridges, and the petitioner's own conduct. Regarding the compromise, the Court held that it could not be accepted because the legal heirs of one victim were absent, and the alleged representative failed to prove his status as a Wali. The Court affirmed that under the law, where multiple victims exist, a waiver by the Wali of one victim does not affect the rights of the Wali of another victim.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted confession be used to sustain a conviction if it is corroborated by independent evidence?
  • Does a waiver of Qisas by the legal heirs of one victim affect the rights of the legal heirs of another victim in a case involving multiple murders?
  • Can a compromise application be accepted in a murder case if the legal heirs of one of the victims are not identified or present?
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• Province of Sindh Versus Din Muhammad1993 SCMR 1551 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-28
  youthful offenderjuvenile detentionSindh Children Actstatutory interpretationsentencing limitationsProvincial Government powershabeas corpus
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that set aside an order of the Provincial Government detaining a youthful offender, Muhammad Jamil, for seven years. The core legal question was whether the Provincial Government, when acting under Section 68(2) of the Sindh Children Act, 1955, possesses unlimited power to sentence a youthful offender, or whether it is bound by the age-related detention limits prescribed in the Act. The Supreme Court held that the Provincial Government’s power is not absolute and remains subject to the statutory limitations of the Act. The Court affirmed that Section 68(1) prohibits sentencing a youthful offender to imprisonment, and Section 71 restricts detention beyond the age of eighteen. The Court clarified that the Provincial Government cannot exercise authority wider than that of the trial court and must adhere to the Act's protective framework. Additionally, the Court interpreted Section 68(2), ruling that the grounds for reporting a case to the Provincial Government are disjunctive, meaning a finding on any one of the specified grounds is sufficient to trigger the reporting mechanism.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Provincial Government have unlimited power to sentence a youthful offender under Section 68(2) of the Sindh Children Act 1955?
  • Are the grounds for reporting a case to the Provincial Government under Section 68(2) of the Sindh Children Act 1955 conjunctive or disjunctive?
  • Can a youthful offender be detained beyond the age of eighteen under the Sindh Children Act 1955?
  • Does the prohibition against imprisonment in Section 68(1) of the Sindh Children Act 1955 apply to the Provincial Government?
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• Saidullah Versus Federal Public Service Commission1993 SCMR 1550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ozair Versus Province of Punjab Shah Abdul Rashid and Ejaz Muhammad Khan, Advocate-on-Record1993 SCMR 1548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-24Read full judgment →
• Nasir Ahmed Versus State1993 SCMR 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-04
  post-arrest bailblasphemy lawsreligious feelingsstatutory interpretationcriminal liabilityprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant bail to the petitioner, who was charged under Sections 295-A, 295-C, and 298-C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The charges arose from the use of specific religious expressions on a wedding invitation card, which the prosecution alleged constituted defiling the name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and outraging religious feelings. The core legal question was whether the act of 'defiling' is determined solely by the words used ex facie or whether it requires an examination of the broader context, including the accused's faith, intention, and background. The Supreme Court observed that the expressions used did not prima facie appear derogatory or offensive in isolation, noting that the alleged offense only arises when external knowledge of the accused's background is applied. Consequently, the Court held that the case presented serious questions requiring in-depth examination at trial. The petition was converted into an appeal, the High Court's order was set aside, and the petitioner's bail was confirmed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the offense of defiling the name of the Holy Prophet require an examination of the accused's background and intent, or is it determined solely by the words used?
  • Does the use of specific religious expressions on a wedding invitation card constitute an offense under Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is an offense punishable by three years' imprisonment subject to the prohibitory clause regarding the grant of bail?
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• Badshah Jan Versus Shahzada Sirajuddin1993 SCMR 1444 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-09
  land disputeChitralSanadIslamic common lawproprietary rightsconstitutional jurisdictionFederal Land Commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through leave of the court arises from the refusal of the High Court to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction regarding a land dispute in Chitral, which had traversed through various forums including the Chitral Land Inquiry Commission, the Federal Land Commission, and the Tribunal Land Disputes. The core legal questions pertained to the nature of the appellants' rights under an old Sanad granted by the former Ruler of Chitral, the legal competence of a successor Ruler to disregard that Sanad, and the validity of proprietary rights claimed through subsequent forced ejectments and exaction of services. The Supreme Court held that the successor Ruler's act contrary to the ancestor's command and the general Islamic Law was illegal and without lawful authority, and that the appellants' long-standing possession exempted from service and rent constituted a valid proprietary grant. The key principle laid down is that under Islamic common law, unconstitutional and oppressive acts of an autocratic ruler cannot create rights for beneficiaries or operate as an estoppel against subjects who submitted under coercion, and where a vacuum exists in statutory dispensation, Islamic common law applies.

  Questions settled

  • What was the nature of rights as tenants or otherwise of the appellants under the Sanad granted in the previous century?
  • Whether a successor Ruler could defy the previous Ruler's command regarding the rights of the appellants in the land in dispute?
  • If the act of the successor Ruler is rendered without lawful authority, do the appellants have any right in the land on account of their possession without the obligation of rendering Khidmat or Qalang?
  • Does the passive submission of subjects to unconstitutional and illegal acts of an autocratic ruler operate as an estoppel against them under Islamic common law?
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• S. Manzoor Raza Versus Member (Admn.), Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad1993 SCMR 1438 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-05-02
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingsincome tax assessmentmisconductwithholding incrementsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld a departmental order imposing a penalty of withholding four increments without cumulative effect upon the petitioner, an Assistant Income-tax Officer. The petitioner was charge-sheeted for finalizing an assessment for the year 1984-85 within one day of receiving a duplicate return, despite ongoing investigation proceedings against the assessee. While the Inquiry Officer exonerated the petitioner regarding the first charge, he found the petitioner guilty of the second charge concerning the assessment procedure. The petitioner contended that the assessment was justified based on the assessee's past history as a salaried person qualifying for self-assessment and argued he lacked jurisdiction over the association of persons involved in the complaint. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether, given the specific facts and the assessee's history, the petitioner's decision to proceed with the assessment under the Income-tax Ordinance was legally justified or constituted misconduct warranting disciplinary action under the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Was the petitioner justified in making an assessment under Section 59 of the Income-tax Ordinance given the assessee's history?
  • Did the petitioner's actions in finalizing the assessment constitute misconduct under the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules?
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• Muhammad Younis Versus Muqadam Sultan1993 SCMR 141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-28
  execution proceedingseviction orderfrivolous litigationcompensatory costsburden of proofPardahnashin ladiesobjection petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed a revision petition regarding execution proceedings. The petitioner, a judgment-debtor under an eviction order, filed an objection petition alleging that the decree-holders had entered into a compromise with him, effectively renewing the tenancy and superseding the eviction order. The executing court, the appellate court, and the High Court all concurrently rejected this contention, finding that the petitioner failed to discharge the heavy burden of proof regarding the alleged compromise, particularly given the status of the decree-holders as Pardahnashin ladies. The Supreme Court upheld these findings, noting that if a genuine compromise existed, the petitioner should have produced the respondents before the court to withdraw the execution. The Court affirmed that judgment-debtors have a legal and moral obligation to honor decrees and surrender possession. Finding the litigation frivolous and intended to delay execution, the Court dismissed the petition and imposed compensatory costs on the petitioner for the undue financial loss and agony caused to the decree-holders.

  Questions settled

  • Does an alleged compromise between a judgment-debtor and a decree-holder, which is not formally recorded or verified before the executing court, suffice to supersede an existing eviction order?
  • Is the burden of proof on a party asserting a compromise with Pardahnashin ladies to prove the execution of documents and the validity of the transaction?
  • Can the Supreme Court impose compensatory costs on a judgment-debtor for filing frivolous objections that delay the execution of a decree?
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• Pakistan Services Limited Versus Commissioner of Income Tax (Revision), Karachi1993 SCMR 1406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-04
  trading lossfixed assetscompulsory acquisitionincome taxlex non cogit ad impossibiliaEast Pakistanrecognition of statewritten down value
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the admissibility of trading losses claimed by various assessees regarding fixed assets located in former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) that were lost following the 1971 war. The core legal question was whether such losses, arising from the compulsory acquisition of assets by the Bangladesh government, qualified for deduction under Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, and whether the statutory requirement to 'write off' such assets in the books of account could be waived given the impossibility of performance. The Supreme Court held that the compulsory acquisition of assets by the Bangladesh government constituted a valid ground for claiming loss under Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, once the State of Bangladesh was recognized by the Government of Pakistan. The Court further held that the legal maxim 'lex non cogit ad impossibilia' (the law does not compel the impossible) applied, excusing assessees from the strict requirement of writing off assets in their books when such action was rendered impossible by the circumstances of the war and subsequent political events.

  Questions settled

  • Does the compulsory acquisition of assets by the Bangladesh government qualify as a loss under Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act 1922?
  • Can the statutory requirement to write off assets in the books of account be waived if the circumstances make such an act impossible?
  • Does the retrospective recognition of Bangladesh by the Government of Pakistan validate the compulsory acquisition of assets for the purpose of tax deductions?
  • Is a reference application under Section 136 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 time-barred if the order was passed after the repeal of the Income-tax Act 1922?
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• Chairman, WAPDA, Lahore Versus Zahoor Ahmad1993 SCMR 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-14
  service tribunallimitationremandWAPDAterms and conditions of servicespeaking orderquantum of punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had converted the respondent's removal from service into retirement without first adjudicating the threshold issue of limitation. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal could bypass the mandatory determination of limitation—specifically after a remand order from the Supreme Court—and proceed to grant relief on merits by converting the penalty of removal into retirement. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred in law by failing to address the limitation issue, which was a condition precedent for exercising jurisdiction. The Court further held that the Tribunal's conversion of removal into retirement was unsupported by findings of mala fides or bias, and lacked the requisite speaking reasons. The key principle laid down is that Service Tribunals, despite their broad powers to mould relief, must strictly adhere to procedural norms, including the mandatory resolution of limitation issues before reaching the merits, and must provide cogent, reasoned orders that demonstrate a conscious application of mind to the facts and law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Service Tribunal convert a penalty of removal from service into retirement without first determining the question of limitation?
  • Is a Service Tribunal required to provide cogent, speaking reasons when modifying the quantum of punishment awarded to a civil servant?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to modify a penalty under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act without a finding of mala fides or bias?
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• Wali Muhammad Versus Muhammad Shah1993 SCMR 1365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-13Read full judgment →
• Arshad Kamal Khan Versus Saeeda Khalid Kamal Khan , Abdul Rauf, Advocate Supreme Court and M.A.I. Qarni, Advocate­-on-Record1993 SCMR 1360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-29Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Said Amir Versus Deputy Commissioner/District Collector, Sargodha1993 SCMR 1358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-21Read full judgment →
• Summeri Versus Muhammad Saleh , Khan Muhammad Bajwa, Advocate instructed by S. Abul Asim Jaferi, Advocate-on-Record1993 SCMR 1353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-20Read full judgment →
• Fateh Khan Versus Begum Jan1993 SCMR 135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-05
  occupancy tenantabandonment of tenancycultivation through tenant-at-willrevenue recordsleave to appealtenancy rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent judgments of the lower courts decreeing the respondents' suit for possession of land based on occupancy rights. The core legal question was whether the occupancy rights had extinguished due to abandonment under section 38 of the Tenancy Act. The Supreme Court held that the lower forums correctly concluded that abandonment was not established, as the revenue records consistently showed the occupancy tenant cultivated the land through tenants-at-will, including co-owners, and the conditions for statutory abandonment were not met. The key principle laid down is that physical self-cultivation by an occupancy tenant is not mandatory, and cultivation through sub-tenants or lessees—even if they are co-owners—prevents the extinguishment of occupancy rights under section 38 of the Tenancy Act, provided the requirements of cultivation and rent arrangement are satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the occupancy rights of a tenant are extinguished under section 38 of the Tenancy Act when the land is cultivated through a tenant-at-will?
  • Is physical self-cultivation by an occupancy tenant obligatory under the law to prevent abandonment?
  • Can co-owners in possession of land as tenants-under the occupancy tenant deny the rights of the occupancy tenant?
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• Rasul Bibi Versus Sikandar Hayat1993 SCMR 1336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-09
  pre-emptionPattisub-division of villagerevenue recordburden of proofhomogeneity of descentagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the plaintiff claimed a superior right of pre-emption based on ownership within a specific 'Patti' (sub-division). The core legal question was whether the mere mention of a 'Patti' in revenue records sufficiently establishes a 'recognized sub-division' of a village under Section 15(c) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the mere nomenclature of 'Patti' in revenue documents does not automatically constitute a recognized sub-division. The Court affirmed that to satisfy the statutory requirement, a claimant must demonstrate that the sub-division possesses well-defined attributes, specifically homogeneity of area or descent of the proprietors. Such attributes must be established through evidence regarding the history of the village or settlement records, such as the Kafiayat-e-Deh. Revenue entries created primarily for fiscal purposes are insufficient to discharge the burden of proof. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the plaintiff failed to provide the necessary evidence to prove that the claimed Patti was a recognized sub-division.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere mention of a 'Patti' in revenue records establish a recognized sub-division of a village for the purposes of a pre-emption claim?
  • What criteria must be met to prove that a 'Patti' constitutes a recognized sub-division under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
  • Is homogeneity of area or descent a necessary attribute for a village sub-division to qualify under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
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