Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Presort: Muhammad Haleem, Actg. C. J., Aslam Riaz Hussain And Amir Gul1981 SCMR 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-04
  ocular testimonydouble murderrelated witnessesappreciation of evidencedeath sentencecriminal appealcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction for double murder and attempted murder, where the appellant challenged his death sentence. The core legal questions were whether the ocular testimony of related and allegedly inimical witnesses, in the absence of independent corroboration, was sufficient to sustain a conviction, and whether the appellant's advanced age (70 years) warranted a reduction in sentence. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and death sentence, finding that the lower courts correctly appreciated the evidence. The Court held that the testimony of a witness who is a close relative of the accused—specifically the victim's widow who is the appellant's sister—carries significant weight, as there is no reason for her to falsely implicate her own brother in a double murder. The Court affirmed that where ocular testimony is consistent and credible, the non-production of other witnesses or minor medical discrepancies do not undermine the prosecution's case. Furthermore, the Court established that heinous crimes, such as double murder arising from trivial disputes, do not merit leniency based solely on the advanced age of the offender.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of a close relative of the accused be relied upon to sustain a murder conviction?
  • Does the advanced age of an offender automatically entitle them to a reduction of a death sentence in a murder case?
  • Is the non-production of a witness by the prosecution fatal to the case if the defense had the opportunity to examine them?
  • Does a discrepancy between medical evidence and ocular testimony necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case?
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• Pirzada Nazir Hassan vs Major (RLTD.) Ejaz Ahmad Khan1981 SCMR 684 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-24
  specific performanceexecution of decreestay of executionaccrued interestsale considerationvendor and purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court concerning the entitlement to interest accrued on a sale consideration deposit. The petitioner, a vendor, had entered into an agreement to sell a property to the respondent. Following a decree for specific performance in favor of the respondent, the petitioner appealed, and the High Court stayed the execution of the decree, ordering the respondent to deposit the balance sale price of six lakhs in a bank to abide by the appeal's outcome. After the appeal was dismissed and the sale deed was eventually executed through court, the petitioner sought the interest accrued on the deposited amount for the period prior to the registration of the sale deed. The core legal question was whether the vendor was entitled to interest on the purchase money deposited in court while the execution of the decree was stayed at his own instance. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to interest prior to the date of the actual registration of the sale deed, as he could not have withdrawn the money without performing his obligation to execute the deed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a vendor entitled to interest on the purchase price deposited in court during the pendency of an appeal filed by the vendor himself?
  • Does a vendor have a legal right to withdraw the balance sale price from court before the execution and registration of the sale deed?
  • From what date is a vendor entitled to interest on the sale consideration deposited by the purchaser in court following a decree for specific performance?
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• Pir Ghulam vs Province of Baluchistan1981 SCMR 876 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-01
  evictiongovernment accommodationconstitutional jurisdictionunauthorized occupationspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan, which had dismissed a constitutional petition against an eviction order from a government quarter. The petitioner, who was residing in the premises following the death of the original allottee, Taimur Khan, argued that as a low-paid government servant, he was entitled to residential accommodation. The Civil Estate Officer had issued the eviction order under the Baluchistan Governing Lands and Buildings (Recovery and Possession) Ordinance, 1956. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any legal right to possess the property. The Court affirmed that the petitioner's status as a government servant did not grant him a legal entitlement to occupy the specific quarter in question, nor did it provide a valid ground for challenging the eviction order in constitutional jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, with the Court noting that the petitioner's plea for accommodation should be addressed to the relevant administrative department rather than the judiciary.

  Questions settled

  • Does a government servant have a legal right to retain possession of government accommodation solely on the basis of being a low-paid employee?
  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained against an eviction order where the petitioner lacks a legal right to the possession of the property?
  • Is the plea for residential accommodation by a government servant a valid ground for challenging an eviction order in a court of law?
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• Pir Bakhsh vs The State1981S C M R 1121(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-23
  criminal appealmurderfalsus in uno falsus in omnibuscorroborationmedical evidenceinterested witnessenmityacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, by the trial court, which was upheld by the High Court while acquitting his co-accused. The prosecution alleged that the appellant shot the deceased following a history of local enmity, supported by ocular testimony, motive, and medical evidence. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and noted that the First Information Report was recorded after preliminary investigations, giving time for deliberation. The Court further noted that the eye-witnesses were closely related interested witnesses whose testimony was found entirely false regarding three co-accused, and that the medical evidence contradicted the witness accounts rather than corroborating them. Holding that medical evidence and motive could not corroborate false testimony, and that it was unsafe to sift grain from the chaff where witnesses introduced substantial falsehoods, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can ocular testimony that is disbelieved and proved false regarding a majority of co-accused be relied upon to convict a remaining accused?
  • Does medical evidence or motive constitute sufficient corroboration where the primary ocular testimony is found to be false?
  • Whether the rule of sifting the grain from the chaff can be applied when eye-witnesses introduce substantial falsehood into their testimony?
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• Phool Din and Another vs Abdul Majid1981 SCMR 711 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-27
  evictionpersonal bona fide needsubsequent eventsleave to appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an eviction petition filed by the respondent landlord against the petitioners-tenants concerning a shop situated in Bahawalnagar, on the ground of personal bona fide use. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the application, but the District Judge accepted the landlord's appeal and ordered eviction. The Lahore High Court dismissed the tenants' second appeal. In the petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that subsequent to the lower court proceedings, the landlord had inherited other shops upon his father's death, which should negate his personal need. The Supreme Court held that the plea of subsequent events could not be raised for the first time before this Court, especially since the father had passed away years earlier while the matter was pending in the High Court and the petitioners had enjoyed the benefit of a stay order. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings regarding the bona fide personal need of the landlord and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot raise a new plea of subsequent developments for the first time in the apex court when such facts were available during the pendency of proceedings before the lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a plea of subsequent events for the first time in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Does the inheritance of other properties by a landlord during the pendency of litigation automatically negate a finding of bona fide personal need?
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• Pannu N Khan Etcs vs Muhammad Anis and Othres1981 SCMR 1129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-18
  constitutional jurisdictionsettlement propertyremand ordertransfer of propertySupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 4-3-1981, which interfered with the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner dated 17-1-1981 regarding the transfer of a property. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's exercise of constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with a settlement authority's order that was passed strictly in compliance with a final and unchallenged earlier remand judgment of the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order contained no defect warranting correction under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, and thus the High Court erred in interfering with it. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a settlement order complying with a final remand direction should remain undisturbed in the absence of legal defects.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere under its constitutional jurisdiction with an order passed by a settlement authority in strict compliance with a final and unchallenged remand order?
  • Does an order passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner pursuant to previous judicial directions warrant interference when no legal defect is shown?
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• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs Messrs Pak Saaf Dry1981 PLD Supreme Court 553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-20
  arbitration agreementstay of legal proceedingsstep in the proceedingssubstantive right of appealsubmission to jurisdictionextension of time for written statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a civil suit filed by the respondent against the appellant for the recovery of money for dry cleaning and dyeing services rendered under an agreement containing an arbitration clause. The appellant applied under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for a stay of the suit proceedings to refer the dispute to arbitration. The High Court Single Judge rejected the application on the ground that the appellant had taken a step in the proceedings by applying for extensions of time to file a written statement, thereby submitting to the court's jurisdiction. A Letters Patent appeal against this order was dismissed as not maintainable under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal questions examined were whether the right of appeal under the Arbitration Act was preserved despite the Law Reforms Ordinance, and whether seeking an adjournment to file a written statement without instructions or knowledge of the arbitration agreement constitutes a 'step in the proceedings'. The Supreme Court held that the right of appeal was a substantive right unaffected by subsequent general procedural changes, and that seeking time to file a written statement under such circumstances does not amount to a step in the proceedings or a submission to jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed, and the suit proceedings were stayed for reference to arbitration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of appeal under the Arbitration Act, 1940 is a substantive right that remains unaffected by subsequent procedural enactments?
  • Does an application for an extension of time to file a written statement invariably constitute a 'step in the proceedings' under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Can a defendant who seeks an adjournment to obtain instructions and inspect the plaint be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court?
  • Whether an appeal is maintainable under section 39 of the Arbitration Act against an order refusing to stay a suit.
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• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs Khalid Waheed and Other1981 SCMR 573 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-15
  quashment of complaintcriminal breach of trustpiercing the corporate veildirectors' liabilitycriminal liability of companydishonored chequesCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a criminal complaint filed by Pakistan International Airlines Corporation against the directors of Khyber Express Limited for alleged criminal breach of trust and cheating following the dishonor of several cheques. The Peshawar High Court had quashed the complaint under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, reasoning that a company is a distinct legal entity and the complaint failed to specify which individual director was responsible. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order. The Court held that the High Court acted prematurely and without jurisdiction in quashing the complaint. The core legal principle affirmed is that the doctrine of separate legal entity does not insulate directors from criminal liability for a company's actions. Courts may pierce the veil of incorporation to identify the individuals responsible for the company's criminal conduct. Consequently, the Magistrate is required to conduct an inquiry to determine individual culpability rather than dismissing the complaint at the initial stage for lack of specific attribution.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal complaint be quashed solely because it fails to specify which individual director is responsible for the company's alleged offense?
  • Does the doctrine of separate legal entity shield directors from criminal liability for offenses committed by the company?
  • Is it permissible to pierce the corporate veil in criminal proceedings to determine the liability of company directors?
  • Does the issuance of a notice by a Magistrate to respondents in a criminal complaint constitute an excess of jurisdiction?
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• Pakistan Engineering Co. Ltd. vs Punjab Employees' Social Security1981 PLC 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-11
  social security contributionstatutory obligationpenalty for non-paymentemployer liabilityWest Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinancearrears of contribution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order regarding the imposition of penalties for the non-payment of social security contributions. The core legal question was whether an employer's liability to pay contributions and the subsequent penalty for non-payment under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965, is contingent upon the issuance of a demand notice or the actual provision of services by the institution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the obligation to pay contributions is a mandatory statutory duty that arises immediately upon the application of the Ordinance to an establishment. The court established the principle that these statutory obligations are independent of any administrative action or demand by the Social Security Institution. Consequently, failure to comply with the requirements of sections 20 and 21 of the Ordinance automatically triggers the penal provisions under section 23, regardless of whether the institution has provided medical care or issued a formal demand for payment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the obligation to pay social security contributions arise only upon the issuance of a demand notice by the institution?
  • Is an employer liable for penalties under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965, for failing to pay contributions despite the absence of medical services provided to workers?
  • Are the statutory obligations of an employer under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965, dependent on action initiated by the Social Security Institution?
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• Pak Cigarette Labour Union Khyber Tobacco Co. Ltd., Mardan vs Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd., Karachi and Another Labour Union and Another Link 11981 PLD Supreme Court 495 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-25
  statutory bonusprofit bonuswagesset offlabour disputecollective bargaining agreementestoppel against statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two appeals concerning the interpretation of Standing Order 10-C of the West Pakistan (Industrial and Commercial Employment) (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, which mandates the payment of a statutory profit-sharing bonus to workmen. The core legal questions were whether a bonus paid under an agreement or settlement becomes part of the workmen's wages, and whether workmen are entitled to receive the statutory bonus in addition to any contractually agreed profit bonus. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a bonus is a remuneration distinct from and in addition to wages, representing a share in profits, and does not permanently merge into wages. The Court further held that Standing Order 10-C establishes a minimum statutory share in profits. Consequently, an employer is not liable to pay both the agreed bonus and the statutory bonus in full as separate, cumulative liabilities. Instead, the employer is entitled to set off the contractually paid bonus against the statutory liability, remaining liable only to make good any shortfall where the agreed bonus is less than the statutory minimum.

  Questions settled

  • Does a bonus paid under a settlement or agreement become a permanent part of a workman's wages?
  • Are workmen entitled to receive a statutory profit bonus under Standing Order 10-C in addition to a contractually agreed profit bonus?
  • Can an employer set off the amount of bonus paid under a settlement against its statutory liability under Standing Order 10-C?
  • Does the absence of an express reference to profits in a settlement deed preclude a bonus from being classified as a profit-based bonus?
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• Officer on Special Duty, Central Record Office, Lahore and Others vs Bashir Ahmad and Othsrss1981 SCMR 1198 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-10
  review petitionDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958bogus claimsfinality of orderfresh fraudcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arose from an appeal involving the cancellation of land allotments under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. Land originally confirmed in favour of certain displaced persons had been sold to vendees. Subsequent proceedings initiated by informers to cancel the allotment on grounds of bogus claims were dismissed after inquiry by the officer exercising powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, and that order attained finality. Fresh notices issued by the authorities were set aside by the High Court and the Supreme Court in appeal. The petitioner sought a review of the Supreme Court's judgment to explicitly incorporate an oral observation made during the hearing regarding the authority's power to reopen the matter. The Supreme Court condoned the delay in filing the review petition on the facts presented. Allowing the review petition, the Court held that if the officer exercising powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner sought to reopen the case strictly on the ground of fresh fraud—and not to re-examine the correctness of the entitlement—he was free to do so, and directed the incorporation of this observation into the judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be allowed to incorporate an omitted observation regarding the authority's power to reopen proceedings on grounds of fresh fraud?
  • Does the finality of a settlement order bar the reopening of an allotment case if new evidence of fraud is subsequently discovered?
  • Can administrative delay in obtaining sanction from a competent authority constitute a valid ground for condoning delay in filing a review petition?
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• Noor Muhammad vs Deputysettlement Commissioner, Multan and Other1981 SCMR 974 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-14
  transfer of propertysettlement schemecommercial unitremandspecial leave to appealconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning the transfer of a disputed portion of a shop in Multan under settlement laws. The core legal question is whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner could subsequently review a prior order treating the premises as a single commercial unit and whether a rival claimant was entitled to transfer based on a settlement form and possession. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to challenge an earlier remand order of the High Court directing reconsideration of the rival claimant's application, thereby affirming the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition. The court laid down the principle that a party cannot bypass an earlier binding remand order by the High Court and claim the property as a single unit when the matter has already been opened for fresh determination regarding rival applications.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner could review an order treating a property as a single commercial unit?
  • Is a party precluded from raising the plea of a single commercial unit if they failed to challenge an earlier remand order of the High Court?
  • Whether a rival claimant was entitled to the transfer of the disputed premises under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
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• Noor Hussain vs Misri Khan and Other1981 SCMR1125 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-10
  land resumptionGrow-More-Food Schemedefault in paymentrectifiable breachforfeiture of tenancyColonization of Government LandsCollector's jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the resumption of land allotted to him under the 'Grow-More-Food Scheme' due to his failure to pay dues. The Collector resumed the land, a decision initially challenged by the petitioner in a civil suit, which was decreed in his favor. However, the appellate court reversed this, and the High Court dismissed the petitioner's second appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that under Section 24 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912, the Collector was required to determine if the breach was rectifiable and provide an opportunity to remedy the default before resumption. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had already been granted an opportunity by the Commissioner to pay the dues, which he failed to utilize. The Court ruled that the petitioner could not demand successive extensions of time for payment, as this would render the Collector's authority to enforce compliance ineffective. Consequently, the resumption was upheld, and the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Collector required to provide an opportunity to rectify a breach before resuming land under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912?
  • Can a defaulter claim a right to successive extensions of time for payment of land dues after failing to comply with a previous extension granted by a Commissioner?
  • Does the failure to comply with a grace period granted by a Commissioner justify the forfeiture of land tenancy?
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• Noor Din (Represented by His Legal Heirs) vs Bashir Ahmad and Otiierss1981 SCMR 1212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-12
  Rehabilitation Settlement Schemeland allotmentsitting allotteereservation of landclaim formRehabilitation authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  The appeal, filed by the legal heirs of Mst. Zainab Bibi and Noor Din, challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that restored the allotment of disputed land to the respondents, Bashir Ahmad and Shakoor Ahmad. The core legal question concerned the validity of the reservation of land in favor of the appellants and whether they held a superior claim over the respondents. The Supreme Court held that the reservation of land for the appellants was incompetent and not authorized under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, as it failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for reserving land for old claimants. Furthermore, the Court determined that the respondents, as sitting allottees, held a superior claim because, at the time the land was proposed in their favor, the appellants had no pending claim in the village. The Court affirmed that rehabilitation authorities cannot ignore the rights of valid allottees based on an illegal reservation. The appeal was dismissed, establishing that land allotment priority depends on the status of claims at the time of the proposal.

  Questions settled

  • Can rehabilitation authorities reserve land for a claimant pending adjudication of their claim without specific statutory authorization?
  • Does the status of a 'sitting allottee' depend on the presence of a pending claim in the village at the time of the land proposal?
  • Is an illegal or void order of reservation of land by rehabilitation authorities enforceable?
  • Does the principle of 'first come first served' apply to land allotment if the claimant has not yet established a valid claim in the village?
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• Noor Alam and 2 Others vs Fazal Dad1981 SCMR 439 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-14
  customary lawgift of ancestral landriwaj-i-amgratuitous alienationdaughter's sonpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the concurrent decisions of the lower courts, which held that a sonless Bhatti Rajput of Gujar Khan Tehsil, District Rawalpindi, was competent under Customary Law to gift ancestral land to his daughter's son. The core legal question was whether a sonless proprietor possessed unrestricted power to make such a gratuitous alienation of ancestral property under the applicable custom. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the proprietor was indeed competent to make the gift in favor of his daughter's son. The Court laid down the principle that in the western districts of the Punjab, which have been more influenced by Muhammadan Law, the older Riwaj-i-Am serves as a crucial check on subsequent entries, and daughters' rights are regarded with greater consideration, thereby upholding the validity of such gifts under Customary Law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sonless Bhatti Rajput of Gujar Khan Tehsil is competent under Customary Law to gift ancestral land to his daughter's son?
  • Do proprietors in the western districts of the Punjab possess unrestricted powers of gratuitous alienation by way of gift or bequest under custom?
  • What is the evidentiary weight of the earlier Riwaj-i-Am compared to subsequent entries regarding customary powers of alienation?
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• Warts and 9 Other vs The State1981 PLD Supreme Court 127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-02
  sudden fightchance encounterculpable homicidemurdertenant landlord disputeself-defencebenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants for rioting and murder. The core legal dispute arose from longstanding agrarian tensions between landlords and tenants over crop shares and land demarcation, culminating in a violent clash resulting in a death and multiple injuries. Both parties presented conflicting versions, with the prosecution alleging a premeditated ambush and the defence pleading self-defence following a chance encounter. The Supreme Court analyzed the evidence, noting that both sides suppressed material truths, and concluded that the incident was not a premeditated ambush but a sudden fight arising from a chance encounter in the heat of passion without undue advantage being taken. Consequently, the Court held that Exception IV to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 applied, altering the conviction from murder under Section 302 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The key principle laid down is that where evidence reveals a sudden quarrel and mutual combat without premeditation, the case falls under Exception IV to Section 300, warranting a conviction under Section 304 Part I rather than murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a fatal altercation arising from a chance encounter without premeditation attracts Exception IV to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can statements of accused persons under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be utilized to evaluate the plausibility of a defence plea in a criminal trial?
  • How should courts evaluate conflicting versions and suppressed facts in cases involving cross-cases and mutual combat?
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• Noor Ahmad Shahs vs Member Board of Revenue, Etc,1981 SCMR 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-12
  pre-emptionLand Reforms Regulationplaint rejectiondeposit of pre-emption moneycivil court powersconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition challenging a revisional order by the Member, Board of Revenue. The petitioner had filed a pre-emption suit under paragraph 25(d) of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (M.L.R. 115) before the Collector, who ordered the deposit of half the sale money. Upon failure to deposit within the extended time, the Collector rejected the plaint under section 23(4) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act. The core legal question was whether the procedural provisions of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, including the power to order deposit of pre-emption money and reject plaints, apply to pre-emption suits filed under Martial Law Regulation 115 when the Regulation itself does not prescribe a procedure. The Supreme Court held that while M.L.R. 115 creates a substantive right of pre-emption for tenants, it does not provide procedural rules, meaning the procedural framework of the provincial pre-emption law applies. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the procedural provisions of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act apply to pre-emption suits filed under paragraph 25(d) of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (M.L.R. 115)?
  • Does a Collector acting under M.L.R. 115 have the power to order the deposit of pre-emption money and reject a plaint for non-compliance under the provincial pre-emption law?
  • Can a new factual plea regarding an extension of time for depositing pre-emption money be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
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• Noor Ahmad Shah and Others vs Ch. Wali Muhammad1981 SCMR 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-15
  ejectment proceedingsrent arrearsadjustment of renttime-barred rentstriking off defencelandlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld an order striking off the petitioner's defense in an ejectment proceeding. The core legal question was whether rent payments made by a tenant for a period prior to the arrears claimed by the landlord could be adjusted against the subsequent arrears ordered by the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller had ordered the tenant to deposit arrears for a specific period, excluding time-barred rent. The tenant sought to adjust earlier payments against these arrears, a request denied by the Rent Controller and the High Court, but initially allowed by the first appellate court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly reversed the appellate court's decision. The ratio of the decision is that payments made specifically for rent due in a prior period cannot be adjusted against arrears of rent accrued for a subsequent period, as they constitute distinct obligations. The Court affirmed that such prior payments do not qualify as a valid tender against subsequent arrears.

  Questions settled

  • Can rent payments made for a period prior to the arrears claimed be adjusted against the arrears of rent ordered by a Rent Controller?
  • Does a deposit of rent for a period preceding the arrears constitute a valid tender that can be adjusted against subsequent arrears?
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• Noor Abdullah and Another vs The State1981 SCMR 859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-27
  suspension of sentenceSection 307 PPCattempted murderleave to appealcounter caseappreciation of evidenceinterim order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was directed against an interim order of a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which refused the petitioners' application for suspension of sentence pending their appeal against conviction and five years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners contended that the eye-witnesses ought not to have been believed because they were named as accused in a counter case. The Supreme Court observed that such contentions related directly to the merits of the case, which fell to be appreciated and determined during the regular hearing of the main appeal. Holding that the High Court's refusal to suspend the sentences did not violate any provision or principle of law, particularly where specific roles of firing upon the victim were attributed to the petitioners by witnesses believed by the trial court, the Supreme Court found no ground for interference and dismissed the petition in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's discretionary order refusing suspension of sentence when the plea raised pertains entirely to the merits of the pending appeal?
  • Whether the credibility of prosecution eye-witnesses based on their status as accused in a counter case can be determined at the stage of an application for suspension of sentence rather than at the regular appeal hearing?
  • Does specific attribution of firearm injuries to convicts by witnesses believed by the trial court justify refusing suspension of sentence pending appeal?
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• Niazoo Ali as Niaz Muhammad vs The State1981S C M R 1217 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-01
  murdertriple murdereyewitness testimonydivisibility of evidencebenefit of the doubtdeath sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a triple murder trial where the appellant Niazoo Ali was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to death for the murder of Muhammad, alongside the acquittal of his co-accused by the courts below. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether the testimony of eye-witnesses, part of whose evidence led to the acquittal or benefit of the doubt for co-accused, could still be relied upon to sustain the conviction of the appellant without independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not reject the eye-witnesses as untruthful but merely extended the benefit of the doubt to certain co-accused due to lack of overt acts, and that the specific and consistent role attributed to the appellant regarding the fatal firing was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court laid down the principle that eyewitness testimony is divisible where specific roles are assigned, and the acquittal of some co-accused on grounds of caution does not inherently vitiate the conviction of another against whom the evidence is solid and consistent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eye-witnesses is divisible when some co-accused are acquitted on the basis of benefit of the doubt?
  • Can the conviction of an accused for murder be sustained solely on eye-witness testimony without corroborative recovery evidence?
  • Does the acquittal of certain co-accused due to minor contradictions require the automatic acquittal of the remaining co-accused assigned specific overt acts?
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• Niaz Muhammad vs The State1981 SCMR 797 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-23
  review petitionmurderabscondencemedical evidencecriminal petition for special leave to appealocular evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed against an earlier order of the Supreme Court dismissing a criminal petition for special leave to appeal. The petitioner, Niaz Muhammad, along with another accused, was convicted under sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and sentenced to death, which convictions and sentences were upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions involved whether the review petition could entertain grounds not pressed during the initial hearing and whether a minor discrepancy regarding medical evidence constituted an error patent on the face of the record warranting review. The Supreme Court held that grounds not pressed at the original hearing cannot be re-opened without satisfactory explanation, and minor inaccuracies in describing medical evidence that do not affect the substantive conclusions of the case do not justify a review. The key principle laid down is that a review petition cannot be used to re-argue points deliberately omitted or not pressed by competent counsel at the initial hearing, nor will minor factual misdescriptions in judgments lead to review unless they impact the core findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party re-open and argue a ground in a review petition that was omitted or not pressed at the original hearing without providing a satisfactory explanation?
  • Whether a minor inaccuracy in the description of medical evidence in a judgment constitutes an error patent on the face of the record sufficient to warrant a review?
  • Does the absence of a bullet extracted from a dead body affect the conclusion that injuries were caused by two different types of weapons when supported by other medical descriptions?
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• Niamat Ali vs The State1981 SCMR 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-01
  murderappeal against acquittaldying declarationmedical evidenceweapon recoverymotivecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby the appellant's acquittal by the trial court for murder was set aside and he was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in a sentence of imprisonment for life. The core legal question concerned the appreciation of evidence in a murder trial, specifically regarding dying declarations, medical evidence consistency with weapon dimensions, and the presence or absence of motive. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly set aside the perverted acquittal of the appellant, finding that the First Information Report was rightly treated as a dying declaration requiring no further corroboration, that minor discrepancies regarding blood stains and weapon dimensions were not fatal to the prosecution case, and that the sentence awarded was already the lesser alternative provided by law. The court laid down principles governing the evidentiary value of dying declarations and the evaluation of medical evidence in criminal trials.

  Questions settled

  • Can a First Information Report dictated by an injured person who later succumbs to injuries be treated as a dying declaration?
  • Whether an acquittal based on a perverse view of evidence can be interfered with by an appellate court?
  • Is independent corroboration strictly required when a conviction is based on a reliable dying declaration?
  • Does a discrepancy between the weapon width and the injury dimension alone suffice to discard ocular testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir and Others vs Syed Israr Ahmad Etc:S1981 SCMR 829 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-14
  possession of propertyconcurrent findingsPermanent Transfer Deedmisreading of evidencesecond appealproperty ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a civil suit for possession of property, which was decreed in favor of the plaintiff-respondent by the Civil Judge and subsequently upheld by the District Judge and the High Court in a regular second appeal. The petitioners challenged the concurrent findings of the lower courts, arguing that the property in dispute did not belong to the plaintiff by virtue of the Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) issued to him. The Supreme Court addressed the core legal question of whether the lower courts erred in their factual determination regarding the ownership of the disputed roof or 'barsati' area above a shop. The Court held that the challenge to the ownership was essentially a question of fact already thoroughly examined by the courts below, and the petitioners failed to demonstrate any misreading or omission of evidence. The Court affirmed the principle that, absent specific exclusions, the transfer of a shop includes the space from the ground to the sky. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lacking merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the transfer of a shop include the space from the ground to the sky unless otherwise specified?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts be reopened in a petition for special leave to appeal without demonstrating misreading or omission of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Alias Jeera vs The State1981 PLD Supreme Court 240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-19
  bailbail cancellationzinasuppression of factssuborning evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioner's second bail petition by the Lahore High Court in a case concerning Zina. Earlier, bail granted to the petitioner by an Additional Sessions Judge was cancelled on the grounds that a previous order of the High Court was suppressed from notice and that there was an uncontroverted assertion of an attempt to suborn the evidence. The core legal question was whether interference was warranted against the refusal of bail where attempts were made to mislead a court of law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that no justification existed for interference with the lower orders refusing bail, as the petitioner had attempted to mislead a court of law. The key principle laid down is that attempting to mislead a court of law or suborn evidence disentitles an accused person to the discretionary relief of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be cancelled if a previous adverse order by the High Court was not brought to the notice of the bail-granting court?
  • Does an attempt to suborn evidence constitute a valid ground for the refusal or cancellation of bail?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's refusal to grant bail when an accused has attempted to mislead a court of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Muhammad Din Etc.S1981 SCMR 415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-23
  murdercommon objectgrave and sudden provocationinjured witnessesappreciation of evidencemotiveright of private defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court which had set aside the murder convictions and sentences of the respondents under Section 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, altering them to Section 304 Part I read with Section 149. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court correctly evaluated the evidence of motive, the place of occurrence, and the testimony of injured disinterested witnesses to conclude that the incident was a sudden fight without premeditation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misread the evidence regarding the motive and ignored material facts, notably that the incident occurred at the dera of neutral parties and involved injured independent witnesses whose presence was natural. The Court ruled that the assailants were the aggressors and could not claim the benefit of a sudden fight or private defence. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restored the trial court's convictions under Section 302/149, but commuted the death sentences to transportation for life in view of the motive relating to family honour.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in discarding the prosecution's evidence of motive based on misread testimony?
  • Does an attack launched at the dera of neutral and disinterested persons render the assailants the aggressors disentitling them to the plea of sudden fight?
  • Whether the testimony of injured witnesses having no prior animosity carries special weight in criminal trials?
  • When should a death sentence be commuted to transportation for life on the ground of motive involving family honour?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad and Another vs Ghulam Nabi and Another1981 SCMR 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-16
  evictionpersonal usedefault in rentreconstructionlandlord and tenantspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of the petitioners' second appeal by the High Court, which had upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts ordering the eviction of the tenant petitioners from the shop in dispute on the grounds of default in rent, personal use, and reconstruction. The core legal question is whether a landlord's occupation of another rented shop in the same urban area disqualifies them from seeking the eviction of a tenant from their own shop for personal use in good faith. The Supreme Court held that the occupation of a rented shop by a landlord does not constitute a disqualification in law for seeking eviction from their own property. The Court established the principle that a landlord is not barred from seeking eviction for personal use merely because they are currently occupying a rented premises, and dismissed the petition as lacking merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the occupation of a rented shop by a landlord disqualify them in law from seeking the eviction of a tenant from their own shop for personal use?
  • Whether concurrent findings of lower courts regarding personal use and reconstruction can be interfered with without showing a legal or factual mistake?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazim Hussain vs Government of Punjab and Other1981 SCMR 831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-01
  probationary servicetermination of serviceservice ruleslocal governmentpresumption of probation extensionpolitical victimization
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Chief Officer of the Municipal Committee, Jhang, challenged the termination of his services, which occurred after his two-year probationary period. The petitioner alleged that his termination was motivated by political considerations, citing minutes from a Provincial Local Government Board meeting. The core legal question was whether the termination of the petitioner's probationary service, conducted under the West Pakistan Local Councils and Municipal Committees Service Rules, 1963, was legally valid, specifically regarding the presumption of probation extension and the alleged political motivation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the termination was lawful. The Court found no evidence that political considerations influenced the Board's decision, noting that other similarly situated appointees were retained. Furthermore, the Court clarified that under the applicable rules, where an initial probation period is not explicitly extended, it is deemed extended for one year. The judgment affirms that a probationer's services may be terminated in accordance with the prescribed rules, provided the procedure is followed, and rejects claims of mala fide based on unsubstantiated allegations of political bias.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to explicitly extend a probationary period result in a deemed extension of probation under the West Pakistan Local Councils and Municipal Committees Service Rules, 1963?
  • Can a termination of service during probation be challenged on the basis of alleged political motivation without supporting evidence?
  • Is the termination of a probationer valid if conducted in accordance with the terms of appointment and relevant service rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Ali and 3 Others vs Musiitaq Ahmad and 19 Other1981S C M R 807 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-22
  limited ownerwilladverse possessionMuslim Personal Lawleave to appealinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a civil revision filed by the petitioners concerning a land dispute. The core legal question involved whether a female limited owner under customary law could execute a valid will bequeathing inherited property, and whether the petitioners could claim the property based on adverse possession or principles of testamentary succession to a one-third share. The Supreme Court held that a limited owner lacks the power to make a testamentary disposition of property that does not belong to her as a full owner, and upon her death, the property devolves upon her lawful heirs under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, rather than vesting in her as full ownership to support notional inheritance or acceleration of succession. The court laid down the principle that an alienee or legatee from a female limited owner cannot retain any share of the property where the limited interest terminates by her death, as she never became vested with full ownership in any part of the property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a female limited owner can execute a valid will to bequeath property inherited from a deceased husband?
  • Can a legatee claim a one-third share of property on the basis of a will executed by a limited owner whose interest terminated by death?
  • Does the principle of surrender and acceleration of succession apply to a testamentary disposition by a limited owner?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawaz Ali and Another vs The State1981 SCMR 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-06
  murdereye-witnessesdying declarationcircumstantial evidencedelay in FIRmotivereappraisal of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and death sentence of the appellants for the murder of Ghulam Nabi, which was upheld by the Sind High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, given the significant discrepancies between the ocular, medical, and circumstantial evidence, and the reliability of the dying declaration and motive. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were vitiated because they ignored crucial evidence favoring the accused, including inconsistencies regarding the place of occurrence, absence of blood at the scene, medical evidence contradicting the eye-witness accounts, and questionable circumstances surrounding the dying declaration and delayed First Information Report. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, laying down the principle that courts must consider both evidence supporting the prosecution and exculpatory evidence favoring the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether inconsistencies between ocular evidence and medical or circumstantial evidence are sufficient to discredit prosecution witnesses?
  • Can a dying declaration furnish reliable corroboration when made after the deceased has had extensive opportunity to consult with interested eye-witness relatives?
  • Whether the absence of blood at the alleged place of occurrence casts grave doubt on the prosecution's claim regarding the location of the crime?
  • Does a failure by lower courts to consider evidence favoring the accused vitiate concurrent findings of guilt?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab and Another vs Amin Hazin and Other1981 SCMR 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-10
  land allotmentdisplaced personsrehabilitationclaim transfercancellation of allotmentadmissions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute regarding the cancellation of agricultural land allotments made to a displaced person, Bagh Ali, in District Gujranwala. The core legal question was whether a statement made by the claimant in 1964, which led to the cancellation of his allotment in village Bharoki Virkan, could be legally extended to justify the cancellation of his separate, validly obtained allotments in villages Kingarwali and Mandhir. The Supreme Court examined the official records from the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, Sialkot, which confirmed that the claimant had legitimately transferred his claim from Sialkot to Gujranwala and had not received any land in Sialkot. The Court held that the claimant's previous admission was confined strictly to the Bharoki Virkan allotment and could not be used to invalidate his other legitimate allotments. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order and the Deputy Commissioner's cancellation order, restoring the allotments in Kingarwali and Mandhir. The principle laid down is that admissions regarding specific property allotments cannot be broadly construed to invalidate separate, distinct allotments without evidence of impropriety in those specific transactions.

  Questions settled

  • Can an admission regarding the cancellation of a land allotment in one specific village be extended to invalidate separate, distinct allotments in other villages?
  • Does the transfer of a claim from one district to another under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 render allotments in the transferee district valid if the claimant received no land in the original district?
  • Is a Settlement Commissioner justified in cancelling land allotments based on a statement that does not explicitly cover those specific allotments?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab Ali and Othbrss vs Settlement Commissioner and Other1981S C M R1025 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-23
  settlement commissionertransfer of propertyrevisional powerslocus standispecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the transfer of property units to respondent No. 2 under settlement laws. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioners, who applied for transfer under Scheme No. VIII, acquired a valid claim to property units after an earlier transfer order was set aside and the case remanded. The Supreme Court held that the setting aside of the original transfer order and the reopening of the case were intended solely for the original applicants whose file was destroyed, and not to benefit subsequent applicants whose claims depended on property availability after Scheme No. I claims were satisfied. The Court affirmed that the petitioners lacked locus standi to challenge the transfers. The petition was dismissed in limine, laying down the principle that remand proceedings resulting from the destruction of records do not automatically open up property allotments for fresh claimants who failed to apply under the primary transfer schemes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether subsequent applicants under Scheme No. VIII have locus standi to challenge property transfers when an earlier transfer is reopened solely due to the destruction of the original file?
  • Does an order setting aside a transfer and remanding a case for fresh disposal enure to the benefit of parties who did not apply under the primary transfer scheme?
  • Can a party claim property availability under Scheme No. VIII before the rights of claimants under Scheme No. I are exhausted?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasir Ud Din vs Muhammad Siddique1981 SCMR 709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-11-13
  ejectmentbona fide personal requirementleave to appeallandlord and tenantrestoration of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This leave petition arises from the High Court's order in ejectment proceedings initiated by the respondent against the petitioner regarding residential premises on the ground of bona fide personal requirement, as the respondent was facing vacation of his current Government accommodation. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment, but the Additional District Judge reversed the decision, holding the requirement was not bona fide and was based on procured notices. The High Court restored the Rent Controller's order, finding the appellate court's decision was based on speculation rather than concrete evidence. The Supreme Court heard the petitioner's arguments regarding alleged mala fides and demands for higher rent, and held that statutory safeguards exist allowing the tenant to apply for restoration of possession and prosecution if the landlord fails to occupy the premises after vacation. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, granting the petitioner three months to vacate the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the appellate court's finding regarding bona fide personal requirement?
  • What is the remedy available to a tenant if a landlord fails to occupy the premises after obtaining ejectment on the ground of personal requirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasir Ali vs Alunsht Merar Khan1981 PLD Supreme Court 607 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-07
  post-dated chequecheatingquashment of proceedingsdishonour of chequecriminal liabilityfraudulent inducement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the High Court's refusal to quash criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant for the offence of cheating under Section 420, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following the dishonour of a post-dated cheque. The core legal question was whether the issuance of a post-dated cheque that is subsequently dishonoured inherently constitutes a criminal offence or remains a civil matter, and whether such proceedings should be quashed at the initial stage. The Supreme Court held that the law cannot be laid down so broadly as to hold that a post-dated cheque never gives rise to a criminal offence. The Court determined that the drawer's intention and knowledge are questions of fact to be ascertained through evidence at trial, not merely from the complaint. The key principle laid down is that where a complaint alleges fraudulent and dishonest inducement, quashment of proceedings at an early stage is inappropriate, as the determination of guilt depends on the totality of circumstances revealed during trial. The Court further noted the availability of relief under Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a post-dated cheque that is subsequently dishonoured automatically constitute the offence of cheating under Section 420, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Should criminal proceedings be quashed at the initial stage when the complaint alleges fraudulent and dishonest inducement?
  • Is the intention of the drawer of a post-dated cheque a question of fact to be determined at trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Naseem Shafi and Another vs Tanvir Affandi and 13 Other1981S C M R 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-04
  preliminary decreedismissal in defaultrevisional jurisdictionpartnership suitlimitationcourt's mistake
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside an order dismissing a suit in default after a preliminary decree had already been passed. The core legal question was whether a trial court possesses the jurisdiction to dismiss a suit for default once a preliminary decree has been issued, and whether the High Court could rectify such an error in revision. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that a suit cannot be dismissed for default after the passing of a preliminary decree. The Court reasoned that once a preliminary decree is passed, the litigation continues, and an order of dismissal in default is legally incompetent. Furthermore, the Court upheld the High Court's exercise of revisional jurisdiction to correct the trial court's failure to exercise its own jurisdiction, emphasizing the principle that a litigant should not suffer due to the court's mistake. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, as the High Court's approach was found to be unexceptionable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court dismiss a suit for default after a preliminary decree has been passed?
  • Is the High Court empowered to set aside an order of dismissal in default in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction?
  • Does a litigant suffer prejudice due to a court's error in dismissing a suit in default after a preliminary decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Najam Ud Din vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and Othrss1981 SCMR 540 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-07
  evacuee propertydemarcation of propertywrit jurisdictiondelay in refilingPermanent Transfer Deedquestion of factlaches
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a property dispute regarding the demarcation of evacuee property, specifically House No. 150 in Chiniot, which the petitioner, Najam-ud-Din, purchased at a government auction. Following the purchase and issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.), disputes arose regarding the physical boundaries of the property, as the occupant, Ghulam Muhammad, had merged the house with an adjoining property. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner conducted a demarcation, which was subsequently challenged in appeal and revision proceedings. The petitioner eventually filed a writ petition in the Lahore High Court, which was dismissed due to significant, unexplained delay in refiling the petition after it was returned with objections. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's dismissal, agreeing that the delay in refiling was inexcusable. Furthermore, the Court held that the demarcation of property boundaries constitutes a question of fact, which is generally not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court noted the petitioner's own indolence in failing to object while the properties were being demolished and rebuilt, thereby precluding relief.

  Questions settled

  • Is the demarcation of property boundaries considered a question of fact?
  • Can a writ petition be dismissed on the ground of unexplained delay in refiling after the removal of objections?
  • Does a petitioner's failure to object to the demolition and reconstruction of property constitute laches or indolence?
  Read full judgment →
• Najam Moin vs DR. Riaz Ud Din Ahmad, Etc.S1981 SCMR 789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-02
  leave to appealpersonal requirementejectmentconcurrent findingslandlord and tenantbona fide requirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a second appeal upholding the eviction of the petitioner from a rented shop. The core legal question concerned whether a concurrent finding of fact regarding the landlord's personal requirement for the disputed shop could be vitiated by a separate, earlier decision where the landlord's eviction claim regarding a different shop was disallowed. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by three lower forums regarding the bona fide personal requirement of the landlord for his son remained a valid factual determination, and the outcome of litigation concerning a different property did not legally bar or invalidate the proven bona fide requirement in the present case. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact regarding personal requirement must be evaluated on the specific evidence of each case, and concurrent factual determinations by lower courts will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court merely because a separate eviction proceeding concerning another property had a different outcome.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding personal requirement can be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the failure of an eviction petition regarding one property automatically render a landlord's claim for personal requirement in respect of another property not bona fide?
  Read full judgment →
• Mvhammad Siddiq and Others vs Government of Pakistan and Other1981 SCMR 1022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-22
  constitutional petitionterritorial jurisdictionTribal Areasouster of jurisdictionexecution of warrantsAssistant Political AgentKhyber Agency
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged an order of a Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a constitutional petition filed under Article 201 of the Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1972. The appellants challenged the action of the Assistant Political Agent, Khyber Agency, who took cognizance of a criminal complaint under Section 420, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, referred the matter to a Council-of-Elders, and issued warrants and summons to be executed in Faisalabad (then Lyallpur). The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed territorial jurisdiction over proceedings originated by an authority in a Tribal Area where execution of process was to occur outside that area. The Supreme Court affirmed that jurisdiction over Tribal Areas is excluded only in matters exclusively concerned with those areas. However, because the process was issued by an authority acting in the Tribal Area and execution was directed within Faisalabad, jurisdiction lay with the Lahore High Court, not the Peshawar High Court. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with observations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of superior Courts is ousted in matters where a part of the cause of action or execution of process occurs outside Tribal Areas?
  • Does the High Court of a province have writ jurisdiction over an Assistant Political Agent acting exclusively within a Tribal Area?
  • Which High Court possesses territorial jurisdiction when process issued in a Tribal Area is to be executed in a district outside that area?
  Read full judgment →
• Muzaffar Ali vs Muhammad Shafi.1981 PLD Supreme Court 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-11
  review jurisdictionsubstantive right of reviewsecond appealurban rent restrictioncivil procedure codefinality of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave addresses the core legal question of whether the High Court possesses the power to review its own judgments and orders passed in second appeals under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959. The litigation originated from an eviction application filed by the landlord, which culminated in a second appeal before the High Court and a subsequent review proceeding. The Supreme Court held that the right of review is a substantive right that must be expressly conferred by statute, and since neither the Ordinance nor the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 applicable to such appeals expressly or impliedly confer a power of review—having specifically excluded Part VIII containing Section 114—the High Court has no jurisdiction to review its appellate orders under the Ordinance. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, setting aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and restoring the Single Judge's order dismissing the review application as incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction to review its orders passed in second appeals under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959?
  • Is a right of review considered a substantive right requiring express statutory conferment?
  • Do the provisions of Part VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to second appeals heard under Section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Mutalli Khan Etc. vs Ghulam Sarwar1981 SCMR 983 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-01
  minor's propertyguardianshipexchange of propertyMuhammadan Lawrevisional jurisdictionalienation of minor's property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over agricultural land in Gujrat District, which the petitioners claimed to have acquired from the respondent, a minor, through an exchange agreement. The petitioners' father had initially secured a civil court decree validating the exchange, but this was overturned by an Additional District Judge, who held that the minor's maternal grandfather lacked the authority under Muhammadan Law to exchange the minor's property. The Lahore High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioners' revision petition, noting the lack of legal authority for such an exchange. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the exchange was in the minor's interest and that the grandfather had been appointed as the minor's guardian. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, finding no evidence of such an appointment and characterizing the trial court's conclusion as perverse. The Court held that neither the minor's mother nor the maternal grandfather possessed the legal authority to exchange the minor's property. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that unauthorized exchanges of a minor's property are legally invalid.

  Questions settled

  • Does a maternal grandfather have the authority under Muhammadan Law to exchange a minor's property?
  • Can a court presume the appointment of a guardian without evidence of such an appointment?
  • Is a contract for the exchange of property entered into by a minor void?
  Read full judgment →
• Mustafa Khan and Others vs The State1981 SCMR 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-05
  self-defencefree fightculpable homicide not amounting to murdermurderre-appraisal of evidenceabscondencecommon intentionbloodfeud
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the convictions of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentences of death for the murders of two persons, alongside convictions under Section 307. The core legal question involved the re-appraisal of evidence regarding the right of self-defence, the nature of the encounter, and whether the combat was premeditated or a sudden mutual fight. The Supreme Court, by majority view, held that although the complainant party went in pursuit of the appellants following an earlier altercation, both sides deliberately engaged in an armed encounter, negating the plea of private defence for either party. The majority held that where two bodies of men engage in a deliberate armed fight, the offense falls under culpable homicide not amounting to murder rather than premeditated murder. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the appeal as to conviction but converted the conviction from Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to Section 304, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing the death sentence to transportation for life, while maintaining the conviction under Section 307.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of private defence is available to either party when both sides knowingly and deliberately engage in a mutual armed encounter?
  • Does a premeditated armed clash between two opposing groups amount to murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether abscondence of an accused can serve as corroborative evidence of participation in a crime?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to Section 304 Part I when both parties are found to have willingly participated in an armed fight?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Etc. vs Akhtar Hussan Etc.S1981 SCMR 944 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-11
  pre-emptionsplitting of bargainsale-deedspecification of pricespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court dated 13-6-1979 in R. S. A. No. 133/79, wherein the petitioners sought to pre-empt a part of a sale transaction by splitting up the bargain on the ground that the shares of various vendees were separately mentioned in the sale-deed. The core legal question is whether a pre-emption suit can be maintained by splitting up the bargain and pre-empting a part of the sale transaction when the shares of the vendees are specified in the sale-deed but the price is not specified. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the view taken by the High Court—that such a plea is of no effect without specification of price—is supported by established precedents of the Court. The key principle laid down is that splitting up a bargain in a pre-emption suit without specification of price is not permissible.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emption suit be maintained by splitting up the bargain based on separately mentioned shares of vendees without specification of price?
  • Whether the High Court's refusal to allow the splitting of a bargain in a pre-emption suit is legally sustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmed vs Muhammad Akram and Another1981S C M R 1248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-02
  culpable homicidesudden fightpremeditationleave to appealappellate interferenceException IV to Section 300
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that altered the respondent's conviction from murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly applied Exception IV to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which pertains to sudden fights without premeditation, or whether the circumstances indicated a premeditated murder. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings were sustainable based on the evidence, noting that the respondent could not have reasonably planned an ambush at the chosen location and time, and that the respondent's involvement in a scuffle resulting in his own injuries negated the theory of a pre-planned attack. The key principle laid down is that the possession of a weapon alone does not necessarily prove premeditation, and appellate courts will not interfere with findings of fact that are reasonably supported by the evidence on record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of a weapon by an accused person automatically establish premeditation for a murder charge?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with findings of fact made by a High Court if those findings are reasonably supported by the evidence on record?
  • Does a sudden encounter resulting in a scuffle and injuries to both parties qualify for the application of Exception IV to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmad vs WAPDA and Another1981 SCMR 1077 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-19
  limitationcondonation of delayservice tribunaljurisdictionsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 24 March 1980, which was filed with a delay of 66 days. The core legal question is whether the time spent pursuing a mistaken remedy through a writ petition before the High Court can constitute a sufficient ground for the condonation of delay under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court held that because Article 212(3) explicitly requires orders of the Service Tribunal to be challenged directly before the Supreme Court, time spent pursuing a writ petition in the High Court cannot be regarded as time spent bona fide in a wrong forum. Consequently, the Court ruled that there was no valid ground for condoning the delay and dismissed the petition as time-barred. The key principle laid down is that mistaken recourse to the High Court in matters falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal and the Supreme Court under Article 212 does not afford a basis for condonation of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Whether time spent pursuing a writ petition in the High Court against a Service Tribunal order can be excluded for the purpose of limitation under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the mistaken filing of a constitutional petition in the High Court constitute a bona fide pursuit of a remedy in a wrong forum for condonation of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmad vs Settlement and Rehabilitation1981 SCMR 706 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-07
  evacuee propertysettlement of claimslimitationtransfer of propertyspecial leave to appealP.T.O.claimant vs non-claimant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee property. The petitioner claimed prior entitlement to a house based on an N.C.H. Form and a P.T.O. issued in 1960, challenging a transfer made to the respondent in the same year. The core legal question was whether the settlement authorities were justified in refusing to reopen a transfer finalized fourteen years prior, particularly where the petitioner had allegedly consented to the transfer to the respondent, a claimant, during the original proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the settlement authorities committed no illegality in refusing to reopen the matter after such an extensive delay. The Court emphasized that the petitioner, as a non-claimant, had no superior right over the respondent, a claimant, and noted the petitioner's failure to pursue his alleged P.T.O. for over a decade. The principle laid down is that stale claims regarding the transfer of evacuee property, especially where the petitioner previously acquiesced to the transfer, cannot be reopened after an inordinate delay.

  Questions settled

  • Can a transfer of evacuee property be reopened after an inordinate delay of fourteen years?
  • Does a claimant have a preferential right to the transfer of evacuee property over a non-claimant?
  • Is a petitioner who previously consented to the transfer of property to another party entitled to challenge that transfer years later?
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• Murid Ahmad and Others vs Member, Board of Revenue and or Other1981S C M R 1182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-22
  State landopen auctiondefault in installmentsresumption of landconstitutional petitionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the resumption of disputed State land. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioners were entitled to relief and extension of time for depositing defaulted installment payments after failing to avail multiple opportunities granted by revenue authorities. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no fault in dismissing the constitutional petition since the petitioners were afforded reasonable opportunities to make up the default but persistently failed to do so without pointing to any governing law or rule supporting their claim. The key principle laid down is that discretionary leniency granted by revenue authorities for clearing default payments cannot be endlessly claimed or extended when a party fails to comply with the stipulated conditions and deadlines.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party failing to avail opportunities to pay defaulted installments for State land can challenge the resumption of land?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against orders upholding the resumption of State land due to non-payment of dues?
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• Murid Ahmad and Others vs Ghulam Hussan and Other1981 SCMR 1253 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-16
  adverse possessionleave to appealadditional evidencesecond appealpermissive possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a second appeal by the High Court, which had affirmed the decree in favour of the respondent for the possession of a disputed house. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioners had established title through adverse possession, and whether additional evidence could be permitted at the belated stage of leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings against the plea of adverse possession were unexceptionable, and that documents newly discovered after many years of litigation and not pleaded earlier could not be introduced to reopen the case. The Court dismissed the petition, laying down that stale claims of adverse possession unsupported by clear, hostile evidence within the statutory period cannot succeed, and appellate courts will not lightly permit additional evidence at the leave stage to contradict previous pleadings and prolong litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of adverse possession be sustained on the basis of documents that fall within the limitation period of the institution of the suit?
  • Whether additional evidence can be permitted at the stage of a petition for leave to appeal to reopen a long-standing litigation.
  • Is possession considered hostile when the occupant's predecessor has admitted the true owner's title in prior judicial proceedings?
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• Murad Ali vs The State1981 SC M R871 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-12
  illegal gratificationtrap caseanti-corruptionspecial leave to appealbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld his conviction under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioner, a Line Superintendent of WAPDA, was accused of demanding and accepting illegal gratification from a complainant for facilitating the installation of an electric connection. A trap was successfully organized, and tainted currency notes were recovered from the petitioner's possession, though he claimed the amount was a friendly loan. The core legal question involved the sufficiency of evidence in a trap case and whether acquittal under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 undermines a conviction under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution proved its case through cogent evidence, the defence plea was rightly rejected, and an acquittal on a separate charge does not diminish the proof regarding the established offence. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of tainted currency notes in a trap case sufficiently establishes the charge of accepting illegal gratification under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Does an acquittal under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 adversely affect or whittle down the prosecution case regarding a charge under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can a defence plea claiming a friendly loan without supporting defence witnesses successfully rebut consistent prosecution evidence in a bribery case?
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• Munir Ahmed/ vs Government of ~Baluchistan and 4 Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-01
  educational admissionreserved seatspermanent residence certificateadministrative lawselection committeejudicial reviewconstitutional petitiondomicile certificate
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court regarding the refusal of admission to the first-year M.B., B.S. class at Bolan Medical College. The core legal question was whether the Selection Committee could validly reject the petitioner's application for a reserved seat based on an informal report by the Deputy Commissioner, despite the petitioner possessing a valid permanent residence certificate issued by the District Magistrate. The Supreme Court held that the Selection Committee’s decision was without lawful authority. The Court determined that the Committee ignored the valid certificate required by the prospectus and improperly relied on extraneous reports. The Court established that administrative bodies must strictly follow the criteria stipulated in their prospectuses and cannot disregard valid official documentation in favor of informal inquiries. Furthermore, the Court held that innocent students already admitted should not be displaced due to administrative errors. Consequently, the petitioner was declared entitled to admission, though the request to displace the existing student was refused to avoid penalizing an innocent party.

  Questions settled

  • Can a selection committee reject a candidate based on an informal report when the candidate holds a valid permanent residence certificate as required by the prospectus?
  • Does a local certificate that is revalidated by a District Magistrate satisfy the requirement for a permanent residence certificate for college admission?
  • Should an innocent student already admitted to an educational institution be displaced to accommodate a petitioner who was wrongly denied admission due to administrative error?
  • Is a decision by a selection committee that ignores valid official documentation and relies on extraneous reports subject to judicial review?
  Read full judgment →
• Munawar vs The State1981 SCMR 1092 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-25
  post-arrest bailcommon intentionvicarious liabilityconstructive liabilityfirearm injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the refusal of the Lahore High Court to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner, Munawar, who was implicated along with others under sections 302, 307, and 326 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and causing firearm injuries. The core legal question was whether an accused person who is not alleged to have caused any injury to the deceased, but is attributed injuries to a prosecution witness, is entitled to bail as a matter of law on the premise that constructive liability under section 34 cannot be invoked at the bail stage. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that there is no universal rule of law that an accused who causes no injury to the deceased cannot be burdened with vicarious liability at the bail stage. The court clarified that the question of constructive liability depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, and where the material prima facie reveals a shared common intention among armed assailants, vicarious liability is properly attracted, disentitling the accused to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused who has not caused any injury to the deceased can be burdened with common intention under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at the bail stage?
  • Does previous case law lay down a universal rule that a person who causes no injury to the deceased is entitled to bail?
  • Can courts examine the question of constructive liability on the basis of available material at the time of considering bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Munawar Hussain and Another vs Rehmat Ali1981 SCMR 971 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-23
  evictiondispossessionexecution proceedingsrent restrictiondiscretionary jurisdictionjudgment-debtorindependent possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from an eviction proceeding initiated by a landlord against a tenant, Sh. Noor Hussain, under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. Following the eviction order, the petitioners, who are the nephew and son of the original tenant, filed an application to prevent their dispossession, claiming independent possession of the premises. The Rent Controller and the High Court dismissed their application, with the High Court ruling that an application under Order XXI, Rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is not maintainable by a person who has not yet been dispossessed. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court declined to examine the legal correctness of the High Court's interpretation of Rule 100. Instead, the Court held that the petitioners failed to establish any independent right to possession, noting they were merely attempting to evade an eviction order against their relative. Consequently, the Court refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 185 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, dismissing the petition on the grounds that the petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of independent tenancy.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application under Order XXI, Rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable by a person who has not yet been dispossessed of immovable property?
  • Does the Supreme Court have an obligation to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 185 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 when a petitioner fails to substantiate their claim of independent possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhamniad Khan vs The State1981 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-05
  criminal appealmurdercommon intentioninterested witnesscorroborationstatement to policeinvestigating officeracquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, wherein the appellant Muhammad Khan challenged his conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as maintained by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the conviction of the sole remaining appellant could be sustained upon the solitary statement of an interested witness, corroborated by an inadmissible statement made by the accused to an investigating officer during the course of investigation. The Supreme Court held that the statement made by the accused to the police sub-inspector during investigation was inadmissible in evidence under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (referred to in the text as Section 16 of the Cr. P. C.), and that the accused's statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 did not amount to an admission or corroboration. The Court established the principle that statements made to an investigating officer by an accused are barred from being used as corroborative evidence, leading to the setting aside of the conviction and the acquittal of the appellant due to lack of independent corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Is a statement made by an accused person to an investigating officer during the course of investigation admissible in evidence as corroboration?
  • Can the conviction for murder be sustained on the solitary testimony of an interested witness without independent corroboration?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a vague statement made by an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding statements made to police?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yusuf Shah vs Pakistan International Airlines1981 PLD Supreme Court 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  master and servantwrongful dismissaldeclaratory suitstatutory corporationservice code
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellant's suit challenging his dismissal from service as a Security Guard by the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation. The core legal question was whether an employee of a statutory corporate body can maintain a civil suit for a declaration that his dismissal was illegal, in the absence of statutory rules governing his service. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of formal statutory rules or regulations—since the Pakistan International Airlines Service Code constitutes mere internal administrative instructions rather than statutory rules—the relationship between the corporation and its employee is governed by the ordinary law of master and servant. Consequently, a declaratory suit to challenge termination of service is not maintainable. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil suit for a declaration of illegal dismissal is maintainable by an employee of a corporate body governed by the master and servant rule?
  • Do the internal administrative instructions or service codes of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation have the status of statutory rules?
  • Whether the termination of service of a corporate employee without statutory rules can be challenged through a declaratory suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yunus vs The State1981 SCMR 422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-22
  murdersentence reductionfamily honorretrospective punishmenttransportation for lifecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that reduced the death sentence of the respondent, Karam Khan, to imprisonment for life following his conviction for the murder of Abdul Rahman. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in reducing the sentence and whether the sentence of 'imprisonment for life' was legally applicable given the date of the offense. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court's reasoning regarding the nature of the injuries was flawed, the reduction of the sentence was justified because the motive involved the accused's family honor regarding his wife, a factor consistently recognized by the Court as warranting a lesser penalty than death. Furthermore, the Court held that because the offense occurred before the enforcement of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, the sentence of 'imprisonment for life' was impermissible under the principle against retrospective punishment. Consequently, the Court altered the sentence to 'transportation for life,' which, under the unamended law, was equivalent to twenty years, ensuring compliance with Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Is a sentence of imprisonment for life applicable to an offense committed before the enforcement of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
  • Does the principle of family honor regarding female relatives justify a lesser penalty than death in murder cases?
  • Can a court impose a penalty greater than that prescribed by law at the time the offense was committed?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf vs Muzaffar Ali1981 SCMR 105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-29
  ejectmentnon-payment of rentprovisional transfer ordersettlement authoritiesdemarcation of propertyadverse possessionstatutory tenancyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an ejectment proceeding initiated by the respondent landlord against the petitioner tenant for non-payment of rent of a disputed room in Faisalabad. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, which was upheld by the Additional District Judge and subsequently by the High Court in second appeal. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the landlord's title as transferee under a somewhat vague Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) could be established by referring to underlying transfer orders of the Settlement Authorities, and whether the tenant could set up a plea of adverse possession or deny the tenancy. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Rent Controller and appellate courts were fully justified in looking to the specific orders of the Settlement Commissioner to clarify the property transferred, and that the tenant's possession prior to statutory notice was under the Settlement Department rather than adverse. The key principle laid down is that where a transfer order issued by settlement authorities is general or vague, the actual property transferred can be ascertained and given effect to by referring to the specific foundational orders of the Settlement Authorities, and a tenant cannot defeat an ejectment action by raising a belated plea of adverse possession against a statutory landlord.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Rent Controller can refer to the underlying orders of the Settlement Authorities to identify property when a Provisional Transfer Order contains a vague description?
  • Does a tenant's possession prior to the issuance of a statutory eviction notice constitute adverse possession against a transferee landlord?
  • Can a tenant challenge the transfer orders of the Settlement Authorities in rent proceedings after failing to overturn them before the settlement authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younus vs Ismail and Another1981 SCMR 1216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-25
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirybail cancellationjuvenile age determinationculpable homicide
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an order passed by the Sind High Court releasing respondent No. 2 on bail. The High Court granted bail on the ground that the case required further inquiry as to whether the offence fell under Exception 1 of Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 or Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and also concerning the exact age of the respondent based on conflicting medical evidence and a birth certificate. The core legal question was whether the discretion exercised by the High Court in granting post-arrest bail on these grounds was proper. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the grounds cited by the High Court indeed presented a case of further inquiry under the law, and the discretion to grant bail was properly exercised. The Supreme Court established the principle that where the applicability of a penal provision or the determination of age requires further inquiry, the grant of bail by the High Court constitutes a proper exercise of discretion which will not be interfered with. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the determination of whether an offence falls under Exception 1 of Section 300 or Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 constitutes a ground for further inquiry warranting bail?
  • Whether conflicting evidence regarding the age of an accused person justifies the grant of post-arrest bail for further inquiry?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion exercised by a High Court in granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younus vs Akhtar Hussain and Other1981 SCMR 1049 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-28
  adverse possessionpermanent injunctionjudicial admissionejectment proceedingsmaintainability of suitleave to appealtenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the respondents from interfering with his possession of a shop, claiming title through adverse possession. The trial court dismissed the suit, noting the petitioner had previously admitted to being a tenant of the respondents' predecessor-in-interest in earlier ejectment proceedings. The appellate court and the Lahore High Court affirmed this dismissal, further holding that a suit for permanent injunction under the Specific Relief Act 1877 was not maintainable without a prayer for a declaration of ownership. Upon seeking special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the petitioner was bound by his own judicial admission of tenancy. The Court held that the suit was a frivolous attempt to thwart ejectment proceedings and that the petitioner could not simultaneously claim tenancy and adverse possession. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine, and the interim order previously granted was vacated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who has admitted to being a tenant in prior ejectment proceedings subsequently maintain a suit claiming title by adverse possession?
  • Is a suit for permanent injunction maintainable under the Specific Relief Act 1877 without a prayer for a declaration of ownership where title is disputed?
  • Does a judicial admission of tenancy preclude a claim of adverse possession over the same property?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younus and 2 Others vs Muhammad Younus Khan Etc.S1981 SCMR 899 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1950-03-08
  evacuee propertysettlement lawsrepeal of lawspending proceedingsindustrial concernjurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the orders of the Settlement authorities. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners sought the transfer of disputed land as an unregistered industrial concern (a brick kiln), claiming possession since 1951. However, the land had been transferred to the respondents as agricultural land. The predecessor-in-interest initiated proceedings by making a reference to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner on June 13, 1975, after the repeal of the evacuee laws. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities had jurisdiction to entertain the reference and subsequent revision petition after the repeal of the relevant settlement laws. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that under Section 2 of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974, only proceedings pending immediately before July 1, 1974, were saved. Since the petitioner failed to prove that any transfer proceedings were pending on the target date, the fresh reference initiated in 1975 was incompetent, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Settlement authorities have the jurisdiction to entertain fresh applications or references filed after the repeal of the evacuee laws under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance 1974?
  • What is the effect of the target date of July 1, 1974, specified in the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance 1974 on proceedings initiated after that date?
  • Can a revision petition be maintained before Settlement authorities after the repeal of the relevant settlement laws if no proceedings were pending on the statutory cutoff date?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasin vs Punjab Administrative Tribunal, Lahore1981 SCMR 122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-23
  service lawcompulsory retirementdisciplinary authorityBasic Kanungoadministrative tribunaldelegation of powersstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the dismissal of a service appeal by the Punjab Administrative Tribunal concerning the compulsory retirement of a Basic Kanungo. The core legal question was whether the Collector, Muzaffargarh, possessed the jurisdiction to order the appellant's compulsory retirement, or whether such authority resided exclusively with the Director of Land Records, given the appellant's status as a candidate on the Director's list. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Collector was the competent authority to impose the penalty. The Court established that the West Pakistan Kanungo Service (Northern Zone) Rules, 1964 and the Board of Revenue Delegation of Powers Rules, 1958 effectively superseded the earlier Punjab Kanungos Service Rules, 1945 and the Land Records Manual. Consequently, the Collector, as the appointing authority, held the power to impose disciplinary penalties, including compulsory retirement. The Court further clarified that administrative circulars issued under the now-redundant provisions of the 1945 Rules could not override the prevailing statutory delegation of powers, thereby affirming the Collector's disciplinary jurisdiction over the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Collector have the jurisdiction to order the compulsory retirement of a Basic Kanungo?
  • Do the West Pakistan Kanungo Service (Northern Zone) Rules, 1964, supersede the Punjab Kanungos Service Rules, 1945, regarding disciplinary authority?
  • Can administrative circulars issued under repealed rules override the Board of Revenue Delegation of Powers Rules, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yar Alias Yara vs The State1981 SCMR 567 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-08
  murderextra-judicial confessioncircumstantial evidencehostile witnessappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction for murder. The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Court for the murder of his wife, Mst. Bivi, based on circumstantial evidence and an extra-judicial confession made to his mother-in-law, Mst. Jallan. The Lahore High Court upheld the conviction but erroneously rejected the extra-judicial confession on the ground that the witness did not inform her father first. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the guilt was proven. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the High Court's rejection of the extra-judicial confession unjustified, noting the witness was truthful and uncontradicted. Furthermore, the Court relied on the testimony of a witness who heard the appellant's voice at the scene during the time of the murder, corroborated by medical evidence regarding the cause of death (lathi blows). The Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the recoveries of incriminating items and that the appellant failed to explain his presence at the scene. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction based on the totality of circumstantial evidence and the credible extra-judicial confession.

  Questions settled

  • Can an extra-judicial confession be rejected solely because the witness did not inform a specific family member first?
  • Is the testimony of a witness who has turned hostile admissible to implicate an accused?
  • Does the failure of an accused to explain their whereabouts at the time of a crime, when placed at the scene by evidence, support a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob vs Feroze Din and 3 Other1981 SCMR 760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-15
  dismissal for defaultwrit petitionrestoration applicationabsence of counselremandstatus quoadjudication on merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, who had dismissed the petitioner's writ petition both for default of appearance and on merits. The core legal question concerned the propriety of a court deciding a case on its merits when the petitioner and their counsel were absent, rather than restricting the order to a dismissal for default. Upon hearing arguments, the Supreme Court observed that the proper course of action in cases of default is to address the restoration of the petition rather than adjudicating the merits in the absence of the party. Consequently, the Supreme Court, by consent of the parties, set aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that the petitioner must file a restoration application in the High Court, and the writ petition should only be decided on its merits if the restoration application is allowed. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the High Court for this purpose, granting a temporary status quo order to facilitate the filing of the restoration application.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court dismiss a writ petition on merits when the petitioner is absent and the dismissal is based on default?
  • Is it appropriate for a court to decide a case on merits after dismissing it for default due to the absence of the petitioner?
  • What is the correct procedure when a writ petition is dismissed for default of appearance?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob Etc. vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Land)1981 SCMR 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-07
  review petitionconsent ordercounsel consentnew plea in reviewSupreme Court review jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking review of its previous order dated 1st June 1978, whereby Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 222 of 1978 was dismissed. The original petition was dismissed on the primary ground that the underlying High Court order was a consent order, disentitling the petitioners from reopening the matter. The petitioners sought review on the contention that they had not consented to the arrangement proposed by their counsel during the writ petition hearing in the High Court and therefore should not be bound by the consent order. The Supreme Court observed that this specific contention had neither been raised before the High Court nor before the Supreme Court during the hearing of the main petition. Consequently, the Court held that raising a new plea regarding lack of consent for the first time in review proceedings provides no valid justification for reviewing a previous order. The review petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be entertained on grounds and pleas that were never raised before the High Court or the Supreme Court during the main proceedings?
  • Whether a client can challenge a consent order in review on the ground that counsel lacked consent when such objection was not raised earlier?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob and Another vs Sadiq and 4 Other1981 SCMR 947 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-19
  Rehabilitation Settlement Schemestatutory refugeesriverine landevacuee propertyland allotmentsurrender of rightsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves civil petitions for special leave to appeal arising from concurrent orders of the settlement authorities and the Lahore High Court concerning land allotments made under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The core legal question was whether inhabitants of a riverine village, who were treated as statutory refugees and allotted alternative land after their village was inundated and who surrendered their original land to the Government, could subsequently be compelled to return to their original village when it re-appeared due to a shift in the river's course. The Supreme Court held that once displaced persons are permanently settled on alternative evacuee property and have surrendered their original proprietary rights to the Government, they cannot be forced to return to their original lands upon re-appearance, as asking them to do so is unrealistic and uncalled for. The key principle laid down is that statutory refugees settled under paragraph 27 of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme retain their permanent allotments and cannot be displaced merely due to the subsequent re-emergence of their original riverine lands after they have surrendered their title.

  Questions settled

  • Whether statutory refugees settled on alternative land under paragraph 27 of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme can be forced to return to their original land when it re-appears due to a change in the river's course?
  • Does a previous dismissal of a writ petition for want of jurisdiction constitute a bar on merits regarding entitlement to land allotments?
  • What is the effect of surrendering proprietary rights in original riverine land in favour of the Government under the land settlement laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Umar vs Mst. Aiysha Aziz1981 SC MR 276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-12
  evictiontentative rentdefault in rentstriking off defenceex parte orderservice of noticesupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of eviction proceedings initiated by the respondent-landlord against the appellant-tenant in Karachi. The Rent Controller ordered the deposit of tentative rent, which the appellant failed to deposit within the stipulated time, causing a delay of three days. The Rent Controller struck off the appellant's defence and ordered eviction, rejecting the appellant's plea of illness since he ran a hotel and could have arranged for the deposit through employees. Although the Additional District Judge set aside this order, the High Court allowed the landlord's appeal ex parte and subsequently dismissed the tenant's restoration application, finding proper service and rejecting the tenant's false plea regarding postal delivery dates. Upon a petition for leave, the Supreme Court evaluated the sufficiency of notice and the merits of the default. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to justify the delay in depositing the rent and that his plea of personal illness was inadequate given that he operated a business establishment. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, with a four-month grace period granted to hand over vacant possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether personal illness of a tenant operating a business constitutes sufficient ground to excuse a delay in depositing tentative rent?
  • Whether an ex parte order of the High Court should be set aside when the appellant's plea regarding delayed postal notice is found to be false?
  • Does a tenant running a commercial establishment bear the burden of ensuring timely rent deposit through employees if the tenant falls ill?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tufail vs Rashid Hussain Farooqui and Other1981 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-11
  evictiontentative rentstriking off defencerent controllerdefault in rentsecond appealplea of hardship
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a second appeal by the Sind High Court, which upheld the striking off of the petitioner's defence in an eviction proceeding. The core legal question concerns the legality of striking off a tenant's defence for repeated failure to deposit tentative rent as ordered by the Rent Controller, and whether a plea of mental illness or mere hardship excuses such defaults. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly rejected the petitioner's technical pleas and unsubstantiated defense of mental illness, noting that the defaults occurred prior to the alleged onset of the ailment, and that mere hardship does not warrant interference with lawful eviction orders. The ratio decidendi is that persistent failure to comply with tentative rent orders justifies striking off a tenant's defence, and pleas of hardship or unproven medical conditions cannot overturn concurrent findings of rent defaults. The Court dismissed the petition while granting a four-month grace period to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether persistent failure to comply with an order for the deposit of tentative rent justifies striking off a tenant's defence?
  • Does a plea of hardship constitute a valid ground for interfering with an eviction order?
  • Whether an unproven claim of mental illness excuses defaults in the payment of tentative rent?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tufail vs Kh. Muhammad Sadiq1981 SCMR 161 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-14
  ejectmentpersonal usereconstructiontenantspecial leave to appealconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by a tenant against concurrent orders of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller, the District Judge, and the High Court, directing the eviction of the petitioner from the shop in dispute on the ground of personal bona fide need of the landlord for reconstruction. The core legal question was whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the landlord's personal need for reconstruction warranted interference by the Supreme Court under special leave jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the case was concluded by concurrent findings of fact supported by cogent reasons and that arguments pertaining merely to the appreciation of evidence do not constitute grounds for granting special leave. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not disturb concurrent findings of fact on the question of personal need for reconstruction where the lower forums have properly appreciated the evidence and no principle of law has been violated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's personal need for reconstruction can be challenged in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Does an argument pertaining merely to the appreciation of evidence constitute a sufficient ground for granting special leave to appeal in an ejectment matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tufail and Others vs Muhammad Anwar Khan and Other1981 SCMR 421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-10
  agricultural landallotment cancellationfrauddisplaced personsregistered sale deedrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute regarding the cancellation of an allotment of agricultural land measuring 62 kanals 6 marlas situated in village Nandhir, District Gujranwala, which was originally allotted to respondent No. 3 and subsequently sold to the appellants via a registered sale deed. The core legal question concerns whether a statement made by the allottee in connection with a separate allotment in another village could lawfully be utilized to cancel the allotment of the disputed land on the grounds of fraud. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the cancellation of the allotment by the Deputy Commissioner exercising powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner was unjustified and not maintainable based on extraneous statements. The Court laid down the principle that an allotment of land cannot be cancelled based on statements made in entirely separate proceedings concerning different properties without proper independent proof of fraud specific to the land in question.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a statement made by an allottee in connection with an allotment in one village can be utilized to cancel an allotment of land in another village?
  • Can the High Court in revisional jurisdiction interfere with a finding of fraud recorded by a Settlement authority?
  • Under what circumstances can an allotment made under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act be cancelled?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Talib and Others vs Member (R.), Board of Revenue and Other1981 SCMR 908 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-04
  inheritance mutationlimitationtime-barred appealwrit jurisdictionrehabilitation schemeconcurrent findingscollaterals
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed their writ petition regarding the inheritance mutation of land previously allotted to Mst. Nathi. The petitioners, claiming to be collaterals, had initially challenged the mutation before Revenue authorities, but their appeal was dismissed as time-barred. They subsequently challenged this dismissal through revisions and a writ petition, arguing that the mutation should have been handled under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme rather than the Punjab Land Revenue Act. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were debarred from challenging the orders because they had initiated the proceedings themselves and failed to challenge the Collector's finding on limitation in their writ petition. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the question of whether sufficient cause existed for condoning the delay in filing an appeal was a question of fact within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue authorities. Consequently, the Court ruled that the petitioners could not re-agitate objections that were or could have been raised in the time-barred appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge an order in a writ petition if they failed to challenge the finding of limitation on which that order was based?
  • Is the question of whether sufficient cause exists for condoning delay in filing an appeal a question of fact within the exclusive jurisdiction of Revenue authorities?
  • Are parties who initiate proceedings before a forum debarred from challenging the jurisdiction of that forum in subsequent writ proceedings?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by Revenue authorities regarding the limitation of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Taj vs The State1981SCMR 1090 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-16
  post-arrest bailculpable homiciderash and negligent actmurderpretrial detentionjurisdiction of trial court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail to an accused charged under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, while in police custody for a separate arms offence, allegedly pushed a Head Constable into a well while attempting to escape, resulting in the officer's death. The petitioner argued that the act constituted a rash and negligent act under Section 304-A rather than murder, and sought bail due to the duration of his incarceration. The Supreme Court declined to determine the nature of the offence at the pre-trial stage, holding that doing so would usurp the trial court's jurisdiction. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision to deny bail, noting the petitioner's direct responsibility for the fatal injuries and the circumstances of the incident, which occurred while the petitioner was in custody for another offence. The Court also declined to consider the argument regarding trial delay as it had not been raised before the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court determine the specific nature of an offence at the bail stage without usurping the jurisdiction of the trial court?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the incident resulting in death occurred while the accused was in police custody for another offence?
  • Should an appellate court consider arguments regarding trial delay that were not raised before the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique vs Syed Muhammad Shakir1981 SCMR 1166, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-31
  evictiondefault in rentlandlord and tenantspecial leave to appealurban rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a second appeal by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the tenant's eviction. The core legal question was whether an erroneous reference by the Rent Controller to subsection (6) of Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959—despite the absence of a prior order directing the deposit of rent—vitiated the eviction order where the tenant was admittedly a chronic defaulter in paying rent. The Supreme Court held that the mistaken reference to the provision did not invalidate the eviction order, as the tenant was undeniably a defaulter without just cause and the courts below correctly found that eviction was warranted due to overall default. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that a technical or erroneous reference to a statutory subsection in an eviction order does not vitiate the order where the substantive ground of default is fully established and doing so would cause no injustice.

  Questions settled

  • Does an erroneous reference to subsection (6) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 vitiate an eviction order where no prior deposit order was made but default in rent is admitted?
  • Whether a chronic defaulter who denies the relationship of landlord and tenant can successfully challenge an eviction order on technical grounds of misquoted statutory provisions?
  • Is special leave to appeal warranted against concurrent findings of lower forums ordering eviction of a tenant who admittedly failed to pay rent?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddiq and Another vs Mst. Mumtaz Begum and Other1981 SCMR 842 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-07-29
  pre-emptioncompromise decreeexecution of decreerectification of decreelimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning a compromise decree passed in pre-emption suits, which stipulated that respondents were allowed one year to execute the decree upon payment of a specified sum, failing which the decree would stand cancelled and the rival pre-emptors' suit would stand decreed. The core legal question revolves around whether the stipulated one-year period for execution commenced when the original incorrect decree was passed or when it was subsequently rectified by the trial court to reflect the correct land area. The Supreme Court held that the agreed period of one year could not start running until an executable decree came into existence following its rectification. The Court affirmed the principle that time for execution under a conditional compromise decree does not run against a decree-holder while the decree remains unexecutable due to an erroneous decree-sheet requiring correction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period stipulated in a compromise decree for taking possession starts from the date of the original decree or from the date when an erroneous decree-sheet is rectified?
  • Does a compromise decree remain inexecutable until clerical or descriptive errors in the decree-sheet are corrected by the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs The Settlement Commissioner, Sargodha and 81981 SCMR 886 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-20
  displaced personscompensation and rehabilitationassociation agreementtransfer of propertysettlement commissionerwrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed a writ petition regarding the disposal of a property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question involved the validity and precedence of competing association agreements entered into with the original transferee of a disputed shop and house. The Supreme Court held that the prior association agreement entered into by respondent Muhammad Ibrahim remained valid notwithstanding the temporary cancellation of the primary transfer order, as the transfer was subsequently restored through ongoing proceedings within the same departmental hierarchy, and payments had been duly adjusted from his compensation book. The Court further affirmed that association agreements executed after the original transferee's entitlement was determined but before the formal transfer order were permissible under the instructions of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the cancellation of a primary property transfer annuls a prior association agreement entered into by the transferee?
  • Can an association agreement be legally executed after a person's entitlement to a property is determined but before the formal transfer order is passed?
  • Whether an associate's failure to independently challenge the cancellation of a transfer invalidates their claim under an association agreement?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Muhammad Younas and 2 Other1981 SCMR 548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-09
  evacuee propertyPermanent Transfer Deedauction salewaiver of claimSettlement Scheme No. VIIIadministrative jurisdictionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the transfer of evacuee property to the respondent, arguing that the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) in his favor precluded the reopening of the case by the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The petitioner further contended that the respondent's appeal was time-barred and that the auction sale, once confirmed, could not be set aside. The Supreme Court observed that during the appellate proceedings, the petitioner had explicitly abandoned his claim to the property, requesting the cancellation of the auction and a refund of the purchase price. Furthermore, the Court noted that the respondent's application under Settlement Scheme No. VIII was pending at the time the P.T.D. was erroneously issued to the petitioner, rendering the transfer legally flawed under the governing rules. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner, having waived his rights and failed to challenge the subsequent administrative findings, could not maintain his writ petition. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision to uphold the transfer of the property to the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who has explicitly requested the cancellation of an auction and the refund of the auction price later challenge the transfer of that property to another claimant?
  • Does the pendency of a claim form under Settlement Scheme No. VIII preclude the valid issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed to another party?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against an order where the petitioner has previously abandoned their interest in the subject matter during administrative proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue and 2 Other1981 SCMR 638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-09
  land leaserevenue recordsforgerywrit jurisdictionfindings of factKhasra GirdawariJamabandicultivator status
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the cancellation of a land lease granted to the petitioner under a fifteen-year lease scheme. The core legal question was whether the Revenue Authorities' finding of fact—that the petitioner was not an actual cultivator and had manipulated revenue records to secure the lease—could be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. The Collector had cancelled the lease upon finding the petitioner was a Chaukidar, not a cultivator, and that the Khasra Girdawari entries were forged. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact regarding the forgery and the petitioner's status. The Court affirmed that findings of fact by Revenue Authorities, especially when supported by the original record, are generally beyond the scope of writ jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court established that the presumption of correctness attached to a Jamabandi entry is rebutted when evidence demonstrates that the underlying Khasra Girdawari entries were forged, and no premium can be granted to a beneficiary of forgery.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with a finding of fact made by Revenue Authorities regarding the forgery of revenue records in a writ petition?
  • Does the presumption of correctness attached to a Jamabandi entry persist when the underlying Khasra Girdawari entries are proven to be forged?
  • Is a person who is not an actual cultivator entitled to a lease under a scheme specifically reserved for genuine cultivators?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Deputy Commissioner, Bahawalnagar1981 SCMR 1158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-21
  service appeallimitationcompulsory retirementabatement of suitspecial leave to appeallack of diligence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal dismissing a service appeal as time-barred. The petitioner, a Patwari who had been compulsorily retired from service by the Deputy Commissioner, initially challenged the dismissal order in a civil suit, which abated pursuant to Section 8 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act. Following abatement, he sought copies of relevant orders to file an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal. When the appeal was ultimately filed on 6-2-1975, the Service Tribunal held that it was barred by limitation because the petitioner failed to demonstrate diligence or provide documentary evidence of efforts made during a 38-day period prior to filing. The Supreme Court evaluated the Tribunal's decision and held that no fault could be found with the finding regarding lack of diligence. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal, affirming the rejection of the time-barred appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a lack of documentary evidence showing diligent efforts to procure necessary copies justify the dismissal of a service appeal as barred by limitation?
  • Can a service appeal filed past the statutory period of limitation be condoned without a sufficient explanation for delay after the abatement of a civil suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and Others vs Settlement Commissioner, Bahawalpur and Other1981 SCMR 1048 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-21
  produce index unitswrit petitionres judicatasettlement commissionercancellation of unitsreview petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the dismissal of successive writ petitions concerning the adjustment and cancellation of Produce Index Units under settlement laws. The core legal question is whether a second writ petition seeking the same relief on the basis of a subsequent report is maintainable after the dismissal of an earlier writ petition and review application on the same allegations, and whether it is barred by the principle of res judicata. The Supreme Court held that the second writ petition was rightly dismissed by the High Court as it was barred by the rule of res judicata and lacked merit. The key principle laid down is that a subsequent writ petition seeking identical relief based on grounds available or arising from the same controversy is barred by res judicata once an earlier petition and review challenging the core administrative order have been dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second writ petition on the same allegations is barred by the rule of res judicata after the dismissal of an earlier writ petition?
  • Does a subsequent report regarding entitlement constitute a fresh ground sufficient to overcome the bar of res judicata in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and Another vs The State1981 SCMR 512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-02-20
  murder convictiondeath sentenceeyewitness testimonycorroborative evidenceleave to appealcriminal liabilitycommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against the conviction and death sentence of the petitioners, Muhammad Sharif alias Billa and Muhammad Sharif alias Channa, for the murder of Muhammad Sharif alias Pahara under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court regarding the petitioners' guilt were supported by sufficient evidence, particularly concerning the credibility of eyewitness testimony and the corroborative value of weapon recoveries. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts correctly appraised the evidence. The Court found the eyewitness accounts trustworthy, noting they were corroborated by the recovery of a pistol matching the bullet extracted from the deceased and a blood-stained knife. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the occurrence in a busy street during daylight and the high number of injuries sustained by the deceased effectively eliminated any possibility of mistaken identity. The conviction and sentence were upheld as the findings were based on solid, corroborated evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of a weapon matching a bullet extracted from a deceased victim provide sufficient corroboration for eyewitness testimony?
  • Can the occurrence of a crime in a busy street during daylight hours eliminate the possibility of mistaken identity?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when eyewitness accounts are corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of incriminating weapons?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and Another vs Muhammad Afzal Sohail Etc.1981 PLD Supreme Court 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-01
  constitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionrent restrictionejectmentpersonal useappellate jurisdictionsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition filed by tenants against an appellate order for their ejectment. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, should re-evaluate evidence in rent matters where the legislature has abolished the right of second appeal, and whether a landlord operating a business in a residential area is precluded from claiming personal use of a shop. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction is limited and cannot be invoked merely to re-examine findings of fact or to act as an appellate court. The Court affirmed that a landlord’s operation of a business in a residential area does not disprove the bona fide requirement for a shop. The key principle laid down is that constitutional jurisdiction is not designed to correct decisions merely because they are perceived as wrong; it is restricted to ensuring that inferior tribunals do not flout statutory provisions or established law, and it should not be used to circumvent legislative intent regarding the finality of rent orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction empower it to re-evaluate evidence in rent cases as if it were a second appeal?
  • Can a landlord who operates a business in a residential area claim a shop for personal use under the rent laws?
  • Is a tribunal's decision subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction merely because the decision is perceived as wrong?
  • Does the abolition of second appeal in rent matters permit the filing of writ petitions to challenge final appellate orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and Another vs District Judge, Sahiwal and Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 571 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-05
  dower decreeFamily Court jurisdictionconstitutional petitionabandonment of issuehandwriting expertspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition against a dower decree passed by a Family Court. The core legal questions involved the jurisdiction of the Family Court over a surety, the alleged misreading of evidence regarding the Kabeen Nama without a handwriting expert, and the applicability of the Evidence Act versus Rules of Muslim Law. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that objections regarding the surety's liability were abandoned at the trial stage and not raised before the appellate or high courts, that findings on evidence and handwriting do not warrant interference in constitutional jurisdiction, and that a party cannot adopt a course of action at trial and later challenge it. The key principle laid down is that points not raised or expressly given up at trial, and omitted before lower appellate forums, cannot be urged before the Supreme Court in a constitutional challenge.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise an objection regarding the liability of a surety before the Supreme Court when the issue was given up at the trial stage?
  • Whether the High Court's refusal to interfere with a Family Court's appreciation of evidence regarding a Kabeen Nama warrants interference under constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can a party challenge the procedure or rules of evidence adopted by a Family Court when they willingly participated and led evidence without objection during the trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahbaz Cheema vs Province of Punjab Etc.S Province of Punjab Etc.S Anwar Sipra, Advocate Instructed By S. Inayat Hussain Advocate On Record1981 SCMR 469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-21
  ad hoc appointmenttermination of servicePunjab Civil Servants ActMartial Law Instruction No. 21Services Tribunalvested right
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of civil petitions for special leave to appeal filed by ad hoc Sub-Engineers of the Punjab Irrigation Department whose services were terminated following scrutiny under Martial Law Instruction No. 21. The core legal questions involved whether ad hoc appointees acquired a vested right to continue in service, whether the inclusion of a military officer in the Selection Committee vitiated the proceedings, and whether regular recruitment could be initiated while ad hoc employees held the posts. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that ad hoc appointments are stopgap arrangements liable to termination without notice or assigning cause under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, upon the availability of regularly recruited candidates. The Court ruled that the petitioners had no vested right to regular retention, that the termination orders were competently made by the Superintending Engineer, and that the department was under a legal obligation to pursue regular recruitment. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed and the Punjab Services Tribunal's decision upholding the termination was affirmed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ad hoc civil servant has a vested legal right to continue in service or resist regular recruitment?
  • Can the services of an ad hoc appointee be terminated without notice or assigning reasons under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
  • Does the inclusion of a military officer in a scrutiny committee vitiate a termination order lawfully passed by the competent civilian authority?
  • Is a government department barred from initiating regular recruitment while ad hoc employees are still holding the posts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shah and Others vs Hayat Khan and Other1981 SCMR 1045 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-14
  occupancy tenancyadverse possessionjurisdiction of civil courtcolonization of government landsspecial leave to appealbenamidarres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioners' second appeal by the High Court, which had affirmed the concurrent judgments of the lower courts dismissing the petitioners' suit for a declaration of occupancy tenancy rights over government-allotted land by way of adverse possession. The core legal question was whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit seeking a declaration of occupancy tenancy under the government based on adverse possession, and whether the petitioners could relitigate claims previously rejected in earlier rounds of litigation. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners could not claim occupancy tenancy under the government by adverse possession and that the suit was barred under section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912, as well as being barred by the principle relating to prior concluded litigation involving the same subject-matter. The key principle laid down is that status as an occupancy tenant under the government cannot be acquired by adverse possession, and civil court jurisdiction is barred in matters where the revenue authorities are empowered to act under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person can claim the status of a government occupancy tenant by adverse possession?
  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit regarding matters which the Collector or revenue authorities are empowered to dispose of under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912?
  • Can a party relitigate a previously decided claim concerning land tenancy rights by merely altering the form of pleadings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafique Ahmad vs The State1981 PLD Supreme Court 472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-11
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonycircumstantial evidencerecovery of weaponstatement under section 164 Cr.P.C.leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which confirmed the petitioner's conviction and sentence of death under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Haji Abdul Rahman. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular and circumstantial evidence, specifically regarding nighttime identification, interested witnesses, and whether a previous statement of a witness under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be treated as substantive evidence when the witness was won over and not examined by the prosecution. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were based on proper appreciation of evidence, including consistent ocular testimony and corroborative recoveries of blood-stained clothing and a weapon at the instance of the accused, and that a prior statement under section 164 Cr.P.C. of a witness who gave conflicting versions cannot be treated as substantive evidence. The court laid down the principle that a witness making contradictory statements at different stages is unworthy of credence, and such evidence must be ruled out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a previous statement of a witness recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be treated as substantive evidence when the witness has been given up as won over?
  • Can a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code be sustained on the basis of related eye-witnesses corroborated by circumstantial evidence of recoveries?
  • How should the testimony of a witness who makes contradictory statements at different stages of the proceedings be viewed by a court of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafiquddin vs Settlement Commissioner and Other1981 SCMR 251 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-11
  evacuee propertyillegal constructionfinality of orderSettlement CommissionerPermanent Transfer Deedpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of an evacuee property in Karachi, specifically regarding a room or shop illegally constructed by the petitioner on the ground floor after partition. The core legal question is whether a claimant whose appeal regarding an unauthorized construction was dismissed by an Additional Settlement Commissioner, which order became final, can subsequently re-agitate their claim based on a later judicial interpretation of the law, and whether transfer documents erroneously issued can override a final administrative adjudication. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner is bound by the final order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner and cannot re-agitate the matter based on subsequent legal developments. The Court laid down the principle that a final and unchallenged order regarding property entitlement attains finality and cannot be reopened due to subsequent changes in judicial interpretation of the law, and that an unauthorized construction subsequently erected cannot form the basis of a valid evacuee property claim contrary to a final binding determination.

  Questions settled

  • Can a claimant re-agitate a property claim based on later judicial interpretations of law after an adverse administrative order has attained finality?
  • Does an erroneously issued Permanent Transfer Deed override a final and binding order rejecting a claim regarding an unauthorized construction?
  • Whether an unauthorized construction erected after partition on evacuee land can be treated as evacuee property?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafi vs The State and Another1981 SCMR 237(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-08
  quashing of proceedingscriminal proceedings and civil suitabuse of process of the courtstay of criminal proceedingsfraud and forgeryconflicting decisions
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, facing prosecution under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for fraud and forgery regarding a shop's power of attorney and sale deed, appealed against the Lahore High Court's refusal to stay criminal proceedings pending the decision of a prior civil suit between the parties. The core legal question was whether simultaneous criminal proceedings and civil litigation involving the same subject matter amount to an abuse of court process and warrant a stay of the criminal trial. The Supreme Court held that while criminal proceedings are not automatically stayed by civil litigation, a stay should be granted where criminal liability depends on or is intimately connected with the civil outcome to prevent conflicting decisions and grave injustice. However, considering the prolonged delay of nearly nine years, the Court directed that while the recording of evidence may proceed, the final criminal judgment must await the conclusion of the civil suit. The appeal was partly accepted on these terms.

  Questions settled

  • Whether criminal proceedings should be stayed pending the disposal of civil litigation connected with the same subject-matter?
  • Does pursuing simultaneous civil and criminal remedies amount to an abuse of the process of the court?
  • What guiding principle should be applied in exercising discretion to stay criminal proceedings during civil litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shabbir and 2 Others vs Haji Ghulam Sabir1981 SCMR 982 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-13
  ejectment petitionrent restrictionlate deposit of rentestoppelstriking off defensetenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three petitions for special leave to appeal against a common judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding an ejectment order against tenants. The tenants failed to deposit rent for July 1974 by the statutory deadline of 15th August 1974, depositing it instead on 7th September 1974. The core legal questions were whether the landlord's previous acceptance of late rent payments created an estoppel preventing him from objecting to the late deposit in 1974, and whether the tenants' belief that summer vacations excused the delay constituted a valid defense. The Supreme Court held that the landlord's prior generosity did not estop him from enforcing the statutory requirement. Furthermore, the Court rejected the tenants' excuse regarding court closures, noting that judicial officers were available during vacations and that the tenants failed to deposit the rent immediately upon the courts' reopening. Consequently, the Court upheld the order striking off the tenants' defense and dismissed the petitions, though it granted a three-month grace period for vacating the premises subject to continued rent payment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's previous acceptance of late rent payments create an estoppel against objecting to subsequent late payments?
  • Can a tenant rely on the closure of civil courts for summer vacations to excuse a failure to deposit rent by the statutory deadline?
  • Is an order striking off the defense of a tenant justified when rent is not deposited within the statutory time limit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Salim Khan Etc. vs Chief Settlment & Rehabilitation1981 SCMR 1240(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-10
  settlement claimland entitlementfinality of decisiontampering of recordreviewCentral Record Officespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court considered a petition for special leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition regarding the determination of land entitlement under settlement laws. The petitioners' verified claim had previously been adjudicated, reviewed, and finalized up to the Supreme Court in earlier proceedings. Subsequently, an additional area of land under another Khewat was cancelled by the Officer on Special Duty upon discovering fraudulent tampering and collusion in the record office. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' subsequent writ petition in limine on grounds of finality and collusion. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the newly claimed Khewat was not examined in the prior round and that the Officer on Special Duty lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that if the petitioners claimed greater entitlement based on newly discovered facts, their remedy was to seek review of the earlier decisions. Absent such review, the earlier decisions attained finality and the question could not be reopened.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party reopen a settlement entitlement that has attained finality up to the Supreme Court without seeking a formal review based on newly discovered facts?
  • Whether the discovery of alleged additional land entitlement under a different Khewat justifies bypassing the finality of earlier settlement adjudications instead of seeking a review?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem and Other vs Begum Musarrat Bashirul Hassan and Another1981 PLD Supreme Court 578 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-31
  ejectmentbona fide personal useconversion of residential buildingUrban Rent Restriction OrdinanceRent Controller permissionlandlord and tenantacquiescence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court arose from an ejectment petition filed by a landlady against her tenant regarding the ground floor of a residential bungalow. The Rent Controller ordered eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for personal use as residence, which was upheld by the Additional District Judge and the High Court. The appellate courts also noted that the tenant had converted the residential building into a commercial non-residential building by installing a printing press without the written permission of the Rent Controller, as mandated by Section 11 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The tenant contended that long-term acquiescence by the landlady barred conversion objections and rendered personal residential use claims incompetent. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under Section 11, a residential building retains its character unless written permission from the Rent Controller is obtained. The Court further ruled that concurrent findings establishing bona fide personal requirement were independently sufficient to sustain the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a residential building retain its residential character if converted to commercial use without the written permission of the Rent Controller under Section 11 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can a landlord's alleged long-term acquiescence to commercial use validate the conversion of a residential building without statutory permission from the Rent Controller?
  • Is a concurrent finding of bona fide requirement for personal use sufficient on its own to sustain an order of ejectment regardless of illegal conversion issues?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq Alias Muhammad Siddiq vs Member (Consolidation), Board of Revenue and 3 Other1981 SCMR 969 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-12
  consolidation of holdingsleave to appealconstitutional petitionadditional evidenceconsentservice of notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition concerning a consolidation of holdings case. The petitioner contended that the High Court erred in finding that the respondents had not consented to consolidation schemes numbered 334, 335, and 336, arguing that the court ignored evidence of consent given by one Bashir Ahmad. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the documents purportedly evidencing this consent were ever presented before the High Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to admit this additional evidence. Furthermore, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court's decision was also predicated on the finding that the respondents were not served in time for their appearance before the Collector, a point the petitioner failed to refute. Finding no merit in the contention that the respondents were consenting parties, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision and dismissed the petition, affirming that appellate courts will not consider evidence not previously placed before the lower forum.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner introduce additional evidence in the Supreme Court that was not presented before the High Court?
  • Does the failure to serve notice on respondents in consolidation proceedings invalidate the claim of consent?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's factual findings regarding consent when the petitioner fails to challenge all grounds of the impugned order?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saadullah Khan vs Postmaster General and Other1981 SCMR 1140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-23
  service tribunal jurisdictioncompulsory retirementcivil servantterms and conditions of servicepublic interest retirementleave to appealservice record review
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant in the Postal Department, sought special leave to appeal against an order of the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his appeal regarding his compulsory retirement. The petitioner was retired under Section 13(ii) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, upon completing 25 years of service qualifying for pension. The Service Tribunal had declined jurisdiction, holding it could not adjudicate the validity of an order retiring a civil servant in the public interest. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that the Tribunal possesses exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to the terms and conditions of service, including the legality of retirement orders. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal, noting that the contentions raised regarding the scope and nature of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, as well as the petitioner's claim of being denied a hearing and the legality of a second review of his service record, required further consideration. The Court ordered the appeal to be heard on the existing record, granting parties liberty to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of an order retiring a civil servant in the public interest?
  • Does the retirement of a civil servant constitute a matter relating to the terms and conditions of service?
  • Can a civil servant be subjected to a second review of their service record for the purpose of compulsory retirement after having already completed the qualifying period of service?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rauf vs Messrs Makran Fisheries Ltd. and Another1981 SCMR 631 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-20
  industrial disputedismissal from serviceshow-cause noticewrit jurisdictionunclean handsnatural justicedomestic enquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a labour dispute where a supervisor was dismissed following allegations of misbehaviour with female staff. The petitioner challenged his dismissal, arguing that he was not served with a second show-cause notice and that his termination was not effected via a valid written order. The Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the domestic enquiry was fair and the misconduct was proven. Regarding the legal questions, the Court held that Standing Order 15(4) of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 does not explicitly mandate a second show-cause notice prior to dismissal. Furthermore, the Court determined that the petitioner’s proven misconduct rendered his appeal to natural justice hollow. Crucially, the Court laid down that the discretionary remedy of a writ petition is unavailable to a party who approaches the court with 'unclean hands.' Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the petitioner’s conduct precluded him from seeking equitable relief, regardless of technical procedural arguments regarding the dismissal process.

  Questions settled

  • Does Standing Order 15(4) of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 mandate a second show-cause notice before the dismissal of a workman?
  • Is a petitioner who has committed serious misconduct entitled to the discretionary remedy of a writ petition?
  • Does a written dismissal order issued after an oral termination satisfy the requirements of Standing Order 12(3) of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
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• Muhammad Ramzan vs Ch. Bashir Ahmad1981 PLD Supreme Court 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-27
  evacuee propertystatutory tenantnotice of transferrepeal of statutetransitory provisionsejectment proceedingsGeneral Clauses Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a writ petition regarding the eviction of a tenant from an evacuee property. The core legal question was whether, following the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, a transferee landlord remains legally obligated to serve a notice under Section 30 of the repealed Act to a statutory tenant before initiating ejectment proceedings. The petitioner argued that such a right to notice was preserved under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, were of a transitory and temporary character designed to manage the immediate post-partition settlement of refugees, rather than creating permanent rights. Consequently, the Court ruled that the obligation to issue notice did not survive the repeal of the Act. The Court affirmed that the protection afforded by Section 30 was not intended to be perpetual, and the landlord's liability to serve notice ceased upon the repeal of the statute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the obligation to serve notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 survive the repeal of the Act?
  • Are the provisions of Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 regarding notice and protection permanent or transitory in nature?
  • Does Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 preserve the right to notice under a repealed statute if the underlying provision was of a temporary character?
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• Muhammad Ramzan and Others vs Province of Punjab and Other1981 SCMR 620 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-20
  waqf propertylimitation actcondonation of delaygood faithremandwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' appeal concerning the acquisition of property under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961. The core legal question revolves around whether the time spent prosecuting a writ petition in the High Court in good faith could be excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act for the purposes of a delayed petition before the District Judge under section 7 of the Waqf Ordinance. The Supreme Court noted that differing opinions had been rendered by the High Court in analogous cases, where similar matters had been remanded for a proper determination of limitation after recording evidence. Upon concession by the respondents, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and remanded the case to the District Judge, Sheikhupura, to frame an issue on limitation and decide the matter independently. The key principle established is that the time spent pursuing a writ petition under a bona fide belief may warrant exclusion under limitation principles, and consistent treatment should be accorded to similarly situated litigants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time spent pursuing a writ petition in the High Court can be excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act when filing a subsequent petition under section 7 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961?
  • Whether an appellate court should adopt a consistent approach in remand matters for similarly situated litigants facing identical questions of limitation?
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• Muhammad Ramzan and 4 Others vs Settlement Authorities and 2 Other1981 SCMR 194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-12
  condonation of delayLetters Patent Appeallimitationdiscretionary jurisdictioncounsel negligence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed a Letters Patent Appeal as time-barred. The petitioners had filed the appeal with significant delay, attributing it to misinformation provided by their counsel's clerk, who allegedly claimed the initial writ petition had been admitted for hearing. The High Court refused to condone the delay, noting the absence of a supporting affidavit from the clerk and the fact that the original writ petition was dismissed in the presence of the petitioners' counsel. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's discretionary refusal to condone the delay was justified. The Court held that the explanation provided was insufficient, particularly given that the counsel was present when the writ petition was originally dismissed. The Court affirmed that misinformation or failure of communication between a counsel, their clerk, and the client does not automatically constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Consequently, the Supreme Court found the High Court's exercise of discretion unexceptionable and dismissed the petition, upholding the principle that procedural negligence by a legal representative does not warrant the condonation of substantial delay.

  Questions settled

  • Whether misinformation provided by a counsel's clerk to a client constitutes sufficient ground for condonation of delay in filing an appeal?
  • Is the refusal of a High Court to condone delay in filing a Letters Patent Appeal subject to interference if the explanation offered is unsubstantiated?
  • Does the presence of a counsel at the time of an order's pronouncement preclude a party from claiming ignorance of that order to justify a delay in filing an appeal?
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• Muhammad Raft Etc. vs Additional Commissioner (Rev.), Sargodha1981 SCMR 1181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-24
  special leave to appealejectment suitjurisdictionlimitation periodrevenue proceedingsautomatic transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition that challenged an order of the Additional Commissioner (Revenue). The Additional Commissioner had allowed a revision application and directed an ejectment suit to be decided afresh according to law. The core legal question concerned the effect of the prescribed limitation period under the Punjab Land Reforms (Procedure for Ejectment Suits) Rules, 1977, where an Assistant Collector decides a case after the maximum period of sixty days. The Supreme Court held that upon the expiry of sixty days, the case automatically stands transferred to the file of the Assistant Commissioner/Collector, rendering any subsequent decision by the Assistant Collector without jurisdiction. The Court affirmed the legal position that the matter is deemed pending before the Assistant Commissioner for fresh adjudication and dismissed the petition in limine.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal effect under the Punjab Land Reforms (Procedure for Ejectment Suits) Rules, 1977, when an Assistant Collector fails to decide an ejectment suit within the maximum period of 60 days?
  • Does an order passed by an Assistant Collector in an ejectment suit after the expiry of the prescribed 60-day period remain with jurisdiction?
  • Whether a revision petition is competent against an ejectment order passed beyond the statutory 60-day period?
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• Muhammad Qasim and 3 Others vs Haji Fazal Shah and Other1981 SCMR 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-06
  evacuee propertyprovisional transfer orderforged compensation booksnew evidencepetition for leave to appealreview
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which allowed writ petitions filed by the first respondent regarding the cancellation of Provisional Transfer Orders (P.T.O.) issued for evacuee shops purchased at a public auction. The core legal questions involve the competency of the Assistant Settlement Commissioner to initiate proceedings for the cancellation of a P.T.O. and whether sufficient evidence existed to prove that the compensation books utilized by the respondent for payment were forged. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that leave cannot be granted on the basis of new material not produced before the High Court, and directed that the proper course for the petitioners, upon acquiring new evidence, is to seek a review of the High Court's judgment. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts will not entertain new documentary evidence for the first time that was not part of the record before the lower court, and parties must seek review before the appropriate forum.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal on the basis of material not placed before the High Court?
  • What is the proper course of action for a party that obtains relevant settlement department records after the dismissal of their writ petition by the High Court?
  • Whether an Assistant Settlement Commissioner is competent to initiate proceedings for the cancellation of a P.T.O.?
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• Muhammad Nawaz vs The State1981 SCMR 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-20
  illegal gratificationcorruptionraidcorroborationprosecution sanctionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against the judgment of the Sindh High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his conviction under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, a public servant, demanded and accepted a bribe through a co-accused, which was recovered during a raid. The petitioner contended that the prosecution failed to prove the first instalment of the bribe as a key witness was not examined, and that the main witness's testimony lacked corroboration. The Supreme Court held that although the first instalment was not proved, the petitioner's presence at the complainant's house at the pre-arranged time and the recovery of arrest warrants against the complainant from his possession provided sufficient corroboration. The Court also declined to entertain a new plea regarding the lack of prosecution sanction as it was not raised before the lower courts. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for bribery be sustained if the payment of an earlier instalment of the bribe is not proved beyond reasonable doubt?
  • What circumstances can serve as sufficient corroboration of an accomplice or interested witness's testimony in a bribery case?
  • Can a plea challenging the validity of prosecution sanction be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not raised in the courts below?
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• Muhammad Nasarullah Khan vs Muhammad Ayaz Khan and Another1981 SCMR 43 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-05
  pre-emptioncourt fee deficiencyconditional decreerejection of plaintprocedural complianceagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a trial court could pass a conditional decree in a pre-emption suit requiring the plaintiff to make up a deficiency in court fees, with the consequence that failure to do so would result in the automatic dismissal of the plaint. The petitioner argued that such a conditional order was improper. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, agreeing that the trial court acted within its authority to pass a conditional order requiring the payment of court fees. The Court affirmed that the failure to make up the deficiency in court fees, despite the deposit of pre-emption money, justified the dismissal of the suit. The judgment reinforces the principle that procedural requirements regarding court fees must be strictly complied with and that trial courts possess the discretion to impose conditional orders to ensure such compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court pass a conditional decree in a pre-emption suit requiring the payment of court fees under penalty of dismissal?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled to an extension of time to make up a deficiency in court fees if no sufficient cause is shown?
  • Does the failure to make up a deficiency in court fees justify the dismissal of a pre-emption suit?
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• Muhammad Nasar vs Muhammad Arshad and Another1981 SCMR 894 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-08
  bail cancellationvicarious liabilitydiscretionary jurisdictioncriminal appealspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's application for the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent, Muhammad Arshad. The respondent was accused of involvement in a murder case registered under Section 302/307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, specifically for allegedly holding the deceased to facilitate the infliction of fatal injuries by co-accused. The core legal question was whether the respondent's alleged vicarious liability warranted the cancellation of his bail. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts exercised their discretionary jurisdiction appropriately in granting bail. The Court found no factual or legal error in the High Court's refusal to cancel the bail, noting that the lower courts had considered the specific circumstances and the nature of the allegations. The petition was dismissed, affirming that the High Court did not violate any legal principles applicable to criminal cases of this nature in maintaining the respondent's release on bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the allegation of holding a deceased person to facilitate an attack by co-accused automatically necessitate the cancellation of bail?
  • Is the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction by lower courts in granting bail subject to interference by the Supreme Court absent a legal or factual error?
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• Muhammad Mustafa and Others vs The State1981 SCMR 1221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-19
  common intentionconstructive liabilitymurderassaultcriminal appealpre-concertSection 34 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased during a dispute over rented premises. The core legal question was whether the appellants shared a common intention with the principal accused, who inflicted the fatal knife wounds, thereby attracting constructive liability under Section 34. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to establish a pre-concert or shared intention to kill. Evidence indicated that the appellants' initial involvement was limited to a scuffle following a heated argument, and the deceased was able to escape their grasp before being fatally attacked by the principal accused alone. The Court held that the act of killing was an independent act of the principal accused, not a product of common intention. Consequently, the Court set aside the murder convictions, altering them to convictions under Section 352/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for assault, and sentenced the appellants to the period of imprisonment already served. The principle laid down is that constructive liability under Section 34 requires proof of an overt act demonstrating pre-concert or active cooperation in the specific offence charged.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime and participation in a preliminary scuffle automatically establish common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can an accused be held constructively liable for murder under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the fatal act was an independent action of the principal offender?
  • Is it necessary to prove an overt act or pre-concert to establish common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Muhammad Latif vs Settlement Commissioner, Sargodha Division, and Other1981 SCMR 1195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-17
  settlement lawtransfer of propertyevacuee propertyres judicatabinding effect of judgmentwrit petitionP.T.D.
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a plot of land adjacent to a house previously transferred to the respondent, Faqir Muhammad. The petitioner, Muhammad Latif, sought to overturn a Settlement Commissioner's order that had dismissed his claim to the plot, arguing that he was not bound by a prior High Court judgment in the respondent's favor because he was not a party to that specific litigation. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Department could legally transfer the plot to the petitioner after a High Court judgment had already declared the plot to be part of the respondent's property. The Supreme Court held that the Department was bound by the High Court's earlier judgment, which had declared the plot to be part of the respondent's house. Consequently, the Department lacked the authority to enter into a subsequent transaction with the petitioner. The Court affirmed that the petitioner could not bypass the binding nature of the High Court's prior adjudication, leading to the dismissal of the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Settlement Department transfer property that has already been declared part of another person's property by a High Court judgment?
  • Is a government department bound by a High Court judgment to which it was a party, even if a third-party claimant was not?
  • Does a subsequent purchaser of property have a valid claim if the property was already subject to a prior judicial determination of ownership?
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• Muhammad Latif vs Mahmijd Ali1981 SCMR 221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-20
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantagreement to sellres judicatarent controllerpreliminary issuepart performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment order against a tenant, where the petitioner challenged the Lahore High Court's dismissal of his second appeal. The core legal questions were whether the Rent Controller erred in refusing to summon the landlord for signature comparison regarding an alleged agreement to sell, and whether the courts improperly relied on evidence from a preliminary issue concerning the landlord-tenant relationship to decide subsequent issues of default and personal need. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's claim of possession under an agreement to sell had already been conclusively decided against him in the preliminary stage, rendering the attempt to re-litigate the issue impermissible. Furthermore, the Court held that there is no legal prohibition against a Rent Controller considering evidence previously recorded in the same proceedings, regardless of whether it pertained to preliminary or subsequent issues. The Court affirmed that once the relationship of landlord and tenant is established, the tenant cannot re-open the controversy by attempting to introduce evidence previously failed to be proved. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant re-litigate the issue of possession under an agreement to sell after a final finding has been made that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists?
  • Is a Rent Controller prohibited from relying on evidence recorded during a preliminary issue when deciding subsequent issues in the same proceedings?
  • Does the doctrine of part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 apply where the possession has already been judicially determined to be that of a tenant?
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