Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• LT. Col. (Retd.) Ishtiaq Ur Rehman Khan vs Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division1983 SCMR 1061 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-15
  evacuee propertysettlement schemetransfer of propertyfindings of factwrit petitionleave to appealintegral part
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from civil petitions for leave to appeal challenging a judgment of the High Court in writ petitions concerning the transfer of evacuee property under the settlement scheme. The central factual issue was whether contiguous Plots 80-B and 82-B formed an integral part of a bungalow situated at Plot No. 81-B, Model Town, Lahore, previously owned by an evacuee. The petitioner, who was transferred Plot No. 81-B, claimed entitlement to the adjoining plots as part of the main bungalow, whereas Plot No. 80-B had been transferred to a private respondent before settlement authorities ordered the disposal of both plots by public auction. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's writ petition while accepting the respondent's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's order, holding that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the petitioner's claim were adequately addressed by the settlement authorities and the High Court, and required no interference. The Supreme Court laid down that findings of fact determined by relevant authorities and upheld by the High Court will not be disturbed in constitutional jurisdiction absent any legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities and the High Court can be interfered with by the Supreme Court in leave to appeal petitions?
  • Whether contiguous evacuee plots automatically form an integral part of an adjacent transferred bungalow?
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• Lahore Development Authority vs Messrs Khalid Javed & Co.1983 SCMR 718 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-02
  arbitration awardrule of courtobjections to awardnominee arbitratorsmisconduct of arbitratorleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed in limine the petitioner's First Appeal against a Civil Judge's decree making an arbitration award the rule of the court. The underlying dispute arose from a road-widening contract awarded by the petitioner to the respondent, which was referred to two arbitrators who were both nominees of the petitioner. The arbitrators awarded a sum to the respondent, and the petitioner's objections were rejected by the trial court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the arbitrators were the petitioner's own nominees, both parties were afforded a fair opportunity to present their cases, and each item of the claim was adequately considered on its merits. Finding that no legal misconduct was established against the arbitrators, the Court held that the trial court was fully justified in making the award the rule of the court and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an arbitration award can be set aside or challenged if no legal misconduct is established against the arbitrators?
  • Can a party successfully object to an arbitration award rendered by its own nominees where a fair opportunity was given to both sides and claims were decided on merit?
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• L. M. D. Mall (Lailla Muhammad) Staff Nurse, Zanana Hospital, Dera1983 PLD Supreme Court 431 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-24
  service lawpay scalecivil court decreevested rightsStaff NurseService TribunalNational Pay Scalesreversion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the pay scale and status of a Staff Nurse, whose position was previously affirmed by a civil court decree. The appellant challenged the N.-W. F. P. Service Tribunal's decision, which denied her the National Pay Scale (N.P.S.) No. 9, classifying her instead as an untrained nurse entitled only to N.P.S. No. 1. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal could disregard the appellant's established status and pay history to reclassify her based on new training criteria. The Supreme Court held that the appellant’s status as a Staff Nurse was conclusively determined by the civil court decree, and her long-standing pay history entitled her to the prescribed and consolidated pay scales. The Court ruled that the introduction of new National Pay Scales could not be used to retroactively reduce the appellant's established pay scale or vested rights. The principle laid down is that administrative rules cannot override vested rights established by judicial decree or long-standing service history, and a civil servant's pay cannot be arbitrarily reduced by new classification criteria.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Service Tribunal disregard a prior civil court decree establishing the status and pay entitlement of a civil servant?
  • Does the introduction of new National Pay Scales allow the government to retroactively reduce the established pay scale of a civil servant?
  • Is a government servant entitled to the consolidated pay scale if they fail to exercise an option within the prescribed period?
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• Khwaja Muhammad Nasim and Others vs The Additional District Judge, Lahore and Another1983 SCMR 410 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-07-04
  landlord and tenantrelationship of landlord and tenantsale deedejectment petitionpermissive occupationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller, the Appellate Court, and the High Court, which held that no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. The core legal question is whether an agreement by a vendor to pay a specified monthly amount for continuing to reside in the sold property after a stipulated period creates the relationship of landlord and tenant. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the question of whether a tenancy had been created in the circumstances—where the vendor continued occupation and agreed to pay a monthly sum—requires reconsideration. The principle established is that an arrangement permitting a vendor to remain in possession of sold property upon payment of a periodic sum may warrant examination to determine if a landlord-tenant relationship was thereby constituted.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement by a vendor to pay a monthly sum for continuing to reside in a sold property create the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Whether the mere agreement to pay an amount for occupying another's property establishes a tenancy?
  • Does occupation of a property after the expiry of a stipulated period with implied consent constitute a tenancy?
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• Khushi Muhammad vs Jamat Ali Etc.S1983 SCMR 734 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-20
  leave to appealde novo trialdeaf and dumb accusedfair trialremandcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant against the dismissal of a revision petition by the High Court, which had upheld the Additional Sessions Judge's order remanding a criminal case for a de novo trial. The core legal question concerns the legality of remanding a trial involving deaf and dumb accused persons where the trial court failed to conduct a preliminary inquiry under Section 341 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding their ability to understand the proceedings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the initial omission justified a de novo trial for all co-accused, including those without disabilities, and stayed the remand proceedings pending the hearing. The key principle laid down is that an inquiry into the capability of a deaf and dumb accused to understand court proceedings should ideally be conducted at the initial stage of the trial to ensure a fair trial and proper compliance with procedural safeguards.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to conduct an initial inquiry regarding a deaf and dumb accused's ability to understand proceedings under Section 341 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiates the trial?
  • Is a de novo trial justified for co-accused who suffer from no physical disability when the remand is necessitated by the disability of other co-accused?
  • When must an inquiry into the understanding capacity of a deaf and dumb accused be conducted during a criminal trial?
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• Khushi Muhammad Altaf Hussain Baluch vs The State the State1983 SCMR 697 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-26
  murderdeath sentenceFIRalibire-appraisal of evidencecriminal appealwitness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's dismissal of appeals against death sentences for murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of the First Information Report (FIR) given alleged delays and discrepancies, the effect of the prosecution's failure to examine all listed witnesses, the validity of an alibi plea, and the credibility of a witness not produced before the Committing Magistrate. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the convictions and sentences. The Court held that an FIR is not intended to record minor details, and subsequent elaboration does not constitute a change in the prosecution's version. It affirmed that the prosecution is not obligated to produce every witness listed in the calendar of witnesses. Additionally, the Court ruled that the burden of proving a special plea, such as an alibi, rests solely on the accused. Finally, it established that the non-production of a witness before a Committing Magistrate does not diminish their credibility at trial, provided their name was present on the prosecution's calendar of witnesses.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to produce a witness before the Committing Magistrate render their testimony at trial unreliable?
  • Does the burden of proving an alibi rest on the prosecution or the accused?
  • Is the prosecution required to produce every witness listed in the calendar of witnesses?
  • Does the elaboration of details in testimony at trial, which were not present in the FIR, constitute a change in the prosecution's version?
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• Khurshid Alam vs Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another1983 SCMR 276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-29
  service tribunallimitation periodtime-barred appealunauthorized absencemedical fitness certificatedismissal from serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, filed by a former Police Constable against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The petitioner challenged his dismissal from service, which followed unauthorized absence from duty. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner's appeal before the Service Tribunal was time-barred and whether the petitioner could rely on private medical certificates to contest findings of fitness for duty made by a competent authority's designated medical officer. The Supreme Court held that the appeal before the Tribunal was indeed time-barred, as the petitioner failed to file within the statutory limitation period after the dismissal order. Furthermore, on merits, the Court affirmed that a competent authority has the power to refer an officer to a designated Medical Superintendent, whose opinion prevails unless challenged through the constitution of a Medical Board. The Court established that an employee cannot unilaterally choose private doctors to override official medical assessments and that no question of law of public importance was raised to warrant leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a departmental appeal against a dismissal order enlarge the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • Is a public servant entitled to rely on private medical certificates to override the findings of a Medical Superintendent designated by the competent authority?
  • What is the procedure for challenging the medical opinion of a Medical Superintendent regarding an employee's fitness for duty?
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• Khurshid Ahmed vs The State1983 SCMR 513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-14
  murderhostile witnessdeath sentenceocular evidencecommon intentionchance witnesscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a conviction and death sentence under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of Muhammad Ayub. The petitioner and a co-accused were convicted for the murder, which was allegedly motivated by a property dispute. The core legal questions concern the reliability of ocular evidence from witnesses labeled as 'chance witnesses' and the impact of the complainant turning hostile at trial, alongside a request for sentence mitigation based on the co-accused's sentence commutation. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the hostile complainant did not invalidate the prosecution's case, as the ocular evidence of other witnesses remained credible and consistent with the medical evidence. The Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence, noting that the petitioner's specific role and clear motive justified the capital punishment, regardless of the co-accused's sentence. The principle laid down is that the testimony of a hostile witness is subject to judicial scrutiny and does not automatically discredit other corroborated prosecution evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of a hostile witness automatically invalidate the entire prosecution case?
  • Can the evidence of witnesses present at the scene be discarded merely because they are characterized as chance witnesses?
  • Is a death sentence for one co-accused necessarily unsustainable if the co-accused's sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment?
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• Khurshid Ahmads vs The State1983 SCMR 1146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-19
  murderdeath sentence reductionimprisonment for lifegenesis of incident shrouded in mysteryocular testimonyblood-stained recoveriescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by Khurshid Ahmad challenges the judgment of the High Court upholding his conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and the confirmation of his death sentence for the murder of his wife, Mst. Shamim Akhtar. The prosecution case rested on eyewitness accounts, recovery of a blood-stained razor and clothes, motive, and medical evidence. The core legal question was whether the ocular testimony and corroborative recoveries were sufficient to sustain the capital conviction, and whether extenuating circumstances warranted a lesser sentence given that the exact genesis of the incident remained shrouded in mystery. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the eyewitnesses and recoveries firmly established the guilt of the appellant, thereby maintaining his conviction for murder. However, the Court ruled that because the immediate trigger and precise circumstances preceding the attack behind the school building were unknown, the appellant was entitled to a mitigated penalty. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that where the genesis of an occurrence is shrouded in mystery and sudden provocation or unexplained events immediately precede the crime, the lesser sentence of imprisonment for life is appropriately awarded instead of capital punishment. The conviction was upheld, the death sentence was reduced to imprisonment for life, and the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure was granted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses from different villages can be relied upon when their presence at the crime scene is satisfactorily explained and corroborated by blood-stained clothing?
  • Does the uncertainty surrounding the immediate genesis of an incident constitute a mitigating circumstance warranting the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the period spent as an under-trial prisoner when computing a sentence?
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• Khuna Gul vs Mian Said Farid and Another1983 PLD Supreme Court 209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-26
  pre-emptionlimitationcustomary lawRiwajretrospective effectvested rightstime-barred
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from a pre-emption suit filed in Swat, where the sale occurred on February 23, 1974, when the local customary law ('Riwaj') governed the area. Under Article 255 of the Riwajnama Swat, the petitioner had a one-month limitation period to file a pre-emption suit, which he failed to do within time. Subsequently, on May 20, 1974, the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (Application of Laws) Regulation 1974 extended the N-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1950 and the Limitation Act 1908 to Swat. The petitioner then filed a new suit within the one-year limitation period provided under the newly extended Act. The core legal question was whether the extension of the Limitation Act and the Pre-emption Act could revive a cause of action that had already become time-barred under the previously applicable customary law. The Supreme Court held that while a suit is generally governed by the law of limitation in force at the time of its institution, a subsequent change in the law of limitation cannot resuscitate or revitalize a cause of action that had already become barred under the old law, as the opposite party had acquired a vested right.

  Questions settled

  • Can a subsequent change or extension of the law of limitation revive a cause of action that has already become time-barred under the previously applicable law?
  • Does the extension of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act 1950 and the Limitation Act 1908 to Swat via Regulation II of 1974 affect rights and liabilities acquired or incurred under the pre-existing customary law ('Riwaj')?
  • Whether a defendant's acquired title or defense of limitation can be defeated by a subsequent procedural enactment extending the limitation period after the original period has expired?
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• Khuda Bux vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Other1983 SCMR 915 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-09-09
  giftland reformsmartial law regulationvoid ab initioleave to appealconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, grandson of a donor, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the High Court. The petition arose from an order that vacated a previous confirmation of a gift of land made under Martial Law Regulation 115. Subsequently, Martial Law Regulation 115 was amended retrospectively by Sind Ordinance No. XIV of 1972, rendering gifts to non-heirs void ab initio. The core legal questions involved whether the amending ordinance was ultra vires the Interim Constitution and whether the cancellation of the gift confirmation without notice to the donee was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the gift stood void by operation of law rendering notice unnecessary, and that the amendment did not violate the Fundamental Rights embodied in the Constitution. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that where a statutory amendment renders a transaction void ab initio by operation of law, consequential administrative orders confirming such transactions fall automatically, obviating the need for elaborate review proceedings or individual notice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amendment making certain gifts void ab initio operates by operation of law to invalidate a prior gift confirmation?
  • Is a separate notice necessary to a donee when a gift stands void ab initio by operation of a retrospective statutory amendment?
  • Whether Sind Ordinance No. XIV of 1972 is ultra vires the Fundamental Rights of the Constitution?
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• Khuda Bakhsh vs Muhammad Yaqub and Other1983 SCMR 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-21
  locus standiremand orderproperty transfersettlement of claimsurban propertyjurisdiction of settlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a constitutional petition challenging the disposal of an urban property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner exceeded the scope of a High Court remand order by dividing the disputed property between the petitioner and the respondent, and whether the petitioner retained locus standi to contest the transfer after surrendering his rights to a third party. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner had lost his locus standi by surrendering his rights to seek transfer in favor of another individual. Furthermore, the Court held that the petitioner had acquiesced to the remand order, which broadly opened all questions regarding the property's transfer, including its divisibility. The Court affirmed that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction in dividing the property, as it was in the possession of multiple claimants. The principle established is that a party who accepts a remand order cannot later challenge the scope of that order, and a claimant who surrenders their rights to transfer lacks standing to contest subsequent property allocations.

  Questions settled

  • Does a claimant who has surrendered their right to seek transfer of property retain locus standi to challenge subsequent transfer orders?
  • Can a party who accepts a remand order later challenge the authority of the subordinate officer to decide issues within the scope of that remand?
  • Is a Deputy Settlement Commissioner competent to divide a property between multiple occupants if the remand order opens all questions regarding the disposal of the house?
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• Khuda Bakhsh vs Muhammad Siddique Khan1983 SCMR 1187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-31
  adalapi agreementspecific performancebreach of contracttime as essence of contractcompensation for improvementsconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld a decree for possession of land in favor of the respondent. The respondent had entered into an 'adalapi' agreement with the petitioner in 1963 for the development of a mango orchard on 84 kanals of land. The respondent sued for possession in 1971, alleging the petitioner failed to fulfill the contractual terms within the stipulated seven-year period. The trial court decreed the suit, and the High Court dismissed the petitioner's second appeal, affirming that time was of the essence and that the petitioner failed to develop the orchard as agreed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that time was not of the essence and claimed entitlement to compensation for improvements. The Supreme Court held that the issues raised were essentially questions of fact, noting that the lower courts concurrently found the petitioner failed to comply with the agreement and failed to provide evidence justifying compensation. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding breach of contract?
  • Is a party entitled to compensation for improvements on land if they fail to prove the costs incurred?
  • Does a failure to develop land within a stipulated timeframe under an adalapi agreement justify a decree for possession?
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• Khuda Bakhsh and 2 Others Iqbal Alias Baley vs The State the State the State1983 SCMR 336 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Khizar Hayat and Others vs The State1983 SCMR 889 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-02
  criminal appealcompromiseculpable homicidereduction of sentencefamily disputecompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning convictions under sections 304, Part I, 324, and 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code. During the pendency of the proceedings, the parties, who are close relatives, entered into a compromise. The legal heirs of the deceased victims stated that they accepted compensation and had forgiven the petitioners, expressing no objection to their acquittal. The Advocate-General expressed no opposition, and several heirs were present or filed affidavits confirming the settlement. The Supreme Court considered the compromise in the interest of peace and good relations, dismissed the petition as not pressed for some petitioners whose sentences were already served, converted the petition into an appeal for the remaining principal petitioners, and reduced their substantive sentences of imprisonment to the period already undergone while maintaining the fines and compensation orders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can reduce the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone in view of a compromise between the parties in a criminal matter?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be converted into an appeal by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether a sentence of fine can be maintained while reducing the substantive sentence of imprisonment based on a compromise?
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• Khizar Hayat and Others and Ghulam Nabi vs The State Khizar Hayat1983 SCMR 638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-12Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Shaiq Hassan vs Rai Ahmad Noor and Other1983 SCMR 677 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-12
  evacuee propertyproperty transfersettlement lawslimitationjurisdictionproperty divisionallotmentpossessionwrit petitioncondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court concerned the transfer of the residential portion of a house in Jhang Sadar, an evacuee property. The core legal questions revolved around the appellant's entitlement as an allottee deemed to be in possession, the timeliness of the respondent's appeal against the rejection of his L.H. Form, and the legality of dividing the property to enable transfer to a local resident. The Supreme Court held that the question of limitation goes to the root of jurisdiction and must be decided by Settlement Tribunals even if not urged by parties. It further ruled that the bifurcation of a house to reduce its value below Rs. 10,000 for transfer to a local was contrary to the Chief Settlement Commissioner's notification, unless such division pre-existed partition and formed an independent unit. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and declaring the appellant entitled to the transfer of the residential portion of the property.

  Questions settled

  • Does the question of limitation go to the root of jurisdiction for Settlement Tribunals?
  • Are Settlement Tribunals obligated to decide the question of limitation even if not raised by the parties?
  • Is the bifurcation of a house permissible to bring its value below Rs. 10,000 to enable transfer to a local in possession?
  • Does participation in an auction of commercial units estop a party from challenging the transfer of a disputed residential property?
  • What constitutes "possession" under Section 2(6) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
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• Khani Zaman vs The State1983 SCMR 573 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-22
  murderco-accused statementconfessionadmissibility of evidencecapital sentencecriminal appealpolice firing
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Khani Zaman, a Head Constable, for the murder of an Army Naik (N. K. Lal Hussain) during an altercation at a cinema in Kohat. The core legal questions involved the admissibility and evidentiary value of an exculpatory statement made by a co-accused (Mir Abbas) under section 30 of the Evidence Act, and whether the remaining evidence was sufficient to sustain a capital conviction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a statement by a co-accused that exculpates the maker while heavily implicating a co-accused does not amount to a 'confession' and is entirely inadmissible against the co-accused under section 30 of the Evidence Act. Setting aside the statement of the co-accused and noting that no eyewitness saw the actual firing inside the manager's room, the Court found the remaining evidence insufficient to prove the charge. The appeal was accepted, the conviction and death sentence were set aside, and the appellant was ordered to be released.

  Questions settled

  • Is a statement by a co-accused that exculpates the maker while incriminating another accused admissible as a confession under section 30 of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Can a conviction on a capital charge be sustained solely on the basis of an inadmissible statement of a co-accused?
  • Whether the application of section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is justified when the fatal act is attributed to the independent personal volition of a single accused?
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• Khan Ziaullah Khan and Others vs Settlement Commissioner (Lands)1983 SCMR 1196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-01
  allotment cancellationsettlement of claimsland allotmentsurplus landadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld an order by the Settlement Commissioner (Lands). The Settlement Commissioner had cancelled an allotment of land previously made to the petitioners, favoring respondent No. 2, whose claim had been pending since 1961, whereas the petitioners' claim only originated in 1970. The petitioners challenged this cancellation, arguing that even if the cancellation was valid, the authorities should have only allotted a portion of the land to respondent No. 2, allowing the petitioners to retain the remaining balance. The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court's findings, which noted that the Settlement Commissioner could not allot an area exceeding the claim of respondent No. 2. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's position, holding that if the area allotted to the respondent is less than the total land previously held by the petitioners, the petitioners are entitled to retain the surplus. The Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, granting the petitioners liberty to approach the relevant authorities to adjust the allotment based on the actual extent of the respondent's claim.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner allot land in excess of a claimant's entitlement?
  • Are petitioners entitled to retain surplus land if the successful claimant's entitlement is less than the total land allotted?
  • Does the cancellation of an allotment for a superior claim require the forfeiture of the entire land if the claim is smaller than the total area?
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• Khan Shahzada vs Maulvi Fazal Rabi and 3 Otiimss1983 SCMR 125 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-08
  election petitionelection tribunalvalidity of ballot papersdraw of lotsestoppel against statutelocal councils electionjurisdiction of election tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines whether an Election Tribunal can inquire into the validity of ballot-papers for the first time when no objection was raised before the Presiding Officer during the count under the N.-W. F. P. Local Councils (Election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman) Rules, 1979. The election for the Chairman of a Union Council resulted in a tie, resolved by drawing lots in favor of the appellant. The first respondent challenged the election via an Election Petition before the Deputy Commissioner, who inspected the ballot-papers, found two votes cast in favor of the appellant to be invalid due to improper marking, and declared the first respondent successful. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Election Tribunal possesses exclusive jurisdiction under Rule 8 to determine election disputes and examine ballot validity, and that the failure to raise an objection before the Presiding Officer does not bar the Tribunal from deciding the question. The Court also rejected pleas of estoppel and acquiescence, affirming that there can be no estoppel against a statute.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Election Tribunal examine the validity of ballot-papers for the first time when no objection was raised before the Presiding Officer during the count?
  • Does the failure of a candidate to object to ballot-papers before the Presiding Officer bar them from filing an Election Petition challenging the election result?
  • Can the doctrine of estoppel or acquiescence be invoked against a statutory procedure governing election disputes?
  • What is the scope of jurisdiction of an Election Tribunal under Rule 8 of the N.-W. F. P. Local Councils (Election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman) Rules, 1979?
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• Khan Rehman Mian vs Tor Lali Bacha1983 SCMR 563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-11
  pre-emptionlimitation periodphysical possessionunregistered sale-deedconcurrent findingspetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the lower courts, including the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's revision application and held that the respondent's pre-emption suit was within time. The core legal question concerned the determination of the starting point of limitation for filing a pre-emption suit where the sale of land was effected through an unregistered document and not recorded in the register of mutations, specifically invoking section 31(1) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, which links limitation to the date of taking physical possession. The Supreme Court held that all three courts below correctly appreciated the evidence, including the petitioner's own statement, in concluding that actual physical possession was taken four to five months after the sale transaction rather than on the date of the execution of the sale-deed. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that concurrent findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • What is the starting point of limitation for a pre-emption suit under section 31(1) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, when the sale is made through an unregistered document not recorded in the register of mutations?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the date of taking physical possession of suit land based on the appreciation of evidence by the lower courts?
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• Khan Muhammad Ayub Khan vs Ch. Sami Ullah Khan1983 SCMR 472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-02
  ejectment proceedingsrent defaultstriking off defenceconcurrent findings of factlandlord and tenantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from ejectment proceedings initiated by a landlord against a tenant. The core legal question was whether the tenant had committed a default in the payment of rent, thereby justifying the striking off of his defence under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. The Rent Controller had initially ordered the tenant to deposit arrears and future rent, subsequently striking out the defence for non-compliance regarding specific months. However, the Appellate Court reversed this finding, determining that previous deposits made by the tenant were sufficient to cover the alleged arrears, thus negating the claim of default. The High Court upheld this decision. The Supreme Court, upon review, affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, noting that the determination of default was a question of fact. Having examined the accounts, the Court concluded that no default had occurred. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that appellate courts will generally not interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding rent deposits unless a clear error is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with a finding of fact regarding rent default when lower courts have concurrent findings?
  • Does the adjustment of previously deposited amounts against alleged rent arrears negate a finding of default under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance?
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• Khalid Mahmood and Others vs Muhammad Akram Sheikh and Other1983 SCMR 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-25
  civil serviceseniority determinationservice tribunalleave to appealinterim relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three Civil Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal regarding the determination of seniority of civil servants. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether the order passed by the Service Tribunal was based on correct statutory and legal principles applicable to the determination of seniority for civil servants. Upon review, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the validity of the Tribunal's decision. Regarding the prayer made by the petitioners to suspend the operation of the impugned order pending the final adjudication of the appeals, the Court found no sufficient justification to grant such interim relief. Consequently, the Court proceeded to grant leave to consider the merits of the legal questions raised concerning seniority determination, while declining to stay the operation of the impugned order. The judgment serves as a procedural step in the appellate process, focusing on the necessity of reviewing the Tribunal's application of seniority rules without disturbing the existing order during the pendency of the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is there sufficient justification to suspend the operation of a Service Tribunal's order regarding civil servant seniority pending an appeal?
  • Does the Supreme Court have grounds to grant leave to appeal to examine the statutory principles applied by a Service Tribunal in determining seniority?
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• Khair Din vs Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and Other1983 SCMR 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-13
  rural buildingsettlement schemedisvibility of propertycomposite propertyconstitutional petitiontransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition concerning the transfer of a composite rural building comprising two shops and a residential unit under Settlement Scheme No. VII. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to the transfer of the entire residential portion, including the part situated on top of the shop transferred to a respondent, or whether the settlement authorities correctly divided the property and transferred the upper portion along with the shop to the commercial occupant. The Supreme Court held that where a rural building is occupied by more than one person, the inter se entitlement of the occupants must be determined in accordance with the general principles of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and relevant settlement schemes, empowering authorities to divide composite properties vertically or treat parts as commercial units. The Court concluded that the concurrent findings regarding the divisibility and transfer of the property were unexceptionable and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether settlement authorities are competent to order different parts of a composite rural building to be treated separately as commercial or residential units?
  • Does a rural building occupied by more than one person require the inter se entitlement of occupants to be determined in accordance with general principles of the Act and Settlement Schemes?
  • Can a court interfere with the division of a rural building by settlement authorities where the property is found to be indivisible in a manner that serves the interests of the parties?
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• Khadim Hussain vs The State1983 SC M R124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-21
  post-arrest bailrule of consistencyco-accusedmurderequal treatment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of the petitioner's bail application by the High Court. The petitioner was accused of offences under Sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. While his co-accused had been granted bail by the learned Sessions Judge, Faisalabad, the petitioner's bail applications were repeatedly dismissed by the High Court on the sole ground that his earlier bail application had been rejected. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the ground of rule of consistency, given that his case was identical to that of his co-accused who were already released on bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since the petitioner's case was absolutely at par with that of his co-accused, he was entitled to the same treatment. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and granted bail to the petitioner, establishing that the rule of consistency must be applied when the role of the accused is identical to those already enlarged on bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to the grant of bail on the ground of consistency if their co-accused with similar roles have already been released on bail?
  • Can a subsequent bail application be dismissed solely on the ground of the rejection of an earlier bail application when co-accused have since been granted bail?
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• Khadim Hussain vs Nazir and Other1983 SCMR 986 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-16
  leave to appealappraisal of evidenceocular testimonyinterested witnessesmurderrecovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, which acquitted the respondent of the murder of the complainant's brother. The core legal question concerns the proper appreciation of ocular testimony by related witnesses, the corroborative value of a blood-stained weapon recovery, and whether the High Court erred in rejecting the prosecution's evidence. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised regarding the appreciation of evidence and corroboration warranted a thorough examination. The Court laid down the principle that a case is fit for the reappraisal of evidence by the apex court when the High Court fails to evaluate prosecution evidence in accordance with well-established principles governing criminal cases, particularly regarding related witnesses and corroborative recoveries.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eye-witnesses who are related to the deceased can be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship without proof of a motive to falsely implicate the accused?
  • Does the recovery of a blood-stained weapon provide sufficient corroboration to ocular testimony in a murder trial?
  • When is a criminal case considered fit for the reappraisal of evidence by the Supreme Court following an acquittal by the High Court?
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• Khadim Hussain vs Mst. Ghulam Janna T and Another1983 SCMR 758 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-12
  writ jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factsummary dismissalejectment petitionrent controljudicial application of mindleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a tenant, challenged an ejectment order granted in favor of the respondent, who required the shop for her son's personal use. After the Rent Controller and the appellate court ruled against the petitioner, the High Court dismissed his writ petition in limine, citing concurrent findings of fact. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court's summary dismissal order was legally insufficient and failed to constitute a proper judgment, relying on precedent regarding the disposal of writ petitions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. It held that while a court must demonstrate it has applied its mind, there is no requirement for a writ dismissal order to follow a specific, elaborate format, provided the reasoning is decipherable. The Court distinguished the present case from precedents involving quasi-judicial authorities, noting that here, the impugned order originated from a judicial authority, and the High Court had clearly identified that the concurrent findings of fact did not warrant interference under writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a High Court required to write a detailed judgment when dismissing a writ petition in limine?
  • Does a summary dismissal order in a writ petition satisfy legal requirements if the reasoning is decipherable?
  • Can a High Court refuse to interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a rent matter under writ jurisdiction?
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• Kh. Azhar Hussain and Another vs The State1983 SCMR 978 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-19
  murderattempt to murderocular testimonyinjured witnessesbenefit of doubtfugitive from lawcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the conviction of the appellants for murder, attempt to murder, and house trespass. The core legal questions involved the assessment of ocular testimony of injured and related witnesses, the sustainability of convictions where co-accused were acquitted on benefit of doubt, and the effect of a fugitive appellant. The Supreme Court held that the consistent, direct testimony of injured eye-witnesses sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant Muhammad Aslam despite the acquittal of co-accused, and dismissed the appeal of the fugitive appellant Khawaja Azhar Hussain as he remained absconding. The key principle laid down is that the testimony of injured eye-witnesses, whose presence is unquestionable, can safely form the basis of a conviction even if some co-accused are given the benefit of the doubt, provided the evidence against the convicted person is direct and unimpeachable.

  Questions settled

  • Can the conviction of an accused be sustained on the testimony of injured eye-witnesses when some of the co-accused have been acquitted on the basis of benefit of the doubt?
  • What is the legal effect on a criminal appeal when the appellant becomes a fugitive from law?
  • Whether the presence of injuries on the person of an accused can substantiate a plea of right of private defence in the face of consistent ocular testimony establishing unprovoked aggression?
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• Kaura vs The State and Other1983 SCMR 436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-06-02
  First Information Reportregistration of FIRsecond FIRcriminal investigationpolice dutysame transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which directed the police to register a fresh First Information Report (F.I.R.) regarding a murder that was already the subject of an existing, registered F.I.R. The core legal question was whether the police can be compelled to register a second F.I.R. for the same occurrence when an investigation into the initial report is already underway. The Supreme Court held that once a case is registered under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the investigative process is set in motion, and the police are both competent and duty-bound to uncover the truth and identify the actual culprits. Consequently, the registration of a second, fresh report regarding the same transaction is legally unnecessary and improper. The Court observed that the High Court's impugned order likely stemmed from an accidental slip and suggested that the petitioner seek a review before the High Court to rectify the situation. The petition was dismissed with these observations.

  Questions settled

  • Can the police be directed to register a second FIR for the same murder when an FIR has already been registered?
  • Is the registration of a fresh FIR necessary when an investigation into the same incident is already pending under an existing FIR?
  • Does the registration of a second FIR for the same incident cause prejudice to the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Karim Jan vs The State1983 SCMR 288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-09
  criminal misappropriationentrustment of propertyanti-corruptionpublic servantcriminal breach of truststock deficiency
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a criminal appeal directed against the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction of the petitioner under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 for misappropriation of government stores while serving as an incharge of stores in the Agriculture Department. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution successfully proved the entrustment of property and the dishonest intention of the petitioner, and whether the withholding of the original stock register vitiated the trial. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding entrustment and shortage of stock were well-founded, that the petitioner's conduct in absconding when asked to open the store demonstrated a guilty conscience, and that the absence of a formal written order did not negate control where actual custody and control were established. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution must prove a formal written order of appointment to establish entrustment of property in a charge of criminal breach of trust against a public servant?
  • Does the failure to produce the original stock register necessarily vitiate a conviction for misappropriation when other evidence proves the shortage?
  • Can a public servant's flight or disappearance upon being asked to open a storehouse be used as evidence of a guilty conscience regarding stock deficiencies?
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• Karim Bakhsh vs Hajiarthi Khan and Other1983 SCMR 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-19
  ejectmenttenantbona fide personal needreconstructionleave to appealconcurrent findingsattorney statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 8th of June, 1982, which dismissed the second appeal and upheld the concurrent orders of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller and the District Judge. The core legal questions involved whether the personal bona fide need and intention to reconstruct could be proved through the statement of the landlord's attorney instead of the landlord himself, and whether impairment of utility and previous litigation findings justified ejectment. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the landlord's large family, lack of residential accommodation, and the impairment of the premises' utility by installing oil extracting machines were fully supported by evidence, and the absence of the landlord from the witness box did not vitiate the claim. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, laying down that an attorney's statement coupled with sufficient documentary and oral evidence can lawfully substantiate a landlord's bona fide personal need and reconstruction intent in ejectment proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord's bona fide personal need and intention to reconstruct be legally established through the statement of his attorney instead of the landlord appearing personally in the witness box?
  • Whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding ejectment recorded by the Rent Controller and appellate authorities can be interfered with in second appeal when supported by sufficient evidence?
  • Does the installation of machinery and making alterations that impair the utility of leased premises constitute a valid ground for the tenant's ejectment?
  Read full judgment →
• Karam Bakhsh and 7 Others vs Nazir Ahmad and 2 Other1983 SCMR 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  pre-emption decreerehabilitation claimlis pendenssettlement revisionmutationland allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which allowed a settlement revision regarding the verification of a land claim based on a pre-emption decree. The core legal question was whether a pre-emption decree obtained prior to migration could be validly relied upon for land allotment purposes, despite objections regarding the vendors' interest, the decree's executability, and the non-attestation of the mutation. The Supreme Court held that the Rehabilitation Commissioner had already conclusively determined the validity and legal effect of the civil court decree in 1953. The Court found that the non-attestation of the mutation resulted from mass migration rather than any failure to satisfy decree conditions. Consequently, the High Court’s decision to uphold the claim was correct. The Court further affirmed that the rights of subsequent purchasers and informers were subject to the doctrine of lis pendens, as their interests arose during the pendency of the dispute. The petitions were dismissed, reinforcing that once a competent authority has verified a claim, it must be given effect.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emption decree be relied upon for rehabilitation land claims if the mutation was not attested due to mass migration?
  • Does the doctrine of lis pendens apply to purchasers of land whose interests arise during the pendency of a settlement dispute?
  • Can a final decision by a Rehabilitation Commissioner regarding the validity of a civil court decree be reopened in subsequent settlement revisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Karachi Transport Corporation vs Iqbal Ahmed Memon and Another1983 SCMR 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-10
  service tribunal jurisdictionremoval from serviceapplication of mindspecial leave to appealcompetent authorityjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which set aside the removal of an employee from the Karachi Transport Corporation. The core legal questions were whether the Service Tribunal possessed jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against an order of removal from service, and whether the Tribunal correctly determined that the competent authority failed to apply its mind when terminating the employee. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Service Tribunal correctly exercised its jurisdiction as the removal order did not fall under the specific bars regarding fitness for appointment or promotion. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the Tribunal's finding that the removal order was unsustainable because the competent authority had not properly evaluated the relevant facts, particularly given that the same authority had recently recommended the employee for a senior position elsewhere. The key principle established is that while authorities may have powers to remove employees under special ordinances, such actions remain subject to judicial review by the Service Tribunal to ensure they are taken with due application of mind and in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar in Section 4(1)(b) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 regarding 'fitness or otherwise' apply to an order of removal from service?
  • Can a service tribunal set aside a removal order if the competent authority failed to apply its mind to the relevant facts?
  • Is an order of removal from service passed under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance 1973 immune from challenge before the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Kanwar Imam Din vs Muhammad Rafique and Another1983 SCMR 791 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-26
  bailmurderminor accusedcancellation of baildiscretionary reliefattendant circumstances
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal converted into an appeal, challenging the grant of bail to the respondent who is facing prosecution for murder. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting bail to a minor accused under the proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a capital case, taking into account conflicting evidence regarding age and the attendant circumstances of the crime. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while discretion exists to grant bail to an accused under sixteen years of age in cases punishable with death or life imprisonment, such discretion must not be exercised by ignoring the gravity and attendant circumstances of the offense, such as playing a leading role in the attack. The Court laid down the principle that the discretion to grant bail based on age in heinous crimes must be weighed against the conduct and specific role attributed to the accused in the commission of the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted to an accused under the age of sixteen in a case punishable with death or transportation for life without considering the attendant circumstances of the crime?
  • Does playing a leading role in a murder attack preclude the grant of bail on the ground of being under sixteen years of age?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the exercise of discretion by the High Court in granting bail when relevant circumstances of the crime were ignored?
  Read full judgment →
• Kanwal Nain and 3 Others vs Fateh Khan and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-07-07
  revisional jurisdictionCode of Civil ProcedureTransfer of Property Actbona fide purchaserostensible ownerbenami transactionconcurrent findings of factappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerned a dispute over a two-thirds share in urban property, where the first respondent claimed his sons (respondents 2 and 3) were benami owners, and their subsequent sale to the appellants was invalid. The trial court and Additional District Judge concurrently held that the appellants were bona fide purchasers for value without notice, protected by Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and dismissed the suit. However, the High Court, in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, re-examined the evidence and overturned these concurrent findings, concluding the appellants had not acted with reasonable care. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the High Court's exercise of revisional powers. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had overstepped its jurisdiction by re-appraising evidence and upsetting concurrent findings of fact in revision, as revisional powers are primarily for correcting jurisdictional errors, not for re-examining facts unless the decision is perverse or based on no evidence. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed, affirming the protection of bona fide purchasers under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, re-appraise evidence and overturn concurrent findings of fact by lower courts?
  • What are the limits of revisional powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding questions of fact?
  • Under what conditions does Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 protect a transferee from an ostensible owner?
  • Is a transferee protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 if the real owner allowed the transferor to hold himself out as the owner?
  • What constitutes 'reasonable care' and 'good faith' for a transferee seeking protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  Read full judgment →
• Kala vs The State1983 PLD Supreme Court 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-13
  murder convictionocular evidencedeath sentenceFIR omissionwitness credibilitymitigating circumstancesjudicial delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of a co-villager. The core legal questions concern the reliability of ocular evidence from related witnesses, the impact of omitting an eye-witness's name from the First Information Report (FIR), the alleged inconsistency between medical and ocular evidence, and whether the death sentence warrants commutation due to the passage of time or alleged mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the relationship of a witness to the deceased does not inherently invalidate their testimony, and that the omission of a witness's name from the FIR does not automatically render their evidence unreliable if they are otherwise credible. The Court found no contradiction between the medical and ocular accounts, noting that the assailant's position relative to the victim explained the injury placement. Regarding sentencing, the Court affirmed that prior disputes settled by a panchayat do not constitute mitigating circumstances, and that judicial delay alone is insufficient to commute a death sentence to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the relationship of an eye-witness to the deceased automatically invalidate their testimony in a murder trial?
  • Does the omission of an eye-witness's name from the First Information Report render their subsequent testimony unreliable?
  • Can judicial delay in the disposal of an appeal serve as a sufficient ground for commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Does a prior dispute settled by a village panchayat constitute a mitigating circumstance for sentencing in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Kajal Khan vs The State1983 SCMR 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-18
  criminal appealmurder convictionchance witnesseseye-witness testimonyblood-feudcorroborationappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction for murder under the Pakistan Penal Code. The appellant, Kajal Khan, was convicted by the trial court for stabbing the deceased, Ishaq Khan, in furtherance of a common intention. The High Court upheld the conviction but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the testimony of two alleged eye-witnesses, who were deemed chance witnesses, was sufficient to sustain a conviction in the presence of admitted blood-feud enmity and the unexplained absence of natural witnesses. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that relying on the testimony of chance witnesses in a case involving long-standing enmity, without independent corroboration, is unsafe. The Court established the principle that where natural witnesses—such as the father and brother of the deceased—are present near the scene but are not produced as eye-witnesses, and the prosecution relies instead on chance witnesses, the evidence lacks the necessary credibility to support a conviction, especially when the conduct of the witnesses contradicts normal human behavior.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the testimony of chance witnesses in the presence of long-standing enmity?
  • Is it safe to rely on the testimony of eye-witnesses when natural witnesses present at the scene were not produced?
  • Does the failure of immediate family members to lodge an F.I.R. when present at the scene cast doubt on the prosecution's version of events?
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• Jehan Bahadur vs Hazrat Wali and Other1983 SCMR 872 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-01
  mortgagee rightscivil revisionres judicatarevenue recordproperty identityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a Peshawar High Court judgment dismissing a civil revision concerning a dispute over mortgagee rights in land. The petitioner claimed mortgagee rights through purchase from predecessors-in-interest whose own claims to those rights had been previously litigated and dismissed in a prior civil suit. The plaintiff-respondents, having purchased rights from a different party, sought possession and the removal of the petitioner from the revenue record. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court reversed this, finding that the petitioner could not acquire rights that had been judicially negated in the earlier litigation and that the identity of the suit property was established. The High Court affirmed these findings. The Supreme Court, upon review, held that the petitioner could not validly purchase rights that the predecessors-in-interest did not possess or that had been extinguished by a prior judicial decree. Furthermore, the Court found that the identity of the property was sufficiently established by the evidence. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person acquire valid mortgagee rights from a predecessor-in-interest whose own claim to such rights has been dismissed by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  • Is a party bound by the outcome of a previous litigation regarding the same property rights when they claim title through the unsuccessful party in that prior suit?
  • Can a court rely on the identity of property established by boundaries provided in the record when determining competing claims to mortgagee rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Anwar and Others vs Ch. Jamil Hassan Manj and Other1983 SCMR 1261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-12
  leave to appealcompromise orderconstitutional petitioncompensation poolland allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, successful informants, sought leave to appeal against a compromise order recorded by the Lahore High Court on 3-12-1978, which disposed of a constitutional petition regarding property allotments in Village Datewali, Tehsil and District Gujranwala. The core legal question was whether a compromise arrangement allowing parties to retain land allotments—including portions allegedly obtained by fraud or without a genuine claim—could damage the interest of the compensation pool without equivalent produce index units or price being received. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the interest of the compensation pool was compromised by the agreement reached between the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a compromise order in a constitutional petition can allow the retention of land allotments obtained by fraud or without a genuine claim?
  • Does an agreed arrangement between parties regarding land allotments from the compensation pool prejudice the interest of the pool if equivalent produce index units or price are not received?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed and Another vs The State1983 SCMR 557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-14
  criminal appealmurderattempted murdercompromisesentencingself-defencecommon intentionland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the conviction of Javed and Muhammad Ayyaz for offences including murder and attempted murder, stemming from a land dispute. The appellants challenged their convictions, arguing self-defence and contesting the application of common intention. The Supreme Court examined the evidence and determined that the land in question belonged to the appellants, leading to the acquittal of the charge under Section 447 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court held that Muhammad Ayyaz was not liable for the murder charge, converting his conviction to attempted murder under Section 307, and noting he had already served sufficient time. Regarding Javed, the Court rejected the plea of self-defence but acknowledged a compromise reached between the parties. Relying on precedent, the Court reduced Javed's death sentence to imprisonment for life, set aside the fines due to compensation paid, and granted the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The judgment clarifies the scope of individual liability in joint criminal acts and the impact of compromise on sentencing in capital cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 447 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained if the accused are the rightful owners of the land in dispute?
  • Does a compromise between parties in a murder case warrant the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Is a co-accused liable for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if they only participated in an attack on a different victim?
  • Should the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be granted when commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• Jan Muhammad vs Muhammad Siddique and Other1983 SCMR 1226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-12
  writ jurisdictionfindings of factstatutory authoritiesremand orderleave to appealends of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court, which set aside a decision by the Assistant Commissioner/Collector, Chunian, and remanded the matter for a fresh decision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, should interfere with findings of fact recorded by a statutory authority when that authority allegedly overlooked material evidence and failed to apply its mind to the merits of the case. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's order. The Court held that while it is a general principle that the High Court should not normally interfere with factual findings of statutory authorities in writ jurisdiction, such interference is justified when the High Court's order is designed to further the ends of justice and ensure a decision based on the true merits of the case. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, upholding the High Court's decision to remand the matter for a proper adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Should the High Court interfere with findings of fact recorded by a statutory authority in its writ jurisdiction?
  • Is a High Court order remanding a case for fresh decision to ensure justice a proper exercise of writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against a High Court order that remands a matter to a statutory authority for a decision on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Jalal Shah Ahd Others vs Custodian of Evacuee Property, West1983SCMR 614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-03-27
  evacuee propertyadverse possessionleave to appealrevenue recordsrehabilitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute concerning evacuee land originally belonging to Hindus who left for India upon Partition. The petitioners claimed title through adverse possession for over twelve years prior to March 1947. After various proceedings before the revenue and rehabilitation authorities and the High Court, the petitioners sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal questions involved the proper appreciation of revenue records regarding adverse possession and the correct interpretation of section 3 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance 1957, specifically whether its protection extends to persons in unauthorized possession or management of evacuee properties. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions of general public importance relating to the interpretation of the statutory provisions of the Ordinance. The Court held that the legal issues raised warranted a full hearing and accordingly granted leave to appeal while continuing the stay already granted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the finding of adverse possession prior to 1st March 1947 was based on a proper appreciation of revenue records?
  • Whether the protection of section 3 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance 1957 is available only to persons who possessed the property under lawful authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Jaffar Khan vs Mst. Shah Begum1983 SCMR 221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-24
  Shariat Law of Inheritancelimited estatecustomary lawcompromise deedreopening of inheritancemutationlife interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a dispute over agricultural land originally owned by a deceased person whose estate was subjected to previous litigation and a compromise deed in 1943 granting a widow a life interest. The core legal question was the effect of the enforcement of the Shariat Law of Inheritance on prior customary law compromises and limited estates held by widows. The Supreme Court held that upon the termination of the limited estate under the Shariat Act, the entire inheritance reopened and earlier compromise deeds restricting the widow to a life interest or maintenance must yield to statutory succession rights. The key principle laid down is that limited estates held under customary law terminated upon the enactment of the Shariat application statutes, necessitating the reopening of inheritance according to Islamic law regardless of prior family compromises.

  Questions settled

  • What is the effect of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962 on a limited estate previously created under customary law?
  • Does a prior family compromise restricting a widow to a life interest survive the enforcement of the Shariat Law of Inheritance?
  • Must the inheritance be reopened upon the termination of a limited life estate under the Shariat Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Jafar Khan and Others vs Arif and Other1983 SCMR 443 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-08
  unlawful assemblyconstructive liabilitysudden fightculpable homicidecommon objectcriminal appealcompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved criminal appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment concerning convictions for murder and assault. The core legal question was whether the accused were liable under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for constructive liability as an unlawful assembly, or if individual liability applied under Exception IV to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 due to a sudden fight. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly rejected the application of Section 149, finding that the accused acted individually during a sudden fight rather than as a pre-planned unlawful assembly. The Court maintained the convictions under Section 304, Part I, but enhanced the fines and compensation amounts for the heirs of the deceased. The key principle laid down is that where prosecution evidence indicates a sudden fight and unexplained injuries on the accused side, constructive liability under Section 149 is not automatically applicable; instead, individual responsibility for specific acts is the appropriate legal standard when a common object is not established.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of weapons consistent with agricultural work and the lack of a pre-arranged plan negate the common object required for an unlawful assembly under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a court convict accused persons for individual acts rather than constructive liability when the evidence suggests a sudden fight rather than a pre-planned attack?
  • Is the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries sustained by the accused a relevant factor in determining whether a case falls under Exception IV to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Islamic Republic of Pakistan vs Haji Ahmad Jan and Other1983 SCMR 765 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-17
  deputation allowanceservice tribunalreversiongovernment servantlienlending and borrowing government
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal directing the Government of Pakistan to pay the respondent, a permanent provincial employee retained by the Central Government upon the takeover of the Regional Passport Office, a deputation allowance for the period he held a higher post. The core legal question was whether the provincial employee, subsequently reverted to his parent department due to a policy change, was entitled to a deputation allowance despite initial terms disallowing it under an expected permanent absorption scheme. The Supreme Court held that the initial denial of deputation pay was tied to a policy of permanent absorption which the Central Government failed to honor, and upon the policy's reversal and the respondent's reversion, he reverted to the status of a deputationist governed by the terms and conditions clarified by the lending provincial government. The Court laid down the principle that when a government servant retains a lien in their parent department and the premise of permanent absorption in the borrowing department fails due to a unilateral policy reversal, the employee is entitled to deputation terms and allowances as determined by the lending authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a provincial government employee transferred to the central government is entitled to a deputation allowance upon being reverted due to a policy change?
  • Does the failure of a borrowing government to permanently absorb an opted staff member alter the employee's status to that of a deputationist?
  • Are the terms of employment of a deputationist governed by the rules of the lending government?
  Read full judgment →
• Islamic Republic of Pakistan vs Da. Safdar Mahmood1983 PLD Supreme Court 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-20
  service tribunalcivil servantreversionad hoc appointmentpunitive reversionSection 12 Civil Servants Actjurisdiction of service tribunals
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a Service Tribunal order reinstating a civil servant to Grade 20. The respondent, originally an Income-tax officer, was promoted to Grade 20 in the Intelligence Bureau. Following a change in government, he was reverted to Grade 19 and subsequently faced disciplinary proceedings for misconduct, which were later dropped, though the reversion was maintained. The government argued the reversion was a valid exercise of power under Section 12 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, claiming the appointment was ad hoc. The Service Tribunal ruled the appointment was not ad hoc and the reversion was a punitive measure in disguise. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Service Tribunal is the exclusive arbiter of facts in service matters. The Court found the Tribunal's factual determination that the appointment was not temporary was plausible. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the reversion was a punitive action disguised as an administrative one, and thus not protected by Section 12. The judgment reinforces the finality of Service Tribunal findings on facts and limits judicial interference in service disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to interfere with findings of fact made by a Service Tribunal in service matters?
  • Can a civil servant appointed to a higher grade be reverted without notice under Section 12 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, if the appointment was not ad hoc, temporary, or officiating?
  • Is a reversion of a civil servant to a lower grade valid if it is imposed as a punitive measure disguised as an administrative act?
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• Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad vs Qazi Abdul Karim, Deputy Accountant General, N.W.F.P., Peshawar and Another1983 SCMR 883 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-07
  service tribunalhigher postpay of the higher officeofficiating appointmentfundamental rulesleave to appealgovernment employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is filed by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan against the judgment of the Services Tribunal, Islamabad, which accepted the appeal of respondent No. 1. The respondent, employed as an Assistant Accounts Officer, had worked in the higher post of Deputy Accountant-General for various periods without formal promotion to that grade. The core legal question was whether an employee who is appointed to officiate in a higher post involving greater responsibilities is entitled to draw the pay of that higher office, despite terms in his appointment restricting him to his original grade's pay. The Supreme Court held that the Services Tribunal rightly concluded in favor of the respondent, ruling that as long as an employee's services are utilized in a higher post, they are entitled to draw the minimum pay admissible in that post. The key principle laid down is that officiating in a higher post carries the right to draw the minimum pay of that grade regardless of restrictive conditions in the appointment notification, aligning with established jurisprudence.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee entitled to draw the pay of a higher post when appointed to officiate in it despite a condition restricting him to his original grade's pay?
  • Does an employee who performs duties in a higher office without formal promotion have a right to the minimum pay of that grade for the period worked?
  Read full judgment →
• Irshad Khan vs Abdul Majeed and 3 Other1983 SCMR 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-19
  local electionelection petitiondisqualificationpolitical basisconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's dismissal in limine of a constitutional petition relating to a local government election. The petitioner, who had been declared successful in the election for Union Council No. 50 (Electoral Unit, Nizampur Ghallian), faced an election petition filed by respondent No. 2. The Election Tribunal allowed the petition, set aside the election result, and disqualified the petitioner for four years under section 21-A of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, for contesting on a political basis. The High Court dismissed the subsequent constitutional petition, holding that the Tribunal's findings of fact were conclusive and not open to interference. The Supreme Court considered whether the Election Tribunal misread the evidence. The Court held that the counsel failed to point out any misreading justifying interference, and that seeking a reappraisal of evidence in writ jurisdiction is unwarranted. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that findings of fact by a tribunal are conclusive unless shown to be without lawful authority through clear misreading.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court reappraise evidence in its constitutional jurisdiction against findings of fact by an Election Tribunal?
  • Whether findings of fact arrived at by an Election Tribunal are conclusive in writ proceedings?
  • Does contesting a local government election on a political basis attract disqualification under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Irshad Hussain (through His Heirs) vs Abdur Rehman Kazi1983 SCMR 471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-25
  rent restrictionevictiondefault in rent paymentcondonation of delayincapacitating illnessstriking off defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Sind High Court which had allowed a landlord's second appeal, resulting in the eviction of the tenant, Irshad Hussain. The core legal question was whether the tenant's failure to deposit rent as ordered under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, could be condoned on the grounds of illness. The Rent Controller had initially struck off the tenant's defence due to the default, finding the illness was not sufficiently incapacitating to prevent the deposit. Although the first appellate court condoned the default, the High Court reversed this, finding the tenant failed to prove the non-deposit was beyond his control. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the tenant's illness was not of such an incapacitating nature as to render the failure to deposit rent inevitable or unavoidable. The Court reiterated that the principles established in Ghulam Muhammad Khan Lundkhor v. Safdar regarding default apply equally to cases involving claims of illness, requiring proof that the default was truly beyond the tenant's control.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant's failure to deposit rent under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 be condoned due to illness if the illness was not incapacitating enough to make the default unavoidable?
  • Does the principle that a default in rent payment must be beyond the tenant's control apply to cases where the tenant claims illness as the cause for non-deposit?
  Read full judgment →
• Irshad Ahmad vs The State1983 SCMR 1263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-02
  leave to appealcriminal convictionmurderevidentiary inconsistenciessentence mitigationprosecution witness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, wherein the petitioner was sentenced for the murder of his mother-in-law. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, aggrieved by his mother-in-law's refusal to allow his wife to accompany him to his place of business, fatally stabbed the deceased. The defense contended that the nature of the injuries suggested multiple assailants and that the prosecution witness, the petitioner's wife, had an illicit liaison with another witness, Faizul Haq, who allegedly committed the murder with her connivance. The Supreme Court observed that the evidence raised significant questions regarding the petitioner's motive, the possibility of third-party involvement, and the reliability of the eyewitness accounts given the alleged illicit relationships. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to specifically examine the appropriateness of the sentence awarded and to further deliberate on the points raised by the defense counsel regarding the evidentiary inconsistencies and the potential for alternative perpetrators.

  Questions settled

  • Does the nature of multiple incised wounds on a victim necessarily imply the presence of more than one assailant?
  • Can allegations of an illicit relationship between a prosecution witness and a third party constitute sufficient grounds to challenge the credibility of eyewitness testimony?
  • Is the sentence of death or life imprisonment appropriate when there is evidence of lurking suspicion regarding the victim's conduct and the involvement of third parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Muhammad Khan vs Abdul Haq CH.1983 SCMR 567 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-13
  pre-emptionlimitation periodattestation of mutationphysical possessiontenantscourt-fee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, concerning the limitation period for filing a pre-emption suit where the sale mutation was attested on 28-11-1973 and the suit was filed on 25-11-1975. The core legal question is whether the suit was time-barred based on the date of actual sale versus the date of attestation of the mutation. The Supreme Court held that since the land was in the actual physical possession of tenants—a fact undisputed by the parties—the vendees could not be deemed to have taken physical possession on the date of sale, meaning limitation correctly ran from the date of mutation attestation. The Court further held that a valuation and court-fee point not pressed before the High Court cannot be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • From which date does limitation run for filing a pre-emption suit when the land is in the actual possession of tenants?
  • Can a new point regarding the valuation of the suit for court-fee, not pressed before the High Court, be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Muhammad and Others vs Muhammad Ilyas and Other1983 SCMR 438 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-23
  evacuee propertycomposite propertytransfer of propertyvalidating legislationdelegation of powerssettlement lawsjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the transfer of a composite evacuee property in Lahore under the settlement laws. The core legal questions involved the competency of an Assistant Settlement Commissioner to transfer a composite property without explicit delegation of powers under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and the curative effect of subsequent validating legislation, namely the Assistant Settlement Commissioners (Validation of Orders) Act, 1973. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that any inherent lack of jurisdiction or technical defect regarding the absence of a specific declaration treating the composite property as a single unit stood fully cured and validated by the enactment of the Assistant Settlement Commissioners (Validation of Orders) Act, 1973. The Court laid down the principle that validating legislation of this nature covers both competency issues and formal procedural defects in the exercise of delegated powers, thereby rendering prior concluded transfers final and unassailable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Assistant Settlement Commissioners (Validation of Orders) Act, 1973 cure the inherent lack of jurisdiction in an Assistant Settlement Commissioner transferring a composite property?
  • Whether the absence of a specific formal declaration treating a composite property as a single unit destroys the efficacy of a transfer order under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can a time-barred application seeking the transfer of a portion of an already transferred property be treated as an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Institute Geographique National vs Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad, through Its Chairman and 3 Other1983 SCMR 1202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-10
  Intra-Court AppealmaintainabilityLaw Reforms Ordinanceconstitutional jurisdictionincome tax assessmentalternate statutory remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's Intra-Court Appeal as not maintainable. The petitioner, a foreign entity, entered into a contract with WAPDA for aerial photography and survey work in Pakistan. The Income-tax Officer assessed the petitioner to income tax, prompting the petitioner to seek rectification, revision, and relief from tax authorities, followed by constitutional petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution before a Single Judge of the High Court, which was dismissed. The core legal question was whether an Intra-Court Appeal was competent against the judgment of the Single Judge under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972, given that the underlying tax proceedings provided alternate remedies of appeal or revision. The Supreme Court held that since the applicable tax laws and the provisions concerning double taxation agreements provided for statutory remedies such as appeal or revision, the Intra-Court Appeal was barred by the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Intra-Court Appeal is competent against the judgment of a Single Judge in constitutional jurisdiction when the original proceedings provide for an appeal, revision, or review?
  • Does the availability of an appeal or revision under the Income-tax Act bar an Intra-Court Appeal under section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972?
  Read full judgment →
• Inspector General of Police vs Ashfaq Ahmad and Other1983 SCMR 34 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-30
  service tribunalseniorityList Fpolice servicepromotiondiscriminationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Inspector-General of Police, Punjab sought leave to appeal against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal which had accepted the respondent Ashfaq Ahmad's appeal regarding his seniority and placement in List 'F'. The respondent, a Sub-Inspector in the Special Branch, was initially omitted from List 'F' on the ground of needing executive police work experience, but was later promoted. Subsequently, a junior officer was assigned post facto ante-dated seniority in List 'F', prompting the respondent to seek similar relief, which was rejected. The Tribunal ruled in favor of the respondent, holding that his service in the Special Branch should have been counted as executive police work under the relevant rules. The Supreme Court examined contentions regarding limitation, the bar under proviso (b) to section 4(1) of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1974 regarding fitness for promotion, and alleged misreading of evidence. The Court held that the appeal before the Tribunal was within time, did not violate the statutory bar as it concerned discrimination qua a junior, and that the Tribunal rightly took exception to the failure to weigh Special Branch service. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether service in the Special Branch should be counted as executive police work for inclusion in List 'F' under the Police Rules?
  • Does an appeal challenging discriminatory ante-dating of seniority of a junior officer violate the bar under proviso (b) to section 4(1) of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1974 regarding fitness for promotion?
  • When does the period of limitation commence for filing a service tribunal appeal against the grant of ante-dated seniority to a colleague?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayat vs The State1983 SCMR 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-12
  murderconfessional statementextra-judicial confessionretracted testimonyhostile witnessrecovery of weaponcapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Inayat, was tried and convicted under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Abdul Rahman and sentenced to death, which was upheld by the Lahore High Court. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to examine the evidentiary value of a confessional statement recorded by a magistrate and an extra-judicial confession made before prosecution witnesses. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that while certain statutory formalities concerning the judicial confessional statement under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 were not duly observed, the conviction could safely rest on other corroborative evidence on record, including the unblemished testimony of the deceased's wife regarding the motive and extra-judicial confession, the statements properly transferred to the sessions record under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the recovery of the dead body and blood-stained weapon at the instance of the accused. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary value of a judicial confession when the recording magistrate fails to observe mandatory formalities under sections 164 and 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained primarily on the basis of an extra-judicial confession and circumstantial evidence when the primary witnesses resile at trial?
  • Under what circumstances can a previous statement of a witness be transferred to the sessions file under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayat Ullah and Others vs Umar Hayat and Other1983 SCMR 1223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-23
  redemption of mortgaged landjurisdiction of civil courtmortgagee rightsexchange of landleave to appealrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their second appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the validity of redemption proceedings concerning land originally mortgaged before 1892 and subsequently transferred through exchange. The core legal questions involved whether the civil court's jurisdiction was barred regarding the redemption of mortgaged land, whether an exchange of land constituted a transfer of mortgagee rights, and whether the redemption proceedings before the Collector were valid. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were indeed successors in interest stepping into the shoes of the original mortgagees, that the redemption proceedings carried out by the Collector were within jurisdiction, and that the subsequent civil suit was rightly barred by time and law. The Court established that where parties acquire land through an exchange involving mortgaged property and are recorded as mortgagees in revenue records, redemption proceedings initiated by original owners against them are valid.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil suit challenging redemption proceedings is barred by section 17 of the West Pakistan Redemption and Restitution of Mortgaged Land Act 1964 or section 12 of the Redemption of Mortgages Punjab Act 1913?
  • Do parties who acquire land via exchange step into the shoes of mortgagees when recorded as such in the revenue record?
  • Whether redemption proceedings carried out by the Collector are valid when the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee is established?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayat Khan and Another vs The State1983 PLD Supreme Court 395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-25
  murderleave to appealmedical evidenceappreciation of evidencedying declarationrecovery of weaponscontradictions in medical testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing an appeal by the petitioners against their conviction for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution case alleged that the petitioners, along with acquitted co-accused, ambushed and killed the deceased over a previous enmity. During the hearing before the Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that ocular testimony was contradicted by medical evidence regarding the firing range, that discrepancies existed concerning the recovery of the deceased's weapons, and that the defense version found support from the circumstances. Upon examining the record and summoning the medical officer to clarify contradictions in his post-mortem report and testimony, the Supreme Court observed that the medical evidence required closer scrutiny and that contentions regarding the appreciation of evidence needed consideration. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the courts below properly applied well-established principles for the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contradiction between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the firing range warrant the granting of leave to appeal in a murder case?
  • How should a court evaluate medical testimony when the post-mortem report contains internal contradictions concerning the distance from which a firearm was discharged?
  • Whether the unexplained handling and subsequent production of the deceased's weapons by witnesses affects the credibility of the prosecution case in a criminal trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Inamul Haq vs SIDDIQL'e Muhammad and Other1983 SCMR 1009 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-16
  settlement of propertywrit jurisdictionfinding of factremand orderfraudulent claimdisplaced personsN.C.H. Form
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the transfer of a house in Lahore under settlement laws. The core legal questions were whether the High Court acted within its jurisdiction by making a finding of fact regarding the filing of an N.C.H. Form after the Settlement Commissioner failed to decide the issue on remand, and whether possession alone entitles a party to property transfer despite a fraudulent claim. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in exercising its constitutional jurisdiction to decide the factual issue itself because the Settlement Commissioner had failed to comply with the specific remand direction to determine the validity of the N.C.H. Form. The Court affirmed that the petitioner’s claim of filing the form was false and fraudulent. The Court established that while superior courts are generally reluctant to interfere with factual findings of tribunals, they possess the authority to set aside perverse findings or decide factual issues directly when a tribunal fails to perform its duty despite clear judicial directions. Furthermore, a claimant cannot rely on possession alone to secure a transfer when the underlying claim is proven fraudulent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court make a finding of fact in writ jurisdiction when a tribunal fails to decide the issue after remand?
  • Does possession of a property alone entitle a person to its transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 if the underlying claim is fraudulent?
  • Is a High Court justified in deciding a factual issue itself instead of remanding the case a second time to a tribunal that failed to follow previous directions?
  Read full judgment →
• Imranuddin and Another vs The State1983 SCMR 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-15
  post-arrest bailcross-casemurderriotingleave to appealjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which rejected the petitioners' application for post-arrest bail in a criminal case involving charges under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail, primarily arguing that a cross-case inquiry report suggested mutual responsibility for the occurrence and that the accused in the cross-case had already been granted bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision to refuse bail. The Court held that the High Court's order suffered from no legal infirmity, noting that the specific allegations against the petitioners—including a direct charge of murder—were serious. The Court established the principle that the mere fact that accused persons in a cross-case have been released on bail does not automatically entitle the petitioners to similar relief, especially when the allegations against the petitioners are more serious in nature. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of bail to accused persons in a cross-case automatically entitle the petitioners in the main case to bail?
  • Is the existence of a cross-case inquiry report sufficient grounds to mandate the release of accused persons on bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's order refusing bail if the order suffers from no legal infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Imam vs Saifur Rehman1983 SCMR 244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-14
  pre-emptionminorbenami transactionfraud on statuteleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioners' regular second appeal by the High Court, upholding the pre-emption decree granted in favor of the respondent, a minor suing through his mother as guardian-ad-litem. The core legal question raised by the petitioners is whether a pre-emption suit filed by a minor having no independent means of his own can be assumed to be a benami transaction or a fraud on the statute orchestrated by the vendor-father for his own benefit. The Supreme Court noted the importance of the question and the conflicting contention that a minor's right of pre-emption cannot be defeated on such grounds. The court held that the question requires an authoritative pronouncement and granted leave to appeal to consider the same, while ordering that the stay previously granted shall continue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit filed by a minor having no independent means of his own can be treated as a benami transaction or fraud on the statute by the father?
  • Can a minor's right of pre-emption be defeated on the ground that the suit was filed in collusion with or for the benefit of the vendor-father?
  Read full judgment →
• Ilam Din vs Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner Etc.1983 SCMR 1141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-06
  dismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration applicationreview of orderfactual recitalsleave to appealconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition for non-prosecution, alongside a subsequent order rejecting the application for its restoration. The petitioner contended that the High Court's order contained factually incorrect recitals regarding previous hearings and non-appearances, asserting that earlier proceedings could not take place due to the learned Judge being on leave. The Supreme Court held that where the factual correctness of recitals in a judicial order is challenged, the appellate court cannot entertain or adjudicate upon such controverted questions of fact. The Court laid down the principle that disputed recitals in a judgment or order must be resolved by approaching the judge who passed the order through a review petition. Until such factual controversy is resolved, no legal basis for restoring the petition or interfering with the order can be established. Accordingly, leave to appeal was refused with observations.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court adjudicate upon disputed factual recitals contained in a High Court order without the petitioner first seeking review before the same judge?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for a party claiming that recitals of non-appearance in a High Court order are factually incorrect?
  • Can a petition dismissed for non-prosecution be restored when factual controversies regarding past appearances remain unresolved?
  Read full judgment →
• Iftikhar vs The State1983 PLD Supreme Court 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-25
  leave to appealacquittalsolitary witnessmedical corroborationappraisal of evidencecriminal assault
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had set aside the petitioner's acquittal by the City Magistrate and convicted him under section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code, sentencing him to six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine. The core legal question concerned whether the solitary statement of the injured complainant, challenged on grounds of alleged discrepancies with medical evidence and motive, was sufficient to sustain a conviction for assault, and whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no legal error in appraising the evidence, finding that the medical evidence corroborated the attack by multiple weapons and persons from close range, and that minor discrepancies in estimating distance or posture did not discredit the trustworthy identification of the assailant. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused, affirming the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the solitary statement of an injured complainant is sufficient to sustain a conviction when corroborated by medical evidence?
  • Does an estimated distance in the testimony of a witness, which slightly differs from medical opinion, discredit the entire prosecution case?
  • Can a High Court's judgment reversing an acquittal be maintained when the appraisal of evidence is found to be free from legal error?
  Read full judgment →
• Hussain Bakhsh vs Muhmmad Amir and Other1983 SCMR 800 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-10
  criminal appealocular testimonymedical evidenceacquittalcapital chargeappreciation of evidencechance witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of the respondents by the Lahore High Court, which reversed their conviction by the trial court for murder and rioting. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court correctly evaluated the ocular testimony and its consistency with medical evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, finding the High Court's reasoning sound. The Court held that the ocular testimony was unreliable, noting material discrepancies, significant improvements from the First Information Report, and the status of the witnesses as chance witnesses. Crucially, the oral account was found to be in direct conflict with medical evidence, which indicated the fatal shots were fired at close range, contradicting the witnesses' claims regarding the distance. Furthermore, the prosecution's failure to prove the alleged motive—abduction—undermined the case. The Court affirmed the principle that in capital cases, conviction cannot be sustained on ocular testimony that is inconsistent with medical evidence, suffers from material contradictions, or fails to inspire judicial confidence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction in a capital case be sustained when ocular testimony is in direct conflict with medical evidence?
  • Does the presence of material improvements in testimony from the First Information Report render witness evidence unreliable?
  • Is an appellate court justified in setting aside a conviction where the prosecution fails to establish the alleged motive?
  Read full judgment →
• Hirjina & Co., (Pak.) Ltd. and Others vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Another1983SCMR 789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-09
  leave to appealexcise dutyCentral Excises and Salt Act 1944constitutional competencepith and substancealcoholic liquorexcisable services
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from petitions for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the levy of excise duty under section 3(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The petitioners contended that the excise duty levied on excisable services provided or rendered in relation to alcoholic liquor constitutes, in pith and substance, a duty on alcoholic liquor, thereby violating Entry 43(b) of the Third Schedule to the 1962 Constitution. It was further argued that levying excise duty on services rendered by hotels, restaurants, and bars is constitutionally impermissible. The Supreme Court observed that the constitutional questions raised regarding the scope of excise duty and legislative competence were of general public importance requiring an authoritative adjudication by the Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these substantial constitutional issues, directed that the appeals be heard on the present record with liberty to file additional documents, and issued notice to the Deputy Attorney-General regarding interim relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether excise duty levied on services rendered in relation to alcoholic liquor constitutes a duty on alcoholic liquor in pith and substance?
  • Whether the levy of excise duty on services provided in relation to alcoholic liquor is barred by Entry 43(b) of the Third Schedule of the 1962 Constitution?
  • Whether the Constitution permits the levy of excise duty on services rendered by hotels, restaurants, and bars?
  Read full judgment →
• Hayat Muhammad vs Zahoor Ul Hassan and Other1983 SCMR 1089 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-14
  writ petitionsettlement commissionerconstitutional jurisdictionsupreme court reviewsettlement proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court refusing to interfere with the order of the Settlement Commissioner, whereby the claim of the petitioner was negatived. The core legal question involves the propriety of the High Court's refusal to interfere with the factual and legal determinations made by the Settlement Commissioner in settlement proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the criticism levelled against the Settlement Commissioner's order does not affect its essential correctness, and consequently, no fault could be found with the High Court's decision to decline interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the superior courts will not interfere with orders of lower settlement authorities where such orders suffer from no legal infirmity or essential incorrectness.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to interfere with an order of the Settlement Commissioner when the order suffers from no essential incorrectness?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court judgment declining to set aside a Settlement Commissioner's finding that lacks legal infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Hayat Muhammad Muhammad Mumtaz Bashir Ahmed vs The State The State and The State (B) Penal Code (XLV Of 1860)1983 SCMR 551 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-15Read full judgment →
• Hanif Gul vs Sarwar Khan1983 SCMR 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-24
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptioncontiguitykhasra numberscompact blockkhatacivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a pre-emption suit regarding land comprised in multiple Khasra numbers. The core legal question was whether a pre-emptor seeking to pre-empt a block of land comprising different Khasra numbers must own property contiguous to every single Khasra number, or whether contiguity to any part of the compact block suffices. The Supreme Court held that the sale of a parcel of land comprising more than one Khasra number does not constitute multiple properties, but a single property represented by that parcel; thus, if the pre-emptor's property is contiguous to any part of the compact block, they are entitled to pre-empt the entire land irrespective of whether the Khasras are in the same or different Khatas. The appeal was accepted, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the District Judge's decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does the sale of a parcel of land comprised in more than one Khasra imply the sale of as many properties as there are field numbers?
  • Is a pre-emptor required to have property contiguous to all Khasra numbers in a block of land to pre-empt the sale?
  • Does land situated in different Khatas constitute separate properties for the purpose of pre-emption when forming a compact block?
  Read full judgment →
• Hameed Akhtar vs The State1983 SCMR 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-29
  post-arrest bailmurderleave to appealappreciation of evidenceexercise of discretiontwo versions
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court affirming the refusal of post-arrest bail to the petitioner by the Sessions Judge. The petitioner, along with co-accused, was charged with murder and causing hurt, with the specific allegation of firing a shotgun hitting the deceased in the belly, leading to fatal injuries. The petitioner argued that bail should be granted based on disputed facts and alternative versions of the occurrence. The High Court rejected these contentions, noting that the plea of two versions had been found false during police investigation. The Supreme Court reviewed the orders of the lower courts and held that the matters raised had been properly evaluated by both courts below. Finding no legal error, infirmity, or improper exercise of judicial discretion in refusing bail at this preliminary stage where evidence appreciation is required, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent orders refusing bail where judicial discretion has been properly exercised?
  • Can disputed questions of fact requiring detailed appreciation of evidence be resolved at the stage of deciding a bail application?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail on the ground of an alternative version of the event that was found false during investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Hamayat Khan and Another vs Ahmed Din and 2 Other1983 SCMR 59 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-28
  constitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionlegal representativesreappraisal of evidencerevision petitionfinality of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the sale of land, where the original plaintiff, Rehmat Ali, filed a suit for declaration alleging he had not sold the property in question. Following Rehmat Ali's death during the suit's pendency, the trial court permitted the impleadment of his legal representatives. The petitioners challenged this order through a revision petition, which was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, and subsequently filed a writ petition in the High Court, which was also dismissed. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court correctly refused to interfere with the lower court's decision via a constitutional petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Additional District Judge acted within his jurisdiction and that his decision had attained finality. The Court emphasized that constitutional petitions should not be used as a mechanism to seek the reappraisal of evidence or to challenge decisions of competent courts on frivolous grounds, particularly when the relevant law does not envisage such a review.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be used to challenge a decision of a competent court on the grounds of reappraisal of evidence?
  • Is a decision of an Additional District Judge regarding the impleadment of legal representatives subject to interference via a writ petition when the court acted within its jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Khan and Another vs The State1983 SCMR 300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-20
  criminal appealdeath sentencecommutation of sentencecommon intentionsentencing discretionmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal filed by two convicts, Abdur Razzaq and Hakim Khan, against their convictions and sentences for the murder of Ghulam Sarwar and his son, Muhammad Asif. The appellants were originally convicted under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with Abdur Razzaq receiving a death sentence and Hakim Khan receiving life imprisonment. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the death sentence imposed on Abdur Razzaq was justified, given that both appellants shared responsibility for the injuries and the incident was not premeditated but arose from a sudden dispute over poisoned hens. The Court held that because the incident was not preplanned and Hakim Khan had received a lesser penalty for his role, the death sentence for Abdur Razzaq was disproportionate. Consequently, the Court converted Abdur Razzaq's death sentence to imprisonment for life, emphasizing that sentencing should reflect the specific circumstances and the shared nature of the criminal act.

  Questions settled

  • Can a death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment when the crime was not preplanned and the co-accused received a lesser sentence?
  • Does the absence of a distinction between the roles of two assailants in a joint attack justify the mitigation of a death sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Ali and Others Hakim Ali and Others vs Fazal Din and Ownss1983 SCMR 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-24Read full judgment →
• Haji Saleeh Muhammad and 2 Others vs Haji Jumma Khan Agha and 4 Other1983 SCMR 587 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-08-24
  special procedurejurisdictionstatutory interpretationterritorial operationexclusion of statutereview applicationconstitutional petitionrevenue administration
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave addresses the jurisdictional limits of the Assistant Commissioner under the Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968, particularly regarding whether village Ahmadoon fell within the excluded area of 'Ziarat' under the Second Schedule. The core legal question involved the interpretation of territorial descriptions in the Schedule and whether subsequent executive re-delimitation of revenue boundaries under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 could alter the territorial operation of a special statute without express legislative authority. The Supreme Court held that the word 'Ziarat' in the Second Schedule referred strictly to the town of Ziarat as it existed at the time of the Ordinance's commencement in 1968, and subsequent creation of a larger Sub-Tehsil in 1974 did not extend the statutory exclusion to village Ahmadoon by executive action. The Court laid down that the territorial operation of an enactment cannot be altered or expanded by executive administrative re-delimitation of revenue units unless the statute explicitly delegates such power, as territorial exclusion requires fixity and definiteness.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent executive re-delimitation of revenue boundaries automatically extend or restrict the territorial operation of a statute?
  • Are the provisions of Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure mandatory or permissive when multiple persons share a common cause of action?
  • Can a party raise a totally new factual and legal ground in a review petition that was never urged during the hearing of the main constitutional petition?
  • What is the proper interpretation of the term 'Ziarat' as specified in the Second Schedule of the Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Rustam Khan (through Legal Heirs) vs Dilbar Khan and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-26
  pre-emptionright of substitutionconsent decreecollusive transactionvendee titlestatutory prohibitioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court order dismissing a revision petition in a pre-emption matter. The appellant, a vendee under a consent decree, argued that the underlying alienation was void under the Kabul River Project (Control and Prevention of Speculation in Land) Act, 1948, and thus could not support a pre-emption claim. The core legal question was whether a pre-emptor or the original vendee can challenge the validity of a sale transaction on the basis of statutory prohibitions to defeat a pre-emption suit. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a pre-emptor stands substituted for the vendee and cannot challenge the validity of the transaction they seek to pre-empt. The Court affirmed that in pre-emption suits, the court is not required to test the sale's validity against external statutory bars, provided the parties intended the transaction to operate as a sale. The defect in the vendee's title does not invalidate the pre-emption claim, as the pre-emptor takes the title as it exists, subject to any existing legal challenges.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emptor challenge the validity of the sale transaction they seek to pre-empt?
  • Does a defect in the vendee's title invalidate a claim for pre-emption?
  • Is a court in a pre-emption suit required to test the validity of the sale against external statutory prohibitions?
  • Does the right of pre-emption constitute a right of substitution or a right of repurchase?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad vs Haji Habib and 3 Other1983 SCMR 714 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-08
  Permanent Transfer DeedSettlement Authoritiesfunctus officioproperty disputeremandtransfer of propertyjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Sind High Court, which remanded a property dispute to the Settlement Authorities for a fresh hearing. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authorities retain jurisdiction to clarify the scope of property transfers after a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) has been issued. The petitioner argued that the authorities became functus officio upon the issuance of the PTD. The Supreme Court, relying on the principle established in Anwar Hussain v. Sarfraz Ahmad (PLD 1971 SC 669), held that while Settlement Authorities generally become functus officio after the issuance of a PTD, they remain competent to clarify the exact portions of properties transferred, particularly when the property serves a dual purpose or when ambiguity exists regarding the scope of the transfer. The Court endorsed the High Court's decision to remand the matter for such clarification, finding no merit in the petition. The key principle laid down is that Settlement Authorities possess the residual jurisdiction to clarify the extent of property transfers even post-PTD issuance to resolve disputes regarding specific portions of the transferred premises.

  Questions settled

  • Do Settlement Authorities become functus officio regarding property transfers immediately upon the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • Can Settlement Authorities clarify the scope of property transfers after a Permanent Transfer Deed has been issued?
  • Is a dispute regarding the transfer of a roof or courtyard subject to clarification by Settlement Authorities after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Sarwar vs Mian Asad Hakim and Other1983 SCMR 177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-19
  review petitionre-hearingremandprejudicecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for review of a judgment dated 14 December 1982 was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The petitioner sought to re-argue points that had already been decided by the Court and requested that a cautionary note be recorded to prevent prejudice regarding a decision after remand on specific issues (Issues Nos. 5 and 5-A) in relation to the decision on Issue No. 4. The Supreme Court held that no justification was presented to warrant a re-hearing of the case. The Court declined to grant the requested cautionary note, observing that the petitioner would not suffer any real prejudice, subject to the extent that the decision on Issue No. 4 had gone against him and its necessary consequences. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the review petition as lacking merit, reaffirming the principle that a review petition cannot be used as a platform to re-argue points already decided by the court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party seek a review of a judgment solely to re-argue points that have already been decided by the Supreme Court?
  • Will the Supreme Court record a cautionary note to prevent prejudice on remand if it reduces the effect of a decided issue?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Qasim vs Mehrban Ali1983 SCMR 1205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-16
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentlandlord and tenanthabitual defaultcondonation of defaultrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an ejectment application filed by a landlord under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, on the ground of default in payment of rent. The tenant resisted the application, contending that the landlord's practice of accepting rent in lump sum for two or three months at a time established a modified mode of payment, thereby precluding a finding of willful default. The Rent Controller and the District Judge ordered eviction, but the High Court reversed this on second appeal, holding that the landlord's conduct had altered the terms of the tenancy. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal and restored the eviction order. The Court held that a landlord's acceptance of delayed or periodic payments of rent does not establish a legally binding practice that alters the statutory requirement to pay rent by the fifteenth of each month. Such acceptance merely condones past defaults and does not entitle the tenant to plead their own negligence or claim discretionary relief in cases of habitual default.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's practice of accepting rent periodically in lump sums alter the statutory timeline for payment of rent under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can a tenant plead a practice of delayed rent payments to escape the consequences of willful default?
  • Does the acceptance of accumulated rent by a landlord constitute a permanent variation of the terms of a lease agreement?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Mahmood and Another vs The State1983SCMR 829 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-04
  post-arrest bailmurder casecriminal appealbail adjudicationjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a bail application by the High Court in a murder case registered at Police Station Lalian, District Jhang. The petitioners, Haji Mahmood and Waqar Ahmad, were accused along with seven others of the murder of one Amir. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioners were entitled to the concession of bail pending trial. Upon hearing the arguments from both the petitioners' counsel and the Advocate-General, Punjab, the Court distinguished the cases of the two petitioners. The Court found no sufficient grounds to release the first petitioner, Haji Mahmood, on bail and consequently dismissed his petition. However, the Court exercised its discretion to grant bail to the second petitioner, Waqar Ahmad. The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed in respect of Waqar Ahmad, subject to the furnishing of bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 20,000 with two sureties. The judgment reinforces the principle that bail adjudication in criminal matters involves a distinct assessment of the individual circumstances and evidence pertaining to each accused person.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court grant bail to one co-accused while refusing it to another in the same murder case?
  • Is the grant of bail in a murder case subject to the individual assessment of the accused's circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ghulam Muhammad (through His Legal Representatives) vs Mian1983 SCMR 749 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-15
  giftusufructuary mortgageequity of redemptiondelivery of possessionrevocation of giftregistered deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a leave to appeal granted to examine whether a valid gift of agricultural land under a subsisting usufructuary mortgage could be made, particularly without notice to the mortgagee. The predecessor-in-interest of the parties had gifted agricultural land to his two sons by a registered deed, subsequently attempted to revoke the gift, and then filed a suit claiming the gift was invalid, procured by fraud, and lacked delivery of possession. The trial court decreed the suit, but subsequent appellate and bench proceedings involved conflicting findings regarding revocation and the necessity of notice or physical possession. The Supreme Court held that property under a usufructuary mortgage, representing an equity of redemption, can be the valid subject-matter of a gift. The Court established that a formal notice to the mortgagee is not an absolute legal requirement or a sine qua non for such a gift to be complete, provided the donor takes all reasonably permissible steps to divest themselves of the property. Furthermore, since the gift was perfected through a registered deed by a father to his sons within prohibited degrees, it was irrevocable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a valid gift be made of agricultural land that is under a subsisting usufructuary mortgage?
  • Is a notice to the mortgagee a mandatory legal requirement for a valid gift of an equity of redemption?
  • Whether a gift made by a father to his sons within prohibited degrees can be revoked after being perfected?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ghulam Hussain vs Province of Punjaband Other1983 SCMR 294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-15
  leave to appealsuit for damagesfinding of factabandoned wellpublic nuisance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's regular second appeal arising from a suit for damages. The core legal question involved the determination of findings of fact regarding alleged damage to the petitioner's house caused by an abandoned well, known as a bouli. The Supreme Court held that there was no justification to re-open the case on a concurrent finding of fact where the petitioner failed to satisfy the normal standard for obtaining such a finding, and accordingly dismissed the petition. However, taking note of the potential for future damage, the Court recorded the respondents' undertaking that the concerned authority would take necessary measures to ensure the bouli does not cause damage or nuisance to the petitioner and local residents. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact concurrently reached by lower courts will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court absent sufficient justification, while public authorities remain responsible for maintaining public property to prevent nuisance or damage.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a suit for damages?
  • What is the responsibility of the concerned authority regarding an abandoned well causing potential damage to residents?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ahmad Sher Khan vs Election Tribunal Etc.S1983 SCMR 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-15
  election petitioncorrupt practiceswrit jurisdictiondelimitation of constituenciespolling irregularitiescollusionlocal government election
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an election dispute regarding the election of a Member of the Town Committee, Noorpur Thal. The petitioner challenged the High Court's judgment, which had partially upheld an Election Tribunal's decision declaring the petitioner's election void. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court erred in upholding findings of corrupt practices against the petitioner despite a lack of specific allegations or evidence of collusion with polling staff, and whether the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to reverse a finding previously decided in the petitioner's favor in the absence of a valid cross-objection. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the High Court's findings on issues regarding the alleged corrupt practices and the delimitation of electoral boundaries required further consideration. The Court suspended the operation of the orders passed by the Election Tribunal and the High Court pending the final adjudication of the appeal, thereby establishing that findings in writ jurisdiction require proper procedural adherence and evidentiary support.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court reverse a finding in favor of a petitioner in a writ petition without a proper cross-objection?
  • Does an allegation of polling irregularities constitute a corrupt practice by a candidate without evidence of collusion?
  • Is a specific allegation of corrupt practice required under the Punjab Local Councils (Election Petitions) Rules 1979 to invalidate an election?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Qadir Motiwala vs Saifuddin Ahmad1983 SCMR 1088 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-14
  rent evictionpersonal requirementleave to appeallandlord-tenant disputestatutory interpretationvacation of premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which upheld an eviction order against the petitioner regarding the first floor of a property in Nazimabad, Karachi. The eviction was originally sought on grounds of default in rent payment and the respondent's personal need. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment based on personal requirement, a decision affirmed by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the respondent had previously vacated the ground floor of the same premises after inducting the petitioner as a tenant on the first floor. The petitioner contended that this prior vacation triggered the application of Section 13(3)(a)(i)(c) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, which restricts eviction if a landlord has vacated a similar building without sufficient cause. The Supreme Court found that the points raised regarding the applicability of this statutory provision and the respondent's admission of prior residence required further consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the respondent's prior vacation of the ground floor barred the current eviction claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does the prior vacation of a portion of a building by a landlord without sufficient cause bar an eviction claim based on personal need under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Whether the provisions of Section 13(3)(a)(i)(c) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 are attracted when a landlord has previously vacated a part of the same premises?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Jalil vs Javid Ahmad1983 SCMR 869 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-26
  stay orderex parte evictionburden of proofoperation of stay ordersame day ordersRent Controllerejectment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from eviction proceedings initiated under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The Rent Controller passed an ex parte eviction order against the tenant on 2-11-1976. On the very same day, the appellate court (District Judge) admitted the tenant's appeal and issued an order staying the proceedings before the Rent Controller. The High Court set aside the eviction order, holding that a stay order takes effect from the time it is passed rather than when it is communicated. The Supreme Court addressed the legal question of whether a stay order passed on the same day as an eviction order invalidates the latter when both orders bear the same date and there is no evidence establishing which order was passed earlier in time. The Supreme Court held that while a stay order operates from the moment it is passed, the burden of proving that the stay order was issued prior in time on the same day rests upon the party asserting its priority. In the absence of evidence demonstrating that the stay order preceded the eviction order, the eviction order remains valid. The appeal was allowed and the ex parte eviction order restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does a stay order take effect from the time it is passed or from the time it is communicated to the trial court?
  • When a stay order and an eviction order are passed on the same day, on whom does the burden of proof lie to establish that the stay order was passed prior in time?
  • Can an ex parte order passed on the same day as a stay order be rendered invalid without evidence showing the stay order preceded it?
  Read full judgment →
• Hadi Hassan Jafry vs Additional Settlement Commissioner and Other1983 SC MR 967 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-29
  settlement lawproperty auctiondemarcation of propertywrit jurisdictionfinality of ordersquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the extent of property transferred to the petitioner via public auction under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the auction of property No. S-IV-22-S-14 encompassed the entire property or was restricted to specific quarters occupied by certain individuals. The Settlement authorities determined that the auction was limited to the three quarters in the occupation of Suba, Lal Din, and Rusi, and this finding was upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the petitioner had failed to challenge the earlier remand order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner which had finalized the extent of the property. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the extent of the property was a question of fact, and the High Court was not obligated to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Settlement authorities. The principle laid down is that where an order defining the scope of a property transfer becomes final due to a failure to challenge it, the matter cannot be reopened, and findings of fact by specialized tribunals are generally not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the extent of property transferred in an auction after failing to contest a prior remand order that finalized that extent?
  • Is the determination of the physical extent of property transferred in a settlement auction a question of fact that precludes interference by the High Court in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does an auction of a property number necessarily include all portions of that property if the auction particulars specify only certain occupied quarters?
  Read full judgment →
• Habibullah vs The State1983 PLD Supreme Court 401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-21
  extra-judicial confessionjudicial confessioncircumstantial evidencemurder convictioncorroborationinterested witnessesmotive discrepancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant for murder, where the death sentence was previously commuted to life imprisonment by the High Court. The core legal question was whether, excluding certain disputed recoveries, the judicial and extra-judicial confessions, supported by attending circumstances, were sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound. It affirmed that the extra-judicial confession was reliable, noting that the witnesses, despite being related to the deceased, had no motive to falsely implicate the appellant, who was their former student. The Court further held that apparent discrepancies in the motives stated in the judicial versus extra-judicial confessions were not mutually exclusive and did not undermine the prosecution's case. The Court established that medical evidence, even when the cause of death is difficult to ascertain due to body decomposition, can corroborate a confession if the accused's account of the weapon and injuries aligns with the findings. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the conviction and the sentence of life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an extra-judicial confession be relied upon when the witnesses are related to the deceased?
  • Does a discrepancy in the motive stated in a judicial confession versus an extra-judicial confession necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can medical evidence corroborate a confession even if the cause of death is not clearly ascertainable due to decomposition?
  • Does the failure of a Magistrate to disclose their identity to an accused before recording a confession automatically invalidate the confession?
  Read full judgment →
• Habibullah and Another vs The Director (Headquarters), Excise &1983 SCMR 1323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-01
  evacuee propertyprovisional transfereeproperty taxurban immovable property taxrecurring tax levyowner definition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition questioning whether a provisional transferee of evacuee property by the Settlement Department is liable to pay property tax, and whether such tax can be levied repeatedly on an annual or half-yearly basis rather than only once. The core legal questions involve the interpretation of the definition of 'owner' under the relevant tax legislation regarding provisional transferees, and whether property tax under the statute is a one-time levy or a recurring yearly or half-yearly charge. The Supreme Court held that a provisional transferee is legally liable to pay property tax as an owner under the amended statutory definition, and that the tax is payable yearly or half-yearly as prescribed by the statute when read as a whole. The key principle laid down is that provisional transferees of evacuee property fall within the definition of 'owner' for tax liability purposes, and urban immovable property tax is a recurring annual or half-yearly levy rather than a single-occurrence tax.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a provisional transferee of an evacuee property is liable to pay property tax under the West Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act?
  • Can urban immovable property tax be levied repeatedly on a yearly or half-yearly basis or only once?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib vs The State1983 SCMR 370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-21
  criminal investigationfinal reportpolice powersjudicial oversightcancellation of caseSection 173 CrPCSection 169 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition challenging the dismissal of a revision petition by the Lahore High Court regarding a criminal case under Section 364-A, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a Sessions Judge acts without jurisdiction by refusing to accept a police application for 'cancellation' of a case under Section 169, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and instead directing the police to submit a final report under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the Sessions Judge did not interfere with the investigation but merely performed a mandatory judicial duty. The Court clarified that the police must submit a final report under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, regardless of whether they find sufficient evidence (Section 170) or insufficient evidence (Section 169). The principle laid down is that a Magistrate or Sessions Judge has the authority to review the police's final report and, under Section 173(3), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, may either accept the police's findings or, if they disagree, summon the accused for trial, thereby ensuring judicial oversight over police investigations.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Sessions Judge have the jurisdiction to direct the police to submit a final report under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an application for the 'cancellation' of a case under Section 169, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a valid substitute for a final report under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What powers does a Magistrate possess under Section 173(3), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, upon receiving a final report from the police?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Khan and Another vs Settlement and Claims Commissioner and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-26
  displaced personsclaim verificationrevisional jurisdictionstatutory cutoff daterehabilitation lawsfraudulent claims
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three petitions for leave to appeal arising from disputes over the verification of land claims by displaced persons. The core legal question is whether, following the amendment of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 by the Displaced Persons Laws Amendment Ordinance, 1964, a Claims Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to review or revise an order verifying a claim after March 31, 1965, where the record of such claim had not been called for prior to that date. The background involves allegations that certain land claims were obtained through fraud, as the villages in question had been acquired by the government long before the verification. While a Settlement and Claims Commissioner previously held that he lacked jurisdiction to review the verification after the statutory cutoff date, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to authoritatively determine the scope of the Claims Commissioner's revisional powers under the amended legislation. The Court ordered that these petitions be heard together with other pending matters involving the same legal issue to resolve the jurisdictional conflict regarding the finality of claim verifications.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Claims Commissioner have jurisdiction to review or revise an order verifying a claim after March 31, 1965, if the record was not called for before that date?
  • What is the effect of the Displaced Persons Laws Amendment Ordinance, 1964, on the power of the Claims Commissioner to review claim verifications?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Hassan Qadri vs The Settlement Commissioner (Lands), Sind and Another1983 SCMR 1133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-18
  leave to appealProduce Index UnitsRehabilitation Settlement SchemeBanjar Qadimcorrection slipdisplaced personconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court arising from a dispute concerning the calculation of Produce Index Units (P. I. U.s) for agricultural land allotted to a displaced person under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The petitioner contended that his land allotment, which included Banjar Qadim and Chahi units, was wrongly calculated entirely at the rate of Flow land, ignoring applicable correction slips and entitlement rules, thereby causing him a substantial loss in P. I. U.s. He further claimed entitlement to an extra allowance for Chahi units. After his departmental objections and appeals were dismissed, and his subsequent constitutional petition was rejected by the High Court, the petitioner approached this Court. The core legal question involved the correct calculation of P. I. U.s and the retrospective or prospective application of relevant correction slips under the scheme. The Supreme Court found the petitioner's contentions regarding the miscalculation and the non-retrospective operation of subsequent correction slips worthy of consideration, thus granting leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether agricultural land comprising Banjar Qadim must be calculated at a reduced rate of Produce Index Units in accordance with the relevant correction slips?
  • Whether subsequent correction slips modifying the calculation of Produce Index Units have retrospective operation?
  • Whether a displaced person acquires a vested right for the settlement of land claims based on the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme existing at the time of allotment?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Ltd. vs Syed Anwar and Other1983 SCMR 916 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-09-07
  Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1974amalgamation schemeremunerationbank employeesservice conditionsstatutory interpretationconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arose from an appeal by Habib Bank Ltd. challenging a High Court judgment that interpreted the term 'remuneration' under the Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1974, and the Banks (Amalgamation) Scheme, 1974. The core legal question was whether 'remuneration' should be interpreted narrowly as 'basic salary' or broadly as 'total emoluments' for the purpose of protecting employees' rights during bank amalgamation. The Supreme Court held that 'remuneration' has a broad, extensive meaning, encompassing all payments and benefits received by an employee in consideration for their services. It ruled that the High Court’s restrictive interpretation, which confined the term to basic salary, was erroneous and defeated the statutory protection intended for employees. The Court established that the guarantee of 'same remuneration' in amalgamation schemes is intended to protect the employee's overall financial position rather than individual components of pay. Consequently, as long as the total emoluments are not reduced, the employer is not prohibited from restructuring basic salary components. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'remuneration' under the Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1974, refer exclusively to basic salary?
  • Can a court restrict the definition of 'remuneration' to basic salary for the purpose of protecting pension and gratuity rights?
  • Does a guarantee of 'same remuneration' upon bank amalgamation prevent an employer from reducing basic salary if total emoluments remain equal or higher?
  Read full judgment →
• H. M. Fazil Zaheer vs Kh, Abdul Hameed and Other1983 SCMR 906 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-02
  evacuee propertyauction salesuo motu revisionsettlement commissionernecessary partytransfer of propertyprovisional transfer order
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court concerning the transfer and auction of an evacuee property, House No. S-52-R-18, Nisbet Road, Lahore, under settlement laws. The appellant, who initially filed an L.H. Form for transfer which was rejected due to the property's high value, challenged the auction sale of the house and subsequent orders through various settlement authorities. The core legal questions addressed whether a suction sale made in the face of an alleged prohibitory order was void, and whether the appellant was a necessary party in the writ jurisdiction proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the auction was legal and proper, that mere pendency of an application does not operate as an automatic stay or restraint on statutory powers, and that a Settlement Commissioner cannot exercise suo motu revisional powers to upset final orders passed by officers of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed with costs, affirming the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an auction sale of evacuee property is void when conducted while a representation or miscellaneous application is pending before the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  • Does the mere filing of a revision petition or representation operate as an automatic stay or implied restraint on the statutory powers of settlement authorities?
  • Can a Settlement Commissioner exercise suo motu revisional powers under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act to set aside or interfere with final orders passed by another Settlement Commissioner of co-ordinate jurisdiction?
  • Whether an eliminated claimant whose rights have been finally adjudicated upon is a necessary party to a constitutional petition challenging a subsequent revisional order?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Nawaz and Another vs The State1983 SCMR 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-13
  common intentionjoint liabilityocular evidenceinjured witnessmedical evidencecriminal appealsentence commutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentences of the appellants for the murder of Fazal Rahman and the attempted murder of Shirin Jan. The appellants contended that the prosecution relied on closely related and inimical witnesses, that medical evidence contradicted the ocular account regarding the number of shots fired, and that common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was not established. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of an injured witness is highly credible and consistent with the circumstances. It affirmed that the presence of multiple cardboard discs and distinct injury patterns confirmed multiple shots were fired, corroborating the ocular account. The Court upheld the conviction, reiterating that joint liability under Section 34 requires participation in a criminal act in furtherance of a common intention, regardless of the specific role played by each participant. However, considering that one appellant did not directly cause the death, the Court commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment while maintaining the conviction for the common criminal act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of an injured witness carry greater weight in a criminal trial?
  • Can joint liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be established even if individual participants played different roles in the crime?
  • Is the conviction of an accused for murder sustainable under Section 34 if they did not directly fire the fatal shot but acted in furtherance of a common intention?
  • Does the presence of multiple cardboard discs at a crime scene corroborate ocular testimony regarding the number of shots fired?
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• Gul Haider vs The State1983 SCMR 1201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-02
  leave to appealmurdercapital punishmentocular testimonymotiveabscondencere-appraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the sentence of death upheld by the High Court. The core legal question involved the re-appraisal of evidence concerning the credibility of ocular testimony from interested witnesses, the remoteness and plausibility of the alleged motive, the lack of independent corroboration from the locality for weapon recoveries, and the four-month abscondence of the petitioner. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to thoroughly re-appraise the evidence to determine whether the petitioner was rightly convicted and if the capital punishment was warranted under the circumstances. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will grant leave to examine concurrent findings of lower courts where arguable points regarding the appreciation of evidence, motive, and lack of independent corroboration are raised.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal can be granted for re-appraisal of evidence in a capital punishment case when questions regarding the credibility of interested ocular witnesses are raised?
  • Does a long remote motive combined with the accused being already a married man cast doubt on the prosecution case?
  • Whether the absence of independent local witnesses to support weapon recoveries affects the reliability of the prosecution evidence?
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• Government of West Pakistan(Now N.W. F. P.) and 2 Others vs Mst. Asmatun Nisa and 6 (nuns1983 PLD Supreme Court 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-04
  land acquisitioncompensationreference to courtapportionment of compensationspecific performanceevacuee propertylocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arise out of a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning land acquisition proceedings and compensation for land originally owned by Hindu evacuees over which the respondents had obtained a decree for specific performance of a contract of sale. The core legal questions involved the entitlement of the decree-holders to receive compensation for the acquired land, the jurisdiction of the referee court under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 to determine questions of title or apportionment not specifically referred, the locus standi of the Government to agitate apportionment disputes, and the rate of interest payable on excess compensation. The Supreme Court held that the referee court cannot go behind the reference to decide unreferred questions of apportionment, that the Government lacks locus standi to contest compensation apportionment between competing claimants, and that amendments to the Land Acquisition Act govern the award of compound interest. The Court laid down that the scope of a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is strictly confined to the matters specifically referred, and the acquiring government is not a person interested in disputes regarding the apportionment of compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a referee court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 has jurisdiction to decide questions of apportionment or title not specifically referred to it?
  • Does the acquiring government have the locus standi to agitate disputes regarding the apportionment of compensation or entitlement to receive the same?
  • Are acquisition proceedings a bar to a decree for specific performance, and does the vendee become entitled to the compensation amount upon acquisition?
  • What is the applicable rate of interest on excess compensation following the Land Acquisition (West Pakistan Amendment) Act, 1969?
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• Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division1983 SCMR 1193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-17
  service terminationleave to appealultra viresjurisdictional requirementscivil servantservice tribunalconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government of Pakistan against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the termination of the respondent's service as an Intelligence Officer. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to address significant questions of law. The core legal issues involve determining whether the termination order, which appeared valid on its face, precluded further judicial inquiry into the jurisdictional requirements and the authority behind the action. Additionally, the Court sought to examine the validity of Rule 17(2) of the Defence Intelligence Service (Civilian Class 1) Rules, 1962, specifically questioning whether it was ultra vires Article 220 of the Interim Constitution and, consequently, whether it remained a valid legal basis for the termination under the Civil Servants Act. Pending the final adjudication of these issues, the Supreme Court suspended the operation of the impugned order of the Service Tribunal and directed that the original record be produced for the hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of termination that appears valid on its face preclude a court from inquiring into the jurisdictional requirements and the authority behind the action?
  • Was Rule 17(2) of the Defence Intelligence Service (Civilian Class 1) Rules, 1962 ultra vires Article 220 of the Interim Constitution?
  • Was Rule 17(2) of the Defence Intelligence Service (Civilian Class 1) Rules, 1962 saved or continued under Section 25 of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
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• Gojra Flour Mills, Gojra and Another vs Government of the Punjab1983 SCMR 1023 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-08
  sale of State landconstitutional petitionleave to appealrevocation of contractBoard of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's dismissal in limine of a constitutional petition concerning the revocation of a contract for the sale of State land. The core legal question involved whether the Board of Revenue lawfully revoked the contract without notice due to non-payment of the price, where the determination and payment mode were allegedly delayed by the respondents. The Supreme Court held that it would be futile to decide the case on merits while related proceedings, including a revision before the Board of Revenue challenging the Collector's order, remained pending or undecided. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, leaving the parties to pursue their remedies through the competent administrative authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when related proceedings challenging the underlying order are still pending before the Board of Revenue?
  • Can a contract for the sale of State land be revoked without notice on the ground of non-payment of price?
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• Ghulam Ullah Memon vs Mst. Rashid Begum1983 SCMR 793 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-08-04
  Custody of minorsHizanatGuardianshipWelfare of minorMuslim LawParental rightsMaternal grandmotherGuardians and Wards Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This leave petition concerned the custody (hizanat) of three minor girls, disputed between their father (petitioner) and maternal-grandmother (respondent) under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act. The Guardian Judge initially awarded custody to the father, finding him to be the legal guardian and financially more affluent, and noting the termination of the grandmother's hizanat. However, the Lahore High Court reversed this decision, emphasizing the minors' welfare. The High Court considered factors such as the father's prior marital history, the mother's unhappy married life, lack of financial support from the father, the eldest minor's preference to stay with her grandmother, and the potential for an uncongenial environment with a step-mother. The Supreme Court dismissed the father's petition, affirming the High Court's judgment. The Court held that while the father is the natural and legal guardian, the paramount consideration in custody matters is always the welfare of the minor, overriding general rules of Muslim Law.

  Questions settled

  • What is the paramount consideration in determining the custody of minors under the Guardians and Wards Act?
  • Can the welfare of a minor override the general rules of Muslim Law regarding a father's right to hizanat?
  • Is a father's right as a natural and legal guardian absolute in matters of minor custody?
  • Can a maternal grandmother be granted custody of minor girls over their father if it serves the minors' welfare?
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• Ghulam Shabir Shah vs The State1983 SCMR 942 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-26
  Offence of Zinairregular marriagevalid marriagedivorce noticeMuslim Family Laws Ordinanceleave to appealHudood Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which had dismissed his first appeal against conviction under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, while reducing his sentence. The petitioner had married his wife's sister during the subsistence of his earlier marriage, having pronounced a written divorce to the first wife shortly before, without the divorce becoming fully effective under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1960 due to lack of notice. The core legal questions involved whether a marriage contracted during the iddat period or during the subsistence of a prior marriage constitutes a void or irregular marriage under the Hudood Ordinance, and whether the courts properly evaluated the accused's statement and the requirements of divorce under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that an irregular marriage does not afford protection where the law explicitly requires a valid marriage, and that the divorce had not become effective without complying with the statutory notice period. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused, affirming the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does an irregular marriage qualify as a valid marriage under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Whether a divorce pronounced by a husband becomes effective without notice to the Union Council under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1960?
  • Can exculpatory parts of an accused's statement be separated from incriminating parts when evaluating the prosecution evidence as a whole?
  • Whether marrying another sister during the iddat period or subsistence of the prior marriage attracts penal liability under section 10(2) of the Hudood Ordinance?
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• Ghulam Razaaq Shah vs The State1983 SCMR 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool vs The State1983 SCMR 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-26
  double murdergrave and sudden provocationdeath sentence commutationextenuating circumstancesocular evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction for double murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant was sentenced to death on two counts by the trial court, a decision upheld by the Lahore High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal solely to consider the appropriateness of the death sentence. The core legal question was whether the appellant's claim of grave and sudden provocation, based on the deceased's alleged indecent behavior toward his wife, warranted a reduction in the sentence, or whether the circumstances constituted extenuating factors justifying a commutation of the death penalty. The Court held that the plea of grave and sudden provocation was unavailable because the acts did not constitute sufficient provocation to deprive an ordinary person of self-control. However, the Court accepted that the appellant was acting under a persistent sense of disgrace caused by the deceased's behavior, which served as an extenuating circumstance. Consequently, the Court maintained the conviction but commuted the death sentences to imprisonment for life, while upholding the fines imposed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the plea of grave and sudden provocation apply when the accused kills victims for teasing his wife over an extended period?
  • Can a sentence of death be commuted to life imprisonment based on the existence of extenuating circumstances regarding the victim's behavior?
  • Do indecent gestures or words alone constitute sufficient provocation to reduce homicide to culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
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• Ghulam Rasool vs Abdul Ghani and Other1983 SCMR 974 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  contempt of courtres judicatasuppression of factscivil litigationpre-emption suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a contempt petition alleging that the respondents violated a final judgment of the Supreme Court by reagitating the same dispute in a civil court through a subsequent suit. During the proceedings, it emerged that the trial court had already dismissed the second suit based on the plea of res judicata, and an appeal was pending before the Additional District Judge. Furthermore, it was revealed that the petitioner had withheld material facts regarding the existence and history of parallel proceedings, including a pre-emption suit and issues concerning the execution of earlier decrees and possession. The Supreme Court evaluated these circumstances, noting that the plea of res judicata was already being addressed in the ordinary judicial hierarchy and that the petitioner had suppressed crucial facts in the contempt petition. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to interfere through contempt proceedings, holding that matters involving the application of res judicata and pending appellate adjudication must be resolved through regular judicial channels.

  Questions settled

  • Does filing a subsequent civil suit on a matter already decided by the Supreme Court automatically constitute contempt of court when the trial court has already dismissed the suit on the grounds of res judicata?
  • Will a contempt petition be entertained where the petitioner has suppressed material facts regarding parallel proceedings and the history of the litigation?
  • Can a party invoke contempt jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning the application of res judicata while an appeal on that very issue is pending before an appellate court?
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