Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Qutab Din vs Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner, Etc.S1982 SCMR 845 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-16
  constitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionsettlement authoritiesdivisibility of propertyconcurrent findingsevacuee propertypetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a property dispute concerning a portion of a house in Khanewal, Multan District, involving conflicting claims over settlement forms and house numbering. The petitioner challenged orders by the settlement authorities and the High Court dismissing his writ petition against the division and transfer of the property's non-evacuee portion between the petitioner and the third respondent. The core legal question revolved around whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the divisibility of the property could be disturbed in constitutional jurisdiction, and whether a previous compromise and rent note before a Rent Controller could override the remand findings and the correct identification of property units. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the tribunals regarding the divisibility of the property were supported by ample evidence and could not be interfered with in limited constitutional jurisdiction, particularly where the petitioner's reliance on the rent note was misconceived in light of an unchallenged earlier High Court judgment. The key principle laid down is that the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact reached by tribunals based on adequate evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can set aside concurrent findings of fact reached by settlement tribunals in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can a party rely on a rent note or compromise before a Rent Controller when a prior unchallenged High Court judgment has settled the matter regarding property confusion?
  • Whether a Deputy Settlement Commissioner's finding on the divisibility of a non-evacuee property unit can be sustained based on concurrent evidence?
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• Qazi Sadiq Hussain and Others vs Umar Din and Other1982 SCMR 1093 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-17
  evacuee propertysettlement operationscomposite propertytransfer of propertywrit jurisdictiondisplaced personsremand order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a composite evacuee property in Lahore, comprising a main bungalow, shops, and quarters, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner correctly exercised his authority in dividing the property and transferring specific shops to their occupants, rather than the entire property to the petitioners. The petitioners challenged the High Court's dismissal of their writ petition, which had upheld the transfer of three shops to the respondents. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners could not challenge the remand order regarding the quarters because they had not filed a petition for leave to appeal against that specific order. Regarding the shops, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the property was composite and that the settlement authorities acted within their lawful discretion under the relevant statute to transfer independent entities to their respective occupants. The key principle established is that settlement authorities possess the jurisdiction to divide composite properties and transfer individual units to occupants who are displaced persons.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a High Court order in the Supreme Court if they failed to file a petition for leave to appeal against that specific order?
  • Do settlement authorities have the power to divide a composite evacuee property and transfer individual units to different occupants?
  • Is the determination of whether a property is divisible or whether specific quarters form an integral part of a main house considered a question of fact?
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• Qayyum Iqbal vs The State and Another1982 SCMR 887 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-10
  leave to appealprohibitioncognizable offencemarijuana recoverycriminal investigationillegalities and irregularities
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court, arising from criminal proceedings under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, where 25 kilograms of Marijuana was allegedly recovered from a house. The core legal questions involved whether the recovery of Marijuana from a house rather than a public place rendered the offence non-cognizable under Article 16 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, whether police investigation without a Magistrate's permission under section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was legally sustainable, and whether non-compliance with rule 6 of the rules framed under Article 31 of the said Order constituted an incurable illegality. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to provide an authoritative pronouncement on these questions, directing that trial proceedings continue but final orders be stayed pending the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether recovery of Marijuana from a house rather than a public place makes the offence non-cognizable under Article 16 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
  • Can an offence under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 be investigated without the permission of a Magistrate under section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does non-compliance with rule 6 of the rules framed under Article 31 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 constitute an incurable illegality rather than a curable irregularity under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Qalandar Khan State through Advocate General N: W. F. P. Peshawar1982 SCMR 1167 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Qabool and Another vs The State1982 PLD Supreme Court 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murdercriminal appealocular testimonymedical evidenceweapon recoveryreappraisal of evidencecapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court maintaining the appellants' conviction and death sentences under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution's case was that the appellants murdered the deceased by inflicting hatchet blows following a prior land dispute, which was witnessed by several eye-witnesses, including an independent and disinterested witness. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the medical evidence, showing injuries caused by a blunt weapon, contradicted the ocular testimony of hatchet assaults, and whether the First Information Report was prompt or the result of deliberation. Upon reappraising the evidence, the Supreme Court held that the independent ocular testimony, corroborated by the recovery of blood-stained weapons, established the guilt of the appellants, and that minor discrepancies regarding the weapon's side of impact did not falsify the prosecution case. The Court affirmed the conviction and dismissed the appeal, laying down that eyewitness testimony from related or chance witnesses, when credible and corroborated by independent evidence and recoveries, remains reliable despite minor variances with medical evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the weapon's side of impact are sufficient to falsify a murder charge?
  • Can the testimony of related or chance eye-witnesses be relied upon without independent corroboration in a criminal trial?
  • Whether the prompt lodging of a First Information Report can be successfully challenged on the basis of police documents and timing discrepancies?
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• Punjab Road Transport Board vs Abdul Salam and Another1982 SCMR 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-27
  property disputeProvisional Transfer OrderPermanent Transfer Deedearmarking schemenatural justiceex parte orderrevisional powersDisplaced Persons Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a property dispute between the Punjab Road Transport Board and two private respondents, both claiming title to the same land through the Settlement Department. The core legal question was whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner could unilaterally cancel the respondents' Provisional Transfer Order and Permanent Transfer Deed without a hearing, and whether the underlying transfer of the property to the respondents was valid given the Board's prior claim. The Supreme Court held that while the Chief Settlement Commissioner acted correctly in ordering a probe into the conflicting claims under Section 20(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, the cancellation of the respondents' documents without notice was legally unjustified. The Court clarified that the documents were merely suspended, not cancelled, and directed the Settlement Commissioner to conduct a fresh inquiry, allowing both parties to present their arguments before passing a final, speaking order. The principle established is that administrative cancellation of transfer documents involving competing claims requires a fair hearing to satisfy the requirements of natural justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Chief Settlement Commissioner cancel a transfer document without providing a hearing to the affected party?
  • Does the Settlement Commissioner have the authority to order a probe into conflicting claims where two parties hold transfer documents for the same property?
  • Is an open site used as a bus stand transferable under the Earmarking Scheme for houses?
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• Punjab Road Transport Board and Another vs Punjab Service Tribunal1982 SCMR 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-22
  service tribunalpromotionjurisdiction of chairmandelegation of powersleave to appealcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Punjab Road Transport Board against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had set aside the Board's resolution annulling the promotion of respondent Ch. Rafiq Ahmad Shad to the post of Controller of Stores in N.P.S. 18, thereby restoring the promotion order passed by the Chairman of the Board. The core legal question revolved around the competence and jurisdiction of the Chairman of the Board to make the promotion order under the relevant rules, and whether the respondent's representation could be treated as an appeal against the Managing Director's refusal to promote. The Supreme Court held that under clause (7) of rule 14 of the Punjab Road Transport Board Rules, 1972, the Chairman could exercise powers delegated to a subordinate authority such as the Managing Director, and that the respondent's representation effectively constituted an appeal against the Managing Director's implicit refusal. The petition was accordingly dismissed, upholding the Tribunal's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chairman of the Punjab Road Transport Board can exercise powers delegated to a subordinate authority under the Punjab Road Transport Board Rules, 1972?
  • Can a representation against non-promotion be treated as an appeal where the subordinate authority has effectively refused promotion?
  • Whether an objection not raised before the Service Tribunal can be urged for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Province of the Punjab vs Ramzan Ali Khan Etc.S1982 SCMR 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-06
  Service Tribunal jurisdictionadvance incrementsinterpretation of government circularsleave to appealservice matterssubstantial question of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the Province of the Punjab challenging a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which granted four advance increments to Private Secretaries employed in the High Court, Lahore. Although the government circular specified certain designated posts for these increments, the Tribunal extended the benefit to the respondents based on an analysis of their actual duties, equating them to the designated categories. The core legal question is whether the Service Tribunal possesses the jurisdiction to interpret a government circular in a manner that extends benefits to non-designated groups solely by reference to the duties performed, while disregarding the explicit designations, pay scales, and status defined in the circular. The Supreme Court held that the petition raised a substantial question of law regarding the Tribunal's power to interpret administrative circulars by subordinating status and pay scale to functional duties. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the scope of the Tribunal's interpretive authority in such service matters constitutes a significant legal issue requiring further adjudication. The impugned order was suspended pending the final appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to extend the benefits of a government circular to non-designated groups based solely on the duties performed?
  • Can a Service Tribunal subordinate considerations of pay scale and status when interpreting the applicability of a government circular?
  • Does the interpretation of a government circular regarding the extension of benefits to non-designated employees constitute a substantial question of law under Article 212(3) of the Constitution?
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• Province of Sind and Another vs Mohandas1982 PLD Supreme Court 220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-11
  Sind Irrigation Act 1879water supplyirrigation modulesource of water supplystatutory interpretationadministrative discretionwater rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the interpretation of the Sind Irrigation Act, 1879, specifically whether replacing a water module type constitutes a change in the 'source of water supply' under Section 91, thereby requiring prior notice to landowners. The respondent challenged the government's decision to convert watercourse modules, arguing it violated Section 91. The Supreme Court held that changing the type of module does not constitute a change in the 'source of water supply,' which refers to the origin of water flow rather than the mechanical outlet device. The Court clarified that the management of modules rests with the Government, provided the landowner receives their assured water supply. The Court established that Section 91 applies only to the diversion of water sources. If a modification to a module results in a diminution of water supply, the appropriate remedy is compensation or water rate remission under Section 31 of the Sind Irrigation Act, 1879, rather than the procedural notice requirements of Section 91. Consequently, the High Court's decision was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does changing the type of a water module or outlet constitute a change in the source of water supply under Section 91 of the Sind Irrigation Act, 1879?
  • Is a Canal Officer required to serve notice under Section 91 of the Sind Irrigation Act, 1879, when modifying the type of water outlet?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for a landowner if a change in water module type results in a diminution of their assured water supply?
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• Province of Punjab, Sh. Muhammad Yusuf Ems vs Saved Bashir A14mad1982 PLD Supreme Court 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-10
  nationalisationservice rulesultra viresheadmasterspay scalestatus protectioncivil servants
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of multiple civil appeals arising from the nationalisation of privately managed schools and colleges in the Punjab under Martial Law Regulation No. 118 of 1972. The core legal questions were whether the Punjab Nationalised Schools (Men and Women Section) Teaching Posts Rules 1974 and the Nationalised Colleges (Men and Women Section) Teaching Posts Rules 1974 were ultra vires of paragraph 13 of MLR 118, and whether the decategorisation of headmasters and professors under these rules violated the guarantees in paragraph 7(2) of MLR 118. The Supreme Court held that the rules were validly made under paragraph 13 of MLR 118 as they aimed at the integration and merger of educational institutions. The Court further held that while paragraph 7(2) of MLR 118 guarantees comparable scales of pay based on equivalent qualifications, experience, and seniority, it does not guarantee the retention of specific posts or status. Consequently, the impugned rules decategorising certain staff were declared intra vires, and the contrary view in PLD 1977 Lah. 549 was overruled.

  Questions settled

  • Whether rules regulating the recruitment and integration of nationalised teaching staff are within the rule-making scope of paragraph 13 of Martial Law Regulation No. 118 of 1972?
  • Does paragraph 7(2) of Martial Law Regulation No. 118 of 1972 guarantee the retention of specific posts and status to teachers of nationalised institutions, or only comparable scales of pay?
  • Can service rules that decategorise headmasters and professors be declared ultra vires if they protect comparable pay but alter the designation or status of the employees?
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• Province of Punjab vs Mst. Bakhat Bibi1982 SCMR 1174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-02
  stay ordervacation of stayillegal dispossessionland acquisitionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an application filed by the respondent in the main appeal seeking a direction to restrain the appellant Government from raising construction on the suit land measuring 42 kanals and 3 marlas, which was allegedly taken into possession by the Irrigation Department without acquisition proceedings. The core legal question concerns the propriety of continuing an interim stay order of execution granted in favor of the appellant Government when the Government subsequently hands over the disputed land to WAPDA for construction and fails to provide proper instructions through its counsel despite court directions. The Supreme Court held that the stay order granted in favor of the appellant Government must be vacated due to the lack of cooperation and proper instructions from the relevant authority regarding the legal status of the land acquisition. The key principle laid down is that interim protection granted to a government authority may be withdrawn if the authority fails to assist the court or comply with directions regarding the subject matter of the dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Can an interim stay order of execution granted in favor of the Government be vacated when the Government fails to provide proper instructions to its counsel?
  • What is the effect of handing over disputed land to a third party while a stay of execution is in operation before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can withdraw interim relief when the appellant department fails to clarify the legality of possession and land acquisition.
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• Province of Punjab vs Ghulam Muhammad Sabir Etc.S1982 SCMR 774 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-16
  ejectment proceedingsrent restriction lawsgovernment land grantnationalization of schoolswrit jurisdictionleave to appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  The Anjuman Taraqi-e-Taleem-e-Aama established Muslim High School and Muslim Model Girls' High School on government-leased land in Faisalabad, which were subsequently nationalized. The respondent, Ghulam Muhammad Sabir, claiming ownership of the property, initiated ejectment proceedings against the schools under rent restriction laws. Although the Rent Controller dismissed the applications, the appellate court accepted them. The Provincial Government's subsequent writ petitions were dismissed by the Lahore High Court, which declined to interfere in its writ jurisdiction. The Provincial Government sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerns whether the respondent could legally assert ownership or landlord status over the property, given the specific conditions of the government land grant prohibiting the assignment, subletting, or transfer of the land or buildings without prior written government permission, and the fact that the building plans were sanctioned in the name of the Anjuman. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these issues, maintaining the status quo in the interim.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person claim ownership or landlord status over property built on government land when the grant explicitly prohibits transfer or assignment without government permission?
  • Does the sanctioning of building plans in the name of an organization preclude an individual from claiming personal ownership of the property?
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• Province of Punjab through the Secretary to Government of Punjab, Education Department Etc. vs Civil Judge, Lahore and Other1982 SCMR 692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-08
  wilful defaultejectmentrent restrictiongovernment tenantmala fide requisitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Provincial Government against a High Court judgment dismissing its writ petition in a rent matter. A school taken over by the Government under nationalisation became a tenant of the premises, subsequently defaulted on rent payments, and attempted to defeat ejectment proceedings by having the property requisitioned. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the ejectment application due to lack of jurisdiction following the requisition, but the High Court later declared the requisition order mala fide and void. Upon remand, the Rent Controller and appellate authorities found the Government to be a wilful defaulter and ordered its eviction, a decision upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether a Government Department as a tenant can withhold rent based on departmental audit requirements and evade ejectment. The Supreme Court held that Government departments are subject to the same obligations as private tenants under rent laws and cannot impose unilateral conditions or evade rent payment due to internal administrative delays. The court affirmed the eviction order and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Government Department as a tenant exempt from the application of urban rent restriction laws regarding default in rent payment?
  • Can a Government Department withhold rent to a landlord on the ground of internal departmental audit procedures and non-production of taxation certificates?
  • Whether an order of requisition obtained to defeat pending ejectment proceedings before a Rent Controller is mala fide?
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• Province of Punjab through Finance Sbcretary vs Ramzan Ali Khan1982 PLD Supreme Court 349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-15
  service tribunaladvance incrementssubstantial question of lawcivil servantinterpretation of circularpublic importance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is directed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which held that Private Secretaries employed in the Lahore High Court were entitled to the benefit of four advance increments granted by a Punjab Government circular dated January 15, 1981, to Stenographers and related personnel. The core legal question was whether the circular applied to the Private Secretaries based on the nature of their duties (as erstwhile Judgment Writers/Personal Assistants) or was restricted strictly to the designated posts enumerated in the circular, and whether the appeal raised a substantial question of law of general public importance under Article 212(3) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal's finding that the Private Secretaries were essentially stenographers performing identical duties was a finding of fact and that the case did not involve a substantial question of law of general public importance, rendering the appeal incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal against the order of a Service Tribunal before the Supreme Court is competent without involving a substantial question of law of general public importance?
  • Does a finding by a Service Tribunal that a particular post's duties are synonymous with another designated category constitute a question of fact?
  • Whether the enumeration of specific posts following 'viz.' in a government circular necessarily excludes unmentioned categories regardless of the actual duties performed?
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• Province of Punjab through Collector, Bahawalpur vs Sufi Habib1982 SCMR 243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-24
  arbitration awardarbitration actsetting aside awardreasoned awardleave to appealcontract dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the execution of a contract, where the respondent had applied under the Arbitration Act for referring the matter to arbitration. An award was rendered by the arbitrator, and the trial court subsequently passed a decree in terms of the award, which was upheld by the appellate court. However, the Lahore High Court accepted a revision petition, setting aside the lower courts' judgments and directing the trial court to appoint a new arbitrator. The High Court held that the award was laconic and silent as to its basis or reasons, making it legally ineffective. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in dismissing the petition, observed that while an arbitrator may not generally be obligated to provide reasons, where reasons are indeed given, they must be based upon the evidence produced and the applicable law. If the arbitrator fails to do so, the award is liable to be set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an arbitration award is liable to be set aside if the reasons provided by the arbitrator are not based upon the evidence produced and the applicable law?
  • Can a court set aside an arbitration award on the ground that it is laconic and silent as to its basis or reasons?
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• Province of Punjab and 2 Others vs Ch. Zahoor Elahi Etc.S1982 SCMR 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-15
  mala fide acquisitionpolitical victimizationconcurrent findings of factland acquisitionfraud on the statutespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal arose out of concurrent judgments of the courts below which decreed the respondents' suits declaring the acquisition of their land under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 to be mala fide, illegal, and without jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the acquisition of land belonging to political opponents of the then government was vitiated by mala fides and political victimization. The Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact regarding mala fides, supported by robust oral and documentary evidence including direct testimony of political coercion by the high-ranking executive, will not be interfered with unless shown to be perverse or against the record. The key principle laid down is that a mala fide administrative act or statutory acquisition is fundamentally an act without jurisdiction and a fraud on the statute, and the Supreme Court is bound by concurrent findings of lower courts on questions of fact unless exceptional circumstances are demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding mala fides in land acquisition proceedings can be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a mala fide administrative act or statutory acquisition amount to an act without jurisdiction and a fraud on the statute?
  • Whether the failure of a material official defendant to appear as a witness permits an adverse inference regarding the legitimacy of acquisition proceedings?
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• Prevent : Aslam Riaz Hussain, Karam Elahee Chauhan And Adam Khan vs1982 PLD Supreme Court 120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-23
  representative suitOrder I Rule 8 CPCabatement of appeallegal representativesShamilat dehproprietary bodyremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit filed by the appellants seeking a declaration of exclusive ownership over certain land, asserting that the revenue entries classifying it as Shamilat-deh (common land) belonging to a 197-member proprietary body were incorrect. The trial court had granted permission under Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to sue the entire proprietary body in a representative capacity through two designated representatives. After the District Judge dismissed the suit, the appellants filed a Regular Second Appeal in the High Court. During the appeal's pendency, one of the members of the proprietary body (defendant No. 1) died, and his legal representatives were not brought on record, leading the High Court to dismiss the appeal as abated in toto.

  The Supreme Court accepted the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that under Order I Rule 8, CPC, the effective parties to a representative suit or appeal are the court-approved representatives, not the individual persons represented. Consequently, the death of an individual represented member does not cause the appeal to abate even if their legal representatives are not substituted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal abates in toto upon the death of an individual represented person in a representative suit under Order I Rule 8 CPC if their legal representatives are not brought on record?
  • Who are the effective parties to a suit or appeal conducted in a representative capacity under Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the retention of an individual represented person's name on the record make them a formal party requiring substitution of their legal representatives upon death?
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• Pirtajbar Shah (Represented by Heirs) vs Muhammad Yaqoob1982 SCMR 1010 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-30
  ejectmentwilful defaultrent controladmissibility of documentscompromise deedleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the ejectment of a tenant for wilful default in rent payment. The Rent Controller initially ordered the tenant's ejectment, a decision reversed by the District Judge on appeal, but subsequently restored by the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question was whether an unproved and disputed compromise deed, which was never incorporated into a court order, could be relied upon by the first appellate court to set aside the ejectment order. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the compromise deed was not legally admissible as evidence because it was never properly proved and had been explicitly objected to by the landlord's counsel during proceedings. The Court held that a document produced in court without being formally proved or accepted cannot be relied upon to alter the rights of parties. Consequently, the finding of wilful default in rent payment was maintained, and the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the tenant's obligation to vacate the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court rely on a compromise deed that was produced in court but never formally proved or incorporated into a court order?
  • Does a document produced in court proceedings require formal proof if its admissibility is challenged by the opposing party?
  • Is a tenant liable for ejectment if they fail to pay rent for the period preceding the institution of the ejectment application?
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• Pir Muhammad vs Education Town Co Operative Society Ltd., Lahore1982 SCMR 995 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-24
  pre-emptionZar-e-Panjamlimitationcondonation of delayrejection of plaintreview petitionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a suit for pre-emption and was ordered to deposit Zar-e-Panjam. After multiple extensions were granted by the trial court, including permission to furnish a bank guarantee, the petitioner failed to deposit the amount within the extended time, leading to the rejection of the plaint. Subsequent appeals and a Regular Second Appeal were dismissed. The petitioner then filed a review application, which was also dismissed, followed by a petition for special leave to appeal. The Supreme Court addressed whether the petition was time-barred and if the delay could be condoned under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Court held that the petition was time-barred as the review application lacked merit and was filed merely to gain time. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 was inapplicable because the review petition was not dismissed due to a defect of jurisdiction or a cause of a like nature. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, noting the petitioner's failure to comply with court orders despite receiving sufficient latitude.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of a meritless review application extend the period of limitation for filing a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Is Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 applicable to a review petition dismissed on merits rather than for a defect of jurisdiction or similar cause?
  • Can a court grant leave to appeal when the underlying petition is barred by limitation and the petitioner failed to comply with court-ordered deposits?
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• Pir Inayat Shah vs Agha Muhammad1982 SCMR 1195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-07
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentstriking off defencerent controllerspecial leave to appealtenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the concurrent orders of the lower courts and the Rent Controller striking off his defence for failing to deposit rent in a timely manner. The core legal question concerns whether illness constitutes a valid ground to excuse a default in depositing rent as ordered by the Rent Controller when the tenant is capable of arranging alternative means for compliance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner's excuse of illness is untenable since personal appearance to deposit rent is not required by law, and the duty could have been fulfilled through family members or a servant. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that personal illness does not excuse statutory or directed deposit defaults where alternative modes of compliance are readily available.

  Questions settled

  • Whether illness constitutes a valid ground for failing to deposit rent as directed by the Rent Controller?
  • Does the law require a tenant to personally deposit rent in court?
  • Whether the Rent Controller is justified in striking off the defence of a tenant who defaults in depositing rent without seeking condonation of delay?
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• Pir Bakhsh and 3 Others vs The State1982 SCMR 940 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-11
  leave to appealacquittal reversalcriminal appealsurrender to jurisdictionsudden fightbail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had reversed the trial court's acquittal of four petitioners, convicting them for various offenses arising from a fatal altercation. The petitioners were initially tried for murder and related offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court, while acquitting three co-accused, convicted the four petitioners, finding that the injuries occurred during a sudden, unpremeditated fight. The petitioners challenged this conviction, arguing that the investigation was flawed, the fight lacked motive, and the prosecution relied on biased, inter-related witnesses. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to two of the petitioners, Pir Bakhsh and Muhammad Akram, while simultaneously granting them bail. However, the Court subsequently clarified that the petition for leave to appeal and bail could not be entertained for the remaining two petitioners, Muhammad Sharif and Muhammad Hanif, as they had not surrendered to the court's jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition regarding the latter two was dismissed, restricting the relief granted to the first two petitioners only.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be entertained by the Supreme Court if the petitioners have not surrendered to the court's jurisdiction?
  • Does the grant of bail and leave to appeal automatically apply to all co-petitioners if some have failed to surrender?
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• Pervez Khan Bahadur the State vs Khan Bahadur and 3 Other the State1982 SCMR 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-23Read full judgment →
• Pakistan vs Muhammad Abdullah Bajwa1982 PLD Supreme Court 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-21
  limitation periodservice tribunalleave to appealcomputation of timecertified copystatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for Leave to Appeal filed by the Federation of Pakistan against a judgment of the Services Tribunal. The core legal question involves the computation of the limitation period for filing such a petition under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The petitioner contended that the 50-day period taken by the Tribunal to transmit a copy of the judgment to the department should be excluded from the limitation period under Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908. Conversely, the respondent argued that Section 12 only permits the exclusion of time 'requisite for obtaining' a copy, and that the petition was filed beyond the prescribed 60-day limit. The Court, without reaching a final holding on the merits, identified that the matter required further consideration regarding the interpretation of Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908 and the Supreme Court Rules. Consequently, the Court directed the Advocate General for Punjab to assist in resolving the dispute regarding the computation of time for filing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the time taken by a Services Tribunal to provide a copy of its judgment to a department qualify as 'time requisite for obtaining a copy' under Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Is the period of limitation for filing a petition for Leave to Appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 computed from the date of the announcement of the judgment or from the date of receipt of the certified copy?
  • Can the time spent by a department waiting for a Tribunal to send a judgment copy be excluded from the limitation period prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules?
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• Pakistan Thrugh Secretary, Ministry of Defence vs L/NK. Sardar Ali1982 PLD Supreme Court 342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-17
  West Pakistan Rangers Ordinanceprior sanction for prosecutionmagisterial powersdisciplinary proceedingsstatutory interpretationForce member trialjurisdiction of Commandant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside the conviction of two West Pakistan Rangers members. The core legal question was whether 'prior sanction' from the Director-General is mandatory under Section 19 of the West Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959, when a member of the Force is tried by a Commandant invested with magisterial powers under Section 20. The Supreme Court held that the requirement for prior sanction under Section 19 applies exclusively when a member of the Force is prosecuted before a court other than one constituted under Section 20. When the trial is conducted by a Commandant or officer invested with magisterial powers under Section 20, no such prior sanction is required. The Court reasoned that Section 19 serves to regulate jurisdiction when 'outsider' courts try Force members, rather than restricting the internal disciplinary jurisdiction of officers empowered under Section 20. The High Court’s interpretation erroneously conflated administrative dismissal consequences with procedural requirements for prosecution. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, affirming that the trial by the Commandant was legally valid.

  Questions settled

  • Is prior sanction from the Director-General required under Section 19 of the West Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959, when a member of the Force is tried by a Commandant invested with magisterial powers under Section 20?
  • Does the requirement for prior sanction under Section 19 of the West Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959, apply to trials conducted by courts other than those constituted under Section 20?
  • Can a member of the Force be tried for an offence under the West Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959, without prior sanction if the trial is held before a court constituted under Section 20?
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• Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. vs Babar Zaman and 3 Other1982 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-04
  disciplinary proceedingsservice rulesdelegated legislationsub-delegationindustrial standing ordersleave to appealstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment concerning disciplinary proceedings against Pakistan Television Corporation (PTC) employees. The core legal questions involve whether the PTC Employees' Service Rules, 1978, were validly framed by a Member of the National Industrial Relations Commission authorized by the Chairman, and whether the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, applies to PTC, thereby mandating strict compliance with its disciplinary timelines. The High Court had previously held the rules ultra vires, reasoning that the Chairman could not delegate rule-making authority to a Member. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the PTC Service Rules were competently framed and whether the rule 2(b) of the Pakistan Essential Services Maintenance Rules, 1962, which permits such delegation, is legally valid. The case addresses the principle of sub-delegation of legislative power and the exclusion of general industrial standing orders where specific statutory service rules govern an establishment.

  Questions settled

  • Are the PTC Employees' Service Rules, 1978, validly framed if enacted by a Member of the National Industrial Relations Commission authorized by the Chairman?
  • Does the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, apply to establishments governed by the Pakistan Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1952?
  • Can a delegatee of the Federal Government further delegate rule-making powers to a subordinate authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Sports Co Operative Industrial Society Ltd. vs Kh. Muhammad1982 SCMR 1175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-15
  ejectment proceedingslandlord and tenantPermanent Transfer OrderRent Controller jurisdictionevacuee propertytitle dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an ejectment proceeding initiated by the respondent against the petitioner society regarding two rooms in a building. The petitioner challenged the ejectment, denying the landlord-tenant relationship and asserting that the property in question was part of an industrial concern it had purchased at auction, alleging the respondent's Permanent Transfer Order (P.T.O.) was obtained through fraud. The Rent Controller, the District Judge, and the High Court all ruled against the petitioner, affirming the ejectment. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller could look behind a valid, subsisting P.T.O. to determine title or validity of transfer. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller is bound by the P.T.O. and lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity or correctness of such a transfer document. The Court further held that as long as a P.T.O. remains uncancelled and its operation unsuspended, it must be acted upon. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the petitioner's contentions regarding title were outside the scope of ejectment proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller adjudicate upon the validity or correctness of a Permanent Transfer Order in an ejectment proceeding?
  • Is a Rent Controller bound to act upon a Permanent Transfer Order that has not been cancelled or suspended?
  • Does a party have the right to challenge the title of a landlord based on a Permanent Transfer Order within summary ejectment proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs The Province of Punjab1982 SCMR 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-14
  condonation of delayleave to appealmisrepresentationrecall of ordercause listexecution first appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding an Execution First Appeal. The appellant had sought condonation of a 206-day delay in filing the petition for leave to appeal, claiming that the High Court judgment was announced without the issuance of a cause list. Upon review, the Supreme Court examined the original register of the High Court and discovered that a cause list had indeed been issued and was duly pasted, containing the case details and the date of announcement. The core legal question was whether the order granting leave to appeal, which was predicated on an inaccurate factual representation regarding the absence of a cause list, could be sustained. The Supreme Court held that the leave to appeal was obtained based on an incorrect statement of fact. Consequently, the Court recalled the order granting leave and dismissed the appeal with costs. The principle laid down is that an order granting leave to appeal obtained through a misrepresentation of material facts is liable to be recalled.

  Questions settled

  • Can an order granting leave to appeal be recalled if it was obtained based on an inaccurate statement of fact?
  • Does the failure to verify the existence of a cause list justify the condonation of a significant delay in filing an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Cycle Industrial Co Operative Societylimited vs Muhammad1982 SCMR 950 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-19
  labour lawstermination of serviceconstitutional petitiondomestic inquiryleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal calls in question a judgment of the Lahore High Court that dismissed in limine a constitutional petition arising from labour proceedings. The petitioner-employer contended that the respondent-workman's services were terminated simply because he was unavailable for service due to imprisonment by a Military Court, and not due to participation in an illegal strike. The High Court, examining the record and witness statements, found that the termination based on physical imprisonment was merely a device to avoid holding a domestic inquiry and thus could not be construed as termination simpliciter, declining to interfere in its writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found the approach of the High Court unexceptionable, holding that no grounds were shown to interfere with the impugned order, and accordingly dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether termination of a workman's services on the ground of imprisonment can be construed as termination simpliciter when no domestic inquiry is held?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere in writ jurisdiction when the High Court's refusal to intervene in a labour matter is based on sound reasoning?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan (Punjab Province) vs Riaz Ali Khan1982 SCMR 770 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-13
  probationertermination of serviceunsatisfactory workconstitutional protectionremoval from servicecivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court regarding the termination of service of a probationer. The core legal question is whether the termination of a probationer's service on the ground of unsatisfactory work constitutes removal or dismissal from service, thereby attracting constitutional protection. The Supreme Court held that the discharge of a probationer for unsatisfactory work does not amount to dismissal or removal from service, provided there is no latent stigma of misconduct, and such termination is in accordance with the terms of the contract or applicable rules. The Court laid down the principle that a probationer's service only attains a sure footing upon confirmation, and termination simpliciter for unsatisfactory work does not require constitutional safeguards.

  Questions settled

  • Does the termination of a probationer's service on the ground of unsatisfactory work amount to removal or dismissal from service?
  • Is a probationer entitled to constitutional protection against termination when discharged for unsatisfactory work without a stigma of misconduct?
  • Does the discharge of a probationer in accordance with the terms of the contract or service rules require formal constitutional safeguards?
  Read full judgment →
• Packages Ltd. vs Pir Muhammad and 11 Other1982 SCMR 716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-20
  consolidation of petitionsjoint trialLabour Courtprocedural powerindustrial disputereinstatementLabour Appellate Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arises from an employer's challenge to the consolidation of several employee grievance petitions by a Labour Court. Ten employees dismissed for prolonged absence filed petitions under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The Labour Court consolidated the cases with the consent of the parties and ordered reinstatement without back benefits. The employer appealed for dismissal of back benefit appeals, while the Tribunal set aside the Labour Court's decision, holding it lacked inherent power under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code to consolidate trials. The High Court reversed the Tribunal's decision, finding consolidation to be a procedural matter permitted under the law. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the consolidation of proceedings for a joint trial is a matter of procedure and an incidental or ancillary power enabling the tribunal to effectively exercise its statutory jurisdiction, rather than an exercise of inherent power. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that procedural consolidation done with consent is lawful and does not prejudice the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Labour Court has the power to consolidate multiple petitions for a joint trial?
  • Is the consolidation of several suits or petitions for the purpose of a joint trial strictly a matter of procedure?
  • Whether the power to regulate its own procedure is incidental or ancillary to the main jurisdiction of a statutory tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Nur Ahmad vs Election Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Sahiwal1982 SCMR 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-23
  election disqualificationlocal governmentcontract for worksullage water disposalconflict of intereststatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld an Election Tribunal's decision disqualifying the petitioner from holding office as a member of the Town Committee, Renala Khurd. The core legal question was whether a contract held by the petitioner for the disposal of sullage water from the Town Committee constituted a disqualifying 'contract for work to be done' under the relevant election laws. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the disqualification. The Court held that the contract, which involved mutual obligations and the performance of a public duty regarding the disposal of sullage water, fell within the scope of the disqualifying provision. The Court established that the term 'work' in the context of election disqualification clauses is not restricted to construction or building projects but encompasses any engagement in the performance of a task or duty where there is mutuality of obligation between the candidate and the local body, aiming to prevent conflicts of interest in public service.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contract for the disposal of sullage water with a local body constitute a disqualifying contract under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is the term 'work to be done' in an election disqualification clause restricted to construction and building projects?
  • What are the essential elements of a contract that creates a disqualification for an elected official under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad, Etc. Sher Muhammad vs The State Noor Muhammad1982 SCMR 1200 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Province of Punjab and Other1982 SCMR 900 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-23
  Lambardari grantvested rightslis pendenssuspense accountColony Manualresumption of grant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the resumption of a Lambardari grant following the petitioner's removal from the position of Lambardar. The core legal question was whether the petitioner acquired a vested ownership right in the Lambardari square land merely by depositing the purchase price while his appointment as Lambardar was subject to ongoing litigation. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not acquire any vested right in the land. The Court reasoned that, pursuant to the 1954 instructions contained in the Colony Manual, any price deposited for a Lambardari grant during pending litigation must be held in a suspense account and only credited upon the finality of the appointment. Consequently, because the petitioner's appointment did not reach finality, the deposit did not confer ownership. The Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, establishing the principle that a Lambardari grant is contingent upon the finality of the appointment, and deposits made during pending litigation do not create vested property rights under the doctrine of lis pendens.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deposit of the price of a Lambardari square during pending litigation regarding the Lambardar's appointment confer vested ownership rights upon the depositor?
  • Under the 1954 instructions in the Colony Manual, how must the Collector treat the price of a Lambardari grant received while the appointment is subject to litigation?
  • Can a Lambardar claim ownership of a Lambardari grant if their appointment is ultimately set aside?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad and Others vs Muhammad Tufail and Other1982 SCMR 538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-16
  civil petition for special leavepre-emptionbahawalpur government notificationstatus quomesne profitssupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by way of civil petitions for special leave to appeal concerning the right of pre-emption over disputed land and potential exemption under a relevant notification of the Bahawalpur Government. The core legal questions involve determining whether the subject land was exempt from pre-emption and resolving an alleged conflict between two previous judgments of the Court, specifically Mst. Rehmat Bibi v. Nathe Khan and others and Sher Muhammad and others v. Abdul Khaliq and others. The Court granted leave to consider these matters and directed that a status quo regarding possession shall continue, subject to the petitioners furnishing security for mesne profits and undertaking to voluntarily surrender the land if the appeal is ultimately dismissed. The principle established relates to the examination of pre-emption rights and exemptions under regional governmental notifications, alongside the reconciliation of conflicting precedents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the land in dispute was subject to pre-emption or was exempted under the notification of the Bahawalpur Government?
  • Is there any conflict between the judgments reported as Mst. Rehmat Bibi v. Nathe Khan and others and Sher Muhammad and others v. Abdul Khaliq and others?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad and Others vs Mst. Nizam Bibi1982 CLC 2208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-21
  pre-emptioncourt-feerejection of plaintlimitationnegligencecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of pre-emption suits for failure to pay the requisite court-fee. The plaintiffs had filed suits with a nominal court-fee, undertaking to pay the deficiency based on net profits, but failed to do so by the date fixed by the trial court. The trial court dismissed the suits under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The District Judge and the High Court subsequently set aside this dismissal, directing the trial court to first quantify the specific court-fee amount before granting time for payment. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the lower appellate courts erred in interfering with the trial court's order. The Court emphasized that where a plaintiff fails to pay the court-fee within the time granted and fails to seek an extension or provide a valid explanation for the delay, the suit is liable to be rejected. The principle established is that a plaintiff cannot be granted indefinite time to pay court-fees, and a vested right of limitation accruing to the defendant cannot be lightly disregarded due to the plaintiff's negligence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial court have the authority to reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a plaintiff fails to pay the required court-fee within the time granted?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled to an indefinite extension of time to pay court-fees in a pre-emption suit?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with a trial court's order rejecting a plaint for non-payment of court-fee where the plaintiff offered no explanation for the delay before the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad and Another vs Extra Assistant Colonization1982 SCMR 431 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-23
  Ejected Tenants Schemefraudulent entriesresumption of landwrit jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factColonization of Government Landsnew plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was directed against a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional writ petition. The core dispute pertained to whether the petitioners held the subject land as legitimate allottees under the Ejected Tenants Scheme or had obtained entries fraudulently following a temporary lease. The Collector, upon reviewing the records, found that the entries were fraudulent, ordered resumption of the land, and this finding was consistently upheld by the Additional Commissioner, the Board of Revenue, and the High Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, holding that factual findings of fraud based on evidence and rendered by authorities with competent jurisdiction cannot be interfered with. Furthermore, the Supreme Court declined to entertain arguments concerning prior adjudication and protection under Section 16 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912, as these points were not raised or argued before the High Court. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent factual findings of fraud established before revenue authorities can be interfered with by the High Court in writ jurisdiction?
  • Can a party raise a new factual or legal argument before the Supreme Court if it was not raised or pressed before the High Court or Board of Revenue?
  • Does Section 16 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 protect a possessor whose allotment entries are found to be fraudulent?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Ali (Represented by His Heirs) vs Muhammad Yousaf and Other1982 SCMR 959 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-10
  joint transferland settlementtime-barred appealconstitutional petitionreview petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the orders of the High Court dated 13-3-1975 and 1-4-1975, which had set aside an order of the Settlement Commissioner regarding the joint transfer of disputed land. The core legal question concerns whether a party, having initially consented to a joint proposal and confirmation of land in 1962, can subsequently challenge the joint transfer after getting their claim independently verified years later. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit, affirming that a subsequent separation of claims does not render a prior valid confirmation illegal, especially when the party was present and raised no objection at the time of the joint confirmation. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot invalidate a past consensual and valid joint transfer of land merely by taking subsequent steps to separate their underlying claims.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a joint transfer of land on the ground of a subsequent separation of claims after having consented to the initial joint confirmation?
  • Whether a revision against an order dismissing an appeal as time-barred can sustain a challenge to a long-standing joint land transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmad Sheikh vs Secretary to Government of Punjab and 111982 PLD Supreme Court 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-31
  service tribunalseniorityinter-provincial transferdissolution of West Pakistanchange of domicilepast and closed transactioncivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a temporary Assistant Engineer who was promoted as an officiating Executive Engineer and initially allocated to the North-West Frontier Province upon the dissolution of West Pakistan, sought and obtained a transfer to the Province of Punjab subject to the express written condition that he would be placed at the bottom of the seniority list. Subsequently, after several conflicting service tribunal decisions and seniority lists, the Punjab Service Tribunal dismissed the petitioner's appeal against a seniority list placing him junior to the respondents, holding him bound by his accepted condition of transfer. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's movement was a transfer upon his own request rather than an allocation under the West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order, 1970, and that rules governing inter-provincial transfers empowered the competent authority to relegate the transferred officer to the bottom of the seniority list. The key principles laid down are that a government servant transferred between provinces on their own request is bound by lawful conditions of seniority agreed upon, and previous tribunal orders obtained without knowledge of crucial facts do not create a past and closed transaction barring rectification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a government servant transferred from one province to another at his own request is entitled to retain his original seniority without regard to conditions accepted upon transfer?
  • Does a service tribunal decision obtained without knowledge of true factual conditions constitute a past and closed transaction that binds the government?
  • Whether the dissolution of the Province of West Pakistan under President's Order No. 1 of 1970 precludes a provincial government from imposing conditions regarding seniority on a subsequent inter-provincial transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Muhammad vs Mst. Tabi and Other1982 SCMR 1003 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-15
  evacuee propertyauction saletransfer of propertysettlement authoritiesvoid auctiondisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee shop. The core legal question was whether an auction sale of the shop, conducted after the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had explicitly ordered its deletion from the auction list, could confer valid title upon the auction purchaser. The respondent had obtained an order transferring the shop to her, which included a directive to remove the property from the auction list. Despite this, the shop was auctioned to the opposing party. The Supreme Court held that once the Deputy Settlement Commissioner issued a valid order deleting the property from the auction list, the subsequent auction was legally void and could not confer any rights upon the purchaser. The Court emphasized that the validity of the transfer order to the respondent remained intact, rendering the subsequent auction proceedings ineffective. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the lower settlement authorities and the High Court, restoring the original transfer order in favour of the respondent, thereby upholding the rights of the appellant as an associate transferee.

  Questions settled

  • Does an auction sale of property remain valid if it occurs after the competent authority has ordered the property's deletion from the auction list?
  • Can a Deputy Settlement Commissioner issue a valid order to delete a property from an auction list?
  • Does an auction purchaser acquire legal rights if the property was not legally available for auction at the time of the bid?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Muhammad and Others vs Abdul Aziz and Other1982 SCMR 883 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-10
  inheritance disputerevisional jurisdictionwrit jurisdictionfinding of factsettlement proceedingspaternity determination
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a dispute regarding the inheritance of a claimant displaced person, Abdul Hafiz Khan, under the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act. The core legal controversy concerned the paternity of Mst. Sakina, specifically whether she was the daughter of the deceased. An initial order by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner declared she was not the daughter, but this was reversed on appeal by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, Capt. Jamshed Burki, who held she was indeed the daughter. A subsequent revision by the Settlement Commissioner set aside this order, claiming the Additional Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to hear a second appeal. The Lahore High Court, however, determined that Capt. Jamshed Burki’s order was actually a valid exercise of revisional jurisdiction, thereby declaring the Settlement Commissioner's interference unlawful. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the petitioner conceded the jurisdictional point. The Court held that findings of fact regarding paternity, once determined by a competent revisional authority, are not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction, particularly when no compelling circumstances exist to depart from this established rule.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of fact determined by a competent revisional authority be interfered with in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does an Additional Settlement Commissioner have the authority to treat an appeal as a revision if the original order was passed by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner?
  • Is a Settlement Commissioner's order setting aside a decision of an Additional Settlement Commissioner lawful if the Additional Settlement Commissioner acted within his revisional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Ahmad vs Jat and Other1982 SCMR 700 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-13
  criminal petitionalteration of convictiongrave and sudden provocationculpable homicidemurderreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against an order of the Lahore High Court whereby the conviction of the respondents under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code was altered to one under section 304(1) of the Pakistan Penal Code with a reduction in sentence. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court correctly appreciated the evidence and properly applied Exception I to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code based on grave and sudden provocation arising from an alleged illicit relationship. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's evaluation of the evidence was proper and that the defence version establishing grave and sudden provocation was probable. The key principle laid down is that where the defence version of sudden provocation is found probable upon a careful appraisal of the evidence, the conviction may appropriately be altered from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder based on grave and sudden provocation?
  • Does the acceptance of a probable defence version warrant the application of Exception I to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's appraisal of evidence when the conclusions drawn are found to be proper?
  Read full judgment →
• Niamat vs The State1982 SCMR 1052 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-05
  leave to appealmurdercorroborationweapon recoverycriminal justiceinterested witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 26-3-1980, which upheld his conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and altered his sentence from death to life imprisonment. The petitioner was tried along with four others for the murder of Ahmad Din, but the trial court and the High Court acquitted the co-accused, relying solely on the recovery of a blood-stained datar as corroboration to sustain the petitioner's conviction. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the recovery of the weapon, which was found in an accessible place and exposed to the elements for a prolonged period, along with other alleged flaws in the investigation and chain of custody, constituted sufficient and safe corroboration to maintain the conviction. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether necessary corroboration was forthcoming required detailed examination to ensure the safe administration of criminal justice, and accordingly granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of a weapon from an accessible place exposed to weather elements can serve as sufficient corroboration for a murder conviction?
  • Does the reliance on interested eye-witnesses necessitate independent and reliable corroboration to sustain a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether flaws in the investigation and missing links in sending a recovered weapon to the Chemical Examiner vitiate the evidentiary value of such recovery?
  Read full judgment →
• Nemat Khan (Represented by His Heir) vs Abadan Khan and Other1982S C M R 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-30
  land allotmentproduce index unitsretrospective effectsettlement authoritiesspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning a dispute over the allotment of agricultural land. The core legal question was whether a subsequent increase in Produce Index Units credited to the petitioners could retrospectively affect or deprive the respondents of a permanent land allotment validly made to them earlier. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition in limine, upholding the judgment of the Lahore High Court. The Court held that a permanent allotment of land made against a verified claim on a specific date cannot be disturbed or adversely affected by subsequent increases in units credited to another party at a later date, as the prior allotment had already attained finality and vested rights had been acquired. The key principle laid down is that subsequent administrative adjustments or increase in entitlement units cannot operate retrospectively to divest a citizen of a valid property right previously secured through a competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a subsequent increase in Produce Index Units operate retrospectively to deprive a person of a permanent land allotment made earlier?
  • Does an initial order of land allotment attaining finality protect the allottee from subsequent adjustments based on later unit increases?
  • Can limitation be pleaded against an allottee whose validly allotted land is sought to be withdrawn by a void subsequent order?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Hussain vs Ziaul Haq and Otshers1982 SCMR 1145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-13
  bailpost-arrest bailjudicial discretiondelay in trialSupreme Court jurisdictioncompetency of High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arising from a High Court order granting bail to respondents despite a prior refusal of bail by the Supreme Court on the merits of the case. The core legal questions addressed by the Supreme Court involve the competency of a High Court Single Judge to grant bail on merits after the Supreme Court has already refused it, and whether a plea for bail based on delay is strictly governed by the statutory provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 or if it can be granted as a general consideration independent of those provisions. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine these issues, specifically focusing on the scope of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The proceedings were directed to be prepared for a hearing to determine if the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction or misapplied the statutory criteria for bail in cases involving prior Supreme Court intervention and claims of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Is a High Court judge competent to grant bail on merits after the Supreme Court has previously refused bail on the same merits?
  • Does the proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 exclusively govern bail pleas based on delay?
  • Can bail be granted on the ground of delay independently of the statutory provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Aimed vs Fateh Muhammad and Other1982 SCMR 696 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-27
  pre-emptionremand orderconstitutional petitionlimitationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld the orders of the Member, Board of Revenue and the Additional Commissioner regarding a pre-emption suit. The petitioner, a tenant claiming pre-emption rights over a portion of sold land, challenged an appellate remand order and a point of limitation. The core legal questions involved whether an appellate court's remand order was open to constitutional scrutiny when no final order had been passed, and whether a plea of limitation not raised before the lower appellate forum could be entertained in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no illegality in declining to interfere with a remand order in its discretionary jurisdiction, noting that the trial court was empowered to re-examine the issues on merits. The petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed with a direction for expeditious disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of limitation not raised before the lower appellate authority be entertained in writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether a remand order passed by an appellate revenue authority is open to interference in constitutional jurisdiction before a final decision is rendered by the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmed vs The State1982 SCMR 939 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-07
  suspension of sentencebail pending appealdelay in disposalcriminal appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Circuit, wherein the sentence of death of the appellants was altered to life imprisonment. Leave to appeal having been granted on 20-3-1978, the petitioners filed a miscellaneous application seeking the suspension of their sentence and release on bail pending the hearing of the appeal. The core legal question concerns whether the appellants should be enlarged on bail solely on the ground of delay in the disposal of the appeal by the court. The Supreme Court held that it is not inclined to release the petitioners on bail merely due to the delay in the disposal of the appeal, keeping in view the state of work pending in the court. The application for suspension of sentence and bail was accordingly rejected, with a direction that efforts be made for the early disposal of the main appeal. The key principle laid down is that delay in the disposal of an appeal alone, given court workloads, does not automatically warrant the release of a convicted appellant on bail.

  Questions settled

  • Can a convicted appellant be released on bail merely on the ground of delay in the disposal of the appeal?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will suspend a sentence and grant bail pending appeal due to the state of work in the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmed vs Muhammad Sharif1982 SCMR 919 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-03
  ejectmentbona fide personal uselandlord and tenantspecial leave to appealdemised premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's second appeal and confirmed the order of the Additional District Judge directing the ejectment of the petitioner from the demised premises. The Rent Controller had initially rejected the landlord's ejectment application, but the appellate court and subsequently the High Court accepted the landlord's plea that the premises were bona fide required for personal use and occupation. The core legal question concerned whether the landlord's simultaneous prayer for enhancement of rent and ownership of other shops negated the bona fides of his personal use requirement. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent factual findings of the lower courts regarding the bona fide personal need were based on conclusive evidence and that the assertions regarding other properties belonging to the landlord were unsubstantiated. The petition was accordingly dismissed in limine, granting the petitioner time to vacate subject to the clearance of rent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether simultaneous prayer for enhancement of rent renders a landlord's claim for personal use mala fide?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent factual findings regarding bona fide personal requirement under rent laws?
  • Whether ownership of other properties in the same locality disproves the bona fide requirement of a demised premises by a landlord?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmed vs Ch. Sardar Muhammad1982 SC MR1113 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad and Another vs The State1982 SCMR 1146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-08
  murderextra-judicial confessioncircumstantial evidencelast seenrecoveryconcealment of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellants for the murder of Muhammad Ibrahim and the subsequent concealment of his dead body. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently established the guilt of the appellants through circumstantial evidence, including last-seen testimony, extra-judicial confessions made before a village Panchayat, and the recovery of incriminating items and the corpse. The Supreme Court held that while the evidence conclusively established the guilt of the primary accused, Nazir Ahmad, for both murder and concealment, the evidence against the co-appellant, Mst. Sardaran, was insufficient to sustain a conviction for murder. The Court affirmed the conviction of Nazir Ahmad for murder and concealment. However, regarding Mst. Sardaran, the Court held that while her involvement in concealing the crime was proved, her direct participation in the murder was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court upheld the conviction of Nazir Ahmad, while partially accepting the appeal of Mst. Sardaran by acquitting her of the murder charge while maintaining her conviction for concealing the body.

  Questions settled

  • Is a conviction for murder sustainable solely on the basis of extra-judicial confession and circumstantial evidence?
  • Does the recovery of personal effects of the deceased from an accused's possession constitute sufficient proof of murder?
  • Can an appellate court maintain a conviction for concealment of evidence while acquitting an accused of the underlying murder charge?
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• Nazir Ahmad and 2 Others vs The State1982 SCMR 251 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-12-02
  robberycriminal convictionconcurrent findingsrecovery of stolen propertydelay in hearingleave to appealocular evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioners' revision against their conviction under Section 394 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners challenged their conviction for robbery, arguing that the prosecution evidence was unreliable and that the delay in hearing their revision petition warranted interference. The Supreme Court observed that the petition was significantly time-barred and lacked merit. The Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which relied on credible ocular evidence and the recovery of stolen property from the petitioners' possession, were sound. The Court rejected the argument that the failure to recover the weapons used in the crime undermined the prosecution's case, noting that the recovery of the stolen vehicle and articles shortly after the incident provided strong corroboration. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the delay in the hearing of the revision petition did not merit relief, particularly as the petitioners had remained on bail during that period. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to recover the weapons used in a robbery undermine the prosecution's case when other incriminating evidence exists?
  • Does a significant delay in the hearing of a revision petition automatically entitle a convicted person to relief if they were on bail during the delay?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts when the evidence is found to be reliable?
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• Nazeer Ahmad and Others vs Yasin and Other1982 SCMR 1154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-31
  land allotmentex parte cancellationlachesdelaysubstantial justicesettlement of land claims
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order that upheld the restoration of land to the original allottee. The dispute arose when 19 kanals of land, originally confirmed in the name of the respondents' predecessor, were cancelled via an ex parte order based on an incorrect report by a Patwari, and subsequently re-allotted to the petitioners. The core legal question was whether the respondents' claim was barred by laches and delay, given the time elapsed before they challenged the cancellation. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower appellate authority's decision, noting that the initial cancellation order was illegal, clandestine, and based on false information. The Court held that where substantial justice has been done and property is restored to the rightful claimant, the plea of laches loses its force, especially when the delay is adequately explained. Consequently, the Court found no justification to interfere with the fair and just order of the High Court, dismissing the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ex parte cancellation of land allotment based on an incorrect official report be upheld?
  • Does the doctrine of laches bar the restoration of land to a rightful claimant when the delay is adequately explained?
  • Is the Supreme Court justified in refusing leave to appeal when substantial justice has been achieved by the lower courts?
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• Nazar Muhammad vs Muhammad Nawaz and Other1982 SCMR 894(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-21
  bailjudicial discretionspecial leave to appealcriminal procedureinterference with bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed by the complainant, Nazar Muhammad, challenging an order dated 23-5-1981 passed by the High Court, which had granted bail to the respondents, Muhammad Nawaz and Laloo, in a criminal case. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court exercised its judicial discretion properly in granting bail to the accused persons, or if there were grounds for the Supreme Court to interfere with that exercise of discretion. Upon reviewing the arguments presented by the learned counsel and examining the relevant orders and documents on the record, the Supreme Court held that the grant of bail is essentially a matter within the discretion of the High Court. The Court found that the High Court’s order was based on sound reasoning, and there was no evidence of misreading or omission of the record. Consequently, the Supreme Court determined that the High Court had not violated any legal principles, and thus, the petition lacked merit and was dismissed, refusing to interfere with the bail order.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of bail essentially a matter of discretion for the High Court?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court order granting bail?
  • Does the absence of misreading or omission of the record by the High Court justify the dismissal of a petition for leave to appeal against a bail order?
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• Nazar Muhammad and Another vs The State1982 SCM R 628 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-12
  criminal appealsentencingpre-trial detentionrigorous imprisonmentstatutory interpretationsentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a High Court judgment that reduced the sentences of the appellants, Nazar Muhammad and Muhammad Siddiq, who had been convicted by an Additional Sessions Judge under sections 325, 323, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellants did not contest the merits of the conviction but argued that the High Court had failed to properly consider the provisions of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which mandates that the court must take into account the period of pre-trial detention when sentencing an accused to imprisonment. Upon review, the Supreme Court examined the impugned judgment and determined that the High Court had, in fact, duly considered the period of detention while exercising its discretion to reduce the sentences from seven years to four years of rigorous imprisonment. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no merit in the appellants' contention regarding the omission of the statutory requirement. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the High Court had satisfied the legal obligation to account for pre-trial custody.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court required to consider the period of pre-trial detention when sentencing an accused to imprisonment under Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the failure to explicitly mention the consideration of pre-trial detention in a judgment necessarily imply that the court failed to apply Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Nawab vs The State1982 SCMR 484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-21
  grave and sudden provocationtriple murderculpable homicidemitigation of sentencecriminal appealdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Nawab, for the triple murder of his father-in-law, mother-in-law, and wife. The appellant admitted to the killings but contended that he acted under grave and sudden provocation, claiming he discovered his wife in a compromising position with an eye-witness. The core legal question was whether the plea of grave and sudden provocation was substantiated and whether it mitigated the culpability for all three murders. The Supreme Court held that while the circumstances surrounding the wife's death supported the plea of grave and sudden provocation, the murders of the father-in-law and mother-in-law were committed while they were asleep, negating any such provocation regarding them. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction under Section 302 for the wife's murder, substituting it with a conviction under Section 304, Part I, while maintaining the death sentences for the other two murders. The key principle established is that a plea of grave and sudden provocation does not extend to victims who were not involved in the provocative act and were killed while asleep.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of grave and sudden provocation mitigate the sentence for the murder of a spouse if the accused also killed other family members who were not involved in the provocative act?
  • Does the killing of sleeping victims negate a claim of grave and sudden provocation?
  • Is a conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 sustainable when the act was committed under grave and sudden provocation?
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• National Bank of Pakistan vs Commercial Union Assurance Co. Ltd., Karachi and 2 Other1982 SCMR 820 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-17
  assignment of insurance policynecessary partyarbitration proceedingsspecial leave to appealbank guaranteecivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The National Bank of Pakistan filed a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which permitted the disbursement of an insurance claim amount to respondent No. 3 against a bank guarantee during the pendency of an appeal arising from arbitration proceedings. The petitioner bank had advanced a cash-credit facility secured by an assignment of the insurance policy. The core legal question was whether the petitioner bank was a necessary or proper party to be impleaded in the appeal arising from arbitration proceedings to which it was not a party, and whether disbursement of the decretal amount should be unconditionally stayed. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was not a party to the original arbitration proceedings and that the disputes regarding entitlement to the dues were already pending adjudication before competent civil courts. The Court ruled that adequate safeguards were provided by the High Court through a bank guarantee, and the petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a party claiming through an assignment cannot intervene in arbitration proceedings or appeals arising therefrom without being a party to the initial proceedings, especially when parallel civil suits are pending for adjudication of rival claims.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an assignee of an insurance policy can be impleaded as a party in an appeal arising from arbitration proceedings to which it was not originally a party?
  • Can disbursement of a decretal amount in an insurance claim be made subject to a bank guarantee pending the adjudication of civil suits between the parties?
  • Does an assignment of an insurance policy entitle the assignee to intervene directly in collateral appeal proceedings without initiating timely action under the policy?
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• Nasira vs Chulam Hussain and Other1982 SCMR 211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-25
  pre-emptionevacuee propertyspecial leave to appealremandco-sharer
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondents filed a pre-emption suit against the petitioner claiming preferential rights as co-sharers and estate owners, which was dismissed by the trial court both on merits and on the ground that evacuee property was not pre-emptiable. The District Judge accepted the respondents' preferential claim but upheld the dismissal on the non-maintainability of pre-emption against evacuee property. In second appeal, the Lahore High Court allowed the respondents' claim relying on precedent. The petitioner sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, contending that the appellate court should have remanded the matter for fresh trial rather than deciding on merits once it found the suit not maintainable. The Supreme Court held that since both parties had led evidence on all issues and the petitioner had not filed cross-objections regarding the findings on preferential claims, the petition lacked merit. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition in limine, affirming that a remand was unnecessary under such circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit is competent in respect of evacuee property?
  • Should an appellate court remand a suit for fresh trial when the lower appellate court dismissed it on a preliminary legal point after parties had already led evidence on all issues?
  • Does the failure to file cross-objections regarding adverse findings preclude a party from challenging those findings on further appeal?
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• Nasir Ahmad vs Dil Muhammad and 2 Other1982 SCMR 1006 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-18
  bail cancellationmurder trialtrial delayexpeditious disposalcriminal procedurejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment that refused to cancel the bail granted to respondents in a murder case, primarily because the trial had already commenced. The core legal question was whether the commencement of a murder trial acts as an absolute bar to the cancellation of bail, or if bail can still be cancelled if the accused is obstructing the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that while the commencement of a trial generally makes the cancellation of bail improper due to potential prejudice, it is not an absolute prohibition. The Court affirmed that bail may be cancelled if the accused is hampering or prolonging the trial or attempting to suborn evidence. However, in this specific instance, the Court declined to cancel the bail, finding insufficient evidence that the delay was attributable to the respondents' conduct rather than the trial judge's failure to manage the proceedings efficiently. The Court emphasized that trial judges must adhere to rules requiring the expeditious disposal of murder cases and should utilize provisions like Section 540-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to prevent unnecessary adjournments.

  Questions settled

  • Does the commencement of a murder trial act as an absolute bar to the cancellation of bail?
  • Under what circumstances can bail be cancelled after a trial has commenced?
  • Is the absence of an accused on medical grounds a sufficient reason to adjourn a murder trial when multiple accused are represented by counsel?
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• Najabat and Other vs Saban Bibi and Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-02
  Letters Patent Appeallimitation periodco-ownershiprevenue mutationacknowledgment of titlesecond appealconstructive possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a civil dispute over landed property. The plaintiffs claimed one-half share as co-owners, alleging that the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants had fraudulently omitted their names from the revenue records in 1902. Upon their immediate protest, the predecessor executed an agreement/acknowledgment (Exh. P. 1) admitting their co-ownership and possession, which was acted upon until 1953 when the defendants effected an exchange mutation. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, but the first appellate court reversed it on limitation and lack of independent title evidence. The High Court, in a Regular Second Appeal, restored the trial court's decree. The defendants' subsequent application for a Letters Patent Appeal certificate was dismissed as time-barred under a mistaken 20-day limitation period. The Supreme Court held that the limitation period for seeking a certificate to file a Letters Patent Appeal against an appellate judgment of a Single Judge is 30 days, not 20 days. On the merits, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs were not bound to sue so long as their co-ownership was acknowledged and acted upon, and limitation only began to run from the first overt act of denial (the 1953 mutation). The High Court's judgment was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • What is the correct period of limitation for filing an application for a certificate to prefer a Letters Patent Appeal against a judgment passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction?
  • Does the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to applications for a Letters Patent Appeal certificate where the High Court Rules provide a specific timeframe for the appeal itself?
  • Does limitation to challenge an adverse revenue entry begin to run against a co-owner if the beneficiary of that entry has executed a written acknowledgment of the co-owner's title and possession which is actively maintained?
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• Muzaffar Shah vs Abdul Khaliq1982 SCMR 456 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-16
  ejectmentpersonal requirementlandlord and tenantconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the appellant-tenant's second appeal and upheld the concurrent orders of ejectment passed by three lower forums on the ground of personal requirement of the respondent-landlord for his son's marriage accommodation. The core legal question was whether the requirement of the house for the landlord's son ceased to be a valid personal requirement due to an alleged statement in evidence that the house might be given to the daughter-in-law in lieu of dower. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide personal requirement for accommodating the newly wedded son remained unaffected, and the purported contradiction was neither supported by the record nor violative of the statute. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact on the bona fide personal requirement of a landlord for family accommodation will not be disturbed in second appeal or leave to appeal unless shown to be perverse or contrary to law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding personal requirement for a son's marriage can be interfered with when supported by evidence?
  • Does an intention to accommodate a newly wedded couple constitute a valid personal requirement under tenancy laws?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal liable to dismissal when mandatory copies of evidence are not filed in accordance with court rules?
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• Muzaffar Mustafa Alias Zafar Ali vs The State1982 SCMR 695 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-26
  capital sentencecompromisereconciliationmurder convictionsentence reductioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the appellant was sentenced to death for the murder of Abdul Karim. Following the dismissal of his appeal by the Lahore High Court, the appellant sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, specifically challenging the sentence in light of a compromise reached between the parties. During the appellate proceedings, the legal heirs of the deceased—the widow, mother, and complainant—appeared before the Court, confirming that a voluntary reconciliation had occurred and that they had received compensation from the appellant's father. They explicitly stated their forgiveness for the appellant. The core legal question was whether the sentence of death should be maintained given this reconciliation. The Court, relying on established precedent regarding the effect of compromise in capital cases, held that the lesser sentence would suffice the ends of justice. Consequently, the Court reduced the sentence of death to imprisonment for life, granted the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and maintained the fine.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence of death be reduced to imprisonment for life based on a compromise between the parties?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a sentence reduced from death to life imprisonment?
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• Mutahir Shah and Others vs The State1982 SCMR 1114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-13
  sodomyunnatural offenceconcurrent findingsmedical evidenceleave to appealcriminal revisionappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal conviction for the offence of sodomy under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners, having been convicted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and having had their convictions upheld by both the Additional Sessions Judge and the Peshawar High Court, sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts were based on sufficient evidence, particularly regarding the credibility of the complainant and the supporting medical evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of fact by the three lower courts were well-founded and supported by both the complainant's testimony and independent medical evidence confirming the offence. The Court affirmed that where concurrent findings of fact are based on proper consideration of evidence and do not suffer from legal adversity or miscarriage of justice, no interference is warranted. The principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in criminal matters absent a demonstration of legal error or miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in criminal cases absent legal error?
  • Is the testimony of a complainant in a sodomy case sufficient for conviction when supported by medical evidence?
  • Does the lack of resistance by a victim in a sodomy case negate the commission of the offence under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Mustafa vs Muhammad Siddique and Other1982 SCMR 288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-13
  acquittal appealocular testimonymedical evidencechance witnessesblood feudre-appraisal of evidencecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition, filed by the complainant Mustafa, challenges the acquittal of respondents Nos. 1 to 5 by the High Court in a murder and murderous assault case. The core legal question revolves around whether the High Court was justified in disbelieving the ocular testimony, which was contradicted by the medical evidence and supported only by related or chance witnesses in the context of a bitter longstanding blood feud between the parties. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court provided cogent and detailed reasons for discrediting the prosecution evidence, particularly noting that the sparse number of injuries sustained despite numerous alleged assailants contradicted the prosecution version, and that no misreading or omission of evidence warranting a re-appraisal had been established. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an acquittal or re-appraise evidence unless a clear flaw, misreading, or omission in the lower court's appreciation of evidence is pointed out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will re-appraise evidence in a criminal petition against acquittal when no misreading or omission of evidence is pointed out?
  • Does a glaring discrepancy between the large number of alleged armed assailants and the minimal injuries sustained support an inference that the ocular testimony is contradicted by the medical evidence?
  • Are witnesses who reside at considerable distances and fail to give convincing explanations for their presence at the scene considered unreliable chance witnesses?
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• Mushtaq Hussain vs Mst. Naseem Akhtar Err.1982 PLD Supreme Court 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-19
  Lambardar appointmentrule of primogenitureWest Pakistan Land Revenue Rulesfemale eligibilityrevenue lawsuccession to office
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the appointment of a female respondent as the Lambardar of a village. The petitioner, the brother of the deceased Lambardar, challenged the appointment, arguing that the rule of primogeniture under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968, favored him as the nearest male collateral and excluded the daughter of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the relevant rules prohibit the appointment of a female as a Lambardar. The Supreme Court held that the appointment was valid. The Court reasoned that while Rule 19(2)(d) of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968, states that a female is not ordinarily eligible for the office of a headman, it explicitly allows for such an appointment in specific circumstances, such as when she is the sole owner of the estate or for other special reasons. Consequently, the Court found no violation of law or jurisdictional error in the revenue authorities' decision to appoint the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rule of primogeniture under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968, strictly exclude a daughter from being appointed as a Lambardar?
  • Under what circumstances can a female be appointed as a Lambardar under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968?
  • Is the appointment of a female as a Lambardar in violation of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968, when she is not the sole owner of the estate?
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• Mushtaq Ali vs The State1982 SCMR 766 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-02
  post-arrest bailmurderself-defencefurther inquirystatutory delaycriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the orders of the Lahore High Court refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case involving murder and rioting. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the grounds of self-defence, conflicting versions of the incident, statutory delay in trial, and deteriorating health. The Supreme Court held that it had not yet been established who was the aggressor, and granting bail under the circumstances would amount to prejudging the case on its merits. The petition was consequently dismissed. The key principle laid down is that where the question of aggression and self-defence requires assessment of evidence, bail will not be granted to an accused charged with a capital offense, as doing so would prematurely prejudge the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused charged with murder is entitled to bail on the plea of self-defence when the identity of the primary aggressor is yet to be established?
  • Does a delay of over a year in the commencement of the trial warrant the grant of bail in a murder case?
  • Whether evaluating conflicting versions of an occurrence at the bail stage amounts to prejudging the case on its merits?
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• Mushtaq Ali vs Muhammad Bakhsh Alias Mian Muhammad1982 SCMR 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-01
  evacuee propertydivision of propertywrit jurisdictionsettlement commissionershop definitioncomposite propertySupreme Court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court setting aside an order of the Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of a composite evacuee property. The core legal question was whether the High Court in its writ jurisdiction was justified in interfering with the Settlement Commissioner's decision dividing a composite building and transferring portions separately to different contesting parties as independent business units. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in treating the premises as a single indivisible shop and failing to consider the powers under the second proviso to section 2(12) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, which allows the authorities to divide multiple-unit premises into separate shops. Furthermore, the High Court incorrectly recorded findings regarding the non-summoning of records without examining the original file. The Court established that the High Court should not interfere with the discretionary division of evacuee property by settlement authorities acting within their lawful authority under the statute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court in its writ jurisdiction can interfere with the division of a composite evacuee property made by Settlement Authorities?
  • Does the second proviso to section 2(12) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 empower the Settlement Commissioner to divide a multiple-unit premises into separate independent shops?
  • Can a finding that a revisional authority acted without summoning the record be sustained without examining the original record of the case?
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• Mushtaq Ali and Others vs Noor Muhammad and Other1982 SCMR 428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-11
  Settlement AuthoritiesPermanent Transfer Documentfunctus officioproperty demarcationwrit jurisdictionestoppelcomposite property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the ownership and usage rights of a roof situated above three shops, which formed part of a composite property previously transferred by Settlement Authorities. The petitioners, transferees of the residential portion, sought to construct on the roof above the shops, which were transferred to the respondents. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner, upon the petitioners' request for a No-Objection Certificate, determined the respondents owned the roof above the shops. The Settlement Commissioner upheld this ownership but allowed the petitioners continued passage rights. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioners' writ petition, affirming the transfer extended from ground to sky. The Supreme Court addressed whether the Settlement Authorities were functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to demarcate the property after the issuance of Permanent Transfer Documents (P.T.D.). The Court held that since the petitioners themselves invoked the Settlement Authorities' jurisdiction to clarify the property boundaries, they were estopped from challenging that authority. The petition was dismissed, as the Court found the orders fair and just.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Settlement Authorities to clarify property boundaries later challenge their authority to decide the matter?
  • Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Document render the Settlement Authorities functus officio regarding the demarcation of transferred property?
  • Is a dispute regarding the demarcation of roof rights in a composite property exclusively the function of civil courts after the issuance of transfer documents?
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• Mushtaq Ahmed vs The State1982 SCMR 951 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-16
  criminal revisionoutraging modestyburqaassault on womanrailway magistrate
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's criminal revision against his conviction under section 354 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioner was originally convicted by the Special Railway Magistrate for an offence under section 354, P.P.C., and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment, which was subsequently reduced to six months by the Additional Sessions Judge, whose judgment was upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the ingredients of an offence under section 354, P.P.C. were made out on the facts alleged by the prosecution, specifically whether slapping the complainant and pulling her Burqa causing it to tear constitutes outraging the modesty of a woman. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the pulling and tearing of the Burqa of a pardah-observing Muslim lady when accompanied by an assault amounts to outraging the modesty of a woman within the contemplation of section 354, P.P.C. The key principle laid down is that acts directed against the religious or cultural attire of a woman, such as forcibly pulling and tearing her Burqa during an assault, satisfy the legal threshold for outraging modesty under section 354 of the Pakistan Penal Code.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pulling and tearing of a Burqa of a pardah-observing woman constitute outraging the modesty of a woman under Section 354 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Whether slapping a woman and tearing her veil amounts to an offence under Section 354, Pakistan Penal Code?
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• Mushtaq Ahmad vs District Manager, Government Transport Service1982 SCMR 965 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-31
  retrospective operationdisciplinary proceedingsmisconductunauthorized use of vehicledismissal from serviceindustrial relationsstanding orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside an order of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal reinstating the petitioner, a bus fitter, following his dismissal from service. The petitioner had been dismissed after taking a bus without authorization and causing a fatal accident. The core legal questions were whether the amendment to Section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, introduced by Act XI of 1976, applied retrospectively to misconduct occurring before the amendment, and whether the charge of misconduct was sufficiently proven. The Supreme Court held that the amendment, which imposed a one-month limitation period for initiating disciplinary action, was not retrospective and did not apply to misconduct occurring prior to its enactment. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the dismissal, finding that the unauthorized act of driving the bus by a fitter was proven. The key principle laid down is that statutory amendments imposing procedural limitations on disciplinary actions do not apply retrospectively to acts of misconduct committed before the amendment's commencement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the amendment to Section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, regarding the one-month limitation period for disciplinary action, apply retrospectively?
  • Can an employee be dismissed for misconduct if the disciplinary action was initiated after the misconduct occurred but before the enactment of a statutory limitation period?
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• Munir Ahmad Etc. vs Noor Muhammad1982 SCMR 1038 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-24
  evacuee propertysettlement schemetransfer of propertycivil suit baravailable propertywrit jurisdictionDisplaced Persons Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee property, specifically a shop, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could claim the property under Settlement Scheme No. VIII while litigation regarding its status and transfer was pending, and whether a civil suit was maintainable to challenge the transfer of such property. The Supreme Court held that the property was not 'available' for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII at the time the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest applied for it, as it was already subject to pending writ proceedings. The Court affirmed that the previous High Court judgment, which had restored the original transfer order in favor of the respondent, was binding. Furthermore, the Court held that the shop and residential portion constituted a single unit, a determination within the competence of the Settlement Authority. Finally, the Court ruled that Section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, created a statutory bar against the maintainability of the civil suit filed by the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil suit be maintained to challenge the transfer of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Does the pendency of a writ petition regarding a property render it unavailable for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
  • Is the determination of whether a shop and residential portion constitute a single unit within the exclusive competence of the Settlement Authority?
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• Muhammad Zaman vs Muhammad Hussain Akhtar and Other1982 SCMR 1138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-09
  evacuee propertyauction bidcompetent authoritystatutory interpretationresidual propertyconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court concerning the disposal of property under Evacuee Laws. The petitioner, the highest bidder for a building site, challenged the refusal of his bid by a committee constituted under the Scheme for the disposal of residual properties. The core legal question was whether the 'Competent Authority' empowered to accept or reject bids was the Deputy Administrator (Residual Property), as defined in paragraph 1(e) of the Scheme, or the committee constituted under paragraph 19(2). The Supreme Court held that the definition of 'Competent Authority' in paragraph 1(e) is subject to the 'context' of the Scheme. Since paragraph 19 specifically delineates the authorities for accepting or refusing bids based on property type and value, it overrides the general definition in paragraph 1(e) in cases of conflict. Consequently, the committee acted within its lawful authority in rejecting the bid. The Court further rejected the argument that the committee's power was subject to the Deputy Administrator's prior approval, affirming the dismissal of the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'Competent Authority' in paragraph 1(e) of the Scheme for the disposal of residual properties prevail over the specific provisions of paragraph 19?
  • Is the committee constituted under paragraph 19(2) of the Scheme empowered to reject an auction bid independently of the Deputy Administrator?
  • Can a new legal argument regarding the procedural validity of a decision be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not agitated before the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaman and Another vs Sultan Ahmad1982 SCMR 785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-08
  abatementnecessary partylegal representativesright of wayjoint ownershipleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit where the respondent claimed a right of way over certain land parcels. The appellate court decreed the suit in the respondent's favor. During the pendency of the Regular Second Appeal filed by the defendants, one of the co-defendants died, and his legal representatives were not impleaded. The High Court consequently dismissed the appeal as having abated in toto, on the ground that the deceased was a necessary party without whom no effective decree could be passed. The petitioners, who were the remaining co-defendants, contended that because one petitioner exclusively owned one of the land parcels and the other petitioner jointly owned the second parcel with the deceased, the appeal could still be maintained to the extent of their respective interests. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to consider whether the non-impleadment of the legal representatives of a deceased co-owner results in total abatement of the appeal when the interests of the surviving co-defendants are distinct or separable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to implead the legal representatives of a deceased co-defendant result in the total abatement of an appeal if the surviving co-defendants hold distinct or separable interests in the suit property?
  • Can surviving co-defendants maintain a regular second appeal to the extent of their own proprietary interests despite the death and non-substitution of a joint owner co-defendant?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf vs The Chief Engineer, Irrigation Ex.S1982 SCMR 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-06
  compulsory retirementstatutory appealMartial Law Review Boardimplied withdrawalservice tribunalcivil servantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Sub-Engineer in the Irrigation Department, challenged his compulsory retirement before the Punjab Service Tribunal. While his statutory appeal was pending, he filed a review petition before a Martial Law Review Board. The Tribunal subsequently dismissed his appeal, holding that filing the review petition implied a withdrawal of the pending appeal. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that he never formally withdrew his appeal and that the Tribunal's dismissal deprived him of his statutory right to adjudication. The core legal question concerns whether the mere filing of a review petition before a Martial Law Review Board, in the absence of an express withdrawal, legally constitutes the abandonment or withdrawal of a pending statutory appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal, particularly in light of Martial Law Order No. 23 and its subsequent amendment by Martial Law Order No. 26. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting the significant implications for similar cases and the need for a definitive interpretation of the relevant statutory and Martial Law provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of a review petition before a Martial Law Review Board automatically constitute the withdrawal of a pending statutory appeal before a Service Tribunal?
  • Can a Service Tribunal dismiss a pending appeal on the basis of an implied waiver without an express statement of withdrawal from the appellant?
  • What is the effect of Martial Law Order No. 26 on the validity of review petitions filed before a Review Board prior to the promulgation of Martial Law Order No. 23?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf vs Ejaz Hussain Alias Ijaz Khan and Another1982 SCMR 786 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-07
  oral salespecific performanceimmovable propertyTransfer of Property Actcurable defectinchoate titleregistration of sale
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the sale of land measuring 83 kanals and 12 marlas, initiated by the vendor, Muhammad Yousaf, who sought a declaration that the sale was invalid. Simultaneously, the vendees filed a suit for specific performance. The trial court dismissed the vendor's suit and decreed the vendees' suit, a decision upheld by the first appellate court and subsequently by the High Court in Regular Second Appeals. The core legal question was whether an oral sale of immovable property, potentially violating Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, is void and whether the vendor could challenge it on that basis. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' findings, holding that an oral sale, even if technically in violation of Section 54, is not void ab initio and that the defect is curable by subsequent registration to perfect the vendee's title. Furthermore, the Court refused to entertain arguments regarding the admissibility of a handwriting expert's report, noting that the issue was not raised before the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Is an oral sale of immovable property void if it violates the provisions of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  • Can a defect in an oral sale of immovable property be cured by subsequent registration?
  • Can a party raise an objection regarding the admissibility of evidence in the Supreme Court if that objection was not pursued in the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf Kurd Etc. vs Secretary, Board of Revenue and Other1982 SCMR 644 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-18
  seniority disputeservice lawprospective applicationretrospective effectstatutory interpretationcivil serviceEstablishment of West Pakistan Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a seniority dispute between Sub-Inspectors of the Excise and Taxation Department in Baluchistan. The petitioners, appointed in 1957, challenged a seniority list that placed the respondent, appointed in 1959, above them. The core legal question was whether seniority should be determined by the Baluchistan Excise Service Rules, 1952 (the "old Rules") or the West Pakistan Excise and Taxation Department Subordinate Service Rules, 1966 (the "new Rules"). The Supreme Court held that the new Rules were prospective and could not divest rights acquired under the old Rules. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that under Section 10 of the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955, laws in force prior to the integration of the province continued to apply until repealed. Administrative letters attempting to override these statutory protections were deemed nullities. Consequently, the Court upheld the respondent's seniority, ruling that the old Rules governed the determination of seniority for the parties involved. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, establishing that subsequent service rules cannot retrospectively alter seniority rights established under prior valid legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Can service rules promulgated in 1966 retrospectively determine seniority rights acquired before their enactment?
  • Does an administrative letter from a Provincial Government have the legal authority to override statutory provisions regarding the continuation of laws?
  • Under the Establishment of West Pakistan Act 1955, do pre-existing service rules remain in force until expressly repealed?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf Etcs vs Commissioner, Lahore Etc.S1982 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-08
  licence feepower loomstax impositiontransitional provisionsconstitutional petitionlocal governmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, owners of power looms in Gujranwala District, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing their constitutional petition challenging the enhancement and imposition of a licence fee on power looms and handlooms by the Commissioner, Lahore Division, via a July 1975 notification under the Municipal Committee (Imposition of Taxes) Rules, 1960. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner retained the authority to impose such taxes after the enforcement of the Punjab Local Government Act, 1975, which vested exclusive taxing powers in Local Councils under sections 138 and 139. The Supreme Court held that under the transitional provisions in section 235(2) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 1975, authorities exercising functions under repealed enactments continue to do so until Local Councils are constituted, provided the Government has not withdrawn those functions. Since Local Councils had not yet been constituted in Gujranwala at the relevant time, the Commissioner's powers remained fully protected. The key principle laid down is that transitional provisions safeguarding existing administrative and taxing functions of authorities under repealed laws remain operational until new local bodies are duly constituted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Commissioner retained the power to impose licence fees under the Municipal Committee (Imposition of Taxes) Rules, 1960 after the enactment of the Punjab Local Government Act, 1975?
  • Do transitional provisions under section 235(2) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 1975 allow previous authorities to continue exercising local council functions until new Local Councils are constituted?
  • Did sections 138 and 139 of the Punjab Local Government Act, 1975 invalidate prior tax notifications before the formal constitution of Local Councils?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf and Others vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner1982 SCMR 822 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-31
  leave to appealinformer claimmukhbariallotment cancellationsettlement proceedingslocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the cancellation of land allotment and the rights of informers in settlement proceedings. The core legal question involves whether an informant has the locus standi to maintain a petition when their allotment is cancelled based on a subsequent mukhbari by another informant, and whether urban land can be given in lieu of a rural claim. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the points raised require detailed consideration and accordingly granted leave to appeal. The Court ordered that the status quo previously issued shall continue, subject to the petitioners furnishing security for mesne profits to the satisfaction of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Land), Faisalabad, within one month. The key principle laid down is that complex questions regarding locus standi in rival informer allotment disputes and the interpretation of settlement circulars warrant a full hearing on appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an informant has the locus standi to file a petition regarding the cancellation of land allotments?
  • Can urban land be allotted in lieu of a rural claim under the applicable settlement laws?
  • How are competing claims between rival informers to be adjudicated in settlement matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf and 2 Others vs The State1982 SCMR 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-25
  post-arrest bailmurderself-defencecommon intentionappreciation of evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, accused of murder and assault, sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's order dismissing their post-arrest bail application. The prosecution alleged that the first petitioner hit the deceased on the head with a wooden bala causing his death, the third petitioner hit him with a lathi, and the second petitioner assaulted a prosecution witness. The petitioners contended that the incident occurred inside their saw mill where the deceased party were aggressors, and raised pleas of self-defence supported by injuries sustained by the petitioners, alongside arguments regarding section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code and delay in the First Information Report. The Supreme Court held that the contentions regarding self-defence, applicability of common intention, and delay required appreciation of evidence which should be determined during trial. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the refusal of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trespass by the deceased party justify the killing of a person so as to sustain a plea of self-defence at the bail stage?
  • Whether questions regarding the applicability of common intention and delay in lodging the First Information Report should be examined at the bail stage or left for trial?
  • Can objections relating to the appreciation of evidence form the basis for interfering with a High Court's order refusing bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf Aliaes Rangeela Butt. vs The State1982 PLD Supreme Court 157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-16
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonymedical evidencereappraisal of evidencecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the death sentence of the petitioner, Muhammad Yousaf alias Rangeela Butt, for the murder of Ashiq Ali under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution case detailed that the petitioner, along with co-accused, stabbed the deceased with a dagger following a prior altercation regarding a monetary dispute. The trial court convicted the petitioner while acquitting his co-accused, and the High Court dismissed his appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner's counsel argued discrepancies in the evidence and inconsistency between the medical and ocular testimony. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to point out any misreading or gross misappreciation of material evidence by the courts below, and declined to undertake a reappraisal of the evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappraise evidence where no misreading or gross misappreciation by the lower courts is pointed out?
  • Does inconsistency between medical evidence and ocular testimony warrant interference when the lower courts' findings are well-founded?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younus and Others vs Additional District Judge, Lahore1982 SCMR 1156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-26
  ex parte decreeejectment petitionsuccessors-in-interestwrit jurisdictionfraudulent decreependency of litigationrent control
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the ejectment of a tenant from a shop. The landlord, having failed in an initial ejectment petition, filed a second petition on identical grounds without disclosing the pendency of the first, obtaining an ex parte decree. The tenant successfully challenged this ex parte decree before an Additional District Judge, who found it was obtained fraudulently. The landlord had meanwhile sold the property to the petitioners. The petitioners challenged the appellate order in the High Court, which dismissed their writ petition. The Supreme Court addressed whether an order refusing to set aside an ex parte ejectment order is appealable and whether purchasers of property are bound by the liabilities of their predecessor-in-interest regarding pending litigation. The Court held that an ejectment order functions as a decree and is appealable. Furthermore, it affirmed that successors-in-interest inherit the liabilities of their predecessors, particularly when they purchase property with notice of ongoing litigation. The Court upheld the High Court's refusal to interfere in writ jurisdiction regarding points not raised before the lower appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order refusing to set aside an ex parte ejectment order appealable?
  • Are successors-in-interest bound by the liabilities of their predecessor-in-interest regarding pending litigation?
  • Can a party raise a legal point in writ jurisdiction that was not raised before the lower appellate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younis Malik vs District Judge Lahore Etc.1982 SCMR 834 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-17
  leave to appealevictionbona fide personal needcommercial premiseslandlord and tenantalternative accommodationconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a decision of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner-tenant's constitutional petition against an appellate eviction order. The respondent-landlady sought the petitioner's eviction from commercial premises on grounds including bona fide personal need. While the Rent Controller initially rejected the eviction application, the District Judge on appeal held the landlady's personal need proved and ordered eviction. The tenant argued that the appellate authority misdirected itself on the law regarding personal requirement by ignoring available vacant accommodation on the first floor. The Supreme Court observed that the suitability of alternative accommodation is primarily a question of fact requiring pleadings and evidence. The tenant failed to elicit or prove during trial that the alternative premises were suitable or adequate to meet the landlady's needs. Finding no misdirection of law by the appellate court or the High Court that would justify constitutional intervention, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal while granting the tenant two months to voluntarily surrender possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the availability of alternative vacant accommodation automatically disentitles a landlord from claiming bona fide personal need without proof of its suitability?
  • Can a question regarding the suitability of alternative accommodation be raised without foundational pleadings and evidence?
  • Does a misapplication of law justifying interference in constitutional jurisdiction arise where a factual defense was not substantiated before the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younas vs The State1982 SCMR 1022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-20
  leave to appealmurder convictionocular testimonyreappraisal of evidenceunder-trial prisonersentence calculationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner for the murder of Bashir Ahmad, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for life by the trial court, a decision subsequently upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the ocular testimony of witnesses related to the deceased and inimical to the accused, alongside the recovery of the weapon, warranted a reappraisal of evidence, and whether the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of the period spent as an under-trial prisoner. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact regarding the conviction, holding that the case was not a fit one for the reappraisal of evidence. However, the Court granted partial relief by directing that the petitioner be given the benefit of the period spent in custody as an under-trial prisoner under the relevant statutory provision. The principle laid down is that while the Supreme Court generally avoids reappraising evidence in cases of concurrent findings, it will ensure the mandatory application of statutory provisions regarding the calculation of sentences for under-trial detention.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Supreme Court required to reappraise evidence in a criminal case where there are concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts?
  • Is a convict entitled to the benefit of the period spent as an under-trial prisoner under Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yar Alias Mamu vs The State1982 SCMR 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-08
  criminal appealleave to granthostile witnesschild witnessappraisal of evidencedeath sentencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the death sentence passed against the petitioner by the Sessions Judge, Sargodha, for the murder of Mst. Bibi. The core legal question concerns the proper appraisal of evidence in criminal cases where eye-witnesses have turned hostile, the sole supporting witness is a child under ten years of age, motive evidence fails, and the recovery of the weapon is disbelieved by the trial court. The court held that the circumstances surrounding the reliability of the sole child witness, the failure of motive, and the discarded recovery evidence warranted a thorough re-examination of the case. Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the norms for the appraisal of evidence in criminal cases were correctly followed and to review the propriety of the death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a child witness under ten years of age is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction when other eye-witnesses have turned hostile?
  • Does the failure of prosecution to prove motive and recovery warrant a re-examination of the appraisal of evidence in a criminal case?
  • Whether the norms for the appraisal of evidence in criminal cases were properly followed by the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yameen vs State Life Insurance Corporation and Another1982 SCMR 546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-06
  rent controlstriking off defencenon-compliance with rent depositact of naturefactual findingsevidence in rent proceedingslandlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a landlord-tenant dispute where the Rent Controller had struck off the tenants' defence due to a failure to deposit monthly rent by the prescribed deadline of July 15, 1978. The tenants contended that the delay was caused by incessant rains, an act of nature beyond their control, and deposited the rent on July 16, 1978. The Rent Controller rejected this plea and ordered eviction, but the High Court reversed this decision on appeal, finding the tenants' explanation credible. The Supreme Court addressed whether the High Court erred in its factual findings and whether the reliance on newspaper reports as evidence was legally permissible in rent proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's factual determination regarding the circumstances beyond the tenants' control was sound and free from infirmity. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the strict rules of the Evidence Act do not apply to proceedings before a Rent Controller, and that the newspaper report was merely corroborative, not substantive evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Do the strict provisions of the Evidence Act apply to proceedings before a Rent Controller?
  • Can a High Court reverse a Rent Controller's finding of fact regarding a tenant's failure to deposit rent due to circumstances beyond their control?
  • Is a newspaper report admissible as corroborative evidence in rent control proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yahya vs Misbah Ul Haq and Other1982 SCMR 269 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-27
  allotment of landpreferential rightconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionsettlement authoritiesfirst come first served
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had allowed a writ petition and restored the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner allotting agricultural land to the respondents. The dispute concerned the preferential right to the allotment of 315 kanals and 9 marlas of agricultural land. The High Court had found that the respondents' claim form reached the village earlier and was registered prior to the petitioner's, thereby establishing a preferential right under the principle of 'first come first served'. The petitioner contended that the High Court exceeded its constitutional jurisdiction by reassessing the material on merits. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while exercising constitutional jurisdiction, the High Court is justified in examining whether the conclusions drawn by settlement authorities are borne out by the record. Since the settlement authorities' findings against the respondents were based on conjectural inferences unsupported by any evidence, the High Court's interference was unexceptionable. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction examine the factual conclusions of settlement authorities if they are based on conjectural inferences unsupported by evidence?
  • Does the principle of 'first come first served' establish a preferential right to the allotment of agricultural land under settlement instructions?
  • Is the High Court barred from interfering with the findings of administrative tribunals when there is no evidence on record to support those findings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tufail Aftab and Another vs Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner1982 SCMR 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-01
  constitutional jurisdictionfindings of factwrit petitionsettlement departmentleave petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a leave petition filed against the order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition challenging concurrent findings of fact by the settlement authorities. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding property demarcation rendered by the Settlement Department in its constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and maintained in appeal and revision—holding that the disputed basement forms part of the adjoining house rather than the petitioners' transferred house—were unexceptionable and not open to question within the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. The court laid down the principle that findings of fact determined by departmental authorities through concurrent decisions cannot be varied or re-examined by the High Court under its constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact of the Settlement Department in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does a basement form part of a transferred property when departmental authorities concurrently find it belongs to an adjoining house?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tariq vs The State1982 SCMR 26 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-14
  criminal petitionmurder convictionmitigating circumstancesillicit liaisoneye-witness credibilitysentencing reductionprovocation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for special leave to appeal arises from the conviction of the petitioner, Muhammad Tariq, for the murder of two individuals, Khadim Hussain and Muhammad Hussain. The petitioner was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Sessions Judge, Rahimyar Khan, and sentenced to death, a conviction subsequently upheld by the Lahore High Court, though the sentence for one count was reduced to life imprisonment due to alleged provocation regarding an illicit liaison. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the conviction on grounds that a single assailant could not have committed both murders, that the eye-witnesses were unreliable as they failed to intervene, and that the sentence should be further reduced due to provocation and an altercation. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, finding no evidence that the eye-witnesses were positioned to intervene or that the altercation justified a reduction in sentence. The Court held that suspicion of an illicit liaison does not constitute a mitigating factor for sentencing in murder cases. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the lower court's findings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suspicion of an illicit liaison between a deceased and the accused's sister constitute a mitigating factor for sentencing in a murder case?
  • Can a conviction be challenged on the ground that eye-witnesses failed to intervene during the commission of the crime?
  • Is it legally plausible for a single assailant to be convicted of multiple murders involving young victims?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique and Another vs Naseer Ahmad1982 SCMR 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-28
  second appealfinding of factmutation of saleforged documentSupreme Court petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the judgment of the High Court which dismissed the second appeal of the petitioners on the ground that the matter was concluded by a finding of fact. The core legal question in dispute was whether the mutation of sale relied upon by the petitioners was genuine or fictitious. The trial court held the document to be forged and fictitious after discussing the evidence at length, and this finding of fact was upheld by the District Judge, Vehari. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the matter in dispute was clearly one of fact, and the concurrent findings recorded thereon by the lower courts were final and could not be interfered with in second appeal or in the present proceedings. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of fact concurred in by the lower courts be interfered with in a second appeal?
  • Whether the question of whether a mutation of sale is genuine or fictitious constitutes a question of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddiq vs Muhammad Sharif1982 SCMR 804 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-11
  evictionwilful defaultrent disputepersonal requirementres judicatapartition of propertytenant attornment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for leave to appeal arising from concurrent findings of three lower courts ordering the petitioner's eviction from a shop in Lahore on grounds of default in rent payment and the respondent owner's personal bona fide requirement for business. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner's failure to pay rent to the respondent—following the partition of the joint property and subsequent transfer of the shop to the respondent's sole ownership—constituted wilful default, and whether the defense of res judicata applied based on a prior dismissed eviction application. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's persistence in refusing to attorn to the respondent after partition amounted to wilful default, and that the partition was not shown to be collusive, while the respondent sufficiently established his personal requirement for the shop. The Court laid down that a tenant who refuses to acknowledge the title of a co-owner to whom the property has been validly transferred through partition commits wilful default, rendering the defense of res judicata misconceived.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant's refusal to acknowledge the title of a landlord to whom the rented property has been assigned upon partition constitute wilful default in the payment of rent?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding default in rent and personal requirement of a landlord be disturbed in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is the principle of res judicata applicable to bar a subsequent eviction petition filed after the partition of joint property among co-owners?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddiq and Other vs Master Muhammad Munis and, Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 325 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-15
  interim reliefsecurity depositnon-compliancepossessionsettlement authoritiessupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil miscellaneous application in a petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of a shop by the settlement authorities through an auction. The core legal question involves the consequence of a party's failure to comply with an interim direction of the Court requiring the furnishing of security for the use and occupation of the disputed premises. The Supreme Court held that where a respondent deliberately fails to comply with the court-ordered security deposit, the possession of the disputed property should be handed over to the petitioners. The key principle laid down is that the Court possesses the equitable power to direct the surrender or handover of possession of disputed premises to the aggrieved party when the opposing party willfully defaults on interim conditional orders imposed during pending proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • What consequence follows when a respondent deliberately fails to furnish security as ordered by the Court for the use and occupation of disputed premises?
  • Can the Court direct the handover of possession of a disputed shop to the petitioner upon the respondent's default in complying with an interim order?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddiq and Another vs Settlement Commissioner and 21982 SCMR 1237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertyindivisibility of propertyremand orderPermanent Transfer DeedDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) ActSettlement Commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the transfer of a one-third evacuee share of a bungalow in Karachi. The appellants held a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) for the share, while the respondents sought transfer of the same share under paragraph 16-C of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, claiming the property was indivisible. The core legal question was whether the property was divisible or indivisible, a determination required to trigger the transfer provisions under paragraph 16-C. Following a High Court remand order directing the Settlement Commissioner to decide this issue, the Commissioner failed to address the question of indivisibility, instead focusing on the finality of the P.T.D. The High Court subsequently cancelled the appellants' P.T.D., assuming the Additional Settlement Commissioner's earlier finding on indivisibility stood. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in assuming the lower authority's finding remained valid. The Court established that where a remand order specifically directs a lower authority to determine a crucial factual issue, the failure to do so necessitates a fresh remand for that specific determination, rather than the High Court assuming the findings of a previous, superseded authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure by a Settlement Commissioner to decide a specific issue directed by a remand order justify the High Court in assuming the findings of a lower authority remain valid?
  • Is the determination of property indivisibility a prerequisite for transferring property under paragraph 16-C of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • What is the appropriate course of action for a High Court when a Settlement Commissioner fails to comply with a specific direction in a remand order?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Saifullah Khan Niazi and Other1982 SCMR 17 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-28
  quashing of criminal casewrit petitionZina Hudood Ordinanceparallel inquiryleave to appealmala fide investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had refused to quash a criminal case registered for the offence of Zina under the Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 against the petitioner's sister and her alleged husband. The core legal question was whether the High Court ought to interfere and quash a pending criminal case and stop the submission of a challan on the plea of mala fides and a disputed marriage. The Supreme Court held that neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court can initiate a parallel inquiry into disputed questions of fact when the police investigation is complete and the challan is ready for submission to the trial court. The key principle laid down is that where a criminal case is ready for trial and evidence can be examined by the trial court, constitutional petitions seeking to quash the proceedings based on disputed factual assertions such as a valid marriage and police mala fides ought not to be entertained.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court or Supreme Court conduct a parallel inquiry into disputed questions of fact when a police challan is ready for submission?
  • Whether a criminal case registered under the Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 should be quashed on the plea of a disputed marriage?
  • Is it proper for the High Court to interfere under constitutional jurisdiction when all relevant evidence can be examined by the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and Others vs Ahmad Yar and Other1982 SCMR 1200 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-24
  Leave to appealCivil procedureWitness examinationList of witnessesOrder XVI CPCSummoning witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted to consider the legal justification of a Civil Judge's refusal to examine witnesses presented by petitioners in court on the relevant date. The core legal question revolves around whether the bar contained in Order XVI Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, regarding the filing of a list of witnesses after the settlement of issues, applies to witnesses brought by a party directly, as opposed to those intended to be summoned through the court. The petitioners argued that Order XVI Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, pertain only to witnesses called through the court, not those personally brought by a party. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine this point, setting the case for an early hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the refusal of a Civil Judge to examine witnesses brought by a party to court on the hearing date is legally justified if no list of witnesses was filed under Order XVI Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Do Order XVI Rule 1 and Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, apply to witnesses personally brought by a party to court, or only to those intended to be called through the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafiq and Another vs The State1982 SCMR 384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-14
  pre-arrest bailanticipatory bailmala fidesmedico-legal examinationrefusal of bailleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the High Court refusing to confirm interim pre-arrest bail to the petitioners. The petitioners were facing prosecution under Sections 148, 382, 452, and 506 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an incident where they allegedly raided the complainant advocate's office, caused injuries to his clerks, and forcibly took away a watch. The core legal question was whether pre-arrest bail should be granted on grounds of alleged mala fides and the complainant's clerk's failure to undergo a re-medical examination. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the background litigation involving the bank did not demonstrate that the advocate had fabricated the incident or that the medical certificate was false. The Court held that failure to undergo a subsequent medical examination does not invalidate initial medical evidence at the bail stage, and law must take its normal course. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an injured victim to undergo a re-medical examination automatically invalidate the initial medical report at the pre-arrest bail stage?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted solely on allegations of background civil litigation without conclusive proof that the FIR was entirely fabricated?
  • Whether the High Court properly exercises its judicial discretion in refusing pre-arrest bail where prima facie criminal allegations and medical evidence exist?
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• Muhammad Shafi vs Muhammad Hayat Shah and Another1982 SCMR 195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-23
  acquittalrevision petitionnon-bailable warrantsjudicial discretionspecial leave to appealcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Muhammad Shafi, was tried for murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and acquitted by the Sessions Judge. The complainant filed a revision petition under Section 439, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, in the High Court against the acquittal. The High Court, upon reviewing the evidence and noting potential misappreciation of testimony by the trial court, admitted the revision for hearing and issued non-bailable warrants against the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner was committed to prison pending the hearing of the revision petition. The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the High Court's order of commitment. The Supreme Court held that the High Court, having satisfied itself regarding the merits of the revision, acted within its discretion in issuing the non-bailable warrants and committing the petitioner to prison pending the final hearing. Finding no grounds to interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion, the Supreme Court rejected the petition for special leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court issue non-bailable warrants against an accused person during the pendency of a revision petition against their acquittal?
  • Is the Supreme Court inclined to interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in committing an accused to prison pending the hearing of a revision petition against acquittal?
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• Muhammad Shafi vs Member, Board of Revenue (Colonies), Lahore and Another1982 SCMR 578 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-03
  Tube-well Sinking SchemeColonization of Government Lands Actlease cancellationuncommanded landvested rightsrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition against the cancellation of a land lease granted to the appellant under the Tube-well Sinking Scheme. The core legal question was whether the disputed land could lawfully form part of the Tube-well Sinking Scheme under section 10(3) of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, given conflicting revenue records and a subsequent official report certifying the land as uncommanded. The Supreme Court held that the High Court and the Board of Revenue erred in relying on incorrect revenue records without examining the definitive report of the Divisional Canal Officer establishing the uncommanded nature of the land, which had created vested rights in favour of the appellant. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter to the Board of Revenue for a fresh decision, establishing the principle that administrative cancellation of a granted lease cannot be sustained upon erroneous revenue entries when official canal records conclusively demonstrate compliance with the scheme conditions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land classified as uncommanded can be lawfully leased out under the Tube-well Sinking Scheme?
  • Does a public functionary have the power to issue a lease regarding cultivated or already leased areas under the Tube-well Sinking Scheme?
  • Can a lease granted under a government scheme be cancelled on the basis of incorrect revenue entries when official canal reports prove otherwise?
  • Are vested rights accrued through a validly granted government lease defeatable by administrative findings based on erroneous records?
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• Muhammad Shafi Etc. vs Sadiq Saeed Khan Etc.S1982 SCMR 199(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-28
  Settlement propertyPermanent transfer deedEvacuee propertySuperstructure rightsProperty disputeSettlement of parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal, which the Court converted into an appeal. The dispute concerned the permanent transfer deed issued by Settlement authorities regarding a specific property (House No. 2848-49). The core legal question involved the rights of the petitioners to the property versus the claims of the legal representatives of Qalandar Khan regarding the underlying land. The Court disposed of the appeal based on a settlement reached between the parties. The holding affirmed the validity of the permanent transfer deed in favor of the petitioners regarding the superstructure, while explicitly excluding any right, interest, or title in the land upon which the evacuee superstructure stands. The Court established the principle that rights and liabilities regarding the superstructure shall mirror those previously held by non-Muslim evacuees, thereby preserving the right of the legal representatives of the original claimant to seek vacant possession of the site in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a permanent transfer deed for an evacuee property be modified to exclude rights to the underlying land?
  • Does the transfer of an evacuee superstructure grant the transferee title to the land beneath it?
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• Muhammad Shafi and 2 Others vs Ali Muhammad and 4 Other1982 SCMR 850 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-20
  pre-emptionstranger vendeesuperior right of pre-emptionjoint purchasependency of suitagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding a pre-emption suit over agricultural land. The core legal question was whether a pre-emption suit remains maintainable when a stranger vendee transfers their share to a co-vendee before the institution of the suit, thereby curing the defect of associating a stranger in a joint purchase. The Supreme Court held that the petition must fail, affirming the lower courts' dismissal of the suit. The Court reasoned that because the stranger vendee had transferred their share to a co-vendee prior to the filing of the suit, the pre-emptors lacked superior rights of pre-emption. The Court upheld the established principle that if a vendee, during the pendency of a pre-emption suit, removes the defect of associating a stranger by purchasing the stranger's share before final adjudication, the pre-emptor cannot succeed, regardless of whether the limitation period for the suit has expired. Consequently, the pre-emptor must maintain their superior position until the date of the decree to succeed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a vendee who associates with a stranger in a joint purchase lose their right of pre-emption?
  • Can a pre-emption suit be defeated if a stranger vendee transfers their share to a co-vendee before the suit is instituted?
  • Must a pre-emptor maintain their superior position until the date of the decree to succeed in a pre-emption suit?
  • Does the removal of a stranger vendee's share during the pendency of a pre-emption suit render the suit non-maintainable?
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• Muhammad Shabbir Ur Rahman vs Chief Administrative Officer; G. H. Q.1982 SCMR 1135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-25
  service tribunalseniorityaggrieved personleave to appealservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal concerning the seniority assigned to a respondent. The core legal question was whether a person who remains junior to the respondent both before and after the impugned seniority assignment qualifies as an 'aggrieved person' under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, so as to maintain an appeal. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner was not affected by the seniority assignment and those actually affected had not challenged it or been impleaded, the petitioner was not an aggrieved person. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a government servant who suffers no adverse impact on their relative seniority position and remains junior cannot maintain an appeal before the service tribunal as an aggrieved person.

  Questions settled

  • Is a government servant who remains junior before and after a seniority assignment an aggrieved person under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Does an employee have the locus standi to challenge a seniority list when they are not personally affected by the assignment?
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• Muhammad Sarwar Khan vs Muhammad Sadiq and Other1982 SCMR 699 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-14
  writ jurisdictioninfructuous petitionallotment of landsettlement commissionerdisplaced personsres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition as infructuous. The petitioner, a claimant displaced person, had been allotted land following a 'mukhbari' application against a third party. Subsequently, the Additional Settlement Commissioner cancelled this allotment upon determining the original allotment to the third party was valid. The petitioner challenged this cancellation in the High Court. While an earlier writ petition had remanded the matter, the Settlement Commissioner maintained the cancellation order. The petitioner filed a subsequent writ petition challenging the same order, which the High Court dismissed as infructuous because the impugned order had already been quashed in separate proceedings. The Supreme Court addressed whether a writ petition remains maintainable when the impugned order has already been quashed in other proceedings. The Court held that once an order is quashed, it ceases to exist, rendering any challenge to it infructuous. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, noting that the petitioner could not challenge an order that was no longer legally alive, and further found no merit in the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ petition be maintained against an order that has already been quashed in separate proceedings?
  • Does an order that has been quashed by a court remain subject to further challenge in a subsequent writ petition?
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• Muhammad Sarfraz Khan vs Noor Muhammad Etc.1982 PLD Supreme Court 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-07
  pre-emptionremoval of doubts ordinanceconstitutional validationprovisional constitution orderinterim constitutionchashma barrageagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses three consolidated petitions for leave to appeal arising from pre-emption suits concerning agricultural land purchased in District Jhelum. The core legal question was whether the Punjab Pre-emption (Removal of Doubts) Ordinance XI of 1972 was a valid and continuing piece of legislation, notwithstanding that it had not been approved by the Assembly within six weeks under the 1962 Constitution, and whether it restricted pre-emption suits to specific areas relating to the Chashma Barrage displaced persons. The Supreme Court held that the Ordinance remained valid and operative by virtue of Article 4(1) of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969, and Article 281 of the Interim Constitution of 1972, which gave protection and validated laws enacted during the relevant period. Consequently, the Court ruled that the pre-emption suits were not barred for land outside the specified districts. The key principle laid down is that legislative measures promulgated during the martial law period and protected by constitutional validation provisions cannot be challenged or declared void for lacking legislative duration or competence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Ordinance promulgated under the 1962 Constitution lapses after six weeks if not approved by the Assembly, despite the provisions of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969?
  • What is the legal effect of Article 281 of the Interim Constitution of 1972 on laws and ordinances promulgated between March 1969 and April 1972?
  • Does the notification issued by the Board of Revenue on 23rd November 1971 bar pre-emption suits for agricultural land situated outside Mianwali District and Khushab Tehsil?
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