Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Azmat and Others vs The State1981 SCMR 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-16
  murderunlawful assemblycommon objectocular evidencerecovery of weaponsomission in FIRover-implicationbenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction and sentencing of five co-accused (a father and his four sons) under Sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and murderous assault. The High Court had affirmed the convictions of four appellants while converting the fifth appellant Azmat's death sentence to life imprisonment due to doubts over who inflicted knife injuries. The Supreme Court evaluated whether the convictions of the appellants were sustainable based on ocular evidence, medical testimony, recovery of unlicensed firearms matched with crime empties, and omissions in the First Information Report (F.I.R.). The Court dismissed the appeal regarding the four appellants whose firearms matched the recovery evidence and ocular testimony. However, regarding appellant Azmat, the Court held that significant omissions in the F.I.R., lack of reliable blood-stained recovery evidence, and the potential tendency to over-implicate all male family members created reasonable doubt as to his presence at the scene. The Court acquitted Azmat while maintaining the convictions of the remaining four appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Does an omission to attribute a specific weapon or act to an accused in the First Information Report create reasonable doubt requiring acquittal?
  • Can a recovery of a weapon stained with disintegrated blood whose human origin cannot be determined serve as corroborative evidence of guilt?
  • Whether the possibility of over-implication of all male family members creates reasonable doubt as to the presence of a specific accused at the crime scene?
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• Azizul Hassan vs Sind Agricultural University and Another1981 SCMR 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-11
  pay revisioncivil serviceswrit petitionlachesdepartmental instructionsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Sind High Court dated 31-8-1980, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition regarding a pay dispute concerning his position as a Field Assistant. The core legal question involved whether the petitioner's claim for a specific pay scale was supported by the applicable rules and departmental letters. The Supreme Court held that the petition was without merit as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the post and pay scale of Field Assistant were covered under the relevant pay revision rules or that the departmental letters relied upon were in accordance with those rules. The Court laid down the principle that departmental letters and administrative instructions cannot override or assist a claimant unless shown to be strictly in accordance with the governing statutory rules, and a writ petition suffering from unexplained delays and lack of foundational legal support is liable to be dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether departmental letters and administrative instructions can sustain a monetary claim when they are not shown to be in accordance with the applicable pay revision rules?
  • Does a writ petition challenging a service pay dispute become barred by laches when representations against the rejection of demands face prolonged delays?
  • Can a petitioner succeed in assailing a High Court judgment regarding pay scales without producing or establishing the applicability of the governing statutory rules?
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• Ataur Rehman vs National Industrial Relations Commission and Other1981 SCMR 255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-09
  National Industrial Relations CommissionIndustrial Relations OrdinanceRegulation 20issuance of processwrit petitionmisconductlabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the dismissal of a writ petition by the Sind High Court, which upheld the rejection of a complaint filed before the National Industrial Relations Commission. The petitioner, a bank employee, alleged misconduct by management after they objected to a union meeting scheduled on a bank closing day. The core legal question was whether the Chairman of the Commission acted illegally by soliciting comments from the respondents instead of immediately issuing process upon receiving the complaint, allegedly in violation of Regulation 20 of the National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 1973. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Chairman’s procedure was lawful. The Court ruled that Regulation 20 empowers the Commission to postpone the issuance of process and conduct an inquiry to ascertain the veracity of a complaint. The Court further clarified that the procedure under Regulation 20 is distinct and does not strictly mirror the requirements of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, particularly where no summons were issued prior to the inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does Regulation 20 of the National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 1973 require the immediate issuance of process upon the filing of a complaint?
  • Can the National Industrial Relations Commission solicit comments from respondents before issuing summons to them?
  • Is the procedure under Regulation 20 of the National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 1973 identical to the procedure prescribed under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Ataullah and 4 Other vs Hakim Razi Ur Rehman and 3 Other Settlement1981 SCMR 884 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-24
  Interim Relief Schemeallotment cancellationnatural justiceaudi alteram partemrehabilitation of displaced personsprocedural fairnesssettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two Civil Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal arising from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the cancellation of land allotments under the Interim Relief Scheme. The core legal question was whether the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner could lawfully cancel an allotment of agricultural land without providing the allottees notice or an opportunity to be heard, despite administrative instructions from the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the cancellation order was illegal and void because the allottees, who were actively seeking claim verification, possessed a vested interest in the allotment that necessitated procedural fairness. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, establishing the principle that administrative instructions cannot override the fundamental requirement of natural justice, specifically the right to a hearing (audi alteram partem), before an allotment is cancelled. Although the Court upheld the invalidation of the cancellation, it expressed sympathy for the petitioners who were displaced by this decision and directed the settlement authorities to attempt to accommodate them within the existing legal framework despite the general ban on fresh allotments.

  Questions settled

  • Can an allotment of land made under the Interim Relief Scheme be cancelled without providing the allottee notice and an opportunity to be heard?
  • Do administrative instructions from the Chief Settlement Commissioner override the requirement of natural justice in cancellation proceedings?
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• Asmatullah vs Muhammad Siddiq and Ano1her1981 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-08
  acquittalocular testimonycorroborationcriminal appealmurderidentity of assailant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the acquittal of the respondent, Muhammad Siddiq, by the Lahore High Court in a murder case. The respondent and a co-accused, Abdur Rashid Khalid, were originally convicted for murder and attempted murder. While the High Court maintained the conviction of Abdur Rashid Khalid, it acquitted Muhammad Siddiq, finding insufficient corroboration of the ocular testimony against him. The appellant challenged this acquittal, arguing that motive, medical evidence, and the respondent's abscondence provided sufficient corroboration to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court examined the evidence and held that the case against the respondent was distinguishable from that of the co-accused. Specifically, the Court found that the co-accused's conviction was supported by physical evidence (licences left at the scene) and a significant period of abscondence, whereas the evidence against the respondent was insufficient to corroborate the ocular testimony regarding his identity as an assailant. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal and dismissed the appeal, affirming that motive and medical evidence alone did not sufficiently corroborate the identity of the assailant in this instance.

  Questions settled

  • Can motive and medical evidence alone serve as sufficient corroboration for ocular testimony to identify an assailant?
  • Is the acquittal of a co-accused justified when the evidence against them is distinguishable from that of a co-accused whose conviction was maintained?
  • Does a shorter period of abscondence compared to a co-accused affect the weight of evidence used for corroboration?
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• Attiqullah vs Kafayatullah1981 SCMR 162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-17
  special oathoath on holy koranresile from offercivil procedurecontractual nature of oath agreementtemporary injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from civil proceedings where the petitioner filed a suit for declaration and an application for ad interim injunction concerning a land dispute. During the appellate proceedings before the District Judge, the petitioner offered to be bound if the respondent took a special oath on the Holy Koran confirming he had not sold the land. The respondent accepted the offer. Subsequently, the petitioner sought to withdraw the offer, but the District Judge disallowed the retraction, administered the oath to the respondent, and dismissed the appeal. A revision petition to the High Court was likewise dismissed. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether a party who makes an offer to have a matter decided based on the oath of the opposite party can be permitted to resile from such an offer after it has been accepted. The Supreme Court held that an agreement to be bound by a special oath is contractual in nature and a party cannot resile from it unless the contract is void or frustrated. Finding no such grounds, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party who makes an offer to have a case decided on the special oath of the opposite party can resile from such an offer after its acceptance?
  • Is an agreement to be bound by a special oath treated as a contract that cannot be broken unilaterally without sufficient grounds of being void or frustrated?
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• Ashiq Hussain vs Additional Commissioner Etc.S1981 SCMR 1176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-09
  urban settlementlocus standiwrit jurisdictionconstitutional petitionproperty transferfinality of orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court regarding an Urban Settlement dispute. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had standing to challenge the transfer of a room to the second respondent, given that the room was deemed an independent property and the petitioner was not in possession of it. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly dismissed the petition because the petitioner lacked locus standi, as the room was an independent unit and the petitioner had no claim to it. Furthermore, the Court refused to entertain arguments regarding the finality of an earlier 1966 order because the petitioner had failed to challenge the subsequent 1974 remand order, and the issue of the respondent's possession was not raised in the High Court. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot challenge the transfer of property in writ jurisdiction if they lack locus standi, and issues not raised before the High Court cannot be agitated for the first time in the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party have locus standi to challenge the transfer of an independent property unit if they are not in possession of said property?
  • Can a party raise an argument regarding the finality of an earlier order in the Supreme Court if they failed to challenge the subsequent remand order in the High Court?
  • Is a party permitted to raise new arguments in the Supreme Court that were not presented before the High Court?
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• Aqa S. Asghar Hussain vs The State1981 SCMR 1112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-17
  public servantcriminal breach of trustanti-corruptionpecuniary interestauction contractorstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court order upholding the appellant's conviction under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The appellant, an auction contractor for the General Manager, Telephones, Karachi, was convicted for embezzling sale proceeds. The core legal question was whether the appellant, not being a regular government employee, qualified as a 'public servant' under Section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, thereby subjecting him to the jurisdiction of the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption. The Supreme Court held that the appellant fell within the definition of a public servant under clause (9) of Section 21, as his duties involved receiving government property and protecting the government's pecuniary interests, for which he was remunerated by commission. The Court clarified that clause (9) defines an officer by reference to functions and duties rather than regular employment status. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the appellant was a public servant performing delegated government functions and was thus subject to the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947.

  Questions settled

  • Does an auction contractor remunerated by commission for government work qualify as a public servant under Section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is regular employment by the government a prerequisite for being considered an 'officer' under clause (9) of Section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the definition of a public servant under Section 21(9) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 depend on the designation of the person or the nature of the duties performed?
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• Amir Din Etc. vs Muhammad Malik Etc1981 SCMR 834 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-25
  consolidation of holdingsland allotmentconstitutional petitionjurisdiction of consolidation authoritiesprejudiceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition regarding a dispute over land allotment during consolidation of holdings proceedings. The core legal question was whether the consolidation authorities acted within their jurisdiction and whether the petitioners suffered any prejudice due to the allotment of land. The Supreme Court observed that consolidation authorities possess the jurisdiction to create lots and blocks for land-owners based on their entitlement. Upon review, the Court found that the area allotted to the petitioners remained undiminished, and the number of blocks assigned to them had actually been reduced, indicating no prejudice or loss. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioners had not suffered any injury from the consolidation proceedings. Relying on the principle established in Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others, the Court determined that this was not a fit case for interference with the orders passed by the consolidation authorities. The petition was accordingly dismissed for lacking merit.

  Questions settled

  • Do consolidation authorities have the jurisdiction to create lots and blocks for land-owners during consolidation proceedings?
  • Is interference by the Supreme Court warranted when a petitioner has suffered no actual loss or prejudice in land consolidation proceedings?
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• Amir Afzal vs Pervez Arshad and 9 Other1981 SCMR 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-11
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantspecific performanceco-sharersbona fide reconstructionwrit jurisdictionpart performance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a tenant of a shop in Attock City, challenged his ejectment ordered by the Rent Controller on the grounds of bona fide reconstruction. The petitioner had previously filed a suit for specific performance based on an alleged agreement of sale with one of the co-sharer heirs of the deceased landlord. Both the Rent Controller and the District Judge affirmed the landlord-tenant relationship and the necessity for reconstruction, leading to the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal. The Lahore High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's writ petition, ruling that an agreement of sale with a single co-sharer does not entitle a tenant to protection under Section 53-A of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, as one co-sharer cannot bind others. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner abandoned the plea regarding the lack of landlord-tenant relationship but argued that the High Court erred in stating that both lower courts had concurrently found the requirement for reconstruction. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court order contained a slight factual inaccuracy, it was not vitiated, and dismissed the petition, granting the petitioner four months to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a single co-sharer bind other co-sharers in an agreement of sale regarding property?
  • Does an agreement of sale with one co-sharer entitle a tenant to protection under Section 53-A of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Does a minor factual inaccuracy in a High Court order regarding the findings of lower courts necessarily vitiate the judgment?
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• Aminullah vs Tbe State__1981 PLD Supreme Court 325 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-08
  criminal appealequal division of judgesreview petitioncapital sentencejudicial precedentlarger benchsemper praesumitur pro negante
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenged a Supreme Court order that dismissed criminal appeals against convictions for murder where the Bench was equally divided, thereby allowing the High Court's judgment to remain operative. The core legal question was whether an equally divided Bench in a criminal appeal must refer the matter to a larger bench or if it may simply allow the lower court's judgment to stand. The Court held that while no explicit constitutional or statutory provision mandates a larger bench, the Court has historically adopted varying practices. Recognizing that consistency and fairness are paramount, particularly in capital cases, the Court determined that the previous practice of referring such split decisions to a larger bench should be followed to ensure a definitive adjudication. Consequently, the Court recalled its earlier order and referred the appeals to a larger bench. The principle laid down is that while the Court possesses the discretion to apply the maxim semper praesumitur pro negante, it should exercise this discretion in favor of referring cases to a larger bench to maintain judicial consistency.

  Questions settled

  • Does an equally divided Bench in a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court have a mandatory duty to refer the case to a larger bench?
  • Can the Supreme Court allow a lower court's judgment to remain operative when the Bench hearing the appeal is equally divided?
  • Is the maxim semper praesumitur pro negante applicable to criminal appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Does the lack of a statutory provision regarding split decisions in the Supreme Court grant the Court discretion to determine its own procedure?
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• Amanullah Khan Etc. vs Member, Board of Revenue (Consolidation), Punjab1981 SCMR 777 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-24
  constitutional petitionabatementlegal heirssubstitution of legal heirscivil procedure codecondonation of delayleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, successors-in-interest of the deceased original petitioner Abdullah, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment holding that a constitutional petition filed in 1967 had abated upon Abdullah's death in 1971, and rejecting their application to set aside the abatement and be impleaded. The core legal question concerned whether the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply to constitutional proceedings regarding the substitution of legal heirs, and whether the factual grounds for condoning the delay in filing substitution applications were sufficient. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Civil Procedure Code is fully applicable to proceedings of a civil nature in constitutional petitions, and applications for substitution must be made within the prescribed time. Furthermore, the High Court's factual finding that the educated and capable legal heirs reasonably ought to have known about the pending proceedings was unexceptionable. The key principle laid down is that procedural provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply to constitutional petitions of a civil nature, requiring timely substitution of legal heirs.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code applicable to proceedings of a civil nature in a constitutional petition?
  • Must an application for the substitution of legal heirs in a pending constitutional petition be made within the prescribed time?
  • Can the refusal of a High Court to condone delay in filing an application to set aside abatement be interfered with when based on reasonable factual conclusions?
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• Allauddin vs Muhammad Farooq and 3 Other1981 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-30
  sudden fightcommon intentionculpable homicidechild offendercriminal liabilityleave to appealException 4 to Section 300
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that modified convictions for murder and assault. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly applied Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding a sudden fight, and whether the doctrine of common intention under Section 34 was applicable to the co-accused. The Supreme Court observed that the incident arose from a spontaneous altercation between neighbors without premeditation, during which the principal accused sustained injuries, indicating a struggle. The Court held that the High Court was justified in invoking Exception 4 to Section 300, as the killing occurred during a sudden fight where no undue advantage was taken. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the co-accused did not share a common intention to commit murder, as his involvement was limited to a separate act of assault. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the conviction modifications. The judgment reinforces the principle that in sudden, unplanned altercations, participants are liable only for their individual acts, and the benefit of Exception 4 applies where no unfair advantage is taken.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sudden, unplanned fight between neighbors qualify for the application of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a co-accused be held liable for murder under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if they did not share a common intention to commit the act?
  • Is a participant in a sudden fight liable for the specific injuries they personally inflicted rather than the acts of others?
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• Allah- Yar vs Muhammad Riaz and Other..1981 PLD Supreme Court 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-30
  pre-emptioncourt-feedeficiency in court-feeextension of timecontumacyundervaluationregular second appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing the petitioner's regular second appeal in a pre-emption suit. The core legal questions involve the exercise of discretion by the court regarding the extension of time to make up a deficiency in court-fee under the relevant procedural and fiscal laws, and whether a plaintiff guilty of contumacy and gross undervaluation is entitled to such indulgence. The Supreme Court held that while time for making up a deficiency in court-fee may be extended by the court, such discretion must be exercised judiciously and not in favour of a party guilty of contumacy, negligence, or mala fide omission. The Court affirmed that the obligation to ensure proper court-fee is upon the court regardless of whether the defendant presses the issue, and upheld the dismissal of the suit due to the petitioner's deliberate failure to pay the requisite court-fee within time.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court extend time for making up a deficiency in court-fee in cases where the party is guilty of contumacy?
  • Does the failure of a defendant to press an issue regarding court-fee relieve the court of its obligation to ensure proper court-fee is paid?
  • Is a plaintiff who grossly undervalues a suit and fails to seek extension of time under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 entitled to appellate relief?
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• Allah Wasaya vs Khuda Baksh, Etc.S1981 SCMR 748 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-11
  cultivating possessionKhasra Girdawariwrit jurisdictionrevenue authoritiespre-emptiondisputed questions of facttenancy rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the concurrent findings of revenue authorities regarding the cultivating possession of agricultural land. The petitioner, claiming to be a tenant, sought to establish superior rights of pre-emption under Martial Law Regulation No. 115 and contested the correction of Khasra Girdawari entries in favor of the respondent. Following a series of administrative proceedings, including a remand by the Commissioner and subsequent findings by the Settlement Officer, it was determined that the petitioner was not in cultivating possession of the disputed land. The High Court upheld these findings, concluding that the revenue authorities had not misread the evidence. The Supreme Court examined the record and affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the arguments raised by the petitioner pertained to disputed questions of fact rather than matters of legal or public importance. Consequently, the Court found no grounds for interference in its appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the petition, reinforcing the principle that findings of fact by competent revenue authorities, when based on evidence, are generally not subject to review in writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere in writ jurisdiction regarding findings of fact made by revenue authorities?
  • Does a claim of misreading of evidence by lower revenue authorities constitute a question of legal or public importance justifying Supreme Court intervention?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by revenue authorities regarding cultivating possession subject to review in a writ petition?
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• Allah Diwaya vs The State1981 SCMR 904 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-18
  murderocular evidencecorroborationblood-stained recoveriesidentification in dark nightspecial leave to appealdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner, Allah Diwaya, under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Khuda Bakhsh. The core legal question involved the reliability of ocular testimony on a dark night, the adequacy of identification through a lantern and a torch, and the sufficiency of corroboration from incriminating recoveries of blood-stained articles. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the courts below regarding the presence of light sources (a lantern and a torch) and the recovery of blood-stained weapons and clothing at the instance of the petitioner provided sufficient and reliable corroboration to sustain the conviction. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the principle that ocular evidence corroborated by natural source identification and unblemished incriminating recoveries is sufficient to maintain a capital sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular testimony of related witnesses on a dark night can be relied upon when corroborated by light sources and incriminating recoveries?
  • Can a previous statement of a court witness under section 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used to corroborate the prosecution case?
  • Whether recovery of blood-stained weapons and clothing at the instance of an accused constitutes sufficient corroboration in a murder case?
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• Allah Ditta vs The State1981 SCMR 625 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-15
  murderleave to appealself-defencesudden fightappreciation of evidencefalsus in uno falsus in omnibuscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that upheld the petitioner's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The core legal questions were whether the trial court erred by failing to properly evaluate a plea of self-defence and whether the incident constituted a sudden fight rather than a premeditated offence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts had correctly appraised the evidence. The Court found no error of law or principle in the findings of the trial court, noting that the petitioner’s possession of a knife indicated prior preparation, which negated the claim of a sudden fight. The Court reaffirmed that the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not strictly applicable in Pakistan, meaning that partial falsity in witness testimony does not automatically invalidate the entire prosecution case. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that it will not re-appraise evidence in a petition for leave to appeal absent a clear error of law or principle.

  Questions settled

  • Is the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus strictly applicable in criminal trials in Pakistan?
  • Does the possession of a weapon by an accused prior to an occurrence negate a plea of sudden fight?
  • Will the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence in a petition for leave to appeal where no error of law is demonstrated?
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• Allah Banda vs Allah Banda and 5 Other1981S C M R1027 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-23
  pre-emptiontenancyKharif cropwrit jurisdictionquestion of factrevenue authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought to pre-empt a sale of land on the ground that it was comprised in his tenancy, claiming the first right of pre-emption under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, as from Kharif 1972. The Collector decreed the suit, but the Additional Commissioner (Revenue) set it aside, and the Board of Revenue upheld the reversal in revision. The Lahore High Court dismissed the subsequent writ petition, holding that the question of when the Kharif crop begins is a factual matter best determined by revenue authorities. The core legal question was whether the High Court could interfere in writ jurisdiction with a concurrent finding of fact regarding the commencement of the Kharif crop season. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that whether Kharif begins in February-March or in May is essentially a question of fact not open to challenge in writ jurisdiction, and the revenue authorities' view on the subject is to be accepted. The key principle laid down is that factual determinations by revenue authorities regarding agricultural crop seasons cannot be re-examined under constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the commencement of the Kharif crop season is a question of fact not open to challenge in writ jurisdiction?
  • Can the High Court interfere with factual findings of revenue authorities regarding agricultural seasons under constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Allah Bakhsh vs The Government of Punjab through the Chief1981 SCMR 673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-28
  service tribunalretrospective promotionseniority listcadrebelated claimspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which rejected the petitioner's claim for retrospective promotion as Senior Clerk and Assistant. The core legal question involved whether a civil servant could challenge seniority and claim retrospective promotion dating back over two decades, bypassing distinct cadres and failing to challenge a junior's earlier promotion within the limitation period and statutory bar. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the petitioner could not be permitted to reagitate settled and stale controversies from decades prior, particularly where the junior colleague belonged to a different cadre and the promotion occurred before the crucial date barring the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that belated challenges to seniority and promotions of persons belonging to different cadres, long barred by limitation and statutory provisions, are unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can claim seniority and promotion over a colleague belonging to a different cadre?
  • Can a belated challenge to a seniority list and promotion made years prior be entertained by a Service Tribunal?
  • Does the Punjab Civil Service Tribunals Act 1974 bar jurisdiction over matters preceding the crucial date of 1-7-1969?
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• Allah Bakhsh vs Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab1981 SCMR 1185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-24
  state landLivestock Breeding Schemecultivating possessionsub-tenantparil delictodiscretionary jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning state land originally granted to respondent No. 2 under the Livestock Breeding Scheme (1960). The petitioner claimed to have been in cultivating possession of the land through a sub-lease from respondent No. 2. Upon the expiry of the grant's term, the petitioner sought a lease of the land from the Collector, which was initially granted but later set aside by the Member, Board of Revenue, whose decision was upheld by the High Court. The core legal question is whether a sub-tenant put into possession by the original state grantee can claim an independent right to the land or challenge the grantee's position after the expiry of the grant, and whether discretionary relief can be extended to a party in pari delicto. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner entered possession as a tenant of respondent No. 2, had no independent right to the land, and being in pari delicto for violating the terms of the scheme, was not entitled to discretionary relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sub-tenant put into possession by a state land grantee can set up an adverse title or deny the landlord's title after the expiry of the grant?
  • Can a party who knowingly participates in the breach of the terms of a government land grant invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the court?
  • Does a sub-tenant possess an independent right to state land upon the expiry of the original grantee's term?
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• Allah Bakhsh and Others vs Mst. Noor Khatoon and Other1981 SCMR 1169- · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-24
  abatement of appeallegal representativesdeath certificateadjudication on meritsquestion of factLaw Reforms Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order allowing an application to bring legal representatives of the deceased appellant, Mst. Noor Khatoon, onto the record. The core legal dispute concerned the actual date of the deceased's death, which determined whether the appeal had abated under the law prior to the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The petitioners contended the deceased died in 1971, while the respondents asserted 1973, relying on conflicting death certificates. The High Court, following an inquiry by the District Judge, Multan, concluded the death occurred on 14-2-1973, thereby avoiding abatement. The Supreme Court upheld this finding, noting that the lower courts had carefully weighed the evidence, including witness testimony and documentary proof. The Court affirmed that the finding of fact regarding the date of death was not vitiated by legal infirmity. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the law favors adjudication on merits rather than technicalities, dismissing the petition and allowing the appeal to proceed on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the date of death of a party?
  • Is a death certificate admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Does the law favor the adjudication of appeals on merits over technicalities regarding abatement?
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• Allah Bachaya and Others vs Mst. Hafizi Begum and Other1981 SCMR 640 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-03
  Adhalapi tenureevacuee propertydeclaration of ownershipconcurrent findingspetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of concurrent findings of the revenue and judicial authorities, including the Custodian of Evacuee Property and the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' claim for a declaration of ownership over land based on an Adhalapi tenure agreement dated 6-3-1915. The core legal question was whether the petitioners established their entitlement to ownership of half the land through development under the said agreement. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the concurrent factual findings regarding the lack of support from revenue records and the valid rejection of the agreement by the lower forums suffered from no legal or factual infirmity. The petition was dismissed in limine, affirming that factual determinations based on an appreciation of evidence will not be interfered with absent misreading or non-reading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent factual findings of lower forums regarding land ownership based on tenure agreements can be interfered with without showing misreading of evidence?
  • Is an agreement unsupported by revenue records sufficient to claim ownership of land under Adhalapi tenure?
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• Alim Ud Din vs Muhammad Riaz Etc.S1981 SCMR 925 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-08
  quo warrantoelection disputeZila Council electiondiscretionary jurisdictionsub judiceSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the order of the High Court upholding the refusal to interfere with alleged disqualifications in the election of a respondent as a member of the Zila Council, Lahore, through constitutional proceedings, on the ground that a regular election petition covering the same points was already pending before another competent forum. The core legal question was whether the High Court is bound to entertain a petition for quo warranto filed by a taxpayer when an election petition involving the same subject matter is already pending. The Supreme Court held that it lies within the discretion of the High Court, depending on the facts and circumstances, whether to conduct an inquiry into a matter already sub judice before another competent forum, and the exercise of such discretion to avoid parallel proceedings and potential prejudice does not suffer from any legal infirmity. The key principle laid down is that the High Court may decline to exercise its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction in quo warranto proceedings if the same matter is already competently sub judice before an alternative forum.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is bound to entertain a petition for quo warranto when an election petition involving the same matter is already pending?
  • Does the refusal of the High Court to interfere in election matters while a regular election petition is sub judice suffer from any legal infirmity?
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• Ali Sardar vs Gul Moeen and Another1981 SCMR 860 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-19
  post-arrest bailmurderplea of alibifurther inquiryleave to appealcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the first informant against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court directing the release of the respondent on bail pending his trial for offences under sections 302 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns whether the respondent was entitled to bail despite previous rejections, particularly in light of a plea of alibi and supporting travel documents produced during investigation. The Supreme Court held that no exception could be taken to the view of the High Court that the accused was entitled to bail as there were sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt under the relevant criminal procedure. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition in limine, affirming the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person is entitled to bail when there are grounds for further inquiry into his guilt?
  • Can a plea of alibi supported by travel documents warrant the grant of bail during pending trial for murder?
  • Does the dismissal of a previous bail application bar the consideration of a subsequent bail plea when new circumstances or investigation findings emerge?
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• Ali Muhammad vs Yamin and Another1981 SCMR 1139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-02-01
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationmurderulterior motivescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court granting pre-arrest bail to the respondent in a murder case involving the alleged intentional crushing of the petitioner's son with a tractor. The core legal question is whether pre-arrest bail was rightly granted by the High Court in the absence of reasoning and proper justification under criminal law. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the High Court erred in granting pre-arrest bail as the allegations in the first information report and the medical evidence revealed no justification for such relief, nor was there any showing of arrest apprehended on account of ulterior motives. The appeal was accepted, the pre-arrest bail was cancelled, and it was clarified that the competent court may consider post-arrest bail after the respondent is arrested in accordance with law. The key principle laid down is that pre-arrest bail is not the rule in criminal cases and requires a clear demonstration of apprehension of arrest due to ulterior motives.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted without showing an apprehension of arrest on account of ulterior motives?
  • Is the High Court required to provide reasons when confirming pre-arrest bail?
  • Does the use of a tractor to hit a person from behind justify the grant of pre-arrest bail in a murder case?
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• Ali Haider vs The State1981 SCMR 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-13
  bail pending appealsuspension of sentencecriminal appealappreciation of evidenceconviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had previously rejected the appellant's application for bail pending appeal under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The appellant had been convicted for offences under Section 307, Section 148, and Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving a sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether, given the state of the evidence presented at trial, the appellant was entitled to the suspension of his sentence and release on bail pending the final adjudication of his appeal. The Supreme Court observed that one prosecution witness testified to the appellant's absence from the crime scene, while the other two witnesses, though placing him at the scene, attributed no specific role to him. Finding merit in the contention that the appeal was likely to succeed, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, accepted it, and granted bail to the appellant, establishing the principle that where evidence against a convict is prima facie weak or contradictory, suspension of sentence pending appeal is appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence be suspended pending appeal under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the prosecution evidence appears weak?
  • Is the absence of a specific role attributed to an accused by prosecution witnesses a valid ground for granting bail pending appeal?
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• Ali Hadi Adney and Another vs Martial Law Administrator, Zone `D' and Other1981 SCMR 141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-03
  Martial Law OrderBoard of Enquirywrongful dismissaljurisdictional defectSummary Military Courtmisappropriation of fundsadministrative enquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, government employees, challenged their dismissal from service and subsequent trial by a Summary Military Court following allegations of financial misappropriation. The Martial Law Administrator, Zone 'D', had constituted a Board of Enquiry under Martial Law Order No. 17 to investigate these allegations. The High Court found that the Board of Enquiry was constituted without lawful authority, as it lacked the requisite qualifications and was foreign to the provisions of Martial Law Order No. 17. Despite this finding of jurisdictional defect and oppressive conduct, the High Court upheld the dismissals and the subsequent order for trial by a Summary Military Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in upholding the dismissals after concluding that the Board of Enquiry's proceedings were illegal and void. The Court ruled that the dismissals could not be sustained based on such flawed proceedings. However, the Court affirmed that the petitioners remained liable for trial for criminal offences under the general laws of Pakistan, rendering the specific challenge to the Military Court trial moot.

  Questions settled

  • Can a dismissal from service be upheld if the underlying Board of Enquiry was constituted without lawful authority?
  • Does a finding of jurisdictional defect in an administrative enquiry invalidate the subsequent dismissal order based on that enquiry?
  • Does the dismissal or removal of a public servant under Martial Law Order No. 17 absolve them from liability for criminal offences committed while in service?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Gohar vs Mst. Nasim Akhtar1981 SCMR 855 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-02
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantdefault in rentdenial of relationshipspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which upheld the ejectment of the petitioner from the demised premises on the grounds of default in rent payment. The respondent had applied for ejectment, alleging default in rent and a bona fide personal requirement for her husband. The petitioner contested the application by denying the relationship of landlord and tenant, claiming instead to hold the property on behalf of the respondent's husband, and asserted that rent had been deposited in court. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the ejectment application, but the Additional District Judge and subsequently the High Court reversed this finding, holding that the petitioner admitted to never paying rent to the respondent and was a defaulter. The Supreme Court considered whether the denial of the relationship was qualified and whether a remand was necessary to determine the default. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's unconditional denial of the landlord-tenant relationship and admission of non-payment justified the ejectment, rendering a remand futile. The petition was dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unconditional denial of the relationship of landlord and tenant by the occupant precludes the defense of non-default in rent?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to remand the case when the tenant admitted to never paying rent to the landlady?
  • Does depositing rent for a subsequent period cure the default established for the earlier period?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Akbar vs Muhammad Anwar1981 SCMR 775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-25
  pre-emptionpartial pre-emptionPunjab Pre-emption Actindivisible transactionexemption from pre-emptionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a pre-emption decree could be granted for only a portion of the disputed land when the remainder was exempt from pre-emption due to the presence of shops. The petitioner argued that the land constituted an indivisible unit and that allowing partial pre-emption violated established legal principles. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the land was effectively bifurcated into distinct parcels. The Court clarified that the doctrine of partial pre-emption is inapplicable where a pre-emptor seeks the entire property, but the court finds only a portion is legally pre-emptible. The key principle laid down is that the exemption under Section 5 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 applies strictly to the specific area where qualifying structures exist, not the entire tract. Furthermore, the mere presence of a boundary wall does not render land exempt from pre-emption, and a decree for the non-exempt portion remains legally permissible.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a boundary wall on land automatically qualify it for exemption from pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
  • Can a court grant a pre-emption decree for only a portion of the land when the remainder is exempt from pre-emption due to the presence of shops?
  • Does the doctrine of partial pre-emption bar a claim when the pre-emptor seeks the whole property but only a part is legally pre-emptible?
  Read full judgment →
• Alhassan Silk Mills Ltd. vs THS Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court1981 PLD Supreme Court 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-23
  labour lawtermination of servicestanding ordersindustrial relationsmisconductgo slow tacticssmall establishmentstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the termination of services of workmen by the appellant, a private limited company employing fewer than 50 workers, for alleged "go slow tactics." The central legal question was whether the procedural protections of Standing Order 15 of the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, apply to establishments with fewer than 50 workers, despite the exclusion provided in the second proviso to section 1(4) of the same Ordinance. The High Court had previously held that Standing Order 12(5) necessitated reconciling the termination process with Standing Order 15. The Supreme Court rejected this, holding that the second proviso to section 1(4) clearly excludes the applicability of Standing Order 15 to such establishments. The Court ruled that Standing Order 12(5) cannot be interpreted to override the specific legislative intent expressed in the second proviso to section 1(4). Consequently, the termination of the respondents' services under Standing Order 12(1) was upheld as valid, affirming that termination for misconduct in small establishments is not a justiciable issue under the Standing Orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does Standing Order 12(5) of the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance 1968 apply to establishments employing fewer than 50 workers?
  • Can the procedure prescribed in Standing Order 15 be enforced in establishments with fewer than 50 workers despite the second proviso to section 1(4) of the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance 1968?
  • Is the termination of a workman for misconduct in an establishment employing fewer than 50 workers a justiciable issue under the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance 1968?
  Read full judgment →
• Ajab Khan and Another vs The State1981 SCMR 976 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-19
  smugglingCustoms Actpolice investigation powersSpecial Judge jurisdictioncriminal appealsentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the conviction of the appellants for smuggling foreign cloth under the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal questions were whether the police possessed the authority to investigate offences under the Customs Act and whether a challan submitted by a Superintendent of Police constituted a valid complaint under section 185-A(6) of the Customs Act, 1969, thereby conferring jurisdiction upon the Special Judge. The Supreme Court held that the police are empowered to investigate such offences, noting that statutory amendments and relevant notifications authorized officers in charge of police stations to initiate proceedings. The Court further determined that the challan submitted by the police was legally sufficient to initiate cognizance. However, considering that the Customs Collector had previously ordered the return of the seized goods upon payment of a fine, effectively vitiating the underlying proceedings, the Court accepted the appeal in part. It upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone and remitted the fines imposed on the appellants, who were identified as mere carriers.

  Questions settled

  • Do the police have the power to investigate offences under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Can a challan submitted by a Superintendent of Police be construed as a valid complaint under section 185-A(6) of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does the improper conduct of an investigation oust the jurisdiction of a Special Judge to try an accused under the Customs Act, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahsan Ilahi vs Messrs Habib Bank Ltd.1981SCMR 336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-12
  civil procedurerecall of witnesscommission for examinationday-to-day trialadjournmentscross-examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the High Court of Sind, which had dismissed the petitioner's application under Order XVIII, Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking to recall a witness for cross-examination. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to recall the witness for further cross-examination. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner had no right to recall the witness for cross-examination. However, in the interest of justice and with the consent of both parties, the Court facilitated an arrangement allowing the petitioner to examine the witness as his own defense witness via commission on interrogatories, provided the petitioner bore the costs. The Court emphasized the importance of procedural efficiency, noting that the trial court should record evidence on a day-to-day basis as mandated by the proviso to Order XVII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Adjournments during the recording of evidence should be treated as an exception rather than a rule, requiring recorded reasons to prevent the piecemeal recording of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party have an absolute right to recall a witness for cross-examination under Order XVIII, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a trial court required to record evidence on a day-to-day basis under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Under what circumstances should adjournments be granted during the recording of evidence in a civil suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Khan vs Punjab Local Council Election Authority and Other1981 SCMR 1250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-09
  local council electionnomination papersfresh electionregulatory powersineligible candidateelection authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the election for a special peasant seat in the District Council, Mianwali. The petitioner challenged the decision of the Punjab Local Council Election Authority, which, after finding the successful candidate ineligible due to defective nomination papers, ordered fresh elections instead of declaring the petitioner (the runner-up with a minority of votes) elected. The petitioner's challenge was dismissed by the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in dismissing the petition, held that the election was held subject to the final orders of the Election Authority and fell within its regulatory powers. The Court ruled that the Authority's power to order fresh elections was not whittled down by its interim regulatory order allowing the election to proceed. Furthermore, the Court established that, in the absence of an express statutory provision to the contrary, the Election Authority possesses the inherent power to order fresh elections to ensure fairness and sustain the representative character of local government institutions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Election Authority have the power to order fresh elections after declaring a successful candidate ineligible, rather than declaring the runner-up elected?
  • Does an interim regulatory order allowing an election to proceed subject to a final decision whittle down the final powers of the Election Authority?
  • Can the Election Authority order fresh elections to ensure fairness and sustain the representative character of an institution in the absence of an express statutory provision?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Khan and Others vs Muhammad Shafi1981 SCMR 1145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-15
  limitationcondonation of delaytime-barred petitiondue diligencecause listleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' revision petition. The petition was filed with a delay of 361 days. The petitioners contended that they were unaware of the High Court's hearing date because no formal notice was issued by the office, and they only became aware of the dismissal when trial court proceedings resumed. The Supreme Court examined the explanation for the delay and found it unsatisfactory. The Court held that litigants are under a duty to vigilantly monitor the cause list, and the failure to do so does not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Furthermore, even after obtaining the copy of the impugned judgment, the petitioners delayed filing the appeal for an additional two months without justification. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition as time-barred, affirming the principle that a party's failure to exercise due diligence in tracking court proceedings does not excuse significant delays in filing appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Is the failure of a party to monitor the cause list a valid ground for condonation of delay in filing an appeal?
  • Does the absence of a formal notice from the court office regarding a hearing date excuse a significant delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be entertained when there is an unexplained delay of several months following the receipt of the impugned judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Khan and Others vs Muhammad Din and Other1981 SCMR 921 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-07
  land consolidationBoard of Revenuewrit jurisdictioninterim orderspecial leave to appealconsolidation scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition challenging an order passed by a Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, regarding a land consolidation scheme. The core legal questions were whether the Collector acted without competence in approving consolidation proposals that had been previously rejected, and whether the High Court properly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction in refusing to interfere with the Board of Revenue's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Collector's earlier order of rejection was merely an interim order, not a final adjudication, and thus the subsequent approval was valid. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that grievances regarding the specific location of allotted land, where entitlement is otherwise met, do not justify the cancellation of an entire village consolidation scheme. The key principle laid down is that an interim order rejecting a proposal does not preclude a competent authority from subsequently approving that proposal upon reconsideration, provided the process remains within the scope of the remand and statutory requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Collector approve a consolidation proposal that was previously rejected in an interim order?
  • Does a grievance regarding the specific location of allotted land justify the cancellation of an entire village consolidation scheme?
  • Is an order rejecting a consolidation proposal an interim order or a final order?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Hassan vs Muhammad Ali and Other1981 SCMR 71 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-07
  joint transferdisplaced personssettlement schemeestoppel inter partesconsent orderdrawing of lotsnullity of order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed a Letters Patent Appeal and upheld an order of the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner. The core dispute involved the joint transfer of two shops to the appellant and his deceased brother, both claimant displaced persons, and whether the Settlement Commissioner could reopen the transfer after it had allegedly assumed finality, as well as the validity of resolving the dispute by drawing lots upon the parties' agreement. The Supreme Court held that the initial joint transfer by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was made beyond the letter of the law and was a nullity, and therefore the Settlement Commissioner was legally entitled to reopen the matter. Furthermore, the Court held that the appellant was bound by the compromise and agreement to draw lots, raising an estoppel inter partes. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a joint transfer of properties made in violation of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act can be regarded as a final order immune from being reopened?
  • Does a judgment or order rendered by consent or agreement between parties raise an estoppel inter partes?
  • Can a party who invokes the jurisdiction of an authority for a favorable outcome subsequently challenge that same jurisdiction when the result is unfavorable?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Din vs Ghulam Siddique1981 SCMR 743 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-14
  pre-emptionconcurrent findingslimitation pleaspecial leave to appealquestion of factcivil possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a civil suit for possession of property, which was decreed in favor of the respondent by the Civil Judge, with subsequent appeals dismissed by the District Judge and the High Court. The petitioner challenged the lower courts' findings, arguing that the property in dispute was a 'shop' rather than 'land,' thereby precluding a suit for pre-emption. Additionally, the petitioner contended that the respondent's suit was time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the classification of the property as 'land' or 'shop' was a question of fact upon which three lower courts had reached concurrent findings, and no misreading of evidence was demonstrated to warrant interference. Regarding the plea of limitation, the Court held that since this issue was not raised in any of the lower courts and would require the introduction of new evidence to resolve factual aspects, it could not be entertained for the first time in the Supreme Court. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of limitation be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court if it requires the examination of new factual evidence?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of a demonstrated misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Din and Another vs Muhammad Aslam Hadi1981 SCMR 732 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-31
  rented premisesbona fide requirementconcurrent findings of factevictionleave to appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the District Judge, Jhelum, ordering the eviction of the petitioners from a rented shop. The landlord sought possession of the premises, claiming a bona fide personal requirement to operate a Homoeopathic clinic with his unemployed son. The petitioners contended that the premises consisted of two independent shops rather than a single unit, thereby challenging the bona fide nature of the landlord's requirement. The Supreme Court observed that this plea regarding the nature of the premises was not raised before the Rent Controller but introduced during the appellate stage. Upon reviewing the evidence, the lower courts concurrently found that the premises constituted a single unit divided into two portions, sharing a common roof and staircase. The Supreme Court held that as the lower courts reached concurrent findings of fact based on cogent evidence, there was no ground for interference. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed in limine, affirming the landlord's genuine requirement for the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts regarding the nature of rented premises?
  • Is a plea regarding the physical nature of rented premises maintainable if raised for the first time in appellate proceedings?
  • Does a landlord's requirement for premises to establish a business with an unemployed son constitute a bona fide need for eviction purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad and 3 Other vs Vice Chancellor, University of Engineering and Technology and Another1981 PLD Supreme Court 464 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-21
  disciplinary proceedingsnatural justiceeducational institutionsstudent disciplinewrit jurisdictionfair hearinguniversity administration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding the disciplinary expulsion of students by the University of Engineering and Technology following their involvement in a violent clash. The core legal questions were whether disciplinary proceedings in educational institutions require the formal procedures of a criminal trial, such as the framing of charges, the presence of witnesses, and the right to cross-examination. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that educational institutions are not criminal courts and are not bound by formal procedural formalities. The Court reaffirmed the principle that while institutions must observe the minimum requirements of natural justice—specifically, informing the student of the allegations and providing a reasonable opportunity to explain or controvert them—they are not required to serve formal charge sheets, examine witnesses in the student's presence, or allow cross-examination. The Court emphasized that institutional authorities possess parental jurisdiction to maintain discipline, provided they act in good faith and adhere to these minimum standards of fairness.

  Questions settled

  • Are educational institutions required to follow formal criminal trial procedures, such as framing charges and allowing cross-examination, when taking disciplinary action against students?
  • What are the minimum requirements of natural justice that must be observed by educational institutions during disciplinary proceedings?
  • Does the failure to serve a formal charge sheet invalidate disciplinary action taken by an educational institution against a student?
  • Can a court interfere with the disciplinary action of an educational institution solely on the ground of impropriety?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Ali vs The State1981 SCMR 397 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-28
  post-arrest bailmurdervicarious liabilityleave to appealmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, whereby the petitioner's request for post-arrest bail in a case under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code was rejected. The core legal question involved whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the medical evidence and the applicability of vicarious liability. The Supreme Court held that the discretionary order passed by the High Court refusing bail did not violate any provision or principle of law governing such cases, as the circumstances of the FIR and the weight of the prosecution case showed the deceased and his unarmed sons were met with violence when lodging a protest. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with a discretionary refusal of bail by the High Court where the order is supported by the weight of the prosecution case and violates no governing legal principle.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code when medical evidence allegedly contradicts the initial FIR?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a discretionary order of the High Court refusing bail if no governing principle of law has been violated?
  Read full judgment →
• Adil Naveed vs Nazir Ahmad Khan Etc.S1981 SCMR 951 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-27
  condonation of delaylimitation periodtime-barred petitionsufficient causesupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal that was barred by 67 days. The core legal question was whether sufficient cause had been shown to condone the delay in filing the petition, specifically regarding the explanation for the time taken in obtaining the certified copy of the High Court's order and the alleged detention of the petitioner's agent. The Supreme Court held that the application for condonation of delay failed to explain each day of the limitation period as required by law, and further noted that the petitioner's agent was actively pursuing his own legal proceedings during the relevant period, demonstrating no physical or other inability to collect the copy. The petition was accordingly dismissed as time-barred. The key principle laid down is that an applicant seeking condonation of delay must provide a sufficient cause explaining each day of the delay, and general assertions of inability are insufficient when record evidence demonstrates active engagement in other legal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does an application for condonation of delay require an explanation for each day of the limitation period?
  • Can detention under Martial Law of an agent serve as sufficient cause for condonation of delay when records show active pursuit of separate litigation during the same period?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rehman vs The State1981 SCMR 1105(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-10
  criminal breach of trustfalsification of accountsno evidenceconjecturecriminal appealsupreme courtmens rea
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from the conviction of the appellant, a Patwari, under Section 477-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for making a false entry in the village Rozenamcha regarding a fraudulent land transaction involving an imposter. The core legal question was whether there was any evidence to support the finding that the appellant knew the person appearing before him was an imposter, rather than relying in good faith on the identification by the local Lambardar. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts substituted evidence with mere conjecture and that there was a total lack of evidence showing the appellant had knowledge of the impersonation. The Court established the principle that a criminal conviction cannot be sustained on assumptions and conjecture in the absence of tangible evidence establishing the requisite mens rea or knowledge on the part of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 477-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained solely on the basis of conjecture regarding the accused's knowledge?
  • Whether a public servant relying on the identification of a local Lambardar for a routine entry can be convicted without proof of guilty knowledge?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts when those findings are based on no evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rehman and 2 Others vs The State1981 SCMR 1107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-23
  criminal appealeye-witness credibilitycorroboration of evidenceinterested witnessesrecovery of weaponshostile witnessesreasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants for causing grievous injuries resulting in death. The core legal question was whether the testimony of closely related eye-witnesses, riddled with material discrepancies and contradictions regarding the weapons used and the presence of witnesses, could sustain a conviction, and whether the recovery of non-blood-stained weapons, unsupported by independent witnesses, provided sufficient corroboration. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the convictions and sentences. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to the unreliability of the eye-witnesses, whose accounts contradicted the FIR and each other, and the lack of credible corroborative evidence. The judgment reaffirms that where eye-witnesses are closely related and their testimony contains significant inconsistencies regarding material facts, such as the weapons carried by the accused, their evidence requires independent corroboration. Furthermore, the testimony of an investigating officer regarding recoveries cannot be implicitly relied upon when independent recovery witnesses have turned hostile and the recovered items lack incriminating features like blood stains.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the testimony of closely related eye-witnesses when their accounts contain material discrepancies regarding the weapons used?
  • Does the recovery of weapons that are not blood-stained, when supported only by the investigating officer and not by independent witnesses, constitute sufficient corroborative evidence?
  • Is the testimony of an investigating officer regarding the recovery of weapons sufficient to sustain a conviction when independent recovery witnesses have turned hostile?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Razzaq vs Assistant Registrar, Co Operative Farming Society, Sahiwal and 3Other1981 SCMR 1064 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-19
  leave to appealunauthorized occupantCo-operative Farming SocietyejectmentColonization of Government Lands Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the ejectment of the petitioner from agricultural land. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner's possession as a tenant under a Co-operative Farming Society was lawful and protected, despite the petitioner not being a member of the Society and the allotment lacking mandatory approval and being tainted by fraud. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact regarding fraudulent entry and lack of eligibility as a non-member were unexceptionable and warranted no interference. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that unauthorized occupants acquiring land through manipulation cannot claim protection under tenancy laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an individual who is not a member of a Co-operative Farming Society is eligible to receive a valid land allotment for cultivation?
  • Can an occupant who enters land through fraud and manipulation claim protection against ejectment under tenancy laws?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding fraudulent land occupation?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid Etc vs Ghulam Dastgir.1981 SCMR 1087 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-31
  ejectmentrent restrictionreconstructionbona fide needlandlord and tenantmutually destructive pleas
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld an ejectment order against tenants of a residential building in Faisalabad. The landlord sought eviction on grounds of rent default, personal need, and reconstruction. The Rent Controller initially rejected the petition, but the First Appellate Authority reversed this, finding the grounds for reconstruction proved. The High Court maintained the eviction, holding that the landlord's need for reconstruction was established by the availability of sanctioned plans, despite the failure of the personal need claim. The core legal question was whether the grounds of personal need and reconstruction are mutually destructive, and whether the failure of one invalidates the other. The Supreme Court held that the grounds are not mutually destructive. It affirmed that reconstruction is an independent ground, evaluated based on the property's condition, economic utility, and the landlord's resources. The Court concluded that the landlord's bona fide intent for reconstruction was satisfied, and the failure of the personal need claim did not negate the validity of the reconstruction ground.

  Questions settled

  • Are the grounds of personal need and reconstruction for eviction mutually destructive?
  • What factors determine the bona fide nature of a landlord's request for reconstruction?
  • Does the failure of a landlord to prove personal need invalidate a separate, proven ground for reconstruction?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rahim and 14 Others vs The State and Another1981 SCMR 294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-25
  acquittalretrialPublic Prosecutorhostile witnessmiscarriage of justiceinherent powers of the courtcriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a High Court judgment that set aside the acquittal of fifteen accused persons and ordered their retrial for murder and attempted murder. The core legal question was whether the High Court acted correctly in setting aside an acquittal where the Public Prosecutor had abandoned key eye-witnesses—including injured parties—on the pretext that they had been 'won over,' without verifying the truth of that assertion. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the High Court's decision to order a retrial. The Court held that while a Public Prosecutor has the discretion to select witnesses, this power must be exercised with care and responsibility. The Court is not a 'silent spectator' to a potential miscarriage of justice. Where there is evidence of foul play or collusion in the abandonment of witnesses, the trial court possesses the inherent power and duty to intervene, verify the status of those witnesses, and ensure that the prosecution of a serious case is not stifled by reckless or collusive conduct.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court set aside an acquittal and order a retrial when the Public Prosecutor has recklessly abandoned key witnesses?
  • Does a trial court have the inherent power to intervene when it suspects that the Public Prosecutor is colluding to stifle a prosecution?
  • Is a Public Prosecutor's claim that witnesses have been 'won over' sufficient to justify their abandonment without judicial verification?
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• Abdul Shakoor vs The State1981 SCMR 832 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-06-27
  trap casetainted moneyillegal gratificationbribeappreciation of evidenceco-accused acquittalpossession of marked notes
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by a store official convicted under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 for demanding and accepting a bribe. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner refused to issue delivery vouchers for cement shipments until paid a bribe. During a raid supervised by a Magistrate, the petitioner accepted marked currency notes and delivery vouchers, then passed the money to a co-accused upon noticing the police. While co-accused were acquitted due to lack of independent evidence or direct involvement, the trial court and High Court convicted the petitioner based on the reliable testimony of the Magistrate and the recovery of delivery vouchers from his person. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the High Court correctly relied on independent magistrate testimony and that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of explaining his possession of the delivery vouchers and tainted money. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused can be convicted on evidence that was disbelieved regarding co-accused if independent corroborative evidence exists?
  • Does the recovery of delivery vouchers and tainted money during a supervised trap operation shift the burden of explanation onto the accused under corruption law?
  • Can a conviction under anti-corruption laws be sustained based primarily on the credible testimony of a supervising Magistrate?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Shahid and Another vs Sh. Azim BakhshP LD 1981 Supreme Court 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-18
  dismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of appealcivil procedurenegligence of counseldiscretion of the courtrent eviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, tenants facing eviction from a shop, challenged their eviction order unsuccessfully before the Rent Controller and the District Court. They then filed a second appeal in the Lahore High Court, obtaining an interim stay order. When the appeal was called for hearing, neither the appellants nor their counsel appeared, leading to its dismissal for non-prosecution. The appellants filed an application under section 151 read with Order XLI, rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code for restoration, offering an excuse for the counsel's absence due to his clerk's failure to check the cause list, but providing no explanation for the appellants' own absence. The High Court dismissed the restoration application. Upon further appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court held that the appellants failed to show that the High Court exercised its discretion illegally or unreasonably, especially given the history of default and lack of vigilance. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution can succeed when neither the appellant nor the counsel provides a sufficient explanation for their absence?
  • Does a litigant invariably escape the consequences of their counsel's negligence in attending court proceedings?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a discretionary order of the High Court declining to restore a dismissed appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Sattar and Another vs The State1981 SCMR 678 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-26
  criminal appealidentification paradeocular evidencestandard of proofappreciation of evidencemurder convictionbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the convictions of the appellants for murder and theft, originally upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the prosecution’s case, resting solely on the identification of the appellants by strangers, was sufficient to sustain a conviction, especially given that the recovery evidence was rejected by both lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the convictions were unsafe. The Court emphasized that evidence of identification of strangers must be scrutinized with extreme caution. It observed that significant discrepancies in the witnesses' descriptions—specifically regarding the assailants' height and age (describing them as "young boys" versus the appellants' actual ages and heights)—could not be dismissed as immaterial. The Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, noting that the real culprits likely escaped. The key principle laid down is that where identification evidence is riddled with material discrepancies and contradictions, particularly concerning physical characteristics, it cannot form the basis of a safe conviction, necessitating the acquittal of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is the evidence of identification of strangers by prosecution witnesses sufficient for conviction when there are material discrepancies in the description of the assailants?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the recovery evidence is rejected and the ocular evidence is found to be unreliable?
  • Does the description of accused persons as 'young boys' in earlier statements create a reasonable doubt when the accused are adults?
  • Should courts ignore discrepancies in the description of the assailants' height and age on the ground that witnesses are educated or disinterested?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Salam vs Assistant Registrar, Co Operative Societies, Hyderabad and 2 Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-26
  benami loanco-operative bankrepayment of loansrecovery of loanborrower liabilitymartial law order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through special leave arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing the appellant's constitutional petition against the recovery of a co-operative bank loan. The appellant's brother had raised loans in the names of fifteen persons, including the appellant, by way of overdraft. The core legal question was whether the appellant had been lawfully exonerated of his liabilities under various orders passed by the authorities or Martial Law Orders, and whether the authorities, having proceeded against the appellant's brother as a beneficiary, were precluded from seeking recovery from the appellant. The Supreme Court held that both the nominal borrower and the real beneficiary fall within the definition of a 'borrower' under the relevant statutes and that accepting an offer of payment from the beneficiary did not operate to exonerate the nominal borrower. The court laid down the principle that recovery proceedings can be pursued against a nominal borrower notwithstanding prior attempts to recover the debt from the actual beneficiary of a benami loan.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a nominal borrower in a benami loan transaction can be exonerated from liability solely because recovery proceedings were initiated against the actual beneficiary?
  • Does the definition of borrower under the West Pakistan Co-operative Societies and Co-operative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance 1966 include both the person in whose name the loan is advanced and the real beneficiary?
  • Can authorities proceed to recover a loan from the nominal borrower after attempting recovery from the surety or beneficiary?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rehman Bajwa vs Sultan and 9 Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-25
  revisional jurisdictionwrit jurisdictioncross-casesacquittalremand for retrialconstitutional petitionmisappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a criminal case where a Magistrate acquitted the accused, but an Additional Sessions Judge, exercising revisional jurisdiction, set aside the acquittal and ordered a retrial, directing that the police case and a cross-complaint be tried together. The High Court subsequently set aside the remand order via a writ petition. The core legal questions were whether the High Court correctly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to interfere with a revisional order, and whether the Additional Sessions Judge erred in ordering a retrial. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its limited constitutional jurisdiction by reappraising evidence as if hearing an appeal. The Court affirmed that a tribunal acting within its jurisdiction cannot be corrected under Article 199 merely for an incorrect decision. Furthermore, the Court held that revisional powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure are broader than writ jurisdiction, encompassing the review of correctness and propriety. The key principle laid down is that cross-cases concerning the same incident should ideally be tried by the same court to prevent conflicting judgments.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to interfere with a decision of a subordinate court merely because the decision is incorrect?
  • Are the powers of a Sessions Judge in revision under Section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 wider than the writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Should cross-cases arising from the same incident be tried by the same court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Razzaq vs Noor Ahmad and Another1981 SCMR 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-02
  evictionlandlord and tenantpersonal requirementconcurrent findings of factspecial leave to appealrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which upheld the eviction of the petitioner from a shop located in Faisalabad. The respondents, as landlords, had initiated eviction proceedings against the petitioner under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959, citing default in rent payment and personal requirement of the premises. The Rent Controller ordered eviction based on personal need, a decision subsequently affirmed by the Additional District Judge on appeal and the High Court in a second appeal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the landlords' personal need for the property were legally sustainable. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any omission, misreading of evidence, or violation of applicable legal principles by the lower courts. The Court affirmed that where concurrent findings of fact are established and no legal error is shown, the matter is not fit for the grant of special leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding personal requirement in rent cases where no misreading of evidence is shown?
  • Is a petition for special leave to appeal maintainable when the petitioner fails to point out any legal error or misreading of evidence by the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Razzaq vs Member, Board of Revenue, Colonies, Punjab, Lahore1981 SCMR 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-22
  non-prosecutiondismissal of appealadjournmentadvocate-on-recordinterim orderstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as an appeal. The core legal question concerned whether an adjournment request, based solely on the inability of newly engaged counsel to appear, constitutes sufficient cause to prevent the dismissal of an appeal for non-prosecution. The Court held that the reason provided was insufficient, noting that the Advocate-on-Record had a duty to ensure counsel was engaged and prepared in a timely manner. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution and recalled the interim order regarding the maintenance of status quo that had been issued previously. The principle laid down is that an adjournment request based on the unavailability of newly engaged counsel, without demonstrating sufficient cause or diligence by the Advocate-on-Record in preparing the case, does not justify delaying proceedings, and such failure to proceed warrants the dismissal of the appeal for non-prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inability of newly engaged counsel to appear constitute sufficient cause for an adjournment?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed for non-prosecution when an adjournment request is denied?
  • What is the consequence of failing to provide sufficient cause for an adjournment request in the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid, Etc. vs Mst. Majidan1981 SCMR 588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-08
  tentative rentstriking off defenceejectmentnon-complianceinterim orderlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by tenants against a common judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had restored the Rent Controller's order striking off the tenants' defence and directing their eviction for non-compliance with a tentative rent deposit order. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether tenants are justified in failing to comply with a tentative rent fixation order under rent restriction laws, and whether an interim order fixing tentative rent is appealable. The Supreme Court held that tentative rent orders are interim in nature, cannot be made the subject matter of independent first or second appeals, and do not justify non-compliance by tenants during the proceedings. The court laid down the principle that failure to comply with a lawful tentative rent order warrants the striking off of the tenant's defence and subsequent eviction, and that interim orders of tentative rent fixation are not independently appealable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an interim order fixing tentative rent is subject to independent first or second appeal?
  • Does failure to comply with a tentative rent order justify striking off the defence of the tenants?
  • Can tenants refuse to deposit tentative rent on the ground that the rate fixed is excessive?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qadeer vs Province of Baluchistan and Another1981 SCMR 841 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-24
  service lawresignationconditional resignationcontinuity of serviceservice tribunalfresh appointmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Baluchistan Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's claim for continuous service from 1951. The petitioner, originally employed in 1951, submitted a resignation in 1958 after his request for a transfer to facilitate his wife's medical treatment was denied. He stated that if the transfer was not granted, his resignation should be accepted. The resignation was accepted, and the petitioner was later re-employed in 1961. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's 1958 resignation was legally invalid due to being conditional, thereby entitling him to continuous service status. The Supreme Court held that the resignation was not conditional but rather an offer of an alternative, which the government accepted. Consequently, the court affirmed that the petitioner's employment in 1961 constituted a fresh appointment, breaking the continuity of his previous service. The court laid down the principle that a resignation offering an employer a choice between two actions, where one is accepted, constitutes a valid, unconditional resignation, precluding claims for continuous service based on prior employment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a resignation offering an employer a choice between transfer and resignation is legally conditional?
  • Does a fresh recruitment after a resignation break the continuity of previous government service?
  • Can an employee claim continuous service status after voluntarily resigning and subsequently being re-employed?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Manna N vs Haji Karam Ilahi1981 SCMR 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-13
  evictionrent controlretrospective operation of lawestoppel against lawbona fide requirementreconstruction of premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an eviction order granted against a tenant on the ground that the landlord required the premises for reconstruction. The core legal question was whether the amendment to Section 13(5)(6) of the Rent Ordinance, which introduced a requirement for the landlord to prove the reasonableness and bona fides of the reconstruction, applied retrospectively to pending eviction applications. The Supreme Court, relying on the precedent established in Hasan and others v. Fancy Foundation (PLD 1975 SC 1), held that the amendment was prospective and did not govern proceedings pending at the time of the amendment. Consequently, the Court rejected the appellant's argument that the landlord was estopped from relying on the unamended law simply because evidence regarding reasonableness and bona fides had been led during the trial. The Court affirmed that there is no estoppel against the law, and since the unamended law did not require proof of reasonableness or bona fides, the evidence presented on those issues was immaterial. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Is the amendment to Section 13(5)(6) of the Rent Ordinance regarding the landlord's requirement to prove reasonableness and bona fides retrospective in nature?
  • Can a party be estopped from relying on the unamended law if evidence regarding the requirements of the amended law was led during trial?
  • Does the absence of a legal requirement to prove bona fides render evidence led on that issue immaterial?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid vs Mst. Naimun Nisa Begum1981 PLD Supreme Court 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  rent restrictionsummary evictionpersonal uselandlord and tenantstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the High Court, which ordered the eviction of the petitioner-tenant from non-residential premises upon the application of the respondent landlady under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether subsection (2) of Section 14 bars a landlord who owns any building in any locality—regardless of its nature or use—from availing the summary eviction procedure under subsection (1). The Supreme Court held that subsection (2) must be read in conjunction with subsection (1), requiring a nexus between the personal use for which eviction is sought and the premises owned by the landlord. The Court reasoned that interpreting subsection (2) in isolation would defeat the legislative intent of providing summary relief to vulnerable classes of landlords. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the eviction orders while granting the tenant four months to vacate the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Whether subsection (2) of Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 disentitles a landlord from seeking summary eviction if they own premises in any locality regardless of its use?
  • Does the ownership of a residential building by a landlord preclude them from seeking eviction of a tenant from a non-residential premises required for personal use?
  • How is subsection (2) of Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 to be construed in relation to subsection (1)?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majeed vs Ata Illahi Etc.S1981 SCMR 217 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-16
  consolidation proceedingsleave to appealallotment of landboard of revenuepractical loss
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order passed by the Member Board of Revenue relating to the allotment of land during consolidation proceedings in village Kot Hassan, tehsil Hafizabad, District Gujranwala. The core legal question considered by the court was whether a petitioner who has suffered no practical or comparative loss in land value or utility through consolidation proceedings is entitled to challenge the allotment. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where the petitioner fails to demonstrate any actual or practical loss resulting from the new allotment compared to their original land, the petition lacks merit and leave to appeal must be refused. The key principle laid down is that discretionary relief and leave to appeal under constitutional or appellate jurisdiction will not be extended in the absence of demonstrable prejudice or actual loss suffered by the aggrieved party.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when a petitioner fails to show any practical loss resulting from land consolidation?
  • Does an allotment of land in consolidation proceedings give rise to a valid claim if the new land is comparable to the original holding?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Khaliq vs Shaikh Mazhar Ul Haque and Other1981 SCMR 1238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-17
  evictionpersonal needlandlord and tenantrented premisesprotracted litigationejectment proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order regarding the eviction of a tenant from a shop. The core legal question was whether a landlord's claim for personal need—specifically to accommodate his male children—is defeated if those children occupy rented premises during the pendency of protracted eviction proceedings. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that a landlord seeking eviction on grounds of personal need cannot be non-suited simply because the intended beneficiaries (the landlord's children) were compelled by the inordinate delay of the litigation to secure rented accommodation elsewhere. The Court held that the landlord's right to reclaim his own property for his children's business remains valid despite the children's temporary occupation of rented premises. The principle established is that a landlord is not precluded from seeking eviction for personal use merely because the proposed occupants are currently utilizing rented property, particularly when the necessity for the eviction arose from the landlord's legitimate requirement and the delay was not of the landlord's making.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord be non-suited in an eviction case on grounds of personal need if his children, for whom the premises were required, have occupied rented premises during the pendency of the litigation?
  • Does a landlord's reinstatement in service negate a previously established ground of personal need for eviction of a tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Karim vs The State and Anothur1981 SCMR 1095 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-19
  quashment of criminal proceedingscriminal breach of trustcheatingadverse observationscivil liabilityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal proceedings registered under Sections 406 and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code against the petitioner, Abdul Karim, following a dispute over the supply of a cotton ginning and baling press financed through the Agricultural Bank of Pakistan. The High Court accepted the petitioner's application and quashed the criminal proceedings. However, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court aggrieved by certain observations made in the High Court judgment regarding the fabrication of agreements and civil liabilities concerning payments and machinery. The core legal question considered was whether unnecessary adverse observations made during the quashment of criminal proceedings prejudice a party in potential civil litigation. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that the contested observations were not necessary for the quashment of the case, possessed no binding effect, and would not prejudice independent civil proceedings. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that unnecessary observations made by a criminal court during quashment do not bind parties in subsequent civil litigation, which must be decided on its own merits and evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Do unnecessary observations made by a High Court in a criminal quashment order have a binding effect on subsequent civil proceedings?
  • Can a petitioner seek leave to appeal against purely descriptive or unnecessary observations in a judgment where the ultimate relief of quashment was granted?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Haque and Another vs Khan Muqarrab Khan and Other1981 SCMR 691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-24
  constitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionassociation deedsettlement departmentfraudcivil suitconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, concerning the transfer of a residential property and shop in Lyallpur by the Settlement Department. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly refused to interfere under its constitutional jurisdiction with concurrent findings of fact by the settlement authorities regarding the execution of an association deed. The Supreme Court held that since there was evidence to support the fourth respondent's claim and the findings were not based on a total misreading of evidence, the High Court was justified in declining interference. Furthermore, the Court laid down the principle that where a case essentially turns on allegations of fraud and disputed questions of fact, the proper remedy is a civil suit rather than a constitutional writ petition, leaving it open to the petitioners to institute a suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with concurrent findings of fact by the Settlement Department based on evidence?
  • Is a writ petition the proper remedy when a case turns on allegations of fraud and disputed questions of fact?
  • Can a party aggrieved by an association deed relating to property transfer file a civil suit to enforce their alleged rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hamid vs Gulab Khan and 2 Other1981 SCMR 188 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-18
  evacuee propertypermanent transfer deedsettlement authoritiesdemarcation disputeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a dispute regarding the proper demarcation of a room claimed by the petitioner as part of an evacuee house transferred to him under settlement laws, while the respondents maintained it formed part of their adjacently transferred house. The petitioner challenged the orders of the Settlement Authorities through a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed in limine, leading to the present petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question raised was whether the Settlement Authorities retained jurisdiction to demarcate the property and re-examine its transfer after the issuance of a permanent transfer deed. The Supreme Court held that interference was unwarranted where the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, upon a detailed spot inspection, found that the disputed room was unquestionably part of the respondent's house and had been recently blocked off to amalgamate it with the petitioner's property, a factual finding affirmed through appellate and revisional forums. The Court accordingly dismissed the petition, upholding the finality of the concurrent factual determinations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Settlement Authorities have jurisdiction to demarcate property after the issuance of a permanent transfer deed?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities regarding property demarcation be interfered with under writ jurisdiction?
  • Whether a property transfer under settlement laws can be re-opened in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hamid Etc. vs Ghulam Rasool1981 SCMR 1054 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-19
  pre-emption suitwaiverlimitationspecial leave to appealcogent evidencenew plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld a decree in a pre-emption suit. The core legal questions were whether the petitioners could raise a new plea of limitation regarding court fees at the appellate stage, and whether the lower appellate court erred in reversing the trial court's finding on the issue of waiver. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners could not raise a new plea of limitation for the first time in the Supreme Court, as it was not urged in the High Court. Regarding the waiver plea, the Court affirmed the High Court's finding that the evidence presented by the defendants was insufficient to establish waiver, noting that waiver in pre-emption suits requires strong, cogent evidence. The Court dismissed the petitions in limine, finding no merit in the arguments presented, thereby upholding the lower court's decision in favour of the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new plea of limitation regarding court fees for the first time in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • What standard of evidence is required to establish a plea of waiver in a pre-emption suit?
  • Can an appellate court reverse a trial court's finding on waiver when the evidence provided by the defendant is based on hearsay or lack of personal knowledge?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed vs Mansur Malik and 4 Other1981 SCMR 973 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-06
  rent evictionremand orderappellate jurisdictionlandlord and tenantdiscretionary jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from an eviction petition filed by landlords against a tenant and the petitioner, Abdul Hameed, alleging rent default and unauthorized subletting. The petitioner contended that he possessed the premises in his own right and that, absent statutory notices under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act or the Rent Restriction Ordinance, no landlord-tenant relationship existed. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, but the Additional District Judge remanded the case for fresh evidence. The High Court set aside this remand order, holding that the appellate authority lacked the power under section 15(3) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance to remand the case for fresh evidence. The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the High Court's decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner had no legitimate grievance as he had challenged the remand order himself. Furthermore, the High Court's order directed the appellate authority to conduct further inquiry, which sufficiently protected the petitioner's rights to lead evidence. The Court declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 185(3) of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellate authority under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 possess the power to remand a case to the Rent Controller for the production of fresh evidence?
  • Can a party who successfully challenges an appellate order in the High Court subsequently complain about the High Court's decision to remand the matter for further inquiry by the appellate authority itself?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed vs Abdul Rasheed1981 SCMR 527 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-24
  ejectment petitionlandlord and tenantconcurrent findings of factlimitationcondonation of delaytime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed the ejectment of the petitioner from disputed premises. The core legal questions were whether the relationship of landlord and tenant was established between the parties and whether the petition for special leave was barred by limitation. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the ejectment petition, finding the tenancy unproven. However, the District Judge reversed this decision, finding the respondent's evidence sufficient to establish the tenancy, a finding subsequently upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact regarding the tenancy. Furthermore, the Court held that the petition was time-barred by 15 days. The petitioner's application for condonation of delay, based on a medical certificate from a private practitioner, was rejected as unreliable, particularly as the certificate was not originally attached to the court file. Consequently, the petition was dismissed both on its merits and on the ground of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship?
  • Is a medical certificate from a private practitioner sufficient to justify the condonation of delay in filing a petition?
  • Does a failure to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant warrant the dismissal of an ejectment petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed Khan vs Water & Power Development Authority and Another1981 SCMR 325 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-20
  compulsory retirementalternative remedyService Tribunalconstitutional jurisdictiondisputed questions of factwrit petitionmaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the dismissal of his constitutional petition challenging his compulsory retirement from service. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court was justified in refusing to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 on the ground that an alternative and adequate remedy by way of an appeal before the Service Tribunal was available under the governing statute, particularly when the case involved disputed questions of fact requiring the recording of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly declined to interfere under its constitutional jurisdiction as the Service Tribunal was the appropriate forum equipped to examine both factual and legal controversies. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that the availability of an alternative statutory remedy, such as an appeal to a Service Tribunal, bars the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction, especially where the determination of the dispute necessitates the recording of evidence and evaluation of disputed questions of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the availability of an alternative remedy before the Service Tribunal bars the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199?
  • Can the High Court refuse to exercise constitutional jurisdiction when a case involves disputed questions of fact requiring the recording of evidence?
  • Does an order of compulsory retirement from service provide grounds for a writ petition when an appeal is statutorily provided before a Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hafiz vs Secretary, Communication & Works DepartmentPLD 19817 Supreme Court 211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-13
  service tribunalmisconductstoppage of incrementscumulative effectgovernment servantsefficiency and discipline rulesspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 212 of the Constitution seeks special leave to appeal against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal against the penalty of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. The core legal questions involved whether a government servant clearing a financial advance against himself constitutes misconduct, and whether the penalty of withholding increments with cumulative effect is permissible under the applicable Efficiency and Discipline Rules. The Supreme Court held that clearing an advance against oneself in a previous capacity violates departmental instructions and amounts to misconduct, and that the amended rules providing for stoppage of increments inherently entail cumulative effect unless expressly stated otherwise. The court laid down the principle that an officer cannot pass orders in their own financial case, and that the stoppage of increments under the relevant efficiency rules operates with cumulative effect unless the competent authority explicitly directs otherwise.

  Questions settled

  • Does a government servant passing orders to clear a financial advance against himself in a previous capacity amount to misconduct?
  • Can the penalty of withholding increments be imposed with cumulative effect under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960?
  • What is the legal effect of the amended rule regarding the stoppage of increments on a government servant's time-scale?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hafeez vs The State1981 PLD Supreme Court 352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-04
  revisional jurisdictionDrug Courtenhancement of sentenceinferior criminal courtspurious drugfinality of orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court, which had not only dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his conviction under section 27 of the Drugs Act 1976, but had also enhanced his sentence from six months to three years' rigorous imprisonment in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The core legal questions were whether the High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction over orders of a Drug Court despite the absence of an express provision in the Drugs Act 1976, whether a Drug Court constitutes an 'inferior criminal Court' under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the finality clause in the Drugs Act ousted such revisional powers. The Supreme Court held that a Drug Court, being subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, is an 'inferior criminal Court' under section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is not ousted by the finality provisions of the Drugs Act 1976. The key principle laid down is that the creation of an appellate relationship implicitly establishes the inferior status of a tribunal, attracting the revisional powers of the High Court under the general criminal procedure law unless expressly excluded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has revisional jurisdiction over orders passed by a Drug Court under the Drugs Act 1976?
  • Does a Drug Court constitute an inferior criminal Court within the meaning of section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether the finality attached to orders of a Drug Court under section 39 of the Drugs Act 1976 ousts the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Can the High Court enhance a sentence in an appeal brought before it from a Drug Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghaffar vs Munir and 4 Other1981 SCMR 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-26
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationcommon objectlalkarajoint criminal liabilitysupreme court review of discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court granting bail to respondents 1 to 4 who were implicated in a case under sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioner contended that the respondents shared a common object and raised a general lalkara, implicating them in the murder. The Supreme Court observed that decisions in criminal cases depend upon their peculiar facts and circumstances, and a general lalkara may or may not fix persons with joint criminal liability depending on those circumstances. Since no active role or specific injury was attributed to the respondents, and the High Court exercised its discretion judicially in granting bail without perversity or miscarriage of justice, the Supreme Court declined to interfere. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, with the clarification that observations made during bail hearings are tentative and will not prejudice the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does a general lalkara invariably fix all persons present at the scene with joint criminal liability regardless of the circumstances?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretionary grant of bail by a High Court in the absence of a perverse exercise or miscarriage of justice?
  • Do tentative observations made by a court while deciding a bail application prejudice the case of the complainant at the subsequent trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghaffar Etc. vs Muhammad Ramzan and Other1981S C M R 1162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-09
  service tribunalseniorityback-dated seniorityreinstatementcivil petition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprises civil petitions arising from a common order of the Baluchistan Service Tribunal, Quetta, which accepted the appeals of the respondents and interfered with the petitioners' seniority as Tehsildars. The petitioners had initially been selected, reverted, and subsequently reinstated in service with back-dated seniority by orders of the Governor. The Service Tribunal altered their seniority rankings without setting aside the underlying reinstatement and seniority-granting orders of the Governor, on the premise that seniority could not run from a back date when the petitioners were not actively performing duties as Tehsildars. The core legal question is whether consequential seniority fixed pursuant to competent executive orders can be interfered with while the foundational reinstatement and seniority orders remain subsisting and un-set aside. The Supreme Court held that until the orders granting back-dated seniority are formally set aside, the consequential seniority fixation cannot be legally interfered with. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to the petitioners to examine this proposition.

  Questions settled

  • Can consequential seniority fixed pursuant to an executive order be interfered with while the foundational order granting back-dated seniority remains subsisting and un-set aside?
  • Whether a service tribunal can alter seniority rankings without setting aside the underlying reinstatement and seniority-granting orders of the competent authority?
  • Does back-dated seniority depend strictly upon the actual performance of duties during the disputed period?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Baqui vs Shaista Khan and Another1981S C M R468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-11
  bail cancellationattempted murdercriminal procedurepetition for leave to appealdiscretion of the court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the cancellation of bail by the Baluchistan High Court. The petitioner was arrested in connection with an occurrence in Quetta and was initially granted interim bail, which was subsequently recalled when it transpired he was charged under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code. After the submission of the challan, the Additional Sessions Judge granted him bail on the ground that the trial would take time. The complainant successfully moved the High Court for bail cancellation, noting that injuries were inflicted on vital parts of the complainant's body and that the petitioner was tentatively implicated under section 307. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court exercised its discretion arbitrarily or unreasonably. The Court held that the High Court properly cancelled the bail based on the material implicating the petitioner in a serious offense, and found no arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the decision. The key principle laid down is that bail may be cancelled by a superior court when the accused is tentatively implicated in a serious crime involving injuries to vital parts of the body, and the lower court's grant of bail under such circumstances is unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can cancel bail granted by a lower court when the accused is charged with an offense under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Does the cancellation of bail by the High Court under Section 307 amount to an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of discretion?
  • Can a trial court entertain a fresh application for bail after recording some evidence if circumstances permit?
  Read full judgment →
• Abaad Ali and Another vs Muhammad Din1981 SCMR 742 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-20
  pre-emptiontenantrevenue recordoral evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal stemming from a pre-emption suit. The core legal question determined by the court was whether the petitioners qualified as tenants entitled to pre-empt a land sale under the provisions of Martial Law Regulation No. 115, given their assertion of tenancy based on oral evidence regarding cultivation and lessee status. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the liability to pay rent is the primary condition for establishing tenancy under the applicable definition adopted from the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, and oral testimony alone is insufficient to rebut the correctness of the revenue record which showed no such liability. Consequently, the petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that oral testimony cannot displace the presumption of truth attached to revenue records regarding tenancy without proof of the essential legal requirement of liability to pay rent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether oral testimony alone is sufficient to disprove the presumption attached to the revenue record regarding tenancy?
  • Is the liability to pay rent a necessary condition for qualifying as a tenant under Martial Law Regulation No. 115?
  • Can petitioners claim a right of pre-emption as tenants without establishing their tenancy status through proper evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• A. M. Wahidi vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan1981 SCMR 310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-28
  ad hoc appointmentservice lawreversionqualifying examinationService Tribunalcompassionate groundsadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his reversion from the post of Section Officer to Assistant Incharge. The petitioner, initially appointed as an ad hoc Section Officer, failed to pass the mandatory qualifying examination within two allowed attempts, despite missing the second attempt due to illness. The core legal question was whether the petitioner possessed a legal right to retain his ad hoc position despite failing the examination, and whether his reversion was legally flawed due to procedural or competency issues. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had no vested legal right to continue in the post of Section Officer on an ad hoc basis after failing to clear the qualifying examination. The Court clarified that while the government may exercise discretion to allow further attempts on compassionate grounds, such discretion does not create a justiciable legal right for the employee to retain the post. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the Tribunal's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does an ad hoc employee have a vested legal right to continue in a post after failing to pass the mandatory qualifying examination within the prescribed number of attempts?
  • Can an appellate court grant leave to appeal on grounds that were not raised before the Service Tribunal?
  • Does the government's discretionary decision to allow an employee another attempt at a qualifying examination on compassionate grounds create a legal right to retain an ad hoc position?
  Read full judgment →
• A. M. Qureshi vs Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Another1981 PLD Supreme Court 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-08
  sovereign immunityrestrictive immunitycommercial transactionsacta jure gestionisforeign statetrade representationjurisdictionlex loci contractus
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed whether a foreign state and its trade representation enjoy absolute sovereign immunity from being sued in the courts of Pakistan for commercial and trading transactions. The plaintiff had filed a suit for the recovery of commission and damages for breach of contract against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its Trade Representation in Pakistan. The trial court and the appellate bench dismissed the suit, holding it non-maintainable without the central government's consent under the Code of Civil Procedure. Granting special leave, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity no longer represents a uniform rule of customary international law regarding commercial activities, which are governed by the restrictive theory of immunity (acta jure gestionis). The Court ruled that under the bilateral treaty, the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and the State Immunity Ordinance 1981, a foreign state entering into commercial contracts localized in Pakistan is subject to local municipal jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower court orders and remanding the suit for trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does a foreign state enjoy absolute immunity from being sued in the municipal courts of Pakistan in respect of commercial transactions?
  • Whether the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 expressly or impliedly bar a suit against a foreign state without the prior consent of the central government?
  • Do rules of customary international law regarding sovereign immunity apply to commercial and trading activities undertaken by a foreign state or its organs?
  • Are statutes relating to diplomatic and state immunity procedural in nature and thus applicable retrospectively to pending proceedings?
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• Zarin Khan vs The State1980 SCMR 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-02
  post-arrest bailinfirmitymedical grounds for bailjail treatmentcriminal procedurebail discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, charged with double murder and attempted murder under the Pakistan Penal Code, sought bail on the grounds of infirmity pursuant to the second proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. His bail applications were previously dismissed by the Sessions Judge and the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that medical reports confirming his chronic Asthmatic Bronchitis and pulmonary tuberculosis qualified him as an infirm person entitled to bail. The Supreme Court examined the medical evidence, including reports from a private practitioner, the jail doctor, and a Medical Board. The Court held that while the petitioner suffered from chronic ailments, the medical evidence did not establish that his condition rendered him an 'infirm person' within the meaning of the statute, as he could receive adequate treatment within the jail system. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the jail authorities are responsible for providing necessary specialized treatment to the petitioner, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a diagnosis of chronic Asthmatic Bronchitis and pulmonary tuberculosis automatically qualify an accused as an infirm person under the second proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail on medical grounds if the medical evidence indicates that their condition can be treated within the jail hospital?
  • What is the responsibility of jail authorities regarding an accused who requires specialized medical treatment while in custody?
  Read full judgment →
• Zakaullah vs Mst. Sultan Jehan Begum1980 SCMR 896 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-26
  non-prosecutiondismissal of appealre-admission of appealsufficient causespecial leave to appealcounsel absence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind, which dismissed the petitioner's second appeal for non-prosecution due to the absence of the petitioner and his counsel. The petitioner sought to have the appeal re-admitted, claiming his counsel was busy before another bench and had received incorrect information regarding an adjournment. The High Court rejected this application, noting that no formal intimation was provided to the court, the affidavit failed to specify the details of the alleged engagement, and the claim regarding the adjournment was implausible. The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court's findings and concurred with the reasoning that the petitioner's assertions lacked merit and credibility. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to re-admit the appeal. The principle affirmed is that an application for re-admission of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution requires credible evidence of sufficient cause for absence, and unsubstantiated claims of counsel's engagement or misinformation do not constitute valid grounds for restoration.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution be re-admitted based on an unsubstantiated claim that counsel was busy before another bench?
  • Is a vague assertion of counsel's engagement sufficient to set aside an ex parte order of dismissal?
  • Does the failure to provide formal intimation to the court regarding counsel's absence justify the dismissal of an application for re-admission of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Zaigham Hafeez vs Controller of Examinations, Board of Intermediate1980 SCMR 527 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-29
  leave to appealunfair meansmatriculation examinationdisciplinary committeeeducational authoritiesstudent disqualification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a student who was disqualified from passing a Matriculation Examination and three subsequent examinations after being found guilty of using unfair means. Following a previous remand by the Supreme Court for a de novo inquiry, the Disciplinary Committee again found the petitioner guilty, and the High Court dismissed his subsequent writ petition. The core legal question is whether the educational authorities disposed of the case in conformity with the intent and spirit of the Supreme Court's earlier remand order, and whether the finding of unfair means was sustainable based on the record. The Supreme Court held that leave to appeal should be granted after observing that the objectionable material was not in the petitioner's handwriting, the answer was not an exact reproduction, and the student possessed an otherwise excellent academic and career record. The Court suspended the disciplinary orders and directed the announcement of the petitioner's examination result subject to the final decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether educational authorities disposed of a case on remand in conformity with the intent and spirit of the Supreme Court's order?
  • Can a finding of unfair means be sustained when the objectionable material is not in the candidate's handwriting and lacks exact reproduction?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted in educational disciplinary matters involving student disqualification?
  Read full judgment →
• Zahoor Hussain vs The State1980 SCMR 35 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-22
  post-arrest bailmisappropriationdelay in investigationnon-submission of challanprevention of corruptioncancellation of bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's rejection of a bail application filed by a Sub-Engineer accused of offenses under Sections 409, 461, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, involving the misappropriation of government property. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail considering the prolonged delay in completing the investigation and submitting the trial report. The Supreme Court observed that although the FIR was registered as far back as 7-12-1978, the police had not submitted even an incomplete challan, and an audit was still ongoing to determine the exact value of the alleged stolen property. Converting the petition into an appeal, the Supreme Court granted bail to the petitioner subject to furnishing required bail bonds. The Court laid down the principle that undue delay in completing investigation and failure to submit a challan justify granting bail, reserving the prosecution's liberty to seek cancellation upon completing investigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does long delay in completing an investigation and submitting a challan justify the grant of bail to an accused?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant post-arrest bail while reserving the prosecution's liberty to apply for cancellation after investigation is completed?
  Read full judgment →
• Yasin alias Cheema and Another vs The State1980 SCMR 575 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-15
  medical evidencecross-examinationpost-mortem examinationocular testimonyblood feudrecovery of weaponscriminal appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the convictions of the appellants under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Muhammad Tufail. The core legal questions involved whether the defence had a legal right to reserve the cross-examination of a medical witness for the Sessions Court under Section 509 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, whether the failure to summon the medical witness caused prejudice, and whether there was any irreconcilable conflict between the ocular and medical evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeals, holding that Section 509 does not confer a right on an accused to demand the presence of a medical witness or to reserve cross-examination, as summoning the witness lies entirely within the discretion of the court. The Court laid down that an accused person has no inherent right to reserve the cross-examination of a medical witness for the trial court, that the non-production of a medical witness does not vitiate proceedings unless actual prejudice is shown, and that minor discrepancies between ocular testimony and medical evidence do not warrant the rejection of truthful eye-witness accounts supported by corroborative recoveries.

  Questions settled

  • Does an accused person have a legal right under the Code of Criminal Procedure to reserve the cross-examination of a medical witness for the Sessions Court?
  • Whether the failure of the trial court or High Court to summon a medical witness for cross-examination automatically causes prejudice to the defence?
  • Can a conflict between medical evidence and ocular testimony alone form the basis for rejecting otherwise credible eye-witness accounts?
  • Does delay in forwarding recovered weapons to the Chemical Examiner invariably render the chemical report unreliable?
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• Wali Khan vs Nasir Khan and Another1980 SCMR 944 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-10
  acquittalbenefit of doubtexhortationocular evidencecriminal appealleave to appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the acquittal of the respondent by the Peshawar High Court in a murder case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondent and his absconding brother waylaid the deceased, with the respondent exhorting his brother to kill the victim. The trial court had convicted the respondent under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but the High Court acquitted him, citing the improbability of a younger brother exhorting an elder brother to commit murder when both were armed, thus extending the benefit of doubt. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in acquitting the respondent without explicitly disbelieving the eyewitnesses. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that an acquittal based on the benefit of doubt does not necessitate a finding that eyewitnesses deliberately provided false testimony. The Court affirmed that the High Court had applied its mind to the facts and that the grounds for setting aside an acquittal were not satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of an accused based on the benefit of doubt necessarily imply that the eyewitnesses provided false testimony?
  • Can an appellate court acquit an accused without explicitly rejecting the testimony of eyewitnesses?
  • What are the conditions required for the Supreme Court to set aside an order of acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Wahiduddin vs Province of Sind1980 PLC (C. S.) 390 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-27
  civil servantprobationertermination of servicemisconduct inquiryservice tribunal discretionproduction of documentssubstantial question of law of public importanceinitial appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, appointed as a Civil Judge on a regular basis upon selection by the Public Service Commission, had his services terminated under section 11 of the Sind Civil Servants Act, 1973 while serving as a probationer. He appealed to the Sind Service Appellate Tribunal, contending that his termination was a punitive removal for misconduct requiring an inquiry, and sought the production of records, which the Tribunal refused. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, holding that the termination was a simple discharge of a probationer. In the petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued he was not a probationer and that the Tribunal erred in refusing to summon the record. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was indeed a probationer under initial appointment, that the Tribunal's power to summon records under the Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973 is discretionary, and that the refusal to summon records did not raise a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the termination of a civil servant serving as a probationer under section 11 of the Sind Civil Servants Act, 1973 requires a show cause notice and an inquiry?
  • Does an initial appointment to a civil service otherwise than by promotion or transfer constitute an initial appointment on probation?
  • Is the power of the Sind Service Tribunal to compel the production of documents under section 5(2)(b) of the Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973 discretionary?
  • Does the question of whether a service tribunal should summon record in a given case involve a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Draz Cheem a vs Nazar Muhammad and Others1980 SCMR 156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-17
  local government electionsdisqualification of candidatesnomination papersstatutory interpretationelection petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions challenging the Lahore High Court's interpretation of clause (f) of section 21 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, concerning candidate disqualifications for local council elections. The core legal question involves whether clause (f) incorporates disqualifications from other laws only when a candidate has been specifically disqualified by a prior individual order, or whether disqualifications operate by operation of law. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly interpreted the provision, finding that the term 'disqualified' under clause (f) signifies disability according to other statutes without requiring a prior specific order of disqualification, and that disqualifications under other laws form an integral part of the Ordinance. The petitions were consequently dismissed, establishing that statutory disqualifications for parliament or provincial assemblies apply automatically to local council candidates under clause (f) by operation of law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether clause (f) of section 21 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 requires a candidate to be specifically disqualified by a prior order of a competent authority before the disqualification applies?
  • Do the disqualifications for membership of the Parliament or a Provincial Assembly under other laws apply automatically by operation of law to local council candidates?
  • Does section 4 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 override disqualifications contained in other statutes incorporated by reference?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Din vs Fazal Muhammad1980 SCMR 906 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-14
  ejectmentrent controlmaterial impairmentconcurrent findings of factleave to appealtenancy dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge regarding the ejectment of the petitioner-tenant. The landlord sought eviction based on two grounds: default in rent payment for November and December 1973, and material damage to the demised property, specifically the removal of doors and tampering with walls, which allegedly impaired the property's utility. The core legal question was whether the alleged structural alterations constituted sufficient grounds for eviction under the relevant rent laws. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of fact by the three lower courts regarding the removal of doors and damage to walls were conclusive. The Court affirmed that such actions constituted material impairment of the property's utility, thereby justifying the eviction order. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by lower courts regarding the material impairment of rented premises, provided such findings are supported by the evidence on record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the removal of doors and tampering with walls in a rented shop constitute material impairment of the property's utility?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts in rent ejectment cases?
  • Is a tenant liable for eviction if they damage the demised property to an extent that impairs its utility?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Nayyar Mirza and Others1980 SCMR 325 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-08
  de novo trialcriminal procedureinterlocutory orderleave to appealinterests of justicetrial continuityprejudice to accused
  Summary & questions settled

  The State filed a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that upheld a Sessions Judge's decision to continue a criminal trial from the stage where his predecessor had left off, rather than conducting a de novo trial. The trial involved charges under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and the presiding judge had retired after 41 of 53 prosecution witnesses had been examined. The accused requested to continue the trial to avoid further delay, a position the Sessions Judge accepted, noting that the interests of justice favored continuity and that no prejudice would be caused to the accused. The High Court dismissed the State's revision petition, finding no merit in the State's objection. The Supreme Court, while acknowledging that the legal objections raised regarding de novo trials were academically important and intricate, declined to intervene at this interlocutory stage. The Court held that the specific facts and the advanced stage of the trial did not justify interference, preferring to allow the trial to conclude and review the matter, if necessary, in the totality of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a successor judge continue a criminal trial from the stage left by a predecessor without conducting a de novo trial?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere in interlocutory criminal proceedings where the trial is at an advanced stage?
  • Is a de novo trial mandatory upon the transfer or retirement of a presiding judge in a criminal case?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Ismail and Another1980 SCMR 268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-28
  sanction for prosecutionlocus poenitentiaedelegation of powersexecutive authorityrevision of sanctionprevention of corruption
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals arose out of two decisions of the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, where criminal proceedings against public servants were quashed on the ground of invalid sanctions for prosecution under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958. The core legal questions pertained to whether an executive authority, having once refused sanction or chosen departmental inquiry, retains the power to subsequently revise or withdraw that decision and grant sanction for prosecution, and whether a delegator can revise a sanction decision made by its delegatee. The Supreme Court held that the grant or refusal of sanction is subject to the principle of locus poenitentiae, meaning the executive authority retains the right to recede until a decisive step is taken. Once a refusal or alternative decision (such as instituting a departmental inquiry) has been given effect to, no locus poenitentiae remains. Furthermore, an order passed by a delegatee exercising delegated powers is deemed to be the decision of the delegator itself, which exhausts the power and cannot be revised by a higher authority. Both appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae prevent the executive from revising an order refusing sanction for prosecution after a decisive step has been taken?
  • Can a delegator revise or override a decision refusing sanction for prosecution that was competently made by its delegatee?
  • Is an order passed by a delegatee in exercise of delegated statutory powers deemed to be the decision of the delegator itself?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Kohistan1980 SCMR 273 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-29
  murderself-defenseocular evidencemedical evidenceinterested witnessesacquittalcriminal appealdying declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  The State appealed against the High Court's acquittal of the respondent, who was initially convicted for murder and causing injuries. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in light of conflicting medical and ocular evidence and the respondent's plea of self-defense. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case. The Court found that the eye-witnesses were hostile to the respondent due to long-standing family enmity, necessitating independent corroboration which was absent. Crucially, the medical evidence contradicted the eye-witnesses' account regarding the direction of fire, rendering their testimony unreliable. Furthermore, the medical evidence supported the respondent's injuries, making his plea of self-defense plausible. The Court affirmed that when ocular evidence is falsified by medical testimony and the prosecution fails to prove motive or provide corroboration for interested witnesses, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. Consequently, the Court dismissed the State's appeal, maintaining the acquittal, as the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof.

  Questions settled

  • Does medical evidence contradicting ocular testimony regarding the direction of fire render eye-witness accounts unreliable?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution fails to prove motive and the eye-witnesses are established to be hostile?
  • Must an accused person prove a plea of self-defense, or is it sufficient that the plea cannot be ruled out?
  • What is the effect of failing to put a question regarding motive to the accused during examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• The Sheikhupura Central Cooperative Bank Ltd., Sheikhupura vs Province of Punjab through Collector, Dist_. Sheikhupura1980 SCMR 699 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-03
  temporary injunctionindemnity agreementtreasury defalcationarrears of land revenuejudicial discretioninterlocutory reliefcontractual liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the recovery of funds defalcated by an employee of the petitioner-bank, which acted as a treasurer for the District Treasury. The petitioner had executed an indemnity agreement in 1955, assuming responsibility for any embezzlement by its employees. Following the conviction of an employee for defalcation, the Collector sought to recover the loss from the petitioner as arrears of land revenue. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that government officials' failure to enforce treasury rules contributed to the loss, and sought a temporary injunction against the recovery proceedings. The trial court and appellate courts refused the injunction, and the High Court affirmed this, finding no illegality or material irregularity in the lower courts' exercise of discretion. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the grant of an interlocutory injunction is a matter of judicial discretion, and interference is only warranted if lower courts acted illegally or with material irregularity. The Court noted that the petitioner's liability under the indemnity agreement remains a triable issue requiring evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with the exercise of discretion by lower courts regarding the grant of a temporary injunction absent illegality or material irregularity?
  • Does an indemnity agreement covering embezzlement by employees create a prima facie liability for the employer in the context of treasury operations?
  • Is the question of whether a loss occurred due to lack of official control versus contractual liability a matter requiring substantial evidence at the interlocutory stage?
  Read full judgment →
• The Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Education Department1980 PLC (C. S.) 393 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-18
  service tribunalpromotion qualificationtechnical education experienceinterpretation of rulespolytechnic principalpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Punjab Administrative Tribunal which accepted an appeal filed by respondent No. 1 against his reversion from the post of Principal, Government Polytechnic Institute, Sialkot, to the post of Head Teachers Trainer. The core legal question centered on the proper interpretation of the expression 'nine years professional and/or technical education experience' required under the West Pakistan Technical Education Department Gazetted Post Recruitment Rules, 1966, specifically whether qualifying experience must be acquired subsequent to obtaining the minimum technical qualification (such as an A.M.I.E. equivalent) or could be counted from the date the candidate began imparting technical education in service. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's interpretation was unexceptional, finding no condition in the rules that limits qualifying experience solely to the period subsequent to obtaining the technical degree. Furthermore, the Court held that no substantial question of law of public importance was involved under the constitutional provision. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether professional and technical education experience required for promotion must be acquired only after obtaining the minimum prescribed technical qualification?
  • Can a limitation requiring experience to be post-qualification be read into statutory recruitment rules when no such restriction is expressly stated?
  • Does the interpretation of service rules regarding promotion criteria constitute a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212(3) of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• The National Electric Fans Manufacturers (Regd.), Gujrat vs S.1980 SC MR 97 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  passing offtrade nameinterim injunctiondescriptive wordssecondary meaningcommercial lawqualified injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a passing-off action initiated by the respondent, an electric fan manufacturer, against the petitioner, who also manufactures fans under the name 'National Electric Fans Manufacturers (Regd.)'. The respondent sought to restrain the petitioner from using the word 'National' in its trade name and on its products. The core legal question was whether a trader can be granted a monopoly over a common descriptive word like 'National' and whether a defendant is entitled to trade under its own business name despite potential confusion. The Supreme Court held that while a trader cannot be prohibited from using its own business name, it must not act dishonestly to pass off its goods as those of another. The Court ruled that the respondent failed to establish a prima facie case for a total monopoly over the word 'National'. However, the Court granted a qualified injunction, allowing the petitioner to use its business name while mandating specific labeling precautions to prevent consumer deception, noting that the respondent's claim was also weakened by significant delay.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trader be granted a monopoly over a common descriptive word used in its business name?
  • Is a defendant entitled to trade under its own business name if it causes confusion with an established competitor?
  • Does the owner of an unregistered trade mark have the right to prevent others from using a descriptive term in their business name?
  • What is the effect of significant delay on a claim for an interim injunction in a passing-off action?
  Read full judgment →
• The Lyallpur Exservicemen Goods Transport Society Ltd., Lyallpur vs Anwar Ahmad Khan and Another1980 SCMR 554 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-18
  settlement schemeproperty transferearmarkingbuilding sitedisplaced personsequitable distribution
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of property in Lyallpur under the Settlement Scheme. The core legal question concerned the entitlement of the petitioner-Society and the respondent to the transfer of an 8-kanal plot, which contained a house. The Settlement authorities had initially earmarked the house for the respondent, while the petitioner-Society claimed entitlement to the plot based on possession and a filed transfer form. The Settlement Commissioner determined that the respondent was entitled to the house plus three times the plinth area (totaling 4 kanals), while the remaining 4 kanals were to be disposed of by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The Lahore High Court upheld this division, confirming the petitioner-Society's entitlement to the remaining 4 kanals as a building site. The Supreme Court found the lower authorities' determination to be fair and equitable, treating the property as two distinct parts—a building site and a house—and consequently dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the equitable distribution of the property between the contesting parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can a property containing both a house and a plot be divided for transfer purposes under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Is a transferee of a house entitled to the transfer of three times the plinth area of the house?
  • Does the finding of fact by a Settlement Commissioner regarding the division of property warrant interference by the Supreme Court if it is equitable?
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• The Custodian of Enemy Property for Pakistan vs The Additional1980 SCMR 667 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-26
  writ petitionlacheswithdrawal of petitioncivil suitlaw of limitationappellate practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan following the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court on the grounds of laches. The petitioner sought to challenge this dismissal by introducing a document for the first time during the Supreme Court proceedings, arguing that its prior absence was the reason for the High Court's adverse decision. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, noting that the petitioner failed to provide any explanation for why the document was not presented before the High Court. Faced with this judicial stance, the petitioner requested to withdraw the petition with the liberty to pursue a civil suit instead. The Supreme Court allowed the withdrawal of the petition. The Court held that while the petitioner is free to initiate a civil suit to vindicate their rights, any such litigation remains subject to the applicable Law of Limitation and other relevant statutory provisions. The Court did not disturb the High Court's findings on laches, effectively concluding the constitutional petition while preserving the petitioner's right to seek alternative civil remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner introduce new evidence in the Supreme Court that was not presented before the High Court to challenge a dismissal based on laches?
  • Does the withdrawal of a writ petition with permission to file a civil suit exempt the subsequent suit from the Law of Limitation?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to withdraw a petition in the Supreme Court after failing to justify the omission of evidence in the lower court?
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• The Commissioner of Incometax/Sales Tax, Zone 'A', Lahore vs Messrs1980 SCMR 607 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-17
  sales taxvested rightretrospective legislationdelegated legislationtax exemptionassessment year
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the assessment of sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The core legal question was whether a subsequent notification reducing the tax exemption limit could be applied retrospectively to take away an accrued right of an assessee whose assessment year commenced prior to the notification. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was legally justified in its view, ruling that a right already accrued cannot be taken away by giving retrospective effect to delegated legislation. The key principle laid down is that fiscal exemptions or vested rights acquired at the commencement of an accounting period under an existing notification cannot be adversely affected by subsequent delegated legislation reducing the exemption limit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a right that has already accrued can be taken away by giving retrospective effect to delegated legislation?
  • Does a subsequent notification reducing the exemption limit for sales tax adversely affect an assessee whose accounting year started prior to the notification?
  • Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was legally justified in holding that the case was covered by Sales Tax Notification No. 2 dated 20th January, 1956?
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• The Commissioner of Incometax Lahore, Zone Lahore vs Nasir A. Sheikh1980 SCMR 718 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-02
  Income-taxdividend incomestatutory exemptiondeductible expensestax assessmentgross dividend
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the calculation of taxable dividend income under the Income-tax Act. The core legal question was whether statutory exemptions on dividend income, specifically the 10% exemption, should be deducted from the gross dividend receipts before or after calculating deductible expenses, such as interest. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and the High Court both held that the legislative intent behind placing the exemption in section 4(3) was to exclude a specified portion of dividend income from the total income calculation entirely. Consequently, the statutory rebate must be applied to the gross dividend receipts first, with deductible expenses applied only to the remaining amount. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld this interpretation, noting that it had previously affirmed this exact legal position in the case of Muhammadi Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax. Finding no merit in the petitioner's argument to deviate from established precedent, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Should statutory exemptions on dividend income be deducted from gross dividend receipts before or after calculating deductible expenses?
  • Does the placement of an exemption in section 4(3) of the Income-tax Act indicate an intention to exclude that portion of income from total income calculation entirely?
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• Tasadiq Hussain vs The State1980 SCMR 370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-22
  recall of judgmentcriminal appealabsence of counseladjournment requestretrialdismissal on merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a miscellaneous application filed by the appellant, Tasadiq Hussain, seeking the recall of a Supreme Court judgment dated 4th December 1979, which had dismissed his appeal against a High Court order directing his retrial for offenses under sections 409 and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The appellant contended that his counsel was ill and had requested an adjournment via the Deputy Registrar, arguing that the appeal should not have been decided in his absence. The Supreme Court rejected this submission, noting that no formal information regarding the inability of the appellant or his counsel to attend was available to the Registry at the time of the hearing. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the appeal was not dismissed for non-prosecution but was decided on its merits with the assistance of the State counsel. Consequently, the Court held that there were no valid grounds to recall the previous order, thereby maintaining the High Court's direction for a retrial.

  Questions settled

  • Can a judgment be recalled on the grounds that the appellant's counsel was absent due to illness if no formal notification was provided to the Court Registry?
  • Is an appeal decided on merits in the absence of the appellant's counsel liable to be recalled if the appellant claims they requested an adjournment?
  • Does the absence of an appellant and their counsel necessitate the dismissal of an appeal for non-prosecution, or can the Court proceed to decide the matter on merits?
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• Talib Hussain and Others vs The State1980 SCMR 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-15
  post-arrest bailaccomplice testimonydelayed investigationmala fidestentative appreciation of evidencecriminal conspiracy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against the refusal of bail in a criminal case concerning disturbances at a public meeting held in Liaqat Bagh, Rawalpindi, in March 1973, which resulted in multiple deaths and injuries. The core legal questions involve whether the delayed investigation and alleged mala fides, the non-recording of statements of injured persons, and the reliance on testimony of accomplices entitled the petitioners to post-arrest bail. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were not entitled to bail at this stage since investigations were still ongoing, the delay did not warrant bail given the complexity of the case, and the court was reluctant to undertake a tentative appreciation of evidence in bail matters. The court dismissed the petitions while directing the prosecution to complete investigations and commence the trial within three months.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delayed investigation entitles an accused person to post-arrest bail?
  • Does reliance on the testimony of accomplices justify the grant of bail in criminal cases?
  • Should the Supreme Court enter into a tentative appreciation of evidence while deciding bail petitions?
  • Does the oral suspension of an investigation by a Provincial Home Secretary amount to a legal cancellation of the First Information Report?
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• T. P. Lobo vs Government of Pakistan and Others1980 SCMR 748 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22
  civil servantad hoc appointmentreversionshow cause noticeservice tribunalpromotion quota
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from an order of the Service Tribunal dismissing the appeal of the petitioner against his reversion from the post of Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks to his substantive post of Examiner of Trade Marks. The core legal questions involve the legality of reverting an ad hoc appointee without a show-cause notice and whether an ad hoc promotion confers a vested right against reversion when the post is allocated for direct recruitment. The Supreme Court held that an ad hoc appointee to a higher post or grade is liable to reversion without notice under the statutory framework governing civil servants. The Court laid down the principle that civil servants holding posts on an ad hoc basis have no legal grievance against reversion to their lower posts, particularly when the vacancy falls within a quota designated for direct recruitment and the statutory provisions explicitly permit such reversion without prior notice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant appointed to a higher post on an ad hoc basis is entitled to a show-cause notice prior to reversion?
  • Does an ad hoc promotion to a post create a right to regular retention against a vacancy allocated for direct recruitment?
  • Can a civil servant appointed on an ad hoc basis challenge his reversion when the post is subjected to direct recruitment in accordance with recruitment rules?
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• Syed Lal Hussain Shah vs Kausar Hussain Shah1980 SCMR 765 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-07
  giftdelivery of possessionestoppelfictitious giftcivil petition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil dispute between a father and son regarding a parcel of land originally acquired through a gift. The petitioner-father had executed a subsequent gift of the same land in favour of his son, the respondent, as part of a tactical device to facilitate the withdrawal of a prior pending cancellation suit filed by the original donor. The petitioner subsequently filed a suit for a declaration and permanent injunction, alleging that the subsequent gift was fictitious and procured through fraud and that it lacked the essential legal requirement of delivery of possession since tenants were in cultivating possession and had not attorned to the donee. Both lower courts and the High Court concurrently held against the petitioner on the question of fraud, and the High Court further held that the petitioner was estopped from challenging the validity of the gift on the ground of non-delivery of possession having expressly stated in the gift transaction that possession was delivered. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the view of the High Court regarding estoppel, concluding that the petitioner could not be permitted to approbate and reprobate, and accordingly dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a donor who has stated in a gift transaction that possession was delivered is estopped from subsequently challenging the gift on the ground of non-delivery of possession?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and the first appellate court regarding the absence of fraud be interfered with without sufficient justification?
  • Whether a gift executed as a device to facilitate the withdrawal of a pending suit can be invalidated by the donor on the plea of its fictitious nature?
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• Syed Ali Abbas vs Allah Bakhsh and Another1980 SCMR 574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-10
  compromise decreesettlement of disputeproperty rightsSupreme Court Rulesdisposal of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon an application filed by the parties under Order XLIX, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1956, requesting the Court to dispose of the petition in accordance with the terms of a compromise agreement. The compromise, supported by affidavits from the widow of the deceased petitioner and the respondent, delineated the division of property, specifically regarding the transfer of residential portions, the usage of shared passages, and the exclusive ownership of specific areas, including a small shop. The core legal question was whether the Court could dispose of the pending petition based on the settlement reached between the parties. The Court, finding the agreement to be lawful and noting no objections to its terms, held that the petition should be disposed of in accordance with the compromise. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court may exercise its authority to dispose of a petition in terms of a lawful compromise agreement submitted by the parties, provided the terms are clear and acceptable to all involved.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court dispose of a petition based on a compromise agreement reached between the parties?
  • Is a compromise agreement regarding property division enforceable if it is supported by affidavits and signed by the parties' counsel?
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• Syed Abdus Sattar Chishty vs Aftab Malik1980 SCMR 742 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-27
  evictionbona fide personal userent defaultlandlord and tenantmisreading of evidencenotice of attornment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an eviction petition filed by a landlord against a tenant on the grounds of default in rent payment and the landlord's personal bona fide requirement for the premises. The core legal questions were whether the tenant had defaulted under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, and whether the landlord had sufficiently established his bona fide personal need for the property. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts misread the evidence and the law regarding the alleged rent default and the landlord's personal requirement. The Court found that the tenant failed to prove the timely tender of rent and that the landlord, living in overcrowded conditions, had established a prima facie case for personal need. The key principles laid down are that a landlord who proves ownership of no other property and demonstrates a genuine need for accommodation satisfies the burden of proof for personal requirement, and that courts must not ignore clear evidence of such need or misinterpret statutory provisions regarding rent default, particularly when the tenant fails to substantiate claims of payment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's demand for enhanced rent in a notice of attornment automatically invalidate a claim of bona fide personal requirement for the premises?
  • What is the effect of a tenant's failure to produce the original receipt or postman's endorsement when claiming rent was tendered by money order?
  • Can a court condone a rent default based on a cursory appreciation of evidence without properly examining the statutory requirements of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Does a landlord who owns no other property and lives in overcrowded conditions satisfy the burden of proof for personal requirement of the demised premises?
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• State through Advocategeneral, N.W. F. P., Peshawar vs Barkat Ali1980 SCMR 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-13
  double murderdying declarationappreciation of evidenceleave to appealidentification of accusedacquittalSupreme Court interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of double murder charges. The prosecution relied on dying declarations and eyewitness testimony, asserting that the assailants were identified by the light of a 100-watt electric bulb in the courtyard. The High Court, however, doubted the presence of the eyewitnesses and the credibility of the 'lighted bulb' theory, concluding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s rejection of this evidence justified Supreme Court interference. The Supreme Court held that the determination of whether the bulb was lit constituted a matter of appreciation of evidence. Finding that the High Court’s conclusion was a possible view, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the acquittal. The judgment reaffirms the principle that the Supreme Court will not disturb a High Court’s finding on the appreciation of evidence if that finding represents a possible view, even if an alternative interpretation of the facts exists.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's finding on the appreciation of evidence if the view taken is a possible one?
  • Is the presence of a lighted bulb at the scene of a crime a matter of fact to be determined through the appreciation of evidence?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to re-evaluate the credibility of eyewitnesses in a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal?
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