Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Bakhsh vs Safdar Hussain And Other1986 SCMR 300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-28
  pre-emptionwaiverestoppelattesting witnessrival pre-emptorsale-deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had allowed a rival pre-emptor's claim in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a prospective pre-emptor who signs a sale-deed as an attesting witness, with full knowledge of its contents, is estopped from subsequently asserting a right of pre-emption against a rival pre-emptor. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's decision. The ratio of the judgment is that a pre-emptor who actively participates in a transaction by attesting a sale-deed, while fully aware of its contents, is deemed to have waived their right of pre-emption. The Court affirmed the principle that waiver of a pre-emption right is absolute and not conditional; once a pre-emptor has waived their right in respect of a sale, they are debarred from asserting it thereafter against anyone, including a rival pre-emptor who secures the benefit of the sale through legal proceedings, regardless of whether the waiving party acts as a plaintiff or defendant.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prospective pre-emptor who signs a sale-deed as an attesting witness with knowledge of its contents waive their right of pre-emption?
  • Can a pre-emptor who has waived their right of pre-emption in respect of a sale assert that right against a rival pre-emptor?
  • Is the waiver of a right of pre-emption absolute, or can it be reserved against specific individuals?
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• Muhammad Bakhsh And Another vs Qadir Bakhsh And Other1986 SCMR 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-19
  revisional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factlimitationmutationpossessionrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  The dispute in this matter relates to agricultural land previously purchased by the predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 1 via a mutation attested in December 1903, which allegedly was never incorporated into the subsequent revenue record or acted upon. The respondent filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, or alternatively for possession, in February 1971. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff was never in possession and that the suit was barred by limitation. This dismissal was upheld by the District Judge in appeal. However, the Peshawar High Court in revision accepted the petition and decreed the suit, holding that the suit was within time. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with concurrent findings of fact regarding possession and limitation in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction without reversing the factual conclusions of the courts below. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and restored the judgment of the District Judge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction can interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below without expressly reversing them?
  • When does time begin to run for a suit for declaration and possession based on an unacted-upon mutation entry?
  • Can a revisional court base its decision on assumptions to set aside concurrent findings of fact regarding possession?
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• Muhammad Ayyub vs The State1986 SCMR 614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-17
  murderocular evidencecorroborationknife recoveryinterested witnessescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, arising from a judgment of the High Court which had altered the appellant's death sentence to imprisonment for life for the murder of Muhammad Iqbal, centered on the reliability of the ocular evidence and the necessity of corroboration. The Supreme Court evaluated the testimony of the three alleged eye-witnesses, noting close familial relationships, omissions in the F.I.R., and unexplained delays in the production of the alleged crime weapon, a knife, which lacked human bloodstains. The Court held that the account furnished by the eye-witnesses was not reliable enough to be acted upon without independent corroboration, and that the purported recovery of the knife failed to provide such corroboration. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and ordered the appellant to be acquitted and released. The key principle laid down is that related and interested ocular testimony, when undermined by material discrepancies, delayed weapon recovery, and undisclosed previous enmity, cannot sustain a conviction without independent and reliable corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular evidence from related and interested witnesses requires independent corroboration?
  • Does the delayed production of a crime weapon to the investigating officer furnish valid corroboration for a murder conviction?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on uncorroborated eye-witness testimony when material contradictions exist?
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• Muhammad Ayub And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 1277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-26
  murderocular testimonyinterested witnessescorroborationmedical evidencerecovery of weaponsblood feudcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which had been upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions concerned whether the conviction was sustainable based on the ocular testimony of interested witnesses, given the existence of a blood feud, and whether alleged conflicts between the ocular version and medical evidence, alongside issues with weapon recoveries, warranted acquittal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the convictions were well-founded. The Court established that while enmity requires a rule of prudence regarding corroboration, it does not automatically invalidate the testimony of interested witnesses if their evidence is intrinsically reliable. Furthermore, minor discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence, such as the absence of blunt weapon injuries, do not necessarily discredit the prosecution's case when the eyewitness accounts are otherwise consistent. Additionally, the recovery of weapons, even with disintegrated blood stains, provides valid corroboration where the accused demonstrated exclusive knowledge of the concealment. The Court affirmed the convictions while granting the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a blood feud between parties automatically invalidate the testimony of interested eyewitnesses?
  • Can the recovery of weapons provide corroborative evidence if the blood stains on the weapons have disintegrated?
  • Does a minor discrepancy between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the nature of injuries necessarily discredit the prosecution's case?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to sentences of life imprisonment?
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• Muhammad Aslam vs The State1986 SCMR 1242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-24
  criminal appealmurderdeath sentencecommutation of sentenceprivate defensechance encounterappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, whether the defense version claiming a right of private defense regarding family honor was credible, and whether the death sentence was appropriate given the circumstances of the encounter. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding the prosecution's evidence consistent and the defense version unconvincing and fabricated. The Court rejected the plea of private defense, noting the lack of deep-rooted enmity and the trivial nature of the dispute regarding an electric connection. However, the Court held that because the incident was a chance encounter and the defense side sustained injuries, the ends of justice would be better served by commuting the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The principle laid down is that while a conviction for murder is maintained based on consistent evidence, the absence of premeditation and the presence of minor injuries on the accused side may warrant the substitution of a death sentence with life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment in a murder case where the incident arose from a chance encounter?
  • Is a defense plea of private defense regarding family honor credible when the evidence suggests a trivial dispute over an electric connection?
  • Does the presence of injuries on the accused's side in a murder case necessitate a reduction in the sentence?
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• Muhammad Aslam Khan vs Secretary, Ministry of Defence And Other1986 SCMR 283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-25
  service appealsenioritydirect recruit versus promoteeeducational qualificationsservice tribunalspecial leave to appealcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal under Article 212 of the Constitution challenged an order of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the petitioner's service appeal regarding seniority and educational qualifications. The core legal questions involved whether a direct recruit could claim seniority over departmental promotees appointed earlier or in the same year under applicable service rules, and whether the petitioner possessed the requisite educational qualifications for the post. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not claim seniority over respondents promoted prior to his entry into service, nor over a respondent promoted in the same year based on established statutory principles of seniority. Furthermore, the Court held that the petitioner lacked the prescribed educational qualifications based on expert opinion and that rule relaxation lay within the exclusive competence of the Federal Public Service Commission. The petition was accordingly dismissed as devoid of force, and the principle was affirmed that new factual contentions regarding quota allocations cannot be raised for the first time before the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a direct recruit claim seniority over departmental promotees who were promoted prior to the direct recruit's entry into service?
  • Are officers promoted to a higher grade in a continuous arrangement and regular measure in a particular year ranked senior to those appointed by direct recruitment in the same year?
  • Can a new factual plea requiring investigation be permitted to be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court when it was not pressed or examined before the Service Tribunal?
  • Does the relaxation of prescribed educational qualifications lie within the exclusive competence of the Federal Public Service Commission?
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• Muhammad Aslam Khan vs Attai Khan And Other1986 SCMR 1208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-12
  constitutional petitionleave to appealno-confidence motionstatutory functionarywithdrawal of petitionwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Chairman of the Local Council, sought leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court order that dismissed a constitutional petition as withdrawn. The underlying petition alleged that the petitioner had colluded with a statutory functionary to delay a no-confidence motion. During the High Court proceedings, the statutory functionary undertook to convene the meeting within ten days. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that the court should not have accepted such an undertaking from the functionary in his absence and that the functionary lacked the legal authority to make such a commitment. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that the dismissal of a petition as withdrawn does not raise a serious question of law. The Court reasoned that the statutory functionary's undertaking is not a matter for constitutional jurisdiction at this stage. If the functionary exceeds their jurisdiction or power while implementing the undertaking, the petitioner retains the right to pursue separate, appropriate legal remedies. The Court declined to prematurely examine the validity of the functionary's statement.

  Questions settled

  • Does a constitutional petition dismissed as withdrawn raise a substantial question of law for the Supreme Court?
  • Can a court interfere with a statement or undertaking made by a statutory functionary during writ proceedings before that undertaking is implemented?
  • Is a separate legal remedy available if a statutory functionary exceeds their jurisdiction while implementing an undertaking given to a court?
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• Muhammad Aslam And Others vs Muhammad Ashraf And Another1986 SCMR 586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-26
  sublettingdefault in payment of rentrent restrictionconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a rent restriction matter, challenging the judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition. The core legal question concerns whether the tenant had sublet the premises without the landlord's consent and whether rent tendered by the alleged subtenant constituted a default. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner-tenant had unlawfully made another person a partner in the tenancy and went abroad, with rent remitted by the said partner, constituting a clear case of subletting without the landlord's consent. Consequently, the tender of rent by the unauthorized subtenant was lawfully refused by the landlord, amounting to a default in the payment of rent. The court laid down the principle that inducting a partner into a tenancy without the landlord's consent, coupled with the tenant leaving abroad and rent being paid by that partner, constitutes subletting, and rent tendered by such an unauthorized person can be lawfully refused, amounting to default. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does inducting a partner into a tenancy without the landlord's consent amount to subletting?
  • Can a landlord lawfully refuse rent tendered by an unauthorized subtenant?
  • Does the remittance of rent by an unassociated partner during the tenant's absence constitute default in payment of rent?
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• Muhammad Aslam And Another vs Tufail Ahmad And Other1986 SCMR 1401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam Alias Moulvi vs The State1986 SCMR 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-11
  criminal appealinfructuous appealmootnessrelease on probationSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question addressed was whether the appeal remained maintainable given the subsequent release of the appellant. Upon review of the record, the Court observed that the appellant had been released on 11 October 1982 by the Assistant Director Reclamation and Probation, Lahore, as confirmed by official correspondence from the Superintendent of Jail, Gujranwala. Consequently, the Court held that the appeal had become infructuous due to the appellant's release. The key principle established is that where an appellant has already been released from custody, rendering the relief sought in the appeal moot, the appeal is liable to be dismissed as infructuous.

  Questions settled

  • Does the release of an appellant from custody render a pending criminal appeal infructuous?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed if the relief sought has already been granted through administrative action?
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• Muhammad Ashraf Khokhar vs Chairman, Railway Board, Islamabad1986 SCMR 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-19
  service lawmala fideannual confidential recordpromotionofficiating promotionburden of proofpublic functionaries
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an employee of the Railway Board, challenged his reversion from a Grade-17 officiating post to his substantive Grade-16 position and sought regularization of his prior service in the higher grade. He contended that his non-promotion was based on a mala fide 'average' grading in his Annual Confidential Record (A.C.R.) for 1976. The Federal Service Tribunal rejected his appeal, finding no evidence of bias, noting that the Countersigning Officer had previously supported the petitioner's career progression. The Supreme Court of Pakistan reviewed the petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal erred in dismissing the allegation of mala fide regarding the A.C.R. entry. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding the petitioner's allegations of mala fide were vague and lacked specific factual support. The Court reaffirmed the established legal principle that allegations of mala fide against public functionaries must be based on specific facts and proven conclusively, rather than mere assertions. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Must allegations of mala fide against public functionaries be supported by specific facts?
  • Can a court interfere with an administrative decision based on an A.C.R. grading in the absence of concrete evidence of bias?
  • Is an employee entitled to regularization of service in a higher grade simply by virtue of having worked in that position on an officiating basis?
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• Muhammad Ashraf And Others vs The Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Food Department, Lahore And Other1986 SCMR 834 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-30
  ad hoc appointmentstopgap arrangementservice lawpromotionlocus standireversionprovisional appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from petitions seeking leave to appeal against the cancellation of the petitioners' promotion to the post of Food-grain Supervisor in the Food Department of the Government of the Punjab. The petitioners, initially recruited as Chowkidars, were promoted to the supervisor post in 1979, but the Secretary to the Government subsequently cancelled these promotions in 1983. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, whose promotions were characterized as stopgap arrangements subject to committee clearance, possessed a vested right to the post or were entitled to a hearing before reversion. The Supreme Court held that the promotions were provisional and ad hoc in nature, necessitated by temporary procurement work, and did not confer any permanent rights upon the petitioners. Furthermore, the Court noted that the relevant rules prescribed initial recruitment rather than promotion for the post. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioners lacked the locus standi to challenge the Government's decision to revert them, as ad hoc appointees have no vested right to continue in a post. The petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an ad hoc promotion made as a stopgap arrangement confer a vested right to the post?
  • Can an employee challenge the cancellation of an ad hoc promotion on the grounds of lack of opportunity of hearing?
  • Does an employee holding a provisional appointment have the locus standi to challenge their reversion?
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• Muhammad Ashraf Ali Muhammad Shoaib vs Muhammad Naseer And 21986 SCMR 1096 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-27
  statutory delegationnatural justiceestoppelconstitutional jurisdictionallotment cancellationadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals concern the management and allotment of shops in the Saddar Co-operative Market, Karachi, governed by the West Pakistan Co-operative Board (Dissolution) Act 1966. The core legal questions were whether the Administrator appointed under the Act could delegate statutory powers to subordinates in the absence of an enabling provision, and whether a party is estopped from challenging the Administrator's jurisdiction after consenting to a remand. The Supreme Court held that the Administrator lacked the power to delegate his authority, rendering orders passed by subordinates void. In the first appeal, the Court ruled that the respondent was estopped from challenging the Administrator's jurisdiction, having consented to the remand. In the second appeal, the Court held that the cancellation of allotment was invalid due to a breach of natural justice, as the affected party was not given notice. The key principle laid down is that statutory powers cannot be delegated unless the statute expressly provides for such delegation, and parties cannot challenge a forum's jurisdiction after consenting to a remand to that forum.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory authority delegate its powers in the absence of an express enabling provision in the governing statute?
  • Is a party estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of an authority if they previously consented to a remand of the case to that same authority?
  • Does an order of cancellation of allotment passed without notice to the affected party violate the principles of natural justice?
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• Muhammad Ashiq vs The State1986 SCMR 678 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-17
  illegal gratificationanti-corruptionbenefit of the doubtcredibility of witnessraid witnesssentence modification
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from the conviction of the appellant, a Consolidation Patwari, under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 for accepting illegal gratification. Leave to appeal was initially granted to examine whether the courts below ignored the cardinal principle of extending the benefit of doubt to the accused, given that the principal prosecution witness made concessions in cross-examination. The Supreme Court evaluated the evidence, noting that the testimony of the raiding magistrate corroborating the recovery of tainted money was reliable and that the defense's explanation lacked plausibility. The Court held that minor or favorable concessions made in cross-examination by a witness do not discredit the consistent and corroborated ocular testimony of the raiding official. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal on merits while modifying the substantive sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment to the period already undergone, considering the passage of substantial time since the commencement of proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contradictions or concessions in cross-examination by a principal witness are sufficient to discredit reliable corroborative testimony regarding a corruption raid?
  • Does the failure of an accused to offer a plausible explanation during examination support the prosecution's case in a corruption matter?
  • Can the Supreme Court modify a substantive sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone due to the protracted passage of time during appellate proceedings?
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• Muhammad Asghar vs Ch. Imdad Ali And Other1986 SCMR 280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-03
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantleave to appealidentity of propertyconcurrent findingssubletting
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his second appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had concurrently upheld concurrent ejectment orders passed against him by the lower authorities. The core legal controversy centered on the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant, disputed through the identification of the property transferred at an auction and subsequently sold to the respondents, alongside allegations of subletting and procedural grievances regarding lack of opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower forums regarding the identity of the property and the landlord-tenant relationship suffered from no legal or jurisdictional defect, and that the petitioner had been afforded adequate opportunity to prosecute his case. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that concurrent factual determinations supported by elaborate inquiries do not warrant further examination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant can be interfered with in second appeal?
  • Does failure to avail opportunities to prove a case at lower stages constitute a valid ground for leave to appeal?
  • Whether a dispute over the identity of transferred property affects the establishment of a landlord-tenant relationship?
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• Muhammad Arshad Saeed vs Pakistan And Other1986 SCMR 1953 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-22
  service tribunalsenioritycivil servantpromotionleave to appealpolice service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant in the Police Group, sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution against the dismissal of his service appeal by the Service Tribunal regarding his placement in the provisional seniority list. The core legal questions involved whether initial seniority could be antedated prior to actual selection, whether future promotion prospects formed part of terms and conditions of service, the legality of lateral entries and quota promotions, and the validity of the five-year service requirement in Grade-17 for promotion to Grade-18. The Supreme Court held that seniority cannot be antedated to a date prior to actual selection, promotion prospects are not part of service terms and conditions, and appointments made by the competent authority under the applicable rules were valid. The Court concluded that none of the petitioner's grounds were tenable and consequently refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant claim seniority from a date prior to their actual selection and entry into service?
  • Whether future prospects of promotion form part of the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant?
  • Are appointments made by the competent authority from the Armed Forces and Provincial Police violative of the rules if made in accordance with applicable Federal rules?
  • Is the requirement of five years minimum service in Grade-17 for promotion to Grade-18 consistent with the civil service rules?
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• Muhammad Aqeel Alias Billa vs The State1986 SCMR 1420 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-05
  murderdeath sentencemitigating circumstancecompromisereduction of sentenceimprisonment for life
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Muhammad Aqeel alias Billa, was tried and convicted of murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving the death sentence, which was subsequently upheld by the High Court. Upon a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the appellant's counsel informed the court that the parties had reached a compromise to live in peace and amity, with the accused party paying one hundred thousand rupees to the legal heirs of the deceased, who acknowledged receipt in court. The core legal question addressed was whether a compromise between the parties and payment of compensation can constitute a mitigating circumstance warranting the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court held that, in light of the precedent in Muhammad Bashir v. The State PLD 1982 SC 139, the compromise constitutes a mitigating circumstance entitling the appellant to a lesser sentence. The court accordingly accepted the appeal, reduced the death sentence to imprisonment for life, and granted the benefit under section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, establishing that a genuine compromise between the parties in a murder case can serve as a valid mitigating factor for sentence reduction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a compromise between the accused and the legal heirs of the deceased constitute a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence?
  • Can the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be granted upon the reduction of a sentence?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can commute a sentence of death to imprisonment for life based on a monetary settlement and compromise between the parties?
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• Muhammad Anwar vs Muhammad Ali Etc.1986 SCMR 1511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-30
  criminal petitionspecial leave to appealacquittalconvictionlimitationcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two criminal petitions for special leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court. The first petition, Criminal Petition No. 274 of 1982, was filed by the complainant against the acquittal of eight accused respondents. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in acquitting the said respondents. The second petition, Criminal Petition No. 341 of 1982, was filed by two convicts against their conviction and sentences, suffering from a question of limitation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's conclusion regarding the acquittal was correct and dismissed the first petition on merits. Furthermore, the Court held that the second petition was time-barred without sufficient grounds shown for condonation of delay and dismissed it accordingly. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with a High Court's proper acquittal order, and time-barred petitions without sufficient cause for delay are liable to dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court's judgment acquitting the accused?
  • Whether a time-barred petition for special leave to appeal can be entertained without sufficient ground for condonation of delay?
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• Muhammad Anwar vs Messrs Associated Trading Co. And Other1986 SCMR 1863 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-10
  Section 20 Arbitration ActArbitration AgreementConcluded ContractReference to ArbitrationFiling Agreement in Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from an application filed by the petitioner under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking a direction to the respondents to file an arbitration agreement in court and refer their dispute to arbitration. The respondents contested the application, denying the existence of any arbitration agreement. A Single Judge of the Sindh High Court dismissed the application on finding that no concluded agreement or arbitration agreement existed between the parties, supported by a certificate confirming the alleged contract was not approved or confirmed by the foreign government involved. A Division Bench of the High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the concurrent findings of the High Court, observing that the petitioner failed to demonstrate the existence of any contract containing an arbitration agreement. Finding no question of law arising for consideration, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 be allowed when the existence of a concluded contract containing an arbitration agreement is not established?
  • Whether an unapproved or unconfirmed contract can constitute a valid arbitration agreement for reference to arbitration under the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Does a petition for leave to appeal lie before the Supreme Court when concurrent findings establish the absence of an arbitration agreement and raise no question of law?
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• Muhammad Anwar And 3 Others vs Allah Bakhsh And Another1986 SCMR 1575 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-28
  pre-emptionamendment of pleadingslimitationcause of actioncivil procedurepreferential right
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute regarding a pre-emption suit where the plaintiffs sought to amend their plaint to include an additional ground for their preferential right to acquire suit land after the limitation period had expired. The core legal question was whether a pre-emptor can be permitted to amend their plaint to introduce a new ground for pre-emption after the expiry of the limitation period. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision to allow the amendment. The Court held that the law does not impose a strict limitation bar on amending a plaint to add a new ground for pre-emption, provided the amendment does not alter the fundamental character or cause of action of the suit. The Court emphasized that under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, courts are mandated to allow amendments necessary for determining the real questions in controversy, and that the delay in filing such an application is not a sole determining factor, as the primary objective is to resolve the actual dispute between the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emptor be allowed to add a new ground in a plaint after the expiry of the period of limitation?
  • Does the delay in applying for an amendment of pleadings under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, automatically bar such an amendment?
  • What is the primary condition for allowing an amendment of pleadings under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Muhammad and Another vs Muhammad Yar and Another1986 PLD Supreme Court 231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-02
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptionorder of successionsuperior pre-emptive valueinheritancevendee as heir
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a regular second appeal in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerns the interpretation of the order of succession under section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act and whether a vendee who is a potential heir (grandson) can defend a pre-emption suit despite the existence of an intervening living heir who has not sued. The Supreme Court held that the order of succession is examined in competition with the vendee or rival suitor actually filing the suit, and not in abstract with those who have not filed. The principle laid down is that a vendee who is entitled under the law to inherit the property at some stage can defend against pre-emption, as non-suing intermediate heirs do not bar the vendee's status as an heir for pre-emption purposes. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the order of succession under section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act is to be examined in competition with non-suing heirs?
  • Can a vendee who is a potential heir defend a pre-emption suit even if an intermediate heir is alive and has not filed a suit?
  • Does the failure of a nearer heir to exercise the right of pre-emption act as a bar to the claim of remote or remoter heirs?
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• Muhammad Amir Khan And Others vs Muhammad Hanif And Other1986 SCMR 1536 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-27
  pre-emptionlimitation periodjoint landmutation of salephysical possessioncivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a civil revision in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerns the determination of the period of limitation for filing a pre-emption suit, specifically whether limitation should be reckoned from the date of physical possession under the sale or from the date of the attestation of the mutation, in respect of a sale involving a share of joint unpartitioned land rather than a specific piece of land. The Supreme Court held that where the subject-matter of the sale is an undivided share of joint land and not specific land, physical possession cannot be deemed to have been taken under the sale so as to attract the limitation period under section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, thereby making a suit brought within a year of the mutation attestation within time. The key principle laid down is that limitation tied to physical possession under section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act does not apply to sales of undivided shares in joint land where specific physical possession is absent.

  Questions settled

  • From what point should the period of limitation be reckoned in a pre-emption suit involving joint land?
  • Does the taking of physical possession under a sale of an undivided share of joint land attract the limitation period under section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
  • Is a pre-emption suit filed within a year of the attestation of the mutation of sale considered within time when specific physical possession of joint land is not established?
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• Muhammad Amin vs The State1986 SCMR 2022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-25
  criminal leave to appealmurdermitigating circumstancesdeath sentencegrave and sudden provocationquantum of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Amin against his conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentence of death for the murder of Muhammad Aslam, which were upheld by the High Court. The core legal question is whether the hot-tempered and provocative conduct of the deceased—who rushed to remonstrate with the petitioner immediately after the petitioner had injured the deceased's brother—constitutes a mitigating circumstance sufficient to alter the sentence of death to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the question of sentence requires detailed consideration as to whether the lower courts accounted for all relevant mitigating circumstances surrounding the sudden provocation and passion in which the act was committed. The key principle laid down is that provocative conduct by a deceased person immediately following an altercation may serve as a relevant circumstance in adjudging the appropriate quantum of sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the provocative conduct of a deceased person who rushed to remonstrate after an initial altercation serve as a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence?
  • Whether the courts below failed to consider all relevant circumstances while awarding the sentence of death for murder?
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• Muhammad Amin vs Allah Rakha And Other1986 SCMR 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-20
  ejectmentpersonal requirementsub-lettingsecond appealconcurrent findingslandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a landlord's eviction application filed against the tenant in respect of rented shops on the grounds of personal requirement and sub-letting. The Rent Controller dismissed the personal requirement ground but ordered eviction from one shop for sub-letting, which decision was upheld by the first appellate court. However, upon a second appeal by the landlord, the Lahore High Court reversed the concurrent findings and ordered vacant possession of the entire premises on the ground of bona fide personal use. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the High Court erred in interfering with concurrent findings of fact and whether the landlord's need could be satisfied by a part of the premises. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was competent to interfere in second appeal as the lower courts had omitted to consider the record correctly and misapplied the law, and further held that the plea regarding partial need could not be raised for the first time before the apex court. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact of the courts below in a second appeal regarding personal requirement of a landlord?
  • Can a plea that the landlord's need is satisfied by only a part of the rented premises be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether the landlord proved bona fide personal requirement for shifting back and establishing business in the disputed shops?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin And 2 Others vs Muhammad Sharif And Another1986 SCMR 1790 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-01
  constitutional petitionland allotmentprinciples of natural justicewrit jurisdictionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court dated 15-10-1984, which set aside an order regarding the land allotment and remanded the case to the Deputy Commissioner for a fresh decision after hearing the concerned parties. The core legal question involved the validity of the High Court's interference in writ jurisdiction on the grounds of violation of principles of natural justice and whether a vendor had locus standi to invoke constitutional jurisdiction without joining the vendee. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order suffered from no infirmity as the learned Judge properly addressed the questions involved and distinguished relevant authorities. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the remand order for a fresh decision on merits in accordance with the principles of natural justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can set aside an administrative order in writ jurisdiction on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice?
  • Does a vendor have locus standi to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court without impleading the vendee?
  • Can questions of fact regarding presence and service recorded by a Settlement Commissioner be investigated in writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1962-04-09
  screening committeeultra viresmunicipal committeedelegation of powerpublic conduct scrutinyservice lawwrongful removal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the dismissal of a writ petition challenging the removal of the Secretary of the Municipal Committee, Kamoke, from service. The appellant was removed following a recommendation by a Screening Committee constituted by the Deputy Commissioner under the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959. The core legal questions were whether the Screening Committee was validly constituted and whether the removal complied with the statutory requirement of being ordered by the appointing authority. The Supreme Court held that the Central Government had delegated the power to constitute Screening Committees exclusively to the 'Heads of Corporations.' The Provincial Government's attempt to delegate this power to the Deputy Commissioner was ultra vires, as the Deputy Commissioner did not qualify as the Head of the Corporation. Consequently, the Screening Committee was invalidly constituted, rendering the removal order based on its recommendation bad in law. The Court established the principle that delegated statutory powers must be exercised strictly within the limits defined by the delegating authority, and subordinate governments cannot expand the scope of such delegation to include unauthorized officials.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Provincial Government delegate the power to constitute a Screening Committee to a Deputy Commissioner when the Central Government's mandate only authorized delegation to the 'Head of the Corporation'?
  • Does a Deputy Commissioner exercise the powers of a 'Head of the Corporation' over a Municipal Committee under the Punjab Municipal Act?
  • Is a removal order based on the recommendation of an invalidly constituted Screening Committee legally sustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali Mutlaq vs Mst. Anwar Fatima And 5 Other1986 SCMR 1674 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-22
  rent controlstriking out defenseinterim orderappealabilitySind Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which held that an order by a Rent Controller dismissing a landlord's application to strike out a tenant's defense under Section 16(2) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance is not appealable. The petitioner challenged this finding, noting a conflict of judicial decisions regarding whether such an order constitutes an interim order subject to appeal under Section 21 of the same Ordinance. Recognizing that this legal question is recurring and requires an authoritative resolution to ensure consistency in rent litigation, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. The Court determined that the matter necessitates a definitive ruling to settle the conflicting interpretations regarding the appealability of orders passed under Section 16(2) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance. Consequently, the Court admitted the petition for regular hearing to resolve this significant question of law.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order of a Rent Controller dismissing an application to strike out a defendant's defense under Section 16(2) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance an appealable order?
  • Does an appeal lie under Section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance against an order refusing to strike out a tenant's defense?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali And Others vs Faizu Alias Sad Bibi And Other1986 SCMR 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-27
  customary successionmuslim personal lawabatement of suitslimited estatereversionersagricultural land inheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a dispute over inheritance governed by custom and subsequent statutory amendments under Muslim Personal Law. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners and respondents inherited agricultural land under custom prior to the enactment of the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1948. Litigation ensued regarding the calculation of shares and ownership rights, culminating in concurrent decrees in favour of the petitioners. Upon a regular second appeal being filed in the High Court, it was dismissed as having abated pursuant to section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act Amendment Ordinance (XIII of 1983). The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the petitioners' suit and subsequent appeal fell within the ambit of abatement provisions under section 2-A(c) of the amended 1962 Act where the dispute relates to the calculation of shares rather than an alienation or challenge to a male heir's acquisition under custom. Granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the matter requires detailed consideration regarding the scope of abatement under section 2-A.

  Questions settled

  • Whether suits relating purely to the calculation of shares under Muslim Personal Law abate under section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act Amendment Ordinance (XIII of 1983)?
  • Does section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act 1962 apply to cases where there is no allegation of alienation or delivery of possession of agricultural land inherited by a male heir under custom?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram And Others vs Muhammad Siddiq And Another1986 SCMR 1113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-04
  criminal petitionenhancement of sentencereappraisal of evidenceconcurrent findingsreduction of sentencesupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal petitions arising from a judgment of the High Court, where one petition was filed by the accused convict seeking reversal of conviction and the other by the complainant seeking enhancement of the sentence from imprisonment for life back to death. The core legal question addressed was whether the Supreme Court should reappraise the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts and whether interference was warranted for the reduction of sentence. The Supreme Court held that it is not a fit case for the reappraisal of evidence as no substantial legal contention was raised to warrant departure from concurrent findings, and further held that the reasons recorded by the High Court for reducing the sentence from death to life imprisonment were valid and proper. Consequently, both petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed, affirming the impugned judgment of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappraise evidence to reverse concurrent findings of fact of lower courts without a valid legal contention?
  • Whether the reasons recorded by the High Court for reducing a sentence from death to imprisonment for life warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram and Others vs Mst. Rehmat Bibi and Othees1986 SCMR 883 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-11
  leave to appealprivate complaintsecond revisionabuse of process of lawinherent powerscriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which had accepted an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and restored a private complaint after setting aside an order of the Additional Sessions Judge passed in revision. The core legal question raised was whether an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is barred when a second revision is barred under Section 439(4)(a) of the same Code. The Supreme Court noted conflicting judicial views on whether invoking Section 561-A circumvents the bar against second revisions, and observed that restricting the High Court might leave parties without a remedy against patently unjust orders and prevent it from securing the ends of justice. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider these questions and stayed further trial proceedings while directing an early hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is barred when a second revision is barred under Section 439(4)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does invoking Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 amount to circumventing the provisions of Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the High Court interfere under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice where a revisional remedy is barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akhtar vs Muhammad Shafique And Another1986 SCMR 533 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-03
  sodomyunnatural offencekidnappingabductionsentence enhancementleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the father of a seven-year-old victim of sodomy against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court. The Federal Shariat Court had acquitted the respondent of the charge under Section 12 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, while maintaining his conviction under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but reducing his sentence. The petitioner sought the restoration of the conviction under Section 12 of the Ordinance and an enhancement of the sentence under Section 377. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that criminal liability under Section 12 of the Ordinance requires an intention or reasonable knowledge to kidnap or abduct for the specified purpose. If the primary intention is to commit the act of sodomy, and the victim is merely moved a few paces for the safe achievement of that purpose, it does not constitute an additional offence under Section 12. The Court also declined to interfere with the reduced sentence under Section 377, noting it was legally sound and passed after considering the respondent's young age and first-offender status.

  Questions settled

  • Whether moving a victim a few paces solely to facilitate the act of sodomy satisfies the legal requirements of kidnapping or abduction under Section 12 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Does criminal liability under Section 12 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 require an independent intention or reasonable knowledge to kidnap or abduct, distinct from the intention to commit the sexual act itself?
  • Can a legal sentence under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be enhanced by the Supreme Court where the lower courts have already mitigated it based on the offender's young age and status as a first offender?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar vs The State1986 SCMR 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-29
  death sentencecommutation of sentencemitigating circumstancesfamily honorcriminal appeallife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Muhammad Akbar, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, with a compensation order, while his co-accused brother was acquitted. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence. Upon seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioner did not contest the conviction on merits but sought a reduction of the sentence. The defense argued that the motive for the crime was rooted in family honor, specifically stemming from a false allegation regarding the pregnancy and abortion of the petitioner's sister, Mst. Sardar Begum, which caused the family significant dishonor and led to the petitioner's prior incarceration. The Supreme Court considered this mitigating circumstance regarding the motive and the preservation of family honor. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, maintained the conviction, but reduced the sentence from death to imprisonment for life, while granting the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The judgment establishes that mitigating factors, such as provocation arising from matters of family honor, can justify the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a death sentence be reduced to life imprisonment based on the motive of family honor?
  • Does the discovery of a false allegation regarding a family member's conduct constitute a mitigating factor for sentencing in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar And Others Abdul Qadeer vs The State Jamshed And Other1986 SCMR 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-28Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ahmad vs Rafiq Ahmad1986 SCMR 372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal And Another vs The State1986 SCMR 1203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-15
  leave to appealdeath sentencecriminal appealappreciation of evidencesafe administration of criminal justiceFIR timingcommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which confirmed the death sentences of the petitioners, Muhammad Afzal and Muhammad Khan, for the murders of Shah Nawaz and Yaqoob. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners, along with two female co-accused, killed the victims following a dispute over a shared path. The trial court convicted all four, but the High Court acquitted the two female co-accused, casting doubt on the prosecution's narrative regarding the specific roles played by the petitioners, particularly Muhammad Afzal. The core legal question is whether the conviction and death sentence of the petitioners remain sustainable in light of the acquittal of the co-accused and the doubts raised regarding the timing of the First Information Report and the specific evidentiary basis for the petitioners' involvement. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the evidentiary sufficiency and the appropriateness of the death sentence required further examination to ensure the safe administration of criminal justice, and consequently granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused on the basis of doubt necessitate a re-evaluation of the conviction of the remaining accused?
  • Is leave to appeal justified when there are significant doubts regarding the timing of the First Information Report and the specific roles attributed to the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdullah vs Rehmat Ullah And Another1986 SCMR 945 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-12
  ejectmenttenantbona fide requirementrent controlleave to appealconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant against an order of ejectment. The respondent landlord sought the eviction of the petitioner from a shop on the grounds of personal bona fide requirement for his son. While the Rent Controller initially rejected the landlord's plea, the Additional District Judge, on appeal, accepted the claim and ordered the ejectment of the tenant. The High Court subsequently upheld the appellate order. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of the appellate court and the High Court regarding the bona fide personal need of the landlord warranted interference. Upon reviewing the record and hearing counsel, the Supreme Court held that the order of the Additional District Judge was correct and proper. The Court found no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts and consequently dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the ejectment order.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's bona fide personal requirement for a rented shop?
  • Is an appellate order for ejectment based on bona fide personal need subject to interference when upheld by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdullah vs Muhammad Mustafa And Other1986 SCMR 689 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-08
  settlement lawpotential building siteappellate jurisdictiondelegated authorityurban agricultural landlocus standiadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that declared an allotment of urban agricultural land by a Settlement Commissioner to be without lawful authority. The core legal question was whether a Settlement Commissioner possessed the appellate authority to reverse a final determination made by the Chief Settlement Commissioner regarding the classification of land as a 'potential building site'. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner acted without jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that once the Chief Settlement Commissioner had made a final determination on the status of the land, the Settlement Commissioner could not sit as an appellate authority to review or reverse that decision. The Court emphasized that the Settlement Commissioner lacked the statutory power to entertain an appeal against the implementation of an order passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Consequently, the High Court's decision to set aside the Settlement Commissioner's order was upheld, and the petition for leave to appeal was refused, leaving the underlying questions regarding the respondents' locus standi and the validity of their transfer deeds to the appropriate authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner exercise appellate jurisdiction to reverse a final determination made by the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  • Does a Settlement Commissioner have the statutory power to entertain an appeal against the implementation of an order passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  • Is the power to declare land as a potential building site exhausted after it has been exercised once?
  Read full judgment →
• Mufti Abdul Ghani vs Province of the Punjab and Another1986 PLD Supreme Court 327 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-13
  review petitionnationalised schoolproperty ownershipfraud and forgerycivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from review petitions and miscellaneous applications seeking review and correction of a previous judgment of the Supreme Court under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 concerning the ownership and transfer of property associated with a nationalised school. The core legal questions involve whether third parties and family members claiming an interest could challenge the judgment through review, whether the property transfer was in favour of a private individual or the nationalised school, and whether grounds for review of the prior judgment were established. The Supreme Court held that the applicants, having full knowledge of the prior protracted litigation wherein the ownership issue was squarely contested, failed to make out any valid case for review, as their shifting stances were mere afterthoughts designed to deprive the nationalised school of its due benefit. The Court dismissed the review petitions, laying down that belated claims by third parties aware of ongoing proceedings cannot be entertained to reopen settled ownership determinations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a third party aware of ongoing litigation can subsequently seek review of a judgment under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party alter its stance regarding ownership of property in review proceedings as an afterthought?
  • Whether a transfer of property by the Settlement Department is deemed to be in favour of the nationalised school or an individual based on contemporaneous documents?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubarik Shah vs The State1986 SCMR 1681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-25
  post-arrest bailleave to appeallalkaracriminal conspiracymotive
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court refusing him post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioner's earlier pre-arrest bail had been cancelled by the Supreme Court with the observation that he could move for post-arrest bail on merits. The Sessions Court and the High Court both rejected the post-arrest bail application, noting that apart from being attributed the role of raising a fatal lalkara, the actual motive for the crime and leadership of the co-accused were also attributed to the petitioner. The Supreme Court heard the counsel, found that both lower courts had duly considered the submissions and formed a prima facie view of the material on record which did not warrant interference, and consequently refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a person attributed with a fatal lalkara and motive entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Does the attribution of a lalkara alone preclude the courts from denying bail when other aggravating factors like motive are present?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zubaida Khatoon And Others vs Settlement Commissioner (L) And Other1986 SCMR 1548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-23
  constitutional petitionspecial leave to appealsettlement commissionercancellation of landrestoration of landoriginal transferee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court dated 28-4-1976, which dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition challenging the orders of the Settlement Commissioner dated 5-11-1973 and 20-12-1973. The disputed land, measuring 8 kanals and 6 marlas, was initially allotted to the respondents, cancelled for default in payment, and subsequently allotted to the petitioners before being restored to the respondents by the Settlement Commissioner. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court was justified in declining to interfere with the restoration of the land to the original transferees despite delays in payment. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in refusing interference as the respondents were the rightful original transferees against a duly verified claim, and the impugned order was substantially just and fair. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal, laying down the principle that discretionary constitutional remedies may be withheld where the ultimate order secures substantive justice to the rightful original transferee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing constitutional interference against the restoration of land to an original transferee despite a default in timely payment?
  • Does a delayed deposit of payment by an original transferee automatically disentitle them to the restoration of allotted land under settlement laws?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal against a High Court order that declines to interfere with a substantially just and fair administrative decision?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zarina Bang And Others vs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd.1986 SCMR 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-07
  Special CourtJurisdictional challengeRetrospectivityAcquittalProtection from arrestProcedural fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three petitions challenging the jurisdiction of a Special Court, specifically regarding the issue of retrospectivity and other legal grounds. The Supreme Court of Pakistan declined to grant leave to appeal, determining instead that the petitioners should raise these jurisdictional objections directly before the Special Court. The Court directed that the Special Court must adjudicate these jurisdictional challenges, alongside any applications for acquittal under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as a preliminary matter before proceeding further. Pending the resolution of these issues, the Court granted the petitioners protection from arrest, provided they continue to attend all scheduled hearings. The Supreme Court further emphasized the special nature of the case and requested the Special Court to expedite the decision-making process, ideally within two months. The holding establishes that jurisdictional challenges and acquittal applications should be addressed as threshold issues by the trial court, ensuring procedural fairness while maintaining the continuity of the trial process.

  Questions settled

  • Can objections regarding the jurisdiction of a Special Court be raised before that court even if they involve complex legal questions like retrospectivity?
  • Should a Special Court decide applications for acquittal under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before proceeding with the merits of the case?
  • Can an accused be granted protection from arrest pending the resolution of jurisdictional challenges by a Special Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zainab Bibi vs Muhammad Bashir And Other1986 SCMR 1450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-14
  transfer of propertyevacuee propertyservant quarterappurtenancesettlement commissionerdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the court addresses whether the appellant was in occupation of Property No. 43 and had applied for its transfer, and whether a person possessing a servant quarter can claim transfer of the main house in the absence of a contestant. The appellant's son was found to be in occupation of a servant quarter on Plot No. 43/1 rather than Plot No. 43, and the Settlement Commissioner's review order transferring the property was set aside by the High Court. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that possession of an outhouse, garage, or servant quarter does not entitle a person to claim the transfer of the main building, as outhouses are appurtenances to a house and not vice versa. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person in possession of a servant quarter can claim the transfer of the main house?
  • Can the occupation of an outhouse or garage be considered occupation of the main house for the purpose of property transfer?
  • Whether the finding of fact regarding possession by settlement authorities can be interfered with when based on inconclusive reports?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Toora And Others vs Taj Muhammad And Other1986 SCMR 699 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-20
  Local Commissionerproperty disputePermanent Transfer Deedrevisional jurisdictionquestion of factcivil court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute concerning the identity and area of property No. 25/C, where the petitioners challenged the evidentiary value of a Local Commissioner's report and the jurisdiction of the civil court to question a declaration made by the Assistant Commissioner. The core legal question was whether the appellate court could rely on a Local Commissioner's report and spot evidence to determine the identity and ownership of the disputed site, and whether such a determination of fact could be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Additional District Judge was fully justified in appointing a Commissioner to ascertain the identity of the disputed site. After considering the report, the spot evidence, and the existing record, the appellate court properly concluded that the plaintiff was the valid transferee of the suit land on the basis of a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD). The Court ruled that this determination of fact had attained finality and was unexceptionable in revisional jurisdiction, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellate court justified in appointing a Local Commissioner to ascertain the physical identity and boundaries of a disputed property?
  • Can a finding of fact regarding property ownership based on a Local Commissioner's report and a Permanent Transfer Deed be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction?
  • Does a determination of fact by an appellate court regarding the identity of a transferred site attain finality if supported by spot evidence and the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Surriya Begum vs Fazal Durrani1986 SCMR 1649 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-04
  rent restrictionbona fide requirementevictionappreciation of evidencelandlord and tenantfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a rent dispute concerning the eviction of a tenant from a house in Quetta. The appellant-landlady sought eviction on grounds of default in rent payment and personal bona fide requirement. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, finding the landlady's requirement genuine and the respondent's defense of mala fide unproven. The High Court reversed this decision, questioning the landlady's bona fide requirement due to her visits to her husband in London and her failure to testify personally. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to re-examine the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reversal was based on extraneous considerations and misappreciation of evidence. The Court affirmed that the landlady's personal requirement was established by the evidence on record, noting that her residence with her brother's large family was undisputed. The Court emphasized that findings of fact by the Rent Controller should not be interfered with unless based on misreading or contravention of legal principles. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with findings of fact recorded by a Rent Controller without demonstrating misreading of evidence?
  • Does a landlady's occasional travel abroad to visit her husband negate her claim of personal bona fide requirement for a house in Pakistan?
  • Is a landlady required to testify personally to establish her bona fide requirement for a rented premises?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sultan And Others vs Mst. Wallan And Other1986 SCMR 97 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-16
  leave to appealamendment of plaintgift deedundue influencesecond appealcancellation of mutationrelief of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a suit instituted by Mst. Wallan challenging the validity of a gift of 200 Kanals of landed property made in favour of her late husband's father and her minor daughters, along with the corresponding mutations attested in 1968. The plaintiff sought cancellation of the gift on grounds of undue influence, intimidation, and coercion. The trial court decreed the suit, but the first appellate court set aside the decree. On second appeal, the High Court allowed the plaintiff to amend her plaint to include a prayer for possession and restored the trial court's decree. The petitioners, heirs of the deceased donee, contended before the Supreme Court that the High Court erred in permitting amendment of the plaint at the second appeal stage when the suit's maintainability had been initially challenged, and that the finding on undue influence was a question of fact not subject to interference in second appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these legal contentions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court in second appeal can allow an amendment of the plaint to add a relief for possession when maintainability was questioned at trial?
  • Whether a finding by the first appellate court regarding undue influence constitutes a finding of fact that is immune from interference in second appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sharifan Bibi And Another vs Ghulam Hussain And Other1986 SCMR 1466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-06
  inheritance disputeconcurrent findings of factShia vs Sunnileave to appealre-appraisal of evidenceadmissibility of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute regarding the inheritance of landed property left by the deceased, Jewan. The petitioners, claiming as heirs, asserted the deceased was a Shia, while the respondents, claiming as collaterals, argued he was a Sunni. The trial court, the District Judge, and the High Court all concurrently found that the deceased was a Sunni by faith, leading to the dismissal of the petitioners' suit and subsequent appeals. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that certain documentary evidence, specifically a survey list and a register from an 'Anjuman Shian', had been wrongly rejected by the lower courts, citing Section 11 of the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court observed that this specific legal plea regarding the admissibility of evidence had not been raised in the lower courts. Furthermore, the Court held that the determination of the deceased's faith was a concurrent finding of fact by three lower courts. Consequently, the Court declined to re-appraise the evidence or interfere with the concurrent findings, ultimately dismissing the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new legal plea regarding the admissibility of evidence before the Supreme Court if it was not raised in the lower courts?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a concurrent finding of fact made by three lower courts regarding the religious faith of a deceased person?
  • Is the determination of a person's religious faith for inheritance purposes considered a question of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sharifa Khatoon vs Anisur Rehman And Another1986 SCMR 1629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-01
  ejectmentrent controlsublettingpersonal useappreciation of evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sindh High Court, which had set aside an ejectment order previously issued by the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller had originally ordered the respondent's ejectment based on findings that the premises were sublet and that the landlady bona fide required the property for her personal use. Upon appeal, the High Court reversed these findings of fact and dismissed the landlady's application. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the record and hearing counsel, determined that the High Court's appreciation of the evidence was inconsistent with established legal principles. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and directed that the appeal be heard on the existing record, while permitting the parties to file additional documents. The case establishes that appellate courts must adhere to settled principles when re-evaluating findings of fact made by a Rent Controller, particularly regarding evidence of subletting and personal requirement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the authority to reverse findings of fact made by a Rent Controller regarding subletting and personal requirement?
  • Is the appreciation of evidence by the High Court in rent matters subject to review by the Supreme Court?
  • Can a party file additional documents during an appeal before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahar Bano vs Quadria And Another1986 SCMR 1727 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-02
  evacuee propertyopen plotstatutory tenancyestoppel against statuteleave to appealejectment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a civil revision by the Sind High Court, which upheld the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts granting possession of an evacuee plot to the respondents. The core legal question is whether the issuance of a notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, creates a tenancy by estoppel preventing the transferee from treating the occupant as a trespasser when the property in dispute is an open plot. The Supreme Court held that Section 30 applies to houses and shops and does not afford statutory tenancy protection to occupants of open plots. Furthermore, the Court established that there can be no estoppel against a statute, and the service of notice under a misconception of law does not confer tenancy rights or estop the transferee from seeking ejectment of an unauthorized occupant.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 create a statutory tenancy in respect of an open plot?
  • Can a transferee be estopped from denying tenancy rights and pleading that an occupant is a trespasser merely because a notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 was served?
  • Is there any estoppel against a statute under Pakistani law?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saira Bano vs Diwan Kewalram And Another1986 SCMR 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-08-15
  execution of decreewrit of possessionexecuting court powerssecond appealtrespasser
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises out of an execution proceeding concerning a dispute over possession of immovable property initially decreed in Suit No. 518 of 1964. The core legal question was whether a decree for possession could be executed against a co-defendant who was found to be a trespasser by the High Court in second appeal, despite the suit initially having been dismissed against her, and how the executing court should identify the property subject to execution. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's direction to the executing court to execute the writ of possession in accordance with the site plans exhibiting the dimensions of the disputed shops was unexceptionable. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the executing court must deliver possession of the property as determined by the record and site plans established during trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executing court direct the issuance of a writ of possession based on site plans exhibited during the trial?
  • Whether execution proceedings can be maintained against a defendant in possession whose status as a trespasser was determined by the appellate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sahib Khatoon vs Allah Ditta And Other1986 SCMR 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-03
  pre-emption suitdecretal amountdeficiency in depositadjustment of costsexecution of decreepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning a pre-emption suit where the trial court decreed possession in favour of the plaintiff on payment of Rs. 12,000 by a specified date, with costs to follow the events. The decree-holder deposited a total amount that fell short of the decretal amount by Rs. 100, while costs were separately assessed. The executing court dismissed the execution application due to the deficiency, but the lower appellate court allowed the appeal, holding that costs could be adjusted towards the decretal amount. The High Court dismissed the subsequent second appeal. The petitioner contends that the decree-holder had sought attachment of the full costs without adjusting them towards the balance pre-emption money and that the compliance with the decree's terms was a prerequisite to obtaining costs. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine whether the decree-holder was entitled to adjust costs and whether non-compliance with the exact deposit terms invalidated the decree.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor's failure to deposit the exact decretal amount by omitting a small sum renders the pre-emption decree unexecutable?
  • Can a decree-holder adjust the awarded costs towards the shortfall in the pre-emption money required to be deposited under the decree?
  • Does an application for attachment of the full costs preclude the decree-holder from claiming a set-off against the pre-emption purchase price?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Robina Shafiq vs The State And Another1986 SCMR 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-07
  petition dismissednot pressedsupreme courtwithdrawal of petitioncriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The petitioner, Mst. Robina Shafiq, through her Advocate-on-Record, stated that he had no instructions to proceed with the case. Consequently, the counsel did not press the petition. Accepting this submission, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as not pressed. The holding affirms that when a petitioner's counsel reports no instructions and declines to press the matter, the court will dismiss the petition accordingly. The key principle established is the dismissal of a legal proceeding for non-prosecution when the moving party chooses not to press its claim.

  Questions settled

  • What is the consequence when a petitioner's counsel states they have no instructions and do not press the petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rehmat Bibi And Others vs Punnu Khan And Other1986 SCMR 962 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-04
  evacuee propertyallotment of landlimitationnecessary partynullity of orderspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of an evacuee land allotment. The core legal question concerned whether an appeal against an allotment could be entertained after a delay of over three years, notwithstanding limitation rules, where the initial allotment was made without notice to a necessary party. The Supreme Court held that an order passed without hearing a necessary party is a nullity in the eyes of the law, meaning no question of limitation arises to bar a challenge. The key principle laid down is that limitation does not run against an aggrieved party who was condemned unheard in property allotment proceedings, justifying the reopening of the matter to ensure proper adjudication of the parties' respective entitlements.

  Questions settled

  • Does limitation bar an appeal against a property allotment made without notice to a necessary party?
  • Is an order passed by a settlement authority without hearing a necessary party a nullity in the eyes of law?
  • Can settlement authorities direct a fresh adjudication after excluding property that was incorrectly allotted?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Razia Begum vs Muhammad Rafi1986 SCMR 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-09
  ejectmentdefault in rentbona fide personal requirementorder of remandlandlord and tenantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of ejectment proceedings initiated by the petitioner landlord against the respondent tenant regarding a commercial shop. The petitioner sought eviction on the grounds of default in rent and electricity charges, and bona fide personal requirement for her husband. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment on both grounds. Upon appeal, the Sind High Court set aside the finding regarding personal requirement, holding that the evidence failed to establish the husband's joblessness or visual disability, and remanded the case to the Rent Controller for a fresh decision on the issue of default due to vague pleadings. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings of fact regarding personal requirement as sound and declined to interfere with the order of remand, noting that the remand provided a fresh opportunity to substantiate the default claim. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the finding of bona fide personal requirement based on appreciation of evidence?
  • Is an order of remand sustainable when the pleadings regarding default in payment of rent are vague and lack particulars?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent or factual findings supported by sound reasons?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rajan (Deceased) Through Her Legal Heirs And Others vs Mst. Anwar1986 SCMR 1470 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-07
  land disputedeclaratory suitexecution of decreebona fide purchasersecond appealleave to appealrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment dismissing a second appeal regarding a land ownership dispute. The core legal questions concerned the identity of the suit land relative to a 1936 decree, the execution status of that decree, and the validity of the petitioners' claims as bona fide purchasers. The Supreme Court held that the identity of the property had been conclusively settled by the 1936 decree, which had attained finality. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the decree had been duly executed, relying on a thirty-year-old Girdawar report that remained unrebutted. The Court established that a decree which has attained finality and been executed cannot be re-litigated. Additionally, the Court ruled that arguments regarding bona fide purchase, which were not pressed before the High Court, could not be raised for the first time during the petition for leave to appeal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the petitioners failed to demonstrate any infirmity in the lower courts' reasoning.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the identity of land covered by a decree that has already attained finality?
  • Is a thirty-year-old Girdawar report regarding the execution of a decree admissible and sufficient proof of possession?
  • Can a plea regarding bona fide purchase, not pressed in the High Court, be raised for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rafiqunnisa And Others vs Chief Settlement Commissioner And Other1986 SCMR 1322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-12
  evacuee propertypublic auctionconstitutional petitioncontractual rightsrebate in sale priceSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the successors of an auction purchaser against the dismissal of their constitutional petition by the Baluchistan High Court. The auction purchaser had purchased an evacuee cinema through public auction, subsequently faced partial cancellation of the lease of the underlying land, and sought a rebate on the sale price and compensation for renovation from the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Upon the rejection of his representation and subsequent recovery proceedings, the petitioners challenged the order via a constitutional petition, which the High Court dismissed on the ground that no statutory provision warranted such a representation and that the matter pertained to a breach of contract. The core legal question was whether contractual rights regarding the sale of evacuee property can be enforced through the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. The Supreme Court held that since no provision in the relevant statute vests power in the Settlement Department to grant a rebate, the rights are governed by the general law of contract, which cannot be enforced via a constitutional petition. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether rights arising from a contract of sale of evacuee property are enforceable by means of a constitutional petition in the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the power under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, or the Schemes framed thereunder, to order a rebate in the sale price of a confirmed auction sale?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rafiqan vs Muhammad Riaz And Another1986 SCMR 738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal appealacquittallimitation periodcondonation of delayleave to appealtime-barredrape
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a criminal appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had acquitted the respondent, Muhammad Riaz, of charges under sections 366 and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, overturning his conviction by the trial Magistrate. The appellant, the victim of the alleged offence, challenged this acquittal. Upon hearing the appeal, the Supreme Court addressed a preliminary objection regarding the limitation period for filing the petition for leave to appeal. The appellant sought condonation of a four-day delay, citing the counsel's lack of knowledge regarding the judgment announcement date and difficulties in obtaining the certified copy. The Court held that the explanation provided for the delay was insufficient and lacked merit. Emphasizing that an acquittal order should not be lightly jeopardized, the Court reaffirmed the principle that delay in filing petitions against acquittals is only condoned when the petitioner is actively prevented by the respondent from filing in time. Consequently, the Court rejected the application for condonation of delay, recalled the leave to appeal, and dismissed the appeal as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court condone a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal?
  • Is a lack of knowledge regarding the date of judgment announcement a sufficient ground for condonation of delay in filing an appeal?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to recall a previously granted leave to appeal if the petition is found to be time-barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Parveen Akhtar vs Muhammad Ashraf1986 SCMR 1944 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-11
  custody of minorsguardian judgeremarriage of motherwelfare of minorsspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed by a mother challenging the custody of her minor children, which had been awarded to the father by the Guardian Judge and upheld by the High Court. The core legal question addressed was whether the custody of the minor children should be granted to the mother, who had remarried a stranger. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that one of the children had attained the age of majority, rendering the issue of his custody moot. Regarding the remaining minor children, the Court held that the mother's remarriage to a stranger constituted a significant factor in determining the best interests of the children. Finding no legal infirmity or error in the reasoning of the lower courts, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the custody order in favor of the father. The judgment reinforces the principle that a mother's remarriage to a stranger is a relevant consideration in custody disputes, often weighing against her claim for custody when balanced against the welfare of the minors.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mother's remarriage to a stranger affect her right to the custody of her minor children?
  • Is the custody of a child who has attained the age of majority still a justiciable issue in custody proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Noor Bai' vs Abdul Ghaffar And Other1986 SCMR 683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-24
  Letters Patent Appealmaintainabilityspecial leave to appealconstitutional petitionsettlement departmentreview of leave order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil appeal against the judgment of the High Court dismissing an Intra-Court appeal as not maintainable. The core legal question concerned the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal under Section 3 of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act VII of 1972 read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. During the hearing, the appellant's counsel did not press the point regarding the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal, but instead sought to obtain special leave to appeal against the earlier order of the learned Single Judge, which had been impliedly refused when leave was originally granted on a limited point. The Supreme Court held that the request amounted to seeking a review of the earlier leave-granting order at a belated stage without sufficient grounds, and further noted that the Single Judge had kept the question of fraud open for future civil litigation. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and rejected the prayer for leave against the Single Judge's order.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Letters Patent Appeal maintainable against the order of a Single Judge under Section 3 of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act VII of 1972?
  • Can a request to challenge an order where leave was impliedly refused be entertained as a review at a belated stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nazir Begum vs Iqbal Hussain Qureshi And Other1986 SCMR 1684 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-10
  pre-emptionadditional documentsrevisional jurisdictioncase decidedestoppelinterlocutory orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises out of a pre-emption suit regarding a residential house, wherein the respondents-plaintiffs sought to produce additional documents namely historical sale deeds through applications under section 151 and Order XIII, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court ultimately rejected the applications upon remand from the High Court, but a subsequent revision petition filed by the respondents was allowed by the High Court, permitting the production of the documents. The petitioner-defendant challenged this order before the Supreme Court, contending inter alia that the revision petition before the High Court was incompetent as the rejection of an application under Order XIII, rule 2 did not constitute a 'case decided' under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court declined to examine this legal contention, holding that the petitioner, having herself previously invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in the earlier round of litigation to challenge an interlocutory order in the same proceedings, was estopped from turning around and raising an inconsistent plea of incompetency. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the rejection of an application under Order XIII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure constitutes a 'case decided' within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Can a party who has previously invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court against an interlocutory order subsequently challenge the competency of a revision petition filed by the opposing party on the same procedural grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nawaz Fatima vs Muhammad Sarwar And Another1986 SCMR 431 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-24
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptionsubsisting rightrevival of rightnotificationcolony areadismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a suit for pre-emption dismissed by the trial court, District Judge, and the High Court. The core legal question was whether a pre-emptor who lacked a right of pre-emption at the time of the sale and at the time of the suit's institution due to an applicable notification prohibiting pre-emption claims could benefit from the subsequent withdrawal of that notification during the pendency of a second appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision and held that a pre-emptor must possess a subsisting right of pre-emption at three crucial stages: the time of the sale, the time of the suit's institution, and the time of the decree. The Court affirmed that where a pre-emptor lacked the right of pre-emption at the time of sale and suit, any subsequent revival or creation of such right during appellate proceedings does not confer an advantage or validate the claim. The petition was dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Must a pre-emptor possess a valid right of pre-emption at both the time of sale and the time of filing the suit?
  • Does the subsequent withdrawal of a prohibiting notification during appellate proceedings validate a pre-emption suit that was invalid when filed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasim Akhtar vs Mst. Mukhtiar Bano1986 SCMR 980 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-15
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptioncustom of pre-emptionappreciation of evidencepetition for leave to appealconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of a pre-emption matter concerning the sale of a house in Multan. The core legal question involves the challenge to concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the respondent's superior right of pre-emption and the existence of the custom of pre-emption in the relevant locality. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioner pertained merely to the appreciation of evidence, which had already been fully and concurrently considered by the three courts below without raising any substantial question of law. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on the appreciation of evidence where no question of law arises for consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding a superior right of pre-emption?
  • Does a petition challenging merely the appreciation of evidence raise a question of law fit for interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasim Akhtar And Another vs Lahore Development Authority1986 SCMR 1352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naseeban Bibi vs Muhammad Yahya Khan And Another1986 SCMR 1964 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-12
  land settlementallotment cancellationres judicataconsent orderurban agricultural landdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment regarding a land settlement dispute. The core legal question was whether the 1976 cancellation of the respondent's land allotment in Chishtian was lawful, based on the allegation that he failed to comply with a 1963 consent order requiring him to surrender other urban land. The petitioner argued that the respondent's failure to surrender the land triggered the cancellation clause of the 1963 order. The Supreme Court held that the respondent had, in fact, complied with the 1963 order by offering to surrender the land within a reasonable time, and the failure to process that surrender lay with the Settlement Authorities, not the respondent. Furthermore, the Court held that the petitioner's claims were barred by the principle of res judicata, as the issues had been litigated and decided in previous proceedings up to the Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision that the 1976 cancellation was without lawful authority and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party be penalized for non-compliance with a consent order when the failure to implement the order lies with the administrative authority?
  • Does a prior refusal of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court in a land settlement dispute create a bar of res judicata against subsequent litigation on the same subject matter?
  • Can a cancellation of land allotment be sustained if the underlying condition for cancellation was satisfied by the allottee?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mumtaz Begum And Another vs Muhammad Yaqoob Khan1986 SCMR 455(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mehrunnisa Begum vs Syed Muhammad Shah And Other1986 SCMR 1400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-17
  condonation of delaytime-barred petitionsufficient causelimitationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenged on the ground of being time-barred by either 33 or 20 days. The petitioner sought condonation of delay, citing the death of her Mukhtar (agent) as the reason for the inability to pursue the case diligently. The core legal question was whether the death of the petitioner's Mukhtar constituted sufficient cause to condone the delay in filing the petition. The Supreme Court held that the plea was factually unsustainable because the Mukhtar had died during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court, yet the appeal was subsequently pursued and attended to by counsel without interruption. Consequently, the Court found no sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The key principle laid down is that a claim for condonation of delay based on the death of an agent is invalid where the record demonstrates that legal proceedings continued to be actively pursued by counsel following the agent's death.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of a Mukhtar constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay if the legal proceedings were actively pursued by counsel after the death?
  • Can a petition be dismissed as time-barred if the petitioner fails to provide sufficient cause for the delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mahjabeen Begum vs R.M. Khan1986 SCMR 1835 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-25
  rent restrictionstrike down defencetentative rent ordermaintainability of appealremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the maintainability of an appeal against an order of the Rent Controller refusing to strike down a tenant's defence for non-compliance with a tentative rent payment order. The High Court had previously dismissed the appeal, holding that an order refusing to strike off defence is incidental or collateral and does not dispose of the entire dispute. The core legal question was whether an appeal lies against such an order under the relevant rent restriction laws. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held, in light of its precedent in Mst. Zubaida Begum v. Mst. S.T. Naqvi, that the appeal is indeed maintainable. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remanded the matter for a decision on merits in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie against an order of the Rent Controller refusing to strike down the defence for non-compliance with a rent payment order under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Is an order under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, refusing to strike off defence considered an incidental or collateral order that bars an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khaliq Fatima vs Bundoo And Other1986 SCMR 631 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-12
  settlement of propertytransfer through negotiationauction cancellationleave to appealproperty entitlementremand proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a shop in Bahawalpur, originally auctioned to respondent Bundoo in 1960. Following the resumption of the property and failed re-auction attempts, the petitioner, Mst. Khaliq Fatima, was granted the shop through negotiations in 1968. The respondent challenged this transfer through appellate and revisional forums unsuccessfully, but the High Court eventually set aside the transfer to the petitioner, remanding the case to determine the respondent's entitlement and ordering an open auction if he was ineligible. Upon remand, the Settlement Commissioner found the respondent ineligible for transfer, thereby upholding the cancellation of his original auction bid. The Supreme Court observed that the respondent did not challenge this adverse finding. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, reasoning that since the respondent was found ineligible for transfer, there was no valid justification to disturb the petitioner's transfer, which had been in place for over seventeen years. The Court maintained the status quo via an interim order pending final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a transfer of property through negotiation can be upheld if the original auction purchaser is found ineligible for transfer?
  • Does the failure of an original auction purchaser to challenge a finding of ineligibility validate a subsequent transfer to another party?
  • Can a long-standing transfer of property be set aside when the competing claimant is found to have no legal entitlement?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kausar vs Mst. Mashkoor Fatima And Other1986 SCMR 596 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-15
  petition for leave to appealcondonation of delaybarred by limitationdeceased partyincompetent petitionres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Mst. Kausar against a judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 26-10-1981, which was barred by 1270 days. The core legal question concerned whether an inordinate delay in filing a properly constituted petition for leave to appeal could be condoned based on the history of previous litigation, particularly where an earlier leave petition was filed in the name of a deceased party and subsequently dismissed as incompetent. The Supreme Court held that the matter stood concluded by its earlier order recalling leave and dismissing the prior defective petition, leaving no scope to re-open the grounds for delay. The Court established the principle that a party cannot re-litigate or seek condonation of delay based on grounds that were or could have been raised in prior proceedings concerning the same defective and incompetent petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inordinate delay in filing a properly constituted petition for leave to appeal can be condoned on the basis of explanations regarding a prior defective petition?
  • Can a party re-open grounds for condoning delay that have already been adjudicated and concluded by a previous order of the Court?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal filed in the name of a deceased person maintainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Karam Jan vs Muhammad Akram And Other1986 SCMR 939 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-28
  acquittal appealleave to appealdelay in FIRocular testimonybenefit of doubtcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment and order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the State appeal and the petitioner's revision petition against the acquittal of respondents in a murder case. The core legal question concerns whether the lower courts erred in acquitting the respondents by relying on minor discrepancies, delay in lodging the first information report, and non-production of a witness, despite the presence of ocular and circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court held that no interference was warranted with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, noting that the trial court had the advantage of observing the witnesses and assessing all surrounding circumstances. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with an order of acquittal upheld by the High Court unless the appraisal of evidence by the courts below is perverse or suffers from a gross misreading resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in lodging the First Information Report can be a ground for disbelieving ocular testimony when explained by circumstances?
  • Does the non-production of an additional witness mentioned in the FIR necessarily discredit the testimony of the sole eye-witness?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent orders of acquittal passed by the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kaniz Fatima vs Additional District Judge, Sialkot And Other1986 SCMR 83(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-15
  dismissal for non-prosecutionshow-cause noticesecurity depositappellate proceedingsnon-appearance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by way of an appeal. The core legal question concerns the consequence of the appellant's failure to deposit the required security and make an appearance before the court pursuant to a show-cause notice and subsequent telegraphic notice. The court held that where an appellant fails to appear and cannot be located by the police at the given address, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. The holding of the court is that the appeal stands dismissed for non-prosecution without any order as to costs. The key principle laid down is that appellate proceedings may be terminated for non-prosecution when the appellant fails to comply with court directions regarding security deposits and personal appearance.

  Questions settled

  • What is the consequence of an appellant's failure to deposit security and appear before the court after receiving notice?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed for non-prosecution when the appellant's whereabouts are unknown and they fail to appear?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Iqbal Mai. and Another vs Falak Sher and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-11
  inheritanceleave to appealMuslim Family Laws Ordinancecustomary lawpredeceased sonlimited ownersettlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment concerning an inheritance dispute involving land held by a deceased predecessor, Atta Muhammad. The petitioners, granddaughters of the deceased, challenged an alienation of land made by the widow of their predeceased father. The High Court had ruled against the petitioners, citing the application of customary law and the inapplicability of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, to successions opened before its promulgation. Before the Supreme Court, the respondents offered a settlement allowing the petitioners to retain the majority of the land, while the respondents retained the specific portion they had purchased. The Supreme Court, noting the complexity of the legal issues regarding the interplay between Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and the Punjab/Sind/N.-W. F. P./Baluchistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (V) of 1962, declined to grant leave to appeal. The Court held that given the fair settlement offer and the potential risks to the petitioners if the legal points were litigated, the case was not a fit one for granting leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a case involving a disputed inheritance a fit case for granting leave to appeal when the parties have reached a fair settlement?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal when the petitioner faces a significant risk of losing their entire claim if the underlying legal questions are decided against them?
  • Can the Supreme Court decline to adjudicate complex questions regarding the interpretation of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 when the matter can be resolved through a settlement?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Imtiaz Bibi vs The State1986 SCMR 1014 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Mst. Imam Bibi vs Allah Ditta And Other1986 SCMR 318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-01
  leave to appealinheritance disputetenancy rightscustomary lawMuslim Personal LawBahawalpur State
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan on a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 22nd June, 1985, arising from a land and inheritance dispute. The High Court had allowed a Regular Second Appeal, holding that since the last owner of tenancy rights, Nizam Din, died prior to the promulgation of Shariat Law in the relevant locality of the Bahawalpur State, his inheritance was governed by previous customary law rather than Muslim law. The core legal questions for examination concern the exact date of death of the last owner, the date and effect of the extension of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 to the Bahawalpur State along with the applicability of Section 19-A, and the impact of the enforcement of Shariat Law via specific government notifications issued in 1951. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions in detail, requiring security in the sum of Rs. 2,500.

  Questions settled

  • What is the date of death of the last owner of tenancy rights, Nizam Din?
  • What is the date and effect of the extension of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 to Bahawalpur State, and when did Section 19-A apply to the disputed tenancy?
  • What is the effect of the enforcement of Shariat Law by Notification No. 20-LD dated 4th March 1951 and the subsequent exemption notification?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hussan Ara Begum And Others vs Messrs Haji Allah Ditta Barkat Ali1986 SCMR 1101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-19
  Constitutional jurisdictionejectmentmisreading of evidencereappraisal of evidenceleave to appealappellate findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a Constitutional Petition challenging an ejectment order passed by the District Judge, Gujrat, regarding a shop. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the District Judge's findings on the basis of alleged misreading of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's approach was correct, affirming that the High Court, in its Constitutional jurisdiction, is not required to reappraise evidence or scrutinize the weight attached to different pieces of evidence by the lower appellate court, especially when the lower court has already discussed the evidence in full. The Court clarified that 'misreading' cannot be used as a misnomer for mere disagreement with the conclusions drawn from evidence. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, though the Court granted the petitioners liberty to institute a fresh petition based on new grounds, such as default and personal requirement, arising from subsequent developments.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court, in its Constitutional jurisdiction, reappraise evidence or scrutinize the weight attached to evidence by a lower appellate court?
  • Does the allegation of 'misreading' of evidence allow for the reappraisal of evidence in a Constitutional petition?
  • Is a party entitled to file a fresh petition if new grounds, such as default and personal requirement, arise after the dismissal of a previous petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Sughra vs Ahmad Khan And Another1986 SCMR 1188 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-12
  murdersudden fightException 4 Section 300 PPCundue advantageSection 302 PPCenhancement of sentenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from cross criminal appeals regarding an incident where the accused stabbed his colleague to death inside an office following a trivial quarrel over handing over files. The trial court acquitted the accused, but the High Court on appeal converted the acquittal to a conviction under Section 304-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, holding that the fatality occurred during a 'sudden fight' under Exception 4 to Section 300 PPC, and sentenced him to seven months' imprisonment. The complainant appealed seeking conviction under Section 302 PPC, while the accused appealed his conviction. The Supreme Court examined whether the offense attracted Exception 4 to Section 300 PPC or amounted to murder under Section 302 PPC. The Supreme Court held that Exception 4 was inapplicable because the accused took undue advantage by attacking an unarmed colleague with a knife and acted with cruelty by repeatedly stabbing him in vital regions over a minor dispute. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittal under Section 302 PPC, convicted the accused of murder, and sentenced him to life imprisonment with benefit under Section 382-B Cr.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an attack with a lethal weapon on an unarmed victim following a trivial quarrel qualifies for Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does inflicting multiple knife blows on vital organs negate the defence of sudden fight under Exception 4 to Section 300 PPC on grounds of cruelty and taking undue advantage?
  • Whether a conviction altered to Section 304-II PPC by the High Court can be restored to Section 302 PPC where the accused acted with cruelty during a sudden quarrel?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Aisha vs Zahoor Ahmad And Other1986 SCMR 702 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-24
  culpable homicideprivate defensesentencing discretionsudden fightPakistan Penal Codecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that maintained the respondent's conviction under Section 304, Part I, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but reduced the sentence from life imprisonment to five years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal questions concerned whether the incident constituted a sudden fight under Exception 4 of Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether the High Court exercised its sentencing discretion appropriately. The Supreme Court held that the incident did not satisfy the criteria for Exception 4, as the act involved premeditation and the use of a weapon on a vital part of the deceased's body without justification. Instead, the Court found the circumstances aligned closer to Exception 2, involving an excess of the right of private defense. The Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, ruling that when an offense constitutes culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the trial judge possesses broad discretion to apportion punishment, ranging from life imprisonment to a short term or fine. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as no grounds existed to interfere with the High Court's discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Does the use of a dagger on a vital part of the body without provocation qualify as a sudden fight under Exception 4 of Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What is the scope of judicial discretion in sentencing for culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
  • Does an accused who exceeds the right of private defense fall under the purview of Exception 2 of Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Mst. Fazeelat Bibi vs Karam Khan And Other1986 SCMR 1628 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-22
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationmurderjudicial discretionlawlessnesscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal filed by the widow of the deceased against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had granted post-arrest bail to the respondent, Karam Khan, in a murder case. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court exercised its discretion judicially in granting bail, given the circumstances of the offence. The prosecution alleged that the accused party, including the respondent, intercepted a police vehicle, disarmed police constables, and pursued the deceased into his father's house to commit the murder. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasoning for granting bail—specifically that the respondent arrived in a second batch and was not the one who fired the fatal shot—was untenable. The Court emphasized that the incident demonstrated extreme lawlessness and total disregard for law enforcement agencies. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and cancelled the bail granted to the respondent, ordering him to be taken into custody immediately.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's reasoning for granting bail based on the accused's arrival in a second batch and lack of attribution of the fatal shot is legally tenable?
  • Does an incident involving the disarming of police guards and the pursuit of a victim into a private residence constitute grounds for refusing bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court cancel bail granted by the High Court if the reasoning provided for the grant is found to be untenable?
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• Mst. Fatima Bai vs Jan Muhammad1986 SCMR 1078 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-14
  landlord and tenantrent controller jurisdictioncoram non judiceeviction proceedingspreliminary issuerestitution of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from an eviction application filed by the petitioner against the respondent regarding a portion of a property. Following an ex parte eviction order, the respondent challenged the proceedings, eventually leading to a remand by the High Court for the Rent Controller to determine the preliminary issue of the landlord-tenant relationship. The Rent Controller subsequently found no such relationship existed and dismissed the eviction application, a finding later affirmed by the High Court. The petitioner sought leave to appeal, challenging the Rent Controller's finding and arguing that the High Court failed to consider a civil court decree establishing her title. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, noting that the petitioner had conceded before the High Court that the Rent Controller lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of a landlord-tenant relationship. The Court held that once a Rent Controller determines that no such relationship exists, they are divested of jurisdiction, rendering subsequent proceedings coram non judice. The Court clarified that these rent proceedings do not prejudice the parties' rights regarding title established in separate civil litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller retain jurisdiction to entertain an eviction application if the relationship of landlord and tenant is found not to exist?
  • What is the legal effect of orders passed by a Rent Controller in proceedings where it is subsequently determined that no landlord-tenant relationship exists?
  • Can a party challenge a finding of a Rent Controller in the Supreme Court after conceding the correctness of that finding before the High Court?
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• Mst. Dilshad Hussain vs P.I . C .I . C . And Other1986 SCMR 276(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-29
  Official Liquidatorcompromisefull and final settlementdisposal of appealpetition dismissed as infructuous
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals and a connected petition came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning a claim for remuneration or compensation in respect of services rendered by the late S.M. Hussain in his capacity as Official Liquidator. During the proceedings, learned counsel representing respondent No. 1 offered a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 (one lac) to resolve the matter in full and final settlement of all claims regarding the deceased Liquidator's services. The appellant, who was the widow of the late Official Liquidator, appeared in person alongside her counsel and formally accepted the offer. In light of the mutual agreement reached between the parties, the Supreme Court disposed of the appeals in terms of the compromise, making no order as to costs. Consequently, the related Civil Petition No. 717 of 1984 was rendered infructuous and was dismissed accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal regarding claims for services rendered by an Official Liquidator be disposed of in terms of a mutually agreed compromise?
  • Does the acceptance of a full and final settlement offer by an appellant render a connected civil petition infructuous?
  • Whether the Supreme Court may dispose of an appeal without an order as to costs upon recorded compromise between the parties?
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• Mst. Bhagan Bibi vs Muhammad Akram And Other1986 SCMR 1180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-11
  writ jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factrent controlleave to appealappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which interfered with concurrent findings of fact previously established by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the First Appellate Court. The core legal question presented for the Supreme Court's examination is whether the High Court is legally justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction to set aside concurrent findings of fact reached by lower rent forums. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, thereby indicating that the propriety of the High Court's interference with such concurrent findings requires a detailed judicial review. The principle at stake involves the scope and limitations of writ jurisdiction when confronted with concurrent factual determinations made by specialized tribunals and appellate authorities under rent control legislation. By granting leave, the Court has signaled that the High Court's exercise of jurisdiction in this specific context warrants further scrutiny to determine if it exceeded the permissible boundaries of judicial review regarding findings of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact recorded by a Rent Controller and confirmed by an Appellate Court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction?
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• Mst. Barkat Bibi vs Manzoor Hussain And Other1986 SCMR 717 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-31
  leave to appealappeal against acquittalevaluation of evidencemisreading of evidencebailable warrantscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner, Mst. Barkat Bibi, against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, whereby the State's criminal appeal challenging the acquittal of the accused/respondents was dismissed. The primary contention raised was that the High Court dismissed the acquittal appeal without properly evaluating the prosecution evidence, addressing the merits, or applying judicial mind, relying instead on conjectures, surmises, and general observations regarding routine appeals against acquittal orders. It was additionally argued that the trial court had misread the evidence and acquitted the accused on flimsy grounds. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the impugned High Court order, which had summarily dismissed the appeal on the premise that laid-down principles regarding acquittal challenges were disregarded. Finding that the questions raised regarding the proper evaluation of evidence and principles governing appeals against acquittal warranted deeper consideration, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and issued bailable warrants against the accused/respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can dismiss a criminal appeal against acquittal without properly evaluating the prosecution evidence or addressing the merits of the case?
  • Whether general observations regarding the routine filing of acquittal appeals justify the dismissal of an appeal without judicial application of mind to the facts?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted where the trial court and appellate court allegedly misread prosecution evidence on flimsy grounds?
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• Mst. Bakht Bano And Another vs Allah Yar And Other1986 SCMR 1483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-21
  customary lawwidow maintenancelimited estateinheritance under customagricultural tribes customleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, daughters of the deceased, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their revision petition by the Lahore High Court, claiming a share in their father's estate governed by custom. The core legal question was whether the widow of the deceased, who held land equally alongside her sons, was a limited owner under custom or merely a maintenance-holder. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that under the general custom of agricultural tribes in the Punjab, where male descendants exist, a widow is ordinarily entitled only to suitable maintenance rather than a life estate, and sharing property equally with sons does not displace this general custom. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the widow was a maintenance-holder, distinguishing between a widow's life estate in the absence of male descendants and a maintenance-holder's right in their presence. The key principle laid down is that land held by a widow in the presence of male descendants is held in lieu of maintenance, and upon its termination, the property reverts to those obliged to provide maintenance rather than tracing descent from the widow.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a widow succeeding alongside male lineal descendants takes a limited life estate or holds property merely in lieu of maintenance under customary law?
  • Does the mere sharing of property equally with sons by a widow suffice to prove a departure from the general custom regarding maintenance?
  • How does the devolution of property differ upon the termination of a widow's life estate versus a maintenance estate?
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• Mst. Bakhan And Others vs Muhammad Ali And 2 Other1986 SCMR 602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-12
  pre-emptionlimitationpecuniary jurisdictionreturn of plaintleave to appealsuit valuation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which affirmed lower court decisions rejecting the petitioners' plea of limitation in a pre-emption suit. The petitioners purchased land in 1967, prompting respondents to file a pre-emption suit in 1968. Initially filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Chiniot, the plaint was returned under Order VII, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, after an amendment increased the suit's valuation beyond the trial court's pecuniary jurisdiction. The plaint was subsequently re-presented in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Jhang. The petitioners contended that the suit was time-barred, an issue decided against them by the trial court and the Additional District Judge, and subsequently upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the petitioners' contention regarding the incorrect legal determination of the limitation issue required further examination. The Court held that the legal validity of the limitation finding warranted a full hearing, thereby staying the proceedings in the interim.

  Questions settled

  • Does the return of a plaint for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction and its subsequent re-presentation affect the limitation period for a pre-emption suit?
  • Can a suit be considered time-barred if the initial filing was within time but the plaint was returned for re-presentation in a court of competent jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aurang Zaib Bibi vs Province of Punjab Through Collector, Multan1986 SCMR 184 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-19
  temporary injunctioncivil procedurediscretion of courtsrevision applicationpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which dismissed the petitioner's revision application. The petitioner had challenged the concurrent orders of the lower courts, namely the Civil Judge and the Additional District Judge, Multan, whereby her application for the issuance of a temporary injunction pending the disposal of her suit for declaration was rejected. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts erred in exercising their discretion regarding the grant of a temporary injunction. The Supreme Court held that no question of law was involved and that the discretion exercised by the lower courts in refusing the temporary injunction was not open to any exception on grounds of law. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the principle that appellate and revisional courts will not interfere with the proper exercise of judicial discretion by lower courts in interlocutory matters unless a clear error of law is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the concurrent refusal of a temporary injunction by lower courts when no question of law is involved?
  • Is the exercise of discretion by lower courts in declining a temporary injunction open to exception without a demonstrable error of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ashraf Begum vs Sh. Muhammad Siddique And Another1986 SCMR 187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-15
  constitutional petitionleave to appealrelationship of landlord and tenantrent ejectmentmisreading of evidencewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition which challenged an appellate order remanding a rent ejectment case for disposal on merits. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere in writ jurisdiction with a finding of fact regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant rendered by an appellate authority. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the lower appellate court's finding was based on a misreading of evidence and whether interference was warranted under constitutional jurisdiction given that the jurisdictional fact of the relationship of landlord and tenant was at issue. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact by tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction are generally immune from constitutional interference unless shown to be based on no evidence or a misreading thereof.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a finding on a question of fact recorded by a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction can be interfered with in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does a misreading of evidence by an appellate authority justify interference under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Is the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant a jurisdictional fact necessary for the exercise of power under rent laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ameer Khatun vs Faiz Ahmad And Other1986 SCMR 1182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-08
  leave to appealretrospective effectprocedural lawcompetent witnesscross-examinationcriminal revisionvested rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a criminal revision by the Lahore High Court concerning a murder trial. The core legal question is whether the amended subsection (2) of section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 44 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, which relate to the examination and cross-examination of an accused person, possess retrospective effect and apply to trials commenced prior to their enactment, particularly where the accused were examined under section 342 before the amendment. The Supreme Court held that the case involves substantial questions of general public importance regarding retrospective application of procedural laws and potential changes to fundamental tenets of criminal jurisprudence, thereby granting leave to appeal. The Court declined to stay trial proceedings and recommended the constitution of a larger Bench by the Chief Justice to resolve the conflicting authorities and legal issues.

  Questions settled

  • Whether amended section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 44 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, have retrospective effect?
  • Whether the conflict of authority as appearing from the case law cited is reconcilable?
  • Whether the laws relied upon have changed a basic principle of criminal jurisprudence regarding the burden of proof?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aisha Khanum . vs Ehsanullah Khan and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  displaced personssettlement commissionerrevision powersspecial empowermenttransfer of propertynotification
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the High Court concerning the transfer of a disputed property under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the notification dated 29th of June, 1963, satisfied the requirement of section 20(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, such that the Settlement Commissioner was specially empowered to hear and decide the revision petition. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner was indeed duly and specially empowered to hear the revision by virtue of relevant government notifications investing him with the powers of a Settlement Commissioner, coupled with the Chief Settlement Commissioner's general notification under section 20(3) of the Act which remained in force until specifically withdrawn. The appeal was accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement Commissioner was specially empowered under section 20(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 to hear the revision?
  • Whether a notification issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner continues to remain in force until specifically withdrawn?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aisha Bai Through Legal Heirs And Another vs Mst. Mobin Khatoon1986 SCMR 1712 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-23
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantreconstructionbuilding plancompulsory open spacebona fide requirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal arising from ejectment proceedings initiated by a landlady against tenants. The landlady sought the eviction of the petitioners on the grounds that the premises were required in good faith for the reconstruction of a new building, supported by a building plan approved by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation. The tenants contested the application, alleging mala fides and harassment, and argued that the proposed construction could proceed without removing their premises because the area was designated as compulsory open space. The Rent Controller and the High Court both ruled in favor of the landlady, finding the requirement for reconstruction to be bona fide. The Supreme Court affirmed these findings, holding that the allowance for compulsory open spaces in an approved building plan is an integral part of the overall layout and sanction for the proposed construction. Consequently, the Court determined that compliance with such building rules and bye-laws necessitates the removal of existing structures, rendering the ejectment order legally sound and unexceptionable.

  Questions settled

  • Is the requirement for reconstruction considered bona fide when supported by an approved building plan?
  • Does the designation of an area as compulsory open space in an approved building plan justify the removal of existing premises for reconstruction purposes?
  • Can a tenant challenge an ejectment order on the basis that construction can proceed without their removal if the approved plan mandates open space?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Zubaida Begum vs Mrs. S.T. Naqvi1986 SCMR 261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-14
  rent restrictionstriking off defenceappealabilityinterlocutory ordercondonation of delayrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the appealability of a Rent Controller's order refusing to strike off a tenant's defence for non-compliance with a rent deposit order under the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Rent Controller had condoned the tenant's delay in depositing rent due to illness, refusing to strike off the defence. The Additional District Judge reversed this, but the High Court held the Rent Controller's order was interlocutory and thus not appealable. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if an appeal against the refusal to strike off a defence is competent under Section 15 of the Ordinance. Relying on precedent, the Supreme Court held that an order refusing to strike off a tenant's defence is appealable, just as an order striking off a defence is. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the case was remanded for a decision on other pending points. The Court also upheld the High Court's discretionary exercise in condoning the delay in filing the second appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order of a Rent Controller refusing to strike off a tenant's defence for non-compliance with a rent deposit order appealable under the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can a High Court's exercise of discretionary jurisdiction to condone a delay in filing an appeal be interfered with if based on valid grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Shahnaz Sehgal vs Mrs. Fatima Ashraf And Other1986 SCMR 1394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-11
  sub-tenancyejectment proceedingslandlord-tenant relationshippreliminary issuerent depositstriking off defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which upheld an order of the Rent Controller directing the eviction of a sub-tenant. The dispute arose when the landlord sought the ejectment of the original tenant (a company) and its sub-tenants, subsequently obtaining an order under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, requiring the deposit of rent. The Rent Controller struck off the original tenant's defence for failure to deposit rent and ordered eviction. The petitioner, a sub-tenant, challenged this, arguing that as she had paid rent to the original tenant (her landlord) and denied any direct landlord-tenant relationship with the respondent-landlord, the Rent Controller was legally obligated to determine the existence of such a relationship as a preliminary issue before ordering eviction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the petitioner's plea regarding the necessity of determining the landlord-tenant relationship as a preliminary issue raised a substantial question of law requiring further consideration. The Court also granted an interim stay against eviction, conditional upon the petitioner continuing to deposit rent.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Rent Controller required to determine the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship as a preliminary issue when a sub-tenant denies such a relationship?
  • Can a Rent Controller order the eviction of a sub-tenant without first resolving the dispute regarding the status of the tenancy?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Rafia Ahmad vs Excise and Taxation Officer 'H' Division And Other1986 SCMR 1675 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-03
  property tax assessmentFair Annual Rental Valuestatutory interpretationleave to appealconstitutional petitiontax enhancement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which had dismissed a constitutional petition challenging property tax assessment orders issued by Excise and Taxation authorities. The petitioner, owner of a residential property in Karachi, contested the substantial upward revision of the Fair Annual Rental Value (F.A.R.V.) of her property, which had been increased from Rs. 10,500 to Rs. 1,68,000, and subsequently reduced to Rs. 1,44,000 through administrative appeals and revisions. The core legal question before the Supreme Court concerned whether the High Court failed to properly interpret Section 9 of the Sind Urban Immovable Property Act, 1958, and whether a statutory bar existed against the enhancement of property assessment under proviso 2 to Section 5 of the same Act, as introduced on 1-7-1977. Finding that the petitioner's submissions regarding the statutory interpretation and the alleged bar on enhancement deserved detailed consideration, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. The Court further ordered a stay on the recovery of the impugned tax demand, subject to the petitioner depositing security in the form of 'Khas Deposit Certificates'.

  Questions settled

  • Does proviso 2 to Section 5 of the Sind Urban Immovable Property Act, 1958, create a complete bar to the enhancement of property tax assessment?
  • Did the High Court err in its interpretation of Section 9 of the Sind Urban Immovable Property Act, 1958, regarding property tax assessments?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. K.A. Marker And Others vs Messrs Mahmood Ahmad & Sons1986 SCMR 1568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-06
  ejectment applicationtentative rent orderdefault in rentstriking off defencetenancy agreementcause of actionrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an ejectment application filed by landlords against tenants for default in rent payment. The Rent Controller had initially ordered the tenants to deposit rent under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. Following allegations of non-compliance with this tentative rent order, the Rent Controller struck off the tenants' defence and ordered eviction. The High Court, however, set aside this order, reasoning that a subsequent agreement between the parties to increase the rent rendered the original rent order ineffective and the ejectment application infructuous. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court erred in dismissing the ejectment application entirely. The Supreme Court held that the creation of a fresh tenancy agreement with an enhanced rent rate did not extinguish the landlords' original cause of action regarding the initial default. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the matter to the Rent Controller to decide the original ejectment application on its merits concerning the alleged previous default.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent agreement to increase rent render an earlier ejectment application based on prior default infructuous?
  • Can a Rent Controller's order for tentative rent deposit be rendered ineffective by the parties' conduct in paying enhanced rent directly?
  • Is an ejectment application based on a specific period of default liable to be dismissed solely because the parties later agreed to a new tenancy at an enhanced rate?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. J.C. Rahman vs Mrs. Salma Ahmad1986 SCMR 951 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-07
  rent controlejectmentpersonal requirementgood faithlandlord-tenant disputeconcurrent findingseviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a landlord-tenant dispute where the petitioner challenged the eviction order upheld by the Sind High Court. The respondent-landlady sought eviction of the petitioner from the ground floor of her house, citing personal requirement for her children and default in utility payments. The core legal questions were whether the landlady's requirement for the premises was genuine and in good faith, and whether the availability of the first-floor premises rendered the eviction request invalid. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the High Court. It held that the landlady’s requirement was genuine, noting that the children from her second marriage could not reasonably reside with the children from her first marriage due to familial friction and the former husband's presence. Furthermore, the Court accepted that the first-floor premises were unsuitable due to the landlady's medical condition preventing stair climbing. The principle laid down is that a landlord's personal requirement, if supported by evidence of genuine need and good faith, constitutes valid grounds for eviction, and appellate courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding such necessity.

  Questions settled

  • Is a landlord's requirement for premises considered genuine if the landlord has a medical condition preventing the use of alternative vacant floors?
  • Can a tenant challenge the genuineness of a landlord's personal requirement for the first time in the Supreme Court if the issue was not raised in the lower courts?
  • Does the presence of other vacant premises in the same building automatically invalidate a landlord's claim of personal requirement for a specific portion of that building?
  Read full judgment →
• Moulvi Sultan Muhammad vs Syed Ijaz Russain Shah And Other1986 SCMR 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-01
  election petitiondisqualificationdefunct political partynomination paperelection tribunalconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks to challenge an order of the Lahore High Court which partly dismissed a constitutional petition against the decision of the Election Tribunal setting aside the petitioner's election as a member of the Union Council. The core legal questions involve whether the Election Tribunal had the jurisdiction to examine the question of a candidate's disqualification independently in election petition proceedings despite the finality of nomination paper acceptance, and whether the finding regarding the petitioner's membership in a defunct political party was sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the Election Tribunal possesses jurisdiction under the relevant rules to declare an election void if the nomination was invalid, and that concurrent findings of fact based on admissions made in judicial proceedings do not warrant interference in constitutional jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that an Election Tribunal is competent to examine the disqualification of a returned candidate during election petition proceedings, and findings of fact based on material evidence by a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction will not be disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Election Tribunal has jurisdiction to examine the question of a candidate's disqualification in an election petition independently of nomination appeal proceedings?
  • Can a finding of fact by an Election Tribunal based on a candidate's admission in judicial proceedings be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the acceptance of a nomination paper by an appellate authority bar the Election Tribunal from declaring the election void on grounds of invalid nomination?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohsin Ur Rehman vs The State And Other1986 SCMR 1687 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-21
  criminal revisioncourt witnessesgiven up witnessesmurder trialessential evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a criminal revision petition filed by the petitioner facing trial in a murder case. The petitioner sought to summon two given-up prosecution witnesses as court witnesses under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 at the argument stage, which the trial court and the High Court had declined due to delay and late stage. The core legal question was whether the trial court was bound under the second part of section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon given-up witnesses as court witnesses without a foundational showing that their evidence was essential for the just decision of the case. The Supreme Court held that in order to invoke the mandatory second part of section 540, there must be a factual basis and a finding that the evidence is essential for the just decision of the case, which was absent in this case. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with the Court clarifying that the petitioner could still summon the witnesses in his defense.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the trial court is bound to summon given-up prosecution witnesses as court witnesses under the second part of section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without a showing that their evidence is essential for the just decision of the case?
  • Can a plea that evidence is essential for the just decision of the case be entertained for the first time in the Supreme Court when it was not raised before the High Court?
  • Whether an accused person examining a witness in their defense is precluded from seeking permission to cross-examine such witness if a genuine need arises?
  Read full judgment →
• Mistri Ahmad Hassan vs Abdur Rauf Khan And Other1986 SCMR 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-16
  ejectmentrent defaultjurisdiction of Rent Controllernon-residential buildingrent agreementspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for Special Leave to Appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed the ejectment of the petitioner from rented premises due to default in rent payment. The petitioner contested the ejectment on two primary grounds: first, that the Rent Controller lacked jurisdiction because the installation of a Saw Mill converted the premises into a factory, thereby excluding it from the purview of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959; and second, that the landlord failed to provide a mandatory notice before initiating proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the premises remained a rented land or non-residential building subject to the Ordinance, distinguishing the case from precedents involving established factories. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the rent agreement contained no stipulation for prior notice, and independently, Section 13 of the Ordinance provides a landlord with a statutory right to seek ejectment upon proof of rent default. The Court concluded that the lower courts correctly exercised jurisdiction and that no legal error warranted interference.

  Questions settled

  • Does the installation of machinery on rented land automatically convert the premises into a factory, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Is a landlord required to provide a notice before initiating ejectment proceedings for default in rent payment under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, absent a contractual stipulation?
  • Does proof of default in payment of rent provide an independent statutory ground for ejectment under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Mustabshera Sufi vs Province of Punjab1986 SCMR 1372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-25
  leave to appealadministrative tribunalappointmentheadmistressenforcement of orderservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal from a judgment of the Punjab Administrative Tribunal, which had formally dismissed her appeal but practically granted her the relief of being appointed as a Headmistress of a school in Lahore. The petitioner contended that despite the Tribunal's directions, the relevant authorities failed to post her to the position. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the matter and granted leave to appeal to examine whether, despite the formal dismissal of the appeal, the petitioner was allowed the relief of appointment and whether the respondents could deny her claim on the ground that the Tribunal's order lacked sound reasoning, especially since the respondents had not challenged the Tribunal's order. The Court thus admitted the petition for regular hearing to resolve these questions of administrative law and enforcement of tribunal directions.

  Questions settled

  • Can administrative authorities deny a petitioner the relief granted by an Administrative Tribunal on the ground that the Tribunal's order was not based on sound reasoning?
  • Whether a respondent who has not challenged an Administrative Tribunal's order can refuse to implement the practical relief granted therein despite a formal dismissal of the appeal?
  • Does the formal dismissal of an appeal by an Administrative Tribunal preclude the enforcement of specific relief practically granted to the appellant within the same order?
  Read full judgment →
• Misal Muhammad vs The State1986 SCMR 847 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-09
  bailmedical groundsbail cancellationcardiac ailmentcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Peshawar High Court cancelling the bail granted to the petitioner, Misal Muhammad, who is charged along with his sons under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of one Farhad. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's medical condition, namely Ischaemic Heart Disease and hypertension, warranted his release on bail on the ground that confinement in jail was hazardous to his life. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the petitioner was suffering from a serious ailment rendering his confinement hazardous and that the discretion exercised by the Sessions Judge in granting bail was just and proper. The key principle laid down is that where an under-trial prisoner suffers from a serious ailment that cannot be properly managed to the extent of preventing hazard to life within jail custody, bail may be granted on medical grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an under-trial prisoner suffering from a serious heart disease is entitled to bail on medical grounds?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court's cancellation of bail be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  • Does chronic hypertension and Ischaemic Heart Disease render jail confinement hazardous enough to justify bail?
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• Mirza Akbar Ali vs National Bank of Pakistan1986 SCMR 321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-03
  execution of decreelimitation actvested rightmoney decreeleave to appealprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a judgment-debtor, sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's dismissal of his civil revision petition, which had upheld lower court orders allowing the execution of a money decree. The core legal question was whether the repeal of Article 182 of the Limitation Act by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 removed the requirement for subsequent execution applications to be filed within three years of the dismissal of a prior execution application, and whether a judgment-debtor has a vested right in such a limitation period. The Supreme Court held that the law of limitation is primarily procedural, the removal of the clog under Article 182 did not affect any vested right of the judgment-debtor, and the execution application filed within twelve years of the decree was valid under section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The key principle laid down is that procedural laws and limitations do not create vested rights in maintaining bars to execution once repealed, and subsequent execution applications are governed by the unhindered twelve-year period under section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 where applicable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the repeal of Article 182 of the Limitation Act affects the vested rights of a judgment-debtor regarding the timeline for filing subsequent execution applications?
  • Does a judgment-debtor acquire a vested right to insist that an execution application must be moved within three years of the dismissal of an earlier execution application?
  • Is the law of limitation considered a procedural law that can remove clogs on the execution of a decree retrospectively?
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• Mirza Abdul Hameed And Others vs Member, Board of Revenue II1986 SCMR 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-15
  constitutional petitionacting governorchief justiceincompatibility of officesjudgment pronouncementvacation of office
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter addresses the core legal question of whether a Chief Justice of a High Court, while acting as the Governor of the Province, can finalize a judgment of the High Court by signing it and having it announced in court. The Supreme Court held that when a Chief Justice of a High Court is appointed and takes over the functions of the Governor of the Province, he vacates the office of the Chief Justice and is unable to perform judicial functions during that period due to the incompatibility of the two offices. Consequently, the signing and pronouncement of a judgment by the Chief Justice while functioning as Acting Governor is without legal authority and void. The key principle laid down is that the offices of the Governor and of a High Court Judge or Chief Justice are fundamentally incompatible, and an incumbent holding the office of Governor cannot simultaneously discharge judicial functions or finalize judicial pronouncements.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Chief Justice of a High Court while acting as the Governor of the Province can finalize a judgment of the High Court by signing it and getting it announced?
  • Does the appointment of a Chief Justice of a High Court as Acting Governor create a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice?
  • Can the principle underlying Order XX, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be applied to validate a judgment signed by a Chief Justice while acting as Governor?
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