Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Miran Bux And Another vs Muhammad Amir And Another1986 SCMR 1225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-06
  murderreduction of sentencemitigating circumstancefailure of motiveocular testimonylife imprisonmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These two petitions for leave to appeal arose from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained the convict's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder but reduced the death sentence to life imprisonment while granting benefit under Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The convict sought acquittal, alleging interested eye-witnesses and failure of motive, whereas the complainant sought restoration of the death sentence, challenging the High Court's observations regarding the victim's character. The Supreme Court observed that the eye-witnesses were close relatives, ruling out false implication. The Court rejected the High Court's conjecture regarding the victim's moral character, holding it was unsupported by evidence. However, applying settled precedent, the Supreme Court held that the failure of the motive asserted by the prosecution served as a valid mitigating circumstance to justify the reduction of sentence from death to life imprisonment. Both petitions for leave to appeal were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the prosecution to prove its asserted motive can serve as a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can a court reduce a murder sentence based on speculative observations regarding the moral character of the deceased without supporting evidence?
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• Mir Ajab Khan And Another vs Ramzan And Other1986 SCMR 1257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-05
  leave to appealland disputerival purchasersmutationcivil revisionmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' civil revision petition regarding a land dispute. The petitioners claimed ownership of the suit land through a sale transaction dated 21st May, 1975, recorded prior to the respondents' purported purchase on 24th May, 1975. The petitioners secured a decree in a civil suit against the original owner, but the respondents subsequently obtained a decree in a separate suit, claiming the earlier decree was not binding on them as they were not impleaded as parties. The Peshawar High Court upheld the dismissal of the petitioners' revision. The core legal question involves the rights of rival purchasers through competing mutations and whether a prior decree against an original vendor binds subsequent purchasers not impleaded therein. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the questions raised regarding the misreading of evidence and the technical objections concerning the non-joinder of parties in the earlier suit. The key principle established is that leave to appeal is granted when substantial questions regarding the appreciation of evidence and conflicting proprietary claims require closer examination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a decree obtained against an original owner in a land suit is binding on subsequent purchasers who were not impleaded as parties to that suit?
  • Can a civil revision be maintained when the lower courts' concurrent findings are allegedly based on a misreading of evidence?
  • How are competing claims of rival purchasers resolved when mutations are sanctioned on the same day based on transactions of different dates?
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• Mir Afzal vs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. And Other1986 SCMR 1533 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-29
  banking recoverybank guaranteedecretal amountdismissal of appealstatutory complianceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal due to non-compliance with a procedural direction. The High Court had ordered the petitioner to furnish a bank guarantee equivalent to the decretal amount as a condition for proceeding with the appeal, pursuant to the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner failed to comply with this order and instead requested permission to provide personal security, which was refused. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal for failure to satisfy the statutory condition. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the impugned order and held that the High Court's decision was entirely in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court affirmed that the High Court acted correctly in dismissing the appeal when the mandatory condition imposed under the relevant banking legislation was not met, thereby upholding the principle that statutory conditions for filing or proceeding with an appeal must be strictly adhered to by the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court dismiss an appeal for failure to furnish a bank guarantee as ordered under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is a court required to accept personal security in lieu of a bank guarantee when the statute mandates the latter for proceeding with an appeal?
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• Mian Khadim Hussain vs Mst. Fauzia Hussain And Another1986 SCMR 1821 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-01
  polygamyMuslim Family Laws Ordinancesecond marriagepermission of first wifeacquittalforeign marriage registrationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that set aside an acquittal granted by a Magistrate under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner, having married the respondent in the United Kingdom, subsequently contracted a second marriage in Pakistan without obtaining the respondent's permission. The respondent filed a complaint alleging a violation of Section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. The Magistrate initially acquitted the petitioner, reasoning that the first marriage, being registered in the UK rather than under the Ordinance, did not trigger the statutory requirement for permission. The High Court reversed this, holding that a valid marriage between Muslims, regardless of the place of registration, necessitates compliance with the Ordinance's requirements for subsequent marriages. The Supreme Court, while acknowledging that some legal points raised by the petitioner were arguable, determined that the circumstances did not warrant interference and dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the High Court's decision to remand the case for trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does a marriage between Muslims performed and registered abroad require the husband to obtain the first wife's permission before contracting a second marriage in Pakistan under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  • Can a Magistrate acquit an accused under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the ground that a foreign-registered marriage does not trigger the requirements of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
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• Mian Ghulam Rasool vs Bashir Ahmad And Other1986 SCMR 955 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-25
  pre-emptionleave to appealex partespecific performancenew points of lawsubstantial justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a vendee, sought leave to appeal from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed his second appeal in a pre-emption suit. Initially, the trial court had dismissed the pre-emptor's suit on the ground that a sale executed through a decree for specific performance was not pre-emptiable. On first appeal, which proceeded ex parte due to the petitioner's absence, the appellate court reversed this decision and decreed the suit. The High Court subsequently affirmed the first appellate court's judgment. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner's counsel abandoned the grounds decided by the High Court and sought to raise entirely new legal points, including a technical challenge to the ex parte proceedings. The Supreme Court declined to permit these new points to be raised for the first time, noting that substantial justice had been done and that the Court would be deprived of the lower courts' views on those issues. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise entirely new legal points for the first time before the Supreme Court if those points were not urged before the High Court?
  • Whether a first appellate court's decision to proceed ex parte is justified if it waited sufficiently for the respondent or his counsel to appear?
  • Will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal to consider new technical points of law if substantial justice has already been done by the lower courts?
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• Mian Abdul Ghani And Another vs Rehmatullah Sheikh1986 SCMR 472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-06
  pre-emptionadditional evidencecivil revisioninterlocutory ordersdiscretionary powerurban property
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, who were plaintiffs in a pre-emption suit concerning urban property, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment. The High Court had set aside a trial court's order that allowed the petitioners to produce a registered deed as additional evidence to prove the contiguity of their property, citing a lack of sufficient cause for the document's initial non-production. The petitioners challenged the High Court's interference, arguing that a revision petition against an order allowing additional evidence was legally incompetent and that the trial court's discretion should not have been disturbed. The Supreme Court, noting that the matter involved a purely legal question regarding the scope of revisional jurisdiction over interlocutory orders allowing additional evidence, converted the petition into an appeal. The Court granted leave to appeal, directing the parties to prepare for a hearing on the existing record while allowing for the submission of additional documents, thereby keeping the legal question of the competency of the revision petition open for final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Is a revision petition competent against a trial court's order granting permission to produce additional evidence?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with a trial court's discretion to allow additional evidence under Order XIII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Messrs Sufi Soap Factory vs The Commissioner of Sales Tax1986 SCMR 885 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-01
  sales taxleave to appealonus of prooftax liabilitymanufacturer exemptionraw materialstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal regarding the levy of sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The petitioner, a soap manufacturer, contended that it purchased raw materials from the open market, where sales tax had already been paid, and thus should not be liable for further tax upon resale or use. The core legal questions involve the interpretation of the point of levy for sales tax and the burden of proof regarding the source of raw material purchases—specifically, whether the Sales Tax Officer must prove that goods were purchased under a license (exempting the seller) or if the assessee bears the onus to prove the purchase was from the open market. The Supreme Court observed that the case presented novel legal issues requiring an authoritative pronouncement on the interpretation of sections 3, 4, and 12 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, and the relevant rules. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to resolve these fundamental questions of tax liability and evidentiary burden.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie with the Sales Tax Officer to establish that raw materials were purchased under a license, or with the assessee to prove they were purchased in the open market?
  • Is sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1951, leviable at only one stage of the manufacturing or distribution process?
  • What is the proper interpretation of the charging provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, regarding the liability of a manufacturer who purchases raw materials from the open market?
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• Messrs Star Textile Mills Ltd vs Pakistan Through Secretary to the Government of Pakistan in the Ministry of Finance, Islamabad And 2 Other1986 SCMR 1288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-07
  capacity dutyabatement of dutycotton fabricscotton yarnproduction capacitytotal productioncentral excise
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from the judgment of the High Court concerning the abatement of capacity duty for shortfalls in shifts in cotton mills. The core legal question was whether the expression 'total production' in the second proviso to Rule 4(1) of the Production Capacity Cotton Fabrics Rules, 1968 and Production Capacity Cotton Yarn Rules, 1968 required the actual production to be converted into a common denominator (such as average count for yarn or picks per inch for fabrics) when compared against production capacity, or whether it referred to actual physical production. The Supreme Court held that the expression 'total production' means the actual physical quantity of goods produced or manufactured, and there is no warrant in the statute or rules to read in a requirement for a notional production based on a common denominator. The key principle laid down is that statutory rules governing excise duty abatement on production capacity must be interpreted according to their plain language, and actual production cannot be notionally adjusted without explicit statutory backing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the expression 'total production' in Rule 4 of the Production Capacity Rules requires actual production to be reduced to a common denominator based on average count or picks per inch?
  • Can an abatement of excise duty be claimed if the total production of a factory in a financial year does not fall short of its production capacity?
  • Does the suspension of work in a mill automatically entitle the manufacturer to an abatement of capacity duty without regard to the total actual production?
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• Messrs Service Industries Ltd. vs Muhammad Raghib And Another1986 SCMR 637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-28
  reconstructionrepaireviction of tenantrented premisesstructural changeslandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind which reversed the Rent Controller's order and allowed the landlord's eviction application under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The appellant-company, tenant of a shop premises, resisted eviction sought on the ground of reconstruction under section 15(2)(vi) of the Ordinance, contending that the proposed work amounted merely to repairs rather than reconstruction, and that the action was mala fide. The core legal question is whether the proposed alterations and construction of a dividing wall and staircase amount to "reconstruction or erection of a new building at the site" under section 15(2)(vi), warranting tenant eviction, as opposed to mere "repairs" governed by section 12. The Supreme Court held that where substantial structural changes are effected in the existing building, such as the construction of a new dividing wall and a staircase to access the upper floor, the work constitutes "reconstruction" rather than repairs, thus entitling the landlord to seek eviction. The key principle laid down is that while "repair" involves restoring a damaged structure to its original condition without terminating tenancy, "reconstruction" in the context of the statute encompasses substantial structural alterations necessitating vacant possession.

  Questions settled

  • Does the proposed work of constructing a new dividing wall and a staircase amount to reconstruction or mere repairs under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Whether structural changes in a building are necessary to constitute reconstruction for the purpose of seeking tenant eviction?
  • Does the requirement of reconstruction under section 15(2)(vi) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, entail the eviction of the tenant?
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• Messrs Rafhan Maize Products C0. Ltd. vs Pakistan Food and Agriculture Committee And Another1986 SCMR 1114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-10
  oilseedsexcise dutystatutory interpretationmaizefiscal legislationcrushing of seeds
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the classification of maize as an "oilseed" under the Oilseeds Committee Act, 1946, for the purpose of levying excise duty on oil extracted therefrom. The appellant, a manufacturer of maize starch and by-products, challenged the imposition of cesses, arguing that maize is a foodgrain rather than an oilseed and that the extraction process involving maize germs does not constitute "crushing" within the meaning of the Act. The core legal questions were whether maize qualifies as an oilseed and whether the extraction of oil from maize germs satisfies the statutory requirement of being "crushed" in a mill. The Supreme Court held that maize is an oilseed, as it is a seed capable of germination, and the legislative intent behind the term "oilseeds" is broad, excluding only coconuts. Furthermore, the Court interpreted "crushed" broadly to include indirect extraction methods that disintegrate the seed's integrity. The Court affirmed that maize falls within the scope of the Act, dismissing the appeal and upholding the levy of excise duty on the extracted oil.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term "oilseeds" under the Oilseeds Committee Act, 1946, include maize?
  • Can the term "crushed" in the context of oil extraction be interpreted to include indirect methods of processing seeds?
  • Is a commodity that is primarily a foodgrain excluded from the definition of "oilseed" for the purposes of excise duty?
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• Messrs Pakistan Associated Construction Ltd. vs Asif H. Kazi And Another1986 SCMR 820 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-08
  ad interim relieftemporary injunctionspecific performanceconstruction contractcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a plaintiff in a pending civil suit, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing its revision petition against the denial of ad interim relief by the courts below. The dispute arose from a construction contract for the Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project, which was delayed, leading the employer to issue a cancellation notice under Contract Clause 63(1). The petitioner filed a civil suit and sought temporary injunctions under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to restrain the respondents from acting upon the notice or interfering with its equipment and site. The trial court, first appellate court, and High Court all declined to grant ad interim relief. The Supreme Court held that the interim relief sought—essentially resurrecting the contract and extending its period—was barred by statutory constraints under Section 21(a) and (d) and Section 56(f) of the Specific Relief Act 1877. The Court concluded that interim relief was rightly refused, dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, and directed the trial court to ensure expeditious disposal of the suit within six months.

  Questions settled

  • Whether interim relief keeping in abeyance the cancellation of a construction contract can be granted by a court?
  • Does Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 impose statutory constraints on granting specific performance or related interim relief for contracts of such nature?
  • Can a court grant an interim injunction to resurrect a commercial contract and extend its period of performance?
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• Messrs Pak. Crafts Emorium vs Basit Yar Khan1986 SCMR 1832 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-25
  ejectmentdefault in rentpersonal requirementsecond appealfindings of factsupreme court petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the High Court, which restored the ejectment order passed against the petitioner-tenant by the Rent Controller on the grounds of default in rent payment and personal requirement. The petitioner contended that the Rent Controller's order was vague and that personal need was not proved. The Supreme Court considered whether any question of law arose from the concurrent findings of fact and whether the High Court erred in interfering with the first appellate court's decision. The Court held that the findings were purely ones of fact, that each aspect of the case had been well considered by the High Court in second appeal, and that no question of law arose. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in rent matters where no substantial question of law is made out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact in an ejectment matter arising from rent proceedings?
  • Does a second appeal lie on pure questions of fact in rent restriction cases?
  • Whether default in payment of rent and personal requirement constitute valid grounds for ejectment of a tenant?
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• Messrs Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Limited vs Muhammad1986 SCMR 1071 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-08-21
  industrial relationsgrievance applicationsuo motu revisionservice of summonsdismissal in defaultwrit jurisdictionfostering justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind dismissing the petitioner company's constitutional petition, which had challenged an order of the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal setting aside the dismissal in default of a respondent employee's grievance application and remanding the matter. The core legal questions involved whether a party could move the Labour Appellate Tribunal to exercise its suo motu revisional jurisdiction under section 38(3-a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969, and whether the amendment conferring such revisional power applied retrospectively to prior orders. The Supreme Court held that while parties have no right to file a revision, there is no bar preventing the Tribunal from acting upon information brought by a party, and further declined to examine the retrospective applicability of the amendment because the original order of the Labour Court dismissing the grievance application was vitiated by illegal service of summons contrary to the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Upholding the High Court's view, the Supreme Court affirmed that writ relief may be refused where the impugned order fosters the cause of justice and rights a wrong.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party move the Labour Appellate Tribunal to exercise its suo motu revisional jurisdiction under section 38(3-a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969?
  • Does service of summons on a female member of a party's family comply with Order V Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • May a High Court refuse constitutional relief in writ jurisdiction where an impugned tribunal order rights a wrong and fosters the cause of justice?
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• Messrs Northern Traders Ltd. vs Mst. Nafisa1986 SCMR 1388 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-04
  leave to appealsecond appealevictiondefault in payment of rentre-assessment of evidencequestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner-company filed a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which had accepted a second appeal and restored an eviction order against the petitioner on the ground of default in rent. The petitioner was a tenant of the disputed premises purchased by the respondent. After receiving a notice of transfer of ownership, the petitioner claimed to have sent four months' rent by cheque to the address specified by the respondent. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, but the first appellate court reversed this finding upon re-assessing the evidence and held that the respondent failed to dispute the receipt of the cheque. The High Court, in second appeal, interfered with this factual finding. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court re-assessing evidence and interfering with a conclusive finding of fact by the first appellate court in second appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised important questions of law requiring consideration, and directed that the stay already granted shall continue.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court re-assess evidence and interfere with a conclusive finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court in a second appeal?
  • Whether the dispatch of rent by cheque to the address provided in the landlord's notice constitutes a valid tender of rent?
  • Does a failure to tender rent to the previous landlord prior to receiving notice of ownership amount to default under rent laws?
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• Messrs North Western Hotel vs Begum Sultana Ahmad1986 SCMR 1284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ejectmentoption for renewallease agreementbona fide requirementcontractual tenancystatutory tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from an ejectment proceeding initiated by the respondent landlady against the appellant tenant firm occupying commercial premises under a lease agreement dated 29th September, 1972. The core legal question is whether the tenancy was validly subsisting at the time of the ejectment application so as to bar the landlord's claim for bona fide personal requirement, based on an option for renewal clause requiring one month's clear notice. The Supreme Court held that an option for renewal of a lease must be exercised strictly within the stipulated time limit, otherwise it lapses, and failure to give the requisite one month's clear notice meant the contractual tenancy had expired, rendering the ruling in Mrs. Zehra Begum v. Messrs Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. inapplicable. The key principle laid down is that time is of the essence when exercising a contractual option for the renewal of a lease, and failure to strictly comply with the notice requirements terminates the contractual tenancy, allowing the landlord to seek ejectment on the ground of bona fide personal use.

  Questions settled

  • Must an option for renewal of a lease be exercised strictly within the time limit prescribed by the agreement?
  • Does the failure to give the requisite clear notice for renewal cause the contractual tenancy to expire?
  • Can a tenant invoke the protection against personal requirement ejectment when the lease agreement has expired due to non-renewal?
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• Messrs Nishat Mills Ltd. vs The Superintendent of Central Excise, And Other1986 SCMR 1476(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-11
  leave to appealexcise rebatedocumentary evidenceindustrial machinerystatutory compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court regarding the entitlement of Messrs Nishat Mills Limited to claim a rebate under the relevant excise rules. The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the documentary evidence provided—specifically a certificate detailing the number of spindles and power looms installed, dismantled, or operational at the petitioner's facility as of specific dates—constituted sufficient compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements to qualify for the claimed rebate. The High Court had previously held that the evidence was insufficient. Upon review, the Supreme Court found merit in the petitioner's argument that the provided certificate satisfied the necessary criteria for the rebate. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to further examine the interpretation of the relevant rule and the sufficiency of the evidence presented. The principle established is that where documentary evidence clearly establishes the operational status of industrial machinery as required by statute, such evidence should be deemed sufficient compliance for rebate claims.

  Questions settled

  • Does a certificate detailing the operational status of spindles and power looms constitute sufficient compliance for claiming an excise rebate?
  • Can the High Court's finding on the sufficiency of evidence for a rebate claim be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon a grant of leave to appeal?
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• Messrs National Embroidery Mills Ltd. And Others vs The Employees!'Social Security Institution, Lahore And Other1986 SCMR 363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-08
  leave to appealattendance allowancewages definitionsocial security contributionconflict of decisions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the view that 'attendance allowance', being in the nature of an incentive, forms part of 'wages' as defined under the relevant social security legislation for the purpose of making contributions to the Employees' Social Security Institution. The core legal question is whether such an attendance allowance constitutes wages under section 2(3) of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965. The Supreme Court noted a conflict of judicial views on the subject and granted leave to appeal to provide an authoritative pronouncement. The key principle established is that conflicting decisions regarding the interpretation of statutory definitions of wages in social security laws require authoritative settlement by the apex court through a regular appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does attendance allowance constitute part of wages under section 2(3) of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965?
  • Can an attendance allowance given as an incentive be subjected to contributions by the Employees' Social Security Institution?
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• Messrs Modern Comforts And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 1437 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-24
  seizure of goodssmuggled goodsCode of Criminal ProcedureCustoms Actre-seizureinfructuous appealwithdrawal of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of Criminal Appeal No. 78 of 1973 and Civil Appeal No. 109 of 1973 arising from the seizure of electronic appliances and spare parts suspected of being smuggled goods under Section 550 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Special Judge initially ordered the release of the goods to the appellants, but the High Court set aside that order in criminal revision and directed the appellants not to dispose of the returned items. Subsequently, police re-seized certain refrigerators and handed them to Customs authorities for adjudication, which was separately challenged by the appellants via a writ petition. During the Supreme Court hearing, the appellants' counsel withdrew Criminal Appeal No. 78 of 1973 to agitate the issue of re-seizure and Customs adjudication within the pending writ petition or before the relevant authorities. Additionally, Civil Appeal No. 109 of 1973 was declared infructuous because the goods had been returned and disposed of following the outcome of the writ petition. The Supreme Court dismissed both appeals accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal challenging the seizure and custody of goods under criminal procedure becomes infructuous upon the withdrawal of the appeal to pursue pending writ proceedings?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed as infructuous when the seized goods have already been returned to and disposed of by the party following separate writ proceedings?
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• Messrs Mirjina and Company Ltd. vs The Settlement Commissioner And Another1986 SCMR 813 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-22
  Permanent Transfer DeedSettlement Schemeprocedural defectlimitation of timepublic auctionevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Sind and Baluchistan dismissing a constitutional petition concerning the cancellation of a Permanent Transfer Deed for a shop. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities were justified in cancelling the appellant's Permanent Transfer Deed and ordering public auction in the absence of fraud, merely due to procedural defects and delay in the transfer application. The Supreme Court held that procedural defects in an application and a failure to use a prescribed form cannot defeat a valuable substantive right that has accrued, and that the time limit prescribed under the relevant settlement scheme is merely an enabling provision rather than a strict statutory limitation. The Court laid down the principle that procedural technicalities and time limits in administrative settlement schemes should not be used to invalidate substantive entitlements to property transfers where no fraud or statutory bar exists.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement authorities are justified in cancelling a Permanent Transfer Deed in the absence of any allegation of fraud?
  • Does the time limit mentioned in the settlement scheme operate as a strict statutory limitation for submitting an application for the transfer of property?
  • Can a procedural defect, such as filing an application on plain paper instead of a prescribed form, defeat a valuable right accrued to a claimant?
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• Messrs Lassani Brother vs The Commissioner Of Income Tax And OtherPTCL 1986 CL. 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-22
  income taxreference applicationpenaltyjurisdiction of high courtself-assessment scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's application under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law by dismissing the reference application in limine instead of answering the referred question of law regarding the sustainability of a penalty imposed under the Income-tax Act. The Supreme Court held that the appeal must be dismissed because the appellant's counsel did not press or question the power to impose the penalty before the High Court, meaning the High Court was not expected to decide the question. The key principle laid down is that a High Court is not required to answer a reference application under the Income-tax Act if the party concerned chooses not to press the point during the hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court is justified in dismissing a reference application under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 when the counsel for the applicant does not press the question of law before it?
  • Does the High Court act as an appellate court when deciding a reference application under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
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• Messrs Kuwait Airways Corporation vs Messrs Union Surgical Company1986 SCMR 890 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-11
  carriage by airlimitation periodextinguishment of rightinternational carriagecivil suit for damagesairway billconsignee refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the defendant examines whether the plaintiff's suit for damages arising out of a contract for the carriage of goods by air was barred by limitation under rule 29 of the First Schedule to the Carriage By Air (International Convention) Act, 1966. The plaintiff consigned goods from Sialkot to Dallas on 30-9-1981, and was informed on 1-11-1981 that the parcels had been delivered to the consignee. The plaintiff ultimately filed a civil suit for damages on 29-9-1984. The trial court and the High Court both held the suit to be within time, construing the starting point of limitation to be the date of final refusal or communication regarding non-acceptance. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the plaintiff was unequivocally informed of the arrival of the goods on 1-11-1981, and limitation began to run from that date, extinguishing the right to bring an action after two years under rule 29. The key principle laid down is that the statutory period of limitation for filing a suit for damages under the Carriage by Air Act commences from the date of arrival, or when the aircraft ought to have arrived, and is not extended or delayed by subsequent correspondence or the failure of the carrier to communicate a consignee's refusal to accept delivery.

  Questions settled

  • Does the two-year limitation period under rule 29 of the First Schedule to the Carriage By Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 begin to run from the date the plaintiff has notice of arrival or when the carrier finally communicates a refusal?
  • Whether subsequent correspondence or failure to notify the consignor about a consignee's refusal to accept delivery extends the limitation period under the Carriage By Air (International Convention) Act, 1966?
  • When does the right to claim damages get extinguished under rule 29 of the First Schedule to the Carriage By Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 in respect of international carriage of goods?
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• Messrs Kuwait Airways Corporation vs Messrs Jehangir Travel Corporation Rawalpindi1986 SCMR 1166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-09
  arbitration agreementinterim injunctionbank guaranteesecond revisionjurisdictioncompetency of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from an application filed before a Civil Judge to initiate arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration Act, alongside a request for an interim injunction to restrain the realization of a bank guarantee. The trial court refused the injunction. The District Judge, treating the appeal as a revision, granted the injunction. The High Court subsequently entertained and dismissed a revision against the District Judge's order. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the competency of the initial appeal. The Court held that the order passed by the Civil Judge was not appealable under the Arbitration Act, making the District Judge's treatment of the matter as a revision correct. However, the Court further held that the second revision filed before the High Court was barred under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Consequently, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the second revision, rendering its order void. The Supreme Court recalled the leave previously granted and dismissed the petition as incompetent, establishing that a second revision is barred by statute.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order refusing an interim injunction in arbitration proceedings appealable under the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Does a second revision lie against an order passed by a District Judge in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction?
  • Is a High Court order passed without jurisdiction subject to a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Messrs Khawaja Brother, Lahore And Another vs The Government Of Pakistan And OtherPTCL 1986 CL. 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-28
  import classificationcustoms dutyimport trade controlstatutory interpretationleave to appealadministrative consistency
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two Civil Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal filed by importers challenging the classification of imported 'black rubber air hoses' by Customs Authorities. The core legal question is whether the imported rubber hoses, imported in lengths of 50 meters, fall under item No. 40.09 of the Import Trade Control Schedule, specifically regarding the interpretation of rules concerning incomplete or unfinished articles that retain the essential character of the finished product. The petitioners argued that the goods should be classified under the relevant sub-head based on established rules of interpretation and previous administrative practice where similar goods were accepted under that category. The Supreme Court, finding that the matter required further consideration regarding the application of the Import Trade Control Schedule rules and the alleged inconsistent treatment by Customs Authorities, granted leave to appeal. The Court held that the issues raised regarding the classification of goods and the consistency of administrative action warranted a full hearing on the merits, allowing the petitions to proceed for further adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Does the import of rubber hoses in 50-meter lengths qualify for classification under item No. 40.09 of the Import Trade Control Schedule?
  • How should the rules of interpretation within the Import Trade Control Schedule be applied to incomplete or unfinished articles?
  • Can previous administrative treatment of similar goods by Customs Authorities be used to challenge a current classification decision?
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• Messrs Jaffar E Tayyar Co Operative Housing Society Ltd. And Others1986 SCMR 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-09
  natural justiceco-operative societymembership expulsionadministrative lawopportunity of hearingshow-cause noticewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Sindh High Court, which had quashed an order by the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, removing the respondent from membership of the appellant society. The High Court held that the removal order was void for violating principles of natural justice, specifically alleging the respondent was denied an opportunity of hearing and to produce evidence. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its factual determination regarding the denial of natural justice. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record clearly demonstrated the respondent had been served with show-cause notices, granted multiple opportunities for personal hearings, and was represented by counsel at the final inquiry. Furthermore, the respondent had failed to raise the grievance of procedural unfairness in his revision application or initial constitutional petition. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court’s finding was factually incorrect. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside, reaffirming that administrative actions are valid when the record confirms that the affected party was afforded adequate opportunity to defend themselves.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court set aside an administrative order on the ground of violation of natural justice if the record shows the party was given adequate opportunity to be heard?
  • Does the failure to raise a grievance regarding procedural fairness in a revision application preclude a party from raising it in a constitutional petition?
  • Is an order removing a member from a co-operative society valid if the member was provided show-cause notices and represented by counsel at the hearing?
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• Messrs Conforde Limited/ vs Messrs Rafique Industries Ltd. And Other1986 SCMR 473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-29
  banking recoveryinterim reliefbank guaranteestatus quoSpecial Court (Banking)preliminary decreeexecution of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for interim relief filed in a pending appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arising from proceedings under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner, a co-defendant in a recovery suit, sought to suspend the operation of a High Court judgment that had remanded a banking case for fresh decision, and further requested to restrain the respondents from encashing a bank guarantee previously furnished by the petitioner. The core legal questions involved the effect of failing to appeal a preliminary decree and the scope of the Special Court's power under the Ordinance to execute decrees in various manners. The Supreme Court granted the interim relief to the extent of maintaining the status quo regarding the bank guarantee, thereby restraining the respondents from encashing it pending the disposal of the appeal. The Court also clarified that the respondents could seek the reversal of debit entries from the Special Court, which would decide such requests on their own merits. The holding establishes that during the pendency of an appeal, interim relief may be granted to preserve the status quo regarding financial security instruments like bank guarantees.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party obtain interim relief to restrain the encashment of a bank guarantee pending the disposal of an appeal?
  • Does the failure of a party to appeal against a preliminary decree affect the subsequent proceedings in a banking recovery suit?
  • What is the scope of the power possessed by a Special Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 to execute a decree?
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• Messrs Burque Corporation Karachi And Another vs Deputy Director, Central Excise and Land Customs, Quetta And Another1986 SCMR 408 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-23
  sales tax exemptioncustoms dutyimport dutystatutory interpretationtax liabilityinfant foodtariff classification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment regarding the imposition of sales tax on imported NIDO powdered milk. The core legal question was whether NIDO qualified for a sales tax exemption under the category of milk food for infants and invalids as provided by government notifications issued under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The appellants argued that because the milk was modified with vegetable fat and vitamins, it constituted infant food. The Supreme Court held that the exemption applied only to products intended for the exclusive use of infants and invalids. Upon examining the product packaging, which advertised the milk as suitable for the whole family, the Court concluded that NIDO did not meet the criteria for exclusive infant use. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the product remained subject to sales tax. The principle established is that tax exemptions for specific categories of goods, such as infant food, require strict adherence to the intended use criteria, and products marketed for general consumption cannot claim such exemptions.

  Questions settled

  • Is NIDO powdered milk exempt from sales tax as food for infants and invalids?
  • What criteria must a product meet to qualify for a tax exemption designated for the exclusive use of infants?
  • Does the Federal Government have the authority to impose sales tax on imported goods under the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
  • Can a product marketed for general family consumption qualify for a tax exemption designated specifically for infant food?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ayesha Textile Mills Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Commerce, Islamabad And Other1986 SCMR 836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-09
  War Risks InsuranceAppellate remedyWrit jurisdictionRemandExhaustion of remediesStatutory appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against orders issued by an Enquiry Officer under the War Risks Insurance Ordinance, 1971, which assessed the insurable value of goods and a factory, ordering the payment of evaded premiums, surcharges, and penal interest. The petitioner had initially challenged these assessment orders directly through constitution petitions in the Lahore High Court rather than pursuing the statutory appellate remedy. Following the precedent established in Pakistan Chrome Mines Ltd v. The Enquiry Officer, War Risk Insurance (Sind and Baluchistan), the Supreme Court addressed the procedural irregularity of bypassing the appellate forum. The Court held that where an appeal was not filed against the Enquiry Officer's order, the appropriate course of action is to remand the matter to the designated appellate authority for a decision on the merits. Consequently, the Court directed that the pending constitution petitions be treated as appeals against the Enquiry Officer's orders and remanded the cases to the Ministry of Commerce, Insurance Wing, for adjudication on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitution petition filed against an assessment order under the War Risks Insurance Ordinance, 1971 be treated as an appeal?
  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to remand a matter to the appellate authority when the petitioner bypassed the statutory appellate process by filing a writ petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Anwar Industry Ltd. vs Mst. Rehmat Bibi And Other1986 SCMR 1435 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-24
  Letters Patent Appealbona fide purchasercollusionlis pendensSection 12(2) CPCwrit petitionland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arising from proceedings in the High Court involving a dispute over land. The central legal questions involve the standing of a party to compromise and withdraw a Letters Patent Appeal after having sold the subject property during the pendency of a writ petition, and whether such an act prejudices the rights of a bona fide purchaser. Furthermore, the Court addresses whether the High Court was under a mandatory obligation to conduct an inquiry under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 upon allegations of collusion between the parties, and the applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 at the appellate stage in the context of alleged collusive proceedings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these issues, confirming an interim order while prohibiting further construction on the property pending the final disposal of the appeal, thereby preserving the status quo.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party retain the right to compromise and withdraw a Letters Patent Appeal after selling the subject land during the pendency of a writ petition?
  • Is the High Court obligated to conduct an inquiry under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when allegations of collusion are brought to its notice?
  • Does Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 apply at the appellate stage in cases involving collusive proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited vs Syed Wahid Hussain1986 SCMR 946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-01
  personal requirementevictionbona fide needlandlord and tenantburden of proofhigher rent demandSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court affirming an order of eviction against the petitioner-bank on the ground of bona fide personal occupation by the respondent-landlord for establishing a medical store for his son. The tenancy of two shops was terminated by notice, and the landlord subsequently filed an eviction application. The tenant resisted, claiming the renewal option was exercised and that the eviction request was mala fide due to a demand for increased rent. Both the Rent Controller and the High Court found the landlord's personal requirement to be genuine and supported by evidence regarding his son's qualification in pharmacy. The Supreme Court held that a mere demand for higher rent does not by itself establish bad faith, and the burden lies on the tenant to prove that the ejectment application is a colourable device when the landlord independently establishes bona fide requirement. Finding no legal infirmity in the concurrent findings of the lower forums, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's demand for higher rent prior to filing an ejectment application automatically render the ground of personal requirement mala fide?
  • Where a landlord independently establishes a bona fide personal requirement, upon whom does the burden lie to prove that the ejectment application is a colourable device?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and the High Court regarding personal requirement be interfered with by the Supreme Court without showing legal error?
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• Messrs a And B Food Industries vs Commissioner Of Sales Tax. Ltd., And OtherPTCL 1986 CL. 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-25
  sales tax refundvegetable gheecapacity dutytax exemptionassessment yearsCentral Excises and Salt Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a private limited company manufacturing biscuits, sought a refund of sales tax paid on vegetable ghee consumed in the production process for the assessment years 1968-69, 1969-70, and 1970-71. The petitioner argued that because vegetable ghee was subject to capacity duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and subsequently exempted via a 1967 notification, they were entitled to a refund. The Sales Tax Officer rejected this claim, reasoning that since no sales tax was actually paid on the vegetable ghee due to the exemption, no refund could be granted. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal initially ruled in favor of the petitioner, but the High Court reversed this decision, answering in the negative regarding the Tribunal's justification for ordering a refund. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying the core legal question as whether a manufacturer is entitled to a refund of sales tax on raw materials consumed in production when those materials were exempted from sales tax and suffered no such tax burden. The Court deemed this an important question of law requiring an authoritative decision.

  Questions settled

  • Is a manufacturer entitled to a refund of sales tax on raw materials consumed in production if those materials were exempted from sales tax and suffered no tax burden?
  • Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is justified in directing a refund of sales tax on goods that did not suffer any sales tax liability?
  Read full judgment →
• Member, Board of Revenue vs Muhammad Iqbal Rathore1986 SCMR 905 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-22
  limitation periodcertified copypetition for leave to appealservice tribunalservice mattercomputation of time
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a service matter arising from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government against the judgment of the Punjab Services Tribunal dated 13-11-1983, which had accepted the respondent's appeal. The core legal question raised was whether a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government is barred by time when a certified copy of the impugned judgment was already received by the petitioner through the Service Tribunal under rule 21(1) of the relevant rules, and whether the petitioner can still exclude the time spent in obtaining a fresh certified copy from the copying agency under section 12 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the case of first impression requires detailed consideration regarding the calculation of limitation and the applicability of section 12 of the Limitation Act when a copy has already been received directly from the Tribunal. The key principle laid down is that the statutory right to deduct time spent in obtaining a certified copy from the copying agency requires examination to determine if it is ousted by the receipt of an official copy under tribunal rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal is barred by time if a certified copy was already received under rule 21(1) of the Tribunal rules?
  • Can a party deduct the time spent in obtaining a fresh certified copy from the copying agency under section 12 of the Limitation Act when an official copy was already supplied by the Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehtab Ali And Others vs Muhammad Siddique And Another1986 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-27
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertycompensation formwrit petitionleave to appealmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing in limine a writ petition filed by the petitioners. The dispute pertains to the transfer of an evacuee shop in Sahiwal Town. The predecessor of the petitioners, Basit Ali, had originally been transferred the shop on the basis of a compensation form, though a discrepancy existed regarding the property number, which he contended was inadvertently stated as 70/2 instead of 69/2-A. Following earlier remand proceedings, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner concluded that possession was not proved and transferred the shop to respondent Muhammad Siddique under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' subsequent constitutional petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the lower settlement authorities and the High Court had failed to properly consider material documentary and oral evidence, including the testimony of the rehabilitation inspector and survey records regarding the correct property number and actual possession. Finding that the orders were based on misreading and non-reading of evidence, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and ordered status quo to be maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a finding of fact by a settlement authority based on the misreading and non-reading of material evidence can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does a discrepancy in property numbers on a compensation form vitiate the transfer when contemporaneous survey and official records establish actual possession?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in dismissing in limine a writ petition where the orders of the tribunal below suffer from a failure to consider material evidence?
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• Mehnga vs Nawab Din And Other1986 SCMR 1023 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-03
  substitution of legal representativescondonation of delaysufficient causeabatement of appealdeceased appellant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an unprosecuted matter where the appellant passed away on 3rd March 1980, and an application for substitution of legal representatives was filed belatedly on 29th July 1985 without showing sufficient cause or justifying the inordinate delay of nearly five years. The core legal question concerned whether such prolonged delay in seeking substitution without valid justification could be condoned. The Court held that the delay could not be condoned, noting that the excuses regarding illiteracy, lack of knowledge, and counsel were unsubstantiated and omitted from the condonation application. The established principle is that an inordinate delay in filing a substitution application without showing sufficient cause renders the appeal defective and imperfect, resulting in its disposal in the absence of the deceased appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inordinate delay of nearly five years in filing an application for substitution of legal representatives can be condoned without showing sufficient cause?
  • Does an appeal abate or become imperfect when no timely steps are taken to substitute the legal representatives of a deceased appellant?
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• Mazharul Haq vs Muhammad Shafiq And Other1986 SCMR 696 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-20
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionco-sharerrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsminor's property rightspermanent settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a suit for possession by pre-emption filed by the petitioner, claiming a superior right as a co-sharer in the suit land. The trial court and the first appellate court decreed the suit in favor of the petitioner. However, the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, set aside these concurrent findings, concluding that the defendants, despite being minors, had permanently settled in the village where the land was purchased, thereby qualifying for the exemption under the pre-emption law. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the defendants' residence and the validity of the land purchase. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the evidence supported the conclusion that the defendants' guardian had permanently settled in the village. The Court affirmed that the law of pre-emption does not bar a minor from purchasing land for house construction, thus allowing the exemption provided under the relevant statute. The petition was consequently dismissed as meritless.

  Questions settled

  • Does the law of pre-emption bar a minor from purchasing land for the construction of a house?
  • Can a High Court in revision interfere with concurrent findings of fact if the evidence supports the conclusion reached by the High Court?
  • Does the purchase of land by a minor for the construction of a house qualify for exemption under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Saeed Qureshi vs Government of the Punjab Through Secretary, Irrigation And Power Department, Lahore And 49 Other1986 SCMR 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-30
  service lawseniority disputeres judicatalimitationconstructive res judicataservice tribunalcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three consolidated appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding seniority disputes among Executive Engineers. The core legal questions were whether the Tribunal correctly applied the principles of res judicata and limitation to the appellants' claims, and whether it properly interpreted the applicable Service Rules. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the appeals. Regarding the first appellant, the Court affirmed that his claims were barred by the principle of constructive res judicata, as he attempted to re-litigate issues that were either previously decided or could have been raised in earlier proceedings. Regarding the other two appellants, the Court upheld the Tribunal's finding that their challenges to the seniority lists were hopelessly time-barred, noting that no sufficient justification was provided to condone a six-year delay. The key principle laid down is that service appeals cannot be used to circumvent the finality of previous adjudications through miscellaneous applications, nor can significant delays in challenging seniority lists be condoned without valid justification.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party revive previously decided issues in a service appeal through a miscellaneous application?
  • Does the principle of constructive res judicata apply to matters that could have been raised in earlier service litigation?
  • Is a Service Tribunal's refusal to condone a significant delay in filing an appeal subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the jurisdiction of a Service Tribunal extend to events occurring prior to July 1969?
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• Matloob Khawar And Others vs Malik Karam Ilahi And Other1986 SCMR 1254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-06
  inherent jurisdictionquashment of proceedingsapprobate and reprobateacquittalcriminal revisionabuse of processleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had remanded a criminal case to the trial court following an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioners, initially acquitted by the trial court under Section 249-A, had their acquittal set aside by the Sessions Court in revision. Subsequently, the petitioners invoked the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A to challenge the Sessions Court's order. The High Court, treating the matter as a challenge to the acquittal, remanded the case for further proceedings. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise such powers of remand under Section 561-A. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that because the petitioners themselves invoked the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 561-A, they were estopped from challenging the High Court's authority to pass necessary orders to secure the ends of justice. The Court declined to decide the broader question regarding the scope of Section 561-A in correcting revisional orders, emphasizing the principle that a party cannot approbate and reprobate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who invokes the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 subsequently challenge the court's authority to pass orders necessary to secure the ends of justice?
  • Does the principle of approbate and reprobate prevent a petitioner from challenging a High Court order passed in proceedings they themselves initiated?
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• Mastak vs Lal And Other1986 SCMR 764 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-08
  leave to appealjurisdictionmortgage redemptionMajlis-e-ShooraFrontier Crimes Regulationrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition regarding the redemption of mortgaged land. The core legal question concerns whether revisional proceedings pending before the Commissioner stood transferred to the Majlis-e-Shoora upon the enforcement of the Baluchistan Civil Disputes (Shariat Application) Regulation, 1976, and whether the petitioner was estopped from challenging the Commissioner's jurisdiction having invoked it himself. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the question of the Commissioner's jurisdiction after the constitution of the Majlis-e-Shoora is of considerable public importance and warrants a full hearing. The key principle laid down is that subsequent legislation taking away jurisdiction can be raised regardless of a party having initially invoked the prior forum, and proper constitution of statutory bodies affects the transfer of pending proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Did pending revisional proceedings before the Commissioner stand transferred to the Majlis-e-Shoora upon the enforcement of the Baluchistan Civil Disputes (Shariat Application) Regulation, 1976?
  • Can a party be estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of an authority if subsequent legislation has taken away that jurisdiction?
  • Whether the Majlis-e-Shoora can be deemed properly constituted when no Chairman has been notified?
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• Marghoob Alam And Another vs Shamas Din And Another1986 SCMR 303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-22
  quashing of criminal proceedingsinherent powersabuse of processcriminal breach of trustcheatingforgerycivil dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged an order of the Lahore High Court which refused to quash criminal proceedings initiated against them under sections 406, 420, and 468 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners argued that the dispute arose from a business agreement and was essentially civil in nature, contending that the criminal prosecution constituted an abuse of the court's process. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly refused to exercise its inherent powers to quash the proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the complaint filed by the respondent disclosed a prima facie case of criminal offences. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the inherent powers under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are designed to prevent the abuse of the process of the court, but are not intended to stifle legitimate criminal prosecutions. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as the allegations in the complaint warranted a trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the complaint discloses a prima facie criminal offence?
  • Does the existence of a parallel civil suit automatically render criminal proceedings an abuse of the process of the court?
  • What is the scope of the High Court's inherent powers under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the stifling of prosecutions?
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• Maqbool Ahmad vs The Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab1986 SCMR 1371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-09
  leave to appealconstitutional petitiontemporary leaseland grant schemeclean hands doctrineparallel litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition relating to a Land Grant Scheme under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912. The petitioner held a temporary lease of land which was allegedly subject to extension and future grant of proprietary rights through subsequent notifications. Meanwhile, the disputed land was allotted to the respondent-respondents as alternate land under the Grow More Food Scheme. The petitioner challenged this allotment unsuccessfully before the revenue authorities and subsequently the High Court. The core question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to interference in discretionary constitutional jurisdiction despite having instituted parallel civil litigation which was abandoned. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not approach the courts with clean hands due to the abandonment of multiple prior civil suits concerning the same subject matter. The Court laid down the principle that the jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal is highly discretionary and will be withheld where a party engages in parallel, abandoned litigation and fails to act with utmost good faith.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the dismissal of a constitutional petition when the petitioner has pursued and abandoned parallel civil suits regarding the same subject-matter?
  • Does a temporary lessee acquire a vested right to extension of lease and proprietary rights based on subsequent notifications to preclude alternate allotment under the Grow More Food Scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad Khan And Others vs Moin Nawaz Jang And Other1986 SCMR 1859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-24
  leave to appealconstitutional petitionurban settlementauction purchasertransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which allowed a constitutional petition concerning an urban settlement dispute. The respondents had purchased a large mansion in an auction, while the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest subsequently obtained a transfer of a disputed portion (a canteen) in his possession through a P.T.O. and P.T.D. The High Court set aside the transfer in favor of the petitioners' predecessor, holding that the disputed portion was part of the mansion previously transferred to the respondents and that the P.T.D. had been issued to them earlier. In the Supreme Court, the petitioners raised a new plea regarding the reduction and lack of demarcation of the mansion's area. The Supreme Court held that a new factual point not urged before the High Court cannot be permitted to be raised at the leave to appeal stage. Consequently, the court found no force in the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a new factual point not urged before the High Court can be allowed to be raised at the leave to appeal stage?
  • Does an auction purchaser hold a superior claim to property transferred via P.T.D. compared to a subsequent claimant?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad And Others vs Mian Muhammad Ismail And Other1986 SCMR 310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-09
  specific performanceagreement to sellsecond appealconcurrent findings of factmisreading of evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had accepted a regular second appeal, set aside the concurrent judgments of the two lower courts, and decreed the plaintiff's suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The core legal question concerned the limits of the High Court's jurisdiction in interfering with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was fully justified in reversing the findings of fact because the lower courts had misread and failed to consider the entire evidence properly, and the legal results flowing from the evidence were not correctly given effect to. The Supreme Court affirmed that where concurrent findings are based on misreading and non-reading of evidence, they are amenable to reversal in second appeal, and consequently dismissed the petitions for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts be reversed by the High Court in a second appeal?
  • Does the High Court have the power to interfere with findings of fact when the lower courts have misread or failed to consider the evidence?
  • What is the effect of a plaintiff discharging the initial onus of proving a prima facie case in a civil matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Mansha vs The State1986 SCMR 543 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-06
  murderdeath sentencemitigating circumstancesinfluence of elderscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, wherein leave was granted exclusively to consider the question of sentence regarding the appellant, Mansha, who argued he acted under the influence of his father while committing double murder. The appellant had been convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to death on two counts by the Sessions Judge, which was upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the appellant's age of thirty years and the initial exchange of abuses over destroyed fodder constituted mitigating circumstances to warrant a reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court held that the principle of influence of elders is confined to offenders of impressionable ages, and given the appellant's age and direct fatal Barchhi blows, no mitigating circumstance existed. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the influence of a father can be considered a mitigating circumstance to reduce a death sentence for a thirty-year-old offender?
  • Does an exchange of abuses over damaged fodder constitute a mitigating circumstance for the imposition of a lesser sentence in a murder case?
  • To what category of offenders is the legal principle of the influence of elders strictly confined?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Waris Khan and Another vs Ishtiaq alias Naga and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-08
  right of private defenceself-defencesection 304 part Iappraisal of accused statementimminent dangerweigh in golden scalesacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from cross-appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by both the complainant and the convict against a Lahore High Court judgment that altered the convict's sentence from Section 302 to Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 on grounds of exceeding the right of private defence. The core legal questions pertained to the proper evaluation of an accused's statement when prosecution evidence is completely rejected, and whether the convict had exceeded his right of self-defence. The Supreme Court held that where prosecution evidence is disbelieved in its entirety, the statement of the accused must be accepted substantially unless contradicted by established facts. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that a person acting under imminent threat is not expected to weigh their defensive reaction in golden scales, and the right of private defence persists as long as reasonable apprehension of danger continues. Finding that the convict acted within his lawful right of self-defence while facing an active threat, the Supreme Court allowed his appeal and acquitted him.

  Questions settled

  • How must an accused person's statement of self-defence be evaluated when the prosecution evidence is disbelieved entirely?
  • Is a person facing an imminent threat expected to weigh the proportion of their defensive reaction in golden scales?
  • When does the right of private defence of the body commence and for how long does it continue?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Rehmatullah And Another vs Mian Muhammad Shafi And Another1986 SCMR 496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-11
  settlement lawsreview proceedingstransfer of propertydisplaced personsjurisdictional defectvisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from an order of the Lahore High Court maintaining a single judge's decision that declared a Settlement and Claims Commissioner's order without lawful authority. The core dispute involves the transfer of a residential portion of a property in Lahore under the settlement laws. The appellants, who were locals in possession, challenged the transfer of the middle residential portion to respondent Muhammad Shafi, who had only applied for a shop via a C.S. Form and was not entitled to the residential unit. The Supreme Court considered whether review orders could be passed during the pendency of a revision application under Section 21(1)(c) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Court held that the review order passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner during the pendency of the revision suffered from a jurisdictional defect and could not form the basis of a valid transfer. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders and upheld the Settlement and Claims Commissioner's order, laying down that statutory bars on review during pending revisions must be strictly observed and jurisdictional defects can be raised at any stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order in review can be passed during the pendency of a revision application under Section 21(1)(c) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can a question of jurisdiction be raised at any stage of the proceedings?
  • Is a person who only applied for a shop via a C.S. Form entitled to the transfer of a separate residential portion?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Ramzan vs Messrs General Iron Stores And Other1986 SCMR 1693 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-29
  bona fide personal requirementlandlord and tenantevictionrent controlleave to appealdisclosure of facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a landlord's constitutional petition seeking the eviction of a tenant on the grounds of bona fide personal requirement. The Rent Controller had initially allowed the eviction, but the appellate court and the High Court reversed this decision, citing the landlord's lack of bona fides. The lower courts based their findings on three factors: the landlord's operation of a different business in rented premises, the fact that his son and son-in-law occupied other properties owned by him, and his failure to disclose these circumstances in his initial application or examination-in-chief. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether these specific circumstances legally bar a landlord from seeking eviction for personal use. The Court further sought to clarify whether a landlord is legally obligated to proactively disclose all such facts regarding other properties or business activities in their initial eviction application or during their examination-in-chief to establish bona fide personal requirement.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's ownership of other properties occupied by family members constitute a legal bar to seeking eviction on the grounds of personal requirement?
  • Does the fact that a landlord operates a business in other rented premises bar them from seeking eviction of a tenant for personal use?
  • Is a landlord legally required to disclose all facts regarding other properties or business activities in their initial eviction application or examination-in-chief to prove bona fide personal need?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Rafique vs Tehseen Qureshi1986 SCMR 1539 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-27
  Superdariinterim custodyseized propertycriminal proceedingspossessionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the interim custody (Superdari) of a motor vehicle during the pendency of criminal proceedings. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in granting the custody of the vehicle to the respondent, Tehseen Qureshi, from whom the vehicle had been seized by law enforcement. The Supreme Court observed that the vehicle was admittedly taken into possession from the respondent, who claimed to be a purchaser of the vehicle. While the petitioner contested the respondent's status as a bona fide purchaser, the Court held that the fact of possession at the time of seizure provided sufficient justification for the High Court's order. The Supreme Court found no legal infirmity or justification for interference with the High Court's decision and consequently dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. The principle affirmed is that, in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, the interim custody of a seized vehicle is appropriately granted to the person from whose possession it was originally recovered.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fact that a vehicle was seized from a person's possession justify granting them interim custody (Superdari) during pending criminal proceedings?
  • Is a dispute regarding the bona fide purchase of a vehicle sufficient grounds to overturn an order of Superdari granted to the person from whom the vehicle was seized?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Ashraf vs Mst. Afroden Bi And Other1986 SCMR 568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-03
  Pre-emptionCantonment ActAdditional EvidenceSecond AppealConcurrent FindingsLocal CommissionerDemarcation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed his pre-emption suit, holding the subject land was situated within the extended limits of the Campbellpur Cantonment and thus not pre-emptible. The core legal questions concerned whether the High Court erred in setting aside concurrent findings of fact by admitting additional evidence via a Local Commissioner's report, and whether the notification extending the Cantonment limits was validly issued. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its discretion to admit additional evidence to resolve a material factual omission where previous reports were defective. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a notification issued under the Cantonment Act is presumed valid unless proven otherwise. Consequently, the land fell within the Cantonment limits, triggering the bar on pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The Supreme Court concluded that the factual controversy was settled by the accepted report of the Local Commissioner and refused leave to appeal, upholding the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court admit additional evidence in second appeal to resolve a material factual omission?
  • Is a notification issued under the Cantonment Act presumed to be valid unless the contrary is shown?
  • Does the inclusion of land within a Cantonment area bar the right of pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Mir Bashi And Others vs Haji Allah Khan And Other1986 SCMR 562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-09
  leave to appealrevenue recordWajibul ArzShamilat landtitle and ownershipadditional evidencerevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment and decree of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' revision petition concerning a dispute over Shamilat lands in village Naryab, District Kohat. The core legal questions involve whether mere entries in the revenue record and Wajibul Arz can form the basis of title without supporting title deeds, mutations, or conveyances, whether revenue records can be altered to the detriment of original owners without notice, and whether the High Court acting in revisional jurisdiction possesses the power to record additional evidence directly rather than remanding the case to the trial court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these contentions, directing that the auction amount regarding the sale of Mazari by the Government be invested in a Khas Deposit. The key principle noted is that the evidentiary value of revenue entries and the scope of revisional jurisdiction regarding the recording of additional evidence require thorough examination by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Can mere entries in the revenue record and Wajibul Arz form the basis of title without supporting title deeds or conveyances?
  • Whether revenue records can be changed to the detriment of original owners without notice, knowledge, or consent?
  • Does the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court empower it to record additional evidence directly rather than remanding the case to the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Katoo And 3 Others vs Allah Bakhsh And 2 Other1986 SCMR 1363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-26
  pre-emptionsecond appealconcurrent findingsleave to appealquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court dismissing the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal in limine regarding a pre-emption suit. The core legal question is whether concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts can be disturbed in a second appeal where such findings are based on evidence. The Supreme Court held that a concurrent finding of fact based on evidence, regardless of how meagre that evidence may be, cannot be disturbed in a second appeal. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless a defect such as the misreading of evidence or omission to consider material evidence is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a concurrent finding of fact be disturbed in a Second Appeal if it is based on evidence?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in the absence of misreading or omission of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Iftikhar Ali vs Pakistan Through Secretary To Government Of Pakistan Establishment Division1986 SCMR 1434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-21
  Service TribunaljurisdictionremandMartial Law Regulation 58dismissal from serviceArticle 270
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an order of the Service Tribunal, Government of Pakistan, which dismissed the civil servant's appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction under the validation provisions of Article 270(4) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The petitioner had been suspended under M.L.R. 58 in 1969 and subsequently dismissed from service in 1970.

  The core legal question was whether the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal to entertain an appeal against a dismissal order was ousted by Article 270(4) of the Constitution.

  Following its precedent set in Civil Appeal No. K-1 of 1978, the Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred in holding that its jurisdiction was ousted by Article 270(4). Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the matter to the Tribunal for decision on the merits regarding all questions of law and fact.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal is ousted by the validation provisions of Article 270(4) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Gul Hussain vs Muhammad Ayub And Other1986 SCMR 1349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-24
  pre-emptiondismissal of suitproduction of evidenceadjournmentcivil procedurerevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a suit for possession by pre-emption. The petitioner's suit was originally dismissed by the trial court under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, due to the petitioner's failure to produce evidence despite being granted opportunities to do so. The appellate court and the High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's appeal and revision petition in limine. The core legal question was whether a court, when refusing a request for an adjournment under Order XVII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, is restricted from dismissing the suit under Order XVII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the trial court acted within its authority. The ratio established is that where a party fails to produce evidence despite previous adjournments, the court is empowered to proceed under Order XVII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and dismiss the suit for failure to produce evidence, rather than being limited solely to refusing the adjournment request.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court dismiss a suit under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if a party fails to produce evidence after being granted adjournments?
  • Does a court have the power to dismiss a suit when refusing a request for adjournment under Order XVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Makhni Bi vs Muhammad Yasin and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-07
  enhancement of sentencemurdersudden fightleave to appealmisplaced leniencycriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Mst. Makhni Bi seeking the enhancement of sentences of the respondents who were tried for the murder of Ashiq Hussain arising out of a sudden fight. The trial court convicted the respondents under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Upon appeal, the High Court altered the convictions, reducing the sentences for the accused to varying terms under sections 304, 323, and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court examined the participation of the accused, finding sufficient grounds to maintain the dismissal of the petition regarding one respondent, but granted leave to appeal to consider the propriety and enhancement of sentences for Muhammad Yasin and Muhammad Ayyub due to the brutal nature of the attack over a trivial matter. The Court laid down that misplaced leniency in awarding minor sentences in violent crimes undermines public confidence in the administration of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sentences awarded for culpable homicide and hurt are sufficient to meet the ends of justice in a sudden fight?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted for the enhancement of sentences where the High Court has reduced them?
  • Whether the participation of an accused who sustained injuries during the same occurrence can be doubted?
  Read full judgment →
• Makhmad And Another vs Shadi Khan Through His Legal Heirs1986 SCMR 1018 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-05
  revisional jurisdictionreappraisal of evidencemisreading of evidenceremand of casescope of revisioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had set aside concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts regarding the validity of a property sale. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, could reappraise evidence and decide the matter itself rather than remanding the case upon finding that lower courts had ignored or misread vital evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that when a High Court identifies that lower courts have ignored or misread material evidence, it falls under the scope of Section 115(c), allowing the High Court to pass any order it deems fit, including correcting the error directly rather than mandating a remand. The principle laid down is that the High Court possesses the discretion to either remand a case or resolve the matter itself upon discovering material errors in the lower courts' appreciation of evidence, thereby avoiding unnecessary litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court, under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, reappraise evidence in its revisional jurisdiction?
  • Does the High Court have the discretion to decide a case itself rather than remanding it when it finds that lower courts have ignored or misread material evidence?
  • Is the High Court's power to pass 'such order as it thinks fit' under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 limited to remanding the case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mak Construction' Limited vs National Bank of Pakistan1986 SCMR 1788 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-01
  arbitration awardobjection petitionrule of courtmisconduct of arbitratorconstruction contractconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute between a construction company and the National Bank of Pakistan regarding a contract for constructing a building in Gujranwala. Following differences over whether the construction was to be completed in phases, the matter was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator rejected the petitioner's claim, prompting the petitioner to file an objection petition before the Senior Civil Judge, Lahore. The trial court dismissed the objections and made the award the Rule of the Court, holding that the objections concerned questions of fact and did not constitute misconduct by the arbitrator. The High Court dismissed the appeal, finding no misreading of evidence and noting that the petitioner never pressed for framing issues or adducing evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the concurrent findings of the courts below, holding that the factual determinations of the arbitrator were correct and that there was no merit in the petition. The Court laid down the principle that courts will not interfere with an arbitrator's factual findings unless misconduct or misreading of evidence is clearly established.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil court interfere with an arbitrator's findings on questions of fact in the absence of misconduct or misreading of evidence?
  • Is a party entitled to object to the non-framing of issues by the trial court if it failed to press for the framing of issues or the adducing of evidence during the proceedings?
  • Whether concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court upholding an arbitration award can be overturned by the Supreme Court without proof of jurisdictional error or material irregularity?
  Read full judgment →
• Major Retd. Sultan Ahmad Khan vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan And Another1986 SCMR 1847 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-25
  compulsory retirementservice tribunalcommercial pilot licenceleave to appealill-health
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his compulsory retirement from service on the ground of ill-health. The core legal question concerns whether the compulsory retirement of the petitioner—an Operational Manager in the Plant Protection Department—was justified due to the non-renewal of his commercial pilot licence on medical grounds, and whether his duties were distinguishable from those of a co-employee whose appeal had been previously dismissed. The Supreme Court held that since the points involved were identical to those in a connected pending matter where leave to appeal had already been granted, leave to appeal should likewise be granted in the present case. The Court ordered that both appeals be heard together on the existing record with liberty to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether compulsory retirement from service is justified when an employee is unable to renew a commercial pilot licence required for the post due to ill-health?
  • Does an Operational Manager whose duties allegedly involve managerial functions stand on a different footing regarding the necessity of holding a commercial pilot licence?
  • Should appeals involving identical legal questions and arising from the same department be heard together by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Major Abdul Latif And Another vs Land Acquisition Collector And Other1986 SCMR 1228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-06
  land acquisitioncompensationunrebutted evidenceleave to appealvaluation of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which set aside the enhanced compensation awarded by the Additional District Judge for houses acquired for the Tarbela Dam. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court erred in restoring the Land Acquisition Collector's valuation based on an unproduced report, despite the respondent-department failing to produce any rebuttal evidence before the trial court where the petitioners' evidence remained unrebutted. The Supreme Court held that the contention raised significant force and granted leave to appeal, noting that the respondent-department's failure to produce evidence or the underlying report before the trial court rendered the High Court's reliance improper. The key principle laid down is that where a party fails to produce evidence in rebuttal before the trial court, the unrebutted evidence of the opposing party cannot be lightly disregarded on the basis of unproduced departmental reports.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can rely on a report not produced in evidence before the trial court?
  • What is the legal effect of a party failing to produce rebuttal evidence before the trial court?
  • Can the valuation determined by a Land Acquisition Collector be restored when the opposing party leads no evidence in court?
  Read full judgment →
• Maj. Mehboob Hussain vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Plots) And 2 Other1986 SCMR 368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-07
  urban settlementwrit jurisdictiondiscretionary relieftransfer of propertypending proceedingsrepeal of lawfraud and forgery
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a dispute over the transfer of an urban plot between the petitioner and respondents, both claiming entitlement through separate auction processes. The petitioner, holding a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) and Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.), challenged the jurisdiction of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Plots) to entertain the respondents' application for transfer documents, arguing that the relevant settlement law had been repealed and the respondents' claim was neither pending nor genuine. Conversely, the respondents contended that they had completed necessary formalities and their case remained pending before the Settlement Authorities at the time of repeal. Both parties alleged fraud and forgery against each other regarding the documents supporting their respective claims. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's writ petition, refusing to interfere in its discretionary jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that given the conflicting factual allegations of fraud and the complexity surrounding the status of the pending proceedings, the High Court's refusal to grant relief was unexceptionable. The petition was dismissed, as no justification for interference was established.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the discretion to refuse relief in a writ petition concerning disputed property transfers involving allegations of fraud?
  • Can a Deputy Settlement Commissioner proceed with an application for transfer documents after the repeal of the relevant settlement law?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Khan Sheerani vs The State1986 PLD Supreme Court 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-01
  leave to appealappreciation of evidenceinterested witnessdying declarationcorroboratory evidencecriminal appealocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a High Court judgment that modified the petitioner’s conviction from Section 302 to Section 304-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner contends that the High Court erred by upholding the conviction based solely on the testimony of one eye-witness, despite the trial court having disbelieved the dying declaration and other eye-witnesses. Furthermore, the petitioner argues that the sole eye-witness was an interested party and that the lack of incriminating recovery or other corroboratory evidence renders the conviction unsafe. The Supreme Court, finding the petitioner's arguments regarding the appreciation of evidence to have considerable weight, granted leave to appeal. The Court held that the case necessitates a thorough reappraisal of the evidence to ensure compliance with established legal principles governing criminal trials. Specifically, the Court highlighted the critical need for independent corroboration when relying on the testimony of an interested witness, especially where other prosecution evidence has been discredited by the lower courts. The request for interim bail was rejected, though an early hearing was directed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of an interested witness require independent corroboration to sustain a conviction?
  • Can a conviction be maintained when the trial court has disbelieved the dying declaration and other primary eye-witnesses?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal to reappraise evidence in a criminal case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Ahmad vs District Collector, Lahore And Other1986 SCMR 1354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-23
  Intra-Court Appealdismissal in defaultcause listSupreme Court of Pakistanleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court dismissing an Intra-Court Appeal after refusing to re-admit an appeal dismissed in default. The core legal question revolves around whether the High Court took a too technical view in dismissing the appeal based on the appellant's counsel failing to locate the case in the cause list due to an alleged omission. The Supreme Court examined the contentions and found the factual premise raised by the petitioner—that the case was not listed in the regular cause list provided to the Bar Room—to be incorrect upon verification of the records by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the case was duly listed in the regular cause list in compliance with the rules, and no grounds existed to interfere with the High Court's order. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, affirming the principle that failure to appear due to an unverified claim of a missing cause list entry does not warrant the restoration of an appeal dismissed in default.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Intra-Court Appeal dismissed in default can be re-admitted when the counsel fails to trace the case in the cause list?
  • Does a listing of a case in the regular cause list distributed to the Bar Room satisfy the procedural requirements for notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahboob Elahi vs Mst. Iqbal Jan1986 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-18
  leave to appealappreciation of evidencefindings of factrevision applicationdeclaration of title
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which dismissed the petitioner's revision application and upheld the decree passed by the Civil Judge in favor of the respondents for declaration of title, possession of a shop, and perpetual injunction. The core legal question revolves around the propriety of interfering with concurrent findings of fact reached by the lower courts based on the appreciation of evidence. The Supreme Court held that since the findings of fact reached by the lower court are solidly rooted in the evidence on record, there is no valid justification for the apex court to interfere. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact concurrent in nature that are duly supported by evidence on the record.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact that are rooted in evidence?
  • Can a revision application challenge a decree for declaration of title and possession based on factual appreciation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahboob Elahi And Others vs Muhammad Iqbal1986 SCMR 1619 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-23
  specific performanceagreement to sellco-sharerspower of attorneytransferee pendente liteearnest money
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil dispute concerning an agreement to sell a house. The respondent filed a suit for specific performance after the petitioners, who had entered into an agreement to sell the property, failed to complete the transaction, citing the refusal of other co-sharers. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, a decision upheld by the Additional District Judge and subsequently the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the agreement to sell was enforceable given the petitioners' claim that other co-sharers had not consented, and whether the property could be subject to such an agreement. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding that the evidence established the petitioners were the owners in possession and that one petitioner held a special power of attorney for the other. The Court held that the petitioners failed to prove the existence of other co-sharers or their lack of consent, and that a transferee pendente lite could not evade liability under the Specific Relief Act. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a contract for the sale of property be enforced if the seller holds a power of attorney for the other owner?
  • Is a transferee pendente lite liable under the Specific Relief Act for a prior agreement to sell?
  • Does the failure to plead and prove the existence of other co-sharers preclude a defendant from raising such an objection in appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mabusul Waris And Another vs Additional Secretary to the Government of N. W.F.P. And Other1986 SCMR 1024 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-07
  review petitionwrit petitiondismissal in limineremand of caseSupreme Court review
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arises out of a previous judgment of the Supreme Court in a civil appeal which had set aside a High Court finding regarding an administrative order passed by the Additional Secretary, Home and Tribal Affairs Department, but instead of remanding the matter, had directly restored an earlier order dated 7-6-1970. The core legal question addressed in the review is whether the Supreme Court, upon finding the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition in limine to be erroneous, should have remanded the case to the High Court for a hearing on merits rather than substituting its own final decision. The Supreme Court held that the inadvertent restoration of the administrative order was erroneous, allowed the review petition, and remanded the case back to the High Court to hear the writ petition afresh on merits. The key principle laid down is that where a writ petition is dismissed in limine and the appellate court finds the preliminary dismissal improper, the appropriate course is to remand the matter to the High Court for adjudication on merits rather than deciding the merits directly.

  Questions settled

  • What is the appropriate course of action for an appellate court when it sets aside a High Court's limine dismissal of a writ petition?
  • Can the Supreme Court substitute its own final finding of fact instead of remanding the case to the High Court or tribunal?
  • Under what circumstances will a review petition be allowed when an order is inadvertently recorded?
  Read full judgment →
• M.A. Aziz Khan vs Muhammad Ahmed Khan And Other1986 SCMR 1679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-29
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationleave to appealcriminal litigationtrespasssupplementary statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's application seeking the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent. The dispute arose from civil litigation regarding a house, leading to an F.I.R. involving allegations of trespass, confinement, and ouster. The respondent had been granted pre-arrest bail in June 1985, and subsequent applications for cancellation were unsuccessful. When additional offences were added to the case, the Sessions Judge granted further pre-arrest bail, a decision the High Court refused to interfere with. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted that the initial grant of pre-arrest bail was not under challenge. The Court held that the extension of pre-arrest bail to cover newly added offences, following a supplementary statement by the complainant, did not present any substantial question of law warranting interference. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming the lower court's decision to maintain the bail status.

  Questions settled

  • Does the addition of new offences to an existing F.I.R. automatically necessitate the cancellation of pre-arrest bail previously granted?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to interfere with a High Court order refusing to cancel pre-arrest bail when no substantial question of law is involved?
  Read full judgment →
• M. Shafie vs Secretary to Governemnt of Pakistan Housing and Works_Accountant General1986 SCMR 1666 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-03
  service appealcompetency of appeallimitation barFederal Service Tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which dismissed the petitioner's appeal on the grounds of limitation. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the Federal Service Tribunal erred in its approach by focusing on the limitation period rather than the fundamental competency of the appeal itself. The Supreme Court observes that the impugned order challenged before the Tribunal was passed prior to 1st July 1969, which renders the appeal incompetent due to the specific statutory bar contained in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Court holds that because the appeal was inherently incompetent under the law, the Tribunal should have dismissed it on that basis rather than on limitation grounds, which would have allowed the petitioner to seek alternative relief in a competent court of law. Consequently, the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal to examine this specific plea regarding the competency of the proceedings and directs that the appeal be heard on the existing record, while permitting the parties to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against an order passed before 1st July 1969?
  • Should a tribunal dismiss an appeal on the grounds of limitation when the appeal is inherently incompetent under the governing statute?
  • Does the bar under Section 4(1)(c) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 preclude an appeal against orders passed prior to 1st July 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• M. Sabbar Idrees And Others vs Clare Benedicta Conville1986 SCMR 1967(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-23
  temporary injunctionguardianshippower of attorneyattaining majoritymutationprima facie casecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two petitions for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' civil revisions. The petitioners had purchased disputed land from an attorney appointed by the respondent's guardian, with the mutation attested on March 25, 1982. However, the respondent had attained majority on October 14, 1980. The revenue authorities subsequently cancelled the mutation, prompting the petitioners to file a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction, alongside an application for a temporary injunction. The trial court granted the temporary injunction, but this was reversed by the appellate court and upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether a temporary injunction could be granted where the underlying sale transaction was executed by a guardian's attorney after the minor had attained majority. The Supreme Court held that since the respondent attained majority prior to the sale mutation, the guardianship and the associated power of attorney had terminated. Consequently, the petitioners failed to establish a prima facie case, and the refusal of the temporary injunction was legally justified.

  Questions settled

  • Does a general power of attorney executed by a guardian on behalf of a minor terminate automatically once the minor attains majority?
  • Can a temporary injunction be granted to a purchaser of land when the sale transaction was executed by a guardian's attorney after the minor had already attained majority?
  • Whether a purchaser of land from an unauthorized attorney can establish a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction during the pendency of a declaratory suit?
  Read full judgment →
• M. Hanif Niazi vs The Director of Food And Other1986 SCMR 1066 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-21
  civil servicedisciplinary proceedingsbiasnatural justicedismissal from serviceefficiency and discipline rulesadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the dismissal of a civil servant, a Junior Clerk, who was terminated by the Deputy Director of Food after an Authorized Officer had initially recommended his exoneration. The core legal question was whether the Authority possessed the power under the Sind Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, to interfere with the Authorized Officer's findings and whether the proceedings were vitiated by personal bias. The Supreme Court held that while the Authority generally possesses the power to review proceedings and correct improprieties, the specific dismissal in this case was legally flawed due to clear personal bias. The Deputy Director, who was the subject of the appellant's complaints, acted as the accuser, the initiator of the inquiry, and the final decision-maker. The Court established that such a concentration of power in a biased official vitiates the entire disciplinary proceeding. Consequently, the Court set aside the dismissal order and the Service Tribunal's judgment, directing that the case be examined afresh by a competent authority other than the biased official.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Sind Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1973 allow the Authority to review and set aside the findings of an Authorized Officer?
  • Does the participation of an official who is the subject of a civil servant's complaints in the disciplinary process against that servant constitute bias sufficient to vitiate the proceedings?
  • Is an Authorized Officer's recommendation in a disciplinary inquiry a final order or a tentative one subject to the Authority's approval?
  Read full judgment →
• Lt. Col. Shah Dad vs Border Area Allotment Committee And Other1986 SC MR 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-06
  Border Area Allotment Committeeland allotmentfraudulent transactionwrit jurisdictiondiscretionary reliefSettlement Department
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court concerning the cancellation of land allotment within the municipal limits of Kasur by the Border Area Allotment Committee. The core legal questions involved whether land within the border belt could only be allotted by the Border Area Allotment Committee, whether urban land in the border area fell under Martial Law Regulation No. 9 of 1959, and whether the Settlement Department was competent to allot such land to non-claimants. The Supreme Court held that the writ jurisdiction is discretionary, and since the High Court rightly found the original transaction to be a fictitious and fraudulent arrangement orchestrated by the appellant to augment his land holdings beyond permissible limits, no equity existed in his favour. Consequently, the Court recalled the order granting leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, establishing that fraudulent transactions in border area allotments disentitle a party to discretionary constitutional remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allotment of land within the Border Belt could only be made by the Border Area Allotment Committee?
  • Whether urban land within the border area came within the ambit of Martial Law Regulation No. 9 of 1959?
  • Whether the Settlement Department was competent after the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No. 9 of 1959 to allot land to any person other than a claimant?
  • Does a party who procures land through a fictitious and fraudulent transaction retain any equity for the exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaquat Hussain And Others vs Abdul Majid And Other1986 SCMR 1906 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-12
  criminal appealballistic evidencesudden fightplace of occurrenceevidentiary valuemurder convictionrecovery of weapons
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a violent incident involving two related families, resulting in three deaths. The core legal questions concerned the determination of the place of occurrence, the evidentiary value of ballistic reports despite procedural delays, and the sustainability of convictions where the prosecution's narrative of the fight was partially disbelieved. The Supreme Court held that the occurrence took place in the complainant's house, rejecting the defense's counter-version. Although the Court disbelieved the prosecution's specific account of the fight's initiation, it maintained the convictions of the appellants, Muhammad Riaz and Faiz Ali, based on corroborated ballistic evidence linking their weapons to the crime scene. The Court established that delay in sending crime empties to a ballistic expert does not automatically invalidate the evidence if the recovery is otherwise proven and chain of custody is not compromised. Furthermore, it held that in a sudden fight, individual liability applies, and the Court may uphold convictions even when the prosecution withholds the full truth regarding the immediate provocation, provided the guilt is established by independent evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in sending crime empties to a ballistic expert automatically invalidate the evidentiary value of the recovery?
  • Can a court uphold a conviction when the prosecution's version of the fight's initiation is disbelieved?
  • Does the failure to prove the prosecution's specific narrative of the fight necessitate the acquittal of the accused?
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• Major (Retd.) Muhammad Yousaf vs Mehraj Ud Din And Other1986 SCMR 751 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-22
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantdefault in payment of rentstatutory noticerelationship of landlord and tenantconstitutional petitionlaches
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a Constitutional petition challenging the dismissal of an ejectment application under the Rent Restriction Law. The Rent Controller and appellate authorities had dismissed the landlord's application on the sole ground that no relationship of landlord and tenant existed due to the alleged non-service of a statutory notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Supreme Court of Pakistan converted the petition into an appeal and held that the non-service of a Section 13-A notice does not negate the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. Furthermore, the Court ruled that where rent remains unpaid or untendered even after the institution of an eviction application, the filing of the application itself serves as sufficient notice under Section 13-A. Consequently, the Court reversed the findings of the lower forums, established the relationship of landlord and tenant, and ordered the eviction of the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-service of a notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 negate the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Can the institution of an eviction application be treated as sufficient notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 if rent is not paid or tendered thereafter?
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• Lal Muhammad And Others vs District Judge, Multan And Other1986 SCMR 827 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-31
  evacuee propertystatutory tenancyejectmentlandlord and tenant relationshipPermanent Transfer Deedwrit jurisdictionfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed a writ petition challenging an ejectment order passed by a Rent Controller. The petitioners, occupants of former evacuee property, faced eviction proceedings for non-payment of rent initiated by the respondent, who had acquired the property via a sale deed from the original transferees. The core legal questions were whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed and whether the petitioners were entitled to statutory protection under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller and the appellate authority correctly determined the relationship of landlord and tenant based on the evidence. The Court affirmed that the petitioners could not simultaneously deny the landlord-tenant relationship while claiming statutory protection under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Furthermore, the Court held that the Rent Controller cannot go behind a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) to adjudicate allegations of fraud regarding the original transfer of property. The petition was dismissed as it sought to re-agitate findings of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant simultaneously deny the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and claim statutory protection under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Does a Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to go behind a Permanent Transfer Deed to adjudicate allegations of fraud regarding the original transfer of property?
  • Can the High Court interfere with findings of fact recorded by subordinate statutory forums in its constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Lal Khan vs Faiz Ahmad And Another1986 SCMR 1962 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-11
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionLand Reforms Regulationtenancy rightsjoint Khatasvendee-defendant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a Civil Revision arising from a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, a vendee-defendant, possessed a superior right of pre-emption under the Land Reforms Regulation by virtue of being a tenant on the land in dispute. The petitioner argued that as a tenant on a portion of the joint Khatas, he should be deemed a tenant of the vendors, thereby granting him a preferential right. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's tenancy was recorded under different individuals, not the vendors, and specifically covered only 97 Kanals of a larger 424-Kanal holding. Crucially, the land sold by the vendors did not include the 97 Kanals cultivated by the petitioner. The Court affirmed that under paragraph 25(3)(d) of the Land Reforms Regulation, a tenant can only claim a superior right of pre-emption in respect of the specific land comprised in their tenancy. As the land sold was distinct from the petitioner's tenancy, the pre-emption suit was correctly decreed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant claim a superior right of pre-emption under the Land Reforms Regulation for land that is not comprised within their specific tenancy?
  • Does a tenant of specific land within a joint Khata automatically qualify as a tenant of the vendors who sell a different portion of that same Khata?
  Read full judgment →
• Lal Din vs Ghulam Muhammad And 2 Other1986 SCMR 487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-07
  pre-emptiondismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of suitlimitation periodex parte proceedingsdate of hearing
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit for pre-emption that was dismissed for non-prosecution under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The trial court had mistakenly listed the case for hearing on July 17, 1967, instead of the actual date of September 17, 1967. The plaintiff's counsel appeared on the incorrect date, stated he had no instructions, and the suit was dismissed. The trial court later restored the suit, but the High Court reversed this, holding that the restoration application was time-barred under Article 163 of the Limitation Act 1908, as Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 did not apply. The Supreme Court examined whether the dismissal was without jurisdiction because it occurred on a date not fixed for hearing. Ultimately, the Court held that even if the dismissal date was irregular, the appellant failed to file a restoration application within the statutory period of 30 days from the actual date of hearing (September 17, 1967). Consequently, the Court revoked the leave to appeal, affirming that the application was time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Limitation Act 1908 allow for the condonation of delay under Section 5 for applications falling under Article 163?
  • Can a suit be validly dismissed for non-prosecution on a date other than the one fixed for hearing?
  • Does a party's failure to file a restoration application within the statutory period render the application time-barred, regardless of the irregularity of the dismissal date?
  Read full judgment →
• Lahore Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan And Another1986 SCMR 1362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-07
  customs dutytariff classificationbilletsconstitutional petitionleave to appealfactual findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition concerning a customs tariff classification dispute. The petitioner-Company imported iron and scrap, contending it was re-rollable and re-meltable, thus subject to a 10% duty rather than the 20% duty imposed by Customs Authorities. The High Court had affirmed the findings of the customs authorities, concluding that the imported goods met the definition of 'Billets' under Note (h) of Chapter 73 of the Pakistan Customs Tariff and were correctly assessed under heading 73.07. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any legal infirmity or error in the factual findings affirmed by the High Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the classification was correct, dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, and upheld the lower court's decision. The judgment reinforces the principle that factual findings regarding the classification of goods under customs tariffs, when affirmed by the High Court, will not be disturbed absent a showing of legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Are factual findings regarding the classification of imported goods under the Pakistan Customs Tariff subject to interference if no legal infirmity is shown?
  • Does the definition of 'Billets' in Note (h) of Chapter 73 of the Pakistan Customs Tariff apply to imported iron and scrap that meets the specified description?
  Read full judgment →
• Lahore Development Authority vs Fahmeeda Khatoon And Other1986 SCMR 1478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-09
  Intra-Court Appealreview petitionlimitationlocus standiwrit petitionallotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves three civil petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Lahore Development Authority against a common order of the Lahore High Court dismissing its Intra-Court Appeals. The core legal questions concern the maintainability of Intra-Court Appeals against an order dismissing a time-barred review petition, the requirement of explaining each day's delay in review applications, and whether the petitioner had locus standi. The Supreme Court held that under Order XXXVII, Rule 7, C.P.C., an order rejecting an application for review is not appealable, rendering the Intra-Court Appeals incompetent. Furthermore, the Court held that the appeals, even if treated as challenging the original writ order, were barred by limitation due to an inadequate explanation of delay. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order of the Court rejecting an application for review appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does an Intra-Court Appeal lie against an order refusing to review an order passed in a writ petition?
  • Can a time-barred review petition be entertained without explaining each day's delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Khushi Muhammad alias Natho vs The State1986 PLD Supreme Court 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  attempt to murderunlicensed armsadmissibility of judgmentseparate trialsocular testimonymedical evidenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals arise out of a judgment of the Sind High Court upholding the appellant's convictions under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 13-D of the Arms Ordinance. The incident involved the appellant firing an unlicensed pistol at the injured complainant, leading to his apprehension at the spot. The core legal questions involved whether ocular testimony and medical evidence sufficiently established the attempt to commit murder, and whether evidence recorded or findings reached in a main criminal case could be legally relied upon to uphold a separate conviction under the Arms Ordinance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the conviction under section 307, P.P.C., was well-founded based on trustworthy ocular, medical, and motive evidence, but set aside the conviction under the Arms Ordinance. The Court laid down the principle that each case must be judged upon its own facts established by evidence led therein, and that under section 43 of the Evidence Act, findings or judgments in another case are not admissible as evidence of facts to prove a charge in a separate trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether evidence recorded in a main trial can be utilized to uphold a conviction in a separate connected trial without being produced therein?
  • Is a judgment in one case admissible as evidence of findings of fact in another case under section 43 of the Evidence Act?
  • Whether ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence and prompt lodging of the F.I.R. is sufficient to sustain a conviction under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Khudadad And Others vs Muhammad Habibullah Khan1986 SCMR 727 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-01
  pre-emptionabandoned issuescivil revisionleave to appealwaiver of issues
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench, which dismissed the petitioners' civil revision. The original suit was filed for possession by pre-emption of a share of land. The trial court decreed the suit, and in the first appeal, the defendants pressed only issue No. 6 regarding the sale consideration, while abandoning or not pressing the remaining issues. The Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal, and the High Court dismissed the subsequent revision, holding that issues abandoned or not pressed before the lower appellate court cannot be re-agitated in revision. The core legal question is whether issues abandoned or not pressed before the lower appellate court can be re-agitated in appeal or revision. The Supreme Court held that a party cannot re-agitate issues that were abandoned or not pressed before the lower appellate court. The key principle laid down is that points abandoned or not pressed during earlier appellate proceedings cannot subsequently be reopened in higher forums.

  Questions settled

  • Can an issue abandoned or not pressed before the lower appellate court be re-agitated in a revision petition?
  • Whether a party is permitted to raise questions of law in revision that were previously given up during first appeal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Khuda Bux And Others vs Ghulam Nabi Through Legal Representatives1986 SCMR 1642 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-01
  leave to appealevictiondefault in payment of rentrent controllerconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sind High Court dated 10-11-1985, which dismissed the petitioners' appeal and upheld the Rent Controller's order directing their eviction from the demised premises on the ground of default in rent payment. The core legal question revolves around whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the default in rent payment by the courts below were sustainable in law. The Supreme Court held that no exception in law could be taken against the concurrent factual findings of the two courts below establishing that the petitioners were indeed defaulters in payment of rent, thereby incurring liability for ejectment. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that concurrent findings of fact regarding default in rent payment, supported by evidence, warrant no interference in a petition for leave to appeal, leading to the dismissal of the petition on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding default in rent payment be interfered with in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does default in payment of rent incur the liability of ejectment under the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Khuda Bukhsh And 6 Others vs The State1986 SCMR 1146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-14
  post-arrest bailmurderlethal weaponsindiscriminate firingprima facie casecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court refusing the grant of post-arrest bail to seven petitioners accused of murder and causing injuries. The petitioners were alleged to have been armed with firearms and to have fired indiscriminately, resulting in the deaths of two individuals and injuries to ten others, alongside the destruction of property. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the general nature of the allegations and the absence of specific recovery of weapons or individual role assignments. The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of the petitioners' names in the First Information Report, combined with the specific allegations of indiscriminate firing and property destruction, established a prima facie case of participation in an attack with lethal weapons. Consequently, the Court determined that the petitioners were not entitled to the concession of bail. The principle laid down is that where the prosecution's case prima facie establishes participation in a violent attack with lethal weapons, the absence of specific weapon recovery does not automatically entitle the accused to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of specific recovery of firearms entitle an accused to bail in a case involving allegations of indiscriminate firing?
  • Is the inclusion of an accused's name in the First Information Report with a specific role in an attack sufficient to deny bail?
  • Does participation in an attack with lethal weapons constitute sufficient grounds to deny the concession of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Khizar Hayat Bhatti vs The Director of Inspection and Technical1986 SCMR 1236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-11
  civil servantdepartmental proceedingsdismissal from servicesecond show-cause noticeenquiry reportprocedural irregularityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant dismissed from service following departmental proceedings for receiving illegal gratification and making a written confession, sought leave to appeal against the Service Tribunal's decision upholding his dismissal. The petitioner challenged the dismissal on procedural grounds, alleging he was not supplied with a copy of the enquiry report, was denied a personal hearing, evidence was recorded in his absence, and no second show-cause notice was served. Furthermore, he claimed his confession was obtained under duress. While the Service Tribunal acknowledged these procedural irregularities, it concluded that the petitioner suffered no prejudice. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the failure to serve a second show-cause notice was a mandatory legal requirement and that the failure to provide the enquiry report prejudiced his defense. Finding that the case involved substantial questions of law of public importance requiring authoritative pronouncement, and noting that leave had been granted in a similar case arising from the same occurrence, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is the service of a second show-cause notice a mandatory requirement in departmental proceedings against a civil servant?
  • Does the failure to supply a copy of the enquiry report to a civil servant necessarily prejudice their defense in departmental proceedings?
  • Under what circumstances does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against a judgment of the Service Tribunal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Fazal Karim vs The State And Other1986 SCMR 483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-03-21
  quashing of proceedingsfoodstuffs controllicensing controlnormal quantityproducer exemptioninherent jurisdictionexcess stock
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from the dismissal of a petition under section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashing of criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant, a farm manager, for storing excess wheat without a licence under the West Pakistan Foodstuffs (Control) Ordinance, 1957. The core legal questions were whether producers are entirely exempt from licensing and quantity restrictions regarding food grains produced by them, and whether criminal proceedings should be quashed when an FIR erroneously cites a repealed law whose provisions are identical to the repealing Act. The Supreme Court held that while a producer is exempt from obtaining a licence to store or sell food grains produced by them under clause 3 of the West Pakistan Foodgrains (Licensing Control) Order, 1957, they are nevertheless prohibited under clause 5 from possessing stocks exceeding the defined 'normal quantity' without written permission from the licensing authority, and must submit stock statements. Furthermore, an erroneous reference to a repealed enactment in the FIR does not vitiate proceedings if identical provisions exist in the repealing statute. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a producer is entirely exempt from all restrictions on the possession and storage of food grains produced by them under the West Pakistan Foodgrains (Licensing Control) Order, 1957?
  • Does an erroneous reference to a repealed law in an FIR vitiate criminal proceedings when the provisions of the repealing statute are identical?
  • Can the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked to cut short a trial on matters requiring the recording of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Farooq Bakhsh And Others vs Province of the Punjab And Other1986 SCMR 1385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-18
  property taxleave to appealrent assessmenthotel managementtax levy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court dismissing their writ petition concerning the levy of property tax by the Excise and Taxation Department on a hotel. The core legal question involved the manner in which the Department is empowered to assess the rent received by the landlord for property tax purposes, specifically whether assessment based on presumed income of the hotel management is permissible under the law. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioners regarding the method of assessment require further consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the proper interpretation and application of Section 5 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 and related rules.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Department empowered to assess property tax rent on the basis of income presumed to have been earned by a hotel management?
  • Whether the method of assessing rent for property tax purposes complies with Section 5 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Muhammad vs The State1986 SCMR 2017 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-18
  bail cancellationpetition for leave to appealcriminal trialpre-trial bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 12-10-1985, whereby the petitioner's bail granted by the Sessions Judge, Khushab, was cancelled. The petitioner stands accused along with three others in a criminal case registered under section 354-A read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which is currently pending trial. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in law in cancelling the pre-trial bail granted to the petitioner. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and examining the available record, the Supreme Court held that the learned Judge of the High Court did not violate any provision or principle of law in cancelling the bail. Consequently, finding no valid justification to interfere with the impugned order, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the cancellation of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in cancelling bail granted by the Sessions Court when no principle of law is violated?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of the High Court cancelling bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Beg vs Rab Nawaz And Another1986 SCMR 507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-15
  criminal petitionacquittalmurderappraisal of evidencedeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the conviction and death sentence awarded to respondent No. 1 by the Sessions Judge, Jhelum, and acquitted him of murder and other charges. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court committed any substantial error or unjustified reasoning in setting aside the conviction and acquitting the respondent based on doubts in the prosecution case and the unreliability of witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's counsel failed to establish that the High Court's treatment of the case or its reasoning was palpably wrong or unjustified. The Court laid down the principle that an order of acquittal by a High Court will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court unless the petitioner demonstrates a substantial error or that the appraisal of evidence and reasoning adopted by the High Court was palpably wrong or unjustified.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court when the reasoning is found to be justified?
  • Does the unreliability of eyewitness testimony provide a sufficient ground for the High Court to acquit an accused in a murder case?
  • Whether the petitioner can succeed in a petition for leave to appeal against acquittal without showing a substantial error in the High Court judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Bahadur Khan vs Abdul Razzaq And Other1986 SCMR 700 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-21
  occupancy tenancysale of occupancy rightsexecution of decreemutationpresumption of truthcivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision concerning land rights and occupancy tenancy. The core legal question revolves around whether the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents could benefit from amended tenancy laws after selling his occupancy rights and whether execution proceedings and related mutations were validly conducted. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the execution of possession and compliance with legal formalities carried a presumption of truth and could not be displaced in the absence of cogent rebuttal evidence. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that official revenue reports and execution proceedings carry a presumption of truth, and questions of fact concurrently determined against a party cannot be reopened without substantial rebutting evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can an occupancy tenant who sold his rights benefit from subsequent amendments if he was not in occupation of the land?
  • Does a revenue official's report regarding the delivery of possession carry a presumption of truth in the absence of cogent rebuttal evidence?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding execution proceedings can be interfered with in civil revision?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Bahadur Khan And Others vs Pazal Dad (Represented By Legal Heir)1986 SCMR 694 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-19
  partition of landrevenue officer jurisdictioncivil suitoccupancy tenantsco-sharersquestion of title
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of partition proceedings initiated under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, wherein the petitioners obtained a larger share of land, prompting the respondents to file a civil suit challenging the partition. The lower courts and the Lahore High Court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, finding that their share had been unlawfully and drastically reduced without any legal relinquishment of title. The core legal question concerns the extent of the civil court's jurisdiction to review revenue partition proceedings where questions of title and grave reduction of a co-sharer's legitimate share are involved. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that where partition proceedings result in the unlawful deprivation of a party's statutory share without proper relinquishment, such proceedings can be assailed through a civil suit as a question of title is involved. The key principle laid down is that revenue partition modes cannot arbitrarily extinguish the substantive property rights and statutory shares of co-sharers or occupancy tenants.

  Questions settled

  • Can revenue partition proceedings be challenged in a civil suit when a question of title is involved?
  • Does a Revenue Officer have the exclusive jurisdiction to distribute land in a partition manner that reduces a co-sharer's statutory share without relinquishment?
  • Whether a joint owner can apply for partition of their share in land under the Land Revenue Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Bahadur and Others vs Mst. Salima and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-14
  pre-emptiondeposit of pre-emption moneyrejection of plaintextension of timeclerical mistakejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a civil revision in a pre-emption matter. The respondent-plaintiff filed a pre-emption suit wherein the trial court's order-sheet initially recorded the date for depositing pre-emption money as 22-7-1975 instead of 22-9-1975 due to a clerical mistake, effectively allowing only twenty-four hours for the deposit. Subsequently, upon an application by the plaintiff, the trial court permitted the deposit, which was made on 18-9-1975. A successor judge later rejected the plaint under section 23(5)(b) of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act for default in timely deposit. The District Judge and the High Court concurrently held that the original date was a clerical error and that the extension and subsequent acceptance of the deposit were lawful exercises of judicial discretion. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that courts possess the discretionary power to extend time or correct clerical mistakes regarding pre-emption deposits to meet the ends of justice, and that no procedural impediment should stifle discretionary relief unless expressly mandated by statute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court has the jurisdiction to correct a clerical mistake regarding the date fixed for depositing pre-emption money?
  • Can a court extend the time for depositing pre-emption money upon an application made after the expiry of the originally fixed period?
  • Is a formal application a condition precedent for a court to exercise its discretionary power to extend time for depositing pre-emption money?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Ashfaque Ur Rehman Khan vs Member Board of Revenue And Another1986 SCMR 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-07
  auction of government landboard of revenueconfirmation of auctionnatural justicediscretionary powerwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court judgment dismissing the petitioner's writ petition regarding the auction of Government land. The auction, conducted on September 5, 1977, was approved by the Deputy Commissioner but subsequently refused confirmation by the Board of Revenue, whose review dismissal led to a constitutional petition in the High Court. The core legal question is whether the Board of Revenue is bound by the rules of natural justice to afford a hearing to the auction purchaser before refusing to confirm a land auction. The Supreme Court held that the confirmation or refusal to confirm an auction falls within the discretion of the Board of Revenue, which can be exercised without granting a hearing to the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that the confirmation of a government land auction is a matter of administrative discretion exercisable without affording a mandatory opportunity of hearing to the auction purchaser.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Board of Revenue is required to afford a hearing to an auction purchaser before refusing to confirm a government land auction?
  • Is the confirmation or refusal to confirm a government land auction by the Board of Revenue a matter of administrative discretion?
  • Does the failure to hear an auction purchaser prior to refusing auction confirmation violate the rules of natural justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalo Khan And Others vs Sh. Abdul Rahim1986 SCMR 692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-20
  pre-emptionwaiver of pre-emptionestoppelacquiescenceright of pre-emptionjoint Khatedar
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a suit for possession through pre-emption filed by the respondent against the petitioners, who had purchased land via a registered agreement to sell. The petitioners contended that the respondent had waived his right of pre-emption by demanding and accepting a mortgage payment of Rs. 2,000 from them prior to the sale, arguing that this conduct, along with the delivery of possession, estopped the respondent from asserting a pre-emption claim. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the Additional District Judge reversed this decision, and the High Court maintained that reversal. The core legal question was whether the respondent's acceptance of the mortgage money and his conduct constituted a waiver or estoppel regarding his right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners failed to produce cogent evidence of acquiescence. The Court affirmed the principle that the mere receipt of mortgage money by a pre-emptor after a sale does not necessarily constitute a waiver of the right of pre-emption, as such acts do not inherently demonstrate an intention to abandon that statutory right.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acceptance of mortgage money by a potential pre-emptor after a sale constitute a waiver of the right of pre-emption?
  • Can a pre-emptor be estopped from filing a suit for pre-emption based on their conduct regarding the mortgage of the suit property?
  Read full judgment →
• Khaliqdad Khan vs Syed Altaf Hussain Shah And Another1986 SCMR 1975 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-29
  suspension of sentencedeath sentenceleave to appealcriminal procedureappellate discretionmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against an order of the Lahore High Court suspending the death sentence of respondent No. 1, a police sub-inspector convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Sessions Judge, Khushab. The core legal question concerns the proper exercise of judicial discretion under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in suspending a sentence of death, and whether a detailed order of this nature might prejudice the final appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the case exhibits unusual features and necessitates an authoritative pronouncement regarding the parameters and exercise of powers under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that the suspension of a capital sentence requires a careful and proper exercise of discretionary powers under Section 426, ensuring that detailed premature findings do not adversely impact the final hearing and disposal of the pending appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the suspension of a death sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was a proper exercise of judicial discretion?
  • Does a detailed order suspending a sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 risk affecting the final hearing and disposal of the appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalil Ahmad Kershi vs Noor Muhammad1986 SCMR 1464 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-16
  ejectmentrented premisesbona fide personal requirementremand orderlandlord and tenantdefault in rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind, which had upheld an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller. The landlord initially sought eviction under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, but subsequently amended the application to include grounds under Section 15 of the same Ordinance, specifically citing default in rent payment and bona fide personal requirement. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the application but, following a remand order by the High Court, ultimately ordered eviction. The petitioner challenged the propriety of the initial remand order and questioned the bona fide nature of the landlord's personal requirement claim. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not challenge the remand order in the appeal against the final decision, as the remand order itself had not been contested at the relevant time. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the determination of the landlord's bona fide personal requirement is a question of fact conclusively decided by the lower forums, providing no grounds for interference. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a remand order in an appeal against the final order passed after the remand if the remand order itself was not challenged earlier?
  • Is the determination of a landlord's bona fide personal requirement a question of fact that cannot be reopened in appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mahmood Soomro vs Province of Sind Through Chief Secretary1986 SCMR 1341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-03
  service senioritynecessary partycivil decreeservice tribunal jurisdictionres judicatasub judiceimproper impleadment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Assistant Commissioner, challenged a decision by the Sind Service Tribunal regarding the seniority of a colleague, respondent Khuslomal. Khuslomal had previously filed a civil suit against the Provincial Government to have his name included in a 1959 select list for Mukhtiarkars, which was decreed in his favour after the Government admitted his claim. This decree resulted in the petitioner being relegated in seniority. The petitioner argued that the civil decree was not binding on him as he was not impleaded as a party in that suit, despite being directly affected. The Service Tribunal declined to interfere, citing lack of jurisdiction to review a civil court decree and noting that the matter was sub judice in the High Court and Civil Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, primarily to consider the petitioner's contention that a judgment and decree obtained in a suit where necessary parties were not joined is not binding on those affected parties. The Court held that the legal issues raised regarding the binding nature of the ex parte civil decree warranted further examination.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil court decree binding on a person who was not joined as a party to the suit but is directly affected by the judgment?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to review or sit in appeal over a decree passed by a Civil Court?
  • Can a government department's admission of a claim in a civil suit bind third parties whose seniority is adversely affected by the resulting decree?
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• Khalid Ikramullah, Director, Social Security Institution, Lyallpur (Faisalabad) vs Punjab Employees Social Security (Non Gazetted) Staff Union, Faisalabad Through Its G.S. And 2 Other1986 SCMR 618 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-13
  Industrial Relations OrdinanceSocial Security InstitutionCollective Bargaining AgentCancellation of Union RegistrationConstitutional PetitionLabour Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court concerning whether the Social Security Institution established under West Pakistan Ordinance X of 1965 constitutes an "industry" under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and whether an application under section 34 of the same Ordinance by the Employees Staff Union was competent. The respondent Union had sought enforcement of a settlement regarding allowances before the Labour Court, which initially granted relief. The Labour Appellate Tribunal subsequently dismissed the application, holding the institution was not an industry. The High Court reversed this on constitutional petition. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant raised a preliminary ground that the registration of the respondent Union had been cancelled by the Labour Court, a decision that attained finality and rendered the application under section 34 incompetent and infructuous. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal and set aside the High Court judgment on the preliminary ground that the cancellation of the Union's registration deprived it of the status of a Collective Bargaining Agent, making its proceedings under the Industrial Relations Ordinance untenable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 remains competent after the cancellation of the registration of the Collective Bargaining Agent Union?
  • Does the cancellation of a trade union's registration render its pending claims and petitions under the Industrial Relations Ordinance infructuous?
  • Is the registration of a union a necessary prerequisite for maintaining an action as a Collective Bargaining Agent under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
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• Khairdi vs Mst. Chanani And Other1986 SCMR 1318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-30
  customary lawinheritancepleadingsconcurrent findingsunmarried daughterself-acquired propertyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a Letters Patent Appeal regarding the inheritance of self-acquired land. The core legal question was whether the inheritance of the deceased's self-acquired property was governed by custom, specifically whether an unmarried daughter inherited to the exclusion of others, and whether the absence of a specific issue on 'custom' in the pleadings prejudiced the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the parties were fully aware that the controversy revolved around Customary Law, as evidenced by the conduct of the proceedings and the evidence led by both sides. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the case was governed by custom, under which the unmarried daughter was the rightful heir. The principle laid down is that where parties have proceeded to trial with full knowledge of the real controversy and have led evidence on the relevant issues, the absence of a specific formal issue in the pleadings does not invalidate the proceedings or cause prejudice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a specific issue in the pleadings invalidate a judgment where the parties were aware of the real controversy and led evidence on it?
  • Can a party raise the plea of prejudice due to the absence of a specific issue for the first time in a Letters Patent Appeal?
  • Is the Supreme Court inclined to interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of a specific family custom?
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• Khair Din And Others vs Ch. Qudrat Ullah1986 SCMR 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-23
  pre-emptionco-vendeestrangerimprovement of statusgiftfinding of factdelivery of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the respondent against the petitioners, who claimed an equal right of pre-emption. The petitioners conceded that the unity of the sale transaction could not be split and that one of the co-vendees, being a stranger, initially possessed an inferior right of pre-emption compared to the plaintiff. However, the petitioners argued that this co-vendee had acquired a co-sharer status prior to the suit's institution through a gift of land from his father, which improved the status of all co-vendees. The lower courts rejected this plea on factual grounds, finding that neither the donor nor the donee testified to prove the essential elements of a valid gift, namely declaration, acceptance, and delivery of possession. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld these findings, holding that the case was concluded by a concurrent finding of fact supported by cogent evidence. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the status of co-vendees in a pre-emption suit can be improved by a subsequent gift of land to one of the vendees if the elements of the gift are not factually proven?
  • What essential elements must be established by evidence to prove a valid gift in the context of improving a pre-emptor's status?
  • Can a concurrent finding of fact disbelieving a transaction of gift be disturbed by the Supreme Court when supported by cogent evidence on record?
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• Khadim Hussain vs Ch. Muhammad Ibrahim And Other1986 SCMR 1360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-16
  pre-emptionrestoration of appealdismissal in defaultnext friendpre-emption moneyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which refused to restore a pre-emption appeal filed by a minor plaintiff. The core legal question concerned the restoration of an appeal dismissed in default due to the death of the minor's next friend, and the subsequent willingness of the petitioner to pay the original pre-emption price fixed by the trial court. The Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal, noting that since the petitioner was now willing to pay the original pre-emption amount of Rs. 14,500, an appropriate application could be made before the High Court for permission and time to deposit the pre-emption money. The Court held that the High Court possesses the power to grant reasonable time to a pre-emptor to make the deposit of pre-emption money upon the disposal of an appeal, and that the time spent pursuing the matter diligently in the Supreme Court would not serve as a bar to such an application.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has the power to grant reasonable time to a pre-emptor to deposit pre-emption money upon the disposal of an appeal?
  • Can an application for permission and time to deposit pre-emption money be made after abandoning the contest regarding the pre-emption price?
  • Whether time spent in pursuing a bona fide petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court acts as a bar to seeking time for depositing pre-emption money in the High Court?
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• Kh. Muhammad Naseer vs The Secretary, Education And Other1986 SCMR 1828 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-30
  service seniorityseniority listpromotee officersservice tribunalcontinuous appointmenttrained vs untrained teachers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Baluchistan Service Tribunal regarding the seniority of a government employee. The petitioner, a Headmaster, challenged the seniority list of Senior English Teachers and Class-II officers, seeking a declaration of seniority over respondents and claiming entitlement to promotion based on his academic qualifications. The core legal questions were whether the Service Tribunal correctly applied the seniority formula approved by the Governor and whether the petitioner's seniority could be determined based on his earlier service as an untrained teacher. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal correctly applied the established seniority formula, which distinguished between trained and untrained teachers and integrated them based on specific length-of-service criteria. The Court affirmed that seniority for promotee officers under the relevant rules is fixed with reference to the date of continuous appointment to the service, not merely length of service in a lower cadre. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Service Tribunal competent to grant relief regarding promotion or grade entitlement if such relief is barred by the proviso to the governing statute?
  • How is the seniority of promotee officers determined under the West Pakistan Education Service Class II Rules 1963?
  • Does seniority in a lower cadre (Senior English Teacher) automatically determine seniority in a higher service cadre (Class II) for promotees?
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• Kh. Abdul Wahid And Another vs Chairman, WAPDA And Another1986 SCMR 1534 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-29
  interlocutory orderleave to appealremandmala fidesService Tribunalmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two petitions for leave to appeal directed against an interlocutory order of the Federal Service Tribunal rejecting the petitioners' applications to add additional grounds alleging mala fides following a remand by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Service Tribunal had rejected the applications on the basis that the issue had already been considered by the Supreme Court in an earlier round of litigation. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an appeal or petition for leave to appeal lies against an interlocutory order of the Service Tribunal, and whether a plea of mala fides can be considered by the Tribunal on remand. The Supreme Court held that the petitions were incompetent as they were directed against an interlocutory order. However, the Court clarified its intent, laying down the principle that if a party can demonstrate that action against them was actuated by mala fides, the Service Tribunal is not debarred from taking note of such allegations upon remand. Both petitions were accordingly dismissed with observations.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable against an interlocutory order passed by a Service Tribunal?
  • Is a Service Tribunal debarred from considering allegations of mala fides on remand if supported by evidence?
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• KH. Abdul Majeed vs Custodian of Evacuee Property and Others- s1986 PLD Supreme Court 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-02
  evacuee propertyoral partitionjoint Hindu family propertycustodian of evacuee propertyconfirmation of salerevisional jurisdictionlife interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of a property sale involving evacuee property in Karachi. The core legal question was whether an oral partition of joint Hindu family property, which preceded the sale by a widow holding a life interest, was valid, and whether the Custodian of Evacuee Property properly exercised his jurisdiction in refusing to confirm the sale. The Supreme Court held that an oral partition of joint Hindu family property is legally effective and does not require registration, provided it is a bona fide family arrangement. Furthermore, the Court held that the Custodian, while not a court of law, must act judicially and possesses broad discretionary powers under the Administration of Evacuee Property laws to confirm or reject transfers. The Custodian’s decision to refuse confirmation based on factors such as the nature of the vendor's life interest, the lack of required certificates, and doubts regarding the transaction's bona fides was within his lawful authority. Consequently, the High Court erred in interfering with the Custodian's order, as it substituted its own judgment for that of the Custodian without establishing jurisdictional error.

  Questions settled

  • Can an oral partition of joint Hindu family property be legally effective without a registered instrument?
  • Does the Custodian of Evacuee Property have the authority to refuse confirmation of a sale based on the nature of the vendor's interest?
  • Is the Custodian of Evacuee Property considered a court of law for the purposes of judicial review?
  • Under what grounds can the High Court interfere with the findings of the Custodian of Evacuee Property in its constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Karim Haider And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 938 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-08
  bailbail cancellationsuo motu bail cancellationdelay in FIRmurdercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which had refused bail to one petitioner and suo motu cancelled the bail granted to the other two petitioners by the trial court in a case registered under sections 302, 34, and 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code read with sections 10 and 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question concerned the justification for refusing bail and cancelling bail already granted, particularly in the face of an unexplained inordinate delay in lodging the First Information Report. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the accused petitioners were entitled to bail given the delayed F.I.R. and circumstances of the case. The key principle laid down is that unexplained delay in lodging the F.I.R. weighs in favor of granting bail to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail already granted to an accused by the trial court can be cancelled by the High Court without strong and exceptional grounds?
  • Does an unexplained inordinate delay in lodging the First Information Report entitle the accused persons to the concession of bail?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can convert a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal and grant bail in criminal matters?
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• Karamat Hussain vs Kazi Ali Muhammad1986 SCMR 441 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-08-10
  default in payment of rentejectmentlandlord and tenantdiscretion of courtspecial leave to appealadvance rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed by a landlord against the order of the High Court setting aside an ejectment order passed against the respondent-tenant. The core legal question concerned whether the Rent Controller or the High Court possesses the discretion under section 13(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, to condone a technical default in the payment of rent. The Supreme Court held that the use of the word 'may' in the provision confers a judicial discretion to refuse ejectment upon proof of default, provided such discretion is exercised in accordance with sound judicial principles and not arbitrarily. The Court found that since advance rent was still lying in deposit with the landlord and a subsequent payment was accepted by him, the default was purely technical, and the High Court rightly exercised its discretion in favour of the tenant. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Rent Controller has discretion in the matter of ordering ejectment once a default in the payment of rent is proved under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Can a technical default in rent payment be condoned by the court in light of advance rent lying in deposit with the landlord?
  • How must the discretion conferred by section 13(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, be exercised by the courts?
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