Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Bashir vs Senior Superintendent of Police (City), Lahore1987 SCMR 865 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-01
  civil servantdisciplinary proceedingsshow-cause noticemisconductwilful absenceservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding disciplinary proceedings against a civil servant. The petitioner contended that the charges leveled against him were vague and lacked specificity, particularly regarding alleged threats to local inhabitants. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that his mere implication in a criminal case under the Pakistan Penal Code did not constitute misconduct, especially since he was later cleared, and that his absence from duty was not wilful as it was supported by a medical certificate. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted that the petitioner's response to the show-cause notice was submitted only after the impugned disciplinary order had already been issued. The Court found that the Tribunal had appropriately considered the material on record, including the nature of the petitioner's absence, and had even adopted a lenient view. Finding no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's decision, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, affirming that disciplinary findings based on the record will not be disturbed where the petitioner failed to timely respond to show-cause notices.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere implication of a civil servant in a criminal case constitute misconduct per se?
  • Can a civil servant challenge disciplinary findings on the basis of vague charges if they failed to respond to the show-cause notice in a timely manner?
  • Is a Service Tribunal's finding regarding the wilful nature of a civil servant's absence from duty subject to interference if based on the record?
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• Muhammad Bashir vs Mst. Nasiran And Another1987 SCMR 999 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-25
  evacuee propertydemarcation of propertyfunctus officiosettlement authoritiespermanent transfer deedwrit jurisdictionproperty identification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the identification and demarcation of an evacuee house in Rawalpindi, claimed by three different parties under conflicting property numbers (G/116-A, G/117, and G/119). The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authorities became functus officio regarding the demarcation of property boundaries once a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) had been issued, or if they retained jurisdiction to resolve such disputes. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Authorities are not universally functus officio upon the issuance of a P.T.D. and remain the appropriate forum to identify and demarcate the property they originally transferred, especially when the parties themselves invoked that jurisdiction. The Court established that Civil Courts cannot effectively adjudicate property rights until the subject matter—the specific property transferred—is clearly identified by the authority that transferred it. Consequently, the High Court's decision directing the parties to the Civil Court was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Settlement Authorities for a proper, lawful demarcation based on relevant settlement records.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed render Settlement Authorities functus officio regarding the demarcation of property boundaries?
  • Are Settlement Authorities the competent forum to identify and demarcate property transferred under settlement schemes?
  • Can a Civil Court adjudicate the extent of property rights before the specific property transferred has been identified and demarcated by the Settlement Authorities?
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• Muhammad Bashir vs Mirza And Other1987 SCMR 1277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-29
  giftsalepre-emptionsecond appealfindings of factburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines whether the High Court was justified in second appeal in interfering with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts that an ostensible gift was genuine. The core legal question involved whether the transaction in dispute, registered as a gift, was in reality a sale intended to defeat a superior right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts failed to examine the evidence in its true perspective, noting that the appellant was unrelated to the donor, belonged to a different village, and failed to establish any adoption or natural obligation justifying such a valuable gift. The Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the judgment of the High Court decreeing the pre-emption suit, laying down the principle that concurrent findings of fact based on a misreading or failure to properly appreciate the evidence can be interfered with by appellate courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court in second appeal can interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the nature of a transaction?
  • Does an ostensible gift made to an unrelated person without established ties constitute a sale to defeat pre-emption?
  • What is the effect of failing to properly evaluate oral and documentary evidence on record by the lower courts?
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• Muhammad Bashir And Others vs Abdul Latif1987 SCMR 2032 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-02
  civil suitleave to appealdemarcation of propertySettlement Departmentconcurrent findingsjurisdiction of civil court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a defendant in a civil suit, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing his regular second appeal, which had upheld the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts in favor of the respondent. The core legal question revolved around the jurisdiction of the civil court to examine the question of demarcation and title of a property transferred by the Settlement Department. The Supreme Court held that where both parties claimed title and demarcation from the Settlement Authorities, the factual findings rendered by those authorities and subsequently concurred upon by the three civil courts regarding the distinct identities and titles of the properties were not open to scrutiny on the factual plane by the civil court. The Court laid down the principle that concurrent factual findings based on evidence regarding property demarcation and title determined by settlement authorities cannot be reopened or scrutinized by civil courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to scrutinize on a factual plane the demarcation and title of a property already decided by the Settlement Authorities?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact recorded by lower courts regarding the distinct identities of properties open to interference in second appeal?
  • Can a party challenge property demarcation before a civil court when both parties claim title from the Settlement Department?
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• Muhammad Azeem Khan vs Muhammad Amin (Deceased) Through His1987 SCMR 2015 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-01
  constitutional petitionbona fide purchaserland settlementallotment of landdisplaced personsfactual controversyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the Lahore High Court's dismissal of a constitutional petition regarding the refusal of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to upset an earlier land allotment made to Ahmad Din. The disputed land was originally allotted to Ahmad Din, who sold it to Muhammad Amin, who was held by the courts to be a bona fide purchaser for value. Following earlier remand proceedings, the Chief Settlement Commissioner re-examined the entitlement and genuineness of Ahmad Din's allotment and upheld it, finding his total allotted units were well within his verified entitlement. The High Court dismissed the subsequent constitutional petition in limine. The core legal question was whether the factual inquiry conducted by the Chief Settlement Commissioner regarding the allottee's entitlement and the genuineness of the allotment warranted interference by the superior courts. The Supreme Court held that the determination of factual controversy by the designated authority with exclusive jurisdiction does not warrant interference unless perverse, and the conclusions drawn from original records cannot be reopened in constitutional or appellate jurisdiction. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused, affirming the protection of bona fide purchasers and the finality of factual findings by specialized settlement authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a bona fide purchaser for value on the basis of public record is entitled to protection of his rights?
  • Can the superior courts interfere with the factual findings of a designated settlement authority in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether an inquiry conducted under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 by the Chief Settlement Commissioner is open to re-examination on factual disputes by an appellate court?
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• Muhammad Azeem And Another vs Talib Hussain And Another1987 SCMR 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-18
  habeas corpusabductioncriminal registrationminor custodypolice recoverySupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan following an impugned order directing the registration of a criminal case against the petitioners. The factual background involved the abduction of a six-month-old minor from the lawful custody of the mother, Mst. Shahnaz, allegedly by one Jamil with the connivance of the petitioners. This incident occurred while the mother was attending High Court proceedings regarding a habeas corpus petition filed for her own recovery. Despite a High Court order for the production of the child through police intervention, the minor remained unrecovered. The mother expressed grave apprehension regarding the child's safety, citing the prior killing of her first daughter by her in-laws. The core legal question was whether the High Court's direction to register a criminal case under Section 364 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was justified given the circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the facts of the case did not justify any interference with the High Court's order, noting the continued failure to produce the minor. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to produce a minor child in a habeas corpus proceeding justify the registration of a criminal case against the alleged abductors?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court order directing the registration of a criminal case?
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• Muhammad Ayyub And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 1906 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-07
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryvicarious liabilitycriminal procedureevidentiary discrepancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of bail by the Lahore High Court in a criminal case involving charges under sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners were accused of participating in a violent altercation resulting in fatalities and injuries. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail pending trial, given contentions regarding false implication, the specific roles attributed to them, and discrepancies between the alleged weapons used and the nature of the injuries sustained by the prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court observed that the dimensions of the injuries on the prosecution witnesses appeared inconsistent with the weapons allegedly used by the petitioners, necessitating further inquiry. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted bail to the petitioners. The key principle established is that where there are significant discrepancies in the prosecution's evidence, such as the nature of injuries not matching the alleged weapons, a case for further inquiry is made out, justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy between the alleged weapon used and the nature of injuries sustained by victims constitute grounds for further inquiry in a bail application?
  • Is the determination of vicarious liability in a criminal case a matter to be decided at the trial stage rather than at the bail stage?
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• Muhammad Ayub vs The Chairman, Electricity Board, WAPDA, Peshawar and Another1987 PLD Supreme Court 195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-10
  double jeopardydepartmental proceedingscompulsory retirementcriminal acquittalservice lawWAPDA Efficiency and Discipline Rulesconstitutional protection
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Sub-Divisional Officer at WAPDA, challenged his compulsory retirement imposed through departmental proceedings following his acquittal by a Special Judge in a criminal trial involving charges of illegal gratification. The petitioner contended that the departmental punishment violated Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, which protects against double jeopardy, arguing that he could not be punished for the same charges for which he had been acquitted. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the protection against double punishment under Article 13 applies specifically to criminal prosecutions for the same offence. The Court clarified that the term 'offence' in this constitutional context refers to a crime punishable under criminal law. Consequently, the Court ruled that departmental proceedings and the subsequent imposition of penalties under the WAPDA (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules are distinct from criminal prosecution and are not barred by the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, even if the underlying facts are the same as those in a criminal trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the constitutional protection against double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 bar departmental proceedings against a civil servant who has been acquitted of criminal charges based on the same facts?
  • Does the term 'offence' in Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 encompass penalties imposed during departmental disciplinary proceedings?
  • Can a civil servant be subjected to departmental disciplinary action after being acquitted of criminal charges for the same conduct?
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• Muhammad Aslam vs The State1987 SCMR 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-11
  leave to appealdeath sentencemurderwithholding witnessre-appraisement of evidencematrimonial disputesentence mitigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with a sentence under section 324 for injuring a prosecution witness. The prosecution case alleged that the petitioner and a co-accused attacked the deceased with daggers due to a matrimonial dispute regarding the divorce of the petitioner's wife, Mst. Maqboolan, who was the deceased's daughter. The defense contended that the prosecution withheld Mst. Maqboolan, an essential eye-witness whose presence at the scene was admitted by prosecution witnesses during cross-examination, thereby concealing the true version of events involving a sudden altercation and self-defense. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal restricted to the question of sentence alone, noting that the concurrent findings on evidence by the courts below warranted re-appraisement specifically regarding the quantum of sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal can be granted solely on the question of sentence when the conviction has been concurrently affirmed by the courts below?
  • Does the withholding of a material eye-witness by the prosecution warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether re-appraisement of evidence is permissible on the question of sentence in a criminal appeal arising from a capital punishment case?
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• Muhammad Aslam vs Raja Azhar Mahm00d And Another1987 SCMR 1979 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-29
  grave and sudden provocationculpable homicidemurderself-controlcriminal appealaltercation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines whether the High Court was justified in extending the benefit of Exception 1 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code to the respondent. The incident arose from a fatal altercation between two co-employees wherein the deceased allegedly teased the respondent by calling him a 'Chamcha'. The High Court had treated the fight as a single continuing transaction involving grave and sudden provocation due to head injuries sustained during the scuffle. The Supreme Court held that the utterance of the word 'Chamcha' and the ensuing scuffle did not constitute grave and sudden provocation sufficient to deprive a person of ordinary sense and calmness of their power of self-control, particularly given the delayed use of the firearm after the initial separation. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's finding, altered the conviction from culpable homicide not amounting to murder to murder, and substituted the sentence to imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether calling a person a 'Chamcha' constitutes grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Did the High Court err in treating two separate stages of a fight as a single continuing transaction for the purpose of granting the benefit of mitigation?
  • What is the proper test for determining the gravity of provocation in a murder trial?
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• Muhammad Aslam vs Jalal Din And Another1987 SCMR 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-11
  suit for possessionevacuee propertyadverse possessionrevision petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the order of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's revision petition. The matter originated from a suit for possession of land measuring 3 Kanals 19 Marlas brought by the respondent. While the trial court initially dismissed the suit, the appellate court partially accepted the respondent's appeal, finding him to be the owner of 19 Marlas of the land transferred to his father as evacuee property, which was in the possession of the petitioner. The appellate court directed the petitioner to remove the malba within sixty days. The petitioner challenged this decision via a revision petition, which was dismissed by the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, upon hearing the parties and reviewing the record, determined that the petitioner failed to establish that he had matured his title over the suit land through adverse possession. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can successfully resist a suit for possession of land without establishing that they have matured their title over the suit land through adverse possession?
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• Muhammad Aslam And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-16
  appreciation of evidencecriminal appealocular testimonyleave to appealconvictionlife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' criminal appeal and maintained their convictions and sentences of life imprisonment for offences under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The case arose from an incident on 28-7-1980 in District Lahore, resulting in the death of one Zulfikar and injuries to Abdul Khaliq. The prosecution relied on ocular testimony, including that of the injured witness, Abdul Khaliq, who was found to be disinterested and impartial. The trial court and the High Court had both accepted the prosecution's evidence, noting the deceased sustained eighteen injuries, including a firearm injury. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the evidence was not worthy of reliance and had not been properly appreciated. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that there was no infraction of any rule or principle of law governing the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases. Consequently, the Court found no substance in the petition and dismissed it, affirming the lower courts' findings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with the appreciation of evidence by lower courts when no rule or principle of law has been violated?
  • Is the testimony of an injured witness who is neither related nor inimical to the accused sufficient to sustain a conviction?
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• Muhammad Aslam And Another vs Mst. Sardar Begum Alias Noor Nishan1987 SCMR 813 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-10
  special leave to appealminoritysale-deedcivil suitevidentiary valuebirth and death registeragricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' revision petition in limine. The underlying dispute arose from a civil suit filed by the respondent seeking possession of agricultural land she had previously sold to the petitioners via a sale-deed dated 23-1-1978. The respondent alleged that she was a minor at the time of the transaction, rendering her incompetent to execute the sale. While the trial court initially dismissed her suit, the Additional District Judge subsequently decreed it in her favor, a decision upheld by the High Court in revision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the respondent was indeed a minor at the time of the sale-deed's execution, specifically concerning the evidentiary value and linkage of the birth and death register extract relied upon by the respondent. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the petitioners' contention regarding the lack of evidence linking the birth record to the respondent required further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and ordered the status quo to continue.

  Questions settled

  • Does an extract from a register of births and deaths constitute sufficient proof of minority without evidence linking the document to the specific individual?
  • Can a sale-deed executed by a minor be set aside in a suit for possession?
  • What is the standard for granting leave to appeal in a civil revision matter involving disputed questions of fact?
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• Muhammad Asif And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 1670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-05
  criminal appealmurderunlawful assemblyprivate defenseappreciation of evidencehigh court reversalfirearm injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the trial court's acquittal of several accused and its conviction of Muhammad Asif under section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code, instead convicting the appellants under sections 148, 307 read with 149, and 302 read with 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, imposing sentences including death and rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecution version of an unprovoked armed attack by the appellants or the defence version of private defense and a prior altercation was established by the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly appreciated the evidence and rejected the defence's improbable version, finding that the appellants were the aggressors who had ambushed the complainant party. The key principle laid down is that the plea of private defense must be evaluated against the probabilities of the case, the nature of injuries, and the physical evidence, and cannot be sustained when contradicted by established facts and common sense.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal and partial conviction recorded by the trial court?
  • Does the plea of right of private defense stand established when inconsistent with the probabilities and physical evidence of the case?
  • Whether multiple injuries caused by two types of firearms negate the defence version of an isolated aggressor party?
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• Muhammad Ashraf vs Sharak Haider And Other1987 SCMR 1872 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-26
  acquittalleave to appealappreciation of evidenceocular testimonyinjured witnessesbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed against the acquittal of the respondents by the trial court and the High Court in a murder and murderous assault case. The core legal question is whether the courts below properly applied the established principles of appreciation of evidence in criminal cases while rejecting the ocular testimony of injured and independent eye-witnesses and granting acquittal to the accused. The Supreme Court held that the reasons recorded by the courts below for rejecting the testimony of the eye-witnesses and acquitting the respondents who were attributed active roles were unsatisfactory, especially given that two eye-witnesses sustained injuries and the accused were known. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider the proper appreciation of evidence in criminal cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the courts below properly applied the well-established principles of appreciation of evidence in criminal cases?
  • Can the testimony of injured eye-witnesses be discarded without satisfactory reasons when their presence at the spot is established?
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• Muhammad Ashraf vs Deputy Director Food, Multan Region And Another1987 SCMR 122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-11
  service lawdepartmental proceedingsdismissal from serviceshow-cause noticePunjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rulesshortage of goods
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his dismissal from service and the imposition of a financial penalty. The petitioner, a civil servant, was accused of a shortage in wheat supply during his tenure at a procurement centre. Departmental proceedings were initiated against him under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, following which he was issued a show-cause notice, afforded an opportunity of being heard, and subsequently dismissed from service with a penalty imposed for the alleged shortage. The core legal question was whether the departmental proceedings and the subsequent dismissal were conducted in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court held that the procedure adopted by the authorities in terminating the petitioner's services and imposing the penalty was strictly in accordance with the law. Consequently, the Court found the Service Tribunal's decision to dismiss the appeal justified and refused to interfere with the impugned order, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether departmental proceedings conducted under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, were procedurally valid in the instant case?
  • Is a civil servant entitled to relief against dismissal if the departmental authority followed the prescribed procedure and provided an opportunity of being heard?
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• Muhammad Ashraf Khan And Others vs Administrator (RP)_Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore And Other1987 SCMR 1358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-13
  residual propertiesevacuee propertytransfer of propertybuilding siteconstitutional jurisdictionfindings of factpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from three appeals raising common questions concerning the interpretation of "available properties" and "possession" under the Scheme for the Management and Disposal of Available Urban Properties, framed pursuant to section 3 of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The core legal questions involved the entitlement of applicants to the transfer of building sites based on possession and construction prior to the target date of 1st January 1976, and the extent of interference by High Courts in constitutional jurisdiction regarding concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that where statutory authorities, after spot inspection, recorded concurrent findings of fact that the appellants failed to establish permanent construction or possession prior to the target date of 1st January 1976, such factual determinations could not be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that claimants of building sites must strictly fulfill the temporal requirements of possession and construction as stipulated under the Scheme. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact recorded by residual property tribunals regarding the date of construction can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • What constitutes a "building site" and "possession" for the purposes of claiming transfer under the Scheme for the Management and Disposal of Available Urban Properties?
  • Are claimants entitled to the transfer of a building site if they fail to prove permanent construction prior to the target date of 1st January 1976?
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• Muhammad Ashraf And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-18
  leave to appealocular evidenceinterested witnessre-appraisal of evidencemurder convictionwitness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' appeal against their conviction and sentence of life imprisonment for murder. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners, along with a deceased co-accused, murdered the victim due to a motive involving illicit relations with the co-accused's daughter. The core legal question was whether the ocular evidence provided by the prosecution witnesses, particularly an alleged independent witness, was sufficient to sustain the conviction, or whether the testimony suffered from such variations and improbabilities as to render it unreliable. The Supreme Court held that the findings of fact reached by the lower courts did not suffer from any legal infirmity. The Court rejected the contention that the witnesses were interested, finding that the alleged connection of the independent witness to the complainant was too remote to suggest false implication. Consequently, the Court found no grounds for re-appraisal of evidence and dismissed the petition, affirming that minor variations in testimony do not undermine the substantive reliability of eyewitness accounts in murder cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of minor variations and improbabilities in the testimony of an eyewitness necessarily render their evidence unreliable?
  • Can a witness be considered 'interested' due to a remote or old connection with the complainant party?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court undertake a re-appraisal of evidence in a criminal appeal?
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• Muhammad Ashraf Alias Achhu vs The State1987 SCMR 363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-20
  murderdeath sentencemitigating circumstancecompromisecommutation of sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Muhammad Ashraf, was convicted of murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to death, a conviction and sentence subsequently upheld by the High Court. Upon filing a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the father of the deceased appeared and submitted an affidavit confirming a compromise had been reached. This compromise involved compensation and the marriage of two girls from the accused's family to two boys from the deceased's family. The complainant explicitly stated he had forgiven the accused. The petitioner's counsel requested that this compromise be considered a mitigating circumstance to reduce the death sentence. The State offered no objection to this request. The Supreme Court, treating the petition as an appeal, held that the compromise constituted a valid mitigating circumstance. Consequently, the Court maintained the conviction under Section 302 but commuted the sentence of death to imprisonment for life, establishing the principle that a compromise between the parties in a murder case can serve as a mitigating factor for sentencing purposes.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise between the parties in a murder case be considered a mitigating circumstance for sentencing?
  • Is it permissible for the Supreme Court to reduce a death sentence to imprisonment for life based on a compromise reached between the accused and the complainant?
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• Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmad vs Muhammad Zubair And Other1987 SCMR 596 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-11
  murderacquittalenhancement of sentenceocular evidenceleave to appealcriminal revisionreasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a murder case. The convicts, Muhammad Zubair and Muhammad Zafar, challenged their convictions for the murder of Fayyaz Ahmad and causing injuries to others, while the complainant sought the reversal of the acquittal of a co-accused, Muhammad Ishaque, and the enhancement of the convicts' sentences. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the convictions based on ocular evidence, the propriety of the acquittal of the co-accused, and whether the sentences warranted enhancement. The Supreme Court held that the convictions of the two primary accused were well-founded on the testimony of independent witnesses, including a court bailiff and injured parties, and dismissed their appeal, noting it was also time-barred. Regarding the acquittal of the co-accused, the Court declined to interfere, affirming that even if a different view of the evidence were possible, it did not constitute sufficient grounds to set aside an acquittal. Furthermore, the Court refused to enhance the sentences, finding that the initial lack of premeditation and the presence of injuries on the accused mitigated the circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Can an acquittal be set aside by the Supreme Court merely because a different view of the evidence is possible?
  • Is the testimony of a court bailiff and injured witnesses sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Does the absence of premeditation and the presence of injuries on the accused justify refusing an enhancement of sentence?
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• Muhammad Asghar And 3 Others vs The State1987 SCMR 2011 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-25
  criminal petitionleave to appealmurdercommon objectinterested witnessesinjured witnessesdying declarationappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses two connected criminal petitions arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a murder case with a background of extreme enmity. The trial court had convicted several accused persons under section 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, sentencing some to death and others to imprisonment for life, while acquitting a few. Upon appeal, the High Court maintained certain convictions, reduced the death sentences to imprisonment for life in some instances, and acquitted several respondents. The convict-petitioners challenged their convictions, whereas the complainant sought sentence enhancement and the reversal of acquittals. The Supreme Court heard the contentions regarding the appreciation of ocular testimony, the use of an unaccepted dying declaration for corroboration, and the presence of interested witnesses bearing injuries. Finding it necessary to examine whether the evidence was properly appraised in accordance with safe administration of criminal justice, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions and ordered bailable warrants for the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of injured eye-witnesses requires independent corroboration when they are considered interested witnesses?
  • Can a statement of a deceased person not formally treated as a dying declaration be utilized to corroborate ocular testimony?
  • Whether the High Court properly appraised the evidence in accordance with the principles of safe administration of criminal justice.
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• Muhammad Asghar Ali vs Inayat Ullah And Other1987 SCMR 1278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-16
  suspension of sentencefree fightcommon intentionmurderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of this Court is directed against an order passed by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court suspending the sentence of respondents who were convicted under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in suspending the respondents' sentences on the assumption that a free fight had occurred, rendering section 34 inapplicable, without evaluating the evidence on record. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's approach was erroneous as it based its opinion on assumptions rather than a careful consideration of the evidence on record. The impugned order of the High Court was consequently set aside and the appeal was allowed. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court cannot suspend a sentence or make assumptions regarding a free fight without examining the evidence on the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in suspending the sentence of the respondents on the assumption of a free fight without considering the evidence on record?
  • Can an appellate court suspend a sentence based merely on the assumption that a free fight took place between the parties?
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• Muhammad Arshad vs Muhammad Islam And Other1987 SCMR 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-01
  specific performanceagreement to sellconcurrent findingscivil revisionsupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises out of a suit filed by the appellant for the specific performance of an agreement to sell a half share in a shop, which was dismissed by the trial Court upon finding that no such agreement existed. The District Judge affirmed the dismissal in appeal, and the High Court subsequently declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower Courts through a revision petition. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant challenged these concurrent findings. The Supreme Court observed that the material issues raised pure questions of fact and noted that the appellant failed to point out any misreading of evidence or demonstrate that the conclusions of the lower courts were unsupported by the record. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court was entirely justified in declining to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts when no misreading of evidence is pointed out?
  • Does the mere appendage of a signature on a deed amount to its valid execution when the executant is unaware of its contents?
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• Muhammad Arshad Rana And Others vs Ikhlaque Ahmad And Other1987 SCMR 1525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwar vs The State1987 SCMR 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-12
  criminal appealmurder convictionSection 382-B Cr.P.C.under-trial periodsentence computationcompensation to heirsreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Muhammad Anwar, was convicted for the murder of Muhammad Aslam and sentenced to death, which the High Court subsequently commuted to life imprisonment while enhancing the fine. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, instigated by his father, stabbed the deceased with a knife (Chhuri) following a dispute over sugarcane cutting. The petitioner challenged the conviction before the Supreme Court, arguing that the lower courts failed to properly appreciate the evidence and the defense version. The Supreme Court reviewed the judgments of the courts below, finding the prosecution's case supported by the testimony of an injured eyewitness and the recovery of the weapon. The Court declined to interfere with the conviction or engage in a reappraisal of evidence. However, regarding the petitioner's request for the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Court held that the benefit of counting the period spent as an under-trial prisoner would be granted only if the petitioner paid the compensation amount of Rs. 20,000 to the heirs of the deceased before the expiry of his sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be made conditional upon the payment of compensation to the heirs of the deceased?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the appreciation of evidence in a criminal case?
  • Should sentences for separate offenses run concurrently or consecutively when the court does not specify otherwise?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwar Butt vs Election Tribunal, Daska And 3 Other1987 SCMR 933 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-10
  local government electionsecrecy of ballotelection petitionmaterially affected resultillegalities by polling staffconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examines whether an election held under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 could be declared void as a whole due to the recording of National Identity Card numbers on ballot papers by polling staff, without proof that the result was materially affected. The appellant contested and won a union council election, which was subsequently challenged via an election petition on grounds including the violation of the secrecy of the poll. The Election Tribunal declared the entire election void, finding multiple illegalities and omissions by the presiding officer, including failure to seal ballot papers properly and noting identity card numbers on them, rendering votes invalid and making it impossible to ascertain the true result. The High Court dismissed the appellant's constitutional petition. The Supreme Court held that where the departure from prescribed methods and violation of the secrecy of the ballot is so fundamental, all-pervasive, and gross as to make it an election not conducted under the governing statute, the election must be declared void as a whole without needing to prove that the result was materially affected. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an election can be declared void as a whole for violation of the secrecy of the ballot without proof that the result was materially affected?
  • Does the recording of National Identity Card numbers on ballot papers by presiding officers invalidate the votes cast?
  • When does a departure from prescribed election methods render an election not conducted under the governing statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwar And 11 Others vs Nazir Ahmed1987 SCMR 672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-14
  withdrawal of appealregular first appealpower of counselVakalatnamapre-emption suitinherent powers
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed their application under Section 151, C.P.C. for setting aside an earlier order dismissing their Regular First Appeal as withdrawn. The core legal question was whether the petitioners' counsel and one of the co-appellants had the authority to withdraw the appeal and whether the withdrawal was vitiated by lack of understanding of court proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly examined the Vakalatnama which authorized the counsel to compromise the matter, and that the counsel had unequivocally asked for the appeal to be withdrawn. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a counsel armed with a Vakalatnama containing powers of compromise can validly withdraw an appeal on instructions, and subsequent regrets or assertions of lack of authorization by a co-appellant without substantive proof do not furnish grounds for setting aside a withdrawal order under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a counsel authorized by a Vakalatnama to compromise a matter has the authority to withdraw an appeal?
  • Can an order dismissing an appeal as withdrawn be set aside under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the appellant did not understand English court proceedings?
  • Whether one of multiple appellants can challenge the withdrawal of an appeal made through counsel and co-appellant statements without sufficient proof of lack of authorization?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin Shah vs Haji Muhammad1987 SCMR 7 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionleave to appealinheritancevendors
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a pre-emption suit. The petitioner challenged a registered sale deed through which land was purchased, while the respondent filed a suit for pre-emption claiming a superior right based on relationship to the vendors. The trial court decreed the suit, and the lower appellate court dismissed the appeal. The High Court partially modified the decree, dismissing the suit regarding the shares of certain vendors while maintaining it for others. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, raising contentions regarding the impact of the precedent in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Malik Said Kamal Shah and the interpretation of the term 'person entitled to inherit land' under section 15(b) of the Pre-emption Act. The Supreme Court held that the contentions required consideration, granted leave to appeal, directed security, and ordered the maintenance of status quo.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emptor claim a superior right of pre-emption on the basis of relationship with vendors in view of the rule laid down in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Malik Said Kamal Shah?
  • Whether a pre-emptor can be treated as a person entitled to inherit land under clause thirdly of section 15(b) of the Pre-emption Act with regard to maternal-aunts, maternal-cousins, and husbands of maternal-aunts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 1522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-02
  pre-arrest bailparity of treatmentcriminal liabilityFIR allegationsspecific roleleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' application for pre-arrest bail in a criminal case involving sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to pre-arrest bail given the specific allegations in the FIR and the principle of consistency regarding co-accused who had already been granted bail. The Supreme Court held that the petition for Anwar A.I. was correctly dismissed because the FIR ascribed a specific role to him, namely inflicting a blow on the complainant. Conversely, the Court allowed the appeal for Mohammad Amin, finding his case indistinguishable from other co-accused who had been granted bail, as no specific role was attributed to him in the FIR. The key principle laid down is that the grant of pre-arrest bail should be consistent with the roles attributed to co-accused; where no specific role is assigned to a petitioner, they may be entitled to bail on parity with similarly situated co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of parity apply to the grant of pre-arrest bail when co-accused have been granted relief?
  • Is pre-arrest bail appropriate for an accused when the FIR attributes a specific, injurious role to them?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be converted into an appeal to grant relief to one co-accused while denying it to another?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin And 2 Others vs Mst. Safia Begum1987 SCMR 1818 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-19
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantbona fide personal requirementreconstructionconsent orderSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from three petitions for leave to appeal filed by tenants against concurrent ejectment orders obtained by their common landlady in respect of three shops in Quetta, which were sought for reconstruction and personal use of the property. The core legal question concerned the bona fide personal requirement of the landlady, specifically challenged on the ground that another tenant in the same building had not been evicted. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the contention regarding the remaining tenant was untenable as it was neither raised in the written statement nor supported by good faith, noting furthermore that the parties subsequently agreed to a modified arrangement. The Court accordingly converted the petitions into appeals and disposed of them in terms of a joint consent statement, maintaining the eviction orders subject to the condition that the tenants shall vacate the premises immediately after the landlady obtains possession from the other tenant and demolishes that portion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an objection regarding bona fide personal requirement can be raised for the first time during cross-examination without being pleaded in the written statement?
  • Can ejectment orders be modified on the basis of a consent statement and joint prayer of the parties before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin & Co. vs Iqbal Ashraf And Other1987 SCMR 784 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-16
  contractual disputeauction bidconcurrent findings of factspecial leave to appealvaluation of goodsrefund of bid money
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a contractual dispute concerning an auction for the disposal of coal ashes and cinder at the Shahdara Power Station. The petitioner, having made the highest bid, deposited the full amount, but the bid was never formally confirmed by the Additional Chief Engineer. After being stopped from removing the goods, the petitioner sought a full refund of the bid money, claiming no goods were removed, while the respondents contended that one-third of the goods had already been taken. The trial court, affirmed by the High Court, found as a matter of fact that the petitioner had removed one-third of the goods and adjusted the refund accordingly. The Supreme Court addressed the core question of whether these concurrent findings of fact regarding the quantity of goods removed and their valuation were sustainable. Holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any infirmity in the concurrent findings of the lower courts, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, reaffirming the principle that it will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on the appreciation of evidence absent a clear legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the quantity of goods removed in a contractual dispute?
  • Does the appreciation of evidence by lower courts regarding the valuation of goods constitute a question of law suitable for appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aman vs The State1987 SCMR 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-05
  petition for leave to appealcircumstantial evidencelast seensodomymurdermitigating circumstancedelay in execution
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which convicted the petitioner under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of a minor child and under section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code for committing sodomy, sentencing him to death and nine years' rigorous imprisonment respectively. The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, including last-seen evidence, recovery of the dead body at the petitioner's pointation, recovery of incriminating blood-stained weapons and clothing, and corroborative medical and chemical examiner reports. The petitioner's counsel did not contest the conviction on merits but sought a reduction of the death sentence solely on the ground of prolonged delay of six years spent in the condemned cell. The Supreme Court held that prolonged incarceration in the condemned cell does not constitute a mitigating circumstance warranting the commutation of the death sentence in heinous crimes. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether prolonged incarceration in the condemned cell can be considered a mitigating circumstance for the reduction of a death sentence?
  • Can a conviction for murder and sodomy be sustained solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence including last-seen evidence and recoveries?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aliand Others vs Settlement and Rehabilitation1987 SCMR 901 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-03
  displaced personland allotmentsettlement and rehabilitationconstitutional petitionre-confirmation of allotmentpreferential right
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the constitutional petition of the appellants regarding the cancellation of land allotments. The core legal questions involve whether the land confirmation made in favor of the appellants in April 1957 had become final and whether subsequent re-confirmation proceedings were void, and whether a Jadid claim form was properly transferred. The Supreme Court held that the allotment made in favor of the appellants on 24-4-1957 stood restored by virtue of an earlier Supreme Court decision, making any subsequent re-confirmation and cancellation proceedings illegal and void. The Court established that where an allotment is restored by a superior court, subsequent inconsistent proceedings by lower authorities are without legal effect, and sitting allottees possessing prior proposed allotments hold a preferential right over later-received claims.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the confirmation of land in the name of allottees that had not been challenged by any person had become final?
  • Whether subsequent re-confirmation and proceedings after a final allotment are void and ineffective?
  • Whether a Jadid claim was properly transferred to the relevant Chak?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs Mst. Hameeda Begum1987 SCMR 1538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-12
  Sind Rented Premises Ordinancelandlord and tenantevictionco-ownershipsubstantial question of lawleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the interpretation of Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question presented is whether the benefit of the summary eviction procedure provided under Section 14 is restricted exclusively to a full owner of the demised premises, or whether such relief is also available to a co-owner who falls within the specific categories mentioned in the statute, such as a widow, a minor whose parents are deceased, a salaried employee nearing retirement, or a person who has attained the age of 60 years. The Court determined that this issue constitutes a substantial question of law requiring authoritative consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, allowed the petition, and directed that the petitioner shall not be evicted from the premises pending the final decision of the appeal, subject to the continued deposit of rent. The Court also ordered that notice be issued to the Advocate-General of Sindh to assist in the determination of this legal question.

  Questions settled

  • Is the benefit of Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 restricted to a full owner of the demised premises?
  • Can a co-owner who is a widow, minor, or retiree avail the summary eviction benefits under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali Shah vs Nook Muhammad And Other1987 SCMR 1546(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-16
  restoration of appealnon-prosecutionlimitationgross negligenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of the petitioner's application for restoration of a second appeal, which had previously been dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether the petitioner provided sufficient grounds to justify the restoration of the appeal despite the significant delay in filing the application. The Supreme Court observed that the appeal was dismissed on 16-9-1979, while the restoration application was not filed until 24-3-1980. The Court found no satisfactory explanation for the petitioner's failure to inquire about the status of the appeal during this interval. Consequently, the Court held that the learned Single Judge correctly determined that the application was time-barred and demonstrated gross negligence on the part of the petitioner. The principle laid down is that a party seeking restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution must provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay and demonstrate due diligence; absent such justification, the court will not interfere with a finding of gross negligence and time-bar.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to inquire about the status of an appeal for several months constitute gross negligence?
  • Can an application for restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution be rejected on the grounds of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali And Another vs Assistant Commissioner, Narowal And Another1987 SCMR 795 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-18
  quashment of proceedingscriminal breach of trustcheatingcivil disputeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' application for the quashment of criminal proceedings pending against them under Sections 420 and 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code before a Magistrate at Narowal. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings ought to be quashed where the underlying dispute between the parties is essentially of a civil nature arising from a breached business contract and delayed repayment of money. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the dispute was civil in nature, as there was no evidence of a dishonest intention at the very inception of the transaction to constitute cheating or criminal breach of trust. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that criminal proceedings cannot be sustained for a breach of contract absent proof of initial fraudulent intent, thereby setting aside the impugned criminal proceedings and directing the release of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings under sections 420 and 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code be sustained when the underlying dispute is essentially of a civil nature?
  • Whether criminal proceedings should be quashed in the absence of evidence showing a dishonest intention at the time of the initial transaction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali And Another vs Abdus Sattar And Other1987 SCMR 1959 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-27
  constitutional petitionsettlement authoritiestransfer of propertyremandpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which accepted a constitutional petition and remanded a property dispute case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision. The dispute concerned four rooms on the first floor of a composite property in Faisalabad, claimed by both the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants (as part of a transferred ground-floor shop) and by respondent No.1 (who filed a C.H. Form and claimed prior possession). The High Court had set aside the transfer of the rooms to the appellants' predecessor and remanded the matter due to lack of adequate opportunity for respondent No.1 to prove his possession and failure by settlement authorities to properly investigate the nature of the property and possession dates. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the remand order, holding that crucial factual questions regarding possession dates and whether the rooms formed an independent unit or part of the shop required proper inquiry. To remove any apprehension, the Court directed that the remand proceedings be decided uninfluenced by the High Court's observations, and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in remanding the case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for re-examining the question of possession and transfer of the disputed rooms?
  • Did the settlement authorities properly inquire into whether the occupant's possession of the disputed rooms originated prior to the target date?
  • Whether the disputed rooms constituted an independent unit or formed an appropriate part of the shop transferred to the appellants' predecessor?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Alam and Another vs Additional Secretary to Government1987 PLD Supreme Court 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-03
  cognizance of offencecriminal proceduredischarge of accusedProvincially Administered Tribal Areascancellation of casepolice reportwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment, which had set aside an order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner discharging murder accused persons under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the Additional Deputy Commissioner, acting under the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Criminal Laws (Special Provision) Regulation 1975, possessed the authority to discharge or cancel a case under Section 169 or Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after having already taken cognizance of the offence. The Supreme Court held that once a court has taken cognizance of a case under the Regulation, it is legally obligated to proceed according to the prescribed statutory framework, specifically the constitution of a Tribunal. The Court ruled that the power to cancel a case under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is not available after cognizance has been taken. Consequently, the discharge order was declared illegal and without lawful authority, and the original cognizance was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Can a case be cancelled under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after a court has already taken cognizance of the offence?
  • Does the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Criminal Laws (Special Provision) Regulation 1975 permit the discharge of an accused under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after cognizance has been taken?
  • What is the effect of taking cognizance on the court's power to discharge an accused under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram vs Muhammad Zar And Other1987 SCMR 1788 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-20
  rent restrictionrelationship of landlord and tenantstriking off defencejurisdictioneviction applicationrent deposit order
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which had set aside the Rent Controller's order striking off the tenants' defence and directing their ejectment. The appellant landlord had filed an eviction petition against the respondents, who raised preliminary objections regarding jurisdiction and the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant. The Rent Controller framed issues and simultaneously ordered the tenants to deposit rent under Section 13(6) of the Baluchistan Rent Restriction Ordinance. Upon the tenants' failure to deposit, their defence was struck off and eviction was ordered. The High Court held that the Rent Controller acted without lawful authority by ordering rent deposits and proceeding with eviction without first determining the preliminary issues of jurisdiction and tenancy relationship through evidence. The core legal question considered was whether a Rent Controller is competent to direct a rent deposit under Section 13(6) without first resolving a bona fide dispute regarding jurisdiction and the relationship of landlord and tenant. The Supreme Court upheld the view that preliminary jurisdictional issues must be adjudicated before ordering rent deposits under the rent laws. The key principle laid down is that where a tenant raises a bona fide plea denying the relationship of landlord and tenant or challenging jurisdiction, the Rent Controller must decide those preliminary issues by recording evidence before making or enforcing an order for deposit of rent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Rent Controller can pass an order for deposit of rent under section 13(6) of the Baluchistan Rent Restriction Ordinance without first deciding the preliminary question of jurisdiction and the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Is it mandatory for the Rent Controller to record evidence and decide preliminary issues concerning maintainability and jurisdiction before directing an eviction for default in rent deposit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram and Other vs Mst. Arif Bibi and Other1987 PLD Supreme Court 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-05
  pre-emptionagricultural landexemption from pre-emptionimprovement of statusorder of priority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a vendee who originally purchased an area of agricultural land exceeding the two Kanals statutory limit under section 5(c) of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, could claim exemption from pre-emption by subsequently transferring a portion of the land to his sons prior to the institution of the suit, thereby reducing his holding to less than two Kanals. The Supreme Court held that the exemption under section 5(c) applies to the property originally purchased, and the subsequent transfer of a portion did not cure the defect of the initial purchase exceeding two Kanals, nor did it constitute an improvement of status under section 17(2) of the Act as the transferees had no superior or equal right of pre-emption. The appeal was consequently dismissed, establishing that pre-emption exemptions are strictly construed based on the initial size of the property purchased.

  Questions settled

  • Does a vendee who originally purchases land exceeding the two Kanals limit qualify for the exemption under section 5(c) of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act, 1950 by subsequently transferring a portion of it prior to the suit?
  • What is the distinction between the concepts of 'status' and 'exemption' under the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act, 1950?
  • Can a vendee improve their status to defeat a pre-emptor's claim by transferring property to persons who lack an equal or superior right of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram And Another vs Second Sind Labour Court And Another1987 SCMR 31 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-13
  Industrial Relations OrdinanceLabour Court jurisdictioncognizance of offenceprivate complaintstatutory interpretationRegistrar of Trade Unionscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether a Labour Court can competently take cognizance of an offence under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, upon a complaint filed by a private party, or if such authority is restricted exclusively to the Registrar of Trade Unions under Section 13(b). The appellants contended that Section 13(b) impliedly excluded private complaints. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Labour Court possesses the jurisdiction to entertain such complaints. The Court reasoned that Section 13(b) merely outlines the Registrar's functions and does not impose a mandatory bar on the Labour Court’s power to take cognizance of offences. The Court emphasized that where the legislature intends to restrict cognizance to specific authorities, it employs explicit negative language, as seen in other provisions of the Ordinance. The absence of such restrictive phrasing in the general provisions governing the Labour Court indicates that no such limitation exists. Furthermore, interpreting Section 13(b) as an exclusive bar would render other specific provisions of the Ordinance redundant. Consequently, the Labour Court may validly take cognizance of complaints initiated by private individuals.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 13(b) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 create an exclusive bar preventing a Labour Court from taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint filed by a private party?
  • Can a Labour Court take cognizance of an offence under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 without a complaint from the Registrar of Trade Unions?
  • Does the absence of negative language in a statute regarding the filing of complaints imply that the court's power to take cognizance is not restricted to specific authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram And 4 Others vs The State1987 SCMR 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-01
  leave to appealself-defencereappraisal of evidenceconcurrent findingsmurder convictiondeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court, which convicted the petitioners for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced them to death. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts erred in their assessment of the petitioners' plea of self-defence. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the contention raised by the petitioners essentially sought a reappraisal of evidence, which is not the function of the Court at the leave-to-appeal stage. Furthermore, the Court determined that the lower courts had already carefully considered and correctly rejected the plea of self-defence. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it. The judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence, particularly when the lower courts have properly evaluated the defense's arguments.

  Questions settled

  • Does a plea of self-defence that has been rejected by two lower courts warrant a reappraisal of evidence by the Supreme Court?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to re-examine the merits of a self-defence plea if the lower courts have already carefully considered and rejected it?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar vs Haji Wahid Bakhsh And Other1987 SCMR 1512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-02
  acquittalmurderpetition for leave to appealenhancement of sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for special leave to appeal filed by the complainant against the judgment of the High Court, which had set aside the conviction of seven respondents for murder and acquitted them of the charge under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while also dismissing the revision petition for enhancement of sentences. The core legal question concerned whether the acquittal by the High Court warranted interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the reasons recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court for acquitting the respondents were sound and the case was not a fit one for interference. Consequently, the petition seeking leave to appeal against the acquittal was dismissed, and the connected petition for enhancement of sentences was dismissed as infructuous. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an order of acquittal by the High Court when the reasons for acquittal recorded by the appellate court are found to be satisfactory upon review.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court when the reasoning of the High Court is found to be satisfactory?
  • Does the dismissal of a petition against an acquittal render a connected petition for enhancement of sentence infructuous?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar Virk vs The State1987 SCMR 853 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-10
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationmedical certificatejudicial discretionpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Deputy General Manager in PASSCO accused under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, sought pre-arrest bail. His interim bail was cancelled by the trial court after it deemed his medical certificate non-genuine upon his failure to appear. His subsequent petition before the High Court was dismissed by the Chief Justice with an observation that the petitioner should approach the trial court again. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, requesting that the High Court itself hear the bail petition due to apprehensions of bias from the trial court. The Supreme Court held that it was not inclined to interfere with the judicial discretion exercised by the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, dismissing the petition for leave to appeal while granting temporary ad-interim bail to enable the petitioner to approach the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the administrative or judicial discretion of a High Court Chief Justice regarding the assignment or hearing of bail petitions?
  • Does the cancellation of pre-arrest bail by a trial court due to a disputed medical certificate warrant interference by the Supreme Court when alternative remedies before the High Court exist?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar Kadri vs Controller, Printing and Stationery, Government of the Punjab And 5 Other1987 SCMR 2024 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-26
  leave preparatory to retirementrevised leave rulesvested rightswithdrawal of concessionsuperannuationcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal by the Punjab Services Tribunal. The petitioner, a retired government servant, had applied for retirement and leave preparatory to retirement (L.P.R.), which was initially granted for six months. During his L.P.R., revised leave rules were issued extending L.P.R. to 365 days and making them applicable to persons already on L.P.R. The petitioner's L.P.R. was accordingly extended, and his retirement date refixed, but a subsequent circular letter sought to exclude certain persons and led to the withdrawal of the concession, the refixing of his original retirement date, and the recovery of salary for the extra period from his gratuity. The core legal question was whether rights and benefits already accrued and acted upon under a valid order could be withdrawn or rescinded by a subsequent circular letter after the government servant had already retired. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether vested rights could be divested by subsequent administrative orders.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant's extended leave preparatory to retirement once granted under revised rules be lawfully withdrawn by a subsequent circular letter after retirement?
  • Whether rights created in favour of a civil servant under a competent order can be rescinded by a subsequent administrative order once the civil servant has already retired?
  • Is a recovery from the gratuity of a retired government servant legally sustainable when based on a retrospective withdrawal of a previously granted leave concession?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 1408 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-25
  leave to appealcommon objectappraisal of evidencemurder convictionunlawful assemblysentence enhancementself-defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two connected criminal petitions for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court. The petitioner, Muhammad Akbar, challenged his conviction and sentence for murder, while the complainant, Nazar Hussain, sought enhancement of the petitioner's sentence and the restoration of the convictions of four co-accused persons who were acquitted of murder charges by the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court correctly appraised the evidence regarding the common object of the accused party and whether the trial court's conviction under the relevant penal provisions was properly modified. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions. The Court held that it is necessary to examine whether the generally accepted principles of the appraisal of evidence were properly applied by the High Court, particularly regarding the common intention or object of the accused party in inflicting injuries. The principle laid down is that appellate courts must rigorously apply established evidentiary standards when determining the common object of an unlawful assembly, especially when assessing whether the accused intended to cause death or merely grievous injury.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere fact that each member of an unlawful assembly inflicted only one injury on the deceased necessarily negate a common intention to commit murder?
  • Can an appellate court set aside a conviction under Section 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 based solely on the age of the accused and the number of injuries inflicted?
  • What are the criteria for granting leave to appeal in criminal cases involving the appraisal of evidence by a High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ahmad Khan vs Mukhtar Ahmad Alias Tari1987 SCMR 1510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-07
  leave to appealmurderacquittalappraisal of evidenceocular testimonyrecovery evidencecriminal justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby the respondent was acquitted of the charge of murdering his brother's wife. The trial court had previously convicted the respondent under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The prosecution case was based on an expeditiously lodged FIR, ocular testimony of two related witnesses, medical evidence showing multiple incised wounds, and recovery of blood-stained articles. The High Court reversed the conviction, holding the motive unproven, the ocular account unreliable, and the recovery evidence deficient because the witnesses were also recovery attesting witnesses. In the present petition, the complainant contended that the High Court overlooked the respondent's own admission regarding taking the deceased from her parents' house to the crime scene, and failed to appreciate the prompt FIR and corroborative evidence properly. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court made a proper appraisal of the evidence in accordance with established principles of criminal justice administration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court made a proper appraisal of the evidence in accordance with the well-established principles of the administration of criminal justice while acquitting the respondent?
  • Can an accused's own statement admitting to taking the deceased to the scene of the crime be used to corroborate the ocular testimony disbelieved by the High Court?
  • Does the fact that eye-witnesses also acted as attesting witnesses for recoveries render the recovery evidence inherently unreliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal vs The State And Another1987 SCMR 1864 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-11
  murdersentence enhancementfamily honourmitigating circumstancescriminal appeallife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the conviction of the accused for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while reducing the sentence from death to life imprisonment. The accused challenged his conviction, while the complainant sought enhancement of the sentence back to capital punishment. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, noting that the accused's counsel did not dispute the conviction or the responsibility for the death, focusing solely on the sentence. Regarding the complainant's petition for enhancement, the Court observed that the prosecution’s own evidence established the motive for the killing was to rehabilitate family honour, which mitigated the circumstances of the crime. Consequently, the Court held that the lesser sentence of life imprisonment was appropriate and that the capital sentence was not warranted. Both petitions were dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision to maintain the conviction while imposing the lesser sentence of life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Is a sentence of life imprisonment appropriate for a murder committed to restore family honour?
  • Can a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be upheld when the accused does not dispute their responsibility for the death?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Khan vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner1987 SCMR 2106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-02
  review petitionwithdrawal of petitioncivil procedureSupreme Court practicejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for review. During the hearing, the Court examined the arguments presented by the learned counsel in support of the petition. Upon the Court expressing its observation that the petition lacked merit and was liable to be dismissed, the counsel sought permission to withdraw the petition. Consequently, the Court permitted the withdrawal of the review petition. The judgment establishes the procedural principle that a party may seek to withdraw a petition for review after the Court has indicated its inclination to dismiss the matter on its merits, thereby avoiding a formal dismissal order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner withdraw a review petition after the Court indicates it merits dismissal?
  • Is a party entitled to withdraw a petition for review during the hearing?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Khan vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner1987 SCMR 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-12
  evacuee propertysettlement disputeauction-purchaserPermanent Transfer Deedrevisional jurisdictionconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition concerning an urban settlement dispute over an evacuee shop. The core legal questions involve the validity of a second auction of evacuee property without the lawful cancellation of a prior confirmed auction, the competence of settlement authorities to set aside transactions and examine the legality of orders leading to the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.), and the effect of the repeal of certain rules on the revisional powers of settlement authorities. The Supreme Court held that a property already disposed of in a first auction is not available in the compensation pool for a second auction, that a confirmed auction cannot be legally cancelled without proper notice and competent authority, and that the repeal of procedural rules does not strip settlement authorities of their statutory powers to examine the legality and propriety of foundational orders tainted by jurisdictional defects. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether evacuee property disposed of in a first auction remains available in the compensation pool for a second auction without proper cancellation of the first?
  • Does the repeal of settlement rules deprive settlement authorities of their statutory power to examine the legality of orders forming the basis of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • Can a confirmed auction be legally cancelled without affording a show-cause notice to the auction-purchaser and by an incompetent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Butt vs The Director General, Audit & Accounts1987 SCMR 1413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-02
  compulsory retirementtime-barred appealcondonation of delayservice tribunalleave to appeallimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his appeal against compulsory retirement as time-barred. The petitioner was compulsorily retired from service under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, in December 1984. Following the rejection of his departmental representation in January 1985, the petitioner failed to file an appeal before the Tribunal until July 1986, resulting in a delay of approximately one and a half years. Crucially, the petitioner failed to provide any explanation for this significant delay and did not file an application for the condonation of delay. The Supreme Court observed that the appeal was hopelessly time-barred and that no question of law had been raised to warrant interference. Consequently, the Court held that in the absence of any justification for the delay or a valid legal question, there were no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's decision. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal filed before the Federal Service Tribunal be entertained if it is significantly time-barred without an application for condonation of delay?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when no question of law is raised?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal And Others vs Government of Pakistan And Other1987 SCMR 1896 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal And Others vs Government of Pakistan And Other (Copy)1987 SCMR 2078 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-28
  evacuee propertyland allotmentlocus standiconstitutional jurisdictionfinding of factjudicial reviewrefugee claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from constitutional petitions challenging the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, which dismissed an application under Sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 and protected an allotment of land made to a refugee. The appellants, who were vendees of the land from evacuee owners prior to partition, had failed to obtain confirmation of their sales from the Custodian. They argued that they had locus standi to contest the subsequent allotment to the refugee, alleging fraud and lack of proper transfer of units. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the appellants possessed sufficient locus standi to maintain their petitions due to their personal interest and participation in the lower proceedings, the High Court had correctly refused to interfere with the Chief Settlement Commissioner's findings of fact. The Court reiterated that in constitutional jurisdiction, the High Court does not act as a court of fact and cannot substitute its own findings unless the subordinate tribunal's decision is based on no evidence, bad faith, or a complete misreading of the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • What constitutes sufficient locus standi for an applicant to maintain a constitutional petition under the Pakistani legal framework?
  • Can the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction substitute its own findings of fact for those recorded by a competent tribunal?
  • Under what circumstances can a finding of fact by a subordinate tribunal or authority be interfered with in writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal And 2 Others vs The State1987 SCMR 524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-12
  criminal appealmurder convictionsentence mitigationeye-witness testimonymedical evidenceleave to appealcommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from a conviction for murder under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners, Muhammad Afzal, Muhammad Asghar, and Sikandar alias Kandoo, were convicted by the trial court and the High Court for the murder of Muhammad Arshad. The prosecution alleged that the motive stemmed from the abduction of a woman, leading to a confrontation where the accused shot the deceased. The petitioners challenged the conviction, arguing that eye-witness testimony was inconsistent with medical evidence, specifically regarding the omission of certain injuries, and that the recovery of weapons was uncorroborated. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, finding it consistent and credible, and rejected the challenges to the conviction. However, regarding the sentence of death awarded to Muhammad Asghar, the Court noted the argument that he lacked a specific motive compared to his co-accused. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition concerning Muhammad Afzal and Sikandar alias Kandoo, maintaining their sentences, but granted leave to appeal specifically on the question of the sentence awarded to Muhammad Asghar.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be granted solely on the question of the sentence awarded to a convict?
  • Does the omission of specific injuries in eye-witness testimony necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Is the absence of a specific motive for one co-accused a valid ground for reconsidering a death sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdullah vs Rashid Shah And Another1987 SCMR 2045 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-29
  enhancement of sentencemurderculpable homicidegrave and sudden provocationpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant for the enhancement of the sentence of the respondent, who was originally convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his wife and sentenced to imprisonment for life, which conviction and sentence were subsequently altered by the Lahore High Court to Section 304 Part-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 with a sentence of five years rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question involved the propriety of altering the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder based on grave and sudden provocation arising from the deceased's refusal to accompany the respondent and her provocative remarks concerning illicit relations. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly appreciated the circumstances of the case, refusing to interfere with the reduction of sentence. The key principle laid down is that where a spouse acts under grave and sudden provocation due to provocative statements and refusal of conjugal rights leading to a loss of self-control, alteration of conviction from premeditated murder to culpable homicide is justified.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction from Section 302 PPC to Section 304 Part-I PPC based on grave and sudden provocation?
  • Does a spouse's refusal to accompany the husband coupled with provocative statements amount to grave and sudden provocation?
  • When will the Supreme Court interfere with the reduction of a sentence by the High Court in a criminal matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdullah Khan vs The Collector/ Deputy Commissioner1987 SCMR 849 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdul Lateef vs Shaikh Ejaz Ahmad1987 SCMR 162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-22
  ejectmentbona fide personal requirementrent appealremand of caseopportunity of rebuttallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court setting aside an ejectment order granted by the Rent Controller in favor of the appellant landlord. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in holding that the appellant's personal requirement for the rented premises was not bona fide due to the subsequent renting out of two flats on the first floor of the building during the proceedings, without affording the appellant an opportunity to explain. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court erred in resting its decision on an unpleaded and unrebutted circumstance where the landlord was given no opportunity to offer an explanation. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the Rent Controller for a fresh decision after providing the parties an opportunity of being heard in accordance with the relevant provisions. The key principle laid down is that a party must be afforded a fair opportunity to address or rebut factual circumstances relied upon against them.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in holding that the requirement of the appellant was not bona fide and in good faith?
  • Can an ejectment application be decided on a factual premise regarding available accommodation without affording the landlord an opportunity to rebut it?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubarik Alias Marri vs The State1987 SCMR 1524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-19
  special leave to appealcriminal appeallimitation periodjail petitionconvictionprocedural delay
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Mubarik alias Marri, was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Faisalabad, and sentenced to death, a decision subsequently upheld by the High Court. The petitioner filed two separate petitions for special leave to appeal against his conviction: one through counsel and another through jail. Due to an administrative oversight, the jail petition was not brought to the Court's attention when the counsel-filed petition was heard and dismissed on its merits. The second petition, submitted through jail, was filed with a delay of 58 days. The Supreme Court addressed the procedural irregularity and the issue of limitation. The Court held that since the initial petition had already been heard and dismissed on merits after providing the petitioner's counsel a full hearing, and given that the subsequent jail petition was time-barred by 58 days, there were no grounds to entertain the second petition. Consequently, the Court dismissed the jail petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a second petition for special leave to appeal be entertained when a prior petition filed through counsel has already been dismissed on merits?
  • Does a delay of 58 days in filing a jail petition for special leave to appeal warrant dismissal when the merits of the case were previously adjudicated?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubarik Ali vs Fazal Muhammad And Another1987 SCMR 1627 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-06
  special leave to appealfraud or misrepresentationjurisdictioncivil procedurejudgment and decree
  Summary & questions settled

  These are two petitions for special leave to appeal arising from the dismissal of applications filed under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by the High Court. The petitioner had initially challenged concurrent judgments and decrees through civil suits and subsequent appeals which were dismissed. After withdrawing his petitions for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court with the intent to pursue a remedy under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, he filed applications in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the applications, holding that because leave petitions were previously filed in the Supreme Court, the applications under Section 12(2) should have been filed in the Supreme Court instead. The core legal question is whether an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 lies before the Supreme Court or the High Court when a petition for special leave to appeal against the lower court's decree was withdrawn. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contention that final judgments were not passed by the Supreme Court when leave petitions were simply not pressed requires examination, thereby setting the matter down for a regular hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 lies before the Supreme Court or the High Court when a petition for special leave to appeal has been withdrawn?
  • Does the withdrawal of a petition for special leave to appeal mean that the final judgment, decree or order was passed by the Supreme Court for the purposes of Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zubaida Begum vs Nathey Khan1987 SCMR 1934 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-24
  transfer of suitfamily courtrestitution of conjugal rightsdissolution of marriagejurisdiction of supreme courtinter-provincial transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought the transfer of a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, pending before a Family Court in Naushero Feroze, Sind, to a Family Court in Rajanpur, Punjab, where her own suit for dissolution of marriage was pending. The Lahore High Court had previously dismissed her application under Section 25-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, on the grounds that the Family Court in Sind was not subordinate to the Lahore High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the Court possessed jurisdiction under Article 186-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to transfer the case. The Supreme Court held that the contention was meritless, clarifying that Article 186-A confers jurisdiction to transfer proceedings between High Courts, not from subordinate courts of one High Court to another. The Court affirmed the High Court's order as unassailable and dismissed the petition, noting that the petitioner's remedy for her safety concerns lay in moving the relevant High Court within whose jurisdiction the case was pending.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction under Article 186-A of the Constitution to transfer cases between subordinate courts of different High Courts?
  • Can a High Court transfer a case pending in a court outside its territorial jurisdiction under Section 25-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zarifan vs Mst. Rehmati1987 SCMR 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-30
  Declaratory suitLimitation periodMutation of inheritanceCause of actionPossessory titleCivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a civil dispute concerning the ownership of land, where the petitioner challenged a 1953 mutation of inheritance, alleging fraud and collusion. The trial court decreed the suit in the petitioner's favor, finding her to be the owner in possession. However, the appellate court and the High Court reversed this decision, ruling the suit time-barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908, calculating limitation from the date of the mutation. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the limitation period for a declaratory suit challenging a mutation commences from the date of the mutation or from the date the plaintiff's possession is threatened. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the lower courts' judgments. The Court held that the cause of action for such a suit does not necessarily accrue from the date of the deed, but from the date the plaintiff's possession is threatened. The key principle laid down is that a plaintiff in possession is not obligated to sue immediately upon the creation of a deed but may wait until the threat to their possession becomes real and visible.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for a declaratory suit challenging a mutation necessarily commence from the date of the mutation?
  • When does the cause of action accrue for a plaintiff in possession challenging a fraudulent deed or mutation?
  • Is a plaintiff in possession required to immediately sue for the cancellation of a deed upon its creation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zainab And Another vs Naeem Ahmad And Another1987 SCMR 1883 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-15
  leave to appealcourt feedeficiency in court feememorandum of appealappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed an appeal before the District Judge against a trial court decree, affixing court-fee stamps worth Rs.30 instead of the required higher amount due to an erroneous entry in the decree-sheet. Upon an objection raised by the respondents, the Additional District Judge granted the petitioners one week to make up the deficiency in the court fee, which they complied with. The respondents challenged this order through a revision petition in the High Court, which was accepted, setting aside the extension and restoring the trial court's decree. The petitioners sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the appellate court has the discretion to grant time to make up a deficiency in court fee on a memorandum of appeal. The Supreme Court held that the contention regarding entitlement to an opportunity for making up the deficiency, as laid down in previous precedent, required examination, and consequently granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can grant time to make up a deficiency in the court fee on a memorandum of appeal?
  • Does an erroneous entry in a decree-sheet regarding the value of a suit constitute sufficient ground for initial under-valuation of court fee?
  • Is the High Court justified in setting aside an appellate court's order granting an extension of time to make up court fee deficiencies?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Walayat Bi And Another vs Muhammad Akram And Other1987 SCMR 832 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-10
  murderleave to appealocular testimonygrave and sudden provocationsentence enhancementcorroborationcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal arising from a murder conviction. The accused, Muhammad Akram, was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Ghulam Rasul, with his sentence reduced to life imprisonment by the High Court, while his co-accused was acquitted. The petitioner sought leave to appeal, arguing that the acquittal of his co-accused necessitated material corroboration of the ocular testimony and that the crime was committed under grave and sudden provocation due to the deceased's alleged illicit relations with the petitioner's wife. Simultaneously, the complainant sought enhancement of the sentence. The Supreme Court examined the consistency of the ocular evidence and the medical corroboration, finding the petitioner's conviction well-founded. Regarding the provocation plea, the Court acknowledged the motive of illicit liaison but found no merit in interfering with the High Court's judgment. The Court held that where ocular testimony is consistent and corroborated by medical evidence, the acquittal of a co-accused does not automatically invalidate the conviction of the remaining accused, and dismissed both petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused on the same evidence automatically invalidate the conviction of the remaining accused?
  • Can a conviction be maintained on ocular testimony alone without material corroboration if a co-accused is acquitted?
  • Is a motive involving illicit relations with the accused's wife sufficient to invoke the exception of grave and sudden provocation under Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Umme Khatoon vs Mst. Umme Salma1987 SCMR 389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-05
  ejectmentpersonal bona fide needdefault in rentpre-litigation noticeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner landlady sought the ejectment of the respondent tenant on the grounds of personal bona fide need and default. The Rent Controller allowed the application solely on the ground of default. Upon appeal, the Sind High Court set aside the eviction order. The petitioner then approached the Supreme Court of Pakistan, contending that the failure to mention personal need in the statutory pre-litigation notice dated 1-4-1978 was inconsequential since personal need was specifically pleaded in the ejectment application and supported by evidence, relying on precedent. The core legal question concerned the effect of omitting the ground of personal need from the pre-litigation notice when it was duly pleaded in the rent application. The Supreme Court held that the contention raised an arguable issue requiring detailed examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal subject to furnishing security in the sum of one thousand rupees, thereby settling that the matter merits a full hearing on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to mention personal bona fide need in a pre-litigation notice invalidate a subsequent ejectment application where personal need is specifically pleaded?
  • Whether an order of the High Court setting aside an eviction order based on default warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Taj Bibi And Another vs Muhammad Akbar And 6 Other1987 SCMR 1851 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-14
  revisional jurisdictionfindings of factsuit for possessionoathconcurrent findingscivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court passed in its revisional jurisdiction, concerning a suit for possession of disputed houses. The respondent No. 1 filed the suit against the appellants, which was initially decreed by the Qazi, Turbat, based on an oath taken by the plaintiffs' attorney at the appellants' request. The appellants unsuccessfully appealed to the Majlis-e-Shoora, which maintained the decree. Subsequently, the respondents filed a revision application in the High Court, which affirmed the lower courts' findings. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its revisional jurisdiction by refusing to interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the ownership of the land underneath the disputed houses. The Supreme Court held that the suit was decreed based on the preponderance of evidence and that the appellants failed to frame or request issues regarding their ownership of the land. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that findings of fact recorded by lower courts are not subject to interference in revisional jurisdiction where no legal error is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with findings of fact in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction?
  • Is a decree based on an oath taken at the request of the parties valid?
  • Does the failure to frame an issue regarding ownership preclude a party from challenging a decree on that ground?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Siddiqa And Others vs Thesettlement Commissioner (Lands), Multan And Another1987 SCMR 431 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-28
  clarification of ordermistake in judgmentproperty in disputesupreme court orderscope of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an application seeking clarification of a previous order of the Supreme Court dated 12-10-1983, specifically addressing whether Khasra No. 408 was part of the land in dispute alongside Khasra Nos. 409 and 410. The core legal question concerns the accurate reflection of the property in dispute and the scope of the Supreme Court's order upholding the High Court's judgment. The Court held that since its earlier order merely maintained the High Court's order dated 31-3-1980 without intending to add or subtract anything, the High Court's order and the factual recital therein—which referenced only Khasra Nos. 409 and 410—rule the field. The key principle laid down is that an order of the Supreme Court upholding a High Court decision carries no intention to alter the underlying factual matrix or property descriptions established by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of the Supreme Court upholding a High Court judgment alters the factual recital of properties in dispute established by the High Court?
  • Can a party seek clarification of an appellate court order to rectify a perceived mistaken inclusion of a property number?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shammo Mai vs The State1987 SCMR 780 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-08
  post-arrest bailabsconding co-accusedZina Ordinancebail adjudicationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the High Court's rejection of a bail application filed by Mst. Shammo Mai, who was accused alongside an absconding co-accused, Shana, of committing offences under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The State opposed the bail, arguing that the petitioner's release would merely facilitate the absconding co-accused's attempt to secure bail. The Supreme Court rejected the State's apprehension, holding that any future bail application by the absconding co-accused would be adjudicated on its own merits, specifically accounting for the factor of his abscondence. Finding the case appropriate for relief, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted bail to the petitioner subject to the furnishing of bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner, Multan. The judgment affirms that the bail of one accused does not automatically entitle an absconding co-accused to similar relief, as the latter's conduct remains a relevant consideration for the court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of bail to one accused automatically entitle an absconding co-accused to bail?
  • Should a court consider the abscondence of a co-accused when deciding a bail application for another accused?
  • Is the potential for a co-accused to seek bail a valid ground for denying bail to an arrested accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shakila Begum vs Abdul Ghani And Other1987 SCMR 1337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-10
  land allotmentMukhbari applicationnecessary partywrit jurisdictiondiscretionary jurisdictionremandevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a dispute over the allotment of land in village Durgahpur, Gujranwala, which was initially cancelled by the Chief Settlement Commissioner following a Mukhbari application alleging that the original allottee, Muhammad Siddique, had obtained the land through bogus units. The original allottee's successor-in-interest, Abdul Ghani, challenged this cancellation via a writ petition, which the Lahore High Court accepted, granting him possession of half the land. Mst. Shakila Begum, who had purchased the land from the Mukhbari applicant, appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that she was a necessary party who had been intentionally excluded from the writ proceedings and that the writ petition suffered from laches and res judicata. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner was indeed a necessary party with a vital interest in the subject matter. Furthermore, the Court held that the High Court erred in exercising its discretionary jurisdiction because the merits of the case had not been properly raised before the Settlement authority. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case to the notified officer for a fresh hearing after ensuring the petitioner is heard.

  Questions settled

  • Is a person who has purchased land from a Mukhbari applicant a necessary party in writ proceedings challenging the cancellation of the original allotment?
  • Can a High Court exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction when the merits of the case were not previously raised before the relevant Settlement authority?
  • Does the failure to implead a necessary party in a writ petition warrant setting aside the impugned judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shah Sultana And Others vs Abdul Khaliq And Another1987 SCMR 1791 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-12
  suit for possessionlimitationadverse possessiondispossessionrevenue recordmutationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision petition by the Baluchistan High Court, which affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts dismissing the petitioners' suit for possession as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the plaintiffs' suit for possession based on title and alleged dispossession was barred by limitation under the Limitation Act 1908, and whether the courts below erred in relying on revenue records regarding the respondents' long-standing possession since 1953. The Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff brings a suit for possession on the ground of dispossession or discontinuance of possession, the limitation is governed by Article 142 of the Limitation Act 1908, requiring the plaintiff to prove dispossession within twelve years preceding the suit, failing which the suit must be dismissed as time-barred without requiring the defendant to establish adverse possession. The Court accordingly dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, upholding the concurrent findings of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Which article of the Limitation Act 1908 governs a suit for possession based on dispossession or discontinuance of possession?
  • Does a plaintiff in a suit for possession based on dispossession need to prove dispossession within 12 years preceding the suit?
  • Is it necessary for a defendant to establish adverse possession when the plaintiff fails to prove dispossession within the statutory limitation period?
  • Can revenue records and mutation entries be relied upon as collateral evidence to establish the duration of a party's possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina Bibi Alias Lal Bibiand Others vs Sardar Ali And Other1987 SCMR 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-09
  displaced personsland settlementP.I. Unitsrehabilitation schemeconstitutional petitionmortgagee units
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court setting aside a Settlement Commissioner's order and restoring that of the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The core legal question involves the proper construction and scope of a previous High Court order concerning the land entitlement of displaced persons under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, specifically regarding whether the exclusion of certain mortgagee units precluded the subsequent adjustment of land for inferior soil quality under the applicable rehabilitation scheme. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court's earlier order did not bar the application of provisions allowing adjustments for inferior soil quality. The key principle laid down is that the withdrawal of specific units in earlier proceedings does not inherently restrict the application of separate statutory or schematic provisions meant to address soil quality adjustments during final land settlements.

  Questions settled

  • Does a previous High Court order excluding certain mortgagee units under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 preclude subsequent adjustments for inferior soil quality under the Rehabilitation Scheme?
  • Whether the Settlement Commissioner properly construed the scope of the earlier High Court decision regarding land entitlements?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina Bai vs Baluchistan Co Operative Bank Ltd.1987 SCMR 1858 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-21
  rent restrictionejectmentdefault in payment of rentappellate procedureright of rebuttalnatural justiceremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which had set aside an ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller against the respondent bank. The appellant landlord had sought eviction on grounds of personal bona fide requirement, material damage to the property, and default in rent payment. While the Rent Controller ordered eviction based solely on the default issue, the High Court reversed this decision on appeal, relying on fresh evidence regarding ledger entries in the bank's account books to prove payment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in relying on new evidence at the appellate stage without providing the appellant an opportunity to rebut it. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reliance on evidence without allowing the appellant to challenge it violated the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case, directing that the appellant be afforded a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence considered at the appellate stage.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court rely on fresh evidence without affording the opposing party an opportunity to rebut it?
  • Is a landlord entitled to an opportunity to rebut evidence introduced for the first time during an appeal in rent restriction proceedings?
  • Does the failure to provide an opportunity for rebuttal of new evidence at the appellate stage warrant a remand of the case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saeeda Beg Um And Others vs Nazir Ahmad1987 SCMR 806 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-15
  displaced personsland allotmentrevisional jurisdictioncondonation of delaywrit jurisdictionlimitationrehabilitation settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal concerns a dispute over the allotment of land to displaced persons. The petitioners, displaced persons from India, were initially allotted land in District Sahiwal, which was later withdrawn and re-allotted to the respondent. Following a revision petition, the Additional Rehabilitation/Settlement Commissioner restored the land to the petitioners, leading to the cancellation of the respondent's allotment. The respondent subsequently appealed this cancellation to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, who condoned the delay and allowed the appeal. The Settlement Commissioner later set aside this order, citing limitation issues, but the High Court restored the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's decision, favoring the respondent on grounds of equity and procedural fairness. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the contentions raised by the petitioners—specifically regarding the Settlement Commissioner's competence to reverse the condonation of delay and the propriety of the High Court's interference in writ jurisdiction—warranted further consideration. The Court held that the legal questions concerning the limitation period and the exercise of revisional jurisdiction required a detailed examination on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Settlement Commissioner competent to reverse a decision of a Deputy Settlement Commissioner regarding the condonation of delay?
  • Can the High Court in writ jurisdiction interfere with an order of a Settlement Commissioner regarding the condonation of delay?
  • Does an allotment of land made subject to the outcome of a pending revision petition become final if not specifically challenged?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sadiqan And Others vs Messrs Multan Silk Rayon Mills And Other1987 SCMR 1689 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertycompensation poolindustrial area schemeallotmentlocus standiland acquisition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellants against the concurrent orders of the settlement authorities. The core legal questions involve whether the disputed land formed part of the compensation pool under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, given the prior approval of the Central Government for its acquisition under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949, and whether the appellants possessed the necessary locus standi to challenge the respondent's allotment without establishing a valid competing title. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Central Government's prior sanction under section 12(3)(b) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949, validly excepted the land from the compensation pool under the notification issued pursuant to section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, regardless of whether acquisition proceedings were fully completed. The key legal principle laid down is that a party challenging an existing allotment and possession must first establish their own valid title and locus standi through an allotment that legally forms part of the compensation pool, failing which they cannot question the legality of the rival claimant's title or possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether evacuee land sanctioned for acquisition by the Central Government prior to the notification under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 forms part of the compensation pool?
  • Can a party challenge the title and possession of an allottee without first establishing their own valid locus standi and subsisting title to the disputed land?
  • Does the completion of acquisition proceedings condition the validity of an approval for acquisition accorded under section 12(3)(b) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949?
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• Mst. Rehmat Bibi vs Fazal Muhammad And Other1987 SCMR 843 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-03
  second appealquestion of factmutationappellate interferencereappraisal of evidencecustomary law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had reversed the findings of the Additional District Judge regarding a disputed question of fact: whether the petitioner was married in 1936. The trial court had initially affirmed the marriage, but the Additional District Judge reversed this finding. Upon second appeal, the High Court reappraised the evidence, overturned the appellate court's decision, and restored the trial court's original finding. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the authority to reverse a finding of fact during a second appeal. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court generally cannot interfere with factual findings in second appeals, it is competent to do so when the lower appellate court has failed to give due weight to critical evidence, such as a mutation record, or has ignored significant circumstances bearing on the issue. In this case, the petitioner's failure to challenge a 1936 mutation for twenty-five years justified the High Court's intervention. The petition was dismissed as meritless.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact in a second appeal?
  • Under what circumstances is a High Court justified in reversing a finding of fact made by an appellate court in a second appeal?
  • Does the failure to challenge a mutation for a significant period of time constitute a relevant circumstance for determining a disputed fact?
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• Mst. Rasul Bib I vs Mst. Rehmat Bibi1987 SCMR 2036 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-21
  limitationsecond appealcause of actiontime-barred suitpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition for leave to appeal challenging the judgment of the High Court, which allowed a second appeal filed by the respondent on the ground of limitation. The core legal question addressed is whether the petitioner's suit was barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908, having been filed approximately 19 years after the cause of action accrued. The Supreme Court held that the view taken by the High Court was unexceptionable and squarely covered by precedent, affirming that the suit was indeed time-barred. The key principle laid down is that a suit governed by a six-year limitation period cannot be maintained nearly two decades after the accrual of the cause of action.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit filed nineteen years after the accrual of the cause of action is barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can a second appeal be validly decided on the sole ground of limitation when the suit is filed beyond the prescribed statutory period?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rabia Bib I vs Ghulam Qadir And Another1987 SCMR 1550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-16
  second appealfictitious salefraudulent saleconcurrent findingscivil suitpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner instituted a civil suit seeking to set aside a sale transaction on the allegations of it being fictitious and fraudulent. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the petitioner, but the first appellate court, the Additional District Judge, reversed this decision and dismissed the suit. Subsequently, the High Court dismissed the second appeal after re-examining the evidence and affirming the findings of the lower appellate court. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the concurrent findings of fact. The core legal question concerned whether the concurrent factual findings of the courts below regarding the validity of the sale warranted interference in second appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any legal or factual infirmity in the judgments of the High Court and the Additional District Judge. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that concurrent findings of fact affirmed in second appeal will not be disturbed by the apex court unless shown to suffer from material defect or legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the lower appellate court and the High Court can be interfered with when no legal infirmity is shown?
  • Can a sale transaction be avoided on the ground of being fictitious and tainted with fraud without establishing the same through sufficient evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Noor Jehan Begum vs Dr. Abdus Samad And Other1987 SCMR 1577 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-10
  locus standiaggrieved personevacuee trust propertyPermanent Transfer Deedwrit petitionpublic auctionsettlement scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeal arose from the judgment of the High Court of Sind allowing a writ petition that set aside the Central Government and Evacuee Trust Property Board's sale sanction in favour of the appellant. The property had been transferred to the appellant via a Permanent Transfer Deed after the first respondent's (a local occupant) claim was rejected. When the property was subsequently treated as evacuee trust property, the Central Government sanctioned its sale to the appellant, following which the first respondent filed a constitutional petition to challenge the transfer. The Supreme Court held that the first respondent lacked locus standi to invoke constitutional writ jurisdiction. Being merely an occupant or tenant who had exhausted his entitlement claims and possessed no right of acquisition, he was not an 'aggrieved person'. The court laid down that a mere expectation to bid at a hypothetical public auction does not confer a vested right or legal injury sufficient to maintain a writ petition against an allotment or transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Does an occupant or tenant of an evacuee trust property possess locus standi as an 'aggrieved person' to challenge its transfer to another party under constitutional writ jurisdiction?
  • Can a potential bidder's mere expectation to participate in a hypothetical future public auction confer locus standi to maintain a writ petition?
  • Whether the exhaustion and rejection of an occupant's claim to evacuee property deprives them of any legally enforceable right or standing to dispute a subsequent transfer to a valid transferee?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naziran Bibi vs Piran Ditta1987 SCMR 663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-09
  venue of trialdissolution of marriagefamily courttransfer of suitsurety bond
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon leave granted to consider whether the venue of a suit for dissolution of marriage filed by the appellant-wife against the respondent-husband should be transferred from Khanpur, District Rahimyar Khan to Lahore. The core legal question concerns the appropriate venue for trial taking into account the convenience and safety of the parties. The Supreme Court held that the suit should be heard at Rahimyar Khan, where the appellant's parents reside, rather than Lahore where she was temporarily residing without sufficient justification. The Court laid down the principle that while addressing concerns regarding the safety and apprehension of physical harm raised by a female litigant, appropriate security arrangements such as furnishing surety bonds may be ordered to allay fears, while ensuring the venue of trial is determined in the overall interest of the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for dissolution of marriage can be transferred from one city to another on the ground of the wife's temporary residence?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct a party to furnish a surety bond to assure the safety of the opposing spouse in family proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nazir Begum And Others vs Khan Muqarrab Khan And Other1987 SCMR 1301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-28
  evacuee propertypermanent transfer documentfunctus officiolimitation periodresumption of propertysettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the ownership of evacuee property, specifically a shop in Eminabad, which was originally auctioned to respondent Abdul Hamid Khan. Following his failure to pay the balance of the sale price, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner resumed the property and subsequently transferred it to Feroz Din, issuing a Permanent Transfer Document (P.T.D.). Years later, the respondent filed a time-barred appeal against the resumption order, which the Additional Settlement Commissioner allowed, claiming the respondent had deposited a Compensation Book. The appellants challenged this in the High Court, which dismissed their petition, holding the initial resumption order void. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its assessment. The Court reaffirmed the principle that once a P.T.D. is issued, Settlement authorities become functus officio and lack jurisdiction to interfere. Furthermore, the Court found the Additional Settlement Commissioner’s order allowing a time-barred appeal without proper examination of limitation was legally flawed. The case was remanded to the notified officer to determine the validity of the limitation period and the existence of the Compensation Book.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Document render the Settlement authorities functus officio?
  • Can a Settlement authority interfere with a property transfer after a Permanent Transfer Document has been issued?
  • Is an order allowing a time-barred appeal without examining the question of limitation legally sustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nawab Bibi And Another vs Major (Rtd.) Irshad Muhammad Khan1987 SCMR 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-17
  specific performanceagreement to sellequitable reliefconcurrent findingsforged receiptleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the successors-in-interest of a deceased purchaser against concurrent judgments of the lower courts and the High Court, which dismissed their suit for the specific performance of an agreement to sell agricultural land. The core legal question concerned whether the courts were justified in refusing specific performance where the plaintiffs failed to prove a substantial part-payment of the consideration, relied on a forged receipt, and persistently refused to pay the full price of the land throughout the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts rightly refused the equitable relief of specific performance because the plaintiffs did not come to court with clean hands, failed to offer the full consideration during the protracted litigation, and fabricated a receipt. The key principle laid down is that a party seeking the equitable relief of specific performance must demonstrate readiness and willingness to pay the full consideration and approach the court with clean hands, and appellate courts will not interfere with concurrent factual findings regarding forged receipts and non-payment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff who relies on a forged receipt for part-payment is entitled to the equitable relief of specific performance?
  • Can a court grant specific performance of an agreement to sell when the plaintiffs consistently refuse to pay the full agreed consideration?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the non-payment of a disputed sum?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naushaba vs Dr. Nasim And Other1987 SCMR 974 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-13
  guardianshipcustody of minorvisitation rightsinterim custodyconstitutional petitionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which had dismissed her Constitutional Petition arising from a guardianship matter. The core legal question concerned the interim custody and visitation rights of a minor suckling child, specifically the father's right to temporary custody under Section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The Supreme Court heard the parties and found no ground to interfere with the lower appellate court's order regarding temporary custody. However, by consent of the parties, the Supreme Court modified the arrangement by imposing a condition that the paternal grandfather furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000 to the satisfaction of the Nazir of the High Court to ensure the safe return of the minor. The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed subject to this condition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether interim custody of a minor suckling child can be granted to the father under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890?
  • Can the Supreme Court modify visitation arrangements by consent of the parties subject to the furnishing of a personal bond for the safe return of the minor?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Maryam And Others vs Niazi And Other1987 SCMR 1497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-25
  pre-emptionadditional evidencepedigree tableco-ownershiprevision petitionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for special leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' revision petition arising from a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerns whether the lower appellate court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to admit additional evidence, specifically a pedigree table, after the suit had remained pending for decades without the document being produced, and whether a ground of co-ownership expressly given up in the lower appellate court could be resurrected. The Supreme Court held that the refusal to receive the pedigree table into evidence without any acceptable explanation for the delay was unexceptionable, and that a plea expressly abandoned before the appellate court cannot be re-agitated. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that parties cannot introduce belated evidence without sufficient cause and are bound by concessions made during appellate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is justified in refusing to admit additional evidence when a party fails to provide any acceptable explanation for not producing it during the trial?
  • Can a party resurrect a ground of co-ownership in a pre-emption suit after it was expressly given up before the first appellate court?
  • Does the refusal of the lower appellate and high courts to accept belated evidence in a pre-emption suit warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Lalan vs Noor Muhammad And Other1987 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kishwar vs Settlement Commissioner, Lahore And Other1987 SCMR 878 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-11
  lis pendensnatural justicesettlement operationsproperty disputeLetters Patent Appealimpleadmenttransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a property dispute originating in settlement operations, where property was initially transferred as an indivisible unit. Following protracted litigation, a Division Bench of the High Court determined the property was divisible and awarded a specific portion to the original non-claimant occupant. The petitioner, who purchased the property from a respondent during the pendency of the Letters Patent Appeal, challenged the High Court's order, arguing she was denied an opportunity to be heard and that the property was not the subject matter of the dispute. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner, having acquired the property lis pendens without seeking to be impleaded, could not claim a violation of natural justice. The Court reasoned that her predecessor-in-interest had been duly represented and heard during the proceedings. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the property in question was indeed the subject matter of the appeal. The judgment establishes that a purchaser of property during pending litigation who fails to join the proceedings cannot subsequently challenge the outcome on grounds of being unheard.

  Questions settled

  • Can a purchaser of property during pending litigation claim a denial of natural justice for not being heard if they failed to apply to be impleaded?
  • Is a purchaser of property bound by the proceedings conducted against their predecessor-in-interest when the purchase occurred during the pendency of the litigation?
  • Does the failure to implead oneself in pending litigation preclude a subsequent purchaser from challenging the judgment on the basis of lack of notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kishwar vs Settlement Commissioner And 4 Other1987 SCMR 1396 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-26
  composite propertytransfer of propertysettlement operationsdivisible propertyleave to appealreview of order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding the transfer of a composite property originally in the possession of two displaced persons, Muhammad Ismail and Kalu Khan. The settlement authorities transferred the entire property to Muhammad Ismail, holding it indivisible, and subsequently transferred a portion to Rao Muzaffar A.I Khan pursuant to an association agreement. Kalu Khan challenged the rejection of his claim before the High Court. A Division Bench held the property divisible and directed a redistribution of both portions. The petitioner, who subsequently purchased the portion originally transferred to Muhammad Ismail, contended that the High Court erred by adjudicating upon a portion of the property that was not the subject-matter of the dispute before it. The Supreme Court found merit in the contention, noting that the petitioner's portion was never challenged by Kalu Khan, and consequently reviewed its earlier order, granted leave to appeal, and ordered status quo to be maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can make an order with regard to a portion of property that was not the subject-matter of the dispute before it?
  • Can the Supreme Court review its earlier order upon discovering an erroneous assumption regarding a party's succession-in-interest?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khurshid Bibi vs Muhammad Rafique1987 SCMR 1545 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-14
  revisional jurisdictionconcurrent findingssale deedproperty disputeSupreme Court petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed against the concurrent findings of the subordinate courts and the refusal of the High Court in revisional jurisdiction to interfere with the same. The core legal question for consideration was whether the area of the portion of the house sold by the petitioner to the respondent through a sale deed dated 8-8-1970 was less than the area actually recited in the said sale deed. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's counsel failed to demonstrate any legal or factual infirmity in the concurrent findings reached by the trial Court and the Additional District Judge. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of any established infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the area of the portion sold under a sale deed was less than what was recited in the deed?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact that show no infirmity?
  • Will revisional jurisdiction be exercised to overturn concurrent factual findings without proof of error?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khurshid Bibi vs Muhammad Bibi And Other1987 SCMR 737 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-11
  leave to appealpower of attorneyfraudulent entryconcurrent findingscivil revisionland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's civil revision against a decree in favour of the respondents. The respondent had challenged a sale of her land executed by her mother in favour of the petitioner based on a general power of attorney. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court allowed it, holding that the power of attorney was executed solely to pursue litigation and did not authorize the sale of land, finding that the entry regarding sale was fraudulently inserted. The High Court affirmed these concurrent findings. The core legal question concerns the validity of the concurrent findings of fact regarding the scope and fraudulent alteration of the power of attorney. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings suffered from no legal infirmity or violation of principle, and thus declined to interfere. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless they suffer from a legal infirmity or violate established principles.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the scope of a power of attorney?
  • Can a power of attorney executed for a specific purpose like pursuing litigation be used to sell property when the authorization entry was fraudulently inserted?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khatoon vs The State And Other1987 SCMR 2042 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-03
  leave to appealacquittalindependent corroborationinterested witnessesblood-feudcriminal administration of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, the mother of the deceased, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of murder charges under sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court had initially convicted the respondents, but the High Court overturned this, citing deep-rooted enmity between the complainant's family and the accused, and the lack of independent corroboration for the prosecution's evidence. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in requiring independent corroboration when the prosecution witnesses were found to be highly inimical and interested. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, holding that when prosecution evidence is tainted by deep-rooted enmity and interest, the court is justified in seeking independent corroboration. The Court found that the High Court correctly applied established principles of criminal justice by rejecting evidence tainted by the same infirmities as the ocular testimony and by finding that prompt FIR and medical evidence alone did not provide sufficient corroboration. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court justified in requiring independent corroboration when prosecution witnesses are found to be highly inimical and interested?
  • Can prompt FIR and medical evidence alone serve as sufficient corroboration in a murder case involving deep-rooted enmity?
  • Does the recovery of weapons from an accused constitute sufficient corroboration if the recovery witnesses themselves are inimical to the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khairunnisa And Others vs Abdullah1987 SCMR 1634 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-23
  ejectmentdefault in rentstatutory tenanttender of rentchange of ownershiprent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which upheld an ejectment order passed by a Rent Controller against the petitioners on the ground of default in rent payment. The core legal question was whether the petitioners could be held liable for default in the absence of a formal demand for rent by the respondent, particularly given the change in ownership of the property. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were not absolved of their obligation to pay rent. The Court observed that the petitioners had admitted the rate of rent in their written statement and had expressed willingness to pay in response to a notice, yet failed to tender any rent to the respondent or deposit it in court until the ejectment proceedings commenced. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that a tenant cannot evade the obligation to pay rent solely on the basis of a lack of formal demand when the tenant is aware of the change in ownership and the rent liability.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant claim immunity from default in rent payment on the ground that no formal demand was made by the new landlord?
  • Does the failure to tender rent or deposit it in court after receiving notice of a change in ownership constitute default under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1954?
  • Is a tenant liable for default if they admit the rate of rent in their written statement but fail to pay the landlord?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kaniz Mai vs Muhammad Nawaz And Another1987 SCMR 684 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-24
  leave to appealjurisdiction of civil courtfamily court decreeex parte decreedissolution of marriagematrimonial matterjactitation of marriage
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition arising from a matrimonial dispute. The core legal question concerns the jurisdiction of a civil court to set aside an ex parte decree for dissolution of marriage passed by a Family Court, particularly in light of prior precedents. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the civil court possessed the requisite jurisdiction to declare the family court's ex parte decree a nullity on the grounds of fraud, instead of the aggrieved party seeking relief directly from the Family Court under the applicable rules. The Court held that the case raises substantial questions regarding the jurisdictional bounds between civil courts and Family Courts, and accordingly granted leave to appeal to review the matter further based on established case law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil court set aside an ex parte decree for dissolution of marriage passed by a Family Court?
  • Whether an aggrieved party must seek the reversal of an ex parte decree directly from the Family Court instead of filing a separate suit in a civil court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Irshad Begum, Anwarul Haq vs Anwarul Haq And Other the State1987 SCMR 1758 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-16
  criminal appealmurder convictionsentence enhancementocular testimonyre-appraisal of evidencerelated witnessesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-petitions for leave to appeal filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained the conviction of the petitioner, Anwarul Haq, for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while reducing his death sentence to life imprisonment and acquitting his co-accused. The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction, while the complainant, Mst. Irshad Begum, sought enhancement of the sentence. The core legal questions involved whether the ocular testimony of related and allegedly chance witnesses required independent corroboration to sustain a conviction, and whether the circumstances warranted an enhancement of the sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the High Court’s judgment did not warrant interference. The Court determined that no valid grounds existed for a re-appraisal of the evidence presented during the trial. Consequently, the Court dismissed both petitions, thereby upholding the conviction and the sentence of life imprisonment as determined by the High Court. The judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless a compelling case for re-appraisal is established.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of related and chance witnesses in a murder case necessarily require independent corroboration to sustain a conviction?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court undertake a re-appraisal of evidence in a criminal appeal?
  • Is a sentence of life imprisonment appropriate where the motive for murder involves a historical grievance?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Irshad Begum vs Lahore Development Authority And Other1987 SCMR 816 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-09
  land acquisitionexemption plotestoppelconstitutional jurisdictioncompensation adequacyacquiescence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, owner of land acquired by the Lahore Development Authority for the Gulshan-e-Ravi Scheme, challenged the acquisition proceedings and the adequacy of compensation for her land and structure. Having accepted an exemption plot and paid the requisite development charges, the petitioner sought to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was precluded from challenging the legality of the acquisition proceedings because she had already accepted the benefit of an exemption plot and paid development charges, thereby acquiescing to the acquisition. Furthermore, regarding the compensation for the structure, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the awarded amount did not reflect the proper value. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming that accepting benefits from an acquisition scheme estops a party from later challenging the validity of the acquisition proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acceptance of an exemption plot and payment of development charges estop a landowner from challenging the legality of acquisition proceedings?
  • Can a petitioner challenge the adequacy of compensation for a structure without demonstrating that the awarded amount failed to represent its proper value?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hussain Bibi And Another vs Additional Settlement Commissioner1987 SCMR 633 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-01
  evacuee propertyremand orderdelegation of authoritysettlement commissionerjurisdictionstatutory interpretationrepeal laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the disposal of a property dispute involving evacuee property. The core legal question concerns whether an Additional Settlement Commissioner, who was not a designated officer under the relevant repeal legislation, possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a remanded revision petition and subsequently delegate that case to a Deputy Settlement Commissioner for de novo disposal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s previous remand order explicitly directed the Settlement Commissioner exercising powers under the Evacuee Properties and Displaced Persons (Repeal) Act, 1975 to decide the matter. Consequently, the Additional Settlement Commissioner lacked the authority to further entrust or remit the case to another officer. The Court set aside the impugned judgment and the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner, directing that the revision application be disposed of strictly by the authorized officer designated under the law to handle such remanded proceedings. The key principle established is that delegated judicial or quasi-judicial authority under a remand order must be exercised strictly by the designated officer, without further unauthorized sub-delegation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner, upon receiving a case on remand, further delegate the matter to a Deputy Settlement Commissioner?
  • Does an officer not designated under the Evacuee Properties and Displaced Persons (Repeal) Act 1975 have the jurisdiction to decide a remanded revision petition?
  • Must a remanded case be decided strictly by the officer specified in the High Court's remand order?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hashmat Bibi vs Muhammad Ibrahim Alias Chotta And Other1987 SCMR 562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-07
  evacuee propertysettlement schemetransfer of propertywrit jurisdictionfindings of factejectment proceedingsspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These are petitions for special leave to appeal arising from protracted litigation regarding the transfer and ejectment of occupants of an evacuee building in Gujranwala. The core legal question was whether a specific disputed room occupied by Mst. Hashmat Bibi formed part of an adjacent unit previously transferred to another party or constituted an independent, undisposed-of property available for transfer under settlement laws. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent factual findings of the settlement authorities—based on spot inspections and sketch maps—establishing that the disputed room was not part of the previously transferred unit, were final and should not have been interfered with lightly by the High Court in writ jurisdiction. The Court established the principle that findings of fact by specialized settlement tribunals regarding the physical demarcation of property units ought to be respected by superior courts unless shown to be perverse or without lawful authority, thereby restoring the transfer of the unallocated room and setting aside the ejectment order against the occupant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether findings of fact regarding the physical demarcation of property units by settlement authorities can be interfered with by the High Court in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does a room that is not part of an earlier transfer order and lacks allocation in the property sketch constitute an available evacuee property for subsequent transfer?
  • Whether an ejectment order obtained under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance can be sustained when the underlying transfer of the property is upheld in favor of the occupant?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hameeda Bibi vs Muhammad Afzal And 2 Other1987 SCMR 1419 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-31
  acquittalmurderinterested witnessinjured witnesscorroborationenmitypetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the acquittal of the respondents by the Lahore High Court, which reversed their conviction and sentence for murder and murderous assault awarded by the trial court. The core legal question was whether the uncorroborated ocular testimony of an injured and interested witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction in a case involving longstanding enmity. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court properly applied the rule of prudence requiring abundant caution and corroboration when evaluating the testimony of an interested witness amidst extreme enmity, where the possibility of false implication cannot be ruled out. The key principle laid down is that while an injured witness is naturally present, courts must apply caution and seek corroboration in the face of deep-seated enmity to avoid wrongful convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of an injured yet interested witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction in cases of deep-seated enmity?
  • Does the presence of longstanding enmity between parties require the application of the rule of prudence and abundant caution by appellate courts?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal order passed by the High Court when the appraisal of evidence is based on sound legal principles?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hakumat Bibi vs Imam Din and Other1987 PLD Supreme Court 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-12
  written statementOrder VIII Rule 10ex parte decreepronounce judgmentdiscretion of courtVakalatnamarecording evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave raised the question of whether a court can decree a suit under Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without recording any evidence when a defendant fails to file a written statement as directed. The appellant claimed she had never appointed counsel and that the suit could not be decreed solely on the basis of the verified plaint without taking evidence. The Supreme Court rejected the contention regarding unauthorized representation, holding that she had failed to seek an expert comparison of her thumb impression or take action against the counsel. On the legal question, the Court affirmed the view in Sh. Abdus Saboor & Brothers v. Ganesh Flour Mills Co. Ltd., holding that under Order VIII Rule 10, the court possesses discretionary power to pronounce judgment against a defaulting party without recording evidence, provided the discretion is exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court pronounce judgment against a defendant under Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for failing to file a written statement without recording any evidence?
  • Does the failure of a defendant to file a written statement automatically require the recording of evidence before decreeing the suit?
  • Under what circumstances will an appellate court interfere with a judgment passed under Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Mst. Hajran Rhatoon And Others vs Chief Settlement Commissioner1987 SCMR 1153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-27
  condonation of delaylimitationintra-court appealoriginal ordercompetency of appealtime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal that was filed with a significant delay of 1419 days. The petitioners sought condonation of this delay, arguing that the time was spent pursuing an Intra-Court Appeal against an order passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner on 6-11-1982. The core legal question was whether the time spent pursuing an incompetent Intra-Court Appeal could be excluded for the purpose of condoning delay. The Supreme Court rejected this plea, holding that the Intra-Court Appeal was incompetent because the "original order" under the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Act 1972 refers to the order initiating the proceedings, which in this case was the order of 2-1-1960. Since an appeal was competent against that original order under the relevant statute, the subsequent Intra-Court Appeal was legally unsustainable. Consequently, the Court held that the time spent in such incompetent proceedings could not be excused. The petition was dismissed as time-barred, affirming that mistaken legal advice or pursuing an incompetent remedy does not constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay.

  Questions settled

  • What is the meaning of the expression 'original order' in the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Act 1972?
  • Can time spent pursuing an incompetent Intra-Court Appeal be excluded for the purpose of condoning delay?
  • Does an Intra-Court Appeal lie against an order where an appeal was already competent against the original order initiating proceedings?
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• Mst. Ghulam Fatima And Others vs Muhammad Akram1987 SCMR 1339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-10
  dismissal in defaultrestoration of appealsufficient causecivil appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the concurrent judgments of the High Court and the Additional District Judge, which had affirmed the dismissal of their application for the restoration of a civil appeal. The appeal had been dismissed in default on 9-9-1985. The petitioners filed a restoration application on 30-9-1985, with petitioner No. 1 claiming she misheard the adjourned date as 30-9-1985 due to her age and hearing impairment. The lower courts rejected this explanation for lack of sufficient cause. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in refusing to restore the appeal dismissed in default. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings regarding the absence of sufficient cause suffered from no legal infirmity and dismissed the petition. The key principle established is that findings of fact regarding sufficient cause for non-appearance by lower courts will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court unless shown to be infirm.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an elderly litigant's mistaken impression of an adjourned date due to hearing impairment constitutes sufficient cause for the restoration of an appeal dismissed in default?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the lack of sufficient cause for non-appearance?
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• Mst. Feroze Bano And Another vs Mst. Bilqis Jehan And Other1987 SCMR 1009 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-04
  power of attorneywithdrawal of suitagencymaterial irregularitycivil revisionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for declaration, perpetual injunction, partition, and recovery filed by the first appellant, who had executed a registered general power of attorney in favor of the second appellant and others, which was claimed to be irrevocable and executed for consideration. During the pendency of the suit, a sixth respondent moved an application to withdraw the suit, claiming to hold a subsequent power of attorney executed in India. The trial Court dismissed the suit as withdrawn in haste on the same day without issuing notice to the plaintiff or the attorneys under the first power of attorney. The High Court dismissed the appellants' civil revision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the trial Court acted with material irregularity. Applying the principles of Sections 214 and 215 of the Contract Act 1872, the Court ruled that where an agent acts in a situation of difficulty or deals on his own account (such as where the agent's mother was interested in the suit property), there is a duty to consult the principal. The Court remanded the case to the trial Court, directing it to issue notice to the principal and the first attorneys.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court dismiss a suit as withdrawn on the application of a subsequent attorney without issuing notice to the plaintiff or the prior attorneys?
  • What is the duty of an agent under Section 214 of the Contract Act 1872 when faced with a situation of difficulty in the business of agency?
  • Does an agent's attempt to withdraw a principal's suit, which directly benefits the agent's close relative, constitute dealing on his own account under Section 215 of the Contract Act 1872?
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• Mst. Fatima vs Ahmad Khan Ansari And Another1987 SCMR 1589 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  status quotemporary injunctioninherent powerscompromise decreefraudcivil procedureinterim relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a property dispute where the appellant sought a declaration of ownership based on a gift. A compromise decree was subsequently challenged by the respondent, an alleged heir, through an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alleging fraud. The trial court granted an interim status quo order, which was upheld by the High Court despite acknowledging that the requirements of Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 were not strictly met. The core legal question was whether the status quo order was sustainable when the formal requirements for a temporary injunction were not satisfied. The Supreme Court held that while the formal requirements of Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 were not met, the court's exercise of discretion was justifiable under the inherent powers provided by Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The principle laid down is that courts should prioritize the substance of an application over rigid adherence to set phrases, and inherent powers may be invoked to prevent injustice where formal statutory requirements for interim relief are technically deficient.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant an interim status quo order under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the requirements of Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 are not strictly met?
  • Should a court prioritize the substance of an application over the absence of specific set phrases when determining the grant of interim relief?
  • Does an appellate court have the authority to direct a trial court to ignore specific remarks made in a prior judgment to prevent prejudice?
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