Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Ghulam Murtaza And Others vs The Sessions Judge, Leiah And Other1987 SCMR 622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-21
  section 145 CrPCforcible dispossessionjurisdiction of magistratecivil court proceedingsconstitutional petitionspecial leave to appealstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition against the concurrent orders of a Magistrate and a Sessions Judge under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The dispute involved agricultural land where the respondent claimed possession based on a previous civil decree, while the petitioners challenged the decree through an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. During the pendency of these civil proceedings, the respondent alleged forcible dispossession, prompting the Magistrate to initiate proceedings and order restoration of possession, a finding affirmed in revision by the Sessions Judge and upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the institution of civil proceedings or the pendency of a civil matter ousts the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to entertain and proceed with an application under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in the absence of an interim injunctive order. The Supreme Court held that the mere institution of a civil action or pendency of proceedings does not oust a Magistrate's jurisdiction under section 145 unless a specific interim order regarding possession has been passed by the civil court. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere institution of civil proceedings oust a Magistrate's jurisdiction to proceed under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a Magistrate entertain an application under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when no interim order regarding possession has been passed by a civil court?
  • Whether pending revision proceedings against a civil court decree operate as an automatic stay against criminal proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Ghulam Muhammad vs Mst. Shamim Akhtar And Other1987 SCMR 1048 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-12
  abatement of proceedingswrit petitionlegal representativeslimitation periodcondonation of delayleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the appellant's application to set aside an abatement order in a writ petition, following the death of a respondent. The appellant sought to implead the legal representatives of the deceased nearly five years after the abatement occurred. Leave to appeal was initially granted to determine whether the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, precluded the abatement and whether Article 177 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applied to the proceedings. During the hearing, the appellant's counsel conceded that he could not press the legal points regarding the applicability of the Ordinance and the Limitation Act. The appellant instead argued that the application should have been allowed on merits, citing a precedent regarding the condonation of delay. The Supreme Court observed that leave was not granted to examine the merits of the High Court's refusal to set aside the abatement. Consequently, the Court declined to modify the scope of the appeal and dismissed it, noting that the appellant could pursue alternative remedies regarding the subject matter of the original writ petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, prevent the abatement of a writ petition upon the death of a respondent?
  • Is Article 177 of the Limitation Act 1908 applicable to an application for setting aside the abatement of a writ petition?
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• Ghulam Muhammad vs Mst. Amiran Khatoon And Another1987 SCMR 1232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-06
  occupancy tenancylimited ownerlife estateproprietary rightsalienationgiftreversionary rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the nature of property rights acquired by a limited life-estate-holder widow under section 114 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. The core legal question was whether a widow succeeding to an occupancy tenancy as a limited owner becomes an absolute owner upon converting the tenancy into proprietary rights by paying compensation, thereby excluding other legal heirs. The Supreme Court held that the acquisition of proprietary rights under section 114 does not free the widow from the limiting conditions of her tenure, nor does it make her a fresh stock of descent to the exclusion of other heirs under Muslim Personal Law. The Court affirmed that such a widow cannot alienate the property beyond her limited capacity, and potential heirs retain the right to challenge invalid transfers. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a life-estate-holder widow under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 acquires full ownership upon converting occupancy rights into proprietary rights under section 114?
  • Does the acquisition of proprietary rights by a widow under section 114 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 constitute her as a fresh stock of descent excluding other legal heirs?
  • Do potential heirs have the locus standi to challenge invalid alienations made by a limited life-estate-holder widow?
  • Can a widow holding a limited life estate under the un-amended section 59 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 validly gift the entire acquired property to a third party?
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• Ghulam Muhammad And Others vs Additional Deputy Commissioner (G)/Notified Officer And Other1987 SCMR 880 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-04
  Leave to appealWrit petitionLand allotmentSettlement CommissionerCompromise agreementNotified OfficerLocus standiFraudConstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's dismissal of a writ petition in limine. The original dispute involved the cancellation of the petitioners' predecessor's land allotment as bogus and fraudulent. A compromise agreement in a subsequent writ petition referred the matter to a Notified Officer to ascertain if the respondents had pending claims for land adjustment. The Notified Officer found that the respondents did have verified pending claims, leading to the restoration of their allotment. The petitioners challenged this finding, arguing that the respondents' claims were invalid, but the High Court held that these contentions were not raised before the Notified Officer and were beyond the scope of the consent order. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the scope of inquiry on remand was limited by the compromise agreement. The Court also noted that the Settlement Department was not a party to the agreement and that granting relief to the petitioners would amount to perpetuating fraud, which the High Court could not do in its constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is the scope of inquiry on remand, following a compromise agreement, limited to the specific terms agreed upon by the parties?
  • Can a High Court, in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, grant relief that would perpetuate fraud?
  • Do petitioners, whose original land allotment was cancelled as fraudulent, have locus standi to challenge the validity of other claimants' pending claims?
  • Is a Settlement Department, not a party to a compromise agreement between private individuals, legally obligated to allow petitioners to benefit from their own fraud?
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• Ghulam Muhammad Alias Gullo vs The State1987 SCMR 1598 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-22
  murderous assaultocular testimonymedical corroborationplea of self-defencecriminal leave to appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld his conviction under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while modifying the sentence of imprisonment to four years and extending the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner was tried for making a murderous assault with a hatchet on the injured complainant, causing a grievous injury dangerous to life. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular testimony, corroboration by medical and circumstantial evidence, and the validity of the petitioner's plea of self-defence and alternative version of events. The Supreme Court found that concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts were based on trustworthy eyewitness accounts, prompt registration of the First Information Report, and complete medical corroboration which also satisfactorily explained the minor injuries on the petitioner's person. The petition was consequently dismissed, reaffirming the principle that consistent ocular testimony supported by medical evidence and prompt reporting is sufficient to sustain a conviction for a murderous assault.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding ocular testimony can be interfered with when supported by medical evidence?
  • Does the prosecution satisfactorily explain injuries on the accused when medical and circumstantial evidence indicates they resulted from a fall during escape?
  • Can a plea of self-defence be sustained without foundational support in the evidence and when contradicted by prompt eyewitness accounts?
  • Whether prompt lodging of the First Information Report lends sufficient credibility to the testimonies of eye-witnesses in an assault case?
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• Ghulam Hussain vs Fateh Muhammad And 9 Other1987 SCMR 1115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-11
  State landevacuee propertyWell Sinking SchemeEjected Tenants Schemecancellation of grantpossessiontenancy rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute over State land measuring 200 Kanals and 2 Marlas located in District Multan, originally allotted under the Well Sinking Scheme in 1942 to one Veer Singh, who never took possession of the land. The grant was subsequently cancelled by the Collector in 1946 before the partition of India because possession (Dakhal) was not delivered. Post-partition, the land was allotted as State land to the appellant's predecessor under the Ejected Tenants Scheme, while respondents later obtained an allotment of the same land from the Deputy Settlement Commissioner treating it as evacuee property. The Settlement Commissioner set aside the evacuee allotment, but a Single Judge of the High Court accepted the respondents' writ petition, holding that the Settlement Commissioner lacked authority to determine evacuee status. The core legal question is whether land for which a pre-partition grant was cancelled due to non-delivery of possession prior to independence could legally become evacuee property. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that since the grantee never took possession and the grant was lawfully cancelled by the Collector prior to partition, the land remained State land and never became evacuee property. The key principle laid down is that under Section 10(4) of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, no person acquires tenancy rights or title in allotted land until written orders are passed and possession is taken with the Collector's permission, and unpossessed resumed land does not assume the character of evacuee property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land for which a pre-partition grant was cancelled due to non-delivery of possession prior to independence can legally become evacuee property?
  • Does an allottee acquire any right or title in government land under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, without taking physical possession with the permission of the Collector?
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• Ghulam Hassan vs The State1987 SCMR 1220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-12
  murderdeath sentence modificationlife imprisonmentmotive vs intentionomission in FIRunarmed accusedcommon intentionvicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a conviction under Sections 302, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, wherein the appellant was sentenced to death by the trial court, a decision subsequently affirmed by the High Court. The core legal questions pertained to whether an accused who inflicted no physical injury, was empty-handed, and whose specific overt act of holding the deceased was omitted from the F.I.R. could be awarded capital punishment based predominantly on direct motive and shared presence. The Supreme Court observed that while motive serves as a satisfactory corroborative circumstance when reliable evidence exists, it cannot supply the total lack of direct or circumstantial evidence proving active participation in causing fatal injuries. Finding that the appellant did not inflict any injury upon the deceased and was unarmed, the Court held that the sentence of death was excessive. Consequently, the Supreme Court modified the sentence from death to life imprisonment along with a fine to be paid as compensation to the legal heirs.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence of death be sustained against an unarmed accused who inflicted no injury on the deceased?
  • Whether strong motive alone can substitute for the lack of direct or circumstantial evidence of active participation in a murder?
  • Does an omission in the F.I.R. regarding a specific overt act attributed to an accused affect the quantum of sentence?
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• Ghulam Haider Channa R vs Government of Sind And Another1987 SCMR 1615 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-19
  service appeallimitation periodtime-barred appealcompulsory retirementservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sind Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his retirement from service as time-barred. The petitioner was retired from government service on 16 October 1976 upon completing 25 years of qualifying service. He failed to file an appeal before the Service Tribunal within the prescribed period of limitation, instead pursuing remedies under Martial Law Order 23. Although a Review Board recommended relief, the competent authority rejected his petition in 1978. After pursuing other unsuccessful avenues, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal in 1984, which was dismissed due to the significant delay. The Supreme Court examined the circumstances and affirmed the Tribunal's decision, holding that the appeal was clearly barred by time. The Court found no factual or legal error in the Tribunal's reasoning, emphasizing that the petitioner failed to adhere to the statutory limitation period, and consequently dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal before the Service Tribunal be entertained when filed several years after the impugned retirement order?
  • Does the pursuit of remedies under Martial Law Order 23 toll the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
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• Ghulam Dastgir vs Muhammad Zakria Javed And Other1987 SCMR 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-16
  writ jurisdictionjudicial reviewejectment petitionpersonal needfinality of appellate orderre-assessment of evidencerent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that interfered with an appellate order under the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, exceeded its authority by re-evaluating evidence and overturning the findings of the Appellate Authority, given that Section 15(7) of the Ordinance confers finality on the Appellate Authority's decisions. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's interference was justified on the grounds that the Appellate Authority had ignored material evidence or mischaracterized testimony as hearsay. The Court held that the High Court acted within its limited jurisdiction of judicial review because the Appellate Authority had failed to consider relevant evidence—specifically, the personal knowledge of witnesses regarding the landlord's business separation—and had ignored the landlord's uncontroverted testimony regarding personal need. The key principle laid down is that while the High Court cannot interfere with findings of fact in writ jurisdiction, it may intervene if the Appellate Authority has ignored material evidence on record or failed to follow the law as established by superior courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact made by an Appellate Authority under the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to review evidence in a writ petition if the Appellate Authority has ignored material evidence on the record?
  • Is the testimony of witnesses regarding a business dispute between brothers considered hearsay if the witnesses worked in adjacent premises and observed the events?
  • Does the finality clause in Section 15(7) of the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, completely bar the High Court from exercising judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution?
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• Ghulam Ali vs Muhammad Yousaf And Other1987 SCMR 857 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-07
  post-arrest bailcommon intentionconstitutional interpretationbench constitutionjudicial discretioncriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order granting bail to two respondents in a murder case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner contended that the respondents were complicit in the double murder and that the High Court judge lacked the competence to pass the order because his nomination to the bench for only one week violated Article 198(5) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which allegedly requires bench appointments to be for at least one year. The Supreme Court rejected the petition. Regarding the merits, the Court held that the High Court’s exercise of discretion was sound, noting the respondents were unarmed and did not exhort the principal accused to fire. Regarding the legal challenge, the Court held that Article 198(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 empowers the Chief Justice to assign judges to benches as needed for efficient functioning, and that this provision operates independently of the requirements in Article 198(5). The petition was dismissed as lacking merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the appointment of a High Court judge to a bench for a period of less than one year violate Article 198(5) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the Chief Justice assign a judge to a bench or circuit court under Article 198(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 independently of the requirements of Article 198(5)?
  • Is the grant of bail to an unarmed co-accused who did not exhort the principal offender to commit the crime a valid exercise of judicial discretion?
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• Ghulam Ahmad And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 1919 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-11
  criminal petition for leave to appealmurderenhancement of sentenceacquittalocular testimonycommon intentionfire-arm injury
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of cross-petitions arising from a murder trial where four accused persons were tried for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court convicted all four accused and sentenced them to life imprisonment. On appeal, the High Court maintained the conviction and sentence of the main accused, Sher Mohammad, while acquitting the other three co-accused, and dismissed the complainant's revision petition for enhancement of sentence. The complainant sought enhancement of Sher Mohammad's sentence to death and challenged the acquittal of the co-accused, whereas Sher Mohammad filed a jail petition challenging his conviction. The Supreme Court evaluated the medical evidence, ocular testimony, recovery evidence, and the unproven motives. Finding no legal infirmity in the High Court's appraisal of evidence—noting that only Sher Mohammad's shot hit the deceased while the co-accused missed or fired after the victim fell—the Supreme Court dismissed both petitions for leave to appeal, holding that the impugned judgment warranted no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's judgment maintaining conviction and acquittal when ocular and medical evidence support the findings?
  • Does the mere presence of co-accused persons who did not inflict a fatal injury warrant setting aside their acquittal?
  • Whether the failure to prove alleged motives necessitates the enhancement of a sentence of life imprisonment to death for murder?
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• Ghulam Abbas vs WAPDA1987 SCMR 1946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-27
  service appeallimitation periodouster of jurisdictionWAPDA employeesFederal Service Tribunaldismissal from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave challenges an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's service appeal on the grounds of limitation. The appellant, a former Lineman Grade II with WAPDA, was dismissed from service under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act. After initially approaching the Labour Court, the appellant filed an appeal with the Federal Service Tribunal, which was rejected as time-barred. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Federal Service Tribunal could assume jurisdiction to interfere with WAPDA service orders, particularly in light of the ouster of jurisdiction clause contained in Section 17(1-C) of the WAPDA Act. Relying on the precedent established in WAPDA v. Muhammad Arshad Qureshi (1986 SCMR 18), the Supreme Court affirmed that the Tribunal correctly dismissed the appeal. Furthermore, the Court held that the appellant failed to provide any reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the appeal before the Tribunal. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, dismissing the appeal on the basis of limitation and the established jurisdictional limitations regarding WAPDA employees.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to interfere with service orders passed under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act?
  • Can an appeal be entertained by the Federal Service Tribunal if it is filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation without reasonable explanation?
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• Ghazi Inam Nabi Pardesi Through His Legal Heirs And Others vs Mst. Kaniz1987 SCMR 1299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-11Read full judgment →
• Ghaus Muhammad And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 776 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-01
  murdergrave and sudden provocationfamily honourbenefit of doubtacquittalsentence enhancementpreconcerted attack
  Summary & questions settled

  These are three petitions for special leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a murder case. Two brothers were convicted under sections 302 and 323 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of the deceased and causing simple injuries to another, receiving life imprisonment and lesser sentences. Their co-accused was acquitted by the High Court, and the deceased's uncle sought enhancement of the convicts' sentences and challenged the acquittal. The core legal questions involved the determination of whether the killing occurred under grave and sudden provocation due to an illicit liaison, the justification for the co-accused's acquittal, and the appropriateness of the lesser sentence of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully established a preconcerted attack away from the defense's claimed place of occurrence, the co-accused was rightly granted the benefit of the doubt as he bore no injuries and had no independent motive, and the lesser penalty of life imprisonment was justified given the family honor context. The petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the plea of grave and sudden provocation can be sustained without evidence placing the accused and the deceased together at the alleged place of occurrence?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt when he bears no injuries and lacks an independent motive to commit the crime while co-accused are injured?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the discretion exercised by lower courts in imposing the lesser penalty of life imprisonment instead of death for a murder committed to rehabilitate family honour?
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• Fida Hussain Shah vs Muhammad Rafique Shah1987 SCMR 845 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-03
  ex parte decreepre-emptionlimitation periodsetting aside decreecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order dismissing an application to set aside an ex parte pre-emption decree on the grounds of limitation. The trial court had applied Article 164 of the Limitation Act 1908, treating the application as time-barred. Relying on the precedent established by the Supreme Court in Messrs Rehman Weaving Factory v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, the parties agreed that the controversy regarding the applicable limitation period had been resolved. The core legal question concerned which article of the Limitation Act 1908 governs an application to set aside an ex parte decree in these specific circumstances. Following the cited precedent, the Court held that Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 is the applicable provision, rendering the petitioner's application within the period of limitation. Consequently, the petition was converted into an appeal, the appeal was allowed, the ex parte decree was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 164 or Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to an application for setting aside an ex parte pre-emption decree?
  • Is an application to set aside an ex parte decree governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908?
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• Feroze Khan vs Ali Haider And Other1987 SCMR 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-27
  evacuee land allotmentRehabilitation Settlement SchemeMukhbari applicationconstitutional petitionpreferential claimPatwar Circlestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a constitutional petition concerning the allotment of evacuee land in Sahiwal. The core legal question was whether a claimant (Ahmad Khan) possessed a preferential right to land allotment over the appellant (Feroze Khan) based solely on having unsatisfied units within the same Patwar Circle, despite the absence of a formal transfer of those units to the specific Estate (Chak) where the land became available. The Supreme Court held that the appellant, whose units were formally transferred to the relevant Chak, held a superior claim. The Court determined that the respondent’s units, which were neither formally nor actually transferred to the disputed Chak, did not qualify him for allotment. The Court further clarified that a previous inter-parties decision by a Rehabilitation Commissioner did not constitute a general modification of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme’s procedural requirements. Consequently, the Court upheld the principle of first come, first served, declaring the lower authorities' orders invalid as the appellant was the only eligible claimant with units present in the Estate at the time of allotment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a previous inter-parties decision by a Rehabilitation Commissioner automatically modify general procedural instructions under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme?
  • Is a formal transfer of unsatisfied units to a specific Estate required for a claimant to be eligible for land allotment in that Estate?
  • Does the principle of first come, first served apply to the allotment of evacuee land when competing claims exist?
  • Can administrative instructions issued by a competent authority be considered equivalent to statutory rules?
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• Feroz Khan And Others vs Mst. Waziran Bib11987 SCMR 1647 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-27
  leave to appealsale-deedfraud and impersonationadverse inferencewitness boxnon-payment of considerationsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed their second appeal arising from a suit challenging a registered sale-deed on the grounds of fraud, impersonation, and non-payment of consideration. The trial court had dismissed the suit, finding no fraud or non-payment, while the Additional District Judge held that fraud was established but dismissed the suit due to improper form. The High Court reversed the appellate court's finding on fraud and upheld the sale-deed, noting inter alia the failure of the plaintiffs to appear in the witness box. The core legal question was whether an adverse inference could be legally drawn against parties who failed to depose in support of their allegations of fraud, and whether fraud and impersonation were established regarding the sale-deed. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was fully justified in drawing an adverse inference against the petitioners for withholding themselves from the witness box, and that the evidence failed to establish fraud or lack of consideration. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an adverse inference be drawn against a party who alleges fraud and non-payment of consideration but fails to appear in the witness box?
  • Whether the High Court in a second appeal is justified in re-examining evidence when the courts below have recorded conflicting findings on questions of fact?
  • Does the appearance of persons other than the executants before the Sub-Registrar during registration necessarily prove fraud and impersonation by the beneficiary?
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• Federation of Pakistan vs Muhammad Irfan And Other1987 SCMR 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-05
  Leave to appealService matterGovernment policyMinisterial statementMajlis-e-ShooraPromotional examinationVacanciesCentral Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federation of Pakistan sought leave to appeal against a Central Service Tribunal judgment that allowed respondent No.1's departmental appeal. The respondent, having qualified in the 1982 Section Officers' Promotional Examination, was not considered for one of 105 vacancies, despite being placed at merit position No.105. The Tribunal had found that a statement by the Minister Incharge of Establishment Division on the floor of the Majlis-e-Shoora, committing to fill 105 vacancies, constituted a binding commitment that the Government could not renege on. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine, primarily, the legal effect of a Minister's statement on the floor of the Majlis-e-Shoora regarding government service policy and whether the government can lawfully change such a decision and its impact on affected individuals.

  Questions settled

  • What is the effect of a Minister's statement on the floor of the Majlis-e-Shoora regarding government service structure?
  • Does a Minister's statement on the floor of the Majlis-e-Shoora represent a binding government decision in service matters?
  • Can the Government lawfully change a service policy decision once announced by a Minister on the floor of the Majlis-e-Shoora?
  • What is the effect of a change in government service policy on individuals who fell within the original policy's scope?
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• Federation of Pakistan And Others vs Muhammad Mubarrak1987 SCMR 1782 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-12
  resignationforfeiture of servicecivil service rulesservice tribunalleave to appealcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had granted a former employee of the Telephone and Telegraphs Department the benefit of counting his past service towards pension despite his resignation. The respondent had resigned citing domestic circumstances and subsequently joined the Provincial Education Department without disclosing his intent to his parent department. The core legal question was whether an employee who tenders an unconditional resignation without disclosing an intent to join another service can claim the benefit of Article 418(b) of the Civil Service Rules (CSR), which allows for the continuity of service when resigning to take up another appointment. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the respondent's resignation was unconditional and that he had failed to follow proper procedure by not applying through his parent department. The Court found merit in the petitioner's arguments regarding the respondent's conduct, the potential inapplicability of the CSR provisions, and the significant delay in filing the appeal before the Tribunal, which had been condoned without sufficient justification.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unconditional resignation tendered for personal reasons qualify for the protection of Article 418(b) of the Civil Service Rules?
  • Can an employee claim the benefit of continuous service if they failed to disclose their intent to join another department at the time of resignation?
  • Is the Service Tribunal justified in condoning a significant delay in filing an appeal where the representation was made years after the cause of action arose?
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• Federation of Pakistan And Another vs Hashim Shah Qureshi1987 SCMR 156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-05
  civil servantprobationary periodtemporary employmentautomatic confirmationtermination of servicepublic interestservice tribunalpermanent vacancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Federation of Pakistan challenged a Service Tribunal decision that had reinstated a civil servant, Hashim Shah Qureshi, whose services were terminated. The core legal questions were whether a civil servant becomes automatically confirmed upon the expiry of a probationary period, and whether the termination of a temporary employee under Section 11(3) of the Civil Servants Act 1973 requires an explicit finding of public interest. The Supreme Court held that the completion of probation merely renders a civil servant eligible for confirmation, which remains at the discretion of the employer and is contingent upon the availability of a permanent vacancy. The Court further held that the respondent remained a temporary employee despite his length of service, as no automatic conversion to permanent status occurs by operation of law. Consequently, the termination, executed in accordance with the terms of employment and the relevant statutory provisions, was upheld as valid. The key principle laid down is that confirmation is not a legal right enforceable without a permanent post, and public power exercised within the terms of employment is valid absent proof of malice or arbitrariness.

  Questions settled

  • Does the successful completion of a probationary period by a civil servant result in automatic confirmation?
  • Can a civil servant be considered permanent solely based on the length of service without an express order of confirmation?
  • Is the termination of a temporary civil servant under Section 11(3) of the Civil Servants Act 1973 valid if the order does not explicitly state it is in the public interest?
  • Does the availability of a permanent post constitute a prerequisite for the confirmation of a civil servant?
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• Federation of Pakistan And 2 Others vs Major (Rtd.) Muhammad Sabir1987 SCMR 1347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-28
  constitutional petitiondisputed questions of factwrit jurisdictionleave to appealagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent filed a constitutional petition in the Baluchistan High Court challenging his dispossession from agricultural land, claiming ownership through various sale-deeds executed between 1965 and 1971. The petition was resisted by the Government, which asserted that the land belonged to the government and was procured for the establishment of Corps Scouts, and that possession remained with the Scouts. The High Court rejected the objection regarding the maintainability of the petition involving disputed facts and granted relief to the respondent. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the contention that a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 does not lie in matters requiring the determination of factual controversies and detailed inquiry involving the recording of evidence. Finding these contentions worthy of examination, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and ordered that the interim order suspending the impugned judgment shall continue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 lies in matters requiring the determination of factual controversies and detailed inquiry involving recording of evidence?
  • Can disputed questions of fact be adjudicated within the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
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• Fazal Shah And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-11
  appeal against acquittalocular testimonymedical evidence contradictionabscondence as corroborationmurder trialreversal of acquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court which reversed the acquittal of the appellants by the trial court under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code and convicted them for murder and attempted murder. The core legal question concerned the evaluation of ocular testimony in light of material contradictions with medical evidence regarding the situs of injuries and whether the High Court was justified in interfering with a well-reasoned judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to properly address the critical finding of the trial court that the medical evidence contradicted the manner of occurrence stated by the eyewitnesses. The Court reaffirmed that in appeals against acquittal, findings of the trial court based on an assessment of evidence should not be lightly set aside unless perverse or unreasonable. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction by the High Court, and restored the acquittal granted by the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in reversing an acquittal based on a superficial treatment of the trial court's findings regarding medical contradictions?
  • Does an entry wound on the back of the deceased discredit eyewitness testimony stating that the victims were facing the assailants when fired upon?
  • Is abscondence by itself sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction when the primary ocular testimony is found unreliable?
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• Fazal Rahim And Others vs Faqir Muhammad And Other1987 SCMR 1667 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-10
  Shamilat rightsMalkiyyat landRevenue recordPleadingsMutationCivil appealLand disposition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal concerns a dispute over the ownership of Shamilat (common land) attached to specific Khasra numbers. The core legal questions were whether the transfer of Malkiyyat (ownership) land inherently includes Shamilat rights when not explicitly stated, and whether courts may consider evidence outside the scope of the pleadings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that the transfer of Malkiyyat land without explicit mention of Shamilat does not convey Shamilat rights. The Court held that a transferor cannot convey more rights than they possess; thus, where a mutation is silent regarding Shamilat, the transfer is restricted to Malkiyyat land only. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that trial and appellate courts erred by traversing beyond the pleadings to consider historical revenue records that were not part of the case. The key principle laid down is that courts are strictly bound by the pleadings, and in the absence of explicit inclusion, the transfer of land ownership does not automatically encompass Shamilat rights, consistent with statutory provisions regarding land dispositions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the transfer of Malkiyyat land include Shamilat rights if the transfer document is silent on the matter?
  • Can a court base its decision on evidence regarding historical transactions that were not included in the pleadings?
  • Is a transferor legally capable of transferring Shamilat rights that they did not acquire in the original transaction?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Ghafoor vs The State1987 SCMR 1136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-14
  murdersentence enhancementocular evidencemotivecapital punishmentcriminal appealdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the appellant's appeal against a conviction for murder and accepted a criminal revision petition to enhance the appellant's sentence from life imprisonment to death. The appellant was convicted for the murder of a shopkeeper, Niamat Ali, who was shot dead while standing outside his shop. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the sentence of death was appropriate given the uncertainty surrounding the motive for the crime and the appellant's contention that the deceased may have provoked him. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and the death sentence, affirming the High Court's decision. The Court held that where the ocular evidence is of sufficient quality to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the uncertainty or absence of a proven motive does not mitigate the liability for the crime. The Court emphasized that the murder was a wanton act against an innocent victim without extenuating circumstances, thereby justifying the capital sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a proven motive for murder mitigate the liability for the crime when the ocular evidence is sufficient to establish guilt?
  • Can a sentence of life imprisonment be enhanced to death by the High Court in a criminal revision petition?
  • Is the death penalty justified in a case of wanton murder where no extenuating circumstances are present?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Elahi vs Sarfraz Khan1987 SCMR 312 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-13
  special leave to appealex parte decreefraud and misrepresentationconcurrent findingsevacuee propertycivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment and decree of the Lahore High Court upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts in favor of the respondent. The core legal question concerned whether an ex parte decree obtained by the petitioner declaring him the owner of a disputed evacuee house was vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the courts below regarding the presence of fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining the ex parte decree were based on a proper appreciation of evidence and warranted no interference. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in not interfering with concurrent findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence?
  • Does an ex parte decree obtained through fraud and misrepresentation affect the rights of a lawfully transferred property holder?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Din vs Additional District Judge, Gujranwala And Other1987 SCMR 1355 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-04
  landlord and tenantrent controllerconcurrent findingsspecial leave to appealcivil litigationtenancy dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority, which established the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the respondent, Nasir Abbas, and the petitioner, Fazal Din. The petitioner sought to challenge these findings, which were upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings regarding the landlord-tenant relationship warranted interference, particularly in light of parallel litigation pending in the civil court concerning the title of the property. The Supreme Court held that no case for interference was made out, affirming the lower courts' findings. The Court emphasized that the Rent Controller had correctly noted that the petitioner could seek necessary relief in the civil court proceedings if he successfully challenged the document relied upon by the legal heirs of Nasir Abbas to prove the transfer of the house. The judgment reinforces the principle that concurrent findings of fact by lower forums regarding the existence of a tenancy will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court where adequate alternative remedies exist in civil litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of pending civil litigation regarding property title automatically invalidate concurrent findings of a landlord-tenant relationship by a Rent Controller?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority regarding the existence of a tenancy?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad vs Mst. Sakina Bibi And Other1987 SCMR 1146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-02
  gift of landmutationtransfer of possessiondeclaration suitspecial leave to appealvalidity of gift
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a father, sought special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld a gift of land made to his daughters. The petitioner had originally filed a suit for a declaration that the mutation of the land in favour of his daughters was fraudulent and that no gift had been made. While the trial court initially decreed the suit in his favour, the Additional District Judge reversed this decision on appeal, finding that the gift was valid and that the petitioner had perfected it by transferring possession. The High Court subsequently declined to interfere with these findings in revision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the validity of the gift. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, noting that the local patwari and Naib-Tehsildar confirmed the petitioner's presence and participation in the mutation process. Furthermore, evidence regarding the payment of Batai by tenants to the donees established that possession had been transferred. Finding no infirmity in the lower appellate court's conclusions, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the validity of the gift.

  Questions settled

  • Can a gift of land be considered perfected if the donor has transferred possession to the donees?
  • Does the attestation of a mutation by a revenue officer, supported by evidence of possession transfer, constitute sufficient proof of a valid gift?
  • Is a finding of fact regarding the existence of a gift, upheld by the High Court in revision, liable to be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad Khan And Others vs The Deputy Claims Commissioner, Rawalpindi And Other1987 SCMR 692(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  lachesconstitutional petitiondelayjudicial reviewdiscretionary jurisdictionadministrative order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition against an order passed by the Deputy Claims Commissioner. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in dismissing the constitutional petition on the grounds of laches. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the Deputy Claims Commissioner's order was passed on 29-1-1977, while the constitutional petition was only filed on 21-11-1979. The Court held that the petitioner failed to provide any satisfactory explanation for the delay of nearly three years in approaching the High Court. Consequently, the principle laid down is that a constitutional petition may be dismissed on the grounds of laches when there is an inordinate, unexplained delay in seeking judicial review of an administrative order, thereby justifying the refusal of the High Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be dismissed on the grounds of laches due to an unexplained delay of nearly three years?
  • Is an unexplained delay in filing a constitutional petition a valid basis for a High Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Farzand Ali Shah vs The State1987 SCMR 427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-04
  ocular testimonyinterested witnessesbenefit of doubtcriminal appealmurder convictioncorroboration of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal conviction where the petitioner, Farzand Ali Shah, was convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Faisalabad, under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and Section 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for house trespass, receiving a death sentence. The Lahore High Court maintained the petitioner's conviction while acquitting a co-accused. The core legal question was whether the ocular testimony of interested witnesses, closely related to the deceased, was sufficient to sustain the conviction without independent corroboration, and whether the acquittal of a co-accused necessitated the acquittal of the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the ocular testimony of natural inmates of the house was credible and sufficient, noting that the specific act of murder was consistently attributed solely to the petitioner. The Court affirmed that the acquittal of a co-accused based on distinct evidence (Lalkara and indiscriminate firing) does not automatically entitle the petitioner to the same benefit of doubt. The petition was dismissed, upholding the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused based on distinct evidence automatically entitle the remaining accused to the same benefit of doubt?
  • Is the ocular testimony of interested witnesses who are natural inmates of the house sufficient to sustain a conviction without independent corroboration?
  • Can the Supreme Court refuse to re-appraise evidence when the High Court has already carefully considered and accepted the ocular testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Farid And Others vs Allah Yar And Another1987 SCMR 814 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-04
  pre-emption suitsuperior right of pre-emptionspecial leave to appealvendeescollateralsexecution proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for special leave to appeal filed by vendees challenging a decree passed against them in a pre-emption suit. The respondents had initially asserted a superior right of pre-emption based on their status as owners in the estate and as collaterals of the vendors. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether, in light of the judgment of the Shariat Appellate Bench in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360), the respondents could still maintain their claim of a superior right of pre-emption based on those specific grounds. The Court found that the contention raised by the petitioners regarding the impact of the Said Kamal Shah decision on the respondents' claim required further consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to the petitioners. Additionally, the Court ordered a stay of execution proceedings, conditional upon the petitioners furnishing security for mesne profits to the satisfaction of the Executing Court within one month.

  Questions settled

  • Does the decision in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Said Kamal Shah preclude a claim of superior right of pre-emption based on being an owner in the estate or a collateral of the vendor?
  • Can execution proceedings be stayed pending the final adjudication of a petition for special leave to appeal in a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Farid Ahmad vs Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. And Other1987 SCMR 1463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-03
  employer-employee relationshipindependent contractorconstitutional jurisdictionunfair labour practiceindustrial relationsjurisdiction of labour courtworkman definition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether a petrol pump worker employed by an independent contractor is an employee of the principal oil company (Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd.) and whether the High Court rightly decided this issue under its constitutional jurisdiction. The appellant, whose services were terminated by the contractor, filed a criminal complaint for unfair labour practice before the National Industrial Relations Commission against the principal company. The High Court entertained a writ petition and held that the appellant was not an employee of the company. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether an employer-employee relationship exists goes to the root of the Labour Court's jurisdiction, making it competent for the High Court to determine it under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Court affirmed that workers employed by an independent contractor running a petrol pump do not become employees of the principal company merely because the definition of 'workman' in the Industrial Relations Ordinance includes persons employed through a contractor, unless the contractor is a mere supplier of labour. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can determine the question of an employment relationship in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction when it affects the jurisdiction of the Labour Court?
  • Is a worker employed by an independent contractor running a petrol pump an employee of the principal oil company?
  • Does the inclusion of persons employed through a contractor in the definition of workman under the Industrial Relations Ordinance make the principal company liable as an employer for the acts of an independent contractor's employees?
  Read full judgment →
• Faqir Muhammad vs Secretary to Government of Punjab Agriculture1987 SCMR 882 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-21
  service lawseniority disputeexhaustion of departmental remediesjurisdiction of service tribunalcivil servant representationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had decided a seniority dispute in favor of the respondents. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal is competent when the aggrieved party has failed to exhaust departmental remedies, specifically by not filing a representation against a final seniority list issued by the Provincial Government. The Court held that under Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, an appeal is barred if a departmental representation, as provided under Section 21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, has not been filed. The Court observed that even if the order is passed by the Provincial Government, a representation to the next higher authority (the Governor) is required. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the jurisdictional competency of the Tribunal, emphasizing that the failure to exhaust departmental remedies goes to the root of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal before the Service Tribunal competent if the aggrieved party has not filed a departmental representation against a final seniority list?
  • Does the requirement to file a departmental representation apply even when the impugned order is issued by the Provincial Government?
  • Is a representation to the Governor the appropriate departmental remedy under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, when no other appeal or review is provided?
  Read full judgment →
• Faqir Muhammad Khurshid and Other vs Chief Administrator of Auqaf1987 PLD Supreme Court 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-08
  Waqf propertiesSajjadahnashinrevenue recordstrusteeAuqafproperty disputeadministrative notification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over whether various properties associated with the Shrine of Hazrat Shah Sadiq Nihang constitute Waqf properties or the personal property of the Sajjadahnashin. The appellants challenged a notification by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf, which assumed control of these properties under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether historical revenue records and previous administrative orders established the properties as personal assets, thereby precluding their classification as Waqf. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the classification of the properties as Waqf. The Court established that entries in revenue records designating a Sajjadahnashin as owner do not conclusively prove personal ownership, as the Sajjadahnashin often functions merely as a trustee or custodian. Furthermore, the Court held that previous administrative orders or revenue proceedings do not foreclose the exclusive jurisdiction of the forum designated under the Ordinance to determine the nature of the property. The judgment emphasizes that the nature of property as Waqf is a matter of substance, not merely formal revenue entries.

  Questions settled

  • Does an entry in the revenue record describing a Sajjadahnashin as an owner conclusively prove that the property is personal and not Waqf?
  • Can previous administrative orders or revenue proceedings regarding property status foreclose a determination of title under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959?
  • What is the effect of non-compliance with Section 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872, when using previous admissions as evidence?
  • Is an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent competent against a decision rendered under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Falak Sher And Others vs Ghias Ud Din And Other1987 SCMR 231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-29
  evacuee propertynon-evacuee propertycustodian authoritiessettlement departmentsuit for possessiontitle to propertyrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  These five appeals by leave arose out of a consolidated order of the Lahore High Court dismissing civil revisions filed by the appellants. The dispute related to units of property located within Khasra No. 610 in Multan, which the appellants claimed belonged to their predecessor-in-interest, A.I Muhammad. The core legal question was whether the previous declarations by Custodian Authorities regarding a portion of Khasra No. 610 extended to the entire Khasra number, thereby establishing the appellants' title against the respondents who claimed through cancelled settlement transfers. The Supreme Court held that the Custodian and revenue records established that Khasra No. 610 as a whole belonged to A.I Muhammad, and since the respondents' transfer documents had been lawfully cancelled on the basis that the property was non-evacuee, the respondents had no better title to remain in possession. The key principle laid down is that where property is determined to be non-evacuee and belonging to a private owner, and transfer documents issued to third parties through the settlement department stand cancelled, the true owners are entitled to a decree for possession against those in wrongful possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a declaration of non-evacuee status given by the Custodian Authorities in respect of a specific property unit extends to the entire Khasra number of which it forms a part?
  • Can a defendant resist a suit for possession on the basis of transfer documents that have already been cancelled by the Settlement Authorities?
  • Is a civil court precluded from granting a decree for possession to the true owner when the property has been validly determined to be non-evacuee?
  Read full judgment →
• Faizullah Khan and Other vs Abdul Razzaq1987 PLD Supreme Court 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-22
  adverse possessionunexecuted decreelimitationinterruption of possessiontitle by prescriptionimmovable propertyexecution of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over immovable property where the true owners obtained a decree for possession against an adverse possessor but failed to execute it within the statutory period. The core legal question was whether a decree for possession in favor of the true owner, without actual execution, operates to interrupt the continuity of adverse possession. The Supreme Court held that such a decree, by itself, does not interrupt the running of adverse possession. The Court reasoned that the adverse possessor's hostile possession continues until actual dispossession occurs. Consequently, if the true owner fails to execute the decree and the adverse possessor remains in possession for the requisite statutory period, the adverse possessor perfects their title. The key principle laid down is that a decree for possession merely emphasizes the plaintiff's claim to ownership but does not, in the absence of execution or actual disturbance of possession, stop the clock of limitation against the true owner, thereby allowing the adverse possessor to mature their title.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexecuted decree for possession in favor of the true owner interrupt the continuity of adverse possession?
  • Can a party perfect title by adverse possession if the true owner obtained a decree for possession but failed to execute it?
  • Does a declaratory decree regarding title interrupt the running of adverse possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Ejaz Hussain vs The State1987 SCMR 1754 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-04
  criminal appealleave to appealself-defenceright of private defencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal arising from a criminal case. The core legal question for consideration is whether, under the specific circumstances of the case, the petitioner possessed the full right of self-defence to cause the death of the deceased. The Court held that leave to appeal is granted to examine this question regarding the right of self-defence. The appeal is ordered to be heard on the existing record during the current session, with permission granted to the parties to file additional documents if necessary.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the petitioner had the full right of self-defence to cause the death of the deceased in the circumstances of the case?
  Read full judgment →
• Ejaz Ahmad Khan vs Chahat And Other1987 SCMR 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-07
  bona fide purchaserfraudulent allotmentMukhbari applicationcancellation of allotmentDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actleave to appealevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a judgment of a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court regarding the cancellation of land allotted under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958. Land originally allotted to an evacuee was exchanged, gifted, and ultimately purchased by the petitioner. Upon a Mukhbari application alleging that the original allottee was an impersonator and never migrated to Pakistan, the Additional Settlement Commissioner cancelled the entire allotment. The petitioner challenged this cancellation via a writ petition, asserting his status as a bona fide purchaser for value who was entitled to notice before cancellation, and also claiming protection under Act XIV of 1975. The High Court disposed of the writ petition, directing the petitioner to approach the relevant authorities regarding his claim under Act XIV of 1975. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that a bona fide purchaser cannot claim immunity or entitlement to notice against the cancellation of an allotment obtained by fraud, following settled precedents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a bona fide purchaser for value is entitled to notice before the cancellation of an allotment obtained fraudulently in the name of an impersonator?
  • Can a subsequent purchaser of land protect his title if the original allotment was secured through fraud and impersonation?
  Read full judgment →
• Ehsan Ella Hi vs Akhtar Ali And Other1987 SCMR 692(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-07
  pre-emptionurban immovable propertysuperior right of pre-emptionspecial leave to appealcustom of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment and decree of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's suit for pre-emption. The core legal question was whether the petitioner possessed a superior right of pre-emption regarding the urban immovable property in dispute. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to prove the existence of the right of pre-emption in the relevant locality under the applicable statute when it came into force, and furthermore, a son of the vendor is not among the persons entitled to pre-emption under the governing provisions for urban immovable property. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a claim for pre-emption regarding urban immovable property must strictly satisfy the statutory requirements and prove the existence of the custom where required by law, and familial relationship alone without statutory backing does not suffice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff can claim a superior right of pre-emption without proving its existence in the locality when the Pre-emption Act, 1913 came into force?
  • Does a son of the vendor possess a right of pre-emption in respect of urban immovable property under section 16 of the Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  Read full judgment →
• Dumar Coal Company vs Akbar Khan1987 SCMR 1821 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-05
  petition for leave to appealrestoration of applicationdefault of appearancedismissal of suitdiscretionary jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which dismissed an appeal and upheld the Additional District Judge's order. The lower court had rejected the petitioner's application for the restoration of a previous application seeking to set aside the dismissal of their suit, which had been dismissed due to the petitioner's failure to attend the court on the date of hearing. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court properly exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in upholding the dismissal of the restoration application. The Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment was passed in the legitimate exercise of discretionary jurisdiction by the High Court, involved no point of law, violated no principle of law, and warranted no interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court exercised in refusing to restore a dismissed application?
  • Does the dismissal of a suit for non-appearance give rise to a substantial point of law warranting leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Sher Afghan vs Aamar Hayat Khan And 2 Other1987 SCMR 1987 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-22
  election petitionrejected ballot papersmandatory vs directory provisionsvoter intentsecrecy of ballotrepresentation of the people
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 67 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 arose from the judgment of the Election Tribunal Punjab declaring the election of the appellant from National Assembly Constituency No. NA-61 Mianwali-cum-Bhakkar as void and declaring respondent No. 1 as the returned candidate. The controversy centered on the validity of 3,553 disputed ballot-papers where voters affixed the prescribed mark either entirely in blank column No. 4 immediately below the candidate's space or partly in column No. 3 and partly in column No. 4. The core legal question was whether the provisions regarding the manner and location of marking ballot-papers under section 33(5)(b) and rule 17 are mandatory or directory, and whether votes marked outside the designated space are automatically invalid. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the provisions governing the manner of marking ballot-papers are directory rather than mandatory. The ratio decidendi is that a ballot-paper cannot be rejected merely because the prescribed mark is placed outside the designated space, provided the voter's intention to vote for a particular candidate is clearly and reasonably ascertainable, and the mark does not violate the exhaustive statutory grounds for rejection.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of section 33(5)(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 regarding the manner and location of marking a ballot-paper are mandatory or directory?
  • Can a ballot-paper be rejected as invalid solely on the ground that the prescribed mark has been placed outside the space containing the name and symbol of the contesting candidate?
  • What is the test for determining the validity of a ballot-paper where the voter's mark is not placed in the exact designated space?
  • Does the placement of a mark outside the reserved space on a ballot-paper automatically constitute a device for identifying the voter and breach the secrecy of the ballot?
  Read full judgment →
• Faqir Masih vs Mubarik Masih And Other1987 SCMR 697 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-09
  enhancement of sentenceleave to appealmurderappreciation of evidencemitigating circumstancestime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that partially allowed a criminal appeal in a murder case. The High Court had reduced the death sentence of the respondent, Mubarik Masih, to life imprisonment for an offence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while maintaining his conviction under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions were whether the High Court erred in reducing the sentence based on the convict's age and the alleged motive, and whether the convict's jail petition, which was time-barred, warranted interference. The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions. It held that there was no justification to interfere with the conviction or the sentence, noting that the trial court had not provided a definitive assessment of the convict's age and that the High Court's appreciation of the evidence regarding motive was sound. The principle established is that the Supreme Court will not re-appraise evidence or interfere with sentencing discretion where the lower court's findings on motive and age are not demonstrably infirm or unsupported by the record.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's sentence reduction if the trial court failed to provide a positive assessment of the convict's age?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to re-appraise evidence regarding motive if the High Court's findings do not suffer from legal infirmity?
  • Should a time-barred jail petition be entertained when there is no justification for interference with the conviction and sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mrs. Ashraf Abbasi vs Settlement Commissioner, South Zone, Karachi And Other1987 SCMR 16336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertyconversion of propertyearmarking schemesettlement schemetransfer of propertynatural justicevoid order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind regarding the transfer of an evacuee property previously utilized as a medical clinic. The core legal question concerns whether a property could be validly transferred under the earmarking scheme while an application for its transfer as a converted property and a statutory determination of its character under settlement schemes remained pending. The Supreme Court held that the initial rejection of the appellant's transfer form without mandatory notice and without determining the property's converted status under Para 20 of Settlement Scheme No.I rendered the subsequent earmarking and transfer to another party void and a nullity. The key principle laid down is that a property whose status has been altered and is subject to a pending conversion determination by competent settlement authorities is not available for disposal under general earmarking processes until such determination is lawfully concluded after affording a proper hearing to the affected claimant.

  Questions settled

  • Can an evacuee property be validly transferred under the earmarking scheme while an application for its determination as a converted property remains pending?
  • Does the failure to issue mandatory notice before rejecting a transfer application render the resulting order a nullity?
  • Whether a property whose character has been altered can be disposed of without a determination by the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Settlement Scheme No.I?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Aon Muhammad Khan vs Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Saeed Qadir And Other1987 PLD SC 490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-18
  technocratsenate electionelection petitionprofessional competenceinterpretation of statutesoperational unitpolicy-making unit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 48(3) of the Senate (Election) Act, 1975, arose from an election petition challenging the election of respondent No. 1, Lt.-Gen. (Retd.) Saeed Qadir, to the Senate on the ground that he did not qualify as a "technocrat" under clause (b) of the Explanation to Article 5(1) of the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977. The core legal question was whether respondent No. 1 possessed the requisite nationally or internationally recognized professional competence and at least fifteen years of experience and expertise at a high level for administering or managing an operational or policy-making unit without necessarily holding formal academic or professional degrees. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a person without formal professional qualifications can qualify as a technocrat if they possess nationally or internationally recognized professional competence along with the requisite practical experience. The key principle laid down is that Explanation (b) to Article 5(1) emphasizes practical experience, expertise, and competence in administration and management rather than academic qualifications.

  Questions settled

  • Whether formal academic or professional qualifications are mandatory for a person to qualify as a technocrat under clause (b) of the Explanation to Article 5(1) of the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977?
  • Can a person without a university degree acquire nationally recognized professional competence through military engineering and logistics experience?
  • What constitutes sufficient experience and expertise at a high level for administering or managing an operational or policy-making unit under the electoral laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Abdul Rahman Gora vs Mst. Asya Sultana1987 SCMR 1488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-15
  rent evictionbona fide personal uselandlord-tenant disputeleave to appealrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Sind High Court, which upheld an eviction order issued by a Rent Controller against the petitioner. The core legal dispute concerned whether the respondent-landlady had sufficiently established a bona fide personal requirement for the demised premises to justify the petitioner's eviction. The High Court had previously determined that the landlady's family, consisting of six members, required additional accommodation, as the current available space was insufficient for their needs. Upon reviewing the record and hearing counsel, the Supreme Court found no legal or factual error in the High Court's findings. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the landlady had satisfactorily proven her bona fide personal need for the premises. The judgment reinforces the principle that where a landlord establishes a genuine and bona fide personal requirement for a property, and the existing accommodation is demonstrably insufficient for the family's needs, an eviction order is legally justified and sustainable on appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an eviction order be upheld if the landlord proves a bona fide personal need for the premises?
  • Is the insufficiency of current accommodation a valid ground for proving a landlord's bona fide personal requirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Faqir Muhammad Alias Faqir Ali vs The State1987 SCMR 293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-13
  criminal trespassmurderself-defenceappreciation of evidenceleave to appealdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner acted in self-defence and whether his plea of private defence and mitigation of sentence could be sustained where he was apprehended inside a house during a nocturnal intrusion connected with an illicit liaison. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's plea of self-defence was falsified by the recovery of blood-stained earth from inside the courtyard rather than the street, and that a trespasser who enters a house to commit an unlawful act cannot claim the right of self-defence against an occupant lawfully attempting to apprehend him. The court laid down the principle that a person who creates a situation by committing house trespass for an illicit purpose cannot plead self-defence resulting from his own unlawful aggression, nor can he claim a lenient sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trespasser who enters a house for an unlawful purpose plead self-defence when apprehended by the occupant?
  • Whether injuries sustained by an accused during a criminal trespass negate the prosecution's case when physical evidence contradicts the accused's version?
  • Is a plea for a lenient sentence maintainable when a murder is committed during the course of a nocturnal house trespass for an illicit liaison?
  Read full judgment →
• Din Muhammad And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 1953 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-19
  private defenceexceeding right of private defencecriminal appealland disputeproportionality of forcemurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a High Court judgment maintaining the appellants' convictions for murder. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in determining that the appellants exceeded their right of private defense regarding the deaths of two individuals during a land dispute. The Supreme Court observed that while the appellant, Ghulam Yasin, initially possessed a right of private defense against his person and property due to trespass and an unprovoked attack by the complainants, this right was not absolute. The Court held that the appellants exceeded the permissible limits of self-defense by inflicting disproportionate harm, particularly against individuals who were not part of the initial aggression. The Court affirmed that the right of private defense is strictly limited to inflicting only the harm necessary for the purpose of defense. Consequently, because the violence escalated beyond what was required to repel the initial threat, the plea of private defense could not justify the taking of lives. The appeal was dismissed, and the convictions were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of private defense extend to inflicting more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defense?
  • Can a person claim the right of private defense against individuals who were not part of the initial aggression?
  • Does the existence of a right of private defense justify the taking of life when the force used is disproportionate to the threat?
  Read full judgment →
• Din Muhammad And 7 Others vs Noor Muhammad And 2 Other1987 SCMR 399 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-08
  pre-emption suitlimitation periodinstitution of suitdelegation of powersoriginal jurisdictionAdditional District JudgeDistrict Judge
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal concerns a dispute over the limitation period for a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the suit, filed on 1-9-1972 before an Additional District Judge, was barred by time, given the petitioner's argument that the plaint should have been presented to an Administrative Civil Judge, who only received it on 9-9-1972, after the limitation period had expired. The Supreme Court held that the suit was filed within time. The Court found that due to the unavailability of a Civil Judge at the time, the District Judge had validly authorized the Additional District Judge to receive plaints. The Court reasoned that since the District Judge possessed the original jurisdiction to receive plaints, they were empowered under the relevant statutory framework to delegate this specific function to the Additional District Judge. Consequently, the presentation of the plaint to the Additional District Judge on 1-9-1972 constituted a valid and timely institution of the suit. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a District Judge delegate the function of receiving plaints to an Additional District Judge?
  • Does the presentation of a plaint to an Additional District Judge authorized by the District Judge constitute a valid institution of a suit?
  • Is a suit for pre-emption barred by time if the plaint is presented to an authorized Additional District Judge within the limitation period?
  Read full judgment →
• Dilber Hussain And Another vs Ahmad Ali And Other1987 SCMR 1498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-17
  criminal petition for special leave to appealjail petitionacquittalenhancement of sentenceconvictionreappraisal of evidenceleave refused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for special leave to appeal filed against the acquittal of a respondent and enhancement of sentences, alongside a jail petition filed against a conviction and sentence, both directed against the same judgment of the High Court. The core legal question involves the propriety of the High Court's judgment regarding conviction, sentence, and acquittal, and whether grounds exist for interference by the Supreme Court through reappraisal of evidence. The Supreme Court held that no legal flaw exists in the impugned judgment and declined to reappraise the evidence, as the High Court had adequately dealt with all aspects of the case. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused in both petitions. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings or reappraise evidence in the absence of a substantial legal flaw in the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappraise evidence to interfere with a High Court judgment when no legal flaw is pointed out?
  • Is leave to appeal granted against a High Court judgment that has already dealt with all aspects of the case?
  • Can sentences be enhanced or an acquittal overturned without demonstrating a substantial error in the impugned judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Dilbar Hussain vs Mahmoodul Hasan1987 SCMR 1628 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-15
  licenseepossession of propertylocus standisale deed validityleave to appealcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a consolidated judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which dismissed two Regular First Appeals filed by the petitioner. The underlying dispute concerned a suit for possession of property filed by the respondents against the petitioner, and a cross-suit filed by the petitioner seeking a declaration that the respondents' sale deed was unlawful. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner occupied the property as a licensee and whether he possessed the legal standing to challenge the validity of the sale deed executed between the previous owner and the respondents. The High Court, upon re-appraisal of the evidence, concluded that the petitioner was merely a licensee and, as a stranger to the transaction, lacked the standing to challenge the sale, particularly when the vendor supported the transaction. The Supreme Court affirmed these findings, holding that the High Court's factual determinations were supported by the evidence on record and that the legal position regarding the petitioner's status as a licensee and his lack of standing was correct. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a licensee in possession of property entitled to challenge the validity of a sale deed executed between the owner and a third party?
  • Does a person occupying property as a licensee have the legal standing to contest the title of the purchaser?
  • Can a court dismiss a suit for declaration against a sale deed if the petitioner is a stranger to the transaction and the vendor supports the sale?
  Read full judgment →
• Dilawar Khan vs Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan And Other1987 PLD Supreme Court 442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-15
  election petitionChief Election CommissionerElection Tribunalright of appealRepresentation of the People Actstatutory interpretationelection process
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Chief Election Commissioner dismissing an election petition for non-compliance with statutory requirements under the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The core legal question was whether an appeal lies to the Supreme Court against an order of the Chief Election Commissioner dismissing an election petition under Section 56(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was incompetent. The Court established that the Chief Election Commissioner, when dismissing a petition under Section 56(1) for failing to comply with Sections 52, 53, or 54, does not act as an 'Election Tribunal.' The right of appeal provided under Section 67(3) of the Act is restricted exclusively to the 'decision of the Tribunal' rendered upon the conclusion of a trial. Because the Commissioner's dismissal under Section 56(1) occurs at a preliminary stage before any referral to a Tribunal, it does not constitute an appealable decision. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Act explicitly excludes orders made under Article 13 of the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977, from the definition of appealable Tribunal decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie to the Supreme Court against an order of the Chief Election Commissioner dismissing an election petition under Section 56(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • Does the Chief Election Commissioner act as an 'Election Tribunal' when dismissing an election petition for non-compliance under Section 56(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • Is an order passed by the Election Commission under Article 13 of the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977, appealable under Section 67(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  Read full judgment →
• Deputy Commissioner, Kachhi And Others vs Abdul Karim1987 SCMR 1757(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-22
  limitationcondonation of delaytime-barred petitionleave to appealprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question addressed by the Court was whether the petition, which was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, could be entertained. Upon review, the Court observed that the petition was time-barred by a period of eight days. Furthermore, the Court determined that the petitioners failed to provide any valid or sufficient grounds to justify the condonation of this delay. Consequently, the Court held that the petition could not be admitted for hearing. The ratio of the decision reinforces the principle that strict adherence to limitation periods is mandatory for the filing of legal proceedings and that a petition filed out of time without a valid, substantiated explanation for the delay must be dismissed. The Court accordingly dismissed the petition on the grounds of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition be entertained if it is filed beyond the statutory period of limitation without valid grounds for condonation?
  • Is a delay of eight days in filing a petition sufficient to warrant dismissal if no valid explanation is provided?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Rawalpindi vs Messrs Lyallpur Cold Storage, Lahore Road, Lyallpur And Other1987 PLD Supreme Court 436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-17
  income tax registrationpartnership deedoral agreementretrospective effectaccounting yearstatutory interpretationassessee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the interpretation of Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922, specifically regarding the registration of a partnership firm for tax purposes following the 1965 amendment. The core legal question was whether a partnership firm, initially established via an oral agreement, could be validly registered under Section 26-A if the written partnership deed was executed subsequently, but before the end of the relevant accounting year. The Income Tax Department contended that registration required the firm to be constituted by the deed itself during the accounting year, relying on previous Supreme Court precedents. The Supreme Court held that the 1965 amendment, which introduced the requirement for an instrument of partnership to be executed before the end of the previous year, effectively permitted registration even where a prior oral agreement existed. The Court affirmed that such a deed could have retrospective effect, provided it was executed within the specified timeframe. Consequently, the Court upheld the registration of the respondent firm, ruling that the statutory amendment allowed for the formalization of pre-existing oral partnerships for tax registration purposes.

  Questions settled

  • Can a partnership firm be registered under Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act 1922 if the written deed is executed after a prior oral agreement?
  • Does the amendment to Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act 1922 by the Finance Act 1965 allow for the registration of a firm based on a deed executed at any time before the end of the relevant accounting year?
  • Is it necessary for a partnership to be created exclusively by the written instrument of partnership to qualify for registration under Section 26-A of the Income-tax Act 1922?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax And Others vs Mst. Surriya Farooq And Other1987 SCMR 1297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-04
  income taxtax holidaydividend incomeindustrial undertakingtax exemptionshareholder taxation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax against a High Court judgment regarding the taxability of dividend income received by shareholders from a company enjoying a tax holiday. The core legal question was whether dividend income distributed out of profits from an industrial undertaking, which itself is exempt from tax under Section 15BB of the Income-tax Act, remains exempt from tax in the hands of the individual shareholders. The Income Tax Department contended that once the exempt income was distributed as dividends, it became taxable for the recipients. The Supreme Court, upholding the High Court's decision, ruled against the Department. Relying on the precedent established in Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab, NWFP and Bahawalpur versus Mst. E.V. Miller (PLD 1959 SC 219), the Court held that the exemption granted to the company's profits under the statute extends to the dividends distributed to shareholders. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that such dividend income is not taxable in the hands of the shareholders, thereby maintaining the principle that the tax-exempt nature of the source income persists upon distribution.

  Questions settled

  • Is dividend income distributed from the profits of an industrial undertaking exempt under Section 15BB of the Income-tax Act taxable in the hands of the shareholders?
  • Does the tax exemption granted to a company's profits under Section 15BB of the Income-tax Act extend to the dividends received by its shareholders?
  Read full judgment →
• Col. (Retd.) Sadiq Hassan Sheikh vs Lt. Col. Farooq Ahmad1987 SCMR 1887 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-16
  ejectmentrelationship of landlord and tenantclosing of evidencespecial leave to appealconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal against an order of ejectment passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Lahore Cantonment. The core legal question was whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties and whether the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity to produce his evidence before the Rent Controller. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of the tenancy—supported by the petitioner's own letters admitting his status as a tenant—were unexceptionable, and that the petitioner had been given sufficient opportunities to lead evidence before the Rent Controller rightly closed the same for prolonging proceedings. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that concurrent factual findings based on record will not be interfered with absent any infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant can be disturbed by the Supreme Court?
  • Can a Rent Controller close the evidence of a party if it is found that the party is purposely prolonging the proceedings?
  • Whether the admission of tenancy status in letters is relevant to establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• Chuttan And Another vs Sufaid Khan And Another1987 SCMR 503 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-17
  consolidation of holdingsadministrative orderjudicial orderfinality of litigationreconstruction of recordexecutive authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside an administrative order of the Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, which had directed fresh consolidation operations in a village. Historically, the right-holders' plea for fresh consolidation had been judicially rejected three times by the Board of Revenue in revision and review proceedings, which attained finality. Subsequently, the Board of Revenue issued an administrative letter directing fresh consolidation on the ground that the reconstructed record was dubious and unreliable. The High Court declared this administrative order to be of no legal effect. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the Board of Revenue cannot exercise its administrative or executive authority to nullify, override, or set at naught judicial orders that have already attained finality. The Court affirmed that the concept of an administrative order superseding or revoking a judicial order is unknown to Pakistani jurisprudence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Board of Revenue exercise its administrative or executive powers to nullify or override final judicial orders passed by its members?
  • Whether a judicial order that has attained finality can be revoked or set aside through an administrative process?
  • Does the unsatisfactory nature of reconstructed consolidation records justify an administrative direction for fresh consolidation when judicial forums have repeatedly rejected such a plea?
  Read full judgment →
• Chiragh Din And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-02
  disappearance of evidenceattempt to conceal evidencegrievous hurtcommon intentionbenefit of doubtconcurrent sentences
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court convicting the appellants under sections 325/34 and 201/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for voluntarily causing grievous hurt and causing disappearance of evidence. The core legal question was whether a conviction under section 201 for disappearance of evidence is sustainable when the removal of the dead body was successfully resisted and prevented. The Supreme Court held that since the dead body was not actually removed, the substantive offense under section 201 was not complete, altering the conviction to an attempt under section 201 read with section 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code, and further granted the benefit of doubt to one appellant while directing that sentences run concurrently rather than consecutively. The key principles laid down include that an unexecuted act of concealing evidence constitutes only an attempt under section 201 read with section 511, and that multiple sentences for connected offenses in the same transaction should generally run concurrently.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person be convicted of the substantive offense under section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code when the attempt to remove and conceal the dead body was successfully resisted and prevented?
  • Whether an unexecuted attempt to cause the disappearance of evidence falls under section 201 read with section 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Are sentences awarded for multiple offenses arising out of the same transaction to run concurrently or consecutively?
  Read full judgment →
• Chiragh Din And Others vs The State (Copy)1987 SCMR 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-21
  murderself-defencesudden fightocular testimonyinjured witnesscommon intentioncriminal appealaggression
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that maintained the appellants' convictions for murder and assault. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellants acted in self-defence, whether the incident constituted a sudden fight, and the reliability of ocular testimony from injured witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the appellants were the aggressors who invaded the deceased's property, thereby negating any claim of self-defence or the application of Exception IV to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court affirmed that the presence of injuries on prosecution witnesses conclusively established their presence at the scene, rendering their testimony reliable despite discrepancies regarding weapon usage. The Court further held that when an accused party initiates an attack at the victim's residence, the plea of a sudden fight is untenable. Consequently, the convictions were upheld, as the evidence sufficiently demonstrated the appellants' role as aggressors, and the injuries sustained by the prosecution witnesses provided strong corroboration for the ocular account, overriding the defence's version of events.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of injuries on prosecution witnesses establish their presence at the scene of the crime?
  • Can the plea of self-defence be sustained when the accused party initiates an attack at the victim's residence?
  • Does the benefit of Exception IV to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply to a situation where the accused party are the aggressors?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, Pakistan Railwayboard, Lahore vs Muhammad Ali1987 SCMR 638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-31
  civil servantworkmanrailway servantcompulsory retirementmisdescription of lawabatement of proceedingsProvisional Constitution Order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Chairman, Pakistan Railway Board, examined whether the respondent, a railway employee, was a civil servant under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, or a workman excluded from it, and whether his retirement under section 13(ii) of the Act was sustainable. The Supreme Court recalled its earlier ex-parte order on review due to sufficient cause shown by the respondent for his non-appearance. On merits, the Court held that even assuming the respondent was a workman under the Workmen's Compensation Act, an identical power to retire employees after completing 25 years of service was available under paragraph 2046 of the Pakistan Railways Establishment Code Volume II, making the misdescription of the enabling provision inconsequential. Furthermore, the Court held that the constitutional petition before the High Court had abated under Article 13(1) of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, as the bar applied broadly to persons 'in the service of Pakistan', which included railway employees, regardless of narrow statutory definitions of civil servants. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the High Court's judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of retirement passed under an incorrect statutory provision is vitiated when an identical power exists under another applicable set of rules?
  • Does the bar under Article 13 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, apply to railway employees in the service of Pakistan regardless of whether they qualify as civil servants under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Whether a railway employee classified as a workman is nevertheless amenable to retirement powers under the Pakistan Railways Establishment Code Volume II?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Shafqat Ali vs Rao Abdus Sattar1987 SCMR 1531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-22
  abatementsubstitution of legal representativeslimitation periodwrit petitionconstitutional petitionretrospective applicationprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from a dispute over the abatement of a writ petition following the death of a respondent. The core legal question is whether the limitation period prescribed for substitution applications under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies to constitutional petitions, and whether the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972, which amended substitution procedures, applies retrospectively to pending matters. The petitioner argued that Article 177 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies only to suits or appeals, not constitutional petitions, and that the residual Article 181 should govern. Conversely, the respondent contended that constitutional petitions in civil matters are akin to suits, invoking Article 171. The Court observed that these issues, including the potential for retrospective application of procedural changes to cause injustice to vested rights, merit deeper consideration. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to resolve these substantial questions of law, while maintaining the status quo order until the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 177 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to substitution applications in constitutional petitions?
  • Can the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 be applied retrospectively to pending petitions to prevent abatement?
  • Does a constitutional petition in a civil matter constitute a suit for the purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Nasiruddin vs Maulvi Muhammad Maskin And Other1987 SCMR 1310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-15
  settlement lawfinality of judgmentcounsel concessionremand proceedingsres judicataconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of a residential portion of a composite property under settlement laws. The appellant challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed his constitutional petition, which had been filed after the Settlement Commissioner refused to allow his participation in remand proceedings. The refusal was based on a concession made by the appellant's counsel in an earlier High Court judgment (dated 30-6-1967), wherein the counsel stated the appellant was not interested in the residential portion. The core legal question was whether the appellant could challenge the validity of that concession in the current appeal, given that the earlier judgment had attained finality. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant did not challenge the 1967 judgment through review or appeal, it achieved finality. Consequently, the appellant could not now contest the factual basis of that judgment, including the concession made by his counsel, in subsequent proceedings. The Court affirmed that a party cannot bypass the finality of an unappealed judgment by attempting to relitigate conceded facts in later stages of the same litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a factual concession made by their counsel in a previous judgment that has already attained finality?
  • Does a failure to challenge a High Court judgment via review or appeal preclude a party from contesting the findings of that judgment in subsequent remand proceedings?
  • Is a statement made by counsel in open court binding on the client if the client subsequently claims it was made without authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Din vs Abdul Qayyum And 16 Other1987 SCMR 324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-22
  election petitionelection tribunalrecount of votesjurisdiction of tribunalreturning officerrepresentation of the peoplevalidity of ballot papers
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the dismissal of an election petition by the Punjab Election Tribunal regarding the 1985 General Elections. The appellant contested the election result, alleging irregularities in the consolidation of votes and challenging the jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal judge. The core legal questions were whether the judge lacked jurisdiction due to the sequence of appointment notifications and whether the Tribunal erred in refusing a recount. The Supreme Court held that the judge’s appointment remained valid, as the specific notification appointing him was an independent exercise of power under the Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, unaffected by the supersession of earlier notifications. Regarding the recount, the Court held that a recount is not a fishing inquiry. Since the appellant had walked out of the Returning Officer’s recount and failed to demonstrate specific material errors or irregularities, the Tribunal correctly exercised its discretion in denying a further recount. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that a recount is not a matter of right but requires a prima facie case of error.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a new notification superseding an earlier notification regarding the appointment of Election Tribunals automatically invalidate an independent, intervening notification appointing a specific judge?
  • Is a candidate who walks out of a recount conducted by a Returning Officer entitled to demand a fresh recount before the Election Tribunal?
  • Does the mere narrow margin of votes between candidates justify a recount by an Election Tribunal?
  • Is a recount of ballot papers in an election petition a matter of right or subject to the demonstration of specific grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Habibullahs vs Sheikhupura Central Cooperative Bank Ltd_1987 PLD Supreme Court 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-18
  benami transactionbanker's lienresulting trustpresumption of advancementright of set-offbeneficial ownershipfixed deposit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the ownership of fixed deposit accounts opened by a father in the names of his children, which the respondent-Bank subsequently adjusted against the father's outstanding debts. The core legal question was whether these deposits constituted valid gifts to the children or were benami transactions, and whether the Bank could lawfully exercise a lien or right of set-off against them. The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to prove a valid gift, confirming the High Court’s finding that the father remained the beneficial owner of the funds. Consequently, the Bank was entitled to adjust the father's liabilities against these accounts. The Court affirmed the principle that, unlike English law, there is no presumption of advancement in Pakistan when a father deposits money in a child's name. The burden of proving an intended gift rests on the claimant; absent such proof, the law presumes a resulting trust in favor of the person providing the funds, allowing the Bank to exercise its right of set-off against the customer's debts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a deposit made by a father in the name of his child create a presumption of advancement or gift under Pakistani law?
  • Can a bank exercise a right of set-off against accounts held in the name of a third party if the account is found to be a benami transaction?
  • What is the burden of proof for establishing a gift in a benami transaction involving a bank deposit?
  • Does a banker have a right to set off a customer's debts against deposits held in the customer's name, even if the account is nominally in another person's name?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Fayyaz Akbar vs Messrs Delite House Limited1987 SCMR 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-02
  ejectmentpersonal needbona fide requirementres judicatacantonment rent restrictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which reversed the Rent Controller's order and held that previous ejectment proceedings operated as a bar under the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The core legal questions concern whether the previous orders barred the fresh ejectment application under section 23 of the said Act, and whether the landlord's personal need and bona fides were sufficiently established, including his willingness to surrender his licence to practice as an Advocate. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the shop is required bona fide and in good faith, whether the landlord's undertakings regarding his legal practice and business are valid, whether the High Court failed to give due consideration to the landlord's bona fide requirement, and whether there was an incorrect interpretation of section 23 of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The Court held that leave to appeal should be granted to examine these questions on the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether previous orders of the Rent Controller and appellate authorities operate as a bar to subsequent ejectment proceedings under section 23 of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  • Whether the statement of the landlord read with section 17, subsection (6) of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963 is sufficient to prove bona fide and personal need?
  • Whether the shop in dispute is required by the petitioner bona fide and in good faith when he offers to surrender his licence to practice as an Advocate?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Akhtar Ali vs Lal1987 PLD Supreme Court 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-15
  pre-emptionMangla Damstatutory exemptiondisplaced personagricultural landright of pre-emptionstrict construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two appeals against the dismissal of second appeals by the Lahore High Court regarding pre-emption suits. The appellants, who purchased agricultural land in District Jhelum, claimed exemption from the right of pre-emption based on a government notification granting relief to persons displaced by the construction of the Mangla Dam. The core legal question was whether the appellants, as sons of a displaced person, were entitled to this exemption despite not personally holding the required certification. The Supreme Court held that the exemption notification explicitly requires the vendee to be a displaced person and, crucially, to possess a certificate issued in their own favour by the Commissioner, Mangla Dam Affairs. Because the certificates produced were issued to the appellants' father rather than the appellants themselves, the Court ruled they failed to satisfy the mandatory conditions of the notification. The principle laid down is that statutory exemptions for displaced persons are strictly construed; a vendee cannot rely on a certificate issued to a family member, as the certificate must be issued in the vendee's own name to qualify for the exemption.

  Questions settled

  • Does a certificate issued in the name of a father satisfy the requirement for a vendee to claim exemption under the Mangla Dam notification?
  • What are the mandatory conditions a vendee must satisfy to claim exemption from pre-emption under the notification issued pursuant to section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
  • Is it essential for a vendee to possess a certificate in their own name to qualify for the Mangla Dam displaced person exemption?
  Read full judgment →
• Central Board of Revenue, Government of Pakistan Through Member1987 SCMR 630 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-14
  Customs Actrebate of customs dutyerroneous refundshow cause noticeuntrue declarationrecovery of dutyCentral Board of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave was filed by the Central Board of Revenue against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had declared show-cause notices issued under Section 32 of the Customs Act for the recovery of erroneously refunded customs duty rebate to be without lawful authority. The respondent had obtained duty repayment for imported chemicals allegedly used in manufacturing exported sheep casings, but subsequent information indicated the chemicals were never used. The High Court quashed the notices on the grounds that the initial representation was made to the Central Board of Revenue, not a customs officer, and that rebate was granted under the Board's plenary discretionary powers under Section 21. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that the respondent had made declarations on export documents submitted to customs officers to claim the rebate. Therefore, if the chemicals were not actually used, the declarations were false, making Section 32(2) directly applicable. The appeal was accepted and the High Court's order set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether proceedings under Section 32 of the Customs Act can be initiated for recovery of refunded rebate when a declaration claiming the repayment is submitted to a customs officer on export documents?
  • Whether an importer who falsely declares the utilization of imported raw materials in export goods to obtain duty repayment is liable under Section 32(2) of the Customs Act?
  • Does the plenary discretionary power of the Central Board of Revenue to grant rebate bar customs authorities from recovering duties erroneously refunded on the basis of false declarations?
  Read full judgment →
• Buland Khan And 3 Others vs The State1987 SCMR 636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-21
  leave to appealre-appraisal of evidencemurdermedical evidencecontradictionscommon intentioncriminal assault
  Summary & questions settled

  Buland Khan and Mst. Mubarak Jan sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had maintained Buland Khan's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code while altering his death sentence to imprisonment for life, and set aside the murder convictions of Sumandar Khan and Taj Khan while upholding their convictions under sections 323 and 324. The core legal question concerned the appreciation of ocular testimony and medical evidence in light of material contradictions regarding the fatal injury. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to re-appraise the evidence, noting discrepancies between the first information report, the medical report, and the statements of eye-witnesses. The principle laid down is that where material contradictions exist between ocular accounts and medical evidence regarding the attribution of a fatal blow, leave to appeal may be granted for a thorough re-appraisal of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted for the re-appraisal of evidence when material contradictions exist between the ocular account and the post-mortem report?
  • Can a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code be sustained when eye-witness accounts regarding the specific attribution of fatal blows conflict with medical evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Bostan Khan vs Sultan Khan And Other1987 SCMR 1549 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-07
  leave to appealacquittalcriminal revisioncorroborationwitness testimonyblood feud
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant, Bostan Khan, challenging a Lahore High Court judgment dated 16-11-1980, which had dismissed his revision petition against the acquittal of three respondents. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the testimony of a police witness, Sher Muhammad (P.W.12), and the complainant (P.W.9), particularly in the absence of independent corroboration despite a history of blood feud between the parties. The petitioner argued that the presence of the complainant at the crime scene, as observed by the police witness shortly after the incident, should have been sufficient to warrant a conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no merit in the petitioner's contentions. The Court concurred with the High Court's assessment of the evidence and concluded that the testimony did not provide a sufficient basis to overturn the acquittal. Consequently, the Court held that the case did not warrant the grant of leave to appeal and refused the petition, thereby upholding the acquittal of the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Can a revision petition against an acquittal be sustained when the evidence lacks independent corroboration in a case of blood feud?
  • Does the presence of a complainant at the crime scene, as witnessed by police shortly after the incident, necessitate a conviction despite the absence of other corroborating evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Boota Khan And Others vs Faiz Ali And Other1987 SCMR 1475 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-20
  occupancy tenancyPunjab Tenancy Actlimited owneradverse possessionreversionersproprietary rightsinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a regular second appeal regarding inheritance and ownership of agricultural land previously held as occupancy tenancy under the Punjab Tenancy Act. The core legal question was whether a female limited owner, who acquired proprietary rights under section 114 of the Punjab Tenancy (Amendment) Act, held the property as an absolute owner or as a limited estate for the benefit of the reversioners of the last male holder, and whether her possession ripened into adverse possession. The Supreme Court held that the predecessor remained in occupation as a limited life-estate holder under custom, keeping the estate alive for the reversioners, and never asserted a hostile or adverse title to their knowledge; hence, upon the extinction of occupancy rights and acquisition of proprietary ownership, the property accrued to the benefit of the reversioners. The key principle laid down is that a limited owner or life-tenant cannot alter their character of possession without overt, hostile assertion to the knowledge of the real claimants, and statutory enfranchisement of tenancy land into ownership in the hands of a limited owner enures for the benefit of the rightful reversioners of the last male holder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a female holding a limited estate in occupancy rights can prescribe an absolute title by adverse possession against the reversioners without overt hostile assertion?
  • Does the acquisition of proprietary rights under section 114 of the Punjab Tenancy Act by a limited owner enure for the benefit of the reversioners of the last male holder?
  • Can a party raise new pleas of adverse possession and acquiescence for the first time before the Supreme Court when they were not pleaded in the original plaint or lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United1987 SCMR 1197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-13
  nationalization of schoolsMartial Law Regulation 118vesting of propertyproprietary rightsmanagement vs ownershipstatutory interpretationeducational institutions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition regarding the ownership of a building housing the Rang Mahal Christian High School, Lahore. The school was nationalized under Martial Law Regulation No. 118, and the Provincial Government subsequently asserted ownership over the building, claiming it vested in the Government as an asset of the school. The core legal question was whether the term 'vest' in paragraph 5 of Martial Law Regulation No. 118 transferred ownership of the property to the Government or merely transferred the management of the educational institution. The Supreme Court held that the Regulation intended only to take over the management of educational institutions, not to confiscate the private property housing them. The Court clarified that 'vest' is a term of variable import and does not necessarily connote 'vesting in title'. Consequently, the Government's assertion of ownership and its actions to demolish the building were declared without lawful authority, affirming that the appellant retained proprietary rights over the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'vest' in paragraph 5 of Martial Law Regulation No. 118 transfer absolute ownership of property to the Government?
  • Did the nationalization of privately managed schools under Martial Law Regulation No. 118 include the confiscation of the buildings housing those schools?
  • Are proprietors of buildings housing nationalized schools competent to sue for ejectment under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Bilqis Begum And Others vs Fazal Muhammad And Other1987 SCMR 1441 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-20
  settlement lawrepeal of statutepending proceedingsjurisdictiondiscretionary jurisdictionproperty transferevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns the validity of a property transfer order issued by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner after the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to re-open a finalized transfer of a residential unit in 1977, following the repeal of the Act on July 1, 1974, under the guise of a 'pending proceeding.' The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the saving provisions of the Evacuee Property & Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, only applied to proceedings that were actually pending immediately before the repeal date. Since the application to re-open the case was filed in 1976, long after the matter had been finalized and the writ petition dismissed in 1974, it did not constitute a pending proceeding. The Court further declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to interfere, noting the long-standing possession of the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Evacuee Property & Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 allow a Deputy Settlement Commissioner to re-open a finalized property transfer case after the repeal date?
  • What constitutes a 'pending proceeding' under the saving provisions of the Evacuee Property & Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975?
  • Can a Deputy Settlement Commissioner assume jurisdiction over a property dispute that was finally disposed of prior to the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Begum Capt. Mirza Ghulam Sarwar And Another vs District Judge, Jhelum And Other1987 SCMR 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-31
  ejectment petitiontentative rentstriking off defencedefault in payment of rentrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an ejectment petition where an order was passed under section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance directing the petitioners to deposit arrears of rent and future rent. The petitioners failed to deposit the required balance amount within the stipulated time, leading the Rent Controller to strike off their defence, a decision upheld by the District Judge and the Lahore High Court in a writ petition. The core legal question was whether the petitioners' failure to deposit the tentative rent as ordered justified the striking off of their defence, and whether claims regarding repairs or waiver could excuse non-compliance. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were indeed in default for failing to comply strictly with the deposit order according to its terms, and pleas regarding repairs or waiver could only be raised after complying with the tentative rent order. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to comply with a tentative rent deposit order under section 13(6) justifies striking off the tenant's defence?
  • Can a tenant raise pleas of repairs or waiver without first complying with the tentative rent deposit order?
  • Whether the inclusion of the current month's rent in a tentative rent order invalidates the deposit order?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir vs Wazir Ali1987 SCMR 978 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-27
  pecuniary jurisdictionretrospective operationchange of forumprocedural amendmentregular first appealtransfer of appealPunjab Civil Courts Ordinance 1962
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an order of the Lahore High Court regarding the transfer of a regular first appeal (R.F.A.) to a District Judge following an amendment to the law governing pecuniary jurisdiction. The petitioner initially filed the appeal directly in the High Court as the suit's original valuation exceeded fifty thousand rupees. Subsequently, the Punjab Civil Courts Ordinance 1962 was amended by Act V of 1986, raising the pecuniary jurisdiction of District Judges up to two hundred thousand rupees. Pursuant to executive directions, the High Court transferred pending R.F.As within that valuation range, including the petitioner's appeal, to the respective District Judges. The petitioner challenged the transfer, arguing that the 1986 amendment was prospective and did not affect pending appeals. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that statutory amendments altering the forum of appeal without impairing the underlying right of appeal are purely procedural in nature and thus apply retrospectively to pending proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amendment raising the pecuniary jurisdiction of a forum applies retrospectively to pending appeals?
  • Does a statutory change in the appellate forum impair a litigant's vested right of appeal?
  • Can pending first appeals be transferred to a subordinate court upon an enhancement of that court's pecuniary jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmadand Another vs The State1987 SCMR 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-21
  criminal petition for leave to appealmurderappraisal of evidencedeath sentencemurderous assault
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal and a jail petition filed against the judgment of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' appeal and confirmed the conviction and death sentence of one petitioner under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with sentences under Section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involved the appreciation of evidence regarding a fatal assault arising from a dispute over land possession. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts based on eye-witness testimony and recoveries did not warrant a reappraisal of evidence by this Court. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that the Supreme Court will generally decline to re-examine concurrent findings of fact in criminal matters where ocular and corroborative evidence is consistent and reliable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappraise evidence to overturn concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts in a criminal case?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be sustained solely on the ground of seeking a re-evaluation of witness testimony already considered by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Bahadur vs Muhammad Latif And Other1987 SCMR 788 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-25
  bail cancellationplea of alibimurderattempted murdercommon intentionFIRcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's judgment granting bail to respondents charged with murder and attempted murder. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in granting bail based on a plea of alibi and the nature of injuries attributed to the accused, despite a prompt FIR naming the accused and the subsequent submission of a challan against them. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was unsustainable. The Court reasoned that the respondent Muhammad Latif was directly charged in a promptly lodged FIR for a fatal shooting, and the plea of alibi required evidentiary scrutiny at trial rather than at the bail stage. Furthermore, regarding respondent Muhammad Naveed, the Court determined that because the case was registered under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, his case could not be separated for bail purposes. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and cancelled the bail granted to the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of alibi be accepted at the bail stage when the accused is directly charged in a promptly lodged FIR?
  • Should the bail of an accused charged under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be separated from co-accused based on the nature of individual injuries?
  • Does the submission of a challan against the accused impact the validity of a bail plea based on alibi?
  Read full judgment →
• Bahadur Khan vs Mst. Niamat Khatoon And Another1987 SCMR 1492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-25
  Mahomedan Lawrevocation of giftprohibited degreestep-motherstep-sonirrevocability of giftaffinity
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute regarding the revocation of a gift of land made by Mst. Niamat Khatoon to her step-son, Bahadur Khan. The core legal questions were whether the parties stood within the prohibited degree of relationship under Mahomedan Law, thereby rendering the gift irrevocable, and whether the lower courts erred in finding that the relationship did not preclude revocation. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts misdirected themselves by failing to recognize that a step-mother and step-son relationship falls within the prohibited degree, and further, that the parties shared a blood relationship as first cousins through a common ancestor. Consequently, the Court set aside the judgments of the lower courts and dismissed the respondent's suit. The key principle laid down is that under Mahomedan Law, a gift made to a relative within the prohibited degree—including a step-son—is irrevocable, as the purpose of such a gift is to strengthen ties of affinity, and the term 'prohibited degree' in this context is construed broadly to include such familial bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Is a gift made by a step-mother to her step-son revocable under Mahomedan Law?
  • Does the relationship of step-mother and step-son fall within the prohibited degree for the purposes of gift revocation?
  • Can a gift be revoked when the donor and donee are related within the prohibited degree?
  Read full judgment →
• Bahadur And Another vs Saleh Muhammad1987 SCMR 891 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-02
  pre-emptionsecond appealadmission by counselindivisible transactionprinciple of sinkerpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' second appeal in a pre-emption matter. The respondent had instituted a suit for pre-emption on the ground of being an owner in the estate, which was initially dismissed by the trial court. However, the first appellate court decreed the suit based on a concession made by the petitioners' counsel regarding the respondent's status, a position subsequently affirmed in second appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that an admission of fact by counsel should not override trial court findings based on documentary evidence, and that the principle of sinker should not apply because the purchase involved two independent divisible transactions, with one petitioner also being an owner in the estate. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' counsel's admission of fact was validly relied upon and that the lower courts' finding of fact regarding the indivisibility of the transaction was supported by the mutation entries. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can rely on an admission of fact made by a counsel against findings of fact reached by the trial court?
  • Does the principle of sinker apply when a transaction of sale is found to be indivisible and the purchase money is paid jointly?
  • Can findings of fact regarding the divisibility of a transaction and joint payment be successfully challenged when supported by mutation entries?
  Read full judgment →
• Bagh Mall vs Muhammad Shafi1987 SCMR 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-01
  stay ordervacation of staycontempt of courtconcealment of factspossession of landmiscellaneous application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two miscellaneous applications filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan: a contempt application filed by the petitioner alleging that the respondents had violated a stay order regarding the possession of disputed land, and an application by the respondents seeking the vacation of the said stay order. The respondents contended that the petitioner had obtained the stay order by concealing material facts, specifically that the petitioner had taken possession of the land forcibly. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that if the true facts had been disclosed by the petitioner at the time of the hearing, the stay order would not have been granted. Consequently, the Court vacated the stay order and declined to proceed against the respondents for contempt of court. The case establishes the principle that interim relief or stay orders obtained through the non-disclosure or concealment of material facts are liable to be vacated, and subsequent allegations of contempt for violating such orders may not be entertained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a stay order obtained by a party through the non-disclosure of material facts is liable to be vacated?
  • Can a party be held liable for contempt of court for violating a stay order that was obtained by the other party through misrepresentation or concealment of facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Babu vs Arshad Javid And Another1987 SCMR 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-21
  bail cancellationcriminal proceduredelayed disclosurediscretion of High CourtSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the complainant seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent by the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court improperly exercised its discretion in granting bail where prosecution witnesses delayed disclosing material facts for over four months. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's discretion in granting bail was rightly exercised and that provisions concerning further inquiry were inapplicable to the reasoning employed. Consequently, the petition for bail cancellation was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that where bail is granted based on the overall assessment of the circumstances, particularly delayed disclosure by eyewitnesses, and does not rest on the grounds of further inquiry under Section 497(2), interference by the apex court is unwarranted unless the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or incorrectly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the grant of bail by the High Court when discretion has been rightly exercised?
  • Does a delay of more than four months by eyewitnesses in disclosing material facts to the Investigating Officer justify the grant of bail?
  • Are rulings related to further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 relevant when bail is granted on other discretionary grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Aziz Ur Rehman vs Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala Exercising the Powers of Election Tribunal, And Another1987 SCMR 1072 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-05
  election petitionballot paperpresiding officer signaturedirectory vs mandatorylocal body electionconstitutional petitionrecount of votes
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a constitutional petition challenging an Election Tribunal's decision. The dispute arose from a local body election where the petitioner and respondent No. 2 contested a Union Council seat. Following a recount of ballot papers, the Election Tribunal declared respondent No. 2 the winner after excluding several votes cast for the petitioner, specifically those lacking the Presiding Officer's signature and ward number details. The petitioner challenged the exclusion of these votes, arguing that the relevant election rules were merely directory rather than mandatory. The High Court initially remanded the matter for clarification regarding the missing signatures, and upon the Tribunal's subsequent confirmation that the votes lacked necessary signatures, the High Court dismissed the petitioner's constitutional challenge. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the requirement for a Presiding Officer's signature on ballot papers under the Punjab Local Body Election Rules, 1979, is mandatory or directory, and to address the propriety of the High Court's dismissal based on the potential for future elections.

  Questions settled

  • Is the requirement for a Presiding Officer's signature on a ballot paper under the Punjab Local Body Election Rules, 1979, mandatory or directory?
  • Can a constitutional petition be dismissed solely on the ground that a fresh election is likely to be held in the near future?
  Read full judgment →
• Aziz Ur Rehman And Others vs Consolidation Officer, Jhang And Other1987 SCMR 893 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-18
  evacuee landconsolidation of holdingsratable reductionwrit jurisdictiondisplaced personsallotment of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed constitutional petitions challenging orders passed by Consolidation Authorities regarding the allotment of evacuee land. The core legal question was whether the Consolidation Authorities possessed the jurisdiction to ratably reduce the allotted area of evacuee land when the actual land available at the site was less than the area recorded in official papers. The Supreme Court held that the authorities faced an impossible situation where the recorded land did not exist at the site. Faced with the choice of excluding certain allottees or applying a ratable reduction to accommodate all displaced persons, the authorities chose the latter, which was deemed fair and consistent with the wishes of the affected parties. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the reduction was a practical necessity rather than an infringement of title, and thus declined to interfere with the discretionary exercise of writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can Consolidation Authorities ratably reduce the area of allotted evacuee land when the actual land available at the site is less than the recorded area?
  • Does the ratable reduction of allotted land by Consolidation Authorities to match actual site availability constitute an infringement of title?
  • Is the High Court's refusal to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction justified when Consolidation Authorities adopt a fair and practical solution to an impossible allotment situation?
  Read full judgment →
• Aziz Ahmad And Others vs Mst. Hajran Bibi And Another1987 SCMR 527 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil proceduredismissal in defaultrevisional jurisdictioncause of actionres judicataabuse of processheirship declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a civil suit for a declaration of heirship regarding the estate of a deceased individual. The core legal questions were whether the High Court could interfere with a trial court's factual finding in revision, and whether a second suit filed before the dismissal of a prior suit on the same cause of action is maintainable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction to correct a material irregularity in the trial court's factual assessment. The Court held that while Rule 9, Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 might not technically bar a suit filed before the dismissal of a previous one, the principle that no person should be twice vexed for the same cause of action renders such a suit unsustainable. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that omitting to claim relief for specific properties in an earlier suit constitutes a bar under Rule 2(2), Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, as the cause of action remains identical.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with a trial court's finding of fact in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction?
  • Does the bar under Rule 9, Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to a second suit instituted before the dismissal of the first suit?
  • Does the omission to seek relief for specific properties in an earlier suit bar a subsequent suit under Rule 2(2), Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a second suit maintainable when it constitutes an abuse of the process of the court by vexing the defendant twice for the same cause of action?
  Read full judgment →
• Ata Muhammad vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner And Other1987 SCMR 140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-08
  settlement scheme no. viiiclaimant displaced persontransfer of shopconditional confirmation of auctionpermanent transfer deedconstitutional jurisdictioncondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court setting aside the transfer of a shop in favour of the appellant, a claimant displaced person, under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The core legal question was whether an auction conducted in contravention of a telegraphic stay order could be sanctified and whether the appellant's pending transfer application under Settlement Scheme No. VIII overrode a conditional auction confirmation in favor of the respondents. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in blindly following a distinguishable precedent, as the appellant was a claimant displaced person with a prior and superior right of preference under the Displaced Persons (Rehabilitation and Compensation) Act, whereas the respondents' auction confirmation was conditional and the permanent transfer deed (P.T.D.) was issued without lawful authority while the appellant's entitlement remained unadjudicated. Furthermore, the settlement authorities had lawfully exercised their discretion in condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The appeal was accepted, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the respondents' constitutional petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an auction conducted in violation of a telegraphic stay order issued by competent settlement authorities can be sustained in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does a pending transfer application under Settlement Scheme No. VIII by a claimant displaced person override a conditional auction confirmation and subsequent issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • Is the exercise of discretion by settlement tribunals in condoning delay open to interference in constitutional jurisdiction merely because another view was possible?
  • Are the rights of a claimant displaced person superior to those of an auction purchaser under the scheme of the Displaced Persons (Rehabilitation and Compensation) Act 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Ata Muhammad And Others vs Settlement And Rehabilitation Commissioner (Lands) And 5 Other1987 SCMR 1571 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-13
  land settlementurban propertyagricultural landallotment cancellationconstitutional petitionwell irrigated garden
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by leave against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 25-2-1975, which dismissed the appellants' constitutional petition regarding the transfer of land. The facts indicate that land including Khasra No. 2601 was jointly allotted to the appellants and another in 1960 and later partitioned in 1966. A portion of the land was treated as urban residential property by Settlement authorities and subjected to auction and cancellation of allotment. The core legal question was whether 'Ahata Chahi' is subservient to agriculture and whether such land, being partly a garden, could be disposed of as urban property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court held that the disputed portion of 'Ahata Chahi' is subservient to agricultural land as it is irrigated through a well, and that the original allotment made in 1960 had attained finality. The Court laid down the principle that an agricultural well enclosure ('Ahata Chahi') that is subservient to agricultural land and forms part of an allotted garden cannot be treated as urban residential property for separate disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Ahata Chahi is subservient to agriculture?
  • Can a garden partly consisting of an Ahata Chahi be disposed of as urban property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act of 1958?
  • Does an unchallenged settlement allotment attain finality precluding subsequent cancellation?
  Read full judgment →
• Ata Hussain vs Riaz Hussain And Other1987 SCMR 815 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-02
  partition suitpreliminary decreeadmissionsecond appealleave to appealproperty shares
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a civil suit for the partition of a shop, wherein the trial court passed a preliminary decree determining the respective shares of the parties and appointed a Local Commissioner to report on the partibility of the property. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the preliminary decree through a first appeal before the Additional District Judge and subsequently via a second appeal in the High Court. The core legal question concerned the determination of the shares of the parties in the property. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the finding regarding the shares was correctly based upon the clear admission made by the petitioner himself in previous litigation, rendering the matter unfit for interference. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a party's unequivocal admission in prior litigation regarding property shares forms a valid and unassailable basis for concurrent findings in subsequent partition proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a preliminary decree determining property shares when the finding is based on their own admission in previous litigation?
  • Is the Supreme Court inclined to interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts regarding property shares supported by an admission?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashraf Hussain And Others vs M.A. Haque, C.S.P., Chief Settlement1987 SCMR 1073 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-07
  petition for leave to appealsettlement revisionurban landChief Settlement Commissionerpending units
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 4-4-1983, which dismissed the petitioners' settlement revision challenging the legality of an order passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on 12-2-1971 withdrawing an earlier order dated 21-10-1970. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioners are entitled to retain seventeen acres of urban land in Sillanwali against their pending urban and rural units. During the hearing, upon being informed by the caveator's counsel that a civil appeal involving similar points had already been heard by the Supreme Court at Rawalpindi with judgment reserved, the Court deemed it appropriate to grant leave to appeal to await the outcome of the said connected appeal. The Court ordered the petition to be kept pending and placed before the Court upon the delivery of the decision in the referenced civil appeal, subject to furnishing security in the sum of Rs. 2,000.

  Questions settled

  • Are petitioners entitled to retain seventeen acres of urban land in Sillanwali against their pending urban and rural units?
  • Can the Chief Settlement Commissioner lawfully withdraw an earlier settlement order?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Muhammad vs Khuda Bakhsh And Another1987 SCMR 1552 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-02
  leave to appealmurderfatal injurymedical evidencevicarious liabilitycriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondent, Khuda Bakhsh, of a murder charge under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court had convicted the respondent for the murder of the deceased, attributing the fatal injury to him, while acquitting him of vicarious liability under section 34. On appeal, the High Court maintained the conviction for individual acts but reversed the finding regarding the fatal blow, concluding that the fatal injury was inflicted by a co-accused rather than the respondent, thereby reducing the respondent's conviction to an offence under section 325. The petitioner, the complainant, challenged this acquittal, arguing that the medical evidence regarding the skull fractures indicated the fatal blow was caused by a Dang, which the respondent wielded, rather than the handle of a hatchet used by the co-accused. The Supreme Court found the contentions regarding the nature of the injuries and the adequacy of the sentence worthy of examination and granted leave to appeal, ordering the issuance of bailable warrants for the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal when there is a contention that the High Court misappraised medical evidence regarding the cause of a fatal injury?
  • Can a trial court convict an accused for an individual act while rejecting the application of vicarious liability under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Hussain And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 818 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-22
  murderdeath penaltyyouthful offenderappreciation of evidenceleave to appealself-defencesudden provocation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from the convictions and sentences of the petitioners, Ashiq Hussain and Talib Hussain, under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and murderous assault, which were upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions involve the appreciation of ocular testimony, the rejection of the plea of self-defence and sudden provocation, and the appropriateness of the death penalty for a youthful offender. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as regards Talib Hussain, finding the prosecution evidence reliable and his conviction well-founded. However, regarding Ashiq Hussain, noting that he was approximately 14 years old at the time of the occurrence, the Court granted leave to appeal solely to consider whether his youth warranted commuting the death sentence. The key principle laid down is that the youth of an offender at the time of the commission of a capital offence is a material factor requiring consideration in determining the appropriate sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncontradicted statement of an accused regarding his age at trial can establish his youth at the time of the occurrence?
  • Is youth at the time of the commission of the offence a ground for considering the commutation of a death sentence?
  • Whether ocular testimony corroborated by injured witnesses and a court witness is sufficient to sustain convictions under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs Basharat And Other1987 SCMR 1423 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-03
  criminal appealleave to appealacquittalmurderSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Asghar Ali against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 7th October, 1980, which acquitted four respondents of the charge under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's acquittal of the respondents and whether grounds exist for the Supreme Court to interfere with an acquittal judgment. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the reasons provided by the High Court for acquitting the respondents were correct, and consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed as it was not a fit case for interference. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will decline to interfere with a High Court's judgment of acquittal where the reasoning of the High Court is sound and unexceptionable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court judgment acquitting the accused when the reasons given for acquittal are found to be correct?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable against an acquittal under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the High Court's reasoning is sound?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwar Hussain And Others vs Fateh Ali And Other1987 SCMR 167 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-18
  leave to appealdeclaratory suitoriginal sale deedsadverse presumptionfindings of factcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' Civil Revision arising out of a declaratory suit. The predecessor-in-interest of the respondents had sold a portion of disputed land to the petitioners through registered deeds, but later filed a suit seeking a declaration and annulment of the sale, claiming she had not executed the deeds. The trial court decreed the suit, and the appellate and revisional courts affirmed the finding. The core legal question concerned the effect of failing to produce the original sale deeds and the resulting evidentiary presumption. The Supreme Court held that the failure to produce the original deeds raised a strong presumption against the petitioners, and attempts to summon a witness could not cure this omission. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused, establishing that the withholding of primary documentary evidence like original sale deeds justifies an adverse factual presumption against the party holding them.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary effect of failing to produce original sale deeds in a suit challenging the execution of a transaction?
  • Whether the non-production of primary documentary evidence raises a presumption against the party withholding it?
  • Can the failure to produce original deeds be compensated by summoning other witnesses to prove the transaction?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwar Dilshad vs Abdul Waheed1987 SCMR 1661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-24
  ejectmentdefault in rentstriking off defencestay orderurban rent restrictionappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a second appeal concerning the striking off of a tenant's defence for alleged default in rent deposits under section 13(6) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. The core legal question was whether a tenant's defence could be struck off by a Rent Controller for the breach of terms of a stay order passed by a superior court under Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, rather than for contravention of the Rent Controller's own order. The Supreme Court held that upon the dismissal of an appeal, the stay order stands automatically vacated, leaving the Rent Controller's order in the field. Furthermore, a Rent Controller cannot penalise a tenant or strike off a defence for the violation of an interim appellate order passed under Order 41 Rule 5, as only the superior court whose order was breached could take notice of such violation. The key principle laid down is that the jurisdiction to strike off a defence for violating a stay order vests solely in the court that issued the stay, and the Rent Controller's order remains suspended during the pendency of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller strike off a tenant's defence for the breach of terms of a stay order passed by a superior court under Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • What is the effect of the dismissal of an appeal on an interim stay order previously granted by a superior court?
  • Can a litigant be penalized for a delay in depositing rent when the last day of limitation falls on a holiday?
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• Amjad Hussain Abid vs The State1987 SCMR 1546(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-15
  bailleave to appealsodomycriminal jurisprudencediscretionary jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a teacher accused of committing sodomy on a student, filed a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court rejecting his bail application. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court's discretionary refusal of bail warranted interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the case was not a fit one for interference with the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the High Court. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the lower court's decision denying bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in bail matters?
  • Does an accused charged with sodomy have an absolute right to bail at the leave to appeal stage?
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• Amir Muhammad vs Naik Muhammad And Other1987 SCMR 1591 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-21
  co-ownersjoint possessionejectmentundivided propertypartitioncivil proceduredecree modification
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines whether a suit for ejectment of an undivided share in immovable property by one co-owner against another is competent, and whether a decree for physical dispossession can be passed in such circumstances. The plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration and possession of 11 out of 16 shares in agricultural land and water against the appellant co-owner, which was decreed by the trial Qazi, affirmed by the Majlis-e-Shoora, and upheld in revision by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that while a suit for joint possession by a co-sharer against another co-sharer is fully competent, a decree for physical dispossession or eviction cannot be legally granted against a co-owner in respect of undivided joint property. However, instead of setting aside the proceedings, the Court modified the decree to one of joint possession in favour of the plaintiffs to the extent of their 11 shares, holding that courts can mould relief to fit the circumstances of the case. The appeal was partly allowed with this modification.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for ejectment in respect of an undivided share by one co-owner against another co-owner competent in law?
  • Can a court grant a decree for physical dispossession or eviction against a co-sharer in joint property?
  • How is a decree for joint possession of immovable property executed under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can an appellate court modify a decree for eviction to one of joint possession in respect of jointly held property?
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• Amir Muhammad vs Muhammad Ayub And Other1987 SCMR 1742 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-08
  evacuee propertypast and closed transactionjurisdiction of settlement authoritiespermanent transfer deedrepeal of lawsauction of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges a High Court judgment regarding the cancellation of a property transfer. The dispute concerns shops originally transferred to one Naik Muhammad, which were later auctioned and transferred to respondent No. 1 in 1974 after the original transferee could not be located. In 1982, the petitioner sought the transfer of these shops in his own right, leading the Member Board of Revenue to cancel the 1974 transfer. The High Court, however, set aside this cancellation, ruling that the transfer was a 'past and closed' transaction. The core legal question was whether the Member Board of Revenue possessed the jurisdiction to reopen and cancel a transfer finalized over 12 years prior, following the enactment of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that since no proceedings were pending at the time of the repeal, the authorities lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the finalized transfer. The principle established is that once property transfer proceedings are finalized and closed, they cannot be reopened after the repeal of the relevant evacuee laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Member Board of Revenue have jurisdiction to cancel a property transfer after the enactment of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974, if no proceedings were pending at the time of repeal?
  • Can a property transfer finalized through a permanent transfer deed be considered a 'past and closed' transaction?
  • Does the repeal of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws preclude the reopening of finalized property transfers?
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• Amir And 3 Others vs The State1987 SCMR 270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-26
  common intentionleave to appealmurdercriminal liabilityconcerted attackfatal injury
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that maintained their convictions and sentences under sections 302/34, 324/34, and 323/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a fatal attack arising from a dispute over sugar cane theft. The petitioners argued that the incident was a minor dispute lacking common intention to commit murder, claiming the injuries were simple and the fatal blow was not intended to kill. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, noting that the petitioners acted as aggressors who returned to the scene armed after an initial altercation. The Court held that the use of a Barchhi (spear) in a concerted attack on unarmed individuals demonstrated a clear intention to cause harm, and the fatal nature of the injury inflicted by the primary assailant, combined with the group's coordinated aggression, established common intention under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the convictions or sentences and refused the leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the use of a dangerous weapon like a Barchhi in a concerted attack by a group establish common intention to cause death?
  • Can a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained when the accused claims the dispute was minor and the injury was not intended to be fatal?
  • Does the act of returning to a scene armed after an initial altercation demonstrate an intention to commit an offense?
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• Amanullah vs The Member, Board of Revenue Punjab And Other1987 SCMR 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-09
  leave to appealclean hands doctrineconsolidation proceedingswrit jurisdictionmunicipal limits
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition regarding a dispute over two plots of land. The core legal question involved whether the consolidation authorities had jurisdiction to extend operations to Khasra numbers falling within municipal limits. The Supreme Court declined to examine the contention regarding jurisdiction, holding that the petitioner had not come to the court with clean hands as he was in possession of both plots despite having purchased only one and failing to substantiate an oral agreement for the second plot. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, establishing the principle that discretionary relief in constitutional and appellate jurisdiction may be denied to a party that lacks clean hands.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted to a petitioner who does not approach the court with clean hands?
  • Can consolidation authorities exercise jurisdiction over Khasra numbers falling within municipal limits when challenged by a party in possession of excess property?
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• Amanullah Khan And Others vs Haji Muhammad Ayaz Khan And Other1987 SCMR 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-25
  temporary injunctionrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsleave to appealpublic path
  Summary & questions settled

  Amanullah Khan and others sought leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court vacating a temporary injunction that had been granted by the Senior Civil Judge and upheld by the District Judge in a civil dispute concerning land and an alleged public path. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its revisional jurisdiction in reversing concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding a prima facie case and balance of convenience for a temporary injunction. The Supreme Court held that the contentions regarding the High Court exceeding its revisional jurisdiction had force, and accordingly granted leave to appeal, alongside granting an ad interim stay till the hearing of the appeal. The key principle laid down is that the High Court should be cautious in interfering with concurrent findings of fact of lower courts regarding the grant of temporary injunctions in revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact of lower courts regarding a temporary injunction in revisional jurisdiction?
  • Does a private path fall within the ambit of a public path under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Altaf And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 863 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-14
  free fightleave to appealsentence reductionmurderdeath sentencegrievous hurt
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against their convictions and sentences for murder and other offences arising from a violent incident treated by the courts below as a free fight. The trial court and the High Court convicted the accused individually for their respective acts after finding that both sides sustained numerous injuries and suppressed parts of the incident. The core legal question was whether the dictum in Syed A.I Bepari v. Niberan Mollha was correctly applied and whether the death sentences of petitioners Altaf and Khizar Hayat were excessive given the circumstances and injuries sustained by the accused party. The Supreme Court held that while the cited case law was distinguishable, the death sentences were unwarranted given the totality of the circumstances. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal solely to consider reducing the death sentence of Altaf and Khizar Hayat to imprisonment for life, while dismissing the petition in respect of all other petitioners. The key principle laid down is that the existence of injuries on the accused party in a free fight setting may warrant a lesser penalty than death under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the death sentence for murder is warranted in a case involving a free fight where the accused party also sustained numerous injuries?
  • Does the principle in Syed A.I Bepari v. Niberan Mollha apply uniformly to all free fight scenarios regardless of distinguishable facts?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted selectively with regard to the question of sentence while dismissing the petition as to conviction?
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• Allah Wasaya Alias Mahanna And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 741 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-17
  petition for leave to appealcommon intentionmurderbenefit of doubtreappraisal of evidencecriminal assault
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the conviction of the petitioners, Allah Wasaya and Muhammad Sadiq, for the murder of Muhammad Younis under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while altering Allah Wasaya's sentence from death to life imprisonment. The incident stemmed from a dispute over a gift of rice brought to the petitioners' house by the complainant party for conciliatory purposes, which escalated into a fatal altercation where the deceased was stabbed. The High Court had given the benefit of the doubt regarding the precise attribution of the fatal blow due to minor discrepancies in statements. The Supreme Court examined whether common intention under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was applicable given the nature of the injuries. The Court held that both petitioners acting in concert by coming down armed with weapons and attacking the deceased established a clear common intention, and declined to reappraise the evidence, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether common intention under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be inferred when co-accused jointly attack a victim with deadly weapons?
  • Does a discrepancy in statements regarding the precise attribution of a fatal blow warrant the setting aside of a conviction for murder?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappraise concurrent findings of fact by lower courts where no misreading of evidence is shown?
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• Allah Bakhsh vs The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner And Other1987 SCMR 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-11
  evacuee propertysettlement lawstransfer of propertypossessionmisreading of evidencequasi-judicial findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee house in Lahore under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the appellant was correctly declared ineligible for the transfer of a share in the property due to an alleged lack of possession at the relevant time. The Settlement Commissioner had reversed concurrent findings of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the Additional Settlement Commissioner, concluding the appellant was not in possession based on a voters' list entry and the appellant's C.H. Form. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner’s finding was based on a misreading of evidence. The Court found that the appellant's residence elsewhere and his C.H. Form did not negate his possession of the disputed property, especially given the Settlement Inspector's earlier inquiry confirming his occupation. The Court established that a finding of fact by a quasi-judicial authority cannot be overturned on the basis of non-existent or misread evidence. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, restoring the appellant's entitlement to a share of the property.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner overturn a concurrent finding of fact regarding possession based on a misreading of evidence?
  • Does an entry in a voters' list conclusively prove a lack of possession of an evacuee property?
  • Is a party permitted to challenge the possession status of a co-allottee when they did not raise such an objection during the initial settlement proceedings?
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• Allah Bakhsh And Another vs The State And Other1987 SCMR 185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-22
  murdercommon intentionappreciation of evidenceeyewitness testimonymedical evidencerecovery of weaponsenhancement of sentencemotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court whereby the appellants were convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased and under section 307 read with section 34 for a murderous assault on an eye-witness, and sentenced to imprisonment for life and rigorous imprisonment respectively, alongside a petition for enhancement of sentences. The core legal questions involved the assessment of eyewitness testimony, discrepancies in the initial report regarding weapons used, and the sufficiency of motive as a mitigating circumstance against the death penalty. The Supreme Court held that despite minor discrepancies and improvements in the eyewitness account, the presence of the injured witness and the recovery of blood-stained weapons conclusively established the guilt of the appellants. The Court affirmed the convictions and declined to interfere with the sentence of imprisonment for life, recognizing that the motive arising from the deceased contracting a marriage with the appellants' relative generated sudden resentment. The key principle laid down is that minor exaggerations or discrepancies in an injured eyewitness's testimony do not discredit the core of the testimony when presence at the scene is undeniable and corroborated by prompt medical evidence and weapon recoveries.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies and improvements in the testimony of an injured eyewitness are sufficient to discard their evidence in a murder trial?
  • Does the recovery of blood-stained weapons from the possession of the accused provide sufficient corroboration of their participation in the crime?
  • Whether deep-rooted motive and family resentment arising from an unapproved marriage can constitute a mitigating circumstance to withhold the death penalty?
  • Can a conviction under section 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code be sustained when an assault results in a stab wound inflicted during the course of the same transaction?
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