Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Abdul Razzak Khan vs Muhammad Hashim and Others1980 SCMR 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-12
  Permanent Transfer DeedSettlement DepartmentP.T.D. cancellationevacuee propertywrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a dispute over commercial premises involving a passage and staircase situated between two shops in Tharparkar District. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner had the jurisdiction to cancel a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) issued to the first respondent in respect of the disputed property. The Supreme Court held that once a P.T.D. has been validly issued following the failure of the petitioner to fulfill his own offered purchase price, the P.T.D. becomes final and the Settlement Commissioner lacks jurisdiction to cancel it. The Court laid down the principle that the Settlement Department has the jurisdiction to determine questions of fact regarding the classification of property, and a party cannot approbate and reprobate by challenging the creation of a separate property unit after initially offering to purchase it.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement Commissioner has the jurisdiction to cancel a Permanent Transfer Deed once it has been issued to a party?
  • Does the Settlement Department have the jurisdiction to determine questions of fact regarding the classification and numbering of properties?
  • Can a party challenge the creation of a separate property unit after having initially offered to purchase the same unit from the Settlement Department?
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• Abdul Rauf and Others vs The State1980 SCMR 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-21
  criminal appealmurder convictionocular evidencedying declarationpremeditated attacksudden fightculpable homicideinterested witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerns the conviction of the appellants for the murder of five individuals during a violent clash in a village. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established that the appellants initiated a premeditated attack, or if the evidence indicated a sudden fight arising from a chance encounter. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution's reliance on ocular evidence was flawed, as the key witnesses were either interested parties, had their credibility undermined by significant discrepancies and omissions in the initial reports, or were not present at the scene. Furthermore, the court held that the dying declaration was incomplete and failed to clarify the origin of the conflict. Consequently, the court set aside the murder convictions, ruling that the prosecution failed to prove premeditation. The court held that in cases of a sudden fight where the origin of the conflict is unclear and casualties occur on both sides, the appropriate conviction is for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, rather than premeditated murder.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when the prosecution fails to prove the origin of the conflict and the evidence suggests a sudden fight?
  • Is a dying declaration that is incomplete and fails to address the crucial question of how an occurrence began of any corroborative value?
  • Does the status of a witness as a 'natural witness' automatically confer credibility if their name was omitted from the initial First Information Reports?
  • When can a court reduce a conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder in the context of a cross-fire incident?
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• Abdul Rauf and 3 Others vs The State1980 SCMR 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-06
  cognizance of offencenegative police reportCustoms Actspecial judgecriminal revisionjudicial discretionprima facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court order affirming a Special Judge's decision to proceed with a trial under the Customs Act, 1969, despite a negative report from the investigating agency. The core legal question was whether a Special Judge is competent to take cognizance of an offense based on a negative report submitted by an investigating officer. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the court is not bound by the investigating officer's opinion. The ratio established that a court may take cognizance of an offense based on the material available before it, regardless of whether the investigating officer recommends prosecution or suggests discharge. The key principle laid down is that the court's power to proceed with a trial is independent of the investigator's opinion, provided a prima facie case exists. The judgment affirmed that statutory provisions for taking cognizance allow the court to evaluate the record independently and proceed if sufficient grounds for suspicion exist, ensuring that the judicial process is not stifled by negative reports.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Special Judge take cognizance of an offense under the Customs Act 1969 based on a negative report submitted by an investigating officer?
  • Is a court legally bound by the opinion of an investigating officer when deciding whether to initiate a trial?
  • Does a court have the authority to proceed with a trial if the investigating officer recommends the discharge of the accused?
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• Abdul Rashid vs The State1980 SCMR 632 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-18
  jail classunder-trial prisonerconstitutional petitionjusticiable rightprison rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Abdul Rashid, an accused under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, seeking 'B' class jail facilities as an under-trial prisoner. The core legal question is whether the notification governing jail classifications confers a justiciable, enforceable right on under-trial prisoners to demand 'B' class facilities. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the relevant notification makes certain classes of prisoners eligible for better classes in jail custody, it does not confer any enforceable or justiciable right upon them that can be invoked through constitutional proceedings. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as being without merit, affirming the decision of the Sind High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a jail classification notification confer an enforceable right on under-trial prisoners under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a prisoner claim 'B' class jail facilities as a matter of legal right?
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• Abdul Rashid vs Saleh Muhammad1980 SCMR 506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-18
  ejectment petitionbona fide personal needdefault in rentstatutory obligationwaiver of rentconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing a tenant's second appeal in a rent ejectment case. The landlord sought ejectment on grounds of non-payment of rent and bona fide personal need. The Rent Controller found no default in rent payment but ordered eviction based on the landlord's personal requirement, a finding upheld by the District Judge and the High Court. The core legal questions were whether a landlord's past acceptance of irregular, periodic rent payments establishes a binding practice that overrides statutory requirements, and whether the landlord's claim of personal need was bona fide. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a tenant cannot contract out of statutory rent payment obligations, nor can a practice of irregular payment override the law. The Court affirmed that a landlord's tolerance of delayed payments does not constitute a waiver of the statutory requirement for timely payment. Furthermore, the Court declined to re-examine concurrent findings of fact regarding the landlord's bona fide personal requirement, as these were supported by evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant and landlord contract out of the statutory requirements for rent payment?
  • Does a landlord's past acceptance of irregular rent payments create a binding practice that overrides the statutory obligation to pay rent monthly?
  • Can a tenant rely on a practice of irregular rent payment to justify non-payment of rent?
  • Does a landlord's tolerance of delayed rent payments constitute a waiver of the right to demand timely payment?
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• Abdul Rashid (Represented by His Legal Heirs) and Another vs Sadiq Ali1980 SCMR 571 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-14
  property disputepartition agreementmutual consentsettlement lawcivil rightsproperty demarcation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a property dispute over the outhouses of a bungalow in Lahore, which were subject to a partition agreement between the parties in 1960. The core legal question was whether the outhouses constituted a separate entity capable of being transferred independently, and whether the parties were bound by their prior mutual consent to the partition of the property. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the petition for leave to appeal. The Court held that the parties had previously agreed to the partition of the bungalow, and had subsequently acted upon this agreement by constructing boundary walls to demarcate their respective portions. Consequently, the Court determined that the petitioners could not now challenge the division of the property. The key principle laid down is that where parties have mutually consented to a mode of property division and have acted upon that agreement by creating physical demarcations, they are bound by their civil rights and cannot subsequently challenge the validity of the partition or the status of the property portions as separate entities.

  Questions settled

  • Are parties bound by a mutual agreement to partition property when they have acted upon that agreement by physically demarcating the portions?
  • Can a party challenge the status of property portions as separate entities after having previously consented to their division?
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• Abdul Rab Etc, vs Wali Muhammad Etc.1980 SCMR 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-22
  colonization of government landsallotment of landejected tenantsproprietary rightscivil court jurisdictionlease
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning the cancellation of a land allotment and subsequent lease of agricultural land in District Sahiwal. The core legal question involves the jurisdiction of civil courts to interfere with orders of Colonization Officers regarding the interpretation of government policy letters/schemes, and whether ejected tenants in possession on the date of a government policy directive are entitled to purchase proprietary rights. The Supreme Court held that civil courts possess jurisdiction to strike down orders of Colonization Officers when such officers act in excess of their power by violating statutory schemes or policy letters having the force of law. The Court affirmed the Lahore High Court's judgment, holding that since the plaintiffs were still in possession of the disputed land when the government policy letter of 28th March 1963 was issued prohibiting the ejection of such tenants and granting them proprietary rights, they were fully eligible, and the subsequent lease of the land to the defendants was void and in excess of jurisdiction. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil court has jurisdiction to interfere when Colonization Officers act in excess of their power by violating government schemes or policy letters?
  • Does a government policy directive protecting ejected tenants in possession from eviction and allowing them to purchase proprietary rights apply to tenants who remain in possession at the time of its issuance?
  • Can Colonization Officers ignore government policy schemes regarding the settlement of land without acting in excess of their jurisdiction?
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• Abdul Qadus vs Zarbaz Khan and Othres1980 SCMR 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-23
  landlord and tenantrevenue court jurisdictionrent defaultevictionconcurrent findingsagricultural landunauthorized construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed a writ petition challenging concurrent findings of revenue courts regarding a landlord-tenant dispute. The landlord had successfully sued the petitioner for recovery of rent arrears and eviction due to default. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the Revenue Court possessed jurisdiction to try the suit, whether the tenant had defaulted on rent payments, whether the tenant was entitled to a proportionate reduction in rent due to alleged short delivery of land, and whether the tenant was entitled to compensation for unauthorized superstructures. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Revenue Court had proper jurisdiction over the tenancy dispute. Furthermore, the Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the existence of default, the absence of short delivery of land, and the lack of entitlement to compensation for improvements made without the landlord's consent. The judgment reaffirms that factual findings made by lower courts regarding rent default and land possession are generally not open to interference in appellate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Revenue Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate a suit for recovery of rent and eviction against a tenant of agricultural land?
  • Is a tenant entitled to a proportionate reduction in rent if they allege short delivery of the leased land?
  • Can a tenant claim compensation for superstructures erected on leased agricultural land without the landlord's consent?
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• Abdul Majid vs The State1980 SCMR 935 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-22
  dacoityretracted confessionvoluntary confessioncorroborationjudicial confessioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the conviction of the petitioner under Section 395/397, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for his involvement in a dacoity on a passenger bus. The petitioner challenged the conviction on the grounds that his judicial confession was involuntary, procedurally flawed due to the Magistrate's failure to formally record that he identified himself as a Magistrate, and that the confession was self-exculpatory and uncorroborated. The Supreme Court examined the validity of the confession and the corroborative evidence provided by prosecution witnesses. The Court held that the confession was voluntary and properly recorded, noting that the Magistrate's testimony at trial sufficiently established that the petitioner was aware of the Magistrate's status, despite the omission in the written record. Furthermore, the Court found that the retracted confession was sufficiently corroborated by independent eyewitness testimony, rendering the conviction safe. The petition was dismissed, affirming that a retracted confession, when corroborated by reliable evidence, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted confession be relied upon for conviction if it is corroborated by independent evidence?
  • Does the failure of a Magistrate to record in writing that they identified themselves to the accused invalidate a judicial confession?
  • Is a confession considered voluntary if the accused asserts they did not participate willingly but admits to the preparatory acts of the crime?
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• Abdul Majid and Another vs Wajid Ali and 6 Others1980 SCMR 683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-23
  settlement disputelimitationcondonation of delayvoid orderauction confirmationnew plea of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the transfer of a property comprising two shops, a residential house, and a chaubara. The petitioners, who were locals, filed an L.H. Form for the transfer of the residential portion, which was rejected by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner in 1959 on the ground that the property was an inseparable compact unit. The property was subsequently auctioned to the respondents. Over three years later, the petitioners appealed the rejection, which was dismissed as time-barred. After a series of remands and revisions, the Settlement Commissioner and the High Court both maintained that the appeal was barred by limitation and that the property was inseparable. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the initial rejection was void as it was passed behind their back, and thus limitation did not apply. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners had failed to show sufficient cause for the condonation of the long delay. The Court also ruled that a new question of fact regarding the validity of the auction confirmation could not be raised for the first time in the second round of litigation before the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal filed three and a half years after the rejection of a transfer form can be entertained without sufficient cause for condonation of delay?
  • Can a party raise a new question of fact regarding the validity of an auction confirmation for the first time before the Supreme Court in a second round of litigation?
  • Does the omission of a revisional authority to consider the question of limitation and its condonation vitiate its order?
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• Abdul Majeed and Another vs Chief Settlement Commissioner and Others1980 SCMR 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-08
  review jurisdictionsettlement lawprocedural complianceadvocate-on-recordre-hearingproperty transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against the Supreme Court's order dismissing a civil petition regarding the transfer of property under settlement laws. The petitioners challenged the transfer of property on grounds of illegality in the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order, the rejection of a transfer form without a hearing, and the violation of plinth area restrictions. The core legal questions were whether the review petition was maintainable given that it was not signed by the counsel who argued the original petition, and whether the grounds raised in the review petition warranted a re-hearing. The Court held that the review petition was improperly constituted under the relevant rules and that the merits of the case could not be re-litigated in review jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that the requirement for the original counsel to sign the review petition is intended to ensure the petition is confined to matters transpired during the original hearing. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, establishing that review jurisdiction cannot be used for re-hearing a case on merits and that procedural requirements regarding counsel signatures must be strictly observed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be entertained if it is not drawn and signed by the counsel who argued the original petition?
  • Does the scope of review jurisdiction permit the re-hearing of a case on its merits?
  • Is a party permitted to raise new grounds in a review petition that were not agitated during the hearing of the original petition?
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• Abdul Lateef Dar vs District Allotment Committee. Satellite Town, Rawalpindi and Another1980 SCMR 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-07
  allotment cancellationcondition precedentbreach of contractarbitration awardreciprocal obligationsland allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the cancellation of a building plot allotment in Satellite Town, Rawalpindi. The petitioner, who was allotted a plot in 1956, failed to pay the required 20% advance price of the plot as stipulated in the allotment conditions. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's obligation to pay the 20% advance was contingent upon the delivery of full possession of the plot, thereby rendering the cancellation of the allotment unlawful due to the government's failure to deliver the entire area. The Supreme Court held that the payment of the 20% advance was a condition precedent for the allotment itself, serving as security for future instalments, and was independent of the physical delivery of possession. Consequently, the Court upheld the arbitrator's award and the decisions of the lower courts, confirming that the petitioner's failure to comply with this condition justified the cancellation of the allotment. The key principle established is that contractual obligations designated as conditions precedent for an allotment must be fulfilled regardless of the status of possession delivery.

  Questions settled

  • Is the payment of an advance deposit for a plot allotment a condition precedent independent of the delivery of possession?
  • Can an allottee justify non-payment of the required advance price on the grounds that full possession of the plot has not been delivered?
  • Does the failure to pay a required advance deposit for a plot justify the cancellation of the allotment?
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• Abdul Hamid Etc. vs Rashid Ahmed Etc.1980 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-29
  displaced persons propertytransfer of propertysettlement commissionerremand orderinter-court appealspecial leave to appealcommercial unit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed in limine the petitioners' Inter-Court Appeal concerning the disposal of a property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question related to whether a disputed chaubara above a shop was a residential, commercial, or converted property, and whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner was bound by the Settlement Commissioner's remand order to transfer it as a converted property. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the commercial nature of the property used as a hotel since before the partition were unexceptionable, and that the remand order did not restrict the Additional Settlement Commissioner from confirming the transfer of the property as a commercial unit along with the shop underneath. The Court established that findings of fact by settlement authorities regarding the nature of a property will not be disturbed where supported by evidence, and remand orders must be interpreted reasonably according to their true scope.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner is bound to transfer a property as a converted property pursuant to a remand order?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the nature of a property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 be disturbed in appellate proceedings?
  • Whether a chaubara used as a hotel since before partition constitutes a commercial unit transferable by auction?
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• Abdul Aziz vs Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab Etc.1980 SCMR 509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-05
  State land allotmentGrow More Food SchemeBoard of Revenuequasi-judicial authorityrevisional jurisdictionland resumptionadministrative interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the resumption of State land originally allotted to the petitioner under the Grow More Food Scheme. Following the resumption of the land by the Collector for breach of conditions, the petitioner exhausted all legal remedies, with the Board of Revenue and the High Court upholding the resumption. Subsequently, the petitioner obtained an order from the Provincial Minister for Rehabilitation and Colonies restoring the land, which effectively overturned the final decisions of the statutory authorities. The core legal question was whether a Provincial Minister possesses the jurisdiction to act as a quasi-judicial authority and override final findings of fact made by the Board of Revenue. The Supreme Court held that the Minister lacked such authority. The Court established the principle that the general power of supervision vested in the Government does not extend to interfering with the judicial or quasi-judicial functions of specified statutory authorities, unless the governing statute explicitly provides for such revisional or appellate power. Consequently, the High Court correctly declared the Minister's order to be without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Provincial Minister have the jurisdiction to override a final judicial or quasi-judicial order passed by the Board of Revenue?
  • Does the general power of supervision vested in the Government include the authority to interfere with the judicial functions of statutory authorities?
  • Can a government official record findings of fact contrary to those established by a competent statutory authority in a matter that has reached finality?
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• Zulfiqar vs Ramzan and Other1979 SCMR 48 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-02
  grave and sudden provocationmurderculpable homicideenhancement of sentencespecial leave to appealillicit intimacy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court which gave the respondents the benefit of Exception I to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, altering their convictions to Section 304, Part I, and dismissing the revision petition for enhancement of sentences. The core legal questions involved whether the respondents acted under grave and sudden provocation due to illicit intimacy and whether such benefit could be extended to a co-accused not related to the woman involved. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly appraised the evidence regarding provocation and that the co-accused, who treated the woman as his own sister, was equally entitled to the benefit of the exception. The petition was accordingly dismissed, and the principle that grave and sudden provocation can extend to a close friend sharing a familial bond in the context of sudden discovery was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court erred in giving the benefit of Exception I to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 where the accused were armed?
  • Can the benefit of grave and sudden provocation be extended to a co-accused who is not a blood relative of the woman involved but shares a close familial regard?
  • Whether the period of sentence already undergone is adequate in cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Zulfikar Ali Bhutto vs The State1979 SCMR 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-02
  recusaljudicial biasapprehended biasjudicial independenceappellate proceedingsmisconceived application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed by the appellant, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, requesting the Chief Justice of Pakistan to recuse himself from the Bench hearing his appeal against conviction and sentence. The appellant alleged that statements attributed to the Chief Justice in a foreign newspaper indicated bias and prejudgment of the case, suggesting the Chief Justice acted as a spokesman for the Chief Martial Law Administrator. The core legal question was whether the Chief Justice's interactions with foreign media during an international judicial conference constituted sufficient grounds for recusal based on apprehended bias. The Court held that the application was misconceived and based on a distorted interpretation of the Chief Justice's remarks. The Court clarified that the Chief Justice's statements were merely intended to explain the independence of the Pakistani judiciary and the treatment of the appellant in custody, rather than commenting on the merits of the case. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application, affirming its commitment to deciding the appeal impartially and in accordance with the law, uninfluenced by unfounded allegations of bias.

  Questions settled

  • Can a judge be recused from a case based on allegations of bias stemming from statements made to the press regarding the independence of the judiciary?
  • Does a judge's explanation of judicial procedures and custodial conditions to foreign media constitute prejudgment of a pending appeal?
  • Is an application for recusal maintainable when it is based on a distorted interpretation of a judge's public statements?
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• Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and 3 Other vs The State1979 PLD Supreme Court 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-12-04
  incapacitated judgecontinuation of trialbench reconstitutionmedical groundsSupreme Court Rulesjudicial functions
  Summary & questions settled

  This order deals with a situation arising from the continued inability of Mr. Justice Waheeduddin Ahmad, a member of the Bench hearing the appeals, to sit on the Bench due to serious illness involving a cerebro-vascular episode. The core legal question was whether the hearing of the appeals could legally continue before the remaining seven Judges of the Bench in the absence of the incapacitated Judge, or whether such absence barred continuation or necessitated adjournment or reference under Article 209 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the hearing of the appeals could lawfully continue before the remaining seven Judges, as the minimum requirement of three Judges under the rules was satisfied, and that the inability of a Judge due to an act of God did not amount to removal under Article 209. The key principle laid down is that where a member of a Bench becomes physically incapacitated for an indefinite period, the remaining judges exceeding the statutory minimum number may continue the proceedings without constituting an illegal reconstitution or requiring removal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the continued absence of an incapacitated Judge from a Bench prevents the remaining Judges from continuing the hearing of a case?
  • Does the inability of a Judge to perform judicial functions due to illness constitute removal under Article 209 of the Constitution?
  • Can a multi-member Bench continue hearing appeals when one of its members becomes permanently or indefinitely unavailable due to health reasons, provided the minimum quorum is met?
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• Zamiruddin Ahmad vs Mst. Aisha Abbas and 6 Other1979 SCMR 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-22
  ejectmentdefault in rentmunicipal assessmentstatutory tenantsecond appealevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a protracted commercial tenancy dispute concerning an evacuee property in Karachi, initially let to the petitioner by the Custodian and later purchased by the respondents in open auction. The respondents filed an ejectment application against the petitioner before the Rent Controller on the grounds of default in rent payment, unauthorized subletting, and impairing the utility of the premises. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, and the first appellate court eventually maintained the dismissal. However, upon a second appeal, the High Court set aside the dismissal and ordered ejectment on the ground of default, holding that the tenant failed to pay rent at the rate assessed by the Karachi Municipal Corporation after receiving proper notice. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the tenant's refusal to pay rent according to the latest municipal assessment rendered him a contumacious defaulter, despite subsequent reductions in assessment. The Court established that a statutory tenant under section 30 of the Displaced Persons Act must diligently fulfil tenancy conditions, and failure to pay due rent after proper notice justifies ejectment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a tenant to pay rent in accordance with the latest municipal assessment after proper notice constitute a default rendering them liable to ejectment?
  • Can a High Court in second appeal interfere with concurrent findings of fact where the lower courts ignored crucial aspects of the evidence regarding rent default?
  • Is a statutory tenant protected from ejectment under section 30 of the Displaced Persons Act when they fail to fulfil the terms and conditions of the tenancy?
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• Zahoor Ahmad Alias Maki vs The State and Another1979 SCMR 448 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-08
  murder convictionculpable homicideeye-witness testimonyrelated witnessesrecovery of weaponintention to killspecial leave to appealcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged the conviction of the petitioner under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of the deceased, which had been upheld by the Lahore High Court. The core legal questions concerned whether the conviction was justified under Section 302 or if the offence should be reduced to culpable homicide under Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether the testimony of related eye-witnesses and the recovery of the weapon were sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the conviction was sound. The Court affirmed that the relationship of witnesses to the deceased does not inherently invalidate their testimony, especially absent evidence of enmity. Furthermore, the Court established that the intention to cause death is a matter of inference based on the facts, the nature of the weapon, and the vital part of the body targeted. Since the petitioner used a knife on a vital organ, the Court concluded that the act constituted murder under Section 302, rejecting the argument for a lesser offence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the relationship of eye-witnesses to the deceased automatically render their testimony unreliable?
  • Is a delay in recording the First Information Report fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Under what circumstances is an offence classified as murder under Section 302 versus culpable homicide under Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can the intention to cause death be inferred from the use of a weapon on a vital part of the body?
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• Zahid Hussain vs The State1979 SCMR 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-16
  bail cancellationfurther inquiryidentification paradeFirst Information Reportcriminal procedurediscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had cancelled the bail previously granted to the petitioners by an Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in cancelling bail when the accused were not named in the First Information Report (F.I.R.), no incriminating evidence was recovered from them during police custody, and no identification parade was conducted. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s order was unjustified. The Court reasoned that the absence of the petitioners' names in the F.I.R. strongly suggested they were not known to the complainant, thereby necessitating an identification parade, which did not occur. Consequently, the Court determined the case fell under the category of 'further inquiry,' justifying the grant of bail. The Court set aside the High Court's order, restored the bail granted by the trial court, and directed the petitioners to appear before the trial court on the next scheduled date, failing which the bail would be cancelled.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to name an accused in the First Information Report necessitate an identification parade?
  • Is the absence of incriminating recovery and the omission of names in the F.I.R. sufficient to establish a case of 'further inquiry' for the purpose of bail?
  • Can the High Court cancel bail without considering the lack of identification evidence against the accused?
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• West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority through Its Chairman - vs Chairman, National Industrial Relations Commission1979 PLD Supreme Court 912 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-23
  contempt of courtappealabilitystay orderscope of interim injunctionjurisdiction of NIRCWAPDA employeesdiscretion of High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, arising from an order of the Lahore High Court declining to proceed with contempt proceedings, addressed the issue of whether an appeal lies under section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1976 against an order of the High Court refusing to initiate contempt action. The West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) initiated contempt proceedings against the Chairman of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) for allegedly violating a stay order issued by the High Court in a writ petition by continuing proceedings in separate, individual cases of other WAPDA employees. The High Court dismissed the contempt application upon receiving a report. The Supreme Court held that the power to punish for contempt is exclusively between the court and the alleged contemner, and an order by a High Court declining to take contempt action or refusing to issue notice is not an appealable order under section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1976. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a stay order issued in a specific case cannot be extended to cover separate, independent cases involving different parties. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie under section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1976 against an order of the High Court refusing to initiate or proceed with contempt proceedings?
  • Can a stay order issued by a High Court in a particular case extend to cover other separate and independent cases involving different parties?
  • Is the power to punish for contempt exclusively a matter between the court and the contemner so as to preclude appellate interference when the court declines to act?
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• West Pakistan Co Operative Consumers Society Ltd Lahore through Its Managing Director vs Nadeem Nawazish Malik and 3 Other1979S C M R 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-17
  ejectmentdefault in rentrent restrictionspecial leave to appealcondonation of delaytentative rent order
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the second appeal and upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts directing the petitioner's eviction from a commercial shop. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner committed a default in depositing the monthly rent as ordered under section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, and whether sufficient cause existed for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the explanation provided for the delayed deposit was vague, lacking in particulars, and rightly rejected by the courts below as an afterthought. Consequently, the concurrent finding of default warranted the striking off of the defense and the passing of an eviction order. The key principle laid down is that failure to comply strictly with a tentative rent-fixation order without a valid, substantiated explanation constitutes a default justifying eviction, and findings of fact concurrently reached by lower courts on such matters will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to deposit rent by the stipulated date under a tentative rent order justifies striking off the tenant's defense?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding a rent default be interfered with by the Supreme Court in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Whether a vague application for condonation of delay in depositing rent warrants acceptance without necessary particulars?
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• Wajid Ali Khan vs Mst. Hayat Bibi Etc.S1979 SCMR 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-12
  land allotmentrevenue recordwrit petitionsettlement commissionerfindings of factspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing in limine the petitioner's writ petition against the order of the Settlement Commissioner. The core dispute concerns the lawful allotment of agricultural land situated in District Bahawalnagar, involving conflicting claims of allotment between the petitioner and the predecessor of the private respondents. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court was justified in declining to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Settlement Commissioner based on revenue records and allotment documents. The Court held that findings of fact arrived at by the Settlement Commissioner after a careful perusal of the record and unimpeached revenue documents are conclusive and properly immune from interference in constitutional writ jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that factual determinations regarding land allotments made by specialized revenue forums based on authentic records will not be disturbed by superior courts under writ jurisdiction unless shown to be perverse or without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether findings of fact recorded by a Settlement Commissioner regarding land allotments can be interfered with in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the High Court possess the power to dismiss in limine a writ petition challenging concurrent factual findings based on revenue records?
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• Waheedullah vs Abdul Hameed and Another1979 SCMR 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-20
  cancellation of bailmedical grounds for bailconcession by state counselsuborning prosecution evidencemurder casediscretionary power of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought the cancellation of bail granted by the High Court of Sind to the respondent, Abdul Hameed, who was accused of murder and other offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Arms Ordinance. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in granting bail based on the respondent's medical condition of diabetes and the concession made by the Assistant Advocate-General, despite the respondent's prior bail rejections by the Sessions Court. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's order granting bail, effectively upholding the decision. The Court's holding was based on the specific circumstances presented, including the medical reports and the state's concession. However, the Court laid down the principle that the complainant retains the liberty to seek the cancellation of bail if the accused is found to be suborning prosecution evidence, emphasizing that bail is not absolute and can be revoked if the accused interferes with the administration of justice or the integrity of the trial process.

  Questions settled

  • Can a bail order granted by the High Court be cancelled if the accused is found suborning prosecution evidence?
  • Does a concession by the state counsel regarding the medical condition of an accused justify the grant of bail in a murder case?
  • Is a medical condition like diabetes, which is controllable in jail, sufficient ground for the grant of bail under the proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Wahajuddin and Another vs Razia Begum Etc.1979 SCMR 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-14
  civil reviewsettlement authoritiestransfer of propertyindivisible propertyreview jurisdictiondismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil review petition arises from a common judgment and order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan disposing of three civil appeals concerning the transfer of a disputed house. The petitioners sought review of the judgment maintaining the transfer of the entire house to the respondent after the Settlement Authorities found the property to be indivisible. The petitioners contended that a Deputy Settlement Commissioner had reviewed an order of his predecessor without obtaining prior permission from the Additional Settlement Commissioner, an aspect allegedly escaping attention during the appeal. The Court held that factual controversies not argued during the original hearing and seemingly abandoned cannot serve as grounds to invoke review jurisdiction, particularly when no case is made out within the confines of the applicable procedural provisions. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions in limine, reaffirming that failure to press a point at the appellate stage precludes its agitation in review.

  Questions settled

  • Can a factual controversy not argued during the original appeal be raised as a ground in a review petition?
  • Whether review jurisdiction can be invoked on a point abandoned or not pressed during the hearing of earlier appeals?
  • Does an order passed by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner without prior permission of the Additional Settlement Commissioner warrant review when the point was never urged at the appellate stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Usmatullah Khan vs Administrator, Municipal Committee, Jhelum1979 SCMR 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-05
  cattle market licencerenewal of licencewrit petitioncivil court jurisdictionexpired leasediscretionary reliefdamages and compensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the refusal of the Municipal Committee, Jhelum, to renew the petitioner's licence for holding a cattle market for the year 1977-78. The petitioner contended that he had a legal right to renewal under statutory provisions and that the refusal was mala fide without a hearing. The respondents argued that the claim was based on contract, that the petitioner had already filed a civil suit, and that the financial year in dispute had already expired, rendering the issuance of a retrospective licence impossible. The Supreme Court held that since the period in dispute had already expired, neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court could issue a direction for the renewal of the licence with retrospective effect, and the appropriate remedy, if any, was to seek damages or compensation through a civil court. The Court declined to examine the broader legal questions to avoid pre-empting the jurisdiction of the civil court where the matter was already pending.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court issue a direction in writ jurisdiction for the renewal of an expired licence with retrospective effect?
  • Is a writ petition an appropriate remedy when the disputed financial year has already expired?
  • Does a person have a vested right to the issuance or renewal of a municipal licence which is within the discretion of the licensor?
  • Should constitutional jurisdiction be invoked when a civil suit regarding the same contractual dispute is already pending?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Jehan, vs The State1979 SCMR 186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-07
  child witnesscompetence of witnesscorroborationmurderdeath sentenceabscondenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction and death sentence for murder. The core legal question concerns the reliability of a child witness's testimony and whether a conviction can be sustained on such evidence, particularly when the trial court failed to record the specific questions and answers used to determine the child's competence. The Supreme Court held that while it is a rule of prudence that a conviction should not be based on the solitary, uncorroborated testimony of a child due to the risk of tutoring, the conviction in this case was sustainable because the child's evidence was amply corroborated by independent witnesses, evidence of motive, and the appellant's abscondence. The Court emphasized that while trial judges should record the questions and answers used to assess a child's competence for the benefit of appellate review, the failure to do so does not automatically invalidate the conviction if the child's evidence is otherwise credible and corroborated. The appeal was dismissed, leaving the sentence intact.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be based on the solitary testimony of a child witness?
  • Does the failure of a trial judge to record the questions and answers used to determine a child's competence automatically invalidate the conviction?
  • Is it necessary for the prosecution to examine every witness present at the scene of the crime to avoid an adverse inference?
  Read full judgment →
• Tufail Muhammad. vs Abdul Rahim, Etc.S1979S C M R 71 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-03
  review petitionquashment of proceedingsdelay in filing complaintprivate complaintcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review application filed against the Supreme Court's order dismissing a petition for leave to appeal, which had challenged a Lahore High Court order quashing a private criminal complaint under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question concerned whether gross delay in filing a private complaint after the cancellation of a police FIR warrants the quashment of criminal proceedings, and whether grounds for review were established based on alleged inconsistencies with prior apex court precedents. The Supreme Court held that the review application disclosed no valid grounds for review and was merely an attempt to re-argue the previous submissions. The Court concluded that the gross delay of over a year and a half in instituting the private complaint justified the quashment of charges, distinguishing the cited precedents on facts and relevance. The key principle laid down is that unexplained gross delay in filing a private criminal complaint following the cancellation of a police report constitutes a valid ground for quashing proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether gross delay in filing a private criminal complaint after the cancellation of a police FIR justifies the quashment of proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a review application lie merely to re-argue submissions previously considered and dismissed by the Court?
  Read full judgment →
• The Thal Engineering Industries Ltd. vs Tie Bank of Bahawalpur Ltd.1979 SCMR 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-09-27
  execution proceedingsjudgment-debtorcorporate veilattachment of propertyobjection petitionmaintainabilitylegal entity
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from execution proceedings initiated by the Bank of Bahawalpur Ltd. against a judgment-debtor, Abdul Qayyum Arif. The petitioner, Thal Engineering Industries Ltd., sought to challenge the attachment and subsequent auction sale of a factory, claiming ownership distinct from the judgment-debtor. The Executing Court dismissed the objection, finding that the petitioner and the judgment-debtor were not separate legal entities. The Lahore High Court, treating the appeal as a revision, upheld this decision. The Supreme Court addressed whether the petitioner could maintain the objection petition and whether the lower courts erred in their findings. The Supreme Court held that because the petitioner and the judgment-debtor were indistinguishable entities, the petitioner was precluded from raising the objection. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that while courts should lean toward adjudication over technicalities, no interference was warranted here as the objection was substantively meritless. The key principle established is that an entity indistinguishable from a judgment-debtor cannot maintain an objection petition to challenge the attachment of property in execution proceedings, as such claims must be raised by distinct third-party stakeholders.

  Questions settled

  • Can an entity that is indistinguishable from a judgment-debtor maintain an objection petition against the attachment of property in execution proceedings?
  • Should an appellate court allow an appeal to be treated as a revision and subsequently revert to treating it as an appeal if the interests of justice require?
  • Is a corporate body that is found to be the same legal entity as the judgment-debtor barred from challenging the auction of property attached in execution of a decree against that debtor?
  Read full judgment →
• The Sargodha Central Co Operative Bank Ltd., Sargodha vs Messrs1979 SCMR 528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-25
  rateable distributionexecution of decreedecree-holderscivil procedurerevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which set aside the executing court's order regarding the rateable distribution of decretal amounts. Three decrees were passed against the predecessor-in-interest of certain respondents in favour of multiple decree-holders, including the petitioner. The executing court consolidated the execution cases and ordered rateable distribution of the amount deposited by the Rehabilitation Department. The High Court accepted a revision petition filed by aggrieved respondents and set aside the distribution order. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to authoritatively interpret and construe Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, while dismissing the petitioner's stay application. The core legal question concerns the proper application and interpretation of rateable distribution under the Code of Civil Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 permits the rateable distribution of assets among multiple decree-holders under the circumstances of consolidated execution proceedings?
  • Does the High Court have revisional jurisdiction to set aside an executing court's order regarding the rateable distribution of deposited funds?
  Read full judgment →
• The Deputy Director, Food, Lahore Region, Lahore, Etc. the Deputy1979 SCMR 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-09-28
  condonation of delaylimitation periodservice appealcompulsory retirementgovernmental delaytime-barred petitions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprises three petitions for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, dated 8-10-1976, which had set aside the compulsory retirement of the respondents. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether departmental delay caused by examining a matter at various governmental levels constitutes a sufficient ground for the condonation of delay in filing petitions. The Court held that the petitions were barred by time by 45 days and that departmental delays do not furnish a valid ground for extending the period of limitation, reiterating that the government must be treated on par with ordinary litigants regarding limitation laws. Consequently, the applications for condonation of delay were rejected and the petitions were dismissed as time-barred. The key principle laid down is that governmental departments cannot claim preferential treatment under the law of limitation, and each day of delay must be properly explained regardless of administrative processes.

  Questions settled

  • Does departmental examination of a matter at various government levels constitute a sufficient ground for condonation of delay?
  • Can the government claim a different standard than an ordinary litigant under the law of limitation?
  • Must each day of delay be properly and sufficiently explained when seeking an extension of time?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chairman, Selection Committee, Bolan Medical College, Quetta1979 SCMR 529 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-30
  domicile certificatemedical college admissionconstitutional petitionselection committeewrit jurisdictioninternal management
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan accepting a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, filed by respondent No. 1 against the rejection of her medical college admission by the Selection Committee of Bolan Medical College, Quetta. The core legal question was whether the Selection Committee could legally look behind a valid domicile certificate issued by the District Magistrate and reject it on the ground that an earlier certificate from another district had existed and was later cancelled. The Supreme Court held that the Selection Committee had no lawful authority to sit in appeal over the domicile certificate or the District Magistrate's cancellation of the prior certificate, and that overwhelming documentary evidence proved the permanent residence of the applicant's family. The Court also held that while the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 199 by dictating internal management directives such as creating a supernumerary seat, the Supreme Court would decline to disturb the already admitted students to prevent irreparable injustice. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Selection Committee for college admissions can go behind a domicile certificate issued by a competent District Magistrate?
  • Does a High Court under Article 199 have the authority to direct the creation of a special supernumerary seat or interfere with the internal management of an educational institution?
  • Can a citizen hold successive domicile certificates following a change of residence and lawful cancellation of a prior certificate?
  Read full judgment →
• The Administrator and Another vs LT. Col. (Retd:) J. D. Malik1979 SCMR 446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-19
  service disputeemolumentsterms and conditions of serviceimplementation of judgmentright to be heardspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order passed by the Lahore High Court, which directed the petitioners to hear the respondent and resolve a dispute regarding his service terms and emoluments in accordance with a prior Supreme Court judgment. The respondent, a former member of the West Pakistan Co-operative Board, had previously litigated his entitlement to specific salary and allowances, resulting in a Supreme Court ruling that established his entitlement to a monthly salary of Rs. 1,400 plus his Army pension, while denying claims for additional allowances or privileges. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s directive for the petitioners to hear the respondent and decide the dispute afresh in light of the Supreme Court’s earlier findings was legally sound. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s order was eminently just and fair, as it merely facilitated the implementation of the Supreme Court’s previous decision. The Court affirmed that there was no valid grievance against providing the respondent an opportunity to be heard in the disposal of his outstanding service dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Is a High Court order directing an authority to hear a party and decide a dispute in light of a prior Supreme Court judgment legally justifiable?
  • Does a former member of the West Pakistan Co-operative Board have a right to claim allowances beyond the salary stipulated in their initial contract of appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• Taleh Mand vs Qudratulah Etc.S1979 SCMR 574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-26
  murderpoisoningextra-judicial confessioncorroborationrecovery of arsenicbenefit of the doubtpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the conviction and death sentence of the appellants for the murder of one Mehnga by poisoning. The core legal question involved the appreciation of evidence regarding extra-judicial confessions and the corroborative value of recovery evidence in a criminal trial. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no error of law in disbelieving the recovery of arsenic and noting material discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses regarding the extra-judicial confessions. Since the tainted evidence of extra-judicial confessions lacked reliable corroboration, the High Court rightly granted the benefit of the doubt to the appellants. The key principle laid down is that extra-judicial confessions, being a weak type of evidence, require strong and independent corroboration, and where the sole corroborative piece of evidence (recovery) fails to inspire confidence, the conviction cannot be sustained.

  Questions settled

  • Can an extra-judicial confession be relied upon for conviction without independent corroboration?
  • Whether evidence of recovery that is self-contradictory and lacks credibility can furnish valid corroboration for an extra-judicial confession?
  • Does evidence of motive coming from the same witnesses whose testimony requires corroboration have any corroborative value?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Ali vs The State1979 SCMR 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-02
  bail refusalrapecriminal trialdiscretionary jurisdictionprima facie evidenceappellate interferencevictim credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the High Court's refusal to grant bail to the petitioner, who was facing trial for rape under Section 376/109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner committed rape upon the victim at his construction site, supported by evidence including the victim's injuries, the petitioner's scratches, and a semen-stained chadar recovered from the scene. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in denying bail given the prima facie evidence connecting the accused to the crime. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its discretionary jurisdiction based on the material on record, and therefore, interference was not warranted. While dismissing the petition, the Court cautioned that the trial court must ignore the High Court's generalized observations regarding the credibility of an unmarried woman's allegations in that region. The trial court was directed to decide the case strictly on the evidence presented, ensuring a fair adjudication independent of societal assumptions about the victim's character or reputation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of prima facie evidence connecting an accused to a crime justify the refusal of bail?
  • Should a trial court consider generalized observations regarding a victim's character made by a High Court in a bail order?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by a High Court in bail matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Zawar Hussain and 6 Other vs Chief Settlement Commissioner1979 PLD Supreme Court 924 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-19
  evacuee propertyindustrial concernurban immovable propertylocus standiwrit petitionallotment cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning the transfer of urban property in Peshawar, previously owned by a Hindu gentleman who migrated at Partition, which respondent No. 6 claimed as an industrial concern (sawmill) established by his late father under pre-Partition leases. The petitioners, claiming as allottees of agricultural land, challenged the transfer. The core legal questions involved whether the disputed land constituted agricultural land or urban immovable property utilized as an industrial concern, and whether the petitioners had the requisite locus standi to invoke constitutional jurisdiction after withdrawing their departmental appeal. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the settlement authorities and the High Court established that the property was converted to industrial use prior to Partition, rendering it urban property eligible for transfer to respondent No. 6 under the Settlement laws. Furthermore, the Court held that the petitioners lacked locus standi due to their conduct, including the withdrawal of their departmental appeal and failure to participate in prior public auctions. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land situated within municipal limits and converted to industrial use prior to Partition can be treated as agricultural land under settlement laws?
  • Does a party who withdraws their appeal before the departmental authorities retain the locus standi to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Are findings of fact regarding the nature and use of property based on site inspection and documentary evidence open to interference?
  • Whether an evacuee property housing a non-evacuee industrial installation is transferable to the person in possession under the settlement scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Zaigham Hussain and Others vs Syed Kaisar Hussain and Anoters1979 SCMR 463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-16
  special leave to appealurban rent restrictionejectmentdefault in payment of rentdisplaced personsnotice under section 30joint possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a second appeal under section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, regarding the ejectment of the petitioners from residential property. The core legal question concerns whether separate notices under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and separate ejectment applications were mandatory when the heirs of the original occupant were in joint possession as one family rather than separate portions. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioners admitted in their earlier replies that they were living as one family in joint possession, separate notices and separate ejectment petitions were not required. The petition was accordingly dismissed as meritless, affirming the principle that joint occupants constituting a single family unit do not necessitate individual statutory notices or separate ejectment proceedings where admissions corroborate joint possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether separate notices under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 are required for joint occupants of a property?
  • Is it mandatory to file separate ejectment applications against multiple heirs residing in joint possession as one family?
  • Does an admission of joint possession in replies to statutory notices preclude the requirement for individual notices?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Waji-Ul-Hassan Zaidi vs Station House Officer, Police Station, City Jhelum and Another1979 PLD Supreme Court 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-22
  taking cognizanceregistration of FIRexecutive inquirycriminal investigationconstitutional petitionpolice duties
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had challenged the registration of a criminal case and subsequent police investigation. The core legal question was whether an executive inquiry conducted by an Assistant Commissioner under the orders of a Deputy Commissioner regarding police high-handedness amounted to 'taking cognizance' of an offence under the Code of Criminal Procedure, thereby barring the subsequent direction for the registration of a First Information Report (F.I.R.). The Supreme Court held that the inquiry conducted in an executive capacity did not constitute taking cognizance of an offence, and that any member of the public or authority aware of the commission of a cognizable offence can lawfully set the criminal law in motion by directing or lodging an information, barring specific statutory restrictions. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What amounts to taking cognizance of an offence by a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does an inquiry conducted by an executive authority under administrative orders constitute taking judicial cognizance?
  • Can any member of the public or a Magistrate set the criminal law in motion by reporting the commission of a cognizable offence?
  • Whether the direction by an executive officer to register an F.I.R. following an administrative inquiry is legally valid?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Waji Ul Hassan Zaidi vs The State1979 SCMR 112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-18
  post-arrest bailabductionrapesifting of evidencesupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by a retired Superintendent of Police seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 148, 149, 452, 376, 366, 365, 364, 363, 362, and 366 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the serious allegations of abduction, molestation, and rape following a land dispute, and whether the High Court erred in refusing bail. The Supreme Court held that the petition had no merit and dismissed it, affirming the High Court's order. The Court laid down the principle that at the pre-trial bail stage, courts should not sift prosecution evidence in minute detail, particularly when abductees have been recovered and statements recorded implicate the accused, leaving the evaluation of evidence to the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court should sift prosecution evidence in minute detail at the stage of deciding a post-arrest bail application?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail where abductees are recovered from various places and implicate the accused in serious offenses?
  • Does the involvement of an accused in a high-profile abduction and molestation case bar the grant of discretionary relief of bail before trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Superintending Engineer, Lower Bari Doab, Sahiwal vs Messrs Aziz1979 SCMR 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-02
  canal water supplyarbitration awardwrit jurisdictionadministrative discretionspecific performanceirrigation rightsjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the supply of canal water to land purchased by the respondent for industrial purposes, which was later sought to be converted for agricultural use. Following an arbitration award made a rule of the court, the respondent sought water supply, which the irrigation authorities refused. The High Court declared the refusal without lawful authority and directed the authorities to supply water. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court’s direction was not an improper bypass of the Canal and Drainage Act 1873, but rather a necessary consequence of declaring the administrative refusal void. The Court reasoned that since the Superintending Engineer had previously sanctioned the supply pursuant to the binding court decree, remanding the matter for a fresh administrative decision would be a futile exercise. The judgment affirms that where a legal obligation is established by a final decree and administrative prerequisites are met, the High Court may issue consequential directions to ensure the effective implementation of its declaration under its constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court issue a consequential direction to supply canal water after declaring an administrative refusal to do so as without lawful authority?
  • Is a government department bound by a decree making an arbitration award a rule of the court if it was a party to the proceedings?
  • Does the High Court's direction to supply water bypass the procedural requirements of Section 20 of the Canal and Drainage Act 1873 when the underlying sanction has already been granted?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Ahmad and Another vs Mst. Khurshid Bibi and Another1979 SCMR 455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-04-30
  pre-emption suitdismissal in defaultrestoration of suitdiscretionary jurisdictioncivil revisionrebuttal evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which upheld an appellate court's decision to restore a pre-emption suit that had been previously dismissed in default. The core legal question was whether the appellate court and the High Court properly exercised their discretion in restoring the suit, specifically regarding the evaluation of rebuttal evidence concerning the plaintiffs' alleged dilatory tactics. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts had correctly exercised their discretionary jurisdiction. The Court found that the evidence, including the prompt filing of the restoration application and the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses, adequately demonstrated that the delay was not a deliberate attempt to prolong proceedings to arrange the Zar-Panjum. The Court affirmed that the decision was consistent with established legal authorities and that there was no justification for interference. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts possess the discretion to restore suits dismissed in default when the evidence supports the conclusion that the default was not a result of deliberate dilatory tactics, and such discretion will not be interfered with if properly exercised.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court restore a suit dismissed in default under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the evidence shows the delay was not a deliberate dilatory tactic?
  • Is the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction by a High Court in upholding an appellate order for suit restoration subject to interference by the Supreme Court if the evidence was properly considered?
  Read full judgment →
• Subah Sadiq Etc. vs Mistry Taj Din Etc.S1979 SCMR 297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-07
  rent restrictionevictionpersonal requirementpleadingsprocedural technicalitieslandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a long-standing eviction dispute concerning a shop in Jhelum. The landlord sought eviction on the grounds of personal use and reconstruction, which the Rent Controller, District Court, and High Court concurrently upheld. The petitioner challenged the eviction, arguing that the landlord's evidence—stating the shop was required for his son's business—was inconsistent with the original pleadings, which claimed the landlord required it for his own business. The Supreme Court addressed the legal question of whether such a discrepancy in pleadings versus evidence regarding the specific beneficiary of the premises (landlord versus his child) constitutes a fatal defect under the relevant rent legislation. The Court held that since the statute explicitly permits eviction for the use of the landlord or his male children, the discrepancy was immaterial. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that a failure to formally amend the pleadings necessitated dismissal, noting that the Rent Ordinance aims to eliminate procedural technicalities. The Court affirmed the eviction, clarifying that a landlord's requirement for his children is legally consistent with the statutory grounds for eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy between a landlord's pleading that a shop is required for personal use and evidence that it is required for a son's use invalidate an eviction application?
  • Is a landlord required to formally amend an eviction application if the evidence clarifies that the premises are needed for a child rather than the landlord personally?
  • Does the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 permit eviction based on the requirement of a landlord's male children?
  Read full judgment →
• State through Advocate General (Sind) vs Mir Allah Bux and Other1979 SCMR 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-13Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation vs Mst. Sarwat Kazmi1979 SCMR 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-28
  life insurancewritten statementdebarred from defendinguberrima fidesconcealment of diseaserepudiation of contract
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing its appeal against a decree passed in favor of the respondent (the widow of the assured). The petitioner had repudiated the life insurance contract on the ground that the assured deliberately concealed having cancer at the time of submitting the proposal. In the suit, the petitioner repeatedly failed to file its written statement and was debarred from defending, leading to a decree under Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner argued that under Rule 158 of the Sind Chief Court Rules (O. S.), the suit should have been set down for final disposal as a short cause, allowing cross-examination. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner was debarred from defending, and the medical certificates were hearsay without examining their authors, no prejudice was caused. However, the Court clarified that deliberate concealment of material information in insurance contracts, which require utmost good faith (uberrima fides), can be a ground for avoiding the contract.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deliberate concealment of a material illness by an assured entitle an insurance company to repudiate or avoid the insurance contract?
  • Can a defendant who has been debarred from defending a suit for failure to file a written statement claim a right to cross-examine witnesses on hearsay medical certificates?
  • What is the effect of the principle of utmost good faith (uberrima fides) on the disclosure obligations of a proposer in a life insurance contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheru Etc. vs Member, Board of Revenue (Colonies) Etc.1979 SCMR 415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-12
  land allotmentGrow More Food Schemelimitation periodtime-barred petitionrevenue authoritiesrestoration of allotmentadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for special leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed challenges to the restoration of land allotments. The core dispute arose between original allottees under the 'Grow More Food' Scheme, whose allotments were initially cancelled for default in rent payments, and subsequent allottees under a 15-year lease scheme. After the original allottees failed to clear arrears by the stipulated deadline, the land was resumed and re-allotted. However, the original allottees later deposited the arrears and successfully sought restoration of their allotments through revenue authorities. The Supreme Court held that the petitions were time-barred, as they were filed well beyond the limitation period without sufficient explanation. Furthermore, on the merits, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the High Court's decision, affirming that the original allottees were rightly restored to their position. The Court noted that the subsequent allottees were adequately compensated by the direction to provide them with alternative land, thereby upholding the administrative restoration of the prior allotments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for special leave to appeal filed beyond the statutory limitation period without sufficient explanation is maintainable?
  • Can a court dismiss a petition for special leave to appeal solely on the ground of being time-barred?
  • Does the restoration of a prior land allotment by revenue authorities constitute a valid exercise of administrative discretion when alternative land is provided to subsequent allottees?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad vs Muhammad Hayat Alias 14Ayato and Other1979 SCMR 210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-08
  benefit of doubtappreciation of evidencecommutation of sentencecriminal appealmurdereye-witness testimonysudden provocation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted one co-accused and commuted the death sentence of another to life imprisonment. The core legal questions were whether the High Court erred in granting the benefit of doubt to the acquitted accused based on contradictions in eye-witness testimony regarding his movements and weapon possession, and whether the commutation of the death sentence for the other accused was legally justified given the circumstances of the crime. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's appreciation of evidence regarding the acquitted accused was reasonable, as contradictions in eye-witness accounts regarding the accused's actions created a genuine doubt about his participation. Furthermore, the Court upheld the commutation of the death sentence, finding that the High Court exercised its discretion appropriately given the absence of previous enmity and the fact that the altercation arose suddenly from a heated exchange. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with findings of fact by lower courts unless there is a serious defect in the reasoning or a disregard for accepted principles of evidence appreciation.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's acquittal based on the appreciation of evidence if the findings are reasonable?
  • Does a contradiction in eye-witness testimony regarding the movements of an accused justify the grant of benefit of doubt?
  • Is the absence of previous enmity and the sudden nature of an altercation a valid ground for commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment?
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• Sher and Others vs The State and Other1979 SCMR 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-08-16
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryco-accused statementdelayed FIRidentification at nightcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought special leave to appeal against a High Court order refusing post-arrest bail in a case involving murder and dishonest misappropriation of property. The prosecution's case rested on a delayed First Information Report lodged six months after the deceased went missing, subsequent statements of a co-accused, and the late-recorded statement of the co-accused's wife. The co-accused had given conflicting statements, initially implicating himself and the petitioners, but later exculpating himself while altering the weapons attributed to the petitioners and adding other accused. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court erred in relying on the inadmissible police statement of the co-accused to refuse bail. Given the six-month delay in reporting, the mid-night occurrence making identification difficult, and the one-month delay in recording the eye-witness's statement, the Court held that the case was one of further inquiry. Consequently, the petition was converted into an appeal, and bail was granted to the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court rely on an inadmissible police statement of a co-accused recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to refuse bail?
  • Does a significant delay in lodging a First Information Report combined with conflicting statements of a co-accused make a murder case one of further inquiry for the purpose of granting bail?
  • What is the effect of a one-month delay in recording an eye-witness's statement on the assessment of a bail application in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq vs Bostan and Other1979 PLD Supreme Court 917 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-10
  pre-emption suitdefault in depositextension of timepre-emption pricegross negligencecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave arose from a pre-emption suit instituted by the plaintiff-appellant, which was decreed by the trial court subject to the deposit of pre-emption money within a specified time. Upon a second appeal, the Lahore High Court enhanced the pre-emption price and granted a fresh deadline for depositing the differential amount. The plaintiff failed to deposit the amount within the extended time and subsequently sought an extension of time under section 151 and section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, nearly twenty months later. The High Court dismissed the application, holding the plaintiff guilty of gross negligence, and directed that the suit stood dismissed. The core legal question was whether the High Court's explicit direction for the dismissal of the suit upon failure to deposit the enhanced amount operated retrospectively and in excess of jurisdiction due to an alleged absence of such a warning in the original appellate judgment. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of a pre-emption suit for non-payment of the price within the prescribed time results from the mandatory provisions of Order XX Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 rather than by reason of any express direction in the decree, and that the omission of such a default clause does not render the decree inoperative or prevent the suit from failing. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the omission of a default clause regarding non-payment of pre-emption money in a decree affect the legal consequence that the suit stands dismissed upon such default?
  • Can a court extend the time for depositing pre-emption money when the plaintiff is guilty of gross negligence?
  • Whether the dismissal of a pre-emption suit for failing to deposit the required amount stems from the court's specific direction or from the mandatory provisions of Order XX Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Sheikh Khurshid Ahmad vs Abdul Aziz (through Legal Representatives).1979 SCMR 384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-17
  ejectmentbona fide personal requirementsecond appealrent evictionaffidavits in appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of a learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissing a second appeal arising from rent proceedings. The landlord originally sought ejectment of the petitioner-tenant on grounds of default and bona fide personal requirement. While default was not established, the High Court held that the premises were bona fide required by the legal heirs of the deceased landlord due to the size of their family. The petitioner challenged the High Court's order primarily on the ground that the learned Judge had impermissibly relied on affidavits received during the hearing of the second appeal. The Supreme Court observed that the affidavits were obtained merely to elucidate facts that could have favoured the tenant, and found the High Court's judgment elaborate and well-reasoned with no material defect. Holding that no grounds for leave to appeal were made out, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, granting the tenant four months to vacate subject to regular rent payments.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court in a second appeal obtain affidavits from parties to elucidate factual matters without rendering its judgment defective?
  • Does a High Court's finding on bona fide personal requirement based on family size justify eviction in rent proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamim Rahmani vs Mst. Aisha Bibi1979 SCMR 404 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-20
  evictionrent controlstriking off defencedefault in rent paymentinterim orderbank guaranteestay order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an eviction order passed against a tenant for non-payment of rent. The core legal question was whether the tenant's failure to deposit arrears of rent, as directed by the Rent Controller, constituted a default under the relevant rent control legislation, despite the tenant having previously furnished a bank guarantee during an interim appellate stage. The Supreme Court held that the interim order for a bank guarantee lapsed upon the dismissal of the tenant's first appeal, thereby restoring the Rent Controller's original direction to deposit rent. Because the tenant failed to deposit the arrears or obtain a stay order from the High Court, the failure to comply with the Rent Controller's direction amounted to a wilful default. The Court affirmed that the striking off of the defence was legally justified. The principle laid down is that an interim order for security or a bank guarantee does not substitute for the statutory obligation to deposit rent once that interim order expires, and the mere filing of a subsequent appeal without a stay order does not excuse non-compliance with a valid rent deposit order.

  Questions settled

  • Does an interim order for a bank guarantee survive the dismissal of the appeal in which it was granted?
  • Does the mere filing of a second appeal without obtaining a stay order excuse a tenant from complying with a Rent Controller's order to deposit rent?
  • Does the failure to deposit rent as directed by a Rent Controller constitute a default justifying the striking off of a tenant's defence?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahnaz Maqbool vs Province of Sind and Another1979 PLD Supreme Court 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-26
  medical college admissionprospectus rulesstrict constructionestoppelretrospective applicationadministrative laweducational institution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the denial of admission to the Liaqat Medical College, Hyderabad, to the petitioner, who was rejected for submitting certificates on separate sheets rather than within the printed Appendices of the application form. The core legal question was whether this technical omission rendered the application "incomplete" under the Prospectus rules, and whether a subsequent rule change could retrospectively bar the petitioner from admission. The Court held that the rejection was based on a hyper-technical misinterpretation of the rules, as the petitioner had provided the required information. The Court reaffirmed that Prospectus rules must be construed strictly and that any provision which is unfair or unreasonable must be struck down as invalid. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the new eligibility rule could not be applied retrospectively to penalize the petitioner for the delay caused by the college's initial wrongful rejection. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and directed the college to admit the petitioner to the current session at her own risk.

  Questions settled

  • Can a medical college reject an application form on technical grounds when the required information has been provided in a different format?
  • Does a notice to a student to appear for an interview constitute a representation sufficient to create an estoppel?
  • Are rules contained in a medical college prospectus subject to strict construction?
  • Can a new eligibility rule in a prospectus be applied retrospectively to bar a candidate who was wrongly denied admission in a previous session?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Muhammad vs Shaukat Ali1979 SCMR 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-26
  land allotmentsettlement schemeres judicatamutation of inheritancerehabilitation commissionerurban land claimleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition regarding the allotment of land in Chak No. 53/4-R, Bahawalpur. The petitioner originally sought to adjust his rural land claim against urban land allotted to him, which was rejected because the land fell within municipal limits. Following the failure of his initial challenges through appeal, revision, and a writ petition, the petitioner initiated a second round of litigation by acting as an informer, alleging that the respondent held excess land. Settlement authorities dismissed this claim, noting the petitioner had already exhausted his legal remedies and that the land in question had been correctly confirmed in the respondent's name based on a mutation of inheritance regarding deceased brothers. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's contention regarding the adjustment of his claim was no longer open to him, as he had exhausted all legal remedies. Furthermore, the Court found no merit in the allegation of excess land holding, affirming that the property was rightly allotted to the respondents based on inheritance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner re-litigate a claim for land adjustment after exhausting all appellate and writ remedies?
  • Is an allotment of land based on a mutation of inheritance valid when the original claimant has failed to prove excess land holding by the allottee?
  • Does a settlement authority have the power to confirm land in favour of a respondent based on inheritance mutation after previous litigation has concluded?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Muhammad Etc. vs The State1979 SCMR 101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-18
  bail cancellationmurderplea of alibiprima facie casespecial leave to appealmedical evidencecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the cancellation of bail by the Lahore High Court in a murder case. The petitioners were charged under Sections 302, 307, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Muhammad Amin and injuries to his son. The petitioners argued that the medical evidence contradicted the prosecution's version, specifically regarding the number of injuries and the type of weapons used, and raised a plea of alibi and the remoteness of the motive. The Supreme Court examined the record and found that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in cancelling the bail. The Court held that the presence of the petitioners' names in the F.I.R., the presence of an injured eyewitness, and the recovery of blood-stained earth established a prima facie case. It further ruled that a plea of alibi cannot be determined at the bail stage and must be proven at trial. Consequently, the Court found no violation of fundamental principles of justice and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of alibi be effectively determined at the bail stage of criminal proceedings?
  • Does the presence of an injured eyewitness in the F.I.R. constitute sufficient grounds to deny bail in a murder case?
  • Is the cancellation of bail by a High Court justified when the prosecution case is supported by F.I.R. details and recovery of incriminating evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Salahuddin vs The Province of Punjab and 3 Other1979 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  temporary injunctionprima facie caseallotment disputejudicial discretioncivil revisionbalance of convenience
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the allotment of a residential quarter. The petitioner challenged the dismissal of his civil revision by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the refusal of a temporary injunction by the lower courts. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had established a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss sufficient to warrant the grant of a temporary injunction in a suit challenging the allotment of the property to a third party. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a valid legal character or a prima facie case, noting that his own allotment was conditional and subject to cancellation without compensation. Furthermore, evidence indicated that the property was not to be allotted to anyone pending the outcome of the respondent's appeal. The Court affirmed that the grant of a temporary injunction is a matter of judicial discretion, which was properly exercised by the lower courts in accordance with established legal principles.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of a temporary injunction require the petitioner to establish a prima facie case and the balance of convenience?
  • Can a petitioner claim a right to a temporary injunction when their own interest in the property is conditional and subject to cancellation?
  • Is the refusal of a temporary injunction by lower courts subject to interference under revisional jurisdiction if the discretion was exercised according to judicial principles?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Muhammd Saeed vs Mst. Hamidan Begum Etc.S1979 SCMR 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-05
  evictionsublettinglandlord and tenantsecond appealfinding of factrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an eviction order against a tenant, Sh. Muhammad Saeed, who operated a cloth merchant business. The landlord sought ejectment on the ground of unauthorized subletting of the premises to a tailor, Muhammad Buta. The Rent Controller found that the tenant had sublet the premises without the landlord's consent, rendering him liable for eviction under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. This finding was upheld by the District Judge and subsequently by the Lahore High Court in a Second Appeal, which dismissed the matter in limine on the basis that the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the petitioner and the alleged sub-tenant was a finding of fact that could not be disturbed in Second Appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed these findings, rejecting the petitioner's argument that the tailor's presence was merely an association to boost business rather than a subletting arrangement. The Court held that the cited precedents were distinguishable on their facts and found no grounds for interference, thereby dismissing the petition while granting the tenant time to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of fact regarding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship be disturbed in a Second Appeal?
  • Does the association of a tailor in a cloth merchant's shop constitute subletting under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Is a tenant liable for eviction if they allow a third party to use the rented premises without the landlord's consent?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Abdul Majid vs Habib Ahmad (Represented by Legal Heirs)1979 SCMR 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-10
  specific performanceex parte decreetransfer of suitrevisional jurisdictionmaterial irregularityservice of noticeprocedural fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a suit for specific performance of a sale agreement filed by the petitioner against the respondent. The case was transferred by the District Judge from Gujar Khan to Rawalpindi without notice to the parties. Subsequently, the Civil Judge at Rawalpindi issued notices to the parties' advocates. The respondent's advocate noted on the notice that his engagement was limited to the Gujar Khan court and requested service on the respondent personally. The Civil Judge ignored this, proceeded ex parte, and decreed the suit. The respondent's applications to set aside the ex parte order and decree were dismissed by the trial court. The High Court, in revision, set aside the decree and remanded the case for disposal on merits. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the failure to serve the respondent personally, despite the advocate's specific disclaimer of authority for the new venue, constituted a material irregularity. The Court affirmed that the High Court correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to correct this procedural failure.

  Questions settled

  • Does a transfer of a civil suit without notice to the parties constitute a material irregularity?
  • Can a High Court interfere in revision with concurrent findings of lower courts if there is a material irregularity in procedure?
  • Is service of notice on an advocate valid when the advocate has explicitly stated their engagement is limited to a different court?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary, Labour Department, N: W. F. P. Government, Peshawar and 21979 PLC 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The provided judgment text is empty. Consequently, it is impossible to generate a summary, identify statutory provisions, extract keywords, formulate legal questions, or determine the author of the opinion.

  Read full judgment →
• Secretary, Government of Punjab, Food and Co-Operation1979 PLD Supreme Court 835 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-24
  voluntary retirementservice lawwithdrawal of retirementcivil servantleave preparatory to retirementconstitutional validityfinality of option
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the Punjab Service Tribunal's decision, which had permitted a government servant to withdraw his request for voluntary retirement. The respondent had applied for voluntary retirement after 24 years of service, which was accepted by the government, though the application was technically premature. Subsequently, the respondent sought to withdraw his retirement request, which the government denied. The Service Tribunal, relying on the principle that a specific government memorandum lacked the force of a rule, ruled in favor of the respondent. The Supreme Court, however, allowed the appeal. The Court held that the respondent’s retirement was valid under Article 178(4)(a) of the 1962 Constitution, as the government had accepted the request and the respondent had already availed of leave preparatory to retirement benefits. The Court established that once a voluntary retirement option is exercised and accepted, and the process is acted upon, it creates a binding finality. Consequently, the respondent could not unilaterally withdraw his request, and the government's subsequent corrective order did not invalidate the original retirement.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant unilaterally withdraw a request for voluntary retirement after it has been accepted and acted upon?
  • Does a government memorandum regarding the finality of retirement options possess the force of a rule?
  • Can an order of retirement be considered valid under Article 178(4)(a) of the 1962 Constitution if it is issued in substance despite technical defects in the application?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Muhammad Etc vs Additional Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and Other1979 PLD Supreme Court 839 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-22
  land settlementdisplaced personswrit jurisdictionremandmisreading of recordspecial leave to appealbona fide purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions for special leave to appeal arising from land settlement disputes under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958. The core legal question is whether the High Court, upon finding an administrative order vitiated by a misreading of the record, is justified in resolving complex, controversial factual issues itself rather than remanding the matter to the relevant Settlement authority for fresh determination. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the High Court's procedure of resolving disputed facts and admitting new documents, while simultaneously excluding the petitioners from participation in remanded proceedings, raised questions of fundamental importance. The key principle laid down is that when an administrative order is flawed due to a misreading of the record, the proper judicial course is to remand the case for fresh disposal by the competent authority rather than assuming the role of the fact-finding tribunal. Furthermore, judicial proceedings should not exclude parties whose interests are directly affected by the outcome of the remanded issues.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court justified in resolving controversial factual issues itself when an administrative order is vitiated by misreading of the record?
  • Should a case be remanded to the original authority for fresh disposal when the initial administrative order is found to be based on a misreading of the record?
  • Can a court exclude a party from participating in remanded proceedings while simultaneously leaving issues affecting their interests open for determination?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraj Din vs Nazar Hussain and Another1979 SCMR 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-02-11
  review petitiondeath sentencegeneral amnestyexpectancy of lifecommutation of sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had restored a death sentence previously reduced to transportation for life by the High Court. The petitioner sought commutation of the restored death sentence, arguing that he was entitled to the benefit of a general amnesty declared by the President of Pakistan on December 23, 1971, and that the restoration of the death sentence after a significant lapse of time violated his acquired expectancy of life. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the amnesty was inapplicable because the petitioner did not stand sentenced to death on the date of the declaration, as the High Court had already set aside the sentence. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument regarding expectancy of life, noting that the petitioner had been on notice since May 1970, when leave to appeal was granted, that the death sentence remained subject to potential restoration. The Court affirmed that no legal grounds existed to interfere with the sentence in review jurisdiction, suggesting the petitioner approach the executive government for clemency.

  Questions settled

  • Does a general amnesty for death row convicts apply to a person whose death sentence was set aside by the High Court prior to the date of the amnesty declaration?
  • Can a convict claim an acquired expectancy of life when an appeal against the reduction of their sentence is pending before the Supreme Court?
  • Does the restoration of a death sentence by the Supreme Court after a lapse of several years constitute a valid legal ground for review?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Muhammad Etc vs Additional Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and Ot11ers1979 PLD Supreme Court 904 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-22
  land settlementallotment cancellationsubsequent purchaserremand of casewrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arises from petitions for special leave to appeal against orders passed by the Lahore High Court concerning the cancellation of a land allotment and subsequent writ proceedings. The dispute pertains to 98 kanals and 12 marlas of land originally allotted under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958, which was cancelled on the ground that the allottee had not procured it. The petitioners, claiming as subsequent purchasers from the allottee, challenged the cancellation and related orders. The High Court partially dismissed the writ petition, set aside certain portions regarding informants, and made findings regarding the allottee's entitlement and the validity of the petitioners' purchase, while declining to permit reopening of certain matters and dismissing subsequent challenges to non-impleadment in parallel proceedings. The core legal questions involve the propriety of the High Court resolving highly controversial factual issues by examining new documents rather than remanding the case, and the validity of leaving certain entitlement questions open while excluding the petitioners from subsequent proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the questions raised regarding the course adopted by the High Court in resolving controversial matters and excluding the petitioners from open proceedings were of fundamental importance and warranted a detailed examination. Leave to appeal was accordingly granted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court is justified in resolving highly controversial factual issues and admitting new documents on record instead of remanding the case to the settlement authorities?
  • Whether subsequent purchasers of disputed evacuee land can be excluded from proceedings examining the allottee's entitlement and holding?
  • Whether a petition for special leave to appeal is premature when a parallel writ petition raising the same relief is still pending before the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Sana Ullah vs Muhammad Akhtar Etcs1979 SCMR 97 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-11
  writ jurisdictioncivil revisionpecuniary jurisdictionexhaustion of remediessuit valuationregular first appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order dismissing a writ petition. The underlying dispute originated from a civil suit for possession of land and shops, which was decreed by a Civil Judge. Both parties challenged aspects of the decree, with the defendant filing a Regular First Appeal in the High Court and the plaintiff filing a civil revision before the District Judge. The defendant challenged the District Judge's jurisdiction to hear the revision, arguing that the suit's valuation exceeded the District Judge's pecuniary jurisdiction. After the District Judge rejected this plea, the defendant sought relief via a writ petition, which the High Court dismissed, holding that such procedural matters should be resolved through the ordinary remedies provided by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 rather than through extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that it was inappropriate to interfere via writ jurisdiction while the revision and appeal were still pending in competent forums. The Court affirmed that parties must exhaust ordinary civil remedies before seeking constitutional intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Is it appropriate for the High Court to exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 when the underlying civil dispute is already pending before a competent court?
  • Should procedural disputes regarding the valuation of a suit and the resulting forum of appeal be resolved through the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 or through a writ petition?
  • Does the forum of appeal or revision in a civil suit depend on the valuation fixed by the plaintiff or the valuation determined by the trial court in its decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Saleh Muhammad and 5 Others vs Khushi Muhammad and 5 Other1979 SCMR 570 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-09
  displaced personsland settlementMukhbari applicationallotment cancellationproduce index unitsadministrative errorverified claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the allotment of land to displaced persons. The respondents were allotted land based on verified claims, which were later reduced due to a calculation error by the Central Record Office, resulting in an excess allotment. The appellants filed a Mukhbari application seeking cancellation of the respondents' allotments. Before the final order, the respondents voluntarily surrendered the excess land situated in Dera Ghazi Khan. Despite this, the Deputy Commissioner cancelled the respondents' land in Sahiwal, which fell within their legitimate entitlement. The High Court set aside this order, finding no evidence of fraud and noting that the excess was a result of administrative miscalculation. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the respondents had a right to retain land equivalent to their verified entitlement. The Court held that since the respondents had already surrendered the excess land, the cancellation of the land within their legitimate entitlement was legally unjustified and lacked merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can land allotted to a displaced person be cancelled if the excess allotment was due to an administrative miscalculation rather than fraud?
  • Does a displaced person have the right to choose which land to surrender when an excess allotment is identified?
  • Is the cancellation of land within a claimant's legitimate entitlement legally valid if the claimant has already voluntarily surrendered excess land elsewhere?
  Read full judgment →
• Salahuddin and Other vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner II and Other1979 PLD SC 16 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-06
  displaced personsproperty transferlacheswrit jurisdictionsettlement authoritiesN.C.H. formresumption of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition regarding the transfer of a residential property. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, as heirs of a non-claimant displaced person, could challenge the transfer of property made to a claimant displaced person in 1960, based on an N.C.H. form filed in 1959 that remained unaddressed until 1975. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the petition, holding that the property had been validly transferred in 1960 and that the petitioners' failure to pursue their claim for over fifteen years constituted laches, precluding the reopening of the matter. The Court further held that a conditional observation made by a High Court judge regarding potential reconsideration of the claim was contingent upon the actual resumption of the property from the original transferee, which did not occur. The key principle laid down is that long-standing property transfers cannot be reopened at a belated stage due to the claimant's lack of vigilance and the finality of the original transfer order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a property transfer made by settlement authorities be reopened after a significant lapse of time due to the claimant's lack of vigilance?
  • Does a conditional observation by a court regarding the potential reconsideration of a claim create a vested right if the underlying condition is not met?
  • Is a transfer of property to a claimant displaced person valid if a non-claimant's earlier application was not formally disposed of but the non-claimant failed to pursue it for many years?
  Read full judgment →
• Sakhi Muhammad vs Chairman, District Council, Sheikhupura and Another1979 SCMR 179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-22
  writ jurisdictionlicenseeallotment of landrevocation of licenceeviction noticeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional writ petition by the Lahore High Court regarding the cancellation of an allotment of land. The petitioner occupied a 12-marla plot of land owned by the Provincial Government under the management of the District Council, Sheikhupura, pursuant to a lease agreement dated 9 August 1977. Upon alleged non-payment of rent in advance and unauthorized construction, the District Council issued a notice directing the petitioner to surrender vacant possession. The core legal question was whether the petitioner possessed any enforceable legal right under writ jurisdiction to challenge the eviction notice issued by the District Council. The Supreme Court held that under the executed agreement, the petitioner was merely an allottee whose legal status was at best that of a licensee. Because the licence was expressly revocable upon notice pursuant to the agreement's terms, the petitioner had no legal basis to challenge the eviction notice under writ jurisdiction. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allottee occupying government land under a revocable agreement holds the status of a mere licensee?
  • Can a licensee whose licence is validly revoked pursuant to contractual terms challenge an eviction notice through writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Sadiq Ali vs Abdur Rashid and 5 Other1979 SCMR 35 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-09-28
  unlawful assemblycommon objectsentencing discretiondeath penaltymedical evidencecriminal appealvicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a High Court judgment that reduced the death sentences of certain respondents to life imprisonment following their conviction for murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondents had been convicted for double murder and causing injuries while acting as members of an unlawful assembly. The complainant challenged this reduction, arguing that under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, once the common object of an unlawful assembly is established, all members should receive the death penalty. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while Section 149 establishes liability for the offence, it does not dictate the sentence. The court affirmed that sentencing discretion remains vested in the judiciary under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Furthermore, the Court found the High Court’s decision to reduce the sentences was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, as it was based on significant discrepancies between oral and medical testimony regarding the attribution of fatal shots. The principle established is that Section 149 does not remove judicial discretion in sentencing for murder.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 mandate the death penalty for all members of an unlawful assembly upon a murder conviction?
  • Does the court retain discretion under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to award life imprisonment instead of the death penalty in cases involving Section 149?
  • Can a High Court reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment based on discrepancies between oral and medical testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Sabir Din vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry Of Defence and Other1979 SCMR 555 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-24
  territorial jurisdictionwrit petitionservice matteradministrative authoritycause of actionHigh Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a writ petition in a service matter on the grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner, a Deputy Assistant Military Estates Officer, sought to challenge his reversion order, which was recommended by a committee in Rawalpindi and approved by the Director, Military Lands and Cantonments, Rawalpindi. The core legal question was whether the Peshawar High Court possessed the territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition where the impugned administrative action occurred in Rawalpindi and Muzaffarabad, and the relevant authorities were not located within the Peshawar High Court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, holding that the Peshawar High Court correctly refused jurisdiction because neither the impugned action nor the authority taking it fell within its territorial limits under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Court affirmed that for a High Court to exercise writ jurisdiction, the impugned action or the authority must be within its territorial jurisdiction, and administrative links alone do not confer such authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court have territorial jurisdiction to issue a writ against an authority or action located outside its territorial limits?
  • Does the mere administrative link of an office within a specific circle confer territorial jurisdiction on a High Court where the impugned action occurred elsewhere?
  • Is a High Court justified in dismissing a writ petition in limine if the impugned action and the authority taking it are outside its territorial jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Saat Malook vs Rozi Khan1979 SCMR 593 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-30
  pre-emptioncompromise decreeSection 148 CPCprocedural fairnessright of evidenceremandrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a pre-emption suit where the parties entered into a compromise decree requiring the petitioner to pay the sale price by a specific date. The petitioner failed to pay on the due date, alleging the respondent's absence prevented the transaction, and subsequently deposited the funds the following day. The trial court dismissed the suit for non-compliance. The core legal question was whether the court could extend the time for payment under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether the trial court acted legally in dismissing the application without allowing the parties to conclude their evidence. The Supreme Court held that Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 does not permit the extension of time for payment stipulated in a compromise decree. However, the Court ruled that the trial court committed a legal error by dismissing the application without providing the petitioner an opportunity to complete his evidence or the respondent an opportunity to rebut it. The case was remanded for a full evidentiary hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court extend the time for payment stipulated in a compromise decree under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is it legally permissible for a trial court to dismiss an application without allowing the parties to complete their evidence and produce rebuttal evidence?
  • Does a lower appellate court have the authority to treat a revision petition as an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• S. Niaz Ali Shah vs Settlement Authorities and Another1979 SCMR 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1965-05-26
  settlement authoritieswrit jurisdictionfindings of factsuo motu revisiondisplaced persontransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan, which upheld the dismissal of the appellant's writ petition regarding the transfer of a plot under settlement laws. The appellant, a claimant displaced person, contended that he had constructed a permanent structure (a bus stand) on the allotted plot and that the Settlement Authorities ignored relevant evidence while finding the structure to be temporary. The core legal questions involved whether findings of fact by Settlement Authorities based on spot inspection were unassailable in writ jurisdiction, and whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's review of an auction order was a valid exercise of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the nature of the construction were supported by spot inspections and that any initial procedural irregularity by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner in transferring the property was cured by the Settlement Commissioner's valid exercise of suo motu revision powers under the relevant statute. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a finding of fact of the Settlement Authorities arrived at by ignoring a mass of relevant evidence was unassailable in the writ jurisdiction as held by the High Court?
  • Whether the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner reviewing his order for the auction of the plot was an order made in the valid exercise of his jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• S. Ali Raza Shah Naqvi vs Government of Sind Etc.1979 PLD Supreme Court 856 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-28
  service appealdepartmental remedyexhaustion of remediesservice tribunal jurisdictionpromotionlimitationfitness for promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a college professor, challenged the dismissal of his service appeal by the Sind Service Tribunal, which had rejected his claim for a higher grade. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellant had exhausted mandatory departmental remedies and whether the Tribunal possessed jurisdiction over his claim for promotion. The Supreme Court held that the appeal before the Tribunal was incompetent because the appellant failed to file a departmental appeal to the Chief Secretary against the impugned order, as required by law. Additionally, the Court affirmed that, under the governing statute, no appeal lies to a Service Tribunal against a decision determining a civil servant's fitness for promotion or higher grade. The key principles laid down are that the exhaustion of departmental remedies is a strict statutory prerequisite for the maintainability of an appeal before a Service Tribunal, and that Service Tribunals are expressly barred from adjudicating matters relating to the fitness of a civil servant for promotion or higher grade.

  Questions settled

  • Is a service appeal before a Service Tribunal maintainable if the civil servant has not exhausted the required departmental appeal process?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal against an order determining a civil servant's fitness for promotion or a higher grade?
  • Can ignorance of the law be accepted as a valid excuse for failing to file a mandatory departmental appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Rizwan Co Operative Society Ltd. vs Custodian of Evacuee Property and Other1979 SCMR 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-16
  civil reviewevacuee propertytown improvementacquisition of landcompromiseerror apparent on the face of the record
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of Civil Review Petitions Nos. 34 and 35 of 1971, directed against a previous order of the Supreme Court which had set aside a High Court order and declared the sale of land by the Custodian of Evacuee Property to the petitioner as without lawful authority. The core legal questions involved whether certain Khasra numbers were excluded from the acquisition scheme, whether a compromise entered into during the appeal was binding without concurrence, and whether the construction of provisions of the Town Improvement Act, 1922 and Ordinance 15 of 1949 constituted errors apparent on the face of the record warranting review. The Supreme Court held that new grounds not raised at the original hearing cannot be entertained in review, that the construction placed on statutes by the Court cannot be challenged as an error apparent on the face of the record merely because an alternative interpretation is possible, and that a compromise affecting interested parties requires their concurrence. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a new ground not raised at the original hearing of the appeal be agitated in a civil review petition?
  • Whether an erroneous construction of a statute by a court constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record inviting interference in review jurisdiction?
  • Is a compromise entered into during the pendency of an appeal effective without the concurrence of a necessary party having legal interest in the subject matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Riasat Ali vs Muhammad Asghar and 2 Other1979 SCMR 523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-26
  post-arrest bailright of private defencemurderjudicial discretionbail cancellationcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the order of the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to the respondents, who were accused of murder and other offences. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion perversely in granting bail despite the allegations of murder and the presence of eyewitnesses. The Supreme Court examined the circumstances of the case, noting that the investigation revealed the deceased was armed with a gun and had initiated fire, thereby invoking the right of private defence. The Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion by considering the applicability of the right of private defence under the law and the specific nature of the injuries attributed to the respondents. The Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with the High Court's order, as the respondents were entitled to the concession of bail given the findings regarding the deceased's initial aggression and the lack of causal link between the co-accused's actions and the death. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's discretion in granting bail is perverse when the investigation suggests the deceased initiated the aggression?
  • Does the right of private defence under Section 100 of the Pakistan Penal Code constitute a valid ground for granting bail in a murder case?
  • Can bail be granted to an accused when the investigation indicates the injury inflicted by them did not cause the death of the deceased?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Ali vs Abdul Hamid1979 SCMR 423 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-20
  oath on Holy Quranreview jurisdictioncivil revisionestoppelignorance of lawbinding agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil revision dismissed by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld a trial court's refusal to review a judgment based on an oath taken on the Holy Qur'an. The petitioner sought review, claiming he was unaware that the respondent's father, who took the oath, was an Ahmadi and thus allegedly legally incompetent to swear on the Holy Qur'an. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could rescind an agreement to be bound by an oath after discovering the religious affiliation of the deponent, and whether this constituted grounds for review under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was aware of the respondent's father's religious affiliation at the time of the agreement and could not subsequently back out of an offer that had been accepted and acted upon. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a plea of ignorance of law regarding the validity of the oath was untenable. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that parties cannot resile from binding oaths once accepted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party resile from an agreement to be bound by an oath on the Holy Qur'an after it has been accepted and acted upon?
  • Does the discovery of a party's religious affiliation constitute a ground for review under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party successfully claim ignorance of law to invalidate an oath taken on the Holy Qur'an?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Ali Etc. vs Settlement Commissioner (Lands), Bahawalpur and 8 Other1979 SCMR 329 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-27
  review petitionlachescivil court jurisdictioninheritance mutationsettlement schemeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for review of the Supreme Court's order rejecting a petition for leave to appeal, which had challenged the dismissal of the petitioner's writ petition by the High Court concerning a land inheritance dispute. The core legal question revolves around whether the time spent in bona fide civil litigation could be excluded to condone laches in filing a constitutional petition, and whether a review petition can re-agitate points already decided. The Supreme Court held that the civil court lacked jurisdiction, the civil proceedings were not bona fide, and points already disposed of in the leave petition cannot be re-agitated in review. The key principle laid down is that matters already adjudicated upon cannot be reopened in review proceedings, and civil court jurisdiction is barred in settlement matters where proceedings are without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether time spent in prosecuting civil litigation can be excluded to explain laches in filing a writ petition when the civil court lacked jurisdiction?
  • Can a point already agitated and disposed of in a petition for leave to appeal be re-agitated in a review petition?
  • Whether civil courts have jurisdiction in matters governed by settlement and rehabilitation laws once land is confirmed?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Ali and Another vs The State1979 SCMR 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-27
  post-arrest bailmurderresiled complainantfurther inquirySupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court refusing bail to the petitioners who, along with two others, were accused of committing murder. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners were entitled to bail on the ground of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given that the complainant subsequently resiled from his initial version in the First Information Report through a statement under Section 164 and affidavits from various family members vouched for the petitioners' innocence. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that it was difficult at this stage to say if the petitioners had committed the offence when the complainant himself disowned the prosecution case, thereby bringing the case within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2). The key principle laid down is that where the primary complainant resiles from the initial accusation at the bail stage, the matter may appropriately warrant further inquiry under Section 497(2), entitling the accused to the concession of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the complainant resiles from the First Information Report?
  • Can bail be granted on the basis of affidavits and statements under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 indicating the innocence of the accused?
  • Is a deeper appreciation of evidence regarding the possibility of identification appropriate at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Raza Khan vs Faqir Muhammad and Another1979 SCMR 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-25
  bail cancellationvicarious liabilityjudicial discretionmurder casecriminal procedurespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of an application for cancellation of bail by the Peshawar High Court. The petitioner, the complainant in a murder case, sought to cancel the bail granted to the respondent, Faqir Muhammad, by the Additional Sessions Judge, Peshawar. The core legal question was whether the lower courts exercised their discretion appropriately in granting bail, particularly given the petitioner's argument of vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, despite the absence of a specific overt act attributed to the respondent in the First Information Report. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly exercised their discretion, noting that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any legal or factual infirmity in the bail orders. The Court affirmed that allegations of the respondent being a powerful person, existing bad relations, or delayed surrender to the police are insufficient grounds to set aside a well-reasoned bail order. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that bail discretion based on further inquiry is not to be interfered with absent compelling legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be cancelled solely on the grounds that the accused is a powerful person or has bad relations with the complainant?
  • Is a bail order granted on the basis of further inquiry subject to interference if no specific overt act is attributed to the accused?
  • Does the mere allegation of vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 necessitate the cancellation of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Rashiduddin Qureshi vs The State1979 SCMR 99 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-04
  review petitionclarification of ordercriminal trespasstheftpressure tacticssecond review applicationcompromise
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for clarification of a previous Supreme Court order dated 28-3-1974, which had dismissed a review petition filed by the petitioner. The underlying dispute originated from a criminal complaint filed by the petitioner under sections 380, 445, 448, and 451 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alleging trespass and theft. The accused had successfully argued that they held possession of the disputed property pursuant to a written agreement, a fact the petitioner had previously admitted in a compromise before the Peshawar High Court. The Supreme Court had previously dismissed the petitioner's special leave petition on 9-3-1973, finding the complaint to be a pressure tactic, and subsequently dismissed the first review petition on 28-3-1974. The core legal question was whether the order dismissing the review petition required clarification. The Court held that the previous order was unambiguous and contained no error apparent on the face of the record. The application was dismissed, reaffirming that no second review application lies and that the previous findings on merits were final.

  Questions settled

  • Does a second review application lie against an order of the Supreme Court?
  • Can an application for clarification be used to re-litigate the merits of a dismissed review petition?
  • Is an order dismissing a review petition subject to further clarification if it contains no ambiguity?
  Read full judgment →
• Rais Khan vs Said Hanif and Another1979 SCMR 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-09-27
  cancellation of bailpost-arrest baildying declarationabscondenceacquittal of co-accusedocular evidencefurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Peshawar High Court cancelling the post-arrest bail granted to the petitioner. The petitioner, along with co-accused, was charged in a dying declaration and ocular evidence for a incident involving fatal gunshot injuries resulting in three deaths. Following the incident, the petitioner absconded for nearly four years while a co-accused was tried and acquitted. After surrendering, the Sessions Judge granted bail to the petitioner on the ground of further inquiry due to the co-accused's acquittal. However, the High Court cancelled the bail, holding that the acquittal of a co-accused was not a valid ground for bail given the direct mention in the dying declaration, ocular evidence, and prolonged abscondence. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no impropriety in the order cancelling bail and dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquittal of a co-accused serves as a valid ground to grant bail to an absconding accused directly named in a dying declaration and ocular evidence?
  • Whether prolonged abscondence is a relevant factor when considering the cancellation of bail granted to an accused charged with murder?
  • Whether the High Court properly exercises its jurisdiction in cancelling bail granted on the ground of further inquiry when strong ocular and dying declaration evidence exists against the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Rai Ata Ullah Khan vs Raja Anar Khan and Other1979 SCMR 471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-08
  pre-arrest bailbail discretiondelay in FIRgrievous hurtSupreme Court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court granting pre-arrest bail to the respondent, a police inspector accused alongside other government officials of committing various offences including wrongful confinement, hurt, assault, and dacoity during a political gathering. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's discretion in granting pre-arrest bail to the accused given the nature of the allegations and delay in lodging the FIR. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exercised its discretion after an elaborate discussion of all relevant factors, finding no specific attribution for grievous injuries, inordinate delay in FIR registration, and the bailable nature of most charged offences. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the impugned discretionary order and dismissed the petition, upholding the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's discretion in granting pre-arrest bail when based on an elaborate discussion of relevant factors?
  • Does an inordinate delay in lodging the FIR justify the concession of pre-arrest bail to the accused?
  • Is the lack of specific attribution of grievous injuries to individual accused persons a valid ground for confirming pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Qasim Khan vs Nawaz Khan and Other1979 SCMR 358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-22
  review petitionpre-emptionland disputenon-pre-emptibilityconstruction of houses
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for review of an order dated 18-12-1977, which had dismissed a civil petition for special leave to appeal. The original dispute involved a claim of pre-emption regarding a parcel of land measuring less than two Kanals. The Court had previously held that the land was purchased by the vendee for the purpose of constructing houses and, consequently, was exempt from the right of pre-emption. In the review petition, the petitioner contended that the vendee would face practical difficulties in obtaining partition of such a small area from other co-owners. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the alleged difficulty regarding partition pertains to the manner of construction and does not affect the legal finding regarding the non-pre-emptibility of the sale transaction. The Court reaffirmed that such practical concerns do not constitute valid grounds for reviewing a judgment. The review petition was found to be without merit and was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the difficulty of obtaining partition of a small land area constitute a valid ground for reviewing a judgment on pre-emption?
  • Is a sale of land for the purpose of constructing houses exempt from the right of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Prof. Muhammad Haneef vs The State1979 SCMR 459 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-02
  post-arrest bailcross versionfirearm injurymurderleave to appealco-accused bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of the petitioner's post-arrest bail application by the Lahore High Court in a case registered under sections 302, 307, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the grounds that no fatal injury was attributed to him and that a cross-first information report had been lodged with conflicting versions of the occurrence. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's presence, active participation evidenced by a firearm injury inflicted on an injured witness, and the existence of distinguishing features justifying differential treatment among co-accused negate the grant of bail at this stage. The court laid down the principle that minute sifting of prosecution evidence is impermissible at the bail stage, and where lower courts have properly evaluated the material and applied distinguishing features among co-accused, the Supreme Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to bail merely because no fatal injury is attributed to him in a murder case?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's refusal to grant bail when no legal or factual error is pointed out?
  • Whether the existence of a cross-first information report automatically entitles an accused to post-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Principal, Nishtar Medical College, Multan vs Muhammad Iqbal Khan1979 SCMR 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-19
  review petitionstudent disciplinerusticationmedical collegelimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a review petition filed against the judgment of this Court dated 18th of September 1978, which partly accepted an appeal by special leave. The respondent, a final year student at Nishtar Medical College, Multan, was expelled for three years by the Principal after being found guilty of attacking a professor. The respondent challenged his expulsion through a writ petition and an intra-court appeal before the Lahore High Court, both of which were dismissed. Upon further appeal, this Court held that under rule H of the General Disciplinary Rules contained in the prospectus of the Government Medical Colleges of the Punjab for the year 1975-76, the Principal lacked the authority to rusticate a student for more than one year, thereby reducing the penalty. The review petitioner sought a review of this decision and alternatively prayed for the transfer of the respondent to another college. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the review petition was barred by time by 81 days and that the Principal could proceed in accordance with law regarding any transfer power. The review petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Principal of a medical college has the authority to rusticate a student for more than one year under the General Disciplinary Rules?
  • Is a review petition filed with a delay of 81 days liable to be dismissed?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can interfere with administrative transfer powers of college authorities not forming part of the judgment under review?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Ghulam vs Noor Zaman1979 SCMR 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-21
  pre-emptionShafi-i-KhalitN.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act XIV of 1950common irrigation channelright of dischargeeasement rightsappendages
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the plaintiff on the grounds of contiguity and being a participator in immunities and appendages (Shafi-i-Khalit). The trial court partially decreed the suit under clause 'secondly' of Section 12 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act XIV of 1950 because both the plaintiff's land and part of the suit land received irrigation water from the same channel. This decree was largely upheld by the District Judge, but the Peshawar High Court reversed the decisions in second appeal and dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, dismissing the petition. The Court held that receiving irrigation water from a common channel does not confer a right of pre-emption as Shafi-i-Khalit. Clause 'secondly' of Section 12 requires a distinct 'right to discharge' water (a right of flow) over the suit land, rather than merely drawing water from a common source.

  Questions settled

  • Does drawing irrigation water from a common channel constitute a right of pre-emption as Shafi-i-Khalit?
  • What constitutes a 'right to discharge' water under clause 'secondly' of Section 12 of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act XIV of 1950?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervez Iqbal and Another vs Muhammad Hanif and Other1979 SCMR 367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-10
  evacuee propertysettlement lawpermanent transfer deedlachesrevisional jurisdictionauction saleminority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee house in Rawalpindi. The property was initially transferred to the petitioners' predecessor, who failed to pay the evaluation price, leading to the cancellation of the transfer and subsequent auction to the respondents' predecessor. The petitioners, despite being granted time to pay by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, failed to do so for six years. Years later, a Settlement Commissioner accepted a revision petition and restored the property to the petitioners. The High Court set aside this order, citing the Settlement Commissioner's conflict of interest, the death of the respondent prior to the order, and the petitioners' laches. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the petitioners had no subsisting interest in the property due to their failure to comply with the payment order they themselves had requested. The Court affirmed that the Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to reopen the case after such a significant delay and that the property had been validly auctioned and transferred via a Permanent Transfer Deed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party have a subsisting interest in an evacuee property if they fail to comply with a payment order granted upon their own request?
  • Can a Settlement Commissioner exercise revisional jurisdiction to reopen a case after a significant lapse of time without adequate explanation?
  • Does the failure to comply with a payment order for evacuee property render a subsequent auction sale and issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed valid?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad Qureshi and Another vs The Divisional1979 SCMR 157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-08
  constitutional jurisdictioncontractual rightswrit petitionlicense agreementrailway administrationtermination of contract
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, coal dealers, challenged the termination of their license agreements for storage space at Spezand Railway Station by the respondent Railways. They filed constitutional petitions in the High Court of Baluchistan, alleging the notices were issued without lawful authority and under the influence of Martial Law Authorities. The High Court dismissed the petitions, ruling that the matter involved the enforcement of contractual rights, which is outside the scope of constitutional jurisdiction, and noted the agreements were secured through improper influence. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision. The Court held that the Railway Administration acted within its rights under Clause 10 of the agreement, which permitted termination without assigning reasons upon notice. Crucially, the Court reaffirmed the principle that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to enforce purely contractual obligations. Finding no merit in the petitions and lacking jurisdiction to grant the requested relief regarding the eviction, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, noting that any plea for time to vacate should be directed to the respondent Railways.

  Questions settled

  • Can constitutional jurisdiction be invoked to enforce purely contractual rights?
  • Is a Railway Administration entitled to terminate a license agreement based on a specific termination clause?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to grant relief for the enforcement of contractual obligations under its constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmad vs Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. and Other1979 SCMR 671 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-06
  execution applicationrestoration of applicationdismissal for defaultdiscretionary powersupreme court leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's order allowing an application for the restoration of an execution application which had been previously dismissed for default. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's discretion in restoring an execution application where the respondent had advanced a false plea regarding the omission of the case from the cause list. The Supreme Court held that while the view taken by the learned Judge of the High Court was incorrect and the application should ideally have been dismissed, the matter of restoring the execution application fell within the discretionary powers of the High Court, and the order was not so perverse as to warrant the grant of special leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the discretionary orders of the High Court under Article 185 of the Constitution unless the order is shown to be perverse, even if the lower court's view is considered incorrect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the discretionary order of the High Court restoring an execution application?
  • Does a false plea regarding the absence of a case from the cause list render an order of restoration perverse enough to warrant special leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmad and 2 Others vs Additional Secretary, Food and Agriculture, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 Other1979 SCMR 389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-12-05
  locus standiaggrieved personwrit petitionevacuee trust propertytenancy rightstransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition in limine by the Lahore High Court, which upheld that the petitioners lacked the locus standi to challenge an order validating the transfer of evacuee trust property. The petitioners, occupying the property as tenants under the Evacuee Trust Board, argued they were aggrieved persons under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 because they enjoyed better prospects as tenants of the Board than under private owners. The core legal question was whether mere tenants of evacuee trust property possess the requisite locus standi as 'aggrieved persons' to challenge the transfer of that property through writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a tenant's mere expectation of better tenancy terms does not equate to a legal right or substantial interest in the property. The Court established the principle that invoking writ jurisdiction requires demonstrating a direct or indirect legal injury and a substantial interest in the subject matter, rather than a mere change in landlord-tenant dynamics.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant of evacuee trust property have the locus standi to challenge the transfer of that property under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the prospect of enjoying better terms under one landlord versus another be equated with having a legal right or interest in the property for the purpose of writ jurisdiction?
  • What constitutes being an 'aggrieved person' entitled to invoke the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmad and 2 Others vs Additional Secretary, Food and Agriculture, Government of Pakistan and 3 Other1979 SCMR 299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-12-04
  locus standiaggrieved personwrit jurisdictionevacuee trust propertytenancy rightsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a writ petition in limine. The petitioners, who were tenants of the Evacuee Trust Board, sought to challenge an order by the Federal Government validating the transfer of the property in dispute to the respondents under the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975. The core legal question was whether the petitioners possessed the necessary locus standi to maintain a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The petitioners argued that as tenants, they were 'aggrieved persons' because their status as tenants under the Trust was more favorable than their potential status under the respondents. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioners failed to establish a direct or indirect injury or a substantial interest in the subject matter. The Court affirmed the principle that to invoke writ jurisdiction, a petitioner must be an 'aggrieved person' with a tangible legal interest, which mere tenancy does not constitute.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant of evacuee trust property have the locus standi to challenge the transfer of that property to a third party under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is a mere expectation of better tenancy conditions sufficient to qualify a petitioner as an 'aggrieved person' for the purpose of invoking writ jurisdiction?
  • Must a petitioner demonstrate a direct or indirect injury to their legal interest to maintain a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab Din vs Member, Board of Revenue (Settlement & Rehabilita Tion).PLD 1979Supreme Court846 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-08
  evacuee propertydisplaced personspending proceedingsstatutory repealland settlementallotment of landclaimant displaced personinterpretation of statutes
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal addresses a dispute over the transfer of erstwhile evacuee land originally claimed by a displaced person, Rehmatullah, whose application had remained pending due to administrative interventions and subsequent litigation. The core legal question concerns the interpretation of the term 'proceedings' under section 2(2) of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act 1975, specifically whether a pending application for the allotment of land based on unsatisfied verified claims constitutes a pending judicial proceeding saved from abatement upon the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958. The Supreme Court held that the word 'proceedings' is comprehensive enough to encompass administrative and quasi-judicial applications for enforcing substantive statutory rights under the repealed settlement laws, and that pending applications remain sub judice and are saved for final disposal. The Court laid down that the connotation of 'proceedings' must be understood with reference to the text, subject-matter, and legislative intent, covering any prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right without artificially dividing them into strictly judicial or executive categories.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'proceedings' in section 2(2) of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act 1975 include administrative or quasi-judicial applications for land allotment?
  • Are pending applications for the transfer of evacuee land saved under section 2(2) of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act 1975 upon the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Does a person obtaining land on a temporary tender basis acquire a preferential right over a claimant displaced person whose allotment application is pending at the time of statutory repeal?
  • How is the connotation of the word 'proceedings' to be determined when used in a statutory enactment?
  Read full judgment →
• National Steel Ltd. vs Mks. F. Afsar1979 PLD Supreme Court 819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-25
  ejectmentbona fide personal usepremature filingconcurrent findingsleave to appeallandlord and tenantprocedural waiver
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding an eviction order against a tenant. The petitioner sought to challenge the eviction on the ground that the ejectment application was filed before the expiry of the lease period, citing the proviso to section 13(3) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. Additionally, the petitioner challenged the finding regarding the landlord's bona fide personal requirement for the premises. The Supreme Court held that the objection regarding the premature filing of the eviction application was not raised before the Rent Controller or the first appellate court and, therefore, could not be entertained at the appellate stage, especially since the lease period had long since expired and the respondent could have rectified the procedural defect had it been raised earlier. Regarding the bona fide requirement, the Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts. The petition was dismissed, with the Court granting the petitioner four months to vacate the premises subject to rent payment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant raise the objection of premature filing of an eviction application for the first time in the High Court if it was not pleaded before the Rent Controller?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide personal requirement of a landlord?
  • Is an eviction order maintainable if the lease period expires during the pendency of the litigation, even if the initial application was filed prematurely?
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• Naseer Ahmad vs The State1979 SCMR 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-22
  criminal appealmurder convictionocular testimonyreasonable doubtFIR fabricationcivil unrestappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentence of the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, maintained by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given the surrounding circumstances of widespread civil unrest and rioting in Jhelum. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case was fundamentally flawed. The Court observed that the written complaint (FIR) was likely fabricated during the investigation rather than being a contemporaneous record. Furthermore, the ocular testimony was deemed unreliable due to significant contradictions regarding the involvement of other accused persons and the suppression of the broader context of rioting that occurred on the night of the incident. Consequently, the Court concluded that the evidence failed to prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that in cases of large-scale civil disturbance, where ocular testimony is inconsistent and the FIR appears to be a post-investigation creation, such evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the FIR is found to have been fabricated during the investigation?
  • Does the suppression of the broader context of civil rioting by prosecution witnesses undermine the credibility of ocular testimony?
  • Is a conviction for murder sustainable when there are significant contradictions regarding the identity and participation of alleged co-accused?
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• Najam Abbas and Others vs Munawar Ali Khan and Another1979 SCMR 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-26
  transfer of criminal casewitness intimidationdiscretionary powerfair trialcriminal procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which transferred a murder trial from the Sessions Court, Jhang, to another district. The core legal question was whether the High Court's discretionary order for transfer was based on sufficient material and whether the absence of State representation during the transfer application hearing rendered the order illegal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s order was justified, noting that the allegations of witness intimidation provided sufficient material for the transfer, and the High Court was not required to conduct an elaborate inquiry into these allegations. Furthermore, the Court held that the absence of the State at the hearing did not invalidate the order, as notice had been served and the State’s non-appearance implied a decision not to oppose the transfer. The Court affirmed that it would not entertain objections or arguments regarding prejudice that were not raised before the High Court. The petition for leave was dismissed, upholding the discretionary power of the High Court to transfer cases to ensure a fair trial.

  Questions settled

  • Is a High Court required to conduct an elaborate inquiry into allegations of witness intimidation before ordering the transfer of a criminal case?
  • Does the absence of the State at the hearing of a transfer application render the resulting order illegal if notice was served?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to examine objections that were not raised before the High Court in the original proceedings?
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• N. S. Hoon vs Advocate General, Sind, Karachi1979 SCMR 600 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-10
  contempt of courtinfluencing a witnessappreciation of evidencecriminal contemptcorroborationsuo motu cognizance
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal against the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, whereby the appellant was convicted of contempt of court and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 500 for attempting to influence and induce a witness in a pending civil suit. The core legal question was whether the conviction of the appellant based on the solitary, uncorroborated statement of the complainant, alleged to be inconsistent and motivated, was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the contempt proceedings were duly established upon a thorough and careful appreciation of evidence, and that attempts to influence a witness or warp their mind constitute a clear contempt of court. The court laid down that while contempt proceedings are criminal in nature, an alleged contemner is not in the exact position of an accused for all purposes and may file an affidavit or make a statement on oath, and that unrebutted circumstantial corroboration and motive are sufficient to sustain a conviction when the witness's testimony is found credible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an attempt to influence a witness or warp their mind amounts to contempt of court?
  • Can a conviction for contempt of court be sustained on the solitary statement of the complainant?
  • What is the legal position of an alleged contemner in criminal contempt proceedings regarding filing affidavits and making statements on oath?
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• Mushtaq Hussain vs Muhammad Shafi1979 SCMR 496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-25
  evictiontentative rent orderstriking off defenceadjustment of rentlandlord and tenantspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an eviction petition filed by the respondent landlord against the petitioner tenant under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 concerning a residential house in Faisalabad. The Rent Controller directed the tenant to deposit arrears of rent, but upon non-compliance, struck off his defence and ordered eviction. The tenant's departmental appeals before the District Judge and the Lahore High Court were dismissed, leading to a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether a Rent Controller is legally required to determine disputed adjustments before passing a tentative rent deposit order under section 13 of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the order for depositing rent is based on a tentative view and its compliance cannot be shelved pending a regular trial on adjustments. The Court laid down the principle that compliance with a tentative rent deposit direction is a condition precedent for the Rent Controller to further examine or adjudicate upon the tenant's defence pleas.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order directing the deposit of rent under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 can be shelved on the plea of adjustment?
  • Is a tentative rent deposit order based on a preliminary view of the case rather than a regular trial?
  • Does non-compliance with a tentative rent deposit order justify striking off the tenant's defence?
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• Mushataq Ahmaid vs President, Special Military Court No. 7, Karachi1979 SCMR 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-05
  interim bailconstitutional petitionSummary Military Courtspecial leave to appealmotion stage
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against an interlocutory order of the High Court of Sind at Karachi, which declined to grant interim bail to the petitioner at the motion stage of a constitutional petition. The petitioner had been convicted by a Summary Military Court under Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether interference was warranted with the High Court's refusal to grant interim bail before examining the record of a pending constitutional petition. The Supreme Court held that since the matter was still at the preliminary motion stage in the High Court and the legal and factual points raised required examination by that court first, the petition for special leave to appeal should not be entertained. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that appellate interference with interlocutory orders declining interim bail at the pre-admission motion stage is generally unwarranted when the primary constitutional petition remains pending adjudication before the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court's refusal to grant interim bail at the motion stage of a constitutional petition?
  • Should legal and factual contentions on the merits of a conviction be examined by the Supreme Court before the High Court has attended to them at a regular hearing?
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• Musa Khan vs The State1979 SCMR 589 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-02
  murderbenefit of doubtacquittalcriminal appealmedical evidence contradictionocular evidencefirst information report delayinjuries on accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which set aside the acquittal of the appellant, Musa Khan, and convicted him under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for murder, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court examined the record, which revealed significant discrepancies in the prosecution's case, including an unconvincing motive, material contradictions between the ocular testimony and the medical evidence regarding injuries on the deceased, unexplained injuries on the accused's person, and doubts surrounding the prompt lodging of the first information report. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt against the appellant and that the High Court erred in interfering with the trial court's well-reasoned order of acquittal. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of the charges.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside an order of acquittal when the prosecution evidence was fraught with doubts and contradictions?
  • Can injuries found on the person of an accused, which are not explained or owned by the prosecution, be used as an incriminating factor against him?
  • Does a discrepancy between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the nature of injuries inflicted warrant the rejection of eyewitness accounts?
  • Whether delayed lodging of the first information report after police presence at the spot casts serious doubt on the veracity of the prosecution version?
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• Municipal Committee, Gujranwala vs Barkat Bibi and 5 Other1979 SCMR 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-15
  rent restrictionstriking off defencewilful defaultrent deposittenant's obligationdue diligence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that upheld the striking off of a tenant's defence in a rent restriction case. The core legal question was whether the tenant's failure to deposit rent in compliance with a court order under Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance constituted 'wilful' default, and whether the tenant was denied adequate opportunity to explain the non-compliance before the defence was struck off. The Supreme Court held that the tenant's reliance on 'audit objections' as an excuse for non-payment was insufficient, as the objections were easily rectifiable and the failure to comply resulted from the tenant's own negligence. The Court affirmed that the default was wilful and that the tenant had been afforded sufficient opportunity to explain the non-compliance, rendering a separate detailed inquiry unnecessary. The key principle laid down is that administrative or audit objections do not absolve a tenant from the mandatory obligation to comply with court-ordered rent deposits, and failure to do so with due diligence constitutes wilful default warranting the striking off of the defence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of audit objections constitute a valid excuse for failing to comply with a court order to deposit rent under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Is a separate detailed inquiry required before a Rent Controller can strike off a tenant's defence for non-compliance with a rent deposit order?
  • Does the failure to deposit rent in compliance with a court order due to negligence constitute wilful default?
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• Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Ahmadzai vs National Bank of Pakistan and Another1979 SCMR 606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-03
  execution of decreeclerical errorclarification of ordermoney decreeauction of propertyHigh Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an execution proceeding in the High Court of Sind concerning a money decree against the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the authority to clarify or correct an earlier order regarding the properties subject to auction, specifically when that order contained a clerical error or confusion regarding the scope of an intervenor's objection. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its competence in clarifying the order. It determined that the initial order contained a clerical mistake stemming from an error in the intervenor's application, which created confusion regarding which properties were available for sale. The Court reasoned that the High Court was empowered to correct such clerical errors and technical defects to ensure the progress of execution proceedings. Furthermore, the Court noted that the intervenor had explicitly narrowed their objection to a single property, and the Court was competent to act upon that statement. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the contention that the High Court had improperly exercised review powers, as the action was a necessary clarification and correction of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court clarify an order to correct a clerical error or confusion regarding the scope of property subject to execution?
  • Is a formal review application required when a court corrects a clerical mistake or clarifies an order based on a party's statement?
  • Does a court have the authority to act on a statement by an intervenor narrowing the scope of their objection during execution proceedings?
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• Muharram vs The State1979 SCMR 34 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-27
  post-arrest bailmurder trialdiscretionary powerexpeditious trialco-accusedmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the refusal of the Sind High Court to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner, who is facing trial for murder. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion arbitrarily or perversely in denying bail to the petitioner while granting it to a co-accused. The Supreme Court observed that the First Information Report specifically attributed a head injury caused by a hockey stick to the petitioner, which was corroborated by medical evidence indicating serious head injuries. The Court held that the High Court’s refusal to grant bail was a valid exercise of discretion, as the mere fact that a co-accused received bail did not necessitate the same relief for the petitioner, especially given the distinct allegations against him. The Court affirmed that bail is a discretionary matter and found no error in the lower court's decision. However, acknowledging the petitioner's prolonged incarceration, the Court directed the trial court to expedite the proceedings, noting that the petitioner may re-apply for bail if inordinate delay persists.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of bail to a co-accused automatically entitle another accused to bail?
  • Is the refusal of bail by a High Court considered arbitrary when medical evidence supports specific allegations against the accused?
  • Can an accused re-apply for bail on the grounds of inordinate delay in the trial proceedings?
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• Muhammmd Luqman Mirza vs Summary Military Court No. 39, Rawalpindi1979 SCMR 283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-03
  Summary Military CourtMartial Law Regulationswrit jurisdictionreappraisal of evidenceprotest processionslogans against armed forcesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an Inter Court Appeal by the High Court, which had upheld the petitioner's conviction and sentence by a Summary Military Court under Martial Law Regulations 5, 13, and 33. The petitioner was convicted for participating in an unauthorized political protest procession and raising slogans against the armed forces. The core legal questions involved whether the conviction was sustainable on the evidence produced, whether the High Court could reappraise evidence in writ jurisdiction, and whether the proven acts constituted an offence under the cited Martial Law Regulations. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was based on proper and sufficient evidence appraised by the Military Court, that the High Court rightly declined to reappraise evidence in its writ jurisdiction, and that the petitioner's acts clearly fell within the mischief of Martial Law Regulations 5 and 13. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court reappraise evidence in writ jurisdiction against the conviction recorded by a Summary Military Court?
  • Whether participating in a political protest procession and raising slogans against the armed forces constitutes an offence under Martial Law Regulations 5 and 13?
  • Does a petition fail when the conviction is based on proper evidence and is not a case of no evidence?
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